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Download fileBargaining for coalition structure formation
conference contribution
posted on 2015-02-13, 10:08 authored by Syeda FatimaSyeda Fatima, Tomasz Michalak, Michael WooldridgeMany multiagent settings require a collection of agents
to partition themselves into coalitions. In such cases, the agents may
have conflicting preferences over the possible coalition structures
that may form. We investigate a noncooperative bargaining game to
allow the agents to resolve such conflicts and partition themselves
into non-overlapping coalitions. The game has a finite horizon and
is played over discrete time periods. The bargaining agenda is de-
fined exogenously. An important element of the game is a parameter
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 that represents the probability that bargaining ends
in a given round. Thus, δ is a measure of the degree of democracy
(ranging from democracy for δ = 0, through increasing levels of
authoritarianism as δ approaches 1, to dictatorship for δ = 1). For
this game, we focus on the question of how a player’s position on the
agenda affects his power. We also analyse the relation between the
distribution of the power of individual players, the level of democracy,
and the welfare efficiency of the game. Surprisingly, we find
that purely democratic games are welfare inefficient due to an uneven
distribution of power among the individual players. Interestingly,
introducing a degree of authoritarianism into the game makes
the distribution of power more equitable and maximizes welfare.
Funding
Tomasz Michalak & Michael Wooldridge were supported by the European Research Council under Advanced Grant 291528 (“RACE”)
History
School
- Science
Department
- Computer Science