1-s2.0-S0167268115000724-main.pdf (925.26 kB)

Excludability: a laboratory study on forced ranking in team production

Download (925.26 kB)
journal contribution
posted on 06.11.2020, 15:19 by Rachel Croson, Enrique Fatas, Tibor Neugebauer, Antonio J Morales
Exclusion has long been employed as a common disciplinary measure against defectors, both at work and in social life. In this paper, we study the effect of excludability - exclusion of the lowest contributor - on contributions in three different team production settings. We demonstrate theoretically and experimentally that excludability increases contributions. Excludability is particularly effective in production settings where the average or maximum effort determines team production. In these settings, we observe almost immediate convergence to full contribution. In settings where the minimum effort determines team production, excludability leads to a large increase in contributions only if the value of the excluded individual's contribution to the public good is redistributed among the included individuals.

Funding

ESRC Network for Integrated Behavioural Science (NIBS)

National Research Fund of Luxembourg (F2R-368 LSF-PMA-13SYSB)

History

School

  • Business and Economics

Department

  • Economics

Published in

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Volume

114

Pages

13 - 26

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Version

VoR (Version of Record)

Rights holder

© The Authors

Publisher statement

This is an Open Access Article. It is published by Elsevier under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Licence (CC BY 4.0). Full details of this licence are available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Acceptance date

07/03/2015

Publication date

2015-03-14

Copyright date

2015

ISSN

0167-2681

Language

en

Depositor

Prof Enrique Fatas. Deposit date: 6 November 2020

Licence

Exports

Logo branding

Categories

Licence

Exports