10.1007_s00191-017-0529-1.pdf (553.29 kB)
Download fileEvolutionarily stable conjectures and other regarding preferences in duopoly games
journal contribution
posted on 2017-08-25, 11:23 authored by Ilkka LeppanenWe study the evolutionary selection of conjectures in duopoly games when players have other regarding preferences, i.e. preferences over payoff distributions. In both the Cournot and Bertrand duopoly games, the consistent conjectures are independent of other regarding preferences. Both duopoly games have evolutionarily stable conjectures that depend on other regarding preferences but that do not coincide with the consistent conjectures.
For increasingly spiteful preferences, the evolutionarily stable conjectures implicate low quantities in the Cournot game and high prices in the Bertrand game, whereas the inverse relationships hold for the consistent conjectures. We discuss our findings in the context of ultimate and proximate causation.
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