The market for non-executive directors: Does acquisition performance influence future board seats?
journal contributionposted on 2018-02-08, 10:56 authored by Svetlana Mira, Marc Goergen, Noel O'SullivanNoel O'Sullivan
This paper investigates whether non-executive directors associated with good (bad) board decisions are subsequently rewarded (penalized) in the market for directors. This question is addressed by assessing whether the post-acquisition performance of acquiring companies influences the number of non-executive directorships that non-executives involved in these acquisitions hold subsequent to the acquisition. We find that non-executives on the boards of acquirers that increase (omit or cut) their dividend subsequently hold more (fewer) non-executive directorships in listed companies. Our findings suggest that the non-executive labor market is efficient and rewards (penalizes) non-executives for good (bad) acquisitions.
- Business and Economics
Published inBritish Journal of Management
Pages415 - 436
CitationMIRA, S., GOERGEN, M. and O'SULLIVAN, N., 2018. The market for non-executive directors: Does acquisition performance influence future board seats?. British Journal of Management, 30 (2), pp.415-436.
PublisherJohn Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British Academy of Management © The Authors
- VoR (Version of Record)
Publisher statementThis work is made available according to the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) licence. Full details of this licence are available at: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
NotesThis is an Open Access article. It is published by Wiley under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International Licence (CC BY-NC 4.0). Full details of this licence are available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/