posted on 2019-03-22, 14:56authored byAitor Ciarreta, Enrique Fatas, Nikolaos Georgantzis, Carlos Gutierrez-Hita
We analyze a realistic simulation of a complex electricity network. We obtain the data with a series of experimental sessions designed to closely replicate the Spanish electricity market. In the experiments reported here we compare the status quo with two alternative regulatory market structures. In one of them, labeled as vertical separation, we impose that power generating firms and electricity distributors operate as independent business groups. In the second, we study the effect of entry by independent end-suppliers. Both alternative scenarios dominate the status quo in terms of market efficiency, but the latter of them dominates the former.
Funding
Authors thank the NET Institute (www.NETinst.org) for financial support. Aitor Ciarreta would like to acknowledge financial support from Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (ECO2015-64467-R, MINECO/FEDER) and Gobierno Vasco (IT783-13). Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita would like to acknowledge financial support from Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad through the project “Strategic management on complex systems with multiplicity of agents” (Ref: MTM2014-54199-P.).
History
School
Business and Economics
Department
Economics
Published in
Electric Power Systems Research
Volume
143
Pages
728 - 738
Citation
CIARRETA, A. ... et al, 2017. Vertical separation vs. independent downstream entry in an electricity network: Experimental insights. Electric Power Systems Research, 143, pp.728-738.
This work is made available according to the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) licence. Full details of this licence are available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Acceptance date
2016-10-13
Publication date
2016-11-04
Notes
This paper was published in the journal Electric Power Systems Research and the definitive published version is available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.epsr.2016.10.034.