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Petty corruption and citizen reports

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journal contribution
posted on 2022-04-05, 10:41 authored by Charles Angelucci, Antonio Russo
When offering incentive schemes to low-ranking officials, a tension exists between the dual goals of enforcing regulations and preventing corruption. Recent efforts to curb abuses have inspired government interest in using new communication technologies to collect information directly from citizens. We propose a model where a corruptible official is tasked with recommending the government to grant or deny the permit an entrepreneur needs to undertake production. The government tolerates corruption when it does not communicate directly with the entrepreneur. A simple scheme whereby the entrepreneur can report her own noncompliance to the government deters corruption and improves regulatory enforcement.

History

School

  • Business and Economics

Department

  • Economics

Published in

International Economic Review

Volume

63

Issue

2

Pages

831 - 848

Publisher

Wiley

Version

  • VoR (Version of Record)

Rights holder

© The Authors

Publisher statement

This is an Open Access Article. It is published by Wiley under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International Licence (CC BY-NC 4.0). Full details of this licence are available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

Acceptance date

2021-09-16

Publication date

2022-02-12

Copyright date

2022

ISSN

0020-6598

eISSN

1468-2354

Language

  • en

Depositor

Dr Antonio Russo. Deposit date: 23 November 2021

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