UK_privatization_IJIO_resubmission_2.pdf (440.96 kB)
Objectives and incentives: Evidence from the privatisation of Great Britain's power plants
journal contribution
posted on 2019-01-22, 14:44 authored by Thomas TriebsThomas Triebs, Michael PollittDoes privatization increase plant productivity because the private owner’s objective is different, or because she is better able to control management? And, is
privatization sufficient to improve productivity, or is it only effective in combination
with competition? We answer these questions using the quasi-experiment of Great
Britain’s electricity industry privatization. To separate the effect of a change in objectives from a change in incentives we assume, that the former only affect labor but
not fuel productivity. And, assuming that effective competition was only introduced
after privatization, we are able to separately identify the effects of privatization and
competition. We find that privatization increased labor but not fuel productivity:
evidence for the importance of objectives. There is no evidence that the introduction of effective competition after privatization increased labor or fuel productivity:
evidence that privatization increases productivity by itself.
History
School
- Business and Economics
Department
- Economics
Published in
International Journal of Industrial OrganizationVolume
65Pages
1-29Citation
TRIEBS, T.P. and POLLITT, M., 2017. Objectives and incentives: Evidence from the privatisation of Great Britain's power plants. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 65, pp.1-29.Publisher
Elsevier BVVersion
- AM (Accepted Manuscript)
Publisher statement
This paper was accepted for publication in the journal International Journal of Industrial Organization and the definitive published version is available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.12.003Acceptance date
2018-12-19Publication date
2019-01-19Copyright date
2019Notes
This paper is in closed access until 19th Jan 2021.ISSN
0167-7187eISSN
1873-7986Publisher version
Language
- en