2134/16727
Syeda Fatima
Syeda
Fatima
Tomasz Michalak
Tomasz
Michalak
Michael Wooldridge
Michael
Wooldridge
Bargaining for coalition structure formation
Loughborough University
2015
untagged
Information and Computing Sciences not elsewhere classified
2015-02-13 10:08:00
Conference contribution
https://repository.lboro.ac.uk/articles/conference_contribution/Bargaining_for_coalition_structure_formation/9405257
Many multiagent settings require a collection of agents
to partition themselves into coalitions. In such cases, the agents may
have conflicting preferences over the possible coalition structures
that may form. We investigate a noncooperative bargaining game to
allow the agents to resolve such conflicts and partition themselves
into non-overlapping coalitions. The game has a finite horizon and
is played over discrete time periods. The bargaining agenda is de-
fined exogenously. An important element of the game is a parameter
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 that represents the probability that bargaining ends
in a given round. Thus, δ is a measure of the degree of democracy
(ranging from democracy for δ = 0, through increasing levels of
authoritarianism as δ approaches 1, to dictatorship for δ = 1). For
this game, we focus on the question of how a player’s position on the
agenda affects his power. We also analyse the relation between the
distribution of the power of individual players, the level of democracy,
and the welfare efficiency of the game. Surprisingly, we find
that purely democratic games are welfare inefficient due to an uneven
distribution of power among the individual players. Interestingly,
introducing a degree of authoritarianism into the game makes
the distribution of power more equitable and maximizes welfare.