This article analyses the role of the European Council in two key
legislative packages on economic and budgetary coordination,
the Six-pack and the Two-pack, which were negotiated under the
ordinary legislative procedure. It assesses how and to what extent
the key actor in the literature on the new intergovernmentalism – the
European Council – is able to curb the powers of the supranational
institutions – the Commission and the European Parliament – in a
policy area where the community method has been applied since
the Treaty of Lisbon. It tracks the development of the legislative
negotiations – from the stages preceding the Commission’s proposal
to their conclusions, relying on official documents, press reports and
30 original interviews with key decision-makers. The strong role of
the European Council both as an agenda-setter and in the legislative
negotiations stands out, and suggests that the implications of new
intergovernmentalism may well extend beyond intergovernmental
decision-making processes.
History
School
Loughborough University London
Published in
Journal of European Integration
Volume
Volume 38
Issue
Issue 5
Pages
511 - 525
Citation
BRESSANELLI, E. and CHELOTTI, N., 2016. The shadow of the European Council: understanding legislation on economic governance. Journal of European Integration, 38(5), pp.511-525.
Publisher
Informa UK
Version
AM (Accepted Manuscript)
Publisher statement
This work is made available according to the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) licence. Full details of this licence are available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Publication date
2016-07-19
Notes
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Integration on 19 July 2016, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/07036337.2016.1178251.