posted on 2015-09-30, 16:02authored byDave Elder-Vass
Bridging two traditions of social ontology, this paper examines the possibility that the concept of collective intentionality can help to explain the mechanisms underpinning the causal powers of some social entities. In particular, I argue that a minimal form of collective intentionality is part of the mechanism underpinning the causal power of norm circles: the social entities causally responsible for social norms. There are, however, many different forms of social entity with causal power, and the relationship of collective intentionality to these causal powers varies, depending on the form of the mechanism underpinning the power concerned. Some powers depend on collective intentionality, and others do not.
History
School
Social Sciences
Department
Communication, Media, Social and Policy Studies
Published in
Journal of Social Ontology
Citation
ELDER-VASS, D., 2015. Collective intentionality and causal powers. Journal of Social Ontology, 1 (2), pp. 251-269.
This work is made available according to the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 Unported (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0) licence. Full details of this licence are available at: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
Publication date
2015
Notes
This is an Open Access article published by De Gruyter and licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0)