We explore the governance role of trusts in family firms and develop a typology that maps different configurations of boards and trustees with the longevity and efficiency of family firms. Suggestions are given for the proposed effects of these configurations, and comparisons are made with Carney, Gedajlovic, and Strike's “dead money” discussion. Recognition is given to the fact that the dynamics of family firms is inextricably linked to the life cycle of families, and that governance mechanisms need to react to changes and developments during the life cycle if the family firm is to be conserved.
- Loughborough University London
Published inEntrepreneurship Theory and Practice
Pagesn/a - n/a
CitationSCHOLES, L. and WILSON, N., 2014. The importance of family firm trusts in family firm governance. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 38 (6), pp. 1285–1293.
PublisherJohn Wiley & Sons, Inc. © Baylor University
VersionAM (Accepted Manuscript)
Publisher statementThis work is made available according to the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) licence. Full details of this licence are available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
NotesThis is the peer reviewed version of the following article: SCHOLES, L. and WILSON, N., 2014. The importance of family firm trusts in family firm governance. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 38 (6), pp. 1285–1293., which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/etap.12124. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.