The quality of corporate governance is influential to operating efficiency of a public firm and thereby affects the government’s privatization policies. Within a mixed duopoly market, this paper considers corporatization and related corporate governance improving in economic sense to show that the effects of public firm’s governance enhancement can be extracted out from the effects of privatization. More importantly, the optimal privatization policy should be a flexible instrument hinging on the extent of governance improvement. Scenarios with a less efficient or an equally efficient public firm are considered and the result holds in both scenarios. Hence policy implications apply.
Funding
National Council of Taiwan under Grant NSC102-2410-H-390-003-MY2
This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review (when applicable) and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40822-015-0025-6