Sequential auctions for common value objects with budget constrained bidders
journal contributionposted on 2013-11-14, 15:14 authored by Syeda FatimaSyeda Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas R. Jennings
This paper analyzes sequential auctions for budget constrained bidders, for multiple heterogeneous common value objects. In most auctions, bidders not only have valuations for objects but also have budget constraints (i.e., constraints on how much they can actually spend in an auction). Given these constraints, the bidders' problem is to determine how much to bid in each auction. To this end, this paper analyzes the strategic behavior of bidders and determines the equilibrium bidding strategies for the individual auctions that constitute a series. We do this in an incomplete information setting where the bidders are uncertain about their budget constraints, and obtain equilibrium bidding strategies for the participants in individual auctions in a series.
- Computer Science
CitationFATIMA, S.S., WOOLDRIDGE, M. and JENNINGS, N.R., 2010. Sequential auctions for common value objects with budget constrained bidders. Multi-agent and Grid System, 6 (5,6), pp. 403 - 414.
Publisher© IOS Press
- AM (Accepted Manuscript)
NotesThis article was published in the journal, Multiagent and Grid Systems [© IOS Press] and the definitive version is available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/MGS-2010-0158