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Security of two recent constant-round password authenticated group key exchange schemes

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conference contribution
posted on 17.12.2009, 10:15 by Raphael C.-W. Phan
When humans interact with machines in their daily networks, it is important that security of the communications is offered, and where the involved shared secrets used to achieve this are easily remembered by humans. Password-based authenticated group key exchange (PAGKE) schemes allow group users to share a session key based on a human-memorizable password. In this paper, we consider two PAGKE schemes that build on the seminal scheme of Burmester and Desmedt. Weshow an undetectable online dictionary attack on the first scheme, and exploit the partnering definition to break the key indistinguishability of the second scheme.

History

School

  • Mechanical, Electrical and Manufacturing Engineering

Citation

PHAN, R.C.-W., 2009. Security of two recent constant-round password authenticated group key exchange schemes. IN: International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications Workshops, (WAINA '09), Bradford, 26-29 May, pp. 134-139

Publisher

© IEEE

Version

VoR (Version of Record)

Publication date

2009

Notes

This is a conference paper [© IEEE]. It is also available at: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/ Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.

ISBN

9781424439997

Language

en