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Evolutionarily stable conjectures and other regarding preferences in duopoly games

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journal contribution
posted on 25.08.2017 by Ilkka Leppanen
We study the evolutionary selection of conjectures in duopoly games when players have other regarding preferences, i.e. preferences over payoff distributions. In both the Cournot and Bertrand duopoly games, the consistent conjectures are independent of other regarding preferences. Both duopoly games have evolutionarily stable conjectures that depend on other regarding preferences but that do not coincide with the consistent conjectures. For increasingly spiteful preferences, the evolutionarily stable conjectures implicate low quantities in the Cournot game and high prices in the Bertrand game, whereas the inverse relationships hold for the consistent conjectures. We discuss our findings in the context of ultimate and proximate causation.

History

School

  • Business and Economics

Department

  • Business

Published in

Journal of Evolutionary Economics

Volume

28

Issue

2

Pages

347-364

Citation

LEPPANEN, I., 2017. Evolutionarily stable conjectures and other regarding preferences in duopoly games. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 28(2), pp. 347–364.

Publisher

Springer Verlag (© the authors)

Version

VoR (Version of Record)

Publisher statement

This work is made available according to the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0) licence. Full details of this licence are available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Acceptance date

15/08/2017

Publication date

2017-08-26

Notes

This paper was published by Springer as Open Access. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.

ISSN

0936-9937

Language

en

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