Garrod_et_al-2016-The_Journal_of_Industrial_Economics.pdf (276.39 kB)
Early settlement in Euopean merger control
We analyse the determinants of early settlement between merging parties
and the European Commission over remedies that remove concerns of anti-
comeptitive effects. This extends the previously narrow range of econometric
literature on early settlement. Consistent with the theory of early settlement,
our results confirm the importance of delay costs and of uncertainty, measured
by the complexity of the economic analysis required for each merger. We also find a non-monotonic effect of agency resourcing, which raises questions about
the Commission's efficiency in times of high case load. Econometrically, we
select a sample of merger decisions in which the European Commission intervened due to concerns of anticompetitive effects, and our selection model
provides estimates of the factors determining intervention by the Commission.
Conclusions are drawn for public policy.
History
School
- Business and Economics
Department
- Economics
Published in
Journal of Industrial EconomicsVolume
64Issue
1Pages
27 - 63Citation
GARROD, L. and LYONS, B., 2016. Early settlement in Euopean merger control. Journal of Industrial Economics, 64 (1), pp.27-63Publisher
Journal of Industrial Economics Editorial Board and John Wiley & Sons Ltd (© the authors)Version
- VoR (Version of Record)
Publisher statement
This work is made available according to the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Unported (CC BY 4.0) licence. Full details of this licence are available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Publication date
2016-04-26Notes
This is an Open Access Article. It is published by Wiley under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Unported Licence (CC BY). Full details of this licence are available at: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ISSN
0022-1821Publisher version
Language
- en