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Collusion under imperfect monitoring with asymmetric firms

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posted on 2015-02-24, 16:32 authored by Luke GarrodLuke Garrod, Matthew Olczak
Collusion under imperfect monitoring with asymmetric firms

History

School

  • Business and Economics

Department

  • Economics

Published in

Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation, CRESSE

Pages

1 - 36 (36)

Citation

GARROD, L. and OLCZAK, M., 2014. Collusion under imperfect monitoring with asymmetric firms. CRESSE 2014: 9th International Conference on Competition and Regulation: Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation, Corfu, Greece, 4th-6th July 2014, 37pp.

Publisher

CRESSE

Version

  • AM (Accepted Manuscript)

Publisher statement

This work is made available according to the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) licence. Full details of this licence are available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Publication date

2014

Notes

This paper builds on Centre for Competition Policy Working Paper 10-3.

Publisher version

Language

  • en

Location

Corfu, Greece

Administrator link

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    Loughborough Publications

    Categories

    Keywords

    Capacity constraintsMergersCollusionImperfect monitoringEconomics not elsewhere classified

    Licence

    CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

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