posted on 2020-04-30, 13:41authored byRicarda Bouncken, Mathew Hughes, Martin Ratzmann, Beate Cesinger, Robin Pesch
For family firms, alliances represent a form of heightened entrepreneurial risk-taking. However, a dearth of research exists on the implications of forms of alliance governance for family firms. In a study of 939 non-equity alliances of family and non-family firms, we analyse how contracts and trust influence mutual knowledge creation. Both contract completeness and trust assist non-family firms in knowledge creation. However, family firms rely on high levels of trust for the creation of knowledge. Knowledge creation suffers when family firms encounter very complete contracts tied to attempts at high levels of trust. The negative interaction effect is especially strong for non-owner-run family firms.
History
School
Business and Economics
Department
Business
Published in
British Journal of Management
Volume
31
Issue
4
Pages
769 - 791
Publisher
John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British Academy of Management
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution‐NonCommercial‐NoDerivs License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non‐commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.