Vegetarian eating

<p dir="ltr">Book Chapter, part of Handbook of Eating and Drinking</p><p dir="ltr">The philosophical literature is apparently replete with arguments for vegetarianism based on harm to animals. However, these are really arguments for veganism, not vegetarianism. This chapter explores whether we can say anything for vegetarianism. Some reasons motivating vegetarianism seem to be very personal, and so not the sorts of things that could be the foundation of a moral argument. Meanwhile, though they may hold some weight, arguments about vegetarianism as a “middle ground” between veganism and omnivorism are contingent, because, among other things, it is not clear that milk and egg production is less harmful than meat production. Both routes, then, seem unsatisfying for the vegetarian. Could there be a principled case for vegetarianism? Tzachi Zamir is the philosopher who has argued most explicitly for vegetarianism over veganism, but a close examination of his arguments show that they are not compelling. A final option remains open: There may be potential for arguments against eating animals’ flesh and/or their bodies that are independent of concerns about harms to animals in food production. Such arguments offer a critique of meat consumption, but not, necessarily, of egg and dairy consumption. They could perhaps form the basis of a principled case for vegetarianism that does not immediately become a case for veganism. The consequences of such an argument are not simple.</p>