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Regulatory protection when firms move first

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posted on 11.01.2010 by Huw Edwards
I investigate the imposition of a horizontal technical barrier to trade (HTBT) in a symmetric, cross-hauling duopoly. Tariffs and subsidies are ruled out, but, in the absence of a mutual recognition agreement, it is possible for governments to impose HTBTs, so long as firms apply different technologies. If firms are first movers, this possibility may induce them to avoid technical collaboration, in order to tempt governments into creating local monopolies, except where spillovers and R&D effects are high. This exacerbates the costs of regulatory protection, compared to standard models without R&D or spillovers.

History

School

  • Business and Economics

Department

  • Economics

Publisher

© Loughborough University

Version

VoR (Version of Record)

Publication date

2009

Notes

This is a working paper. It is also available at: http://ideas.repec.org/p/lbo/lbowps/2009_19.html

ISSN

1750-4171

Book series

Loughborough University. Department of Economics. Discussion Paper Series;WP 2009 - 19

Language

en

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