

Introduction

Ireland and the EEC: past, present and future¹

In an address he delivered on 15 October 1963 from the White House lawn, on a theme he regularly targeted at Irish people whether in Ireland or the United States of America (US), US president John F. Kennedy told his gathered guests that 'you are building a vigorous, new country which looks to the past with pride and the future with hope'.² The point was simple enough: in living for the present and looking to the future, Ireland must not be dominated by its past; the government and nation would need to be far-sighted if this was to be achieved. This text focuses on *Protectionism to Liberalisation: Ireland and the EEC, 1957 to 1966*. Thus, the purpose of this introduction is simply to present a coherent and cohesive framework in which Ireland's historic relationship with the European Economic Community (EEC), specifically in the decade after the latter's foundation and initial entrenchment, is keenly examined. This presentation endeavours to fulfil that task in a thoroughly straightforward manner, with the function of this first section being to introduce the analytical and contextual approach within which this text operates, primarily in an effort to establish why this particular subject was chosen, but also in order to explain how this piece of research has been explored. It assesses the means that were employed in this text under four distinct headed sections:

- making some opening remarks about the delineation of this analysis;
- prior to demonstrating the validity of choosing Ireland as an individual case study, while defining the specific timeframe;
- before evaluating the methodological approach employed;
- then explaining the structure, while raising obvious and not so obvious questions, pinpointing specific problems, defining several intermediate conclusions, and generally outlining the direction taken by this exploration into Ireland's earliest links with the EEC.

These elements become more apparent as this introduction itself progresses.

It is the Irish government's own official up-to-date view of why the country originally applied to enter the EEC as a full member, however, which serves as the ideal prelude to this study. Prepared on the topic of 'The European Union and the new Europe' as a component of its formal contribution to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, this recent document stated that two fundamental considerations underlay the momentous decision, taken in the summer of 1961 by the taoiseach (Irish prime minister) and his cabinet, for Ireland to attempt – vainly, as it happens – to join the EEC. This assessment asserts that:

- 'it was believed that membership would provide the conditions in which Ireland could best pursue its economic and social development and would offer the best prospect for the protection and promotion of living standards in this country';
- 'it was felt that membership would enable us to participate fully with other democratic and like-minded countries in the movement towards European unity, based on the ideals and objectives to which Ireland as a nation could readily subscribe'.³

This text proves that, throughout the 1960s, there was much more to Ireland's proclivity for full membership than this bland modern assessment might at first imply. Indeed, the research presented here firmly places this analysis regarding relations with the EEC between the years 1957 and 1966 into the broader context of the country's experience of European integration in the decades following the Second World War, as successive Irish governments decisively moved away from a political to an economic basis when formulating foreign policy.⁴

Of course, bilateral Anglo-Irish relations have remained of paramount importance to Ireland in the latter half of the twentieth-century. Although not very original, this statement does recognise that this crucial relationship must be constantly borne fully in mind, as it is rather central to a deeper understanding of Ireland's ties with the EEC, whether that question is explored in economic or in political terms. As one celebrated Irish historian, J.J.Lee, has succinctly stated, the potential for the evolution of a patron-client relationship, or even for an inferiority complex to develop, between the United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland has never been beyond the realms of possibility.⁵ Concurrently, the *Economist* has made a particularly pertinent point which should not be ignored; it states that:

For centuries, Ireland defined itself in relation to Britain, as a victim. If its

much larger neighbour was not subjecting it to physical oppression, then it was wounding its pride with arrogance and condescension. This strain of thinking has by no means disappeared ... but it is far less prominent than before. These days, Ireland has bigger concerns. It defines itself in relation to Europe: an association of nations in which it is recognised as an equal.⁶

Thus, the UK has become a partner for Ireland, if undoubtedly still its foremost; nonetheless, it is only one concern amongst many, no longer necessarily defining Irish identity.

However, despite the relative merits of evaluations and interpretations past and present of Ireland's position within the European setting, it was found in the course of this research that one of the key issues boiled down to answering a relatively simple inquiry:

- Why should Ireland's relationship with the EEC in the period 1957 to 1966 be considered as an appropriate case study for further analysis within the context of European integration history?

In giving an answer to this specific proposition, this introduction was not necessarily intended as some sort of justification for making this particular subject choice. Indeed, illustrating the aptness of choosing Irish-EEC relations, as a matter worthy of inquiry in their own right, has its innate origins more in the realm of presenting an *apropos* explanation, regarding where this piece of history fits into the current state of the historical literature and research on the issue of Ireland and Europe, rather than acting as an *apologia*. Consequently, the question became: what is the validity of choosing Ireland as a case study? It is not difficult to explain logically or, if compelled, to defend vigorously the reasons why it proved to be a particularly suitable subject to select in furthering a better awareness of integration history or to demonstrate how it turned out to be as atypical as, though no more so than, any other case study. The fact is that there has been an ever-growing need in Irish history for cabinet, departmental and inter-governmental debates on its European integration experience to be thoroughly analysed.⁷

The essential theoretical point to be kept in mind during the course of this analysis is that Ireland revealed itself to be an excellent example of a semi-peripheral, underdeveloped and dependent state in the second post-war decade, subsisting within a regional/continental economic structure on the one hand, while, moreover, obviously existing within the broader global economy on the other. It went from a position of not being able to take on the full obligations of burgeoning continental free trade in 1957 to being in a Free Trade Area (FTA) with its main market less than a decade later.⁸ Within this relatively

short space of time, an innovative government jettisoned accepted economic and political dogma to embark upon a fundamentally new foreign policy direction; this was partly because of national preferences being exercised in the face of continental and global economic change, partly as a result of Ireland's ability or inability to negotiate better trading conditions with its neighbours, near and far.⁹ The speed of this reorientation and the arguments which advanced or took away from its cause are wholly investigated as this text unfolds, so that the principal supposition – as outlined above – is comprehensively tested.

In this context, the value of any one theorist's work is obviously onerous for historians to determine until it is actually applied; this is attempted in the opening chapter, before being pursued thereafter in the main body of the text.¹⁰ Even then, although it was found that certain parts of a political science theory might apply when others did not, the possibility of using such theories, which in themselves are often more generalised than specific in form, was not excluded. Thus, this text has not slavishly attempted to fit an Irish case study into any one single hypothesis. Nonetheless, even if this examination does not allude to being entirely aware, for example, of all the finer points of past or current debates on core/periphery or dependency theories, their use has still had some benefit. Indeed, in spite of that inherently problematic consideration, this investigation into the history of Irish relations with the EEC in the early years of the latter's development accordingly connoted an ideal opportunity to try to apply such theories. The technique employed consequently does two different things, presenting a Marxist paradigm within which this analysis is placed and, to a lesser extent, utilising a more liberal vein in its evaluation; this is not necessarily a revisionist argument, as the release of archival material has also allowed a certain degree of primary vision that was previously lacking. In doing so, it coincidentally confirms how and why Ireland had made for a good case study within which European integration history may be examined. With theoretical considerations such as those cited perpetually in mind, coming as they do from quite opposite perspectives, perhaps it is more profitable at an early stage in this investigation to deal in a categorical fashion with the great difficulties intrinsic in employing a comparative case study, thus leaving more theoretical issues to the first chapter.

A 'singular' case study and its timeframe¹¹

It is imperative to explain why a comparative case study was not extensively employed in the course of this research without any further procrastination, as

it might well be argued that one would readily have placed into a more comprehensive context the specific situation pertaining to Ireland. Therefore, prior to delineating the timeframe of this analysis, this portion of the introduction presents a brief dismissal of the merits of a comparative study in this particular instance. In revealing why no definitive comparison was undertaken, this explanation actually helps to solve one of the many problems that faced this research at its outset, as it included making a choice, if any, between a variety of possible comparative case studies. Indeed, an assortment of alternatives were suggested as parallel analyses, but each of these suggestions invariably revealed similar complications; basically, none of the recommendations proffered for this task were found to be practical in fully appraising Ireland's integration experience on the national front or on the international stage, with each presenting impediments that would evidently have limited the ultimate scope of this investigation in utilising the relevant material that was more widely accessible.¹² Yet, this decision to concentrate on Ireland has presented both clear advantages and obvious disadvantages.

With these obstacles firmly in mind, Denmark was seriously considered as a distinctly promising option, but ultimately it was determined that an exhaustive examination was not appropriate; Denmark therefore only acts as a sort of 'shadow comparison', that is a reference point to which Ireland is compared and contrasted.¹³ Another nation – New Zealand – is also utilised in this regard, but mostly as a means of contrasting its experience with that of Ireland rather than acting strictly as a comparison.¹⁴ Thus, neither instance detracts from the central focus of this analysis, Ireland's relations with the EEC. This investigation has concentrated precisely on that relationship mainly because an academic analysis of this nature has not been carried out in this way before now. Indeed, it is set in a more international dimension than might be implied by the title and thereby concerns domestic and external aspects regarding relations with the EEC, helping to put Ireland's world position into a clearer context.¹⁵ It is not limited to a national framework, but concentrates on broader international aspects instead, specifically at the European level. Although this research is based on Irish archives and Ireland, it still provides a study that, in many ways, mirrors the experiences of other states on the economic, political and geographic periphery of Europe, some of whom joined these continental organisations in time, others which did not. Consequently, the archival work focused its attention on materials directly related to the subject at hand; this very point is explained in some depth in the next section after some remarks regarding the timeframe.

The period covered by this text encompasses the premierships of Éamon de Valera and Seán Lemass in the years between 1957 and 1966.

Without going into terrible detail, this section briefly now explains why certain subjects were chosen within the context of Ireland's EEC relations in the second post-war decade. It is immediately apparent, however, that they concentrate on specific crisis periods in Dublin's experience of the integration process. Each turning-point subsequently constitutes the basis for a different episode, its causes and effects, to be explored. These crises range from Ireland's participation in the negotiations for a wider FTA in Europe – sponsored by the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) from 1956 – and the subsequent creation of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1959, to the Irish government's application for full EEC membership in 1961, before extending to the French president's refusal in 1963 of the UK government's bid to participate in the EEC; it then moves from the signing of the Anglo-Irish FTA agreement in 1965 through to the eve of the second application in 1967. This chronological approach, centred as it is on particular crises, is best illustrated in the chapters themselves, the structures of which are explained in the last section of this introduction. Implications resulting from Ireland's experiences of these events are therefore pursued in some detail – relations with the EEC, the effects on trade, Irish neutrality – themes that are elaborated upon more precisely as the research itself progresses and which thus reoccur throughout the central text.

A concise explanation of the general timeframe involved is useful at this juncture as it also helps to explain further what is significant about Ireland as a case study in the context of European integration. This examination covers a decade which specifically encompasses the work of two taoisigh (Irish prime ministers) because this provides a convenient period for analysis, taking in as it does the terms of three governments. An assessment of the influence of these two men on Ireland's European policy has proven profitable as it goes to the heart of this investigation, although historians always have to be careful to make sure that research such as this does not become solely person-orientated, a trap of reification into which it is all too easy to fall. At the same time, however, the perceptions of informed historians regarding central personalities who played exceptionally significant roles in the course of Irish-European affairs still have to be borne in mind; admittedly, this line of investigation has considerable benefits therefore. As was previously noted, the more significant events in the time period around which this text has been constructed include the following:

- the formation of the EEC, plus the aforementioned FTA negotiations, ultimately concluding in EFTA's creation;
- Ireland's first bid to participate fully in the EEC;

- the refusal of the UK application for membership and, by extension, that of the Irish as well;
- the signing of an Anglo-Irish FTA agreement.

Around these landmark events, the central chapters are forged. No single development turned out to be more symbolic though than the opening of Ireland's diplomatic mission to the EEC; it was originally combined with its Belgian mission at Brussels in 1959, but seven years later finally became a separate diplomatic entity.¹⁶ The representational advantages deriving from this initiative should not be underrated in the context of European integration because, in turn, any accruing benefits became much more substantive. The issue of diplomatic relations appropriately emerges as a theme which recurs throughout this analysis.

Of course, this history has previously been recounted in an authoritative analysis by D.J.Maher entitled *The tortuous path: the course of Ireland's entry into the EEC, 1948-73*, which has since proved to be a seminal text for students of Ireland's European integration.¹⁷ There have been other important publications on this subject – including Miriam Hederman's detailed account of *The road to Europe: Irish attitudes, 1948-61*, and Dermot Keogh's indepth examination of *Ireland and Europe, 1919-1989: a diplomatic history* – critical appraisals of which are presented in more detail in a subsequent literature survey.¹⁸ However, it is worth noting that, in his excellent *Irish foreign policy and the European Community: a study of the impact of interdependence in the foreign policy of a small state*, Paul Sharp has put forward the particularly germane theory regarding Ireland's position that:

... [the] Irish government pursue[d] a policy of international role-playing after Ireland became a member of the UN in 1956; and ... this policy continued after Ireland became a member of the European Economic Community.¹⁹

This statement has to be put into the context of Europe's view of Ireland because it is quite clear that economics soon became a more important basis for making decisions. For example, as stated in *La construction de l'Europe*, Pierre Gerbet's opinion – that Ireland was effectively in an economic union with the UK from which it could not disentangle itself – gives added credence to the economic reality of Anglo-Irish relations, while at the same time suggesting the gravity of French president Charles de Gaulle's decision to veto the UK's application for full EEC membership in January 1963.²⁰ Opinions on the subject abound.

If a considerable amount of information is readily available, an obvious question must thus be posed and answered: how innovative or relevant can this particular piece of research on Irish relations with the EEC between 1957 and 1966 actually be? A considered response to this inquiry is partially to be found in the ensuing section on methodological techniques, as well as through an archival appraisal.²¹ Indeed, a rebuttal of this question's validity is followed in the final segment of this introduction by a detailed structural breakdown, along with the submission of some intermediate remarks; it then proceeds onto the opening chapter, essentially an examination of Ireland as a small power and peripheral detailing the theoretical context within which this case study fits. First things first, however, as this next section boils down to answering a central question: what methodological approach is taken to confirm the originality of this material?

Methodological approach

This text explains Irish government attitudes towards European integration in the second post-war decade by concentrating on crisis points or flashpoints; it does so in a fairly subject-oriented manner concerning Dublin's decision-making processes. By necessity, the central themes of this study are concentrated on economic matters, but they deal with other tenets when relevant too, be they of a cultural, diplomatic, ideological, military, political, or social nature. Changes in foreign policy as a corollary of economic realities or political exigencies thus became the 'dependent variable' upon which the rest of this investigation hangs. In the mid-1950s, the reserved views held by de Valera – then in opposition as leader of Fianna Fáil, Ireland's largest political party – on the value of European integration were subsequently even more notable for having been in such marked contrast to the dynamically evolving and, with time, very favourable attitude of his replacement. Speaking in 1955, the former firmly held to his belief that it would be:

... unwise for our people to enter into a political federation which would mean that you had a European Parliament deciding the economic circumstances ... of our life here.²²

His successor was better able to adapt his political views to changing economic circumstances and, indeed, to the grim realities which faced the country, the latter's realism contrasting with the former's parochialism. In 1961, Lemass rather convincingly declared that:

... if all the countries of Europe with which we are trading, Britain and the Six, join together in an economic union, we cannot be outside it.²³

Miscellaneous 'independent variables' – including factors both external and internal, such as diplomatic relations, emigration, domestic politics, trade with the UK – provided the scope within which to realise the aim of concentrating on certain major developments.

The pursuit of these goals was based on an assessment of readily available archives, which was coupled with a comprehensive assessment of influential secondary source material. The primary sources used during this research were based on four main sets of archives, each one fulfilling a certain defined purpose. The reasoning behind these sources reads as follows:

- domestic political considerations and Irish foreign policy – the National Archives at Bishop Street in Dublin (NA);
- various features of Anglo-Irish bilateral relations – the Public Record Office at Kew Gardens in London (PRO);
- the wider Irish diaspora – the presidential libraries of Harry S.Truman at Independence in Missouri (HST), Dwight D.Eisenhower at Abilene in Kansas (DDE), John F.Kennedy at Boston in Massachusetts (JFK), and Lyndon B.Johnson at Austin in Texas (LBJ);
- Ireland's process of European integration – the European Community Archives at the Villa Il Poggiolo in Florence (ACE) and the European Parliament at the Bâtiment Robert Schuman in Luxembourg (PE).

This approach was adopted because it was found that Ireland's relationship with the EEC was influenced by four chief factors, each of which is discussed by means of liberally employing information that came from these sets of complementary sources; it might be noted that the Irish records turned out to be the most useful, not surprising given the subject matter. Each investigative angle is comprehensively dealt with in the bibliography and in turn coupled with an indication of its relative merits regarding Ireland's process of European policy-making; as stated, an in-depth assessment of the current state of the literature regarding this subject was also established as being helpful in putting this research into its proper perspective.²⁴

The employment of archival material has obviously helped to negate the dangers of viewing history in hindsight because, in contemplating day-to-day governmental concerns, the *ad hoc* character of much of the decision-making process was clearly shown. This method had more to do with chronicling daily concerns at certain moments rather than trying to put Ireland

into a larger context which it did not necessarily occupy. In addition, this approach prevented value judgements from being made, providing a superior perspective and rational explanation of actions taken, as well as the viewpoints conceived, in this period. Of course, a full awareness had to be maintained that this material was often penned with other purposes in mind. The documentation analysed thus includes speeches written for public consumption and, understandably in that respect, frequently found that these documents were essentially justificatory. This study concentrates on private memoranda from ministers to civil servants and *vice versa*, communications that might alternatively be viewed as cajoling or informing, persuading or even vaguely threatening, in nature and tone. The wealth of recently released resources – not always written with self-justifying motives in mind, but with the development of policy – were supplemented by informal interviews with protagonists, though only to clarify points rather than to construct oral memoirs. The rationale in utilising these specific materials has therefore been worked out in detail and with some care.

The introduction opened with a relatively short section which posed a central question asking why did Ireland attempt to participate in the EEC and why this question is important. It moved on to explore the benefits of choosing this country as a case study by advancing a loose theoretical framework within which this examination operates before then surveying the timeframe within which it sits. Subsequently, in appraising the value of the primary source materials utilised and explaining how this research compliments and consequently extends the current state of secondary literature on the subject of *Ireland and the EEC, 1957 to 1966*, the methodological approach that was adopted has also been briefly analysed. It now concludes with a detailed structural overview of this text's central chapters; although they are in no way definitive, some intermediate concluding remarks are also made before these observations then run into the text. Additionally, this initial synopsis concludes with an attempt to trace the evolving nature of this study; six years of research have culminated in the presentation of these arguments, but doing justice to that is the purpose of the main body of this text.

Structural overview: the major issues at a glance

The purpose of this structural outline is to give some idea as to how this text operates. There are more questions than answers at this stage of the introduction; however, it is crucial to leave anything more than intermediate conclusions to the central text. Of course, it would be a mistake to have had

any pre-conceived notions about where Ireland's relations with the EEC fitted into the European integration context. Nevertheless, the questions that must be answered are still fairly obvious; for instance, with regard to Ireland's exclusion from EFTA, the need to analyse in more detail why the UK government was intent on freezing Ireland out was a major issue and one that proved to be particularly arduous to answer. In turn, other more general questions which were raised during this research have included: what did Ireland feel that the EEC could help it to achieve and what could Ireland offer in return? In addition, how did Ireland prepare for this dramatic economic change and how did it view its future prospects within that organisation? Also, what economic and political paths did the Dublin government take after its initial EEC membership bid was refused? In truth, these questions multiplied as the research began to make more progress; their answers become more apparent as the chapters themselves open up, as the archives are fully assessed, and as the documentary evidence is itself presented.

Within this short explanation of how the text works, one central point needs to be repeated: Ireland's relative position in Europe and the world in general needs to be considered with its nearest neighbour constantly in mind. This introduction next blends into a relatively concise first chapter – *Small power and peripheral: Ireland in the 1950s* – the objective of which is fairly self-explanatory from its title. In fact, it is primarily employed as a means of placing Ireland in a proper historical context – both in domestic economic and political terms, but also regarding how it related to the UK, within and without a European framework, as well as its actual position in Europe and in relation to the world at large, including the two post-war superpowers, the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Thus, by reinforcing an essential idea that has already been raised – during the late 1950s and early to mid-1960s, Ireland's remodelled foreign policy accommodated changes in Europe so that it had an economically, rather than a politically, oriented outlook which took account of the Six and the UK – it gives a greater sense of theoretical perspective to the subject here.

The second chapter – *From the OEEC to EFTA, 1957 to 1959* – follows up on this review of the mid-1950s by concentrating upon one particular crisis point, Ireland's exclusion from EFTA as principally effected by the UK government. In describing some of the implications of the creation of EFTA for Irish policies towards European integration, this chapter goes further into the realm of theorising rather than just stating facts. Heretofore, in terms of historical research on Ireland's experience of integration, little emphasis has been placed on the late 1950s; this chapter does something to alleviate that position. Indeed, this text argues that the full implications of

EFTA's creation for Ireland have not been properly investigated before; as a direct consequence, many of its effects have thus far been largely ignored. Additionally, this chapter is also a particularly fine example of a crisis point in the history of Ireland's integration into the EEC and for that reason alone – due in part to the fact that such instances are usually considerably revealing, thereby giving a certain focus to what might otherwise have been a sprawling narrative – demonstrates itself to be a practical starting point for this research. Furthermore, within this chapter is an assessment of the significance of the UK's markets as the main conduit for Irish exports and, conversely and intriguingly, Ireland's importance as a market for goods originating in the UK.

At this stage, a third chapter – *Ireland's first EEC application, 31 July 1961* – deals principally with the lead-up to the decision by the Irish government to apply for membership of the EEC in the summer of 1961. This chapter concentrates on the determining processes which led to that decision and analyses two documents in detail, a government White Paper entitled *European Economic Community* and a subsequent *aide-mémoire* that was distributed to the six EEC member states. However, it extends beyond the request itself to the decision taken by the EEC Council in October 1962 to accept the Irish application to negotiate entry, even if only provisionally, thus exploring the paranoia felt at Irish government level regarding the relative lack of progress in the intervening eighteen months before this decision. In turn, it traces how Ireland viewed the UK and the Six, as well as how they saw the former.

Meanwhile, the next chapter – *De Gaulle's refusal of the UK, 14 January 1963* – carries on from there to explore the period prior to and implications of the French president's decision to veto the UK government's application for full EEC membership in the early days of 1963. Once again, Ireland's application to enter the EEC and de Gaulle's refusal can be termed flashpoints for the Dublin government, providing an excellent opportunity to assess its crisis management capabilities, that is how it coped with difficult situations. This fourth chapter subsequently offers an extremely valuable opportunity to explore why, out of the three European Communities (EC), Ireland was really only interested in the EEC; it is immediately apparent that for Dublin neither the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) nor the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) held any real attraction. Therefore, it leads into an exploration of what course of action was decided upon as the prospect of a return to the 'wilderness' years of the 1950s loomed.

The fifth chapter – *The 1965 Anglo-Irish FTA agreement* – concentrates on the lead-up to the signing of this bilateral FTA agreement rather than dealing comprehensively with its implications and aftermath,

because it is the earlier period which is most revealing in the context of Ireland's European integration. A lack of alternative economic options for Dublin, coupled with the beneficial economic development opportunities offered and, indeed, restraints imposed by this new agreement, make for an especially interesting analysis when Ireland's ongoing preparations for EEC entry are considered. The options from which it could choose are evaluated, as well as the actions taken. This harsh grounding in international economic reality continued for some time after Lemass's resignation in November 1966, ultimately only bearing fruit in January 1973 with Ireland's eventual accession to the EEC.

Finally, in the main body of the text, there is a further review chapter which is more abstract in form – *Ireland's European integration, 1957 to 1966*. This essay is combined and interweaved with the conclusions, before a series of useful appendices holding central documents and statistical tables are presented. The sixth chapter attempts to assess the progress made in Ireland's European integration policy during this decade, comparing and contrasting advances made in politics and economics with detailed interpretations linked to a series of illustrative graphs charting changes in the country's orientation. In this context, bilateral relations with Northern Ireland, the state of the Irish nation, and the personalities intimately involved in this continuously evolving reality are all thoroughly analysed; the sixth chapter draws to a close by looking to the future, a theme reinforced via brief conclusions on the question: why did Ireland's first application fail? Although necessarily a detailed list, the ensuing sections of the text present an extensive bibliography of relevant archival materials and secondary sources, even if the main matter used in the course of this research has already been briefly appraised during this introduction. Other subjects have understandably been dealt with in the course of this research and these have been intertwined with the text.²⁵

Clearly, in order to put Ireland into its proper context, its internal economic, political and social workings, as well as relations with its neighbours far and wide, must be outlined. Central to the 'tortuous' course that Dublin followed throughout this era was the fact that its path ran for the most part parallel to – even if it sometimes went counter to or was hidden and meandered from – that of London. Certain decisions and developments outside of its control meant that it had to put its national position into an international perspective. Just like the UK once it decided that it would try to enter the EEC, it became more apparent over time that, if Ireland was ever going to join the Western European mainstream, it must:

... follow an extremely straight and narrow path, maintaining the true objective, overcoming disappointments, above all resisting the temptations of

plausible but inadequate alternatives.²⁶

This history retraces that process in Ireland's case, specifically for the decade that stretched from 1957 to 1966, but obviously it is necessary to begin with something of more immediate import. Therefore, the first chapter on *Small power and peripheral: Ireland in the 1950s* goes much more deeply into the theoretical aspects of this text, as well as providing detailed background to the subject of Ireland's relations with the rest of Europe, and raises the kind of issues that continually recur through the central chapters which then follow.

Notes

- 1 Throughout this text, the constitutionally-based term 'Ireland' is utilised to denote the Republic of Ireland; this terminology does not carry any political connotation as it expresses the country's name as used by the government in its relations with organisations such as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and beyond, including its relations with countries like the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK), the United States of America (US), and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Please note that abbreviations are extensively used throughout these footnotes and that the fullest form of each new reference is given when first utilised.
- 2 Among the dignitaries was Seán Lemass, the Irish prime minister. On many other occasions, John F.Kennedy (US president) made similar statements; for instance, on 28 June 1963, he declared in his famous oration Dáil Éireann (Irish lower parliamentary house): 'I sincerely believe that your future is as promising as your past is proud'; he quoted William Butler Yeats in making an oblique reference to the UK's unremitting links with Ireland: 'Let us not casually reduce the great past to a trouble of fools, for we need not feel the bitterness of the past to discover its meaning for the present and the future'. During his Irish visit that summer, he also stated: '[In Ireland] the past [is] very real and has made the present very hopeful'. M.FitzGerald, *Irish-American diplomatic relations, 1948 to 1963* (Cork: unpublished University College Cork (UCC) MPhil thesis, 1997), pp. 194-6 & 205; Kennedy oration delivered in Dáil Éireann, 28 June 1963, *Public papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F.Kennedy 1963* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 534-9; Kennedy speech given in Limerick, 29 June 1963, *John F.Kennedy 1963*, p. 541; Kennedy address delivered in Washington DC, 15 October 1963, *John F.Kennedy 1963*, p. 784.
- 3 Ireland's contribution to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference entitled 'The European Union and the new Europe', European Parliament document PE165.980, European Parliament, Bâtiment Robert Schuman, Luxembourg (PE).
- 4 It is crucial to note in this context that European integration is taken to mean Ireland's attitude towards, membership of, and/or participation in post-Second World War Western European – and perhaps even wider international – institutions and organisations that had economic, political and/or social implications for the Irish government and nation.
- 5 J.J.Lee quoted in R.McDonnell (ed.), 'Senator Professor Joe Lee', pp. 22-4, in *Graduate* (UCC publication) Autumn 1993, *passim*.
- 6 Leader article, 'Ireland shines', *Economist*, 17 May 1997.
- 7 M.Hederman, *The road to Europe: Irish attitudes, 1948-61* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1983), p. 74.
- 8 Frank Aiken (foreign minister) speaking during a debate in Seanad Éireann (Irish upper parliamentary house), 14 July 1966, *Seanad Éireann parliamentary debates official report (Seanad debates)* vol. 61 col. 1916.
- 9 A.Moravcsik, *The choice for Europe: social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 3; J.M.Skelly, *Irish*

diplomacy at the United Nations, 1945-1965: national interests and the national order (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1997), p. 18. A review of the former appears in the Working Group on European Integration's *Newsletter*, no. 1 June 1999, produced in the Department of History & Civilisation at the European University Institute, Badia Fiesolana, Florence (IUE); it can also be found at <http://www.iue.it/HEC/wg-integ.html> (17 August 1999).

- 10 The theoretical question is dealt with in detail in Chapter 1 under the heading **Ireland's world position**.
- 11 P.Keatinge, *A singular stance: Irish neutrality in the 1980s* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1984), *passim*; L.Kennedy, *Colonialism, religion and nationalism in Ireland* (Belfast: Institute of Irish Studies, 1996), p. 217. This sub-heading comes from a term liberally employed by Patrick Keatinge to portray the country's approach to neutrality. However, its use in this context does not mean to suggest that Ireland's wider historical experience is necessarily any more unique than it is for any other nation, thus agreeing with Liam Kennedy's view that the Irish are not the 'most oppressed people ever'; his coinage of the acronym 'MOPE' is particularly apt when railing against any 'singular' sense of 'victimhood and exceptionalism'.
- 12 Ranging from Southern Italy's Mezzogiorno to Puerto Rico, Canada to the Netherlands, Greece to Portugal, Norway to Spain, all of these propositions failed to meet the necessary criteria because of a range of reasons, including, for example, strict relevance to the subject at hand. There was much more to this decision than practical considerations. In the context of the Western world, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) – the successor to the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) – generally placed Ireland near the bottom of its economic league. Two countries still stood out as offering some respite, Denmark and New Zealand; thus, both states are used to contextualise Ireland, as the latter's integration experience may be better understood by placing it in a comparative perspective, most especially in European terms. Nonetheless, the facts of its own peculiar position must be heard in all of their insular and parochial glory. As Liam Kennedy argues, it is obvious that, within a Western comparative framework and despite lagging behind the world's major players at the start of the twentieth century, Ireland was relatively comfortably placed economically. As a neo/post-colonialist ever since the 1920s, it was certainly not comparable to either African or Asian countries at their relative points of decolonisation. Kennedy, *Colonialism, religion and nationalism*, pp. xv & 170-1.
- 13 The comparative question is dealt with in even more detail under the heading **Ireland's world position** in Chapter 1. In Denmark's case, it was concluded that a thorough inspection of primary material was neither necessarily pertinent nor practical. A detailed review of corresponding and related secondary material was obviously ascertained as essential and this is presented in the opening chapter; indeed, findings have been integrated throughout this research, but not in any conscious way as a comparative. At any rate, this study regarding Ireland's relationship with the EEC was carried out with Denmark in mind, but was ultimately dependent upon secondary sources only.

- 14 In New Zealand's case, simply because this 'singular' study centres on Ireland's relationship with the EEC, the issue of a 'shadow comparison' was once again concentrated on secondary sources and thus invoked the former's experiences only when it was deemed applicable in the light of the latter's EEC relations.
- 15 This issue is dealt with in some detail under the heading **Ireland's world position** in the next chapter.
- 16 P.Keatinge, *The formulation of Irish foreign policy* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1973), p. 307.
- 17 D.J.Maher, *The tortuous path: the course of Ireland's entry into the EEC, 1948-73* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1986).
- 18 Hederman, *The road to Europe*; D.Keogh, *Ireland and Europe, 1919-1989: a diplomatic history* (Cork: Hibernian Press, 1990). For an extensive assessment of related and relevant articles and texts, see the sections in the **Bibliography** headed **Literature survey** and **Secondary sources**.
- 19 P.Sharp, *Irish foreign policy and the European Community: a study of the impact of interdependence in the foreign policy of a small state* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990), p. ix.
- 20 P.Gerbet, *La construction de l'Europe* (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1983), p. 294. In the original French, this quotation read: 'l'Irlande ... étant en union économique avec la Grande-Bretagne, elle ne pouvait s'en trouver séparée'.
- 21 Primary sources are examined in two sections – headed **Archival appraisal** and **Primary materials** – in the **Bibliography**; both precede secondary sources.
- 22 Éamon de Valera (parliamentary opposition leader) speech delivered in Dáil Éireann, 12 July 1955, entitled 'International co-operation and Irish unity', pp. 572-6, in M.Moynihan (ed.), *Speeches and statements by Eamon de Valera, 1917-73* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1980), p. 573.
- 23 Lemass speech delivered in Dáil Éireann, 5 July 1961, *Dáil Éireann parliamentary debates official report (Dáil debates)* vol. 191 col. 266.
- 24 See the sections entitled **Archival appraisal** and **Literature survey** in the **Bibliography**. The main purpose of an extended analysis at the end of the text, however, is clearly to list the primary and secondary source materials employed in the course of this extensive evaluation.
- 25 As previously stated, some of the ground covered in this text was presented in a different context in an MPhil dissertation – *Irish-American diplomatic relations, 1948 to 1963* – and has now been retraced in the light of Ireland's dealings with the European integration concept, as seen through the eyes of successive US governments. Additionally, four other papers have also been completed in the course of this research. One article – 'Irish neutrality and European integration, 1960 to 1972' – records an excellent example of the change in emphasis in Ireland's foreign policy away from political considerations to economic prerogatives, a central theme in this research. Another paper conceived for publication – 'Gli archivi della Comunità europea' – although not directly of much relevance to the text itself, has proven to be a useful way of trying to assess the value of the ACE, an archive which should have been a crucial resource, but was not. In turn, a third presentation – 'Ireland's experience of European integration: from the "political" to the "economic"' – forms part of both the introductory first chapter and the sixth chapter survey of this

investigation, giving a context in which the central subject sits, as well as a comprehensive overview, while a fourth paper – 'Why did Ireland's application fail?' – has helped in drawing some meaningful conclusions. M.FitzGerald, 'Irish neutrality and European integration, 1960-1972', pp. 144-72, in M.Gehler & R.Steininger (eds), *Die Neutralen und die europäische Integration, 1945-1995* (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2000); M.FitzGerald, 'Gli archivi della Comunità europea', pp. 1-9, in C.Pavone (ed.), *Storia d'Italia nel secolo ventesimo: strumenti e fonti* (forthcoming); M.FitzGerald, 'Ireland's experience of European integration: from the "political" to the "economic"', pp. 1-15, unpublished paper presented at a conference – held on 8 December 1995 at the IUE – entitled the *Europeanisation of domestic policy*; M.FitzGerald, 'Why did Ireland's application fail?', 1-8, unpublished paper presented at a workshop – held on 14 December 1998 at the IUE – entitled *Research workshop on the failure of Community expansion, 1961-63*.

- 26 H.Young, 'The man who took us into Europe', *Observer*, 25 October 1998. This quotation was clearly written with the UK in mind, but it equally applies to Ireland. Its author, Con O'Neill, wrote it in the early 1970s as part of an official UK Foreign Office (FO) history of the latter's negotiations to enter the European Communities (EC). H.Young, *The blessed plot* (London: Macmillan, 1998).