Regprot.pdf (236.68 kB)
Download fileRegulatory protection when firms move first
I investigate the imposition of a horizontal technical barrier to trade (HTBT) in a symmetric, cross-hauling duopoly. Tariffs and subsidies are ruled out, but, in the absence of a mutual recognition agreement, it is possible for governments to impose HTBTs, so long as firms apply different technologies. If firms are first movers, this possibility may induce them to avoid technical collaboration, in order to tempt governments into creating local monopolies, except where spillovers and R&D effects are high. This exacerbates the costs of regulatory protection, compared to standard models without R&D or spillovers.
History
School
- Business and Economics
Department
- Economics
Publisher
© Loughborough UniversityVersion
- VoR (Version of Record)
Publication date
2009Notes
This is a working paper. It is also available at: http://ideas.repec.org/p/lbo/lbowps/2009_19.htmlISSN
1750-4171Book series
Loughborough University. Department of Economics. Discussion Paper Series;WP 2009 - 19Language
- en