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posted on 30.03.2007by Vasileios Zikos
This paper examines how the duration of wage contracts influences innovation incentives, wages and employment. We find that wages are non-monotone in the duration of wage contracts. Furthermore, a positive and one-to-one relation between innovation and union utility exists and both attain their highest value under a long-term contract. Profits may vary depending on the extent of R&D spillovers and the associated raising rivals' cost incentive, although they are highest when union/firms engage in a long-term contractual relation. Testable predictions to discriminate between short-term and long-term contracts are also discussed.