The joy of ruling: an experimental investigation on collective giving
journal contributionposted on 22.03.2019, 15:13 by Enrique Fatas, Antonio J. Morales
We analyse team dictator games with different voting mechanisms in the laboratory. Individuals vote to select a donation for all group members. Standard Bayesian analysis makes the same prediction for all three mechanisms: participants should cast the same vote regardless of the voting mechanism used to determine the common donation level. Our experimental results show that subjects fail to choose the same vote. We show that their behaviour is consistent with a joy of ruling: individuals get an extra utility when they determine the voting outcome.
Funding from Fundación Ramón Areces, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Project ECO2014-52345-P) and the ESRC Network for an Integrated Behavioural Science (NIBS) is gratefully acknowledged.
- Business and Economics