Evolutionarily stable conjectures and other regarding preferences in duopoly games
journal contributionposted on 2017-08-25, 11:23 authored by Ilkka Leppanen
We study the evolutionary selection of conjectures in duopoly games when players have other regarding preferences, i.e. preferences over payoff distributions. In both the Cournot and Bertrand duopoly games, the consistent conjectures are independent of other regarding preferences. Both duopoly games have evolutionarily stable conjectures that depend on other regarding preferences but that do not coincide with the consistent conjectures. For increasingly spiteful preferences, the evolutionarily stable conjectures implicate low quantities in the Cournot game and high prices in the Bertrand game, whereas the inverse relationships hold for the consistent conjectures. We discuss our findings in the context of ultimate and proximate causation.
- Business and Economics
Published inJournal of Evolutionary Economics
CitationLEPPANEN, I., 2017. Evolutionarily stable conjectures and other regarding preferences in duopoly games. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 28(2), pp. 347–364.
PublisherSpringer Verlag (© the authors)
- VoR (Version of Record)
Publisher statementThis work is made available according to the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0) licence. Full details of this licence are available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
NotesThis paper was published by Springer as Open Access. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.