This article studies the influence of the European Parliament (EP) in the reform of the EU’s economic governance. Descriptively, it aims to provide a systematic map of the negotiations of the Six- and the Two-Pack legislation, focusing on the key controversies between the co-legislators, and comparing the position of the EP with the Commission’s legislative proposals, the Council position and the final legislative output. The surprisingly limited influence of the EP – given its formal powers and the assessment made by most scholars – is then assessed through rational choice and sociological institutionalist perspectives. While the more favourable BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement) of the Council could explain the outcome of the Two-Pack, and a norm of responsibility triggered by the crisis could account for the limited impact of the EP on the Six-Pack, the authors advance a different explanation. They suggest that in policy areas close to ‘core state powers’, such as budgetary surveillance, the member states still have a primary role to play. Despite the extension of codecision, the EP is expected to act within the boundaries that member states define. The authors’ policy-based explanation adds a new perspective on the study of the EP’s influence on EU law-making.
History
School
Loughborough University London
Published in
The Journal of Legislative Studies
Volume
24
Issue
1
Pages
72 - 89
Citation
BESSANELLI, E. and CHELOTTI, N., 2018. The European Parliament and economic governance: explaining a case of limited influence. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 24(1), pp. 72-89.
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of Legislative Studies on 16 March 2018, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/13572334.2018.1444627.