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Central bank independence and inflation: the case of Greece.

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posted on 21.11.2005, 14:41 authored by Theodore Panagiotidis, Afroditi Triampella
This paper investigates the argument for Central Bank Independence (CBI) in the case of Greece. Using a time series approach and the last data available before Greece joined the EMU, the hypothesis that central bank independence is important for controlling inflation is examined. Employing two indices, which serve as proxies for CBI, LegalCBI and TOR, the inverse relationship between CBI and inflation was confirmed. The interactions between the variability of inflation and CBI were also investigated. Furthermore, evidence was found to suggest that the rate of turnover Granger causes inflation.

History

School

  • Business and Economics

Department

  • Economics

Pages

966034 bytes

Publication date

2005

Notes

This is a working paper.

Language

en

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