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Empire of Rhetorics

A Discursive/Rhetorical Approach to the Study of Japanese Monarchism

by Sachihiko KONDO

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of
the Requirement for the Award of
Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University

February, 2000

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Abstract

This thesis takes a discursive/rhetorical approach to the topic of support for modern constitutional monarchy. It examines in detail some of the rhetorical devices used by modern Japanese speakers when they discuss monarchism. In so doing the thesis highlights both the discursive and social dilemmas involved in contemporary monarchism. In Britain, another constitutional monarchical state, critical psychologists have analysed what have been called 'dilemmas of lived ideology' (Billig *et al.*, 1988). Billig (1992) analysed ordinary people's discourses about British monarchism. He points out that people employ dilemmatic themes as they justify, mitigate and make sense of their own non-privileged positions under egalitarianism. I use Billig's work as a main reference, and apply his analytical frameworks (discursive psychology) for my investigation of Japanese monarchism. Amongst several features of Japanese conversation, I focus on its complicated naming and honorific systems. These systems almost always encode power structures amongst speaker-addressee, speaker-referent as well as addressee-referent relationships. Analysing people's mundane (family) conversations about the Emperor system, I have found contradictory rhetorical common-places, which are not always voiced explicitly, but are often formulated implicitly through these linguistic implications (i.e. naming, honorifics). Moreover, these codes have to be managed in their particular discursive contexts where the different systems of showing honour can conflict. By analysing news articles, in addition, I focus on a terminology which is employed exclusively to describe an Emperor's death. Looking at the contexts in which terms are used (and not used), the process of construction of the social reality (i.e. monarchism under egalitarian social norm) is illustrated.

Through my analysis, I believe, a new perspective for Japanese monarchism is introduced: people represent the institutional reality and accept the inequality simultaneously through mundane discursive interaction.

Keywords: *ideology, dilemma, discourse, rhetoric, discursive psychology, constructionism, Japanese, grammar, monarchy*

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Chapter 1

Monarchy and Democracy

- An Introduction -

1.1.0. The Emperor System

This thesis is a social psychological study of modern monarchism in Japan. Taguchi (1993) reports that there are twenty eight monarchs today. Most of them, including the Japanese Emperor, are constitutional rather than absolute. In order to investigate Japanese monarchism, in this thesis, studies of the British monarchy, another example of a constitutional monarchy, are often considered.

Statistics suggest that Japan is the largest monarchical state, with regard to its population, 126,182,077. The second and third largest are Thailand and the United Kingdom, both of which have populations of approximately sixty millions (Central Intelligence Agency, 1999). Thus, one may claim that a study of the Japanese Emperorship is a study of the world's largest monarchy. (If one considers the British monarch is the head of the Commonwealth of Nations, however, 'Queen Elizabeth II' is the monarch who reigns over the largest population on the Earth.)

Unlike the UK, which has no written Constitution, Japan's two Constitutions, in the pre- and post-war periods, have legitimised the Emperor's status. In the pre-war period, the sacred value of the Chrysanthemum Throne was characterised by some of the articles of the 1889 Constitution (see also Appendix 2-1). For instance:

Article 1. The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.

...

Article 3. The Emperor is sacred and inviolable.

(Project Gutenberg, 1996)

In this way, the Emperor's dignity was authorised by the Constitution. In the pre-war and war-time periods, he was worshipped as an earthly incarnation of the mythical national founder, the Sun Goddess, and respected as the head of the expanded family, which was Japan. Even his portraits were objects of worship, and for ceremonial occasions, such as in schools, rituals were developed in order to show obeisance before the Imperial portraits. As an extreme example, it is said that some headmasters lost their lives in order to protect the portraits, for instance in fires, battles or bombing raids (e.g. Yamamoto and Konno, 1976/1986; Kodama, 1975/1985; Inose, 1986/1992, 1990).

In contrast, the post-war Constitution emphasises the people's sovereignty and equality before the law, but it still retains the Emperor and his family above the people. Articles 1 to 8 concern the matters related to him, such as his status, dynastic rules, political and diplomatic roles, management of the imperial properties and so forth (see also Appendix 2-2).

Article 1. The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power. (Project Gutenberg, 1996)

In this way, the Emperor is neither 'inviolable' (at least, in theory), nor retains the sovereign power (again, at least, in theory). Generally speaking, the majority of the Japanese people support this post-war symbolic Emperor system. In 1995, for example, the largest of the national dailies, the Yomiuri Shinbun (see Chapter 8, *section 8.1.1*), reported that 78.8% of its respondents (all aged over 20) said 'yes' to the Imperial *status quo*. As little as 12.1% of them said 'no' and 9.1% said 'don't

know'. Another opinion poll conducted by NHK (the Japanese public broadcaster, and equivalent to the BBC) in 1993, indicated that 20.5% of the respondents claimed that they 'respected' Akihito, 42.7% of them 'favoured' him, 33.7% of them 'did not have particular feelings' about him and 1.5% of them 'felt hostile' towards the Emperor. This NHK survey is conducted every decade, and according to the 1983 survey, 'respect', 'favour', 'no feeling' and 'hostile' in respect of Hirohito were 27.5%, 22.1%, 46.5% and 2.1% respectively (NHK Broadcast Cultural Research Centre, 1998).

Under the norm of people's sovereignty, the majority of Japanese people seem to be *voluntarily* accepting their non-privileged positions. According to the changes found in the NHK surveys, what is more, Japanese people have become more 'monarchist' during Akihito's reign. This thesis will provide a social psychological analysis of 'the world's largest monarchy', from the non-privileged people's points of view. *How do ordinary people make sense of and/or account for the inequality?* Note here that, in Japanese society which emphasises homogeneity (e.g. Morean, 1988), 'ordinary' does not signify one particular part of the class-divided society, such as 'ordinary people' or 'working class' in English (cf. Billig, 1992). Instead, in this thesis, 'ordinary people' indicates Japanese people without Imperial or aristocratic ties. In this way, they may also be described as 'non-privileged'. Furthermore, in Japan, the majority of people claim to be satisfied with their standard of living (NHK Broadcast Cultural Research Centre, 1998), and over 90% of its population categorise themselves as belonging to the 'middle' stratum of the homogeneous society (Kariya, 1995). Therefore, the notion of 'middle class' in Japan often refers to a much broader range of its population than in Britain.

1.1.1. Personal Background of the Study

Before turning to the main discussions, it is appropriate to make some remarks on my personal experiences and background, which led me to carry out this project on monarchy at Loughborough.

I was born and brought up in a regional city in Japan, Fukuoka. It is often said that regional cities have conservative climates, and Fukuoka is one such city. For instance, one of my closest friends since high-school said that he cried when Emperor Hirohito died in 1989. My family is liberal middle class (at least none of my family 'cried' over Hirohito's death), and most of my school friends came from middle class families, too. Under these circumstances, I grew up accepting the *status quo*, which includes the Emperor system.

When studying at Osaka for my first degree (sociology), I became aware that social problems exist. Osaka is the second largest city in Japan, and the traditional manufacturing, trading and market place. Also, in the area, a high proportion of the population is discriminated against (e.g. former out-castes, Japanese-Koreans), and has been engaged in active protests against the oppression. I made many politically active friends there. Accompanied by them, I joined the departmental student committee, which was led by new-left radicals. At the same time, I was the vice-captain of one of the university athletic clubs, which retained a strict 'senior-junior' hierarchy, and was considered as a 'feudal' or 'militaristic' organisation. In this way, I was a student with a dilemma; because of my liberal family background in the conservative region, I was able to identify myself with both the conservative and liberal viewpoints.

With regard to the Emperor system, I had no interest in it in my Fukuoka days. However, in Osaka, politically active friends regarded the existence of the Emperor as the main cause of the social oppression (e.g. Buraku Liberation Research Institute, 1981, 1994). Since then, I have viewed the monarchy more critically than before. After graduating from the university, I worked as a weekly magazine reporter in Tokyo. As a reporter, I had to learn two taboos in reporting: any kind of open criticism or ironical expression aimed at either former out-caste people or members of the Imperial Family were forbidden. Since the Imperial matters became virtual taboos for my reporting job, the dilemma between monarchism and democracy (e.g. freedom of press) became clearer for me.

After resigning from the editorial office, I studied communication in London. With regard to monarchical matters, two things struck me. First of all, British media attitudes are completely different from their Japanese counterparts. The Japanese media are very careful when reporting Imperial personal matters. In consequence, Imperial coverages are almost identical, and exalt the Emperor and the Imperials (see Chapter 8). On the other hand, the British press, especially the tabloids, aggressively expose the private lives of the royals, such as their extramarital affairs. In addition, ironical attitudes to the Queen and the royals are often found in TV programmes. Secondly, I realised that I became more 'patriotic' and 'monarchist' than ever. I reacted defensively whenever Japan (or anything related to Japan) was criticised or down-graded by non-Japanese people. During my Osaka and Tokyo days, I had been cynical about the monarch and other people's uncritical pro-monarchy attitudes. However, in London, when defending my own Japanese-ness against non-Japanese criticisms, such as PoW issues or the VJ-Day anniversary matters (cf. Murata, 1998), I often found myself sympathising with Akihito. I felt that neither Akihito nor the majority of the Japanese people (i.e. post-war generations) had been *personally* responsible for the aggressive behaviour of Imperialist Japan. Akihito could be regarded as the representative of *my* social group, the post-war Japan.

In this way, while I believe that monarchism has reinforced some anti-democratic values in my society (e.g. discrimination) and the discussions about the monarchy must be more open in Japan (but not as open as Britain), I also feel that Emperorship is one of the factors which constitutes my own Japanese identity. Thus social psychological aspects of monarchism have become my academic interest. Firstly, I wanted to try to account for my own dilemmatic feelings toward the Emperor and the Emperor system, derived from my Fukuoka, Osaka, Tokyo and, indeed, London experiences. As the second point, in the war-time period, the Emperor was the symbol of Japanese superiority and expansionism (e.g. Toyama, Imai and Fujiwara, 1959; Eizawa, 1995). Hence, I believe the psychological analysis of 'pro-monarchy' attitudes in post-war Japan is important, in order to form a less aggressive nationalism. Thirdly, therefore, I want to analyse why and how the majority of Japanese people accept such an obvious

inequality. Billig's analysis of British conventional monarchism (1992) gave some suggestions and I started this project.

1.2.0. Synopsis of Chapters

This thesis consists of two main parts; theoretical reviews in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, and empirical studies of the Japanese conversations and texts in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. Chapter 5 concerns background information of each sample. The contents of each chapter are outlined below.

In **Chapter 2**, a number of studies about the British monarchy are reviewed. An anthropologist, Frazer (1890/1994), analysed universal aspects of monarchism. Also, since the Glorious Revolution in the 17th Century, Britain has been claimed as one of the motherlands of democracy, but at the same time, the 'ancient institution' (Billig, 1992) survived at the heart of British 'democracy'. Several theories have been proposed to account for the dilemma of the 'democratic monarchy' of the UK. The classic example was a journalist, Bagehot (1867/1963), who examined the political roles of monarchs within the context of Victorian Britain. I begin this theoretical review from these Victorian studies. Also, this theoretical review chapter re-analyses the meanings of the establishment of the Royal House of Windsor in 1917. It was, I believe, an important epoch in the establishment of contemporary monarchism in Britain. The rest of this chapter explores several noteworthy studies in the 1930s, 1950s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Looking at developments of these studies in chronological order, one could point out that British scholars have begun to focus on ordinary people's accounts of, or the rhetorical formulations for, the inequality (e.g. Edley, 1991; Billig, 1992).

Chapter 3 outlines the post-war studies about the Japanese Emperor system and their historical contexts. In the post-war period, Japan has been democratised, and intellectuals have attempted to make sense of this post-war 'democratic Emperorship'. In this chapter, studies of the monarchy are divided into five periods, according to socio-historical contexts; 1945-1947 (immediately after the war), 1947-1952 (late

occupation period), 1952-1961 (independence and serious confrontations of right and left), 1961-1975 (economic miracle), 1975-1989 (late-Hirohito period) and 1989- (post-Hirohito period). Shortly after the war, fundamental rhetorical structures of pro- and anti-monarchy discourse were founded (Minobe, 1946; Maruyama, 1946). Since then, a number of studies have been conducted, from political, economic, sociological, psychological and/or linguistic points of view. What has to be noted here is that there were some attempts to look at the dilemma of the post-war Emperorship from non-privileged people's points of view (e.g. Tsurumi, 1952; Shimizu, 1953; Matsushita, 1959; Kodama, 1975/1985; Fujitani, 1992, 1996), but the theoretical backgrounds for these studies were not adequate. In this way, there is a theoretical advantage to British studies in the 1990s.

Chapter 4 elucidates this 'theoretical advantage' of British studies, which is discursive psychology (e.g. Edwards and Potter, 1992; Harré and Gillett, 1994). I believe that this could be the key method for analysing the contradictory institutional realities (e.g. democracy and monarchism) from a social psychological point of view. Firstly, two different social psychological perspectives, emphasising individuality or sociality, are outlined. Secondly, theoretical frameworks of the conventional cognitive approach to psychology (which emphasises the individual aspects), are summarised. In particular, the cognitive concept of a classic social psychological issue, 'attitude', is portrayed and re-examined critically. In the rest of this chapter, the alternative critical approach (which emphasises the social aspects), discursive psychology, is introduced. In particular, I look at its theoretical backgrounds and re-conceptualisations of 'attitude'. What is more, its theoretical or philosophical framework, social constructionism, is reviewed. This social psychological theory, which focuses on rhetorical formulations of discourse, greatly contributes to the analysis of the Japanese (conventional) pro-monarchy 'attitude'.

In **Chapter 6**, a variety of namings for the Emperor by the interview participants are analysed discursively. In the first part of the chapter, some rules of namings by Japanese speakers are summarised. Next, in order to account for different namings found in my data, I use the linguistic theory of speech accommodation (e.g. Giles and

Smith, 1979). In the final part of this chapter, in order to account for further flexible usages of namings, I use discursive psychology, which clarifies that speakers use a variety of namings for rhetorical purposes. Through the series of analyses, some dilemmas or contradictions of monarchical ideology are highlighted. In this way, discursive analyses of namings illustrate the rhetorical nature of post-war Japanese conventional monarchism.

In **Chapter 7**, one of the distinctive features of Japanese speech, its complicated linguistic codes of politeness, is studied. First of all, I summarise the socio-linguistic rules of politeness found in my samples. Next, the participants' uses of politeness (i.e. different degrees of exaltations and humilities) are analysed from a linguistic point of view, using the theory of speech accommodation (e.g. Giles and Smith, 1979). Thirdly, further varieties (or flexibility) of participants' honorifics are analysed from a discursive psychological point of view, and I elucidate rhetorical formulations in Japanese conversations through the use of honorifics. To sum up, in Chapters 6 and 7, I discuss two distinctive features of Japanese language, namings and honorifics. The result of the analyses emphasises the rhetorical nature of Japanese discourse, and indeed the contradictory ideologies of the post-war Emperor system, which are often represented implicitly through these features of Japanese language.

Chapter 8 shifts its analytical focus from conversational data to written texts, and concerns an exclusive terminology for the Emperor's death in Japanese pro-monarchy mainstream newspapers. The news reports about Emperor Hirohito's death in 1989 are analysed, paying particular attention to exclusive Imperial terms. First of all, death terms found in the press are categorised and quantitatively analysed. At the same time, rhetorical formulations of the exclusive death term (which exalts or formalises Hirohito's death) are examined. I also analyse an anti-monarchy press (i.e. the organ of the Japan Communist Party), in order to highlight anti-monarchical discursive/rhetorical formulations and terminologies. The mainstream newspapers also used inclusive death terms, and close discursive examination shows the ideological dilemma of contemporary Emperorship. What is more, through the examination of

conversational data, I suggest that interview participants also rhetorically use death terms for the Emperor.

In short, this thesis explores a variety of aspects of the Japanese Emperorship. First of all, in order to answer the first and foremost question (i.e. 'How do ordinary people make sense of and/or account for the inequality?'), I employ discursive psychology to examine the rhetorical nature of conventional monarchism. This thesis is a small attempt to close the gap between Japanese and British monarchical studies.

Secondly, through the analyses of Japanese discourse in the empirical chapters (Chapters 6, 7 and 8), I point out several rhetorical implications in Japanese speech. Although discursive psychology has been mainly developed by English speaking academics, the rhetorical nature of Japanese, which is accomplished by, for instance, its namings, honorifics and terminology, can be examined discursively. The results of my analysis are, to a certain extent, distinct from studies of Japanese discourse by linguists, socio-linguists and pragmatists (cf. Morean, 1988; Loveday, 1986; Maynard, 1990, 1997b).

In the final chapter, **Chapter 9**, the major findings in the analytical chapters are summarised, and further potentialities of the discursive approach for social psychological issues in Japan are argued. Also, the future of the modern monarchism is briefly discussed from a discursive point of view.

Chapter 2

Analysing Modern Monarchies (1)

- Studies on British Monarchy -

2.1.0. Introduction

Today, we are living in post-French Revolution societies in which the enlightenment and knowledge of that Revolution has destroyed the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. However, 'Her Majesty' still reigns over the United Kingdom, even though there are arguments about the nature of the institution or her methods of 'ruling' her kingdom. The purpose of this chapter is to outline a concise history of social scientific studies of British monarchism. Most of the studies attempt to explain the bottom-line argument: why inherited sovereignty is preserved in the 'democratic', 'enlightened' society.

Several remarkable aspects of the monarchy have been pointed out by social scientists, such as its social and cultural significance, and all studies are more or less accountable within the social and historical contexts of the ages in which they were proposed. I will focus on some of the studies, which suggest novel perspectives. In the following section, first of all, I shall outline two classic studies, from the Victorian era. The first one is Frazer's (1890/1994) research on the global aspects of kingships. The second one is a very influential work of Bagehot (1867/1963), who examines the monarchism within the framework of the British (English) constitutional system of his age. Bagehot considers Britain as a class divided community with ruling élite and ruled masses, and the monarch as a political display for the less educated majorities. Although there have

been a number of revisions to it, as will be seen, Bagehotian theory has been one of the dominant ideas of the British monarchy.

From the fourth section onward, several studies which revise, to a greater or lesser extent, Bagehot's classic perspective of the British monarchy will be discussed. However, prior to the reviews of post-Bagehotian studies, I believe it is useful to discuss one of the important conditions of post-Bagehotian arguments. In the third section of this chapter, I will discuss the foundation of the Royal House of Windsor in 1917, as an example of the 'invention of tradition' (Hobsbawm, 1983). Also the argument concerns the media oriented nature of modern British monarchism.

In the fourth section, finally, as the main concern of this chapter, several theories proposed in different historical and cultural contexts will be introduced in a roughly chronological order; in the 1930s (e.g. Martin 1936; eds. Jennings and Madge, 1937), 1950s (e.g. Shils and Young, 1952), 1970s (e.g. Blumer *et al.*, 1971; Rose and Kavanagh, 1976; Ziegler, 1978), 1980s (e.g. Cannadine, 1983; Coward, 1984; Williamson, 1986; Nairn 1988; Wilson, 1989) and recent discursive/rhetorical studies in the 1990s (e.g. Edley, 1991; Billig, 1992; Abell and Stokoe, 1999; MacMillan and Edwards, 1999).

As a general rule, the earlier studies tended to explain the monarchical 'functions' which originated from the monarch's 'sacred' quality. They also conceptualise the system of the monarchy as a total organisation. Therefore, according to these earlier perspectives, only intellectuals could observe the entire structure of its political, economic and/or social significance. In recent studies, on the other hand, theorists have shifted their perspectives from the élite perspective to the common-sensical understandings of the monarchy by ordinary people, and they employ micro-level analytical techniques to reveal this point. At the end of this chapter, it will be shown that recent 'micro-level' analysis has contributed to answering the bottom-line argument fairly clearly.

2.2.0. Anthropological Approaches

To outline the studies on the monarchy, a good place to start might be a classic anthropological work by Frazer (*The Golden Bough*; 1890/1994). According to him, it is commonly observed that people make an effort to control nature, and at the level of the 'savage', people do so by 'magic'. Frazer elaborately describes several anthropological examples in which the techniques have been developed from relatively primitive ways (i.e. 'Age of Magic') to more sophisticated ones (i.e. 'Age of Religion'). In consequence, small groups of people became specialists in these tasks (e.g. rain-maker). Some of these specialists later became either 'priests' or 'kings'. He sees, for instance, a rain-maker as one of the origins of present kingships (cf. Miyata; *Weather Watching and Emperorship*, 1987). In his view, kingship was developed from the 'magical' control of nature, and this view has been succeeded by several pieces of anthropological research, such as that of Hocart (1927), who investigated the 'sacred kingship' in Fiji.

As a relatively recent example of 'magical powers', it is often said that English monarchs (e.g. Charles I and II and Elizabeth I) could cure scrofula, 'king's evil', by their magical royal touches. In the ancient age, people practised unique customs so as to pass on such kinds of 'magical powers' to the next generation. For instance, 'killing the divine king' was widely observed among 'savages' (Frazer, 1890/1994). Furthermore, Frazer points out that, according to several documents, ancient European people had similar customs (e.g. the succession of 'the King of the Wood' in Nemi, Italy), and, we are still able to detect the vestiges of these customs in some modern festivals and ceremonies.

The point is that cultural anthropological studies emphasise universal supernatural aspects of the monarchical systems. Even though kingships change their appearances according to the 'evolution' of host societies/cultures, the basic principle remains. Frazer's study implies that even in the recent stages of kingships, such as modern constitutional monarchies, kingships need to a greater or lesser extent magical aspects to legitimise themselves. In doing so, the next section will consider Bagehot's analysis of the Victorian monarchy (1867/1963). Bagehot emphasises the monarch's 'dignified'

functions, which obviously originated from magical/religious aspects of ancient kingships.

2.2.1. Victorian Perspective and Modern Successor

A political journalist and the editor of *The Economist*, Bagehot published *The English Constitution* in 1867 (rpt. 1963), which was virtually the first systematic attempt to analyse the modern British constitution, distinguishing 'dignified' (i.e. the House of Lords and the Monarchy) and 'efficient' (i.e. the House of Commons and the Cabinet) parts of the British Constitution (Howard, 1977) and it contributed to the resuscitation of the monarchy in both intellectual and popular crises (Edley, 1991).

The central idea of the book is Bagehot's scepticism for the self-governing ability of the mass of people. Bagehot claims that the British population includes many less qualified (e.g. educational backgrounds) groups: there are not only 'men like Mr Grote' (a scholar who wrote historical accounts of monarchism) but also 'the labourers of Summersetshire [*sic*]' (1963; p 85). According to him, 'we have whole classes unable to comprehend the idea of constitution - unable to feel the least attachment to impersonal laws' (p 85). In order to manage this political system as a whole, Bagehot claims that the constitutional monarch is particularly useful, since he/she represents the action of 'single will, the fiat of a single mind' (p 82).

To be more precise, Bagehot thinks that the House of Commons and the Cabinet (which represent 'efficient' functions) would get mass support only with difficulty, without a monarch. He sees 'dignified', 'theatrical' or 'mystical' (personal) qualities of the monarchy as the key to integrating people. At the same time, however, Bagehot considers that the monarch would not be a person with special abilities. In fact, Bagehot portrays a monarch with irony.

> He can be an average man to begin with; sometimes he will be clever, but sometimes he will be stupid; in the long run, he will be neither clever nor

> stupid; he will be the simple, common man who plods the plain routine of life from the cradle to the grave. (1963; p 118)

Bagehot considers the constitutional monarchy to be no more than a political tool ('dignified function'), but the real politics ('efficient functions') are managed by the House of Commons and the Cabinet. In this sense, his book is located in the Anglo-British political tradition which dated from the 'Glorious Bloodless Revolution', which considers the Constitution has been formulated for civil rights (e.g. Locke, 1690/1990). In the eye of the élite Victorian political writer, Britain was a virtual republic dressed in royal robes, governed by the political élite.

In the 'virtual republic Britain', Bagehot justifies the presence of the monarchy as 'a visible symbol of unity to those still so imperfectly educated as to need a symbol' (1963; p 90). Although a monarch can be 'a simple, common man', as far as 'those still so imperfectly educated' need some symbol for national unity, it is politically useful. Therefore, according to Bagehot, unlike George III, the ideal monarch must perform his/her dignified roles without his/her own political interests (1963; pp 99-101). Bagehot considers an ideal constitutional monarch as no more than a puppet controlled by the élite, performing his/her 'dignified roles' before the non-élite British. The monarch's symbolic functions and political inability are at the heart of British socio-political culture, which serves the stability of the nation, says Bagehot.

There are several successors to Bagehot's work. One of the recent examples is Bogdanor (1995), an Oxford scholar who characterises British history as progressing by evolution rather than revolutions. 'Britain has enjoyed a smooth progress towards democracy and has been a victor in two world wars, republicanism in Britain has remained in the twentieth century, the concern only of a minority, and usually a very small minority' (p 300). He claims that there is no contradiction between the progress of industrialisation and the monarchy. From his point of view, a monarch would not prevent political reform, rather he/she can be just as much of an aid to a reforming government through his/her dignified role. Bogdanor, under those circumstances, emphasises the advantages of British historical progress.

> After overthrowing the monarchy in 1789, France, with sixteen constitutions, has found it difficult, for over 200 years, to discover a stable form of constitutional government. The overthrow of the Russian Czar led to a short-lived democratic republic and then the long night of Bolshevism. (p 299)

Adding some more examples of other nations (e.g. Germany, Austria), he affirms that 'it is a mistake, therefore, to assume that the transition to a republic is likely to be a painless affair, mastered by middle-of-the-road constitutional reformers' (p 300). In this regard, it is clear that Bogdanor 'stresses the organic development of the British constitution, prefers evolution to revolution, and thinks stability is better than strife' (Cannadine, 1998, p 23). Bogdanor celebrates the monarchy as the unique symbol of British national unity, which assures industrialisation through political stability.

It has to be noted here that there are Bagehotian influences on the present Japanese monarchy. When the US officials supervised the drafting of the present Japanese Constitution, *The English Constitution* inspired them to introduce the present Symbol Emperor System (*see section 3.3.0*; Nakamura, 1992). What is more, it is said that Hirohito personally believed in Bagehotian theory. Hirohito visited the UK in 1921, when he was the Crown Prince. He appreciated the hospitality of George V, and he was impressed by the efficiency and less authoritarian nature of the British Royal system. In later days, Hirohito repeatedly claimed that this visit was one of the most remarkable experiences of his life. At that time, George V considered *The English Constitution* to be a reference manual for monarchs. It is said that, thereafter, Hirohito kept Bagehot at his side (Takahashi, 1988; Mizutani, 1991; Large, 1992).

The point is that Bagehot provides a classic perspective: the monarchy's dignified functions contributes to political stability. He also claims that it is at the heart of the British political culture. Here one could pose questions: Does the Queen still solely perform her 'dignified' role before her subjects? (cf. Martin, 1936) Do the Queen and Royal Family contribute to Britain's social stability? In today's Britain, it is highly questionable for the monarch to be considered as a 'dignified' figure. (Pearson, 1986;

Coward, 1983; Nairn, 1988; Edley, 1991; Billig, 1992; Mizutani, 1995). In the later sections, I shall outline post-Bagehotian studies. Prior to doing so, significant aspects of the modern monarchy, its nation-centred character and its dependency on mass media, will be discussed.

2.3.0. 'Naturalized' Monarch / Media Monarch.

The importance of the 'naturalization' (Anderson, 1983; p 86) of the British monarchy in the early 20th Century is a topic studied relatively little by British scholars. For instance, although Hardie (*The Political Influence of the British Monarchy 1868-1952*; 1970) specifies the political ability and influence of George V, he seems to forget to argue about the foundation of the House of Windsor. As another example of royalist arguments, under the title of *Hanover to Windsor*, Fulford (1960) concisely explains:

> ... the mutilation of monarchy in Europe and natural (though exaggerated) revulsion of opinion against continental royalty after the 1914 war meant that the English Royal Family was dangerously isolated. The old conception of royalty as a closed corporation - that circle in which King's father has moved so easily and resplendently - was shattered. As a result of a very silly outcry - largely engineered from Fleet Street - the King abandoned his German titles and name in 1917. The House of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha became Windsor. (pp 172-173)

Fulford continues by saying that the personality of George V contributed to the survival of the German originated Royal Family during the war. He says that the King's personality is 'the true explanation of his hold over the public imagination' (p 174). What surprises me is that in spite of the implication from the title ('*Hanover to Windsor*'), the explanation and analysis of the background to the change of the family name is quite simple (e.g. 'silly outcry of Fleet Street'). Consequently, the (psychological or sociological) effects of the adoption of the new royal family name is far beyond the interest of the royalist historian.

From a liberal point of view, Wilson (1989) comments on the changing surname. He says that the establishment of a new family name is part of the counterfeit 'royal myth'.

> As to the Britishness of the Monarchy, that is a black joke. Geoffrey Bocca has interestingly pointed out that the present Queen is the first British sovereign to have British blood in her veins; and that through her Scottish mother. The dynastic name 'Windsor' was chosen only in 1917 at the height of the First World War by the Hanover-Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, not to signify a new management, but to deflect anti-German feelings. When the Kaiser heard that his cousins had changed the family name, he commanded a performance of 'The Merry Wives of Saxo-Coburg-Gotha'. (pp 57-58)

This event may be considered to be a royal attempt to break away from old conventions and to re-establish a modern monarchical tradition. Therefore, this event has to be seen within broader historical contexts and with regard to its influence on the modern British monarchy.

This royal event can be redefined as 'naturalization' (Anderson, 1983) of the British monarchy. Pearson (1986) points out that the change of family name was due to anti-German feeling throughout the nation. He explains that a royal member who worked as Sea Lord was forced to resign, because of his Germanic surname, Prince of Battenberg (p 18). As seen, this is described as a 'silly outcry of Fleet Street' by Fulford, but Pearson grasps what Fulford might have missed.

> It was exactly what was needed, for it made the all-important point not just that the royal family had cut its ties with Germany, but that it had also changed from distant continental dynasty into a firmly British institution as foursquare and dependable as that most ancient and evocative of royal symbols, Windsor Castle. (p 19)

The Kaiser's joke overlooks one point. George V did not only change his family name, but more importantly, his renamed 'House of Windsor' became a British national institution, although it used to have an international character. George V's decision contributed greatly to the royal survival even after the war.

> For the war - which might easily have wrecked the monarchy in Britain, as it did in Russia, Germany and Austria - actually strengthened the sense of national identity with the royal family and made the Court itself more conscious of the need to create a clear impression that this family, though royal, also shared the sufferings and loyal aspirations of every ordinary family in the land. (Pearson, 1986; p 19)

One more point has to be noted. Mizutani (1995) points out that, after this event, the Royal Family changed its marriage strategies: the royal members used to find their spouses from continental royal families (i.e. German), but since then, royal spouses have tended to be British (or an American in the case of Edward VIII). In this way, since this 'naturalization', the British monarchy has changed its character. The exclusive royal 'blue blood' has been replaced with British blood. The House of Windsor, thereafter, has adapted to the modern nation-oriented mass-society. According to Bagehot, the monarchy was expected to give 'dignified' performances. More recently, however, George V and his descendants are regarded as Britons (see also Martin, 1936; 1962). As hinted at in Pearson and Mizutani, the importance of the 'naturalization' of the British monarchy can not be overemphasised. In the nation oriented mass-democratic society, the Royal Family must demonstrate its 'national identity' quite sensitively. Further social scientific studies on this 'naturalization' would reveal the process of the formation of an imaginative national unity (Anderson, 1983). To discuss such historical matters as a whole is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis.

As Cannadine (1983) suggests, developments of technologies, such as designs of royal coaches and automobiles have contributed to the ideological formulations of modern monarchism. In particular, we need to pay close attention to the development and

popularisation of the media (e.g. newspaper with illustrations, radio and television broadcasts). As seen in Fulford's discussion (1960), 'Fleet Street' played a key role in producing public opinion about monarchical matters in the early 20th Century (cf. Cannadine, 1983; Lippmann, 1922; Chaney, 1986). As one might expect, as the media has become a key factor in the maintenance of the Crown, there have been deliberate attempts to control the news in order to reproduce the monarchical 'myth'. A symbolic example is the death of George V in 1936. His death was through euthanasia, although he was only expected to live a few hours longer. Since the court doctor believed that the King's death had to be announced in the morning broadsheets, especially *The Times*, and not by evening journals, the King was injected with morphine and cocaine. What is more, the doctor suggested to the editor of *The Times* that he should hold back publication because the announcement was expected in a short time (Watson, 1986; Mizutani, 1995).

In the following sections, I shall outline the studies which analyse the 'naturalized' and media oriented British monarchy. In the sections below, my discussion will be guided by Edley (1991), who collected and categorised several monarchical studies in the 1930s, 1950s, 1970s and 1980s. In addition, this thesis will cover later studies in the 1990s, including studies inspired by the 'Diana impact' of the Princess of Wales' BBC *Panorama* interview and her tragic car accident in Paris.

2.4.0. Non-Dignified, Popular Monarchy: Studies in the 1930s

In 1936, Martin wrote an article entitled *The Evolution of Popular Monarchy* in *The Political Quarterly.* Martin discusses the historical and psychological accounts of the monarchy from the Victorian era to the time of its publication, and reconsiders the traditional Bagehotian perspective. Both Bagehot and Martin recognise the monarchical function of uniting the nation. However, their perspectives are significantly different. On the one hand, Bagehot emphasises the dignified political function of the monarchy. Accordingly, Bagehot expects the monarch to appear as a *powerful* and *distant* figure before his/her subjects. On the other hand, Martin believes

the monarchy should symbolise *familiarity* rather than power and dignity. As an example, Martin discusses one of the then biggest royal events, George V's death.

> Nor is the grief that is felt to be explained by any textbook theory that the King is the bond of Empire or the symbol of national unity. There seem to be thousands of men and women who think of the Royal Family as an ideal extension of their own families; they feel, as a woman behind a counter characteristically remarked on the day of King's death, that "he was a father to all of us" ... To such people the Royal Family provides a colour and splendour which their own family lives too often lack, but which they none the less feel to be part of their own romance. Thus the King's death is regarded not so much an external, public event, as a personal loss. (p 156)

Martin criticises the 'textbook theory' (i.e. Bagehot) because it could not explain the people's feeling that the monarchy is an extension of their families. Martin claims that since there is little psychological gap between the monarchy and the people, we could observe a nation-wide grief for the deceased King. In other words, if there is a gap (distance) between the King and people as Bagehot conceptualised, there would not be a nation-wide grief. From Martin's point of view, therefore, today's monarchs have to make an effort to shorten the distance between them and the people by several methods, such as royal visits and direct communications over the radio.

To be more precise, although Bagehot and Martin consider the monarchy serves to stabilise British society, Martin regards the mass of the electorate as not being as irrational as Bagehot hypothesised (e.g. 'the labourers of Summersetshire'). Martin thinks that recent public circumstances do not allow the use of royal privileges on a magical or irrational basis, because if any irrationalities are pointed out, the monarchical system should conflict with the emotion of the masses. In order to avoid these conflicts, Martin claims that the monarchy must become a 'popular monarchy' (e.g. 'father of the nation', in the case of George V) rather than a 'dignified, distant monarchy'. In his later publication, Martin (1962) again points out that popularity is a key for the modern monarchy, looking at the early reign of Elizabeth II. At that time,

Martin believes that TV royal coverages particularly helped to shorten the gap between the royals and people. In addition, Martin sees the monarchy as being popular not only because of its ceremonial occasions, but also because its family matters are sympathised with by TV audiences, especially in the post-Georgian (George V) era.

> George V achieved immense popularity, but he never descended from the throne. That epoch is over. The choice was clear enough. The royal family could have maintained its dignity and the Monarch performed her functions as chief magistrate by living simply and unaffectedly among ordinary people as Scandinavian royalties do. The alternative was a garish publicity in which the royal family was known, not frankly as other officials are known and judged, but as the strange beings from Hollywood are known to TV viewers and readers of Sunday papers. (Martin, 1962; p 133)

Nowadays, popularity has become a key factor to maintain monarchical systems. Delivering information about 'royal ceremonies' as well as 'family matters' as a 'Royal Soap Opera' (Martin, 1962; Coward, 1982), the TV media has become an important means of reproducing 'myths of the monarchy' (Wilson, 1989). Therefore, Martin does not see today's monarchy as dignified figures, but as 'TV monarchy'. His belief that the popularity of the monarchy depends on it being seen as being above politics, has been taken up by other academics researching on the monarchy (Edley, 1991).

Between Martin's two publications, there was another notable study about the Coronation of George VI: *May 12, 1937: Mass-Observation Day-Survey* (eds. Jennings and Madge), published in 1937 (rpt. 1987). This is a uniquely designed survey in which, firstly, several newspaper articles about the coronation were collected. Secondly, a number of observers and 'mobile squads' of reporters wrote down notes about the events they experienced on the day before the coronation as well as the coronation day itself (12 May 1937), on an almost minute by minute time scale. These reporters were working not only in the capital city, but also in several local areas throughout Britain. In addition, several responses to the questionnaire added more information about (ordinary) people's experiences on that day.

It was quite an ambitious attempt to collect the 'ordinary people's voice' of micro-level discourses, although the recording devices (e.g. tape recordings) were practically unavailable for the researchers. There are two significant elements in this survey. Firstly, 'it looks for the significance of cultural objects, such as monarchy, within an account of ordinary people, rather than in the hypothesis of esoteric social theorists' (Edley, 1991; p 19). Secondly, the survey attempted to reveal 'real thoughts' and 'ideas' of ordinary people. Since all the participants (i.e. observers, mobile squads and respondents of the questionnaire) were assured of their anonymity, analysts may observe the rhetorical context of people's talk (ibid.; p 19). To see the point, it is worth selecting an example. Although most of the observers recorded events which honoured the Crown, there were some remarkable exceptions. 'Hootings of onlookers' were reported by CO2 (stands for 'Observer No.2') at Prestwick Cross in London, when the crowds gathered to see the parade.

> Some good remarks:
> '*Whaur's Mrs. Simpson noo!*' (very few people laugh at this).
> 'The wee barrel's sticking it well' (reference to barrel near top of bonfire).
> '*Gie us The Bonnie Wells o' Wearie*' (laughs from crowd).
> 'Good evening!' (intoxicated youths to young girls).
> One girl says 'Don't get funny'. (pp 237-238; emphasis original)

It is possible to see from these descriptions, first of all, that making a mock of the monarchy is not an isolated phenomenon in recent days (cf. Billig, 1992). In 1937, people did not hesitate to jeer at the monarchy playfully, and other onlookers accepted the utterances, responding to them with laughter not anger. At the same time, secondly, these utterances are depicted as 'improper' English, and emphasised in Italics. When an 'intoxicated' young man shouted at girls, however, their voices were reported as 'proper' English utterances. In this way, we may consider that the monarchy in 1937 was no longer just a dignified figure in the way Bagehot conceptualised. Gossipy comments about the new King's brother were naturally made by the onlookers and accepted by the crowds. At the same time, however, these

utterances were distinguished by the reporter as abnormal: they may have been shouted by either unsophisticated (uneducated), drunken or non-English bystanders. Furthermore, these utterances are labelled as 'good remarks' by the reporter. Therefore, conflicting themes of the Crown (e.g. 'freedom of love and royal obligation', 'formality and familiarity') appear in the extracts and the manner of reporting (Billig, *et al.*, 1988; Billig, 1992). Although the *Mass-Observation Day-Survey* can be criticised for its lack of proper theorisation (Edley, 1991), the volume provides an important database for later studies (e.g. Ziegler, 1978).

2.4.1. Study on the Coronation in the 1950s

Shils and Young wrote an article in *The Sociological Review* entitled *The Meaning of the Coronation*, in 1953. They claim the significance of modern monarchy resides in people's beliefs, values and sentiments about what they regard as sacred. Their central idea is derived from Jones, a psycho-analyst, who wrote about British people's ambivalent feelings toward the monarchy (1936/1951). On the one hand, people need an authority which seems to protect them. On the other hand, they feel the authority is restricting their freedom. As such Shils and Young see the British monarchical system as representing people's inevitable ambivalent feelings towards authority. In addition, employing the theory of Durkheim (*Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, 1915/1968), Shils and Young claim that Britain is a family-like community and the royal ceremonies (e.g. Coronation) work as regular reaffirmation of sacred values which bind the community.

> The coronation of Elizabeth II, like any other great occasion which in some manner touches the sense of the sacred, brought vitality into family relationships. The coronation, much like Christmas, was a time for drawing closer the bonds of the family, for reasserting its solidarity, and for reemphasizing the value of family - generousity, loyalty, love - which are at the same time the fundamental values necessary for well-being of the larger society. (p 72)

In this way, Shils and Young consider Britain to be a solid community under a single value system (cf. Martin, 1962). Despite people having ambivalent feelings towards the monarch (i.e. protection and restriction), the value system, which is represented by the monarch, legitimatises the contradiction: 'The monarchy is the one pervasive institution, standing above all others, which has played a part in a vital way comparable to the function of the medieval church as seen by R. H. Tawney - the function of integrating diverse elements into a whole by protecting and defining their autonomy', and Shils and Young claim that 'the sovereign acts as agent of the value system, and the moral values of the society are reinforced in the individuals honoured' (p 79). Again, according to Shils and Young, Britain is a single value virtual family and the monarchical ceremonies signify its 'family ties' based on 'family values'. To be more precise, inheriting Martin's perspective (i.e. 'irrationality' would not make the nation integrated), Shils and Young claim that a 'rational' factor of the national unification is the 'family value' under royal authority.

There are several criticisms of Shils and Young. For example, they tend to overemphasise the homogeneity and solidarity of British society. Also, Shils and Young's analytical attitudes were criticised as they take the coronation ceremony too literally (Birnbaum, 1955; Edley, 1991). What is more, Shils and Young hypothesise the structures of British monarchical ideology and society as a total system. Their emphasis on the ambivalence of monarchical authority might imply 'formal and lived' aspects of ideology (Billig *et al.*, 1988), but in fact, Shils and Young simply concludes that British society and people can be converged under the royal authority.

What is more, some parts of their argument are supported imperfectly. For example, according to the police report, there were less pickpocketings reported on the Coronation Day; and Shils and Young claim that this is evidence of communal unity (p 73). However, one could point out that there is no salient relationship between 'unity' and 'pickpocketing'. For instance, close police attention towards the crowds to secure the royal safety might have prevented the pickpockets' work. In order to prove the family-like ties between the monarch and the people *including the pickpockets*, the analysts would have had to interview pickpockets who stopped their work on the

Coronation Day and/or make statistical comparisons with some crowded non-royal events. In this way, Birnbaum's (1955) criticism of Shils and Young seems to be relevant: 'the perceptions of men are frequently dictated by their interests' (p 19). Shils and Young account for the police report from their 'family value' perspective.

2.4.2. Attitude Surveys and Historical Accounts in the 1970s

There were two attitude surveys about the British monarchy in the 1970s for political analytical purposes (Blumer *et al.*, 1971; Rose and Kavanagh, 1976), both of which employed complicated statistical techniques, and claimed that they revealed ordinary British people's 'attitude' toward the monarchy in a contemporary political context.

The first of these (*Attitudes to the Monarchy: Their structure and development during a ceremonial occasion*; Blumler *et al.*, 1971), inspired by the investiture of the Prince of Wales in 1969, discusses media influences over the people's attitude changes. The researchers measure attitudes using pre-/post-event surveys, in which participants are asked a series of questions. Blumer *et al.* claim two main points. Firstly the mass media have significantly affected people's attitude changes. Secondly, the monarchy's political significance binds British society as a whole: 'Most ordinary Englishmen [*sic*] were caught up in the spirit of the event to an extraordinary degree and communicated their enthusiasm to each other'. Blumer *et al.* continue: 'And certain fundamental social values (family solidarity, national pride) were reaffirmed' (p 170). The later study by Rose and Kavanagh (*The Monarchy in Contemporary Political Culture*, 1976) examines commonly heard claims with regard to the monarch's political roles. For instance, Rose and Kavanagh note that those who support Queen tend to have an 'irrational and mystical confidence in political authority' (p 566).

There are certain problems with these attitude studies. Firstly, these studies provide detailed accounts of previous arguments such as those of Bagehot, Jones, Martin and especially Shils and Young, with statistical explanations of 'attitude'. However the studies add little to the previous works with regard to the socio-cultural background to these 'attitudes'. For instance, both of them claim that historical continuity of the royal

line and its non-political tradition allow people to be integrated. People's 'attitude' is, in other words, dependent on the special quality of the royals derived from their family history. Blumer *et al.* claim that the monarchy has a celebrity quality like pop stars, but only the Queen can represent the moral excellence (cf. Shils and Young, 1953) which unites the nation. Rose and Kavanagh, at the same time, give a historical account for the survival of the monarchy. They outline some negative examples of continental royal families since 1850 which have failed to survive. The point Rose and Kavanagh make is that the a-political nature of the Crown enabled the House of Windsor to survive, and this political neutrality unites the nation (cf. Bagehot, 1867/1963; Martin, 1936). Thus, a comment made by Edley (1991) concerning these works is convincing: 'Yet, even if we could take their findings at face value, we are still left in need of an explanation' (p 25).

Secondly, both studies conceptualise 'attitude' as rather straightforward representations of respondents' (mental) states. Recently traditional concepts of 'attitude' have been criticised by social psychologists in discursive or rhetorical disciplines (e.g. Potter and Wetherell, 1987, 1988; Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Edwards and Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996a, 1996b; Billig, 1989, 1991, 1992; see also Lalljee, Brown and Ginsburg, 1984). For instance, Blumer *et al.* and Rose and Kavanagh make questionnaires which expect standardised responses, such as: 'Some people say we really don't need a Queen; others disagree. What do you think?' (Rose and Kavanagh, 1976, p 552). Rose and Kavanagh (and Blumer *et al.*) try to elicit packaged 'opinion' stored somewhere within the respondents. When the questionnaires stimulate the respondents, the researchers believe that one of the stored 'opinions', which represents the 'attitude', would be activated.

In contrast, social psychologists in discursive and rhetorical disciplines see the respondent's answer as a part of the construction of his/her views. A person who claims to 'hold strong views', constantly negotiates his/her 'view' within given discursive contexts (Billig, 1989, 1991; see Chapter 4 for more details). In this regard, the studies of Blumer *et al.* and Rose and Kavanagh, which are dependent on

quantitative attitude surveys, are of limited value for understanding the detail of people's thinking about monarchy.

Other examples of studies in this decade are *The British Monarchy* (1977), written by Howard, and Ziegler's *Crown and People* (1978). The former concerns socio-cultural and economic aspects of the monarchy in the present Queen's reign, and the latter concentrates on historical accounts in the 20th Century. On the one hand, a modern Bagehotian, Howard, praises several aspects of the monarchical system, such as politics, social influence, finance and so forth. For instance, he claims that despite the large amount of royal budget, 'if you add concealed cost of the monarchy, and subtract the concealed profit, you arrive at the conclusion that such arithmetic is not worth the calculation' (p 158). In so doing, he stresses the cost of 'dignified function' can save that of 'efficient functions' (i.e. Bagehot, 1867/1963). He concludes that 'it would be folly to throw away such a useful constitutional mechanism without getting some corresponding advantage. In any case, there is no need to abolish the monarchy at a stroke. It would divide the country bitterly' (p 199). Being almost identical with Bogdanor (1995), Howard confidently states that 'evolution not revolution is the British way of doing things, as well as the civilized way of doing things' (p 199). (cf. Wilson, 1989)

Although Ziegler (1978) confesses in the preface of his volume that 'I am a moderate royalist: that is to say that in the circumstances of Britain today I believe that constitutional monarchy is the most satisfactory system of government' (p 19), he is not a 'traditionalist' and 'monarchist' like Howard. He is reasonably sceptical about the Crown. Ziegler's main interest is the political cultural significance of the monarchy as well as the relationship between the monarchy and the British people. For these purposes, he has analysed several ceremonial occasions since the Victorian era, such as coronations (George VI and Elizabeth II), royal behaviour in war time and the Silver Jubilee, as national events, considering Mass Observation data viewed by the public eye. He claims that people's support for the royals is widespread but shallow and is evoked on ceremonial occasions.

> 'Crown and People' is a two-way affair. What the people really think of their King may be difficult to establish, what the King thinks of his people is almost impossible. Nevertheless there are moments when the deference slips and a flash of real feeling is to be detected. (p 32)

Ziegler believes that researchers can analyse the socio-psychological significance of the monarchy at the time of royal ceremonies. Hence, to some extent, Ziegler follows the line of Shils and Young (i.e. Coronation in 1953) and Blumer *et al.* (i.e. Investiture in 1969). Also, one may consider that Howard and Zielger share the same perspective that the media plays an important role for the royal ceremonies (i.e. Coronation, Investiture of the Prince of Wales, etc.). One of the outstanding suggestions Ziegler makes concerns the methodological development, emphasising the importance of the 'ordinary people's voice' in order to analyse the monarchy. Discussing the Mass Observation surveys which have been conducted since 1937 (i.e. *May 12 1937: Mass-Observation Day-Survey*; 1937/1987; eds. Jennings and Madge), Ziegler comments:

> These few, and still not fully stupid, principles explain some of the reasons why Mass Observation adopts the techniques, incomplete though they may be, which are now associated with its name. When we are collecting verbal data our aim is not *simply* to record what people say, but to evaluate what they say in relation to the context in which they say it. We aim - often unsuccessfully - at recording those verbal statements which are 'significant and relevant acts', and *relating* these statements to the general climate of top-level talk and socially accepted attitude; and finally at relating these different levels of *saying* to actual physical behaviour - the level of *doing*. (pp 206-207; emphasis original)

Studies on the monarchy have been changing focus: from its dignity (e.g. Bagehot) to its popularity (e.g. Martin). Ziegler proposes further shifts. In order to investigate the 'popular monarch', it is suggested that, firstly, ordinary royal discourse and these rhetorical contexts could be key points in revealing the psychology of the 'popular monarchy'. In this way, the researchers change their focus from 'intellectual thoughts'

to the ordinary people's 'discourse'. As the second point, Ziegler's statement above implies that the ideological framework of monarchism is not a total system, such as the Bagehotian view of 'the English Constitution', but is flexibly constructed within discursive/rhetorical contexts of non-intellectual discourse. In this way, Ziegler's analytical attitude suggested a new direction for the discursive/rhetorical disciplines, which had not been clearly theorised in the 1970s.

2.4.3. Revisions on the Monarchy in the 1980s (1)

In the 1980s, there were several notable studies. Perhaps one of the most important and influential works in this period is the re-consideration of royal ceremonies within an historical context by Cannadine (1983). As one of the chapters of *The Invention of Tradition* (eds. Hobsbawm and Ranger), Cannadine's study employs a functionalist and social constructionist perspective to examine royal ceremonies since the Victorian era. His main interest is the 'performances' which construct social realities in historical contexts. He reveals that what monarchists praise as spectacles of 'thousand-year-old-tradition' are the results of recent inventions. Cannadine claims that while the materials from which invented traditions were forged may have been on occasions genuinely venerable, their 'meaning' was specifically related to the social, political, economic and cultural circumstances of the time.

Hobsbawm (1983) points out that, in late 19th Century Europe, several ceremonies were invented to emphasise the historical continuities of newly founded nation states. Cannadine, who follows Hobsbawm's argument, reveals that royal 'traditions', which have been explained as having long lasting historical roots, are the result of commemorials of the media in recent days. Cannadine investigates the appearance of the ceremonies and their performances in the domestic and international arena with regard to political and cultural changes, such as competition with Continental monarchies. Also, the development of technologies (i.e. automobiles and media) helps to present the royal rituals more splendidly. One more point has to be noted: it was not only 'ceremonies' that were invented, but the capital cities in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries were re-designed for royal pageantry. There are several examples of

this kind in London, such as the widening of the Mall, the building of Admiralty Arch, the re-fronting of Buckingham Palace and the construction of the Victoria Monument in front of it. It was the age of Imperialism when the powerful states symbolised their powers by magnificent buildings, such as the Eiffel Tower in Paris (Cannadine, 1983; p 128; see also Corfield, 1999).

One of the fascinating findings about the royal ceremonies is, according to Cannadine, that 'the role of royal ritual has also acquired a new meaning in an international context, as Britain's world position has declined profoundly' (pp 156-157). His investigation draws a significantly different conclusion about the 'meaning of coronation' which Shils and Young suggested. In this way, his view is not restricted to considering the 'monarchy's function' as a set of preliminary programmed political mechanisms (e.g. binding the society). In contrast, he analyses 'functions' of the ceremonies within the historical contexts. Therefore, the 'meaning' of ceremonies could be re-considered within broader perspectives. Accordingly, his study opens up new possibilities which do not adhere to the Bagehotian tradition.

Several studies look at the royal spectacles in relation to media influences. One of the examples in this decade is Dayan and Katz (1985) who examine the wedding of the Prince of Wales as an *Electronic Ceremony*. The spectacle of the royal wedding was, according to them, accomplished by interactions between performers (i.e. royals) and audiences (i.e. number of crowds, their fashion etc.). They claim that 'the meaning of the royal wedding had less to do with the fact of marriage than with the attendance of crowds' (p 23). Dyan and Katz suggest that the TV broadcasts integrated small ceremonial units (i.e. different sub-events), participants (i.e. royal family, newlywed etc.) and audience (i.e. invited guests, onlookers, TV viewers etc.) under the name of a spectacle, 'royal wedding'. Thus, theatrical performances of ceremonies on the TV represent 'public-ness' in our media oriented society. Furthermore, in the age of duplicable electronic media, the importance of participation in the 'original' event is emphasised. Therefore, the 'royals' can be considered as a resource of British-ness.

Whereas Dayan and Katz examine the royal media events in ceremonial 'royal spectacles', two other distinctive studies analyse the mundane semiotic construction of the royals in our highly industrialised and media oriented society. Coward (*Female Desire*; 1984) analyses the monarchy as a 'royal soap'. As seen in the 1960s, Martin had conceptualised the popularity of the monarchy as a 'Royal Soap Opera'. Coward develops this perspective from a feminist point of view. She points out that royal coverages (i.e. magazine, newspaper, TV) have a similar narrative structure to a popular American soap, *Dallas*. In this way, Coward claims that there is 'a prevalent belief that people, especially women, can advance their social position through sexual alliance. Being a beautiful actress or top model is seen as a route to power; powerful men will be attracted by star qualities' (p 171). Although Coward's main criticism about the conservative 'royal soap' is that it solely emphasises the traditional values of women, she also makes two suggestions. Firstly, people's knowledge about, and images of, the royals are reconstructed and mediated by the media. Secondly, the 'royal soap' is popular, because it is a relevant melodrama for British audiences.

Coward's point is also relevant to the work of Williamson (*Consuming Passions*; 1986), who analyses semantics in the commercial media of contemporary Britain. She argues that there is an ambivalence towards royal figures in the media: the Royal Family is, technically, 'the most upper class', but their life-styles are 'very lower-to-middle class' (p 83) in the media, with the exception of Princess Diana's extreme fairy tale quality. According to her analysis, the Royal Family implies nationhood through the 'family value' (cf. Shils and Young, 1953). Williamson discusses a popular media discourse about the present Queen's contribution in World War II; and finds that:

> ... a kind of nationalism through populism is evident in quotes like this: the real point of the sentence isn't that the Princess did 'national service' but that she did it '*like other girls her age*'. (p 84; emphasis original).

Secondly, Williamson argues that this ambivalence is derived from the class structure. Royalty combines conservative factors of feudal aristocracy with the capitalist- and

petit-bourgeois culture, which serves as neo-conservatism, as exemplified in Mrs Thatcher's government.

Pearson's book about the Royal Family (*The Ultimate Family*; 1986) concerns the development and changes of the British Royal House of Windsor (Hanover) over the last two centuries, with a series of royal biographies. He points out the importance of the media for today's monarchy, and the ambivalence of ordinary/extra-ordinary dialectic (Edley, 1991) which the media has depicted. Pearson's second chapter is 'Queen Mary and the Sacred Kingship' (the first chapter is an introduction), and he concludes his book in the last chapter, 'The Ultimate Family'.

> Queen Mary's firm belief in the sacred nature of the monarchy has all but vanished - as have most of the great ideals it stood for: but human interest, and involvement in the characters and the emotions of the world's most famous family, have become the surest guarantee of its enduring future. (p 295)

Pearson shows that the sacred kingship of the past evolved into a British family with soap quality (although still regarded as 'ultimate'), through its 'naturalization' since 1917 and the power of the mass-media.

2.4.4. Revisions on the Monarchy in the 1980s (2)

In 1988, Nairn published *The Enchanted Glass*. This remarkable volume is 'struggling against the legacy of Bagehot, part of Nairn's project sought, like those of Coward and Williamson, to re-establish the political significance of the institution' (Edley, 1991; p 32). In the 'foreword' to the book, the Scottish critic notes:

> A personalized and totemic symbolism was needed to maintain the a-national nationalism of a multi-national (and for long imperial) entity; and 'the Crown' could effectively translate identity on to that 'higher plane' required by a country (heartland England) which has since the 17th century existed out of itself as much as in. Though profoundly averse to democracy, this version of

> nationality has of course had to adapt to the popular times: and one mode of such adaptation has been precisely that rapprochement of Royal and 'ordinary' we find so prominent in the daily dosage of British monarchism, where a nationalist emotivity informs the concrete individuality of the Sovereign, and her family has become so all-important. (p 11)

Nairn makes systematic criticisms of modern monarchism at the level of ideology and national identity, revising previous perspectives. He stresses several aspects, such as the monarchical function of national unification, its popularity, the media coverage, royal taboos, historical accounts and so on. Nairn states that, in the history of the UK, the monarchy has helped to constitute the English-British nation by 'significant and significantly unacknowledged ways' (p 235). Since the people do not view the monarchy as being politically powerful, the 'English kingship' has successfully dominated the 'a-national' United Kingdom which embodies north-south conflicts. According to Nairn, the central idea of this legitimisation is the 'backward looking' of modern monarchical ideology and the 'English' national identity.

As an example, he argues that while a considerable amount of the UK industrialisation has been carried out by the 'north' (e.g. North Sea oil), the 'south east' oriented commercial system (e.g. City economy) legitimises the inequality between the 'south east' and the rest of the UK. Quoting Hilton's (1987) discussion about the City oriented economic system, Nairn criticises the traditional Bagehotian view. Nairn says that modern monarchism continuously reproduces inequalities, and does not unite the divided nation. It is, in fact, no more than a part of 'crass materialism' (p 240).

> Monarchy is in this sense little more than the popular visage and social cement of Great Britain's unique version of capitalist development: the prolonged and baroquely gilded-hegemony of 'early' or commercial capital over all subsequent phases. To its spiritual enwrapment of the British there corresponds on the material side the hegemony of City-controlled economy for which (as Hilton and others have shown) domestic industrial production was always secondary, and has now become quite peripheral. (p 241)

Nairn, in this way, makes critical revisions about the traditional views of the monarchy. One more point should not be missed. He emphasises that these inequalities are formulated in everyday life rather than people's occasional reactions evoked by the royal ceremonies which have been investigated by Martin, Shils and Young, Blumer *et al.*, Ziegler or Dayan and Katz. According to Nairn, because of the influential power of the mass media, the monarchical ideology is subtly and steadily formulated all over the nation in everyday life, because 'extremely few Great Britons are in that position today. Only a deaf-and-dumb hermit with no T.V. set in remotest Shetland could hope to escape the daily Royal Touch' (p 85).

Narin's book is, according to Arblaster (1989), the first cool revision on the long lasting Bagehotian views, since Martin's 'non-dignified TV monarchy' perspective in 1962. In addition, in a different essay (*Britain's royal romance*;1989), Nairn describes British monarchism as a 'fetishism' which is used to formulate English centred nationalism. He also argues that it is impossible to modernise the Crown in the age of a united Europe (*A Story's End*; 1994). Nairn's historical and political accounts show the direction of future social scientific revisions of the monarchy (Edley, 1991).

Another example of critical social scientific analysis of the monarchy in this decade is Wilson's *The Myth of British Monarchy* (1989). Edley (1991) comments that Wilson has produced 'a handbook for would-be republicans' (p 33). Wilson lists several 'myths' of the monarchy, covering political, economic and cultural significance. These myths consist of 'common senses' of modern monarchism (or *myth*), which justify the contradiction of the democratic and egalitarian social norms. It is often said that, for example, the royals play diplomatic roles; however, according to Wilson, it is a 'myth'. He points out that after a royal visit, British exports to the country concerned tend to decline (pp 50-55). Also, as mentioned above, it is quite appropriate that the House of Windsor, which is often described as being a long lasting 'British' tradition is, in fact, a relatively new adaptation (cf. Howard, 1977).

One more social scientist of the late 1980s should not be excluded; a social psychologist with rhetorical disciplines began to analyse the monarchical matter. Analysing media discourses (1988, 1990) and mundane family talks (1989), Billig attempts to reveal everyday constructions of monarchical ideology by the micro-analytical techniques of discourse. Until Billig's studies, critical work on the monarchy had been restricted to sociological disciplines with a macro viewpoint, such as historical, economical, political or cultural accounts by intellectuals, and they tended to consider the monarchy as a part of the entity of Britain (cf. Zigler, 1977). In contrast, Billig demonstrates that discursive and rhetorical analysis with a micro perspective could reveal the flexible nature of monarchical ideology. Examining the royal discourses of non-intellectuals, we will be able to reveal these common-places and the process of formulation of monarchical ideology under the democratic social norms. As will be seen in the next section, his approach to the monarchy crystallised into a book, *Talking of the Royal Family* (1992).

2.4.5. Discursive Approaches and the Diana Impact in the 1990s

As the Queen's famous speech, *annus horribilis* (1992), suggests the 1990s have been a turbulent period for the Crown; for instance, the separation of the Prince and Princess of Wales, the fire at Windsor Castle (e.g. Pimlott, 1996) and the death of the Princess of Wales. The huge social impact of Diana's BBC *Panorama* interview and the emotional national reaction to her sudden death, also encouraged the study of the monarchy. As seen above, some rather traditional studies such as Bogdanor (1995) were published in this period. However, one should note that in this period, social constructionist, micro-level approaches were developed for monarchical studies, such as Edley and Billig.

Edley's thesis (*Monarchy in the Mirror*; 1991) investigates discursive constructions of modern monarchical ideology, mainly by the popular tabloid papers. He later expanded one of his chapters for a journal article (*Prince Charles - our flexible friend*; 1993), looking particularly at the formulation of a royal identity in the media discourse.

Analysing 'functions' of media discourses, his study shows the contradictory commonplaces within the monarchical ideology (Billig *et al.*, 1988).

In the year after Edley's thesis, *annus horriblis*, Billig (1992) published *Talking of the Royal Family*. Following critical perspectives from Nairn and Wilson, Billig analyses mundane family discussions about the monarchy, employing discursive and rhetorical analysis (see Chapter 4). There are several fascinating findings in this book. Here I shall concentrate on two points: firstly, the ideological functions to legitimise inequality within egalitarianism, and secondly, broadly observed speakers' cynical attitudes toward the monarchy and nationalism.

One of Billig's discussions is a popular theme in the royal discourse: the balance of royal privileges and social equality. He notes that 'privilege-equality' discourse contains a set of contradictory themes, which enable a speaker to calculate *their* 'gain/loss' and *our* 'gain/loss'. According to Billig's metaphor, this is the 'royal credit' discourse. To be more precise, even royalists (and, of course, liberal speakers) consider that royal privileges are problematic in the light of today's egalitarianism. Therefore this could provoke jealousy, which potentially damages the monarchism. However, Billig points out that 'rhetorical means are required to contain the jealous wish' (p 124). For instance, royal privileges are often re-defined as royal obligations or restrictions of freedom. Billig analyses several interviews which refer to this 'royal credit' theme. One of these examples is a mother talking of *their* (i.e. royal) materially desirable life. However, she is also calculating the balance of their life and *her own* (i.e. working class) life.

> She said that the royals can do the 'things we'd love to do', but this was qualified, even as it was expressed: 'but I think they're limited'. She compared 'our' life favourably with 'theirs': 'Our life is governed nine till five; you're told that what your work (is)...and after that you do your own thing...But their whole life...is governed by rules and regulations, which I absolutely hate'. Envy has lost its sting. 'They' might have material possessions and some enviable

> opportunities, but, these are only particulars, outweighed by the general condition of 'their' life. 'Their' whole life is a debit - a hateful debit. (p 124)

Examining several discourses of this kind, Billig points out that non-privileged (working class) lives are often rhetorically exalted. It is impossible for Royals to go to superstores, pubs, fish and chip shops, but 'I've got the only privilege, I've got, of doing, that is, I can walk out me front door and drive down town without fear of nobody trying to shoot me or press taking photos' (p 141; young working class speaker). Also, participants often make jokes about Palace life, such as the amount of cleaning and silver polishing. Billig claims that these everyday rhetorical formulations are important to construct modern monarchical ideology.

The other notable point Billig makes concerns the post-modern nature of modern monarchism. The post-modern monarch (which would be symbolised by Prince Charles' critical comments on 'modernist' buildings) has a nationalistic nature and a cynical knowingness. In so doing, the ignorance, indifference or cynicism to the monarchy 'is necessary to take seriously the possibility that post-modernism is more than a cultural style, but it is a feature of ideology. It is a characteristic of ideology that it settles people down into social positions of inequality' (pp 207-208). From Billig's discursive perspectives, as we have seen, monarchical ideology is continuously constructed and redefined within everyday interactions. In this way, Billig revises the Bagehotian tradition (e.g. total system of 'English Constitution'), and supports Nairn's perspective of a mundane formulation of 'a-national nationalism' (e.g. 'daily Royal Touch').

In addition, this suggestive work shows techniques which reveal dilemmas of the monarchy such as its ordinary and extra-ordinary nature at the level of ideology, which, for instance, Williamson (1986) and Nairn (1988) discuss at the level of politics, economics or culture. Accordingly, discursive/rhetorical studies conducted by Edley and Billig provide powerful analytical tools for investigating modern monarchism. These tools, needless to say, are able to overcome faults of quantitative (attitude

theoretical) approaches, such as those of Blumer *et al.* (1971) and Rose and Kavanagh (1976), which over simplified the concepts of 'attitude'.

In his new edition of *Talking of the Royal Family*, Billig (1998) recalls social psychologists' attitudes towards the monarchical matter: 'Colleagues would smile when I told them what my project was. It seemed an amusing topic to choose, lacking the seriousness of proper subjects like gender, inequality or nationalism' (p xiii). Billig's work could promote the study of the monarchy as one of the major interests of social scientists. Also, several royal scandals have encouraged academic interest with a historical perspective (Cannadine, 1998) and a biographical study about the Queen (Pimlott, 1996). To argue about recent academic interests focusing on the monarchy, one cannot miss the huge 'Diana impact' (e.g. Campbell, 1998). The monarchy is, now, a serious enough topic for social scientists.

In these days, monarchical issues tend to be discussed as 'family matters' by social scientists. Coward's 'Royal soap' suggestion (1983) echoes this idea. What is more, several scandals reported by the popular media (i.e. tabloid papers and '*paparazzi*') help to redefine academics' perspectives toward the monarchical matter; for instance, in 1983, Cannadine considered that the present Queen's coronation was a (media) ceremony which functionally united the nation in the circumstances of the UK's political and economic decline. Recently, Cannadine tends to discuss the same Queen as just a mother who is worrying about the separation of her son (1998, p 68-75). In this regard, the studies in the 1990s have become relatively free from the restricted interest of the monarchy's political, economic or social functions, but they are examining its cultural values of 'family' and 'life'. What is more, analyses in the 1990s tend to be more micro analyses on individual royals and/or research participants.

The 'Diana impact' has provoked social scientists with discursive disciplines to study the accountability of the BBC *Panorama* interview (Bull, 1997; Abell and Stokoe, 1999) and the media accountability of her car accident in Paris (MacMillan and Edwards, 1999). Immediately after her death, also, *The Psychologist* featured a series of public reactions to the incident (e.g. Aron and Livingstone, 1997; Street, 1997;

Billig, 1997c; Mitchel, 1997). Moreover, from a feminist point of view, Campbell (1998) considers Diana's life, marriage, divorce and death by examining how her sexuality has been portrayed in popular commercial media. Campbell evaluates Diana as a woman who fought, consciously or unconsciously, with an established discriminative institution (i.e. the monarchy, Royal Family) with her sexuality. Campbell (1998) positively evaluates Diana's *Panorama* interview, since it 'cemented her connection to the concerns that are alive in popular culture. In naming her suffering, she also gained the empathy of thousands of women who had survived or were going through similar experiences' (pp 6-7). Bull (1997) analyses the interview's critical implications for the royal family (and Camilla) using the theory of equivocation (e.g. avoidance-avoidance conflict). Abell and Stokoe (1999), on the other hand, reveal Diana's criticism from a discursive psychological point of view. Abell and Stokoe see Diana's blaming of her ex-husband, his family and his mistress as constructed within continuous negotiations between the interviewer and the interviewee. MacMillan and Edwards (1999) analyse the media accounts of the cause of Diana's death and rhetorical formulations of the 'blaming' by the media. Since it was obvious that one of the factors of the Princess's accident was the media's (and of course, its audiences') interest in her private life, MacMillan and Edwards are able to point out several descriptive and rhetorical formulations to deal with this dilemma of the media.

2.5.0. Concluding Comments

I have outlined studies on the monarchy from the Victorian age to the end of the 20th Century. Speaking generally, there has been a shift from macro-level approaches which see the monarchy as a part of total social entity, to micro-level analyses. In addition, the classic Victorian study (i.e. Bagehot) which emphasises the monarch's 'dignified' function to unite the nation, has been revised several times. Later studies stress the 'popularity' of the monarch and how this serves to integrate the nation. Nowadays, what is more, some liberal thinkers have become quite sceptical about the function of the Crown in national unity.

In the 1990s, Billig re-works the fundamental questions raised by Nairn (1988), about why an anachronistic 'totemism' or problematic 'fetishism' survive under a democratic social norm. Billig (1988, 1989, 1992) introduces the concept of 'common-places', in order to analyse these dilemmas. Accordingly, dilemmas have become analysable material for social scientists. As seen above, Billig's argument about the dilemma is fairly clear: rhetorical means, in our daily discursive practices, continuously justifying the presence of the monarchy under egalitarianism.

To be more precise, theorists have conceptualised several 'functions' of the Queen in our society. Billig, on the other hand, suggests shifting the analytical focus to the voice of the non-élite, rather than intellectual theories. Non-privileged (e.g. working class) people justify the inequality using, for example, the 'royal credit' discourse. In this way, a shift from the macro-level analysis (i.e. intellectual thoughts) to micro-level analysis (i.e. rhetorical/discursive analysis) of 'common-places' has opened up a new viewpoint to answer the question proposed in the very first portion of this chapter: the inequality under the egalitarian social norm is, in fact, continuously justified by people in less advantaged positions, according to Billig.

Chapter 3

Analysing Modern Monarchies (2)

- Studies on Japanese Monarchy -

3.1.0. Introduction

In the previous chapter, several British theories which look at the monarchy under the 'enlightenment' and 'democratic' social norm were outlined. This chapter will explore the basic question of the previous chapter: 'the justifications of the inequality under the egalitarian social norms' with regard to today's Japan.

Within this chapter only Japanese studies in the post-war era will be reviewed. There are reasons for restricting the period of my investigation. First of all, there were few social scientific studies of the monarchy in the pre-war period, and these often conflicted with the 'official ideology' (Anderson, 1983) of pre-war Imperialism, and were forced to be withdrawn (*see section 3.3.1*). Secondly, and related to the first issue, under the pre-war official ideology of 'ultra-nationalism' (Maruyama, 1946, 1963), the notion of 'democracy' was not based on 'inherent equality' amongst people, but 'His Majesty' bestowed favours on his fellow Japanese (cf. Minobe, 1946). Thus, only the post-war studies are worth considering as 'scientific' studies examining the modern monarchical dilemma, between 'inherent equality' and 'inherited sovereignty'. Thirdly, I will not only present studies looking at the Emperor's functions, but also his character. While the British monarch (i.e. George VI) would be seen as one of the leaders who led his country to victory in the war, Hirohito failed to do so and brought enormous difficulties to the nation. Furthermore, 'His Majesty the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Army and Navy' gave the appearance of having accepted no

responsibility for the war (*see section 3.2.0*). Accordingly, several post-war Japanese studies have been inspired by negative feelings for Hirohito's character, such as his moral sense of responsibility (e.g. Maruyama, 1946). This 'negative feeling' differentiates Japanese studies from British ones, which mainly look at the monarchical 'functions' rather than individual characters. Since this thesis concerns the dilemma of modern monarchism, in this chapter, I will focus on the post-war studies, which concern the dilemma of the Imperial character.

3.1.1. Chapter Outline

Shimizu (1989) reviewed notable journalistic and sociological works of the Emperorship in the post-war period, and divided these works into four chronological groups: the period of 1945-1952, 1952-1961, 1961-1975 and 1975-1989. The first period (1945-1952) was the period of occupation. The second one (1952-1961) covers the period of independence to the onset of active right-wing terrorism, which made the criticisms of the Emperor virtual taboos for journalists and academicians (*see section 3.5.0*). In addition, during this period, the marriage of the Crown Prince was enthusiastically reported by the popular media. The third period (1961-1975) covers the time until the Emperor's visit to Europe and the US. During this period, Japan enjoyed its remarkable economic success. In the last period (1975-1989), Hirohito cerebrated the 50th and 60th anniversaries of his reign and died in 1989 (cf. Amano (ed.), 1995).

I would like to re-organise Shimizu's categorisation. For one thing, I will present studies in the post-Hirohito period, the 1990s. Furthermore, the period of the 'occupation' can be divided into 'immediately after the war' (1945-1947) and the 'late occupation period' (1947-1952). In the period 'immediately after the war', there were several liberal reforms in Japanese politics and economics (e.g. the post-war Constitution, 1946). In the 'later occupation period', the occupation policy changed to anti-communism (e.g. Tooyama, Imai, and Fujiwara, 1959). Thus, in this chapter, social scientific studies on the monarchy will be categorised into six groups: 'immediately after the war' (1945-1947), the 'late occupation period' (1947-1952), the

'Crown marriage and the terrorism' (1952-1961), the 'economic miracle' (1961-1975), the 'late-Hirohito period' (1975-1989) and the 'post-Hirohito period' (1889-).

In this chapter, I will firstly outline Japanese history considering the Emperor's position in society since the mid-19th Century, then secondly, as the main argument, I will introduce several studies in the six periods. The social and historical contexts of the studies will be outlined for each period. Then, in the conclusion to this chapter, I will compare the studies in Japan with the British ones discussed in Chapter 2.

3.2.0. Formation of the Modern State

Until the mid-19th Century, Japan had enjoyed peace for more than 250 years with a regime of half-independent feudal clans under the authority of the Shogun government (Bakufu), which was undisturbed by foreign powers. The Emperors, believed to be the direct descendants of the national founder, the Sun Goddess, were religious authorities who prayed for the rice harvest. Although the Imperial court legitimised Shogun's hegemony over other feudal lords, the court was, at the same time, dependent upon the Bakufu (Amino, 1991, 1997). The Emperor was regarded as the resource of honour, but he could not honour anybody without the Shoguns' consent. According to the terminology of Griffis (1895/1973), it was a 'dual system of government' (p 291), with the Emperor as 'Sacred Chief' and the Shogun as 'Secular Chief' (Benedict, 1946/1967; p 48). In the mid-19th Century, the Shogun government (Bakufu) revised its isolation policy due to increasing pressure from the Western 'barbarians' (the Westerners were considered as 'barbarians' according to traditional Japanese cosmology), but this revision triggered huge political confusion. In 1868, the Shogun government collapsed, and a new nation-state was established which simplified the 'dual system' under the Imperial authority.

The formulation of modern Japanese nationalism, known as the 'Meiji restoration', has been discussed by several scholars (e.g. Griffis, 1895/1973; Gubbins, 1922/1971; Benedict, 1946/1967; Anderson, 1983; Morris-Suzuki, 1984; Inoue, 1991; Suzuki, 1993; Cortazzi, 1993; Fujitani, 1996; Megarry (ed.), 1995; Yasumaru, 1992; Ueyama,

1985; Kamei, 1974). What has to be noted here is that the Japanese Emperor was considered as the indigenous monarch, therefore, 'naturalization' (Anderson, 1983) of the monarchy was not necessary to form a monarchical nation state (*see section 2.3.0*). For instance, Anderson (1983) notes:

> In this ordinary campaign the men of Meiji were aided by three half-fortuitous factors. First was the relatively high degree of Japanese ethnocultural homogeneity resulting from two and half centuries of isolation and internal pacification by the Bakufu... Second, the unique antiquity of the imperial house (Japan is the only country whose monarchy has been monopolized by a single dynasty throughout recorded history), and its emblematic Japanese-ness (contrast Bourbons and Habsburgs), made the exploitation of the Emperor for official-nationalist purposes rather simple. Third, the penetration of the barbarians was abrupt, massive, and menacing enough for most elements of the politically-aware population to rally behind a programme of self-defence conceived in the national terms. (1983; pp 95-96)

Common people had little or no knowledge of the Emperor under the Shogun's regime, but (suddenly) after the Meiji restoration, it became common-place to think of the flow of time (*Gengo* system, *see section 3.7.0*), the organisation of political space and even Japanese culture as converging on that very Emperor. The emerging process of this 'emperor-centred nationalism' (Fujitani, 1996) is a fascinating social scientific topic, but to argue this process in detail would carry us too far away from the main concern of this chapter. It should be noted here that this 'emperor-centred nationalism' was a recent 'invention' (Hobsbawm, 1983) by the Meiji reformers (cf. Kamei, 1974; *see section 3.6.3, 8.3.2*).

After the fall of the Shogun government and the Imperial restoration in 1868, the reformers ended Japan's seclusion and rushed to catch up with the industrialised West. Seeking to enrich the nation, industry was systematically promoted, the Constitution was drawn up (1889), and the Parliament was established (1890). Also, the 'Great Empire of Japan' formed a military oriented political system to confront the increasing

interests and influences of Western powers over East Asia (e.g. The Opium War in 1840). For instance, as early as 1873, Japan introduced conscription, well before the UK. The victories of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) made Japan one of the world powers and, consequently, increased the Emperor's authority, who 'retained the power to declare war, to conclude treaties and to prorogue or adjourn the Diet. He was also supreme commander of the armed forces' (Cortazzi, 1993; p 29).

The Empire of the Sun was a late contender in the competitions amongst the imperialist countries. To deal with imperialistic demands, the military sections tended to dominate national politics. Later, in the reign of Hirohito (the 1930s), Japanese politics almost lost its democratic character, and imperialist leanings intensified. Due to its expansionism (especially over China), the national interest of Japan conflicted with that of other imperialist nations, such as the US and the UK. The military regime re-organised society under the 'ultra-nationalistic ideology' (Maruyama, 1946), in order to converge all the national resources for military purposes. At the same time, the sacred value of the Emperor and the 'mission of the nation' (e.g. serving for the national expansion) were systematically taught in schools (Yamamoto and Konno, 1976/1986). In doing so, on the one hand, the authority and divinity of the Emperor were exalted to a great extent, on the other hand, young officers, who tended not to admit to any authority other than the Emperor's, were no longer under Constitutional control, and extended their ultra-nationalistic movements. For instance, there were two military *coup* attempts by young officers in 1932 and 1936, in which several leading politicians and close attendants of the Emperor were assassinated (e.g. Storry, 1960/1995; Halliday, 1975/1995). From the early 1930s (i.e. systematic invasions of China) to 1945 (i.e. the atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the surrender), the military regime controlled almost all aspects of Japanese life, and the human rights of Asians (including Japanese 'ordinary' people) were obstructed (e.g. Tooyama, Imai and Fujiwara, 1959; Eizawa, 1995; Takasaki, 1993). As will be seen, although there are arguments about the causes of this militarism and ultra-nationalism, these obsessions took place in the name of His Majesty the Emperor.

3.3.0. Immediately After the War (1945-1947)

During the war, general hostility against Hirohito amongst US citizens was quite serious (e.g. More than 70% of US citizens claimed that Hirohito should be executed or imprisoned for life, in summer 1945: Nakamura, 1992). At the same time, the US leaders anticipated potential conflicts with Soviet Russia over the post-war world order. The former ambassador in Japan, Joseph Grew, gave an influential speech at the committee hearing of the Senate House in December 1944, which determined the post-war American policy on the Emperor:

> "...To understand the position of the Emperor... it might be useful to draw a homely parallel. As you know, the queen bee in a hive is surrounded by the attention of the hive, which treats her with veneration and ministers in every way to her comfort... if one were to remove the queen from the swarm, the hive would disintegrate." (cited by Nakamura, 1992; pp 66-67)

Thereafter, the US leaders decided to preserve the 'queen bee' (Hirohito) to maintain an integrated Japan, in order to deal with the influence of communism. After Japan surrendered, the American chief prosecutor of the IMTFE (International Military Tribunal of the Far East) had strict instructions from Washington D.C. not to implicate Hirohito as a war criminal. Whereas several Japanese war-time leaders (e.g. The war-time PM, General Tojo) were executed, Hirohito was not prosecuted. Moreover, he never made any depositions and did not testify at the IMTFE (see Yoshida, 1992, for details about Hirohito's actions to avoid the prosecution).

During the occupation period, the US General MacArther, the commander of the occupation forces, had much greater authority than the Emperor. In the early years of the occupation, MacArther's young staff, mainly the liberal new-dealers, worked hard to make a clean break with the pre-war Japan. They supervised the Constitutional reforms and a policy of unarmed neutrality was propagated. Specifically, the occupation disbanded the Japanese military, had the Emperor denounce his divinity (in the new year speech of 1946), freed political prisoners, redistributed agrarian land from

large landholders to tenant peasants ('Land Reform', in 1946), forced the dissolution of financial cliques and guided the post-war Japanese government through other reforms. In November 1946, the post-war Constitution was proclaimed, (enforced in May 1947) which is characterised by the People's Sovereignty, the Symbol Emperor System and Pacifism (for details about the articles of the post-war Constitution, see Appendix 2-2: for the Parliamental debates of the Constitutional reform, see Yokota, 1978a, 1978b). In 1946, furthermore, Hirohito began his series of Imperial visits throughout Japan and gained national approval as 'a human monarch'. Several scholars have claimed that the psychological ground of the post-war Emperor system was established through these visits (e.g. Sakamoto, 1988, 1989; Azuma, 1997; Fujitani, 1996).

3.3.1. Conventionalist Argument

Minobe was a victim of the mass-hysteria during the ultra-nationalistic period (the 1930s), which blindly exalted the 'divine Emperor'. Minobe was a respected intellectual, a professor emeritus of Tokyo University Law School as well as a member of the House of Peers. Minobe's theory of the Constitution, '*Tenno kikansetsu*' (Emperor organ theory) was little more than the Western idea of a Constitutional monarchy; the Emperor was one of the several organs of the state. However, the term *kikan* (organ) is somewhat unfortunate in the Japanese context, since it connotes a mechanical system, such as a steam engine.

> Minobe's book could well have appeared without attracting any hostile reaction beyond the normal critical comments of reviewers, but this was not to be. A right-wing patriot, also a member of the House of Peers, orchestrated a popular protest which effectively accused Minobe of sacrilege. (Crump, 1989; p 120)

Minobe was driven out of public and academic life and was also subject to personal assault. He resigned as an MP, and his academic theory, '*Tenno kikansetsu*', was officially paganised by a parliamentary resolution in 1935.

After the war, when 'democracy' became the new 'official ideology', liberal people considered Minobe as a champion of the democratic thinkers. For instance, the first issue of a liberal monthly magazine, the *Sekai* (January, 1946), featured Minobe's reform plan of the pre-war Constitution (*Minshu-shugi to Waga Gikai-Seido*: 'Democracy and Our Parliamental System') as the leading article. At that time, the editors of *Sekai* expected Minobe to be a leading ideologue for democratic Constitutional reform. However, 'Minobe's article clearly denied "democracy" with regard to "people's sovereignty", but stressed "monarchical sovereignty" instead' (Watanabe, 1990; p 71).

The notion of the people's sovereignty was derived from the Western tradition of democracy (i.e. French Revolution and American Independence). However, according to Minobe, it could not be adapted to 'the thousands of years of tradition of our country'. What is more, the long tradition of the Emperorship was an immeasurable advantage for the Japanese political system, which the Japanese people should be proud of.

> Our country, Japan, has the greatest advantage, living under the unbroken line of the Imperial sovereigns, which all our people without exception, have had a loyalty to and respect for, which is incomparable to that which exists with any other nation, because the Emperor is the very centre of the unity of our nation. (Minobe, 1946; pp 21-22)

According to Minobe, the traditional authority of the 'centre' which has existed since the foundation of the nation, led the Japanese people to make every effort to fight the war, whereas it often conflicted with their personal interests. In addition, once the surrender became inescapable, the Emperor was the only person able to disarm the Imperial forces systematically. Thanks to his authority, in the post-war era, Japanese people could live without suffering from the 'ultra-nationalism' which had originated from the military clique. Minobe claimed that the maintenance of the monarchy was the 'absolute condition' to ensure the maintenance of an integrated nation: 'Without it, the

existence of Japan as a unified nation, should not be expected' (p 23). Although Minobe emphasised a 'democracy', his idea of democracy does not signify the sovereignty of the people, but a 'democracy' by the monarch's favour. Minobe believed that the Emperor could consult people and rule the country according to public opinion. From his point of view, that is a 'democracy' which suits Japan. To some extent, Minobe's perspective is similar to that of Bagehot (1867/1963; *see section 2.2.1*), but there is no cynicism about the monarch. He, as one of the Japanese political élite, believed that Japan had a 'dignified' and 'efficient' Emperor.

Another notable point is that Minobe's *kikansetsu* (organ theory) could limit (or 'immunise') Hirohito's responsibility for the war; Hirohito just followed the advice of his ministers (e.g. General Tojo) as a part (i.e. 'organ') of the Constitutional entity. The organ theory was originally suppressed, because it implies that the Emperor has a lack of subjectivity (and divinity), but in the post-war era, it was a great means of saving Hirohito's personal reputation. Although Hirohito might have made mistakes, he was innocent, because he was not a dictator who insisted on his own will, but harmonised with other 'organs' (cf. Maruyama, 1946; Yasumaru, 1992). It is a liberal person's dilemma; Minobe, who had a reputation of being a liberal thinker, turned out to be a conservative wishing to protect the pre-war divine Emperorship. From the conservative point of view, on the other hand, Minobe provided a firm theoretical ground for post-war monarchism. The organ theory proposes that the monarch was immune from responsibility for the war, and it is sufficient for (post-war) conservatives that His Majesty is the 'supreme organ'. The militaristic implications of his historical stance are, furthermore, separated from Hirohito. The militarism in his reign was not his fault, the military clique (e.g. General Tojo) had to take responsibility for it.

3.3.2. Liberal Revision of Ultra-Nationalism

Four months after Minobe's article, the May, 1946, issue of *Sekai*, featured a leading article entitled *Cho-kokka-shugi no Ronri to Shinri* ('Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism') by Maruyama, a young and spirited associate professor of Tokyo University Law School. Maruyama examined Japanese war-time authoritarian attitudes

and several unethical events (e.g. atrocities, ill-treatment of PoWs), and pointed out that they were based on the totalitarian morality: 'For the logic according to which "private affairs" cannot be morally justified within themselves, but must always be identified with national affairs, has a converse implication: private interests endlessly infiltrate into national concerns' (p 7; quoted from the English translation by Morris, 1963). Maruyama claimed that individual Japanese people did not have an internal moral standard (cf. Christianity or 'guilt culture', Benedict, 1946/1967), rather, they evaluated someone's value according to his/her closeness to the 'eternal culmination' which was the essence of the 'national polity' (i.e. the Emperor). Thus, people were not able to objectively evaluate their own acts in the ultra-nationalistic regime.

> What determined the behaviour of the bureaucrats and the military was not primarily a sense of legality, but the consciousness of some force that was higher than they were, in other words, that was nearer the ultimate entity. Inasmuch as the formal quality of the national order was not recognised in Japan, it was inevitable that the concept of legality should be poorly developed. The law was not regarded as some general body of regulations that collectively circumscribed the ruler and the ruled, but simply as a concrete weapon of control operating in the hierarchy of which the Emperor was the head. (1963; pp 12-13)

Therefore, the Japanese who belonged to lower classes could not subjectively evaluate the contents of the commands, but were strictly required to obey. For instance, the ill-treatment of the PoWs was a common problem in Nazi-Germany and Japan. However, after the war, the war criminals in court showed different attitudes. Although Hermann Göring 'roared with laughter', Japanese war criminals turned pale and wept. According to Maruyama, the Japanese type of ill-treatment was not 'cold-blooded objective ill-treatment' (i.e. Göring); they treated the PoWs according to the relative status difference between the PoWs and the warders. Although Göring understood why he was being prosecuted, the Japanese warders were not convinced of their guilt. The warders simply imputed duties, obligations and ill-treatment, which they

experienced in barracks, to whomever was inferior to them, such as non-Japanese PoWs.

> In the absence of any free, subjective awareness the individual's actions are not circumscribed by the dictates of conscience; instead he is regarded by the existence of people in a higher class - of people, that is, who are closer to the ultimate value. What takes the place of despotism in such a situation is a phenomenon that may be described as the maintenance of equilibrium by the transfer of oppression. By exercising arbitrary power on those who are below, people manage to transfer in a downward direction the sense of oppression that comes from above, thus preserving the balance of the whole. (pp 17-18)

People in superior positions (e.g. 'supreme organ'), on the one hand, had neither responsibility nor duties. On the other hand, people at the bottom of the society had enormous duties and responsibility with little rewards (i.e. 'transfer of oppression'). Maruyama claims that there should be a proper balance between the privileges and responsibilities: the more privileged (superior) are expected to be more responsible. In this regard, the ultra-nationalistic regime was unfair (e.g. the war criminal warders and the Emperor). Maruyama's argument is a sharp criticism for the post-war pro-monarchy discourses, which redeemed the Emperor's personal reputation based on his theoretical lack of responsibility (i.e. the organ theory). Maruyama claims that everyone has to be responsible for the outcomes of his/her acts, but the Japanese Emperor system functioned as an oppressive institution for the ordinary Japanese. In Maruyama's view, the 'oppressive nature of the Emperor system' and its 'systematic lack of the responsibility', have been regarded as the central ideas of anti-monarchical liberal arguments.

3.4.0. Late Occupation Period (1947-1952)

Despite the liberal reforms by the new-dealers in the early occupation period, the occupation policy in the later period was characterised by its 'reverse course' (Large, 1992). In late 1947 and 1948, the escalation of the Cold War confrontation and the

'loss of China' (1949), made the US focus on rebuilding Japan as an anti-communist state. The outbreak of the war in Korea (1950) made it essential from the US perspective to forge a military, political and economic alliance with Japan. From the economic point of view, the Korean War sparked an explosive expansion in Japanese production to meet the US military demands. By the fiscal year of 1951, Japan had regained its pre-war level Gross National Product (e.g. Johnson, 1982/1995). When the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed in 1951 to end the occupation (enacted in 1952), the Soviet Union refused to sign. At the same time, the US-Japan Security Treaty was concluded. Thereafter, Japan has been a part of the US global strategy.

3.4.1. The Emperor in the Shame Culture

Benedict was an American cultural anthropologist, who worked for the Office of War Information during World War II. The OWI conducted several pieces of research for the sake of the foreseeable post-war occupational work. After the war, she published *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (1946/1967) which was based on her OWI report. This book was translated into Japanese as early as 1948. Although its original publication in the US occurred during the period 'immediately after the war', this volume can be categorised as belonging to the 'late occupation period' because of its publication date in Japan.

Although Benedict had never been to Japan, she completed an outstanding analysis based on literary reviews and interviews of Japanese-Americans. Her central concern was the typology of the culture, focusing upon the synchronisation of the pattern of culture and personality. She believed that a group of people (in other words, people in a particular culture) would show a similar personality, because they share similar infant experiences. In this way, her view has something in common with the theory of the authoritarian personality (Adorno *et al.*, 1950). Benedict provides a classic perspective of Japanese personality and culture: American (or Western) culture is the 'guilt culture', but the Japanese one is the 'shame culture'. Although several criticisms have been proposed against her simple dichotomy of 'guilt' versus 'shame' (e.g. Hamaguchi,

1998), many people, including Japanese intellectuals, have sympathised with Benedict's clear-cut analysis.

Another notable point of this book is the notion of the 'debt (*on*)' (1967; pp 68-79) and 'repaying the debt' (pp 80-93). From Benedict's point of view, Japanese social life is motivated to clear one's account of debt: the balance of '*on*' and 'repaying *on*'. Amongst several 'debts', all Japanese owe the Emperor a debt of gratitude.

> *On* is always used in this sense of limitless devotion when it is used of one's first and greatest indebtedness, one's 'Imperial *on*.' This is one's debt to the Emperor, which one should receive with unfathomable gratitude. It would be impossible, they feel, to be glad of one's country, of one's life, of one's great and small concerns without thinking also of receiving these benefits. In all Japanese history this ultimate person among living men [*sic*] to whom one was indebted was the highest superior within one's horizon. (1967; p 70; emphasis original)

During the war, the OWI required its researchers to account for some irrational Japanese tactics, such as suicide *kamikaze* attack. According to Benedict, since Japanese soldiers owed an enormous 'debt' to the Emperor, they dedicated their lives to repay it: 'In culture based as fully as Japan's has been on personal ties, the Emperor was a symbol of loyalty far surpassing a flag' (p 90). The dedication to the Emperor was the strong motivation which drove Japanese soldiers. What is more, Benedict implied that it is not impossible to make use of this loyalty for democratisation. Benedict suggested that, in order to construct a democratic Japan, the US administrators had to avoid violating Japanese 'shame culture', and utilise its cultural patterns. In this way, her reform plan presupposed the patterns of the war-time culture, including the divine Emperorship. Therefore, her analysis was appreciated by the conservatives, since an American intellectual guaranteed the virtue of the old regime and suggested its modification to construct a democratic Japan (cf. *see section 3.3.0*: Grew's 'queen bee speech').

One more point has to be noted. The Emperor's crest is the Chrysanthemum. Although Benedict does not relate the plant to implications for Imperial matters, several Japanese have misunderstood her title (*The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*), and believed that it was a contrast between 'the peaceful Imperial tradition' (i.e. Chrysanthemum) and 'the militarism' (i.e. Sword). For instance, in the 1960s, an ultra-nationalist novelist Mishima used the phrase, 'the Chrysanthemum and the Sword' repeatedly, as a metaphor of the Imperial cultural superintendency and the revision of Constitutional pacifism (*see section 3.6.1*). In fact, when Benedict referred to the 'chrysanthemum', it was a metaphor of a culture with patterns: '...chrysanthemums are grown in pots and arranged for the annual flower shows all over Japan with each perfect petal separately disposed by the grower's hand and often held in place by a tiny invisible wire rack inserted in the living flower' (pp 206-207). In this way, consciously (i.e. her suggestion for the post-war reform) and unconsciously (i.e. the title), the American anthropologist laid the ground for post-war monarchism, without arguing about the character of Hirohito.

3.5.0. Crown Marriage and Terrorism (1952-1961)

In 1952, Japan became independent. With regard to Imperial matters, the 1950s was the decade of the Crown Prince, Akihito. He attended the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II in 1953, and in 1959, married an 'ordinary' Japanese girl, Miss Michiko Shoda. According to the media coverage, Akihito fell in love with her when they played tennis at a summer resort. Their wedding parade in April, 1959, was an 'Electronic Pageantry' (cf. Dyan and Katz, 1985; Fujitani, 1996), and was a springboard for the popularisation of (commercial) TV broadcasts (e.g. Inose, 1990; Tamura and Murase, 1994). After that, the young couple were depicted by the mass media as the ideal nuclear family, especially in women's magazines and on TV (e.g. Matsushita, 1959).

During this period, in 1955, two major conservative parties, the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party, merged as the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Since then, the LDP has been the dominant ruling party, expect for a few years in the early 1990s (*see*

section 3.8.0). A nationalist PM, Kishi Nobusuke (1957-1960), intended to renew the US-Japan Security Treaty (to be revised every ten years), but his intention evoked active anti-establishment movements. It is said that Kishi utilised the Crown Prince's marriage to soothe the political confrontations (Inose, 1990). Although the new treaty was concluded in 1960, US President Eisenhower had to cancel his state visit to Japan, due to active protests against the renewal of the Treaty and 'US Imperialism'. Active liberal protests also stimulated right-wing terrorism in the early 1960s. For instance, the chairman of the Japan Socialist Party was assassinated in 1960 by a 17 year old 'patriot' at a public political debate. In 1961, a right-wing activist murdered a family member of the president of a publishing company, because of a 'disrespectful novel' about the Imperial Family. In the 1960s and early 1970s, open criticism of the Emperor was virtually taboo in the media.

3.5.1. The First Rhetorical Approach

In 1952, the June issue of a liberal monthly magazine, *Shiso*, featured some discussions about the Emperor system. Two social scientists presented distinctive perspectives; Tsurumi (*Nippon Shiso no Tokushoku to Tenno-sei*: 'Characters of Japanese Thoughts and the Emperor System') and Minami (*Tenno-sei no Shinri-teki Jiban*: 'Psychological Ground of the Emperor System').

Tsurumi, a liberal social scientist, attempted a unique approach to 'post-war Imperialism'. He began his discussion by questioning the morality of the liberal criticism (including himself) which tends to 'normalise' the Emperor system.

> A moral argument would not be a valuable philosophy without the connection of strict self-criticism. By examining 'the Japanese', 'the war-criminals', 'the feudal system' or 'the bureaucracy', as a group which does not include the analyst's self, we complacent liberal scholars turn away the analysis of moral arguments... It is important to have a clearer idea about factual morality. It is necessary for us to do two things; first to collect the facts about 'the Japanese'

> including 'the analyst's self', second to examine them critically for self-reflection. (p 44)

As the 'facts' to be analysed, Tsurumi looked at the rhetorics in interview data of forty villagers near Tokyo and sixty school children in a rural town. In the article, he illustrated his analysis with the interview data of a 53 year old peasant and a 43 year old university graduate landlord. Tsurumi claimed that both well and less educated interviewees justified monarchism based on their personal respect for the Emperor, but the educated respondent used elaborate rhetorics. The peasant simply expressed her attachment to Hirohito and claimed that Hirohito was 'an unlucky person'. On the other hand, the landlord justified the Emperor's presence under democracy in a sophisticated way. Tsurumi lists seven rhetorical categories of the justification of Emperorship: (1) using metaphor (e.g. 'he is a national father'), (2) based on personal feelings (e.g. personal attachment to Hirohito), (3) based on broad national feeling (e.g. 'Hirohito is loved by all the nation'), (4) based on thousands of years of Imperial line and tradition, (5) based on monarchical (dignified) functions (cf. Bagehot, 1867/1963), (6) based on the monarch's authority (e.g. 'everyone needs an authority') and (7) based on the divinity of the Emperor. As early as 1952, Tsurumi's approach employed 'rhetorical perspectives' and 'common-places' (Billig, 1991, 1992) to analyse the 'argumentative nature' (Billig, 1987) of post-war Emperorship.

Tsurumi's analysis implies potential directions of the discursive/rhetorical approach in later days. However, it was unfortunate for Tsurumi that the methodology had not been clearly theorised in the early 1950s. For instance, he viewed the language as reflecting the speaker's 'internal state' and 'morality' in a straightforward way (cf. Chapter 4). Although he claimed that he would develop this approach, few social scientists recognised the potential of Tsurumi's work, and Tsurumi himself lost interest in the approach. For several decades, 'rhetorical formulation' was a relatively ignored topic for the analysis of Emperorship.

3.5.2. Ideological Shift

Minami's article (*Tenno-sei no Shinri-teki Jiban*: 'Psychological ground of the Emperor System') focused upon media representation of the Emperor.

> Several aspects of the Emperor system have been considerably modified in the post-war period. Through that modification, those who support Emperorship, have attempted to reconstruct the post-war system, in order to make it acceptable for the masses. One of the ways of achieving this is the unprecedented utilisation of mass communications. A further way, is the reduction of the psychological distance between the Emperor and the people, which has been achieved by direct contact between the two, such as through Imperial visits. (p 54)

His remarkable finding was the 'shift' in Imperial descriptions in newspaper articles from the pre-war 'authoritarian absolute Emperor' to the post-war images of the 'humane Emperor with love and mercy' (cf. Amano (ed.), 1995). Minami points out that there were several characteristic descriptions of the Emperor in the post-war period. The papers had previously emphasised the 'authority' and 'divinity' of the Emperor, but in the post-war time, they were enthusiastically reporting, for example, the 'human', 'scientist', 'peace lover', 'peace maker' and 'Americanised' (i.e. a gentleman who mastered American etiquette) Hirohito.

Minami's perspective was developed further by Shimizu in the following year, who also examined newspaper articles. Shimizu (1953) analysed newspaper articles in the post-war period in the *Shiso* magazine (*Senryo-ka no Tenno*: 'The Emperor in the Occupation Period'). He pointed out a clear intention on the part of the US and the Japanese power élite to reconstruct the Emperor system. The US decided to preserve the ruling class for efficient occupational administrative business, thus, shifting all responsibility for militarism to the military clique. Shimizu found that during the war-time period, only the Emperor's dignified and powerful aspects were emphasised in the media. In contrast, after the surrender (in late 1945), most of the news stories represented the Emperor as a benevolent man who was anxious about the common

Japanese. For instance, when the blackout regulation was lifted, a newspaper headline on 20th August, 1945, referred to: 'the Gracious Lights of Benevolence - the Bright Imperial Capital - ...' (p 7). In this way, most of the events which benefit people are ascribed to the Emperor's favour. 'The Emperor's virtue until yesterday was dignity and power. Today, the virtue of the Emperor must be a warm benevolence' (p 8) said Shimizu. Immediately after the occupation period, liberal thinkers such as Minami and Shimizu pointed out the ideological shift of Emperorship; from the symbol of oppression (i.e. Maruyama, 1946) to the person with love and benevolence. This concept could be labelled as the post-war 'Imperial ideology of benevolence' (Amano (ed.), 1995) and has been employed by critics of the Emperor system, such as Takeuchi (1958/1995).

Takeuchi (1958/1995), a liberal literature critic, discussed the relationship between Emperorship and the arts. He claimed that since the establishment of modern Japan (i.e. Meiji restoration), the Emperor has had the character of a 'tolerant leader'. To be more precise, the Emperor would accept anybody who followed him as an 'in-group' member, but he could be cruel for those who wished to be in the 'out-group'. Takeuchi claimed that the previous critical studies (e.g. Maruyama, 1946; Tsurumi, 1952; Minami, 1952; Shimizu, 1956), which solely emphasised the cruelty of the absolute Emperorship, might have overlooked the complex nature of the 'out-' and 'in-group' membership distinctions. In order to make a critical revision of monarchism, one should consider some 'benefits' (e.g. comfort of mind for the 'in-group' membership) of the Emperor system. As a result of this ideological 'carrot and stick', Takeuchi deplored the fact that the Emperor system is deeply embedded in everyday life (including arts) both in pre- and post-war Japan.

3.5.3. Modern Mass Monarchy

Inspired by the media fever over the royal wedding, a political scientist, Matsushita, wrote an article in a monthly magazine, the *Chuo-Koron*, in April 1959 (*Taishu Tenno-sei Ron*: 'A Study of the Mass Emperor System'), which presented a notable perspective on the modern media oriented monarchy. Through analysis of the media

coverage, Matsushita found that the Imperials are no longer presented as awesome, but as people to be loved. The difference between their media descriptions in the pre- and post-war periods is more important than the difference in the Constitutional status of the Emperor (cf. Minami, 1952; Shimizu, 1953). The portraits of the Imperials printed in the newspapers now have them wearing civilian clothes, not military uniforms, and the portraits are taken in family surroundings. The Crown Prince fell when he was skiing, lost a tennis match with a girl, and 'even fell in love' (Matsushita, 1959; p 32).

Today, the Emperor system is not legitimised by its tradition, but by the support of the masses (cf. Martin, 1936, 1962). In this way, although the great amount of royal wedding coverage makes liberal people anxious about a possible revival of the pre-war type Emperorship, Matsushita claims that the Emperor system supported by the masses has irrecoverably damaged the notion of absolute monarchism. Several key concepts of the royal marriage, such as the 'love marriage' and 'commoner bride' are contrary to classic monarchical values. Therefore, the media representations of the current Imperial Family are commensurate with the post-war symbol Emperor system.

Matsushita considers that the media attentions of the young Imperials has enabled the character of Emperorship to change. The Crown Prince, especially, provides the new ideological ground for the mass Emperor system. As an example, Matsushita focuses upon the language of the Crown Prince, as reproduced by the media.

> On 28th November, the Asahi Shinbun* organised a round-table talk of the Crown Prince's former class mates, and they quoted a 'rascal-like' speech of the Crown Prince; when he lost a tennis doubles match with Miss Shoda's team. The Prince said 'competitive, she's such a tough gal' and 'Oi, I want that chick in my team'. Also according to the class mates' account: 'It's even worse this month. He gets embarrassed and he speaks amorously of her. He's head over heels.' Such gossip could cause serious damage to the sacred and absolute Emperor system, but they greatly contribute to the mass Emperor system. (Matsushita, 1959; p 39)
>
> * One of the daily broadsheets (*see section 8.2.1*).

In this way, Matsushita clearly points out that some notions, which contradict absolute monarchism, firmly support the post-war Emperorship. Also, this report is not an isolated example; and there is a large amount of media coverage of this kind continuously reproducing and reinforcing modern mass-monarchism (cf. Nairn, 1988; Billig, 1992). Matsushita also discusses the differences in feeling toward the royal wedding that exist between the generations: the 'post-war' generation, which has no idea of the absolute Emperorship, is the prime target audience of such Imperial coverage, and the Imperials become 'stars' of that generation. In addition, the post-war Imperial couple are described as familiar persons, and importantly, they are free from responsibility for the war. Matsushita claims that, therefore, the 'mass Emperor system' is the most firmly established monarchism ever, because it is a responsibility free popular institution based on the power of the popular media.

Matsushita raises some important points. First of all, the generation gap: whereas previous critical studies accused Hirohito of having a personal lack of responsibility (e.g. Maruyama, 1946), Matsushita discusses how the post-war Emperor system is accepted by younger generations. New generations, who do not share memories of the 'absolute Emperor' regard the Emperor system differently from their parents. Secondly, the future of the system: Matsushita expected that, in Akinito's reign, the Emperor system would become more firmly established. Thirdly, the media power: the images of the monarchy are steadily reinforced through the media (cf. Nairn, 1988). Fourthly, therefore, Japanese monarchism has changed its character in the post-war period. It is, now, mass-society and mass-media oriented, a firmly established 'non-sacred mass Emperor system'.

3.6.0. The Economic Miracle (1961-1975)

As discussed in section 3.5.0, there were extreme right-wing attacks in the early 1960s. In 1970, the Japanese Red Army hi-jacked a domestic airliner and went into exile in North Korea. In the same year, an ultra-nationalist novelist, Mishima, who was a serious candidate for the Nobel Literary Prize, staged a military *coup* at a station of the

Self Defence Army, and committed suicide in traditional *hara-kiri* style (*see section 3.6.1*). In addition, in the late 1960s, there were active student anti-establishment movements opposing the US-Japan Security Treaty renewal, synchronised with the student riots in Europe and the civil rights movements in the US.

Despite some radical political movements, the majority of the Japanese enjoyed economic growth during this era. Kishi's successor, PM Ikeda Hayato (1960-1964), successfully shifted the majority's focus from politics (i.e. renewal of the Security Treaty) to economics. In 1960, he promised to double the national income in a decade. The average annual growth of the GNP of 10.3% from 1955 to 1970 fulfilled Ikeda's promise. Although having only the seventh-largest GNP of the free world in 1955, Japan had climbed to second place in 1967 (e.g. Eccleston, 1989/1995). Accordingly, the living standard increased dramatically during this period. In 1962, Japan joined the OECD, and in 1964, the first Olympic Games in Asia took place in Tokyo. In the same year, the Japan National Railway launched the high speed 'Bullet Train' service between Tokyo and Osaka. In 1970, Japan hosted the World Exposition in Osaka, which was a landmark of the Japanese economic miracle. In 1972, Japan hosted the first Winter Olympic Games in Asia in the northern city of Sapporo. As a result of the economic growth, the conservative LDP gained national approval. In the 1970s, Hirohito and his wife visited Europe (1971) and the US (1975).

3.6.1. A-Historical Right and Relativist Left

In 1968, two notable studies were published, from different political points of view. Mishima, an ultra-nationalist novelist, wrote *Bunka Boei-ron* ('A Study of Cultural Defence') in the July issue of the *Chuo-Koron* magazine. Also, a liberal literature critique, Yoshimoto, one of the leading ideologues of the new-left movement, published *Kyodo Genso-ron* ('A Study of Joint Illusions').

Mishima (1968) was a reactionary who never accepted the idea of the 'Mass Emperor system'. Although Japanese people enjoyed materially wealthy lives, he believed that the economy orientated lifestyle damages the true Japanese culture, which should be

distinguished from Western materialism (e.g. 'the immoral consumption policy of Ikeda's Cabinet'; p 106). According to Mishima, the 'real Japanese culture' has to be established through long tradition, such as the Imperial unbroken line, and the successive Emperors must be considered as the superintendents of that culture. Also, an Emperor should not be respected because of his individuality (e.g. character), but his position and cultural functions (e.g. the superintendent of the culture). Mishima believed that both the Emperor and Japanese culture, however, lost their dignity under the 'weekly magazine Emperor system' (cf. Matsushita, 1959). Two years after of this publication, Mishima attempted a military *coup*, and then killed himself. He idealised the a-historical perspective, the Emperor is a centre of Japanese culture, and this viewpoint is still held by the radical right movements.

On the other hand, Yoshimoto (1968/1982) is a constructionist, although he does not use the term 'social constructionism', employing instead the term 'illusion'. Developing the Marxist ideas of the 'base' and the 'superstructure', Yoshimoto claims that institutional powers (i.e. superstructure) are not 'objective facts', but are supported by the language and the collective 'joint illusions'.

> The joint illusion is a form of idea, the product of the attitudes of people. For instance, <the father of the tribe> (Stamm-vater), <the mother of the tribe> (Stamm-mutter) and <the totem> are simply representations of the joint illusions, the same as <customs>, <myths>, <laws> and <states>. In order to suppress their own existence, people burden themselves, and although they are aware of that potential damage of burdening themselves, they still feel that necessity to continue to do so. The joint illusion is one of the suppressions of this kind. (symbols in original; 1982, p 37)

Since Yoshimoto considered the social institutions from a relativist point of view, he could de-construct the *status quo*. He suggested the possibility of de-constructing all the power relations (i.e. 'illusions'), including the Emperor system (i.e. 'father of the tribe'), either as the 'absolute' or 'mass' Emperorship. Yoshimoto was critical of previous thinkers, not only those who emphasised 'the essential a-historical' positive

values of the Emperor (e.g. Minobe, 1946; Mishima, 1968), but also some liberal thinkers, who conceptualised the system's unchangeable oppressive nature (e.g. Maruyama, 1946). Therefore, his perspective was enthusiastically accepted by Japanese young radicals who were engaged in anti-establishment movements in the late 1960s and 1970s.

3.6.2. Challenging The Taboo

As mentioned in section 3.5.0, because of the active right-wing terrorism in the early 1960s, critical discussion of the Emperor was, at that time, taboo in the media. Kodama, a journalist, challenged this 'chrysanthemum taboo' (*Kimi-wa Tenno-o Miaka*: 'Have You Seen the Emperor?'; 1975/1985). He conducted interviews with ordinary people, asking 'have you seen the Emperor?', and collected their responses. From the responses, the readers could find out the contemporary ideological structure of modern monarchism.

> 'Loose Trousers'
>
> When Mrs Atsuko Ikeda* was hospitalised at Okayama University Hospital, Their Majesties visited. We, nurses, were more interested in the Empress, because we are women. They were just like ordinary parents. Next, the Crown Prince and his wife came to the hospital. At that time, also, we couldn't help showing our interest in Michiko rather than the Prince. Then, other Imperial brothers and sisters came as well. All of them were the same as what you find on TV. I shouldn't say this, but frankly speaking, they all had, old fashioned, loose trousers. [Ishii Yoshie, 46 and Kobiki Junko, 41: Chief Nurses] (Kodama, 1985; p 58)
>
> * Hirohito's fourth daughter.

According to this interview, one could point out, firstly, the monarchy is regarded as the interest of women, and secondly, the Imperials are supposed to be found in the media. These two points are common with the findings in the British studies (e.g. Coward, 1984; Williamson, 1986; Billig, 1992), but as to the third point, the speakers

hesitated when pointing out 'humanistic aspects' of the Imperial Family (cf. Billig, 1992). They faltered when talking of the size of their trousers, and the way they delivered the information (i.e. 'I shouldn't say this, but frankly speaking...') suggested the contradictory themes (and 'taboo') of the modern Japanese monarchism (Billig *et al.*, 1988): awesome and/or familiar Imperials. The nurses, who were supposed to have been young children at the end of the war (their ages previously given were at the time of this interview, 1971), could show their familiarity with the Imperial Family but only with some additional effort.

With a few exceptions (e.g. Tsurumi, 1952), there was no attempt to investigate Emperorship through the ordinary people's voice. Kodama suggests that the contradictory social norms are not only legitimised by intellectuals, but also by non-intellectuals who share common knowledge about the monarchy. Sakamoto (1988; *see section 3.7.1*) notes Kodama as one of the pioneers of this kind of approach.

3.6.3. Linguistic Approach

A socio-linguist, Kamei (1974), wrote *Tenno-sei no Gengogaku-teki Kousatsu* ('A Linguistic Study of the Emperor System') in the *Chuo-koron* magazine, which proposes a linguistic analysis of Emperorship. Kamei believes in the power of the language to form an ideology (*see section 7.3.0*).

Kamei focuses on the naming of the Emperor, *Tenno* (see Chapter 6), which exclusively refers to the Japanese monarch in Japanese. According to Kamei, the Meiji reformers in the mid-19th Century deliberately picked this obsolete naming (i.e. *Tenno*) from several possibilities (e.g. *Mikado*). Kamei points out that the newly found terminology, which also distinguishes the Japanese Emperor from other monarchs, contributed to the establishment of the Japan centred ideology (see also Crump, 1989; Fujitani, 1996). In addition, the proper uses of '*Tenno*' and its (English) translation 'Emperor' signified the Meiji reformer's intentions. From the domestic point of view, the exclusive term '*Tenno*' particularised nation-state Japan and integrated the Japanese people. From the diplomatic point of view, the inclusive title of the monarch,

'the Emperor', signified that the newly established 'Empire of the Sun' had aspects in common with other monarchical states, such as Russia, Austria and Germany.

Kamei's approach draws attention to a couple of important points. Firstly, the Emperor had not been sufficiently powerful to legitimise his own title. Although the modern Emperors appeared powerful, the (pre-war) Emperor system had been an oligarchic political system. Secondly, Kamei focuses on the linguistic 'invention' (Hobsbawm, 1983) of the Imperial terminology and its contributions (or 'performances') to form the modern nation state. Thus, he analyses the influences of linguistic power in the formulation of a nationalism (cf. Cannadine, 1983: see also Chapters 6 and 8).

3.7.0. Late-Hirohito period (1976-1989)

In 1976 and 1986, Hirohito celebrated the 50th and 60th anniversaries of his reign. According to liberal people, it was inappropriate not to differentiate between the two different periods, the absolute Emperor in the initial twenty years and the symbol Emperor in the last thirty or forty years. As the conservative LDP insisted on organising the national ceremonies, there were active discussions between right- and left-wingers about the post-war Emperor system (e.g. Asahi Journal (ed.), 1976). Also, these ceremonies, which emphasised Hirohito's long reign, raised the issue of the potential succession. One of the examples concerning the succession was the legitimisation of *Gengo*. This is the Japanese year period which measures the time by the individual Emperor's reign (For instance, Hirohito, known as Emperor *Showa*, died in 1989, which was *Showa* 64). Although *Gengo* had been habitually used, the LDP legitimatised it in 1979 ('*Gengo* Act'). In the course of the 1980s, with the increasing age of the Emperor, his everyday life was not disclosed so often (nor so openly) as before. In 1987, Hirohito had an operation, and in January 1989, he died.

During this period, the Japanese people enjoyed materially prosperous lives. Although later it turned out be just a 'bubble economy', national pride grew. For example, an American author's *Japan as No.1* was a regular best-seller in Tokyo book stores, and

its title became a buzzword. Thanks to their strong currency, Japanese companies were able to buy several overseas properties, and ordinary people consumed expensive 'branded' goods and travelled abroad.

3.7.1. Revisions in the late Hirohito period (1)

Yamamoto and Konno, scholars of ultra-nationalism, analysed the ideological formulations of the pre-war militarism and 'divine Emperorship' in school education (*Taisho, Showa-ki Kyoiku no Tenno-sei Ideorogi*: 'The Emperor System Ideology of Education in Taisho and Showa Periods', 1976/1986). They examined an enormous amount of materials and pointed out that school education played a crucial role in establishing the aggressive pre-war ultra-nationalism, militarism, expansionism, xenophobia and so forth, since the schools were not only the institutions of education, but also the centres of local communities. They revealed that the ultra-nationalistic ideology was established within only one or two generations. In this way, their positive approach shows the process of the 'invention of tradition' (Hobsbawm, 1983) of the ultra-nationalism. In reviewing the book, Ishido (1976) noted that Yamamoto and Konno provide excellent proof of the establishment of the ultra-nationalism: the ideology *was not taught* as knowledge, but *trained* and *disciplined* in schools.

A feminist sociologist, Inoue (1978/1995), analysed media representations of the Emperor and his family and pointed out that the Imperial family symbolises economically satisfied Japanese people's self centred life style (*Maihoumu Shugi no Sinboru toshiteno Koshitsu*: 'The Imperial Family as a Symbol of My-Homism'). Inoue reported that the Emperor (Hirohito) appeared politically powerless, but at the same time, he gained ideological strength based on neo-conservatism (cf. Matsushita, 1959; Williamson, 1986; Nairn, 1988). Media coverage strengthens its ideological power. She claims that the pre-war absolute Emperor system tended to converge the male oriented society, but the post-war Emperor has been designed to attract women's interest; for instance, their 'My-Homism' (home and family centred way of life) or the Crown Prince's 'love marriage'. The Imperial family seems to have an unconventional life style, yet it is the foremost conventional family. Inoue views this as their strategy to

survive under the democratic social norm (cf. Coward, 1984; Williamson, 1986; Minami, 1952; Shimizu, 1953; Amano (ed.), 1995).

In 1978, a scholar of the Constitution, Yokota, wrote articles in political journals (*Seiken Zengo no Tenno-zou*: 'Images of the Emperor at the Framing of the Constitution' and *Seiken Gikai ni okeru Tenno-zou*: 'Images of the Emperor in the Pariamental Debates for the Constitutional Framings'), which investigated Parliamentary debates for the constitutional reform in 1946. Whereas Yokota's paramount concern is the 'continuity' and 'gap' between the pre- and post-war monarchies from the point of view of constitutional study, his investigation of the debates suggests the common-places (cf. Billig, 1988) about the Emperor and the Emperor system amongst MPs, immediately after the war. Hence, Yokota's legal investigation suggests the potentiality of a discursive/rhetorical investigation of the historical documents.

In 1985, a conventionalist historian Ueyama published *Tenno-sei no Shinso* ('The Base Structures of Emperor System'). Ueyama wrote a historical account of the Emperor's political irresponsibility and pacifism. Since ancient times, the role of Emperor has been religious and symbolic. Successive Emperors have been regarded as the descendants and reincarnation of the ancestral Sun Goddess. Thus individual Emperors have been sufficiently authorised and have no need to use actual power. In consequence, Ueyama stated that the post-war Constitution (i.e. symbol Emperor system and pacifism) fitted within the Japanese tradition, and the pre-war Emperor system was deviant. In this way, he justified the post-war Emperor system within Japanese history and acquitted Hirohito's past. Ueyama added a historical account to previous conventionalist argument (e.g. Minobe, 1946), and justified the (potential) Imperial succession from Hirohito to Akihito within the framework of the post-war symbol Emperor system.

3.7.2. Revisions in the late Hirohito Period (2)

In 1986, Inose, a journalist, published one of the best-selling books of this period, *Mikado no Shozo* ('Portraits of the Emperor (*Mikado*)'; rpt. 1992), which includes a

unique biographical investigation, reconstructing the lives of a business tycoon and Hirohito within the context of pre- and post-war capitalism. Inose revealed that new Japanese establishments need authority to legitimise their wealth and power, and the Imperial Family and relatives have been available for such demands. Inose's positive investigations revealed that, in the highly commercial oriented Japanese society, people are consciously or unconsciously living under the Emperor's authority and Imperial taboos.

In addition, Inose suggested novel ways to analyse the Emperorship: the urbanology of Tokyo (the concept of 'empty centre' by Barthes, 1983) and commercial oriented modern life styles (cf. Inoue, 1978/1995; Fujitani, 1992). Whereas the Japanese Emperorship has been considered as a kingship of agriculture (e.g. Miyata, 1987; Ueyama, 1985), Inose suggested that the modern Emperorship is a commercial oriented urban institution.

A cultural anthropologist, Yamaguchi, who conducted several studies in Africa, discussed the 'duality' of the kingship and the Emperor system (*The Dual Structure of Japanese Emperorship,* 1987). He investigated the Imperial myths, looking at their narrative structures. He looked at the semantic confrontations in the Imperial myths:

> The conduct of the imperial family, hitherto undifferentiated, came to be filtered through a structure opposing order and chaos, centre and periphery, justice and violence, formal marriage and incest, settled life and wandering, emperor and princes. Princes were considered to constitute a potential danger and were consequently charged with the undesirable side of the structure, the conduct of princes was looked upon as sinful. The emperor thus set about establishing peace and order within the syntagmatic structure of the narrative, whereas the princes, the divergent elements, served to curve the narrative's linear structure. (p s8)

Thus, Yamaguchi stated that both 'emperor' (i.e. official ideology) and 'prince' (i.e. lived ideology) consisted of inter-dependant structures of kingship (cf. Billig *et al.*,

1988). In the dialogue with Inose (*Mikado to Seikimatsu*: 'The Emperor (Mikado) and End of the Century', 1987/1998), Yamaguchi made a unique account. Hirohito's grandfather, Emperor Meiji was known as the founder of modern Japan, thus even liberal historians call him 'Meiji the Great' (e.g. Asukai 1989/1994). On the other hand, Hirohito's father, Emperor Taisho, suffered from a mental disease. It was and still is broadly believed that Emperor Taisho played with a 'paper telescope' made from the Imperial edict, at the opening of Parliament. As a result, Emperor Taisho was considered as the 'periphery prince', under the shadow of the 'great Meiji'. According to Yamaguchi, Hirohito integrated these opposite characters of the 'periphery prince' and the 'central Emperor'.

Yamaguchi:	... By the way, Emperor *Showa* (Hirohito) is amazing, since he could appeal to two different belief groups, centred and peripheral...
Inose:	Well, you mean his phrase, 'ah, so!', don't you?
Yamaguchi:	Like *King Lear*, he played a fool as well...

(Inose and Yamaguchi, 1998, p 67)

During post-war Imperial visits, Japanese people were surprised at Hirohito's voice, because his high tone differed greatly from people's expectations (cf. Azuma, 1997; Sakamoto, 1988, 1989). Since the former living god also 'played a fool', Hirohito completed the inter-dependent structure of post-war kingship all by himself (cf. Emperors Meiji and Taisho). In addition, Inose and Yamaguchi imply one more point. There are some shared narratives, which are associated with the notion of (individual) Emperors (e.g. 'paper telescope', 'ah, so!') and these narratives give psychological bases to modern kingship (cf. Fujitani, 1992; Billig, 1992).

In 1988, Taki, an historian, published *Tenno no Shozo* ('Portraits of the Emperor'), based on his article in the *Shiso* magazine in 1986. He revealed the historical and political process to popularise the Imperial portrait in the Meiji-era. His investigation revealed that, for instance, the official Imperial photograph of Emperor Meiji, displayed in schools and official places (*go-shinei*, in direct translation, 'the dignified

picture of the truth') was a 'copy of a copy of a representation of the emperor' (review by Fujitani, 1996, p 177), because it was a photograph of a sketch drawn by an Italian artist. For most people in Japan in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, his simulacrum three steps removed was the Emperor's real presence, and the subject of worship. In revealing this image manipulation, one could point out potential dangers of the present Emperor: media representations of the 'peace lover Emperor' might be, also, a simulacrum, being deliberately presented (cf. Shimizu, 1953).

3.8.0. Post-Hirohito Period (1989-)

In September, 1987, Hirohito had a bowel operation. Although he returned to his duty once, in September, 1988, he was hospitalised again, and in January, 1989, he died (see Chapter 8). During the period of his illness, the Japanese public seemed to show their sympathy to the dying Emperor by 'self-restraint'.

> The Emperor gained strength until September 1988 when, on the 20th, he again vomited large measures of blood. After that, he was kept alive only by massive blood transfusions. At this stage, a general mood of voluntary 'self-restraint' (*jishuku*) began to spread among the people, to express their sympathy. In keeping with this mood, department stores withdrew ceremonial foods used on festive occasions, shoppers increasingly stayed home, and trade generally declined. (Large, 1992; p 198)

During this period, also, the Japanese went to the palace and other designated stations throughout Japan to sign one of the many get-well books (*kicho*). Six million people signed their names in two months. In addition, the Emperor's condition was intensively reported (i.e. blood pressure, heart beat, amount of transfusions) day and night, for more than 100 days from when he was hospitalised. After the death of Hirohito, four million people signed the condolence books at the palace and elsewhere provided by the local government. It was the 'Emperor fever', in which all generations seemed to be involved.

> ...the nation was swept by a solemn spirit of mourning and even greater displays of *jishuku*: weddings, holiday trips, and public events were cancelled one after another; employees, public officials, and athletes displayed black arm-bands; shoppers bought only necessities; and the media were given over to programs eulogizing the Emperor as a symbol of Japan's postwar resignation, while recounting the principal events of his reign, as had been planned. (Large, 1992; p 199)

Then Hirohito's eldest son, Akihito ascended the Imperial throne. Apart from Hirohito's funeral and Akihito's coronation, one of the biggest Imperial events in the post-Hirohito period was the marriage of the Crown Prince Naruhito, also known as Prince Hiro, to a career diplomat, Miss Masako Owada, in 1993. Naruhito followed his father's line: the 'love marriage' with an 'ordinary girl', although Miss Owada's personal background (e.g. a career diplomat, studied at Tokyo, Harvard and Oxford University) was extra-ordinary.

In the post-Hirohito period, Japan has suffered from long-term recession after the bubble economy collapsed in 1990. The mismanagement of economic policy (e.g. introduction of the consumption tax in 1990) and political scandals (e.g. a former vice-Prime Minister was arrested by a bribery case in 1992) resulted in the LDP failing to gain a majority in the general election of 1993. Some non-LDP parties formed a coalition cabinet (Later, the LDP regained power). Economic and political confusion led Japanese people to lose confidence in the 'Japanese management' or its value system, which used to be considered as the key factors of the strong Japanese economy.

3.8.1. Performances of the Post-War Emperor

A professor of political science, Sakamoto, analysed the 'performances' of Hirohito in the post-war era (*Shocho Tenno-sei e-no Pafomansu*: 'Performance for the Symbol Emperor System', 1989). Sakamoto examined a variety of media material in the late war-time and post-war period, and pointed out a variety of Hirohito's 'performances'

in different contexts; he played the role of the sacred, symbolic or democratic Emperor within different social and historical contexts. His 'performances' in the series of post-war Imperial visits (*see section 3.3.0* and *3.8.4*) were purposefully designed to gain national approval as a national symbol (cf. Azuma, 1997; Inose and Yamaguchi, 1987/1998). At that time, Hirohito carefully performed as the 'Symbol Emperor', distancing himself from actual politics and behaving as a respectable individual. However, in later days (i.e. after independence), Sakamoto stated that Hirohito's 'performances' changed character; he performed more as a dignified Emperor. Sakamoto's examination was influenced by Cannadine (1983).

3.8.2. Loyalty to the Monarch, Loyalty to the Company

In 1990, a sociologist, Watanabe, wrote *Sengo Seiji-shi no-naka-no Tenno-sei* ('The Emperor System in the Post-War Political History'), which examined several aspects of the modern Emperor system as a new invention (cf. Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds.), 1983). One of the issues that he addressed was *jishuku*, which many liberal people were anxious about as they believed it represented a deterioration from the post-war symbol Emperor system to the pre-war type absolute monarchism (e.g. Okudaira, 1989). However, Watanabe claimed that *jishuku* and the number of condolence signatures were merely representations of Japanese corporate culture.

> The least favourite situation for a corporate employee is being labelled as a *minority* when he/she behaves differently from others, within the corporate society... The label of *minority* would not only be applied to the political or ideological differences, some 'minor' factors of one's lifestyle, principles or religion could cause trouble. For instance, there is a popular discrimination against those who avoid overtime work or who sacrifice a social life with their colleagues for the sake of their family. Japanese corporations discriminate and dislike this kind of minority employee. They seem to challenge the *orders* of the Japanese corporations, which are considered to be the key factors of strength of Japanese corporate society. (p 32, emphasis original)

In this way, Watanabe noted that *jishuku* and other backward looking behaviours were the result of the corporations' loyalty tests for their employees. He stated that, in pre-war Japan, the primary group that people belonged to was the nation state. However, in the post-war period, especially since the rapid economic growth (the 1960s), the primary group of employees has been the corporations. Thus, the 'Emperor fever' in late 1988 and early 1989 was not based on inherent monarchical traditions, but more functionally designed for industrial purposes.

3.8.3. 'Narratives' in the Electronic Pageantry

A Japanese-American sociologist, Fujitani wrote *Electronic Pageantry and Japan's "Symbolic Emperor"* in *The Journal of Asian Studies* in 1992, criticising some previous monarchical studies, which fell into facile and a-historical analyses. Fujitani, for instance, criticised Inose (i.e. 'empty centre' as formulated within the Japanese historical contexts) and Yamaguchi (i.e. universal dual structure of kingship) for conceptualising the eternal value of the Emperorship underlying Japanese history and culture; and for analysing 'orientalist' representations of the *Mikado* (p 826: cf. *section 3.7.2*). Fujitani claimed that the left-wing critics were also backward-looking; and viewed ultra-nationalism as indispensable for the Emperor system (cf. Maruyama, 1946).

> The thrust of my argument, however, is that the recent "*tennõ genshõ*," or "emperor phenomenon," cannot be explained in terms of the Japanese monarchy's or "Japanese culture's" essential features... Instead, it must be understood on its own terms, as a product of our present historical moment. (p 828)

In this way, Fujitani attempted to analyse media representations of the Emperor system at *Hirohito*'s funeral in the framework of late-capitalist Japan. He suggested that analysts should look at narratives on the 'telescreens', as the whole nation-state converged at the Imperial funeral. What we see on the telescreen is not simply a representation of a reality that exists 'out-there', but rather a reality that the medium

constructed through narrative (cf. Edwards, 1997). For instance, the NHK (public broadcaster, BBC equivalent) reported local people's mourning, and, significantly, according to Fujitani, the pro-monarchy discourse was constructed as the 'master narrative' with some 'sub-narratives'.

> In Kyoto, a man started haltingly, "Well you know we are *zainichi kankokujin*, Korean residents in Japan." Immediately, the reporter and most of the adult television audience knew that this man's feelings about the Japanese emperor would be out of the ordinary and most likely negative. "I understand" acknowledged the reporter, even though nothing had really been said. The interviewee concluded, "My feelings are really very complex". (Fujitani, 1992; p 835)

Those in opposition to the 'master narrative' (e.g. Korean residents) and even those potentially antagonistic to the Emperor system were well controlled as they were well fixed in 'harmless locations on the master diagram of Japanese society' (p 835). All of the 'sub-narratives' were represented as being reasonable and coherent, and as being part of the 'master narrative'. In this way, the media (e.g. NHK) successfully represented the 'sub-narratives' as peripheral or, worse, as only a spectacle to be watched. Then Fujitani sharply pointed out:

> Thus the master narrative controlled opposition and alternative meanings by what might in the Gramscian mode be described as a hegemonic process. In this process, the dominant ideology did not simply ignore, which, of course, it also can do and did; rather, it incorporated, absorbed. It revealed social conflicts only to domesticate them, to render them innocuous and supportive of the core ideological structures. (pp 835-836)

Fujitani pointed out that the media rhetorics harmonised modern monarchism under the democratic social norm. Minimising the opposition argument, the audience could attribute the pro-monarchy discourse as the 'master narrative' throughout Japan. Accordingly, Fujitani suggested that micro-level analysis of the 'narratives' (and

rhetorical formulations by the narratives) was important for the examination of modern monarchism (cf. Billig, *et al.*, 1988; Billig, 1992, 1997b).

3.8.4. Linguistic Analysis of the Emperor's Speech

In 1997, Azuma, a linguist working at the University of Utah, examined the documented Emperor's speech, applying the linguistic theory of speech accommodation (*Speech Accommodation and Japanese Emperor Hirohito*: *see section 7.2.1* about the Speech Accommodation Theory). Azuma concentrated on Hirohito's speech styles and their psychological effects. As seen (*section 3.3.0 and 3.8.1*), Hirohito visited war-beaten Japan to encourage its industrial activities during the period 1946-1954. Azuma claimed that the linguistic techniques of 'the very top of the society' contributed to the gaining of national support, when social approval was the crucial condition for the survival of the Emperor system as well as Hirohito himself (cf. Inose and Yamaguchi, 1987/1998; Sakamoto, 1988, 1989)

Azuma's micro-level analysis revealed that Hirohito successfully emphasised the solidarity between the people and himself. The Emperor, who had been considered as a living god, spoke like a local Japanese person (i.e. downward convergence), then the people reacted enthusiastically to the way the Emperor spoke and treasured it. Azuma believed that because of the shared war-time hardships, Hirohito's speech style served to formulate the solidarity between the Emperor and ordinary people. For instance, an opinion poll in 1989 showed that 75 percent of respondents over 60 years old said 'feel close to the Emperor', although as little as 40 percent of those in their 20s and 30s responded in the same way. Thus, Azuma concluded that the pre-war and war-time generations (i.e. over 60 years old in 1989), who shared the same war-time hardships and accepted Hirohito's speech style as a sign of solidarity, as a result had a shorter psychological distance to the Emperor.

As far as I am concerned, Azuma concluded his argument too hastily. Firstly, the Emperor concerned in the opinion poll could not be Hirohito, but Akihito. Hirohito died on 7th January, and the opinion poll was conducted in February (cf. Azuma, 1997;

p 199). Secondly, Azuma assumed that a generation would share the same experiences and sentiments about the Emperor. However, some studies have suggested that people had different opinions and images of Hirohito, according to their personal backgrounds or experiences. Kodama (1975/1985) reported some anti-Hirohito discourses of the war-time generations, for example, a Hiroshima atomic-bomb victim denounced the Emperor's 'ah so!' utterance (*see section 3.7.2*) as it seemed to tease the war victims. Therefore, analysts must consider various factors when interpreting the opinion poll data other than just two factors (i.e. war experience and 'downward convergence'). These other factors could include different educations for the pre- and post-war generations (e.g. Yamamoto and Konno, 1976/1986).

From the methodological point of view, on the other hand, Azuma's study was quite rich. His detailed linguistic analysis revealed a discursive process, in which a speaker determines the relative status between the speaker's self and the addressee (e.g. 'downward convergence'). By looking at the responses of the interlocutors and the contexts, in addition, the analysts could point out the psychological effect of the speech for the hearer (e.g. 'solidarity'). Thus detailed linguistic analysis can be useful for social psychological research. Although Azuma showed its usefulness, his topic was the discourse of the Emperor. I will expand his techniques for ordinary people's utterances. In this way, micro-level linguistic analysis of mundane discussions will reveal the formulations of monarchism amongst non-privileged Japanese people (see Chapters 4, 6, 7 and 8).

3.9.0. Concluding Comments

In this chapter, I have outlined post-war studies of the Emperor system. One of the features of Japanese arguments about Emperorship is the analysts' positionings towards the Emperor's character, because of the 'responsibility arguments' of Hirohito. Another feature is, with some exceptions (e.g. Matsushita, 1959; Watanabe, 1990; Fujitani, 1992), that Japanese studies tend to look at 'everyday formulations' of monarchism, rather than temporary emotions provoked by ceremonies (cf. Martin, 1936; Shils and Young, 1953; Zielger, 1978).

In comparing the studies discussed in Chapter 2 with those discussed in this chapter, we can see that there is a gap between the studies on the British and Japanese monarchies. The Japanese Emperorship has not been analysed by the micro-level discursive/rhetorical approach, which looks at mundane justifications and legitimisation of the inequality (cf. Billig, 1992). Although once Tsurumi attempted to examine the 'rhetoric' of the ordinary people in 1952, his analysis was not theoretically based in discursive theory. Also, Azuma's (1997) micro-level linguistic research is about Hirohito's speech style. Therefore, in this thesis, I will analyse people's utterances employing techniques used by Edley (1991) and Billig (1992). In addition, other analytical tools, such as Japanese socio-linguistics and pragmatics, will contribute to examining details of Japanese people's discourse.

Chapter 4

From Individual to Social

- Discursive/Rhetorical Approach to Psychology -

4.1.0. Introduction

In this chapter, I shall review the discursive/rhetorical approach to social psychology. Discursive psychology is an inter-disciplinary and critical approach to conventional psychology. I shall, first of all, discuss the dominant assumptions of 'rational individuality' by conventional/cognitive psychologists. Historically, psychologists presuppose the rationality of a human being, and try to identify cause-effect links between behaviours. Secondly, as an example of rational individuality, I will outline conventional/cognitive theories of 'attitude'. Attitude theorists believe that 'attitude' is a part of the individualised stimuli-behaviour link.

I will then consider the theories of a group of psychologists who were influenced by social constructionism, and who propose an alternative approach to social psychology, that is discursive psychology. Social constructionism is a study of 'reality' and 'knowledge' (Berger and Luckmann, 1966/1967), which sees social realities as the products of continuous negotiations amongst people. Applying this perspective, discursive psychologists propose a radical paradigm shift for psychological issues. Their analytical focus has shifted from '(rational) individual' to '(continuous) negotiations' in society. This approach gives a highly socialised picture of social psychology. In accordance with this, constructionists have re-conceptualised several psychological topics, which were traditionally considered as matters of individuality, such as 'personality', 'memory', 'emotion', 'identity', 'thinking' and 'attitude'.

Subsequently, the notion of 'attitude' will be re-analysed from a discursive point of view. The discursive/rhetorical approach goes beyond conventional attitude theories and re-conceptualises some weaknesses of cognitivism, such as the notion of 'attitude changes'. I will discuss how discursive psychologists have shown that 'attitude' is a part of rhetorical dynamics in constructions. In addition, examples of discursive psychological analyses of 'racism', 'sexism' and 'monarchism' will be reviewed. As will be seen, by detailed analysis of conversational data, discursive psychologists have identified the rhetorical dynamics of, for instance, 'modern racist attitudes'.

4.2.0. Traditional Individualism

Historically speaking, modern social psychology has its theoretical roots in German 'völkerpsychologie' (psychology of people) and the 'crowd psychology' of the late 19th Century in France and Italy. The former looked at the psychological aspects of collective thinking, which, for example, integrated smaller nations into the German Empire. The latter was influenced by the development of pathology and epidemiology at that time. It modelled people's collective anti-social behaviours, such as urban crimes and revolutionary movements, on 'mental contagion'. Intellectuals were interested in (and establishments were afraid of) the mechanism which caused 'irresponsible (or irrational) behaviours' (i.e. crimes, succession of revolutions) by 'responsible (or rational) individuals' (Graumann, 1988; McGarty and Haslam, 1997; Venn, 1984). More recent examples include war-time governments, concern about moral breakdown and public panic (Morgan and Thomas, 1996), and there were several studies of (war-time) anti-democratic and anti-humanistic behaviour by 'rational' individuals. (Fiske and Tayler, 1984, Adorno *et al.*, 1950). The major concern of the study of group psychodynamics (e.g. 'crowd psychology') was, accordingly, the fate of the 'normal' individual who somehow became 'abnormal' under the social condition of crowds.

For several decades in the post-war period, North America has been the centre of social psychological studies. Many psychological notions have been well digested and

transformed into something American, partly blended with its indigenous behaviourism and individualism (Graumann, 1988). Individual people are viewed as autonomous, independent beings, whose behaviour, such as instincts, needs, desires or wants 'are assumed as given independently of a social context' (Lukes, 1973; cited by Graumann, 1988, p 7). Therefore mainstream social psychology has been dominated by individualism. Individuals are seen as invariant and groups and society are mere unions or products of individual consistent faculties. At the same time, people are conceptualised as those who will behave for their individual satisfactions, such as reinforcement, reward and profit, or they may act to reduce pain, uncertainty, dissonance and so on. To put it another way, human beings are seen as (research) objects which follow rather simple rules, such as the pleasure principle, according to which they act in order to secure pleasure for themselves and to avoid and reduce pain (Graumann, 1988).

Individualism adapted the methodological procedures of American empiricism and behaviourism. For example, according to Allport (1924), social psychology was 'the science which studies the behaviour of the individual in so far as his [*sic*] behaviour stimulates other individuals, or is itself a reaction to this behaviour' (cited by Graumann, 1988, p 13). One of Allport's contributions to social psychology was to establish its status as a 'respectable science'. For that purpose, he attempted to analyse the 'human psyche' as if it were an observable object. Since then, mainstream psychologists have been keen to point out rules or systems which determine human behaviour.

4.2.1. Cognitivism and Individualism

Human social behaviours are not, needless to say, as simple as following obvious rules such as the 'pleasure principle'. We are, in fact, not like mice which push a bar for a piece of food. Psychologists think that 'pleasure' and 'pain' are not clear-cut distinctions, and people deal with a number of factors and conditions (accordingly 'information') simultaneously. As a result, many thinkers have assumed a capability which deals with a vast amount of information, both perceptual and memorial. In order

to see the point, psychologists conceptualise 'cognition' as a set of mental functions, such as 'categorisation', 'schema', 'script' and so forth, through which information can be processed.

Cognitivism has been employed by experimental and social psychologists. They believe that it is what determines what people will do. They analyse human behaviour with regard to '*person* in the *situation*' as well as '*cognition* and *motivation*' (Fiske and Tayler, 1984, p 5; emphasis original). In addition, some cognitivists focus on similarities between the concept of 'cognition' and the functions of computers. They view 'cognition' as if it were a series of programmes. For cognitivists, this 'computerised information processing model' (e.g. algorithm in programmes) appears useful when they make models of cognitive representations, such as what precedes (e.g. planning), accompanies (e.g. monitoring) and follows (e.g. remembering) behaviour (Graumann, 1988; Dawson, 1998).

Therefore, cognitivists think of cognition as a process, which selects information and makes sense of it. It also organises one's behaviour following certain rules. To put it another way, cognitivists consider individuals are organic information processing units, which produce some 'outputs' (i.e. behaviour) as reactions to 'inputs' (i.e. stimuli, perception, memory). Furthermore, with regard to *social* science, cognitive psychologists believe that *social cognitions* are formed through *personal cognitions.*

> We do not all construct the same knowledge at the same time, and we do not all form the same opinion about another person. This everyday experience illustrates how cognition does not depend essentially on the material or 'objective' characteristics of objects. Rather cognition is the mental reconstruction of that which is real, by individuals, based on their past experiences and their needs, desires and intentions. (Leyens and Codol, 1988; p 97)

As far as they assume that people's behaviours are determined by personal cognition, cognitivists believe that social cognition is also determined by individual internal states.

On the whole, cognitivists believe that social psychology is the study of individuals rather than society, analysing 'social *psychology*' through individual behaviours (cf. Harré, 1986; Harré and Gillet, 1994; Willig, 1999). In the following sections, cognitivist approaches will be re-examined, and their limitations will be pointed out, with particular regard to a popular social psychological issue, 'attitude'.

4.2.2. Attitude as Cognition, Discourse as Indication

The notion of 'attitude' is central to our modern society, in which people's personal preferences are the paramount concerns of its politics and economy (e.g. democracy, market economy). It is expected that by understanding 'attitude', we will be able to make some predictions about behaviours, such as voting in elections or purchasing particular branded products (Eiser, 1980; Stahlberg and Frey, 1988; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Potter, 1996a, 1996b).

One of the classic and general definitions of 'attitude' was proposed by Rosenberg and Hovland (1960), who claimed that attitudes are 'predispositions to responses to some class of stimuli with certain classes of responses' (cited by Stahlberg and Frey, 1988; p 143). Although Rosenberg and Hovland presented a complicated multiple structured 'three-component model of attitude' (i.e. 'affect', 'cognition' and 'behaviour'), generally, simpler 'unidimensional models' have been widely accepted. For instance, Petty and Cacioppo (1981) think that a person's 'evaluation' or 'preferences' act as key determinants of attitude: 'the term *attitude* should be used to refer to a general, enduring positive or negative feeling about some person, object or issue' (p 7; emphasis original). In consequence, cognitivists think that people hold an 'enduring feeling', which determines predispositions to attitude objects.

No one can observe the conceptual entity of 'attitude'. In order to investigate the hidden process, cognitivists analyse people's behaviours, especially discursive behaviours, as indicators of their 'attitude'.

> ... one of the most commonly held preconceptions about attitudes is that we *infer* a person's feelings from his [*sic*] overt behaviour - what he [*sic*] says and does. (Eiser, 1980; p 18; emphasis original)

Eiser illustrates his argument with the following example. 'That rose is red' is a description about a fact. However, some descriptions which include evaluation and/or preference about objects, like 'That rose is beautiful', are not only descriptions, but also expressions of speaker's 'attitudes'.

> This is what attitude statements do: they describe attitude objects, and express attitudes. Attitude statements and similar expressive acts, do more than provide a basis for inference. If we understand their meaning and appreciate their context, they *tell us* the person's attitude. (ibid.; p 19; emphasis original)

According to Eiser, as a general rule, positive statements about an object indicate the speaker's positive feeling (or 'attitude'), and a negative expression or behaviour suggests a negative one. When a speaker claims 'That rose is beautiful', attitude theorists assume that the speaker possesses a mental state about the flower, which lets him/her formulate a positive description about it. The adjective 'beautiful' is considered as not only a description, but also as an indication of the speaker's mental disposition. This straightforward assumption has encouraged attitude theorists to measure the hidden process.

Attitude theorists have designed several measurement methods, which try to calculate the disposition, according to the 'attitude statements'. One of the classic examples of this kind is the Likert scale (1932; cited by Oppenheim, 1992), which requires participants to score their 'feelings' toward an attitude object on pre-sorted measurements between opposite preferences, such as 'strongly agree' and 'strongly disagree'. Theorists have further developed the scale method for multi-dimentional systems in order to handle complicated data (Eiser, 1980; Stahlberg and Frey, 1988; Fiske and Tayler, 1984; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Potter, 1996b). In addition, some researchers have developed questionnaires and structured interviews in order to elicit

'attitude statements' from their participants (e.g. Oppenheim, 1992). These attempts are based on two cognitivist beliefs: firstly, attitude is a rigid mental state, and secondly, to a certain extent, attitude statements reflect this internal state. One might claim that attitude theorists look at 'referential-representational functions' of language (Shotter, 1993).

Here, we must consider some of the problems of attitude measurements noted by critical social psychologists (e.g. Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Potter, 1996b; Billig, 1991). Potter (1996b) lists some objections to conventional and experimental attitude research, with regard to their atomism, individualism, ignorance of contexts and ignorance of performative variability of an evaluative expression. We will look at each of these points in turn. Firstly, attitude researchers are blind to the patterned natures of attitude. It is often observed that people's 'attitudes' for independent topics are correlated (e.g. environmental and animal rights issues). However, no account for these kind of relationships is offered by attitude theorists. Secondly, people often account for their individual 'attitudes', by considering shared knowledges about social controversies. However, conventional researchers ignore the social nature of their attitude statements. In other words, if there is no 'collective (or shared) attitude' about a controversy, there might not be any 'individual attitude' about it (cf. Moscovici, 1972, 1984). Thirdly, conversation contains a surprising amount of variation of evaluations or preferences for an attitude object. If we infer an 'attitude' according to an individual's expressions, we must account for such variabilities. Fourthly, evaluative expressions do not only perform as evaluation, but often function in other ways. For instance, 'Oh, great shoes' may be attributed as a complimentary expression, rather than his/her evaluation which may in fact not accord with the compliment given. As a whole, Potter's objections are criticisms about 'individualism' and the 'discourse as indication' view of cognitivism, and suggest that there is a weakness in conventional approaches to recover an 'attitude entity' or to measure it.

Moreover, there is not a straightforward relationship between 'attitude' and 'behaviour'. For instance, classic research in the 1930s by LaPiere illustrates that the same American people (i.e. receptionists of hotels, restaurants) showed different

degrees of racial tolerance (i.e. 'attitude') for real Chinese customers and bookings by Chinese customers (LaPiere, 1934; cited by Potter, 1996b). A person's behaviours towards an attitude object was not invariable in different contexts. To deal with the point, cognitivists have developed several studies which consider consistency and inconsistency of behaviours, such as theory of cognitive consistency (Heider, 1944), social comparison (Festinger, 1954), cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), cognitive balance (Heider, 1958), self-consciousness (Wicklund, 1975) or self-monitoring (Snyder, 1979). All of them are expected to account for how an individual holds and changes his/her attitude and behaviours (e.g. Fiske and Tayler, 1984; Eiser, 1980; Stahlberg and Frey, 1988). However, it is claimed that attitude theorists ignore frequent shifts of 'attitude statements' in mundane talks (Billig, 1987, 1991, 1992; Potter, 1996b). Although a stance for an attitude object seems not to be changed, 'attitude statements' can be variable (*see section 4.3.2*). From these remarks, a couple of questions for cognitive accounts about attitude become clear. Firstly, 'is an attitude an enduring mental state?' Secondly, 'to what extent does an attitude statement reflect a person's mentality?' In the next section, the cognitive view of 'attitude change' is reviewed critically.

4.2.3. Cognitive Accounts for Attitude Change

Cognitivists try to recover some determinants which change people's 'attitude' and, therefore, behaviours. A rather simple explanation was the theory of 'direct experience' by Zajonc (1968), which proposed that 'mere repeated exposure of the individual to a stimulus is a sufficient condition for the enhancement of his [*sic*] attitude toward it' (cited by Stroebe and Jonas, 1988; p 169).

Other psychologists offer more socialised models of attitude change. They believe that effective communication is a key determinant of attitude and behaviour change. For instance, McGuire (1969, 1997) claims that there are five steps to behaviour change: attention, comprehension, yielding, retention and behaviour. In the case of an election campaign, a candidate must attract the audience's attention by his/her speech (i.e. attention). At that time, he/she has to explain his/her policy in understandable language

(i.e. comprehension). Although the audiences are convinced by his/her policy (i.e. yielding), they must retain their decision until the election day (i.e. retention). The voting at the election (i.e. behaviour) is, therefore, determined by all of these 'Information Process Paradigms', in which each step depends on the occurrence of preceding steps. Since attention and comprehension can be combined into a single step of 'reception', McGuire's model can be reduced into a *two-factor model* of persuasion (McGuire, 1969; Stroebe and Jonas, 1988).

There is another notable cognitive study of 'attitude change'. Petty and Cacioppo (1986) and Petty (1997) believe that an 'attitude change' is not determined by a single-process (e.g. $20 or $1 reward), but by a multiple-process, and they conducted a series of experiments to investigate conditions of 'attitude change'. They measured degrees of attitude changes by 'strong arguments' and 'weak arguments'. At that time, the analysts controlled the experimental conditions, such as low or high distortions, one or three exposures and negative or positive moods. These investigations were conducted to support their 'Elaboration Likelihood Model' (ELM).

ELM considers variables which either increase or decrease persuasion by influencing the likelihood that people would elaborate or think about the arguments presented, and it makes cognitive assumptions: firstly, a change of attitude is quantifiable through the use of measurement methods, secondly, the process of 'elaboration' is an individualised mental mechanism. According to the theory of ELM, a person can be persuaded through two different ways: the 'central routes of persuasion' and the 'peripheral routes of persuasion'. If a person is involved in the topic, he/she may well consider the validity of a message before he/she accepts it (i.e. 'central route'). If a person is not sufficiently involved in the topic, other factors, such as the attractiveness of the persuaders, may determine his/her message acceptance (i.e. 'peripheral route'). Also, the effects of each 'route' are determined by two further factors, inputs (e.g. elaboration likelihood of information) and respondents (e.g. motivation and ability to assess validity of information). Hence, ELM considers that attitude change is determined by not only the quality of information, but also the individualised process of elaboration (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Petty, 1997).

The two-factor model of persuasion and ELM are highly dependent upon attitude measurement methods. As discussed, however, (quantitative) measurements are not sufficient to identify the hidden predispositions (*see section 4.3.2*). Furthermore, there are other problems in these 'attitude change' studies. For instance, McGuire's Information Processing Paradigm could explain why it is difficult to induce behaviour change through information campaigns (e.g. election campaigns), but it lacks specific theoretical principles which would allow one to predict the factors that affect reception and acceptance. Also, whereas ELM identifies some conditions for acceptance of persuasion, it fails to identify major determinants which make an argument persuasive.

To be more precise, although these studies focus on a speaker's persuasion and a hearer's acceptance, they disregard an important factor, rhetoric. For instance, firstly, Zajonc does not consider rhetoric. Secondly, McGuire does not address the contents of persuasion, but his model views 'persuasion' as just a part of the cognitive steps. Thirdly, while ELM considers rhetoric (i.e. 'strong or weak argument', 'central or peripheral route of persuasion') as key determinants, it ignores the rhetorical dynamism which makes a statement persuasive (cf. Billig, 1987, 1991; Billig *et al.*, 1988; Potter and Wetherell, 1987, 1995). As far as I am concerned, one of the reasons for their omissions is the difficulty in measuring the effect of rhetoric. However, as will be seen in some of the following sections, recent developments in critical psychology have enabled us to examine the details of rhetorical organisation.

4.3.0. Discourse as Construction

In recent years, alternative approaches to '*social* psychology' have been developed, mainly by European academics, who have emphasised the social aspect of people's behaviour. As early examples, there were theories of social representation (Moscovici, 1972, 1984) and social identity (Tajifel, 1981). They emphasised the inter-personal relationships of social behaviours. As will be specified below, radical critical social psychology was proposed by a group of academics with social constructionist disciplines. The new approach does not try to reveal invisible 'cognition', but pays

attention to local discursive business. This is not a study of autonomous individuals (or 'ego-psychology' according to Parker, 1997), but a study of practical inter-personal relations. Also, critical psychologists think that cognitivism tends to ignore the cultural and historical specificity of behaviour.

Constructionism is, in general, founded on the belief that 'reality' is constituted by social interactions of comprehension. Some aspects of constructionism have to be emphasised. Firstly, constructionism is sceptical about individualism. It sees that people are not independent from society, but rather inter-dependent within culture, history and society (Billig *et al.*, 1988). Secondly, it also criticises 'atomized individualism' (Shotter, 1993), which expects all people to behave the same in response to the same stimuli. Thirdly, this approach stresses the importance of qualitative analysis of language rather than quantitative or statistical analysis. It also eagerly criticises reductionist analyses of the social sciences (Harré, 1986, 1999; Harré and Gillet, 1994; Willig, 1999).

Constructionists believe that there are no absolute and positive 'facts', but factualities which are represented by continuous debates (e.g. Edwards, Ashmore and Potter, 1995). It is claimed that even a factuality of a '(natural) scientific knowledge' is negotiated amongst scientists (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1982; cited by Potter and Wetherell, 1987) within its socio-historical contexts (Kuhn, 1977). A chemist, for instance, distinguishes different minerals when he/she burns them, according to the colours of the flame. However, from a constructionist's point of view, these 'mineral-colour' links are also constructions.

> In the philosophy of positivism, and its associated spontaneous scientific consciousness, we tend to see the world as if it were itself constituted of facts. Facts, however, are not the cause of our perceptual process, but their result. (Shotter, 1993; p 70)

Furthermore, it is obvious that cognitivists (e.g. attitude theorists) who look at individualised 'stimuli-behaviour' links are not as successful as chemists who identify

'mineral-colour' links. In other words, 'cause-effect' links proposed by cognitivists are not persuasive enough (*see section 4.2.2* and *4.2.3*). Thus, with regard to social psychology, Harré (1998) is quite right to note that 'we must assume that the world is richer than we know' (p xii). Consequently, critical psychologists claim that it is not appropriate for social scientists to analyse psychological issues (e.g. 'attitude') with natural scientific or statistical methods. So that they shift their analytical focus from individualised causality of behaviour to detailed examinations of the construction process (e.g. Billig, 1985; Gergen, 1985, 1994, 1999; Abrams and Hogg, 1990; Harré and Gillet, 1994; Ibáñez, 1997; Potter and Wetherell, 1995; Wetherell and Potter, 1989; Burman and Parker (eds.), 1993). As a result, they focus on 'discourse', rather than 'determinants of discourse' (i.e. cognition). The following passage well illustrates the point:

> The dominant view of how phenomena come to be has been that of physical science. This view portrays human beings as some special kind of (inert) object that requires being moved by causal pushes and pulls that are based in the external world as mediated by the internal working of human physiology. In the discursive view, this is no more than a conceptualization or signification of things and suffers the limitation of any discourse. The phenomena being observed are cast into a form that is validated in that discourse: here, cause and effect and the action of forces on bodies. (Harré and Gillet, 1994; p 124)

Constructionists consider a person does not passively accommodate to a given society (i.e. 'fixed-object-passive-lawlike-relation picture', according to Harré and Gillet, 1994), but rather positively participates in discursive activities which construct his/her own social realities, with (and sometimes, without) other people.

With regard to psychological studies, one of the most important constructionists' paradigm shifts is proposed by Billig (1987, 1991). He claims that human 'thoughts', which cognitivists have regarded as the heart of 'cognition', are local discursive and rhetorical organisations. He emphasises dialectical structures of the 'thought process' (i.e. theme and counter-theme; *see section 4.3.2*) and concludes that 'thought' must be

formed through actual and/or hypothetical arguments. He says that the individual process of 'thought' can be modelled upon public debate, too (i.e. 'silent arguments conducted within a single self'; Billig, 1987; p 35; see also Henriques *et al.* (eds.), 1984, about critics of 'language-thought dualism'). In this way, what cognitivists conceptualise as being somewhere *within* people, is replaced by constructionists as being *between* people. In other words, constructionists believe that 'thought' is an observable process in the negotiations (i.e. argument; e.g. Billig, 1987; *see section 4.3.1* for more details). Using the social constructionist perspective, therefore, critical social psychologists can re-examine and re-conceptualise various social psychological issues, such as 'prejudice', 'personality', 'identity', 'causal attribution', 'memory', 'emotion', 'repression' and indeed, 'attitude' (e.g. Middleton and Edwards, 1990; Middleton and Edwards (eds.), 1990; Gergen, 1989; Shotter and Gergen (eds.), 1989; Potter, 1996b; Wetherell, 1996; Potter and Wetherell, 1987, 1988; Wetherell and Potter, 1989, 1992; Edwards, 1991, 1997, 1998, 1999; Billig, 1985, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1999; Antaki, 1994, 1998; Antaki and Widdicombe (eds.), 1998; Harré, 1989, 1999; Armon-Jones, 1996; Sabat *et al.*, 1999).

4.3.1. Discursive Psychology

Critical psychologists have employed theories of language use, such as Speech Act Theory, Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis. It is worth here outlining the theoretical contributions of these to the new form of psychology, 'Discursive Psychology'. In the next section we shall also take a brief look at the discursive psychological view of attitude.

(A) Speech Act Theory

Speech act theorists, such as Austin (1962), see language as functional. Instead of seeing language as representing 'facts' or 'reality' (therefore it can be evaluated as either 'true' or 'false'), they see language as both *stating* and *doing* things (e.g. Edley, 1991; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Edwards and Potter, 1992; Drew and Heritage, 1992; Potter, 1996a). In other words, speech act theorists emphasise the 'performative' (Potter and Wetherell, 1987) and 'rhetorical-responsive' (Shotter,

1993) functions of speech. For instance, some speeches are performative but less descriptive, as in declaring a war, naming a ship, invitations and so on. Speech act theorists offer a highly socialised view of language. Under those circumstances, with regard to Austin's work, Potter and Wetherell (1987) note:

> He draws our attention to the role played by the web of social conventions in the achievement of actions through talk and thus sensitizes the researcher to features of the social context surrounding language use. Despite these positive aspects, however, his theory was primarily developed to combat alternative philosophical views and little consideration was paid to the practicalities of actually applying it to everyday talk in natural situations. (p 18)

(B) Ethnomethodology

The speech act theorist view of 'language as functional rather than descriptive' is common to the sociological tradition of ethnomethodology, which is more guided by detailed empirical studies. Ethnomethodology is a study (i.e. '-ology') of the methods that ordinary people's (i.e. 'ethno-') language uses in order to make sense of their lives. The central figure of this discipline is Garfinkel (1967), who studied the decision making processes of juries in 1950s Chicago (cf. Heritage, 1984; Potter and Wetherell, 1987). He proposed a 'documentary method of interpretation', by which members of a society make sense of and accommodate to the 'world' in which they live. For instance, Garfinkel was interested in distinctions made by the juries, such as between 'fact' and 'opinion', and between what could and could not be deduced from the evidence in the court. As a rule, the prime concern of ethnomethodologists is the normative rules which make sense for members within a society or culture.

That is to say, ethnomethodology is an empirical study of practical local sense making, and it raises two important concerns, *indexicality* and *reflexivity*. Firstly, unlike linguists' notion of *indexicality*, ethnomethodologists refer to it as a flexible and extensive concept. For instance, Edley (1991) shows that an expression, 'I'm cold', could be interpreted differently according to surrounding contexts. It may be a description of bodily sensation, a request for heat or a subtle hint about wanting a

cuddle (p 62). The second notion, *reflexivity*, concerns the interaction between analysis/interpretation of local rules and local society/culture. Since an analyst and participants are both involved in a society/culture, the language used by the analyst can constitute the reality which he/she is looking at. Consequently, it can be said that a piece of research would not only find rules/interpretations of an event, but it also creates/constitutes that event (Potter and Wetherell, 1987).

A variety of works are regarded as ethnomethodological studies, for instance, in a counselling setting, how femininity is represented by a patient who has sexual identity problems (Garfinkel, 1967); how a young lady's mental illness is established as an accountable 'fact', which is gradually realised and accepted by her friends (Smith, 1978); how ambulance calls are designed between callers and call takers (Zimmerman, 1992, 1998); and in the arena of political journalism, how the factuality of the Chancellor of the Exchequer's reported statement is negotiated and established between journalists and the politician (Edwards and Potter, 1992).

(C) Conversation Analysis

Conversation analysis refers to the techniques used to examine interactions in non-experimental settings, which were developed by micro-sociologists with ethnomethodological disciplines (Levinson, 1983). Small recording devices (e.g. tape recorders) enable us to make detailed transcripts of conversations, and it has been revealed that even the most trivial exchanges are rich in meaning and involve skilful interactions between participants (e.g. Atkinson and Heritage (eds.), 1984; Heritage, 1988; Nofsinger, 1991; Edwards and Potter, 1992; Antaki, 1994). Both ethnomethodology and conversation analysis study people's practices of sense making. As a conversation analyst, Heritage (1988) notes:

> Our focus will be on the use of explanations or accounts that are provided in the immediate context of the activities they account for. We thus ignore narrative explanations of events that are external to the conversation in which the account occurs, and explanations which are external to the particular

sequence of conversational interaction in which the account occurs. (pp 131-132)

This highlights the contrast between ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. On the one hand, ethnomethodology concerns socio-cultural contexts of discourse. On the other hand, conversation analysis is interested in sequential contexts and examines the indexical and reflexive natures of systematic actions in conversations (Potter, 1996a; Edwards, 1997). Through analysis of sequential contexts conversation analysts empirically point out rules in people's mundane talks (i.e. 'local management system', according to Levinson, 1983), such as 'turn takings', 'adjacency pairs', 'preference structures' (Levinson, 1983; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Nofsinger, 1991), 'extreme case formulations' (Pomeranz, 1986), 'repair' (Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks, 1977; Nofsinger, 1991; Schegloff, 1997) and so on. Conversation analysts then apply these findings to analyse everyday explanations, arguments, reasonings, attributions and so forth, which create conversational ordinariness. According to Heritage (1988), conversation analysis is not a fixed set of methodological canons, but, a 'resourceful use of the corpus of current knowledge' (p 144).

There are several studies looking at the sequential organisation of conversational data. For instance, how telephone conversations are designed, such as their openings (Schegloff, 1968); and how members of sub-cultural groups confirm their group identities in their mundane talk, for instance, by using exclusive vocabularies (Sacks, 1979; Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1989).

(D) Discursive Psychology

As discussed previously, discursive psychology is critical of cognitivism. It examines the organisation of discourse, and is often identified with 'discourse analysis'. Here, it is worth discussing notions of 'discourse' proposed by different thinkers. According to Parker (1992), for example, it is 'a system of statements which constructs an object' (p 5). From his point of view, discourse can be a part of the framework of arguments (i.e. 'system'), which can be, for instance, the rules which ordain and punish criminal activities (Foucault, 1977) or the institutionalised cultural and religious discriminations

(Said, 1978, 1981). This picture of 'discourse' has something in common with the notion of 'social representation' (Moscovici, 1972, 1984). Parker implies that a discourse signifies local rules which guide local constructions (see also Fairclough, 1989; Van Dijk, 1993; Burr, 1995).

Another group of constructionists draw a more dynamic picture of 'discourse', for example, '*talk and texts as parts of social practices*' (Potter, 1996a; p 105; emphasis original). Potter suggests that discourse analysts look at micro-details of on-going talk and texts (see also Burr, 1995; p 184, about different definitions of 'discourse'), which is an attractive perspective for psychologists. This is in accordance with the point examined in the previous section, '*Discourse as Construction*', especially Billig's idea of 'thinking as arguing' (1987). Potter's definition suggests that discourse analysts could reveal the process of 'thinking', as the disciplines outlined above (i.e. speech act theory, ethnomethodology and conversation analysis) enable us to examine micro-details of 'talk and texts', which constitute 'arguments'. In general, this school of constructionists often refer to the less dynamic picture of 'discourse' (e.g. 'system of statements' by Parker) as either 'common-place' or 'interpretative repertoire' which are used as (rhetorical) resources to formulate arguments.

A number of critical psychologists who identify themselves as 'discursive psychologists' are happy to employ the second notion of 'discourse':

> The focus of discursive psychology is the action orientation of talking and writing. For both participants and analysts, the primary issue is the social actions, or interactional work, being done in the discourse. (Edwards and Potter, 1992; p 2)

One more point has to be noted. One of the features of discursive psychology is its emphasis on rhetoric (e.g. Billig, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1992, 1997a, 1997b; Potter, 1996a, 1996b; Potter and Wetherell, 1995). In order to negotiate the factuality of the accounts, people have to defend their versions of 'fact' against another 'fact'

represented (cf. Billig *et al.*, 1988; *see section 4.3.2*). In consequence, techniques of persuasion become one of the main concerns of psychologists.

Through the analysis of conversational data, discursive psychologists point out rhetorical organisations which represent the speaker as theoretically inconsistent but practically consistent. For instance, a person who claims to have a 'strong view', continuously negotiates the contents of his view with other participants, nevertheless he retains the status of 'a holder of the strong view' (Billig, 1989, 1991; *see section 4.3.2* more details). Discursive psychologists, such as Billig (1987, 1991, 1992, 1997a, 1997b), focus on this flexible and extensive nature of rhetorical formulations. Billig names these phenomena as 'taking the side of the other' (1991) and 'kaleidoscope of common-sense' (1992), whereas some theme dependent rhetorical organisations can be named separately (for example, 'royal credit' discourse in *section 2.4.5*). In the next section, we will review the discursive concept of 'attitude' and its account for 'attitude change' and 'shift of attitude statements'.

4.3.2. Dilemma, Rhetoric and Attitude

The study of discourse and rhetoric by discursive psychologists involves a reworking of the cognitive concept of 'attitude'. Criticising traditional attitude studies, Potter (1996b) notes about the discursive notion of attitude:

> Unlike attitude theory, the goal is not to identify attitude as individual mental possessions, but to study the actual practices of evaluation found in social life, and to show how they throw light on situations involving persuasion. (p 154)

As seen in *section 4.3.0*, constructionists re-conceptualise 'thought' and 'cognition' as discursive interactions. In the same way, discursive psychologists could re-conceptualise the notion of 'attitude' as 'discourse about attitude'. What is more, looking at 'actual practices' (Potter, in quotation above), discursive psychologists tend to avoid using the term 'attitude'. Instead, Billig (1991) proposes 'view', which connotes cognition less.

Discursive psychologists re-conceptualise a study of 'attitude' as a study of people's expressions of their 'views', which are 'rhetorical stances in matter of controversy, and, as rhetorical stances, the act of giving attitudes involves criticisms and justification' (Billig, 1997b; p 43). Billig does not attempt to reveal people's predisposition for objects. He, instead, seeks '...to uncover the complex richness of the social business of "giving opinions". This is done by attending to details of what is said and how it is said' (ibid.; p 43). The point under consideration is how people give and justify their opinions. In conversations, namely in arguments, it is observed that speakers' views are frequently modified, concerning the theme and counter-theme of the topic (Billig *et al.*, 1988). This phenomenon is not an 'attitude change' (i.e. change of cognition), but a part of rhetorical dynamics. Discursive psychologists examine people's frequent shifts of preference or evaluations and conclude that these shifts are performed to represent the speaker as rational and persuasive.

To be more precise, analysts must think about dilemma in our sense making business. Usually, common-sense reasoning requires the speaker to have broader considerations about its counter-theme, because common-sense is normally organised through contrary themes. For example, a proverb often elicits its counter-proverb.

> When social psychologists believed that the group discussions enhanced value of risk-taking, it was as if the discussions reaffirmed the common-sense maxim 'Nothing ventured nothing gained.' But when it was realized that the discussions could also offer the counsel of caution, it was as if reckless venturing were being restrained by the admonition to 'Look before you leap.' (Billig *et al.*, 1988; p 14)

Single vocabularies, what is more, may contain moral and evaluative conflicts: the risk-taker can be described as reckless or courageous, because 'many words are not mere labels which neutrally package up the world' (Billig *et al.*, 1988; p 16). These conflicts are resources of arguments in people's thought process (Billig, 1987; Billig *et al.*, 1988). From this point of view, discursive psychologists criticise cognitive

individualism, which ignores social, cultural, historical and ideological natures of people's behaviours. Discursive interactions have to be analysed within their socio-historical contexts which include dilemmas. As Billig (1992) makes clear in *section 2.4.5*, for example, when conventionalists talk of '(royal) privileges', they often concern its counter-theme, '(royal) obligations' as part of their common-sense reasonings in modern Britain. When we state an opinion as our 'thought', we must be sensitive about its counter-opinion, because of dilemmatic natures of socially shared reasonings. From a discursive/rhetorical point of view, this dilemma between a theme and its counter-theme makes people's 'attitude statements' variable.

Discursive psychologists examine people's 'views', considering the following points. Firstly, they look at the contexts in which the 'view' is stated: 'Contextual information gives the researcher a much fuller understanding of the detailed and delicate organization of account' (Potter and Wetherell, 187; p 54). Second, detailed examinations of the variability of the discourse will illustrate the dilemmas of social life. Thus, as the third point, discursive psychologists note:

> It is clear that the attitudinal object can be constituted in alternative ways, and the person's evaluation is directed at these specific formulations rather than some abstract and idealized objects. (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; p 54)

In the next section, as examples, some remarkable discursive psychological studies about social or institutional realities will be outlined. Again, one must note that in these examples, analysts do not identify the individuals behind the data as being, for example, racist, sexist or monarchist, but attempt to analyse the rhetorical formulations of the 'racist', 'sexist' or 'monarchist discourse' as 'lived ideologies' (Billig *et al.*, 1988).

4.3.3. Racism, Sexism and Monarchism

Barker (1981) points out that modern racism by neo-conservatives often takes rhetorical forms. To put it another way, modern racists are skilful to justify and mitigate their racism under egalitarianism. Recently, some studies have been carried

out by discursive psychologists who are interested in the rhetorical nature of modern discrimination. Also, in this section, I shall discuss the possibility of applications of discursive/rhetorical study to Japanese monarchism.

(A) Racism

Potter and Wetherell (1987) and Wetherell and Potter (1992) analyse a number of racist discourses used by majority white New Zealanders (Pākehā). Examinations of their interview data show the rhetorical natures of their racist discourse about Polynesian immigrants and indigenous Māori people. The following extract shows one of the typical features of modern racism.

> 2. *Respondent.* I'm not anti them at all you know, I, if they're willing to get on and be like us; but if they're just going to come here, just to be able to use our social welfares and stuff like that, then why don't they stay home? (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; p 47)

At first sight, the respondent shows his/her sympathy for the immigrants, however, in the later part of the sentences, he/she makes some conditions for his/her sympathy and this extract turns out to be a racist discourse. The first phrase performs as what Potter names 'stake inoculation' (1996a). Detailed rhetorical examination reveals that the Pākehā respondent carefully represents him/herself in a passive position under the pressure of immigrants; for instance, 'our social welfares' are endangered by immigrants who have another option, such as, 'stay home'. By representing his/her own position as relatively weaker, the respondent justifies his/her racist discourse. The discursive psychologists examine several interview data, and point out some rhetorical features of modern discrimination in New Zealand. They list rhetorical common-places found in racist discourse.

1. Resources should be used productively and in a cost-effective manner.
2. Nobody should be compelled.

...

7. Everybody can succeed if they try hard enough.

8. Minority opinion should not carry more weight than majority opinion.
9. We have to live in the twentieth century.
10. You have to be practical. (Wetherell and Potter, 1992; p 177)

All of these statements can appear to be neutral or non-racist, however, they can be used to reinforce racist discourse, since they also contain implicit hidden messages against egalitarianism. For example, according to the Pākehā discourse shown above, firstly, the welfare system of white New Zealander society is well organised and working properly. Therefore, the immigrants may damage its management (i.e. common-places 1 and 10). At the same time, social welfare is represented as a product of 'our' effort, therefore, the respondent implicitly claims that Polynesians are not legitimated to use it (i.e. common-place 7).

(B) Sexism

Gill (1993) collects ten broadcasters' interviews in which they try to account for the lack of women disc jockeys (DJs) at local radio stations. In order to make their virtual sexist account plausible, male programme controllers (PCs) and DJs have to justify injustice under the social norm of gender equality. Gill finds that all of them draw on and combined different and contradictory accounts. She categorised these accounts into groups and examined them. One of the most popular accounts is something like 'women just don't apply'. There are some sub-categorised accounts for women's non-applications. The second type of account is the 'audience's objection to female DJs'. The third one concerns women's lack of abilities or qualifications, such as operating audio equipment. As the fourth point concerns the female voice as being not suitable for the work of a DJ, because it is 'too shrill, too dusky and just plain wrong'.

According to these rhetorical formulations, DJs and PCs represent that the lack of female DJs is not their responsibility, but the responsibility of the audience who prefer a male voice, or the responsibility of women, who do not apply for the job. Let us consider one of the extracts Gill presents.

Extract twelve (Goodman)

DJ: They they build a mental picture so it's really your voice (.) if your voice is right. For some women that can be hard because their voice is naturally higher. (Gill, 1993; p 89)

Although this extract concerns the 'quality of female voice', Gill points out that this male DJ implicitly states his male centrism, and the female voice is against the norm. He, in other words, claims to discriminate the female voice, rather than female DJs, but he practically discriminates female DJs. According to Gill's interpretation, '...what is clear from this extract is that the male voice is being used as the norm against which other voices are judged for their appropriateness' (p 89). In this way, Potter and Wetherell (1987), Wetherell and Potter (1992) and Gill (1993) demonstrate that social constructionist disciplines could reveal the rhetorical organisation of modern racism and sexism, showing the process of the powerful people defending their vested interest against egalitarianism.

(C) Monarchism

In *section 2.4.5* of Chapter 2, Billig's (1992) study of British monarchism is discussed. Therefore, I will not specify again the details of his study, but it is important to note the uniqueness of his rhetorical analysis. Since the Constitutional monarchy is a contradictory political system, it is difficult to identify 'attitude' or 'view' about monarchy for traditional attitude theorists. However, looking at socialised aspects of the institutional reality, Billig analysed ordinary people's discourse and examined their rhetorical formulation of those who are less privileged. Their rhetorics do not defend their interests, but justify the social inequality and accept their less privileged positions.

One of the fruitful findings of Billig's 'royalist attitude' project is his conceptualisation of the 'kaleidoscope of common-sense'. Speakers make sense of their 'stances', 'opinions', 'views' or 'attitudes', through 'common-sense' reasonings. Billig says that both monarch's 'inclusive' and 'exclusive' qualities are used as rhetorical resources, to support conventional monarchist discourse, but superficial analysis would not be sufficient to distinguish a person as a pro- or anti-monarchist. Qualitative linguistic

examination, on the other hand, reveals the rhetorical dynamics by which a speaker adheres to his/her own stances, concerning different aspects of common-sense knowledges.

Accordingly, as far as I am concerned, the discursive/rhetorical approach will offer new possibilities for the study of the Japanese Emperor system, another example of a Constitutional monarchy. There have been a number of studies of the Japanese Emperor system by historians, economists, political scientists, sociologists and so on (see Chapter 3). These studies are making sense of the social institution by historians, economists, political scientists, sociologists and so on (i.e. 'intellectual ideology'; Billig *et al.*, 1988). However, few Japanese academics are interested in the voice of the ordinary people, or the social psychological aspects of 'the less-privileged Japanese' about the monarchism. Using the discursive psychological approach, we could see the notion of normality and ordinariness about the monarchy in Japanese society, through our everyday sense-making business.

4.4.0. Concluding Comments

In this chapter, I have reviewed the discursive/rhetorical approach to social psychology. In the early part of this chapter, we have looked at the restrictions of conventional psychology. First of all, considering the history of the academic tradition of social psychology, we saw that a classic individualism has been the central assumption. Social psychology has been seen as what accounts for the cause of behaviours by individuals. At the same time, there was an (American) optimism that psychologists would be able to identify all the causes of complicated human behaviours in a reductionist manner (cf. Harré, 1989, 1998, 1999).

Next, we have outlined cognitivism. Cognitivists believe that we select information (e.g. stimulus) and react to it. They believe that if we could recover the cognitive process, we could predict human behaviours, because cognition seems to be the key for information processing and controlling human behaviours. Attitude theorists under cognitive influence, believe that 'attitude' is a part of cognition. Since these

conventional psychologists see the individuals as autonomous but rule-following objects, their research is guided by reductionism, realism and essentialism. Therefore, they analyse people's uses of the language, but they are regarded as indications of internal human entities. Consequently, dynamic discursive/rhetorical business is ignored.

In the later part of this chapter, we have considered psychology with social constructionist perspectives, namely discursive psychology. It proposes more society oriented concepts of social psychology. According to this perspective, the social realities which we consider as 'taken-for-granted knowledge' are not given to us, but the products of our own interactions. In this way, this perspective proposes a strong anti-essentialist picture of our society and psychology. Discursive psychologists criticise cognitivists, because their individualism makes them ignore the social, historical, cultural and ideological contexts of people's behaviour.

To consider the theoretical backgrounds of discursive psychology, I outlined 'speech act theory', 'ethnomethodology' and 'conversation analysis'. All of these disciplines enable psychologists to examine local discourse-in-action. They also enable psychologists to identify rhetorical dynamisms of our mundane reasoning, explanations, arguments and so on. There are a couple of notable paradigm shifts proposed by discursive psychologists. Firstly, the discursive/rhetorical psychologists do not study individuals, especially some invisible rules which control individual behaviours (i.e. cognition). As the second point, since it looks at the interactive relationship between individuals, it emphasises the importance of language and its performances. Thus, discursive psychology is a study of language use. One more point has to be noted. Since discursive psychology focuses on rhetorical formulations of everyday language use, analysts will see what kind of common-places make sense of the participants' discourse. In other words, normative notion of topics in local discussions and arguments, can be identified by discourse analysts.

Finally, the discursive re-conceptualisation of 'attitude' was outlined. Discursive psychologists claim that 'attitude' is not a personal possession which determines one's

behaviour, but is a socialised activity which makes sense of one's behaviour, considering (contradictory) socially shared values. I also discussed some remarkable discursive studies which have something in common with the notion of 'attitude', such as 'racist attitude', 'sexist attitude' or 'royalist attitude'. The rhetorical concerns of discursive psychology provide a powerful framework to analyse these modern discriminations. They illustrate some dilemmatic common-places about the topics concerned.

Chapter 5

Interview Data To Be Analysed

- Method and Samples -

5.1.0. Introduction

In Chapters 2 and 3, studies of the constitutional monarchies of both Britain and Japan were reviewed. In most of these studies, academics considered the political, cultural, economic, historical, sociological, linguistic and/or psychological aspects of the constitutional monarchies. In other words, experts from a variety of areas attempt to make sense of monarchism from their own point of view.

As a result of recent developments in the discursive approach in Britain, there is a gap between British and Japanese studies of monarchies. On the one hand, although a Japanese academic once tried to analyse ordinary people's accounts of the Emperor and Emperor system some fifty years ago (i.e. Tsurumi, 1952; *see section 3.5.1*), since then few academics have attempted to make sense of the non-privileged Japanese voice on the subject of monarchism. On the other hand, in the 1980s and 1990s, critical psychologists have developed analytical techniques to investigate ordinary people's discourse (*see section 4.3.0* and *4.3.1*), and British psychologists have applied these techniques to the dilemma of the 'lived ideology' (Billig *et al.*, 1988) of monarchism (e.g. Edley, 1991, Billig, 1992).

As seen in Chapter 4, discursive psychologists use systematic techniques to analyse people's discourse and process of constructions. Monarchism is a linguistically

constructed ideology, which Eagleton (1991) defines as 'the ways in which people may come to invest in their own unhappiness' (p xiii). Through examinations of discourse, analysts are able to view the dialectic dynamism of people's 'thinking' (Billig, 1987; Billig *et al.*, 1988; *see section 4.3.0*), which are also processes of their 'investments in their own unhappiness'. This is what Billig (1992) demonstrates in his study of (conventional) British royalist discourses. This thesis attempts, therefore, to apply these techniques to discourse on the Japanese monarchy, thus bringing work on the Japanese monarchy into line with work on the British monarchy. I will analyse subtle and continuous interactions by non-privileged Japanese, which justify the social controversy (i.e. democracy and monarchism).

5.2.0. Discourse and Monarchism

Justifications and criticisms of social controversies are often found in subtle interactions in everyday conversations and media coverages, like mundane confirmations of national identity. Since modern monarchism is not a 'hot' ideological topic, but still a 'banal' one in Japan, we have to analyse subtle and continuous negotiations about this social reality through detailed examination of language uses (Billig, 1992, 1995).

Billig (1997b) describes procedures of discourse analysis and this thesis follows his instructions and analyses two kinds of data: recorded family discussions (Chapters 6, 7 and 8) and Japanese newspaper articles which appeared immediately after Emperor Hirohito died (Chapter 8). When analysing conversational data, I will focus on two of the features of Japanese language, its complicated naming system (Chapter 6) and honorifics (Chapter 7). In Chapter 8, I will examine exclusive terminology for the Emperor's death used in newspaper articles. In this thesis, in addition to discursive psychology, the academic tradition of Japanese pragmatics and socio-linguistics greatly contribute to the analysis.

Here it must be emphasised that, in this thesis, some characteristics of Japanese rhetorical formulations (i.e. naming, honorifics and exclusive terms) are analysed *in*

Japanese, then these *analyses are translated into English*. In other words, I analyse neither English transcripts nor texts, but Japanese ones, then I elucidate their rhetorical organisations in English.

5.3.0. Method

In this thesis, six tape recorded semi-structured interviews of a total of fifteen participants are analysed, all of which were conducted by the same male interviewer who was in his thirties (henceforth 'S' in chapters below). All interviewees are 'Japanese', speak Japanese as their mother tongue, were born in Japan and have Japanese passports. At the time of the interviews, all interviewees identified themselves as 'Japanese'. One may claim that six interviews is rather small. Billig (1992), for instance, collected an exceptionally large number of sixty-three samples for his qualitative examination of British conventional royalism. However, this study does not intend to produce a comprehensive analysis of the general ideological tendencies of Japanese monarchism. It is based on micro-discursive analysis of a small number of respondents, in order to analyse details of interactions and codes of talk. It has something in common with detailed sequential examinations by conversation analysts (*see section 4.3.1*). As will be seen, the same piece of data can be examined repeatedly from different points of view, such as participants' namings (Chapter 6) or uses of honorifics (Chapter 7).

In order to elicit as 'natural' discourse, interviews were conducted with 'family' members in 'family' surroundings. There are some advantages to this interview format. First of all, participants knew each other well prior to the discussions (Billig, 1992). There are exceptions to this interview format. In one of the interviews, a non-family member was involved. In another case, participants did not have a family relationship but belonged to the same political party. All of them had been colleagues of the party administration for some years. Also, in one of the interviews, only the husband participated in the discussion, because his wife was not interested in the topic.

The second advantage of using 'families' as interview groups was the parallel which

could be drawn between 'ordinary families' and the 'Imperial Family'. The monarchy does not only symbolise privileges and status, but it also symbolises a family (Coward, 1983; Williamson, 1986; Inoue, 1976/1995; Billig, 1992). When participants talk of the Royal/Imperial Family, they often talk of their own families. Therefore, it can be expected to stimulate some family arguments related to the arguments about monarchy. As Billig (1992) cites from Bagehot (1867/1965), the monarchy is the family on the throne. Thirdly, in order to maximise the naturalness of the arguments, the interviewer avoided experimental settings (e.g. specially designed interview rooms) or telephone interviews, but interviewed in the participants' environment. In consequence, four interviews were conducted in participants' living rooms. One interview was recorded in a pub, since the participants were on their holiday trip, and another one took place amongst members of a political party in their own office. The number of interviewees varied, from one person to four people. Three interviews were recorded in Britain and the rest were conducted in Tokyo. All discussions took place in a relaxed and informal way with tea or beer.

Participants were recruited in different ways. In some cases, they were the interviewer's friends and relatives. Some interviewees were introduced by friends of the interviewer. When the interviewer requested the interviews, the purpose of the interview was explained, such as 'it is a part of a PhD project, which investigates social psychological aspects of Japanese monarchism. Ordinary people's discussions about the Emperor system will be analysed by discourse analysis'. At the time of the requests, the interviewer guaranteed the interviewees' anonymity. In selecting the interview groups (families), characters of groups were concerned, such as their political stances (e.g. right-/left-winger, conventionalist) and ages (pre-/post-war generation), because it was expected that speakers belonging to different social groups have different codes of language when they talk of Imperial issues.

The interviewer did not intend to control discussions tightly, but attempted to encourage interactions amongst participants. When the interviewer was asked about his opinion, he sometimes participated in the arguments. When a participant gave his/her story, the interviewer often asked him/her to specify the times and places of the

events or details of the speaker's opinions. At the beginning of each interview, the interviewer proposed a prepared general question: 'Have you seen the Emperor or other Imperials?' (cf. Kodama, 1975/1985). When discussions were diverted from the topic of the Emperor system, the interviewer suggested interviewees stayed on the main topic. Under those circumstances, the interviewer put forward a number of other prepared questions. Firstly, he asked participants about their views of the Japanese year period (i.e. *Gengo*; *see section 3.7.0*), which measures time by the individual Emperor's reign. Another prepared question was about the Japanese national flag and the national anthem. The national flag symbolises the sun, which connotes the Imperial ancestor, the Sun Goddess. Also the national anthem prays for long reign of the Emperor. These issues were politically controversial topics.

5.3.1. Samples

All participants were middle class. The ages and occupations of the interviewees were those cited at the time of each interview. To illustrate interviewees' general views of the Emperor and Emperor system, their background information will be introduced as much as possible with each analysis. Most of the interviews took about ninety minutes, and were recorded on ninety minute length tapes. They were transcribed into approximately one hundred and eighty pages of Japanese transcripts on A4 paper (some of them were hand written in notebooks).

** Interview 1 (Recorded in April 1996; in London).*

There were three participants in this interview. This was recorded on a weekend afternoon in the living room of a mature PhD student (34; henceforth 'A') of the University of London, with his wife (33; 'B') and a young woman (24; 'C'), who was an MA student of Warwick University. The PhD student and his wife used to work for the same advertising company in Japan, but at the time of the interview, they had resigned from the office and the husband was researching in the area of cultural studies. The young woman, who was studying art history, had visited him to ask for some advice about a job application.

** Interview 2 (Recorded in June 1996; in Edinburgh).*

This interview was recorded in the early evening in a pub in Edinburgh, when an editor (36; henceforth 'D') came to Scotland for a holiday with his wife (32; 'E'), who was a cookery expert, teaching cookery at home. As a weekly magazine reporter, the editor had interviewed a couple of Imperials, such as the current Crown Princess before she had married, and the younger brother of the Crown Prince.

** Interview 3 (Recorded in July 1996; in London).*

In this interview, there were four participants. On the day of interview, a retired business executive (65; henceforth 'F') and his wife (59; 'G'), who lived in Tokyo, were visiting their son's home in London. They had come to London to look after their first grandchild. Their son (36; 'H') and daughter-in-law (36; 'I') also participated in the discussion. The son (i.e. 'H') was a businessman working for a big chemical company, and the daughter-in-law (i.e. 'I') was a journalist. Both of them had suspended their jobs and were studying as post-graduate students in London at that time. The father of the retired executive (i.e. father of 'F') had been a Rear Admiral in the Imperial Navy. This was recorded at the young couple's flat in the afternoon.

** Interview 4 (Recorded in December, 1996; in Tokyo).*

This was recorded at the office of an extreme right-wing party in the afternoon. The party was founded in the 1970s, and was strongly influenced by the cultural nationalism of Yukio Mishima (*see section 3.6.1*). The participants were the secretary general of the party (40: male; henceforth 'J'), a young junior activist, who was also a university student (25: male; 'K'), and an editor of their propaganda newspaper (24: female; 'L').

** Interview 5 (Recorded in August, 1997; in Tokyo).*

This contains an interview with a couple in their seventies, working for their own private documentary film production company. They worked as partners: the husband (74; henceforth 'M') was a producer, and the wife (71; 'N') was a director. This interview was recorded in their dining room after lunch.

** Interview 6 (Recorded in August, 1997; in Tokyo).*

This is not a family discussion, but a face-to-face type interview with an old communist ideologue (93; henceforth 'O') in his living room in the afternoon. Although it had been expected to interview him with his wife, she was watching TV in the next room and did not participate in the discussion. He was one of the founding members of the Japan Communist Party, but had been expelled from the party by the current JCP leaders, due to some differences in basic policies. Since then, he has been known as a critic. Although this was not a family interview, I include it because of my interest in the linguistic codes of his Imperial discourse.

Table-5.3.1.1. List of Participants

	Age	*Sex*	*Occupation*	*Views on Emperor*	*Description*
A	34	M	PhD student	anti-monarchy	husband of 'A'
B	33	F	house wife	anti-monarchy	wife of 'B'
C	24	F	MA student	conventional	visiting 'A'
D	36	M	editor	anti-monarchy	husband of 'E'
E	32	F	cookery expert	anti-monarchy	wife of 'D'
F	65	M	retired executive	conventional	husband of 'G'
G	59	F	house wife	conventional	wife of 'F'
H	36	M	business	sceptical	son of 'F' and 'G'
I	36	F	journalist	sceptical	daughter-in-low of 'F' and 'G'
J	40	M	party activist	extreme monarchist	secretary general
K	25	M	party activist	extreme monarchist	university student
L	24	F	editor	extreme monarchist	propaganda paper editor
M	74	M	film producer	conventional	husband of 'N'
N	71	F	film director	conventional	wife of 'M'
O	93	M	critic	anti-monarchy	founding member of the JCP

Chapter 6

The Emperor or Just An Old Man

- Namings for Rhetorical Purpose -

6.1.0. Introduction

In this chapter, I shall examine participants' naming practices in their talk. As discursive psychologists and ethnomethodologists suggest, descriptions are not merely reports, but interactions which do something more (e.g. Wooffitt, 1992; Heritage, 1984). Naming can suggest a commitment or stance, and as such can be taken as an indication of interest in the phenomenon (Widdicombe, 1993). As will be seen in the following interviews, the participants often perform attributional actions indirectly and implicitly through providing an ostensibly disinterested factual report, and use different ways of naming. There are conventional and unconventional ways of indicating Imperial matters. Both conventional and unconventional are a part of rhetorical formulations.

In this section, the naming practices which the interview participants employ in the interviews will be examined. In doing so, I do not intend to examine the semantics of the individual namings but to examine how namings are part of more general rhetorical formulations. Individual meanings must depend upon the contexts as well as the historical, intellectual and cultural knowledge of interview participants. To understand the contexts, I highlight the cultural and historical background of some particular Imperial terms (see *section 6.3.0*). What I shall endeavour to analyse in this part is how people construct their version of realities, using a variety of discursive devices, such as Imperial namings.

There is a practical problem in analysing Japanese interviews in English. As a result of differences in linguistic and cultural background, I do not believe that all Japanese terms can be strictly translated into English. However, I believe that interactual talks, and indeed the processes of rhetorical formulation, have common features. For example, Brown and Levinson (1978) discuss the universality of politeness formulations in Western and Eastern cultures (cf. Hill *et al.*, 1986; White, 1989). Also, Azuma (1997; cf. *section 3.8.4* and *6.4.1*) uses a linguistic theory developed in Western academic culture to analyse Emperor Hirohito's Japanese discourse.

Discursive and rhetorical psychologists are making a universal point when they claim that people use language to think (Edwards and Potter, 1992; Billig, 1987; Billig *et al.*, 1988; Harré and Gillett, 1994; Maynard, 1993; Chapter 4). Thus, the discursive constitution of thought is not confined to a single cultural context. According to Potter and Wetherell (1987), one of the fundamental issues of the psychology is the construction of the self (and, of course, others). From the discursive psychological point of view, it is claimed that cross-cultural examination of self-construction can be done through examination of the relativity of our own discourse of selves. For example, Potter and Wetherell re-examine an anthropological investigation of indigenous Mãori people in New Zealand. Mãoris conceptualise an external influential energy, *mana*, over their selves and their description of selves is related to this conceptualisation. Potter and Wetherell (1987) state that:

> ... it is possible, given these descriptions, for the Westerner to begin to imagine a different kind of mental life, almost a different world of sensational experience, and through this imagining to begin to de-centre our own conventions for self-expression. (p 105)

Discursive psychology provides a method which encourages analysts to de-centralise their own explanations, and thus to be critical of their own cultural and explanatory assumptions. Hence, I believe, there is no reason not to attempt cross-cultural examinations of naming practices, even if some micro-details of *cultural nuggets* (Antaki, 1998) or *cultural knowledge* (Edwards, 1997) are difficult to transform. I

will, therefore, include some additional explanations for these matters.

I shall be examining the practices of naming in relation to the interactional behaviours and contexts in which the naming occurs. Naming practices can be a part of argumentation. People participating in a debate are thinking within the argument and are naming the objects which they are talking about. Sometimes arguments can revolve around what a person, thing or episode should be called (Billig, 1987; Edwards, 1997). For instance, Billig (1987) describes an example from a newspaper where a specialist meat trade magazine suggests a change of nomenclature, such as butcher and slaughterhouse, in accordance with the recent vegetarian movement (p 172). Naming practices are, as this example suggests, usually related to the contexts and positions of the discursive participants. Thus, they can be understood as part of rhetorics which form participants' 'thoughts' situated in the contexts. We cannot see human thought within a person's brain (this is, according to Billig, one's internal 'silent' debate), but we can witness the processes of debate (Billig, 1997a). What I shall analyse in this section is how people use particular namings as rhetorical devices in their contexts.

6.2.0. Naming Practice In Japanese

In order to analyse rhetorical formulations concerning naming practices, it is important to give an overview of pragmatic studies of namings. In this section, therefore, I attempt to outline some general features of Japanese ways of naming the speaker, addressee and referents.

Japanese naming practices differ in crucial ways from those used in the Western languages, such as English. For example, linguists point out that Japanese people tend to omit subjects and objects as far as they are salient within a context (Hayashi, 1991, 1997; Morean, 1988). Instead of saying 'I will go' or 'he did it', a Japanese person will often simply say '(will) go' (*ikimasu*), or 'did (it)' (*shimashita*), leaving subject and object slots blank, to be filled by the hearer. The extract below (6.2.0.1) is a part of an interview which will be examined later (see Appendix 3-1 'Extracts in Context'). Note that extracts are individually numbered: the first three numbers stand for the section in which the extracts appear and the last numbers are the reference of the extracts. In the

case of the extract below (i.e. 6.2.0.1), it signifies the first extract of this section, *section 6.2.0*. (see also Appendix 1-1, 'Guide to Transcript').

(6.2.0.1)

1. S At that time, with Japanese flag, ***Hinomaru***?
2. F Ya, ya, ya, ya:: in a cold season, putting coat on and a hat, [he was]
3. doing like this. ((waving hand)) Shook [his] hands....

The interviewer (S) asks a retired business executive (F) about his Imperial experience. When the interviewee was a secondary school student, he had welcomed the Emperor at the road side of his home town. S is asking whether F welcomed the Emperor with the Japanese flag, the *Hinomaru*. The interviewer does not ask: 'Did *you* wait for the Emperor?', rather his question is focusing upon the actions of a person, some fifty years before. In asking about the situation of F's imperial experience, S does not specify who was the person with the *Hinomaru* flag. According to contextual sense (cf. Thomas, 1995), it is suggested that F had the flag. Next, answering this question, the interviewee is beginning his narrative. It was a cold season, and an unspecified person put coat and hat on, and shook his hand. Both the narrator and the Emperor were the potential subject of these actions. In this context, however, it was the Emperor, since the narrator is imitating the Imperial wave as his *footing* (Goffman, 1981; Levinson, 1988). The person who welcomed the Emperor with the *Hinomaru* flag was the interviewee, and the person who put coat and hat on, shook his hand and waved his hand in particular way was the Emperor. Although there are blank slots, the speaker and the hearer implicitly negotiate the subjects of the sentence within the discursive interactions. (In my data, some 'blank slots' are filled in the English translation in brackets.)

This avoidance of naming may relate to the taboo of direct namings in Japanese (Suzuki, 1978). Morean (1988) claims the avoidance helps to develop in-group solidarity, which Japanese society mostly requires: 'By avoiding the use of personal referents, they are able to establish a 'selflessness' which contributes greatly towards in-group identity' (p 430). Hayashi (1991) also claims that expressing solidarity through subject ellipsis is one of the features of Japanese conversational styles. It can

be an effective strategy for sharing the 'co-floor' (Sacks, 1972) of the conversation. The way to address or refer to people in Japanese is, therefore, not based on the same pragmatic practices as English. In this section, in order to understand the pragmatic background of the rhetorical formulations in my data, I shall focus mainly on the variety of naming devices and techniques which were found most often in my data.

6.2.1. Rule To Assign Terms For Speaker, Hearer and Referents

It is worth briefly overviewing a study of Japanese personal referent terms by Suzuki (1978). He notes that personal pronouns are important features of European languages, such as English. They are frequently used in conversation and are well established in the history of European languages. There is, however, quite a remarkable difference from Japanese.

Suzuki (1978) points out that Japanese personal pronouns are replaced by new words every few hundred years. As an example, in the 17th to 19th Centuries, *boku*, which literally means '(your) servant' in classic Chinese, was used as a humble first-person pronoun for intellectual gentlemen. (In past times, almost always 'intellectual' meant 'an intellectual man'.) For instance, a famous literary critic in 18th Century Japan (Motoori Norinaga) referred to himself as *boku* several times in his formal writings (Kobayashi, 1993). However, in modern Japan, *boku* is considered inappropriate when speaking to superiors or on formal occasions. It is now regarded as a first-person pronoun for boys or for use on informal occasions. Speakers avoid direct reference to a certain fact or object (e.g. 'I'), but these objects or facts are represented indirectly (e.g. 'servant'). After long uses of euphemisms, these suggestive references gradually lose their original qualities. After a reference has lost its formal quality, it can be downgraded to a casual reference, like current pragmatic usage of *boku*, and another suggestive reference is invented in its place. Suzuki names this phenomenon as 'taboo-type changes'. In Japanese, therefore, the category of 'personal pronouns' in the narrow sense, such as 'I' or 'you' in English, do not form independent word groups, because of the frequent 'taboo-type changes'. Japanese people, as a result, use a variety of naming devices for addressee and referent as well as speaker's self in their talk. Suzuki (1978) shows examples of indirect references, based on one's social roles.

> ... in Japan today, when a father talks to his children at home, he very often refers to himself as *Otõsan* 'Father' or Papa. He would normally say *Otõsan no iu koto o kiki-nasai*, 'Listen to Father', instead of *Boku/Watashi no iu koto o kiki-nasai*, 'Listen to me'. If a nephew or a niece comes to his house, the same man then calls himself *Ojisan* 'Uncle', as in *Kurismasu ni Ojisan ga jitensha o prezento-shiyõ* 'Uncle will give you a bicycle for Christmas'. (p 112)

A woman, also, employs indirect naming devices for herself, such as *Okãsan* (Mother) or *Obasan* (Aunt/Auntie). Furthermore, the couple with their children often address each other following the same rule as indirect naming practices for selves. They tend to address their counterparts as *Otõsan* (Father) or *Okãsan* (Mother), rather than using their names. In everyday Japanese conversations, one may not find any equivalent of popular Western type indirect namings for partners, such as 'honey' or 'darling'. The Westernised younger generation may use them, but they are still the exception. Also, note that 'darling' is a description, but it is not a role of the addressee. Japanese indirect namings are, on the other hand, associated with the role of the people in the family or the society. Suzuki proposes, therefore, not to categorise Japanese address terms as 'first-person pronoun' or 'second-person pronoun', but more inclusively 'self-reference terms' and address terms, which refer to the hearer.

Suzuki claims that a basic rule for orientating Japanese terms of self-reference and address is based upon 'the concept of opposition between superior (or persons of higher status) and inferior (persons of lower status)' (p 127). He claims that 'any Japanese dialogue, even when it takes place in a nonfamily context, can ultimately be regarded as a variation of the basic family dialogue pattern' (p 127). It is, for example, very common that when talking to an old person, a Japanese speaker often addresses him/her as 'grandfather/mother', even if he/she is not the speaker's grandparent. Older members of society, in return, can refer to themselves as 'grandfather/mother' instead of 'me', even if their counterparts are not blood relatives in any sense. The reverse would not happen. An old person neither refers to the younger person as a 'grandchild', nor refers to his/her blood relative grandchild as a 'grandchild'. In a social situation (ie. non-family context), a speaker's address forms may follow general

rules of family dialogue pattern. Suzuki defines this application of kinship terms for non-family situations as *fictive use of kinship terms*, and states that frequent uses of kinship and fictive kinship terms in non-family situations, are parts of the complicated Japanese naming system.

There are several pragmatic studies which analyse Japanese address and reference terms. Developing Suzuki's idea, Ishikawa *et al.* (1981) investigated twenty five plays written by twenty five Japanese playwrights, and organised the Japanese address terms into six categories: (1) kin terms, (2) first and last names, (3) professional names (e.g. 'teacher' at the school), (4) post-designation terms (e.g. 'section chief' in a working place), (5) pronouns and (6) fictives (Suzuki's *fictive use of kinship terms*). Ishikawa *et al.* drew a complicated flowchart for address terms, and noted that the Japanese address system reflects 'the hierarchical characterisation of relationship as higher and lower with regard to age, sex and role' (p 139). Another interesting finding by them is that, in Japanese, the European linguistic sense of 'second-person pronouns', such as *kimi*, *omae* or *anata* (you), are only appropriate to addressees of equal or lower rank. They reveal that the fundamental property which determines the Japanese address system is power semantics (cf. Hayashi, 1997). It can also be determined by highly valued in-group solidarities in Japanese society (cf. Morean, 1988). Harada (1976) discusses a variety of Japanese terms which refer to the speaker, the addressee and so on in the light of Japanese honorifics. He investigates the different terms which refer to the same object according to the formality and speech level of the context (*see also section 7.2.0-7.2.4* for honorific).

This general rule of Japanese naming systems, such as fictive kinship terms, is applicable for references to a third-person (Suzuki, 1978; Harada, 1976). A Japanese speaker may refer to any given old person, who is not a relative of either the speaker or the hearer, as 'grandfather/mother'. (If the referent is not old enough to be referred as a grandparent, he/she could be named as *Ojisan* 'Uncle' or *Obasan* 'Aunt'.) The rules for self-reference, addressee and third-person referent terms have implications of power relations with the use of suffixes, which will be discussed below (*see section 6.2.2*). It may be relevant that the Japanese tend to use terms which suggest 'roles' as references rather than personal names or pronouns. Kinship terms (e.g. father or

mother) are their roles in the family. Post-designation terms (e.g. section chief) and professions (e.g. teacher) suggest referents' roles in the social contexts. Furthermore, when the roles of the referents are not clear enough, Japanese may refer to them by fictive kinship terms according to their age. Japanese speakers may assign the imagined 'role' with the referent within the imagined family structures, according to his/her age.

To analyse Japanese naming practices, therefore, analysts must point out encoded power relations and group categories in their naming practices. Either by taboo for direct namings or by emphasis of in-group solidarity, Japanese speakers tend to avoid using direct references, but employ indirect methods, such as professional names, post-designation terms, fictive kinship terms, or as shall be seen, simply refer to somebody as 'that person' (*see section 6.5.1*).

6.2.2. Suffixes

In their naming practices, Japanese speakers often use suffixes to reflect social hierarchies and in-group solidarities between the speaker, addressee and referent. Some Japanese suffixes can encode social power structures (Loveday, 1986). We may thus see suffixes as an index of the power relations. Gender neutral general Japanese suffixes, *-san* and *-sama*, correspond to English 'Mr', 'Ms', 'Mrs' and 'Miss' (Harada, 1976). If *-san* can be considered as corresponding to 'Mr/Mrs', *-sama* should be regarded as more polite, such as 'Sir/Madam'. One may find that a socio-linguistic approach to Japanese, such as that adopted by Moeran (1988), could be useful for understanding the differences between these suffixes. Moeran points out that the distinction between in-group and out-group, and the important principle of 'out-groupness' affects Japanese language. His view suggests that *-san* is a suffix for in-group members, whereas *-sama* is used for the out-group addressee or referents. Accordingly, the *-san* formulation stresses in-group solidarity, while the other suffix, *-sama*, emphasises distinctions between the referent (or the addressee) and the speaker. In addition, the *-sama* title can be more polite than *-san*, since 'honorifics are reserved for out-group members' (Brown and Levinson, 1978; p 181). Loveday (1986) outlines the general patterns of distinction amongst Japanese suffixes. He categorises these suffixes according to three different characteristics of the addressee

or the referent. The *-sama* suffix can be used in the following circumstances: (1) the addressee is not a young child, (2) the referent/addressee is not known from his/her childhood, and (3) the reference is used in a written channel as super polite form. On the other hand, the *-san* suffix is used in situations (1) and (2), but in terms of situation (3), it is used when the situation requires a less formally polite form than *-sama*. These different suffixes and address terms are used in ways which encode different semantic power relations.

Let us consider, as an example, details of the popular kinship terms which can be used as fictive, *Ojisan* ('uncle' or 'middle aged man'). This term is, in fact, assembled from two parts, *Oji* (literally means 'uncle') and *-san* (suffix). The suffix *-san* can be transferable to another general one, *-sama*. In today's everyday Japanese, on the one hand, *Ojisan* can be casual form to refer to the speaker's uncle or middle aged men general. On the other hand, *Ojisama* is more formal, or would be uttered by a woman, since polite and formal speech styles could be considered as more feminine (Hayashi, 1997; Smith, 1992). The same rule can be applied for the distinction between *Obasan* and *Obasama*, both of which mean 'aunt', too. This matter will be investigated further in a later part of this chapter (*see section 6.5.5*).

6.3.0. Japanese Imperial References and Titles

In this section, I shall outline some exclusive ways to refer to the Emperor or Imperials, including Japanese Imperial titles of honour. Also later in this section, I will examine practical uses of these references with examples from my data, such as by right-wing and left-wing speakers.

Tenno in Japanese is exclusively used to refer to the Japanese Emperor. The Japanese monarchy has tended to be referred to as 'Emperor' by non-Japanese people. According to Crump (1989), however, this English reference ignores enormous implications of its original meaning.

> He was just simply the *tennõ*, a Japanese word misleadingly translated as 'emperor', as if the *tennõ* was to be equated with Julius Caesar, Peter the Great, Napoleon or, in our own century, Haile Selassie. Such an equitation could hardly be right for any of the more than one hundred *tennõ*'s recorded in Japanese history, although some Japanese wish that it were so. (p2) [*tennõ* is Crump's way to describe original Japanese sound for *Tenno.*]

The *Tenno* title was originally invented in the 7th Century, in order to confront the Chinese dynasties of which the monarchs declared themselves as *Kotei* (which is another alternative for Emperor). At the foundation of the modern nation in the 19th Century, the Japanese government employed this term as the official Imperial title (cf. Kamei, 1974; Asukai, 1994; Suzuki, 1993). In other words, in Japanese, the reference to Emperors can be divided into two categories. One of them is *Kotei*, which includes Chinese Emperors, Julius Caesar, Peter the Great, Napoleon, Haile Selassie and so forth. The other one is *Tenno* which exclusively refers to the Japanese Emperor. This division of terms for 'Emperor' stresses a sense of 'Japanese-ness'.

Kogo is the consort of the Emperor. It is not an exclusive reference for consort of *Tenno*, but of Emperors in general. Also *Kotaishi* is an inclusive reference for the male successor for any given monarchy. To sum up, *Tenno* is an exclusive reference for the Japanese Emperor. *Kogo* and *Kotaishi* inclusively refer to the consort of monarch and the Crown Prince respectively. *Heika* is an Imperial title of honour, which means '(Imperial) Majesty'. *Denka* is also a title of honour meaning '(Imperial) Highness'. Consequently, *Tenno Heika* and *Kogo Heika*, are roughly equivalent to 'His Majesty the Emperor' and 'Her Majesty the Empress'. These titles of honour are royal (imperial) titles which are also used for non-Japanese monarchs (Crump, 1989).

As will be analysed in my data, monarchs are sometimes referred to in the same way as common people. In Britain, monarchs can be referred to by non-exclusive terms. For instance, Billig (1992) claims that, in his interview analysis, many respondents dream of an informal meeting with 'Charlie', 'Di', 'Andy' and 'Fergie', referring to royals by casual references. Their casual namings for royal members reinforce the 'informality' of their fantasy meeting. The selection of the naming for royals, thus conveys and

reinforces the speaker's stance and images of the monarchy. It seems to be reasonable that also in Japanese, Imperial namings may show the speaker's stance in his/her Imperial discourses. The variety of namings for Imperials allows the speakers some choice. When monarchs are referred to by exclusive (deferential) Imperial references, speakers may encode the formal power relations in traditional repertoires (cf. Potter and Wetherell, 1987). When they are referred to by inclusive (casual) references, speakers may imply status differences and the relationship between themselves and monarchs, by uses of pragmatic codes of talk. Speakers could indicate the extent of their deference by their choice of the Imperial references. Accordingly, one would expect differences in naming depending on a speaker's views about royalty.

6.3.1. Right-Wing (1)

First of all, I shall see how people of a right-wing political stance refer to the Emperor. Ultra conservatives tend to refer to the Emperor as either *Tenno Heika* or *Heika*, and occasionally *Tenno*, without the Imperial title of honour. In the extracts below, a young activist of an extreme right-wing party is speaking.

(6.3.1.1)

K Well, at the time of the coronation of the present ***Heika***, of that parade, at that time, well, my [college was] *Kokugakuin...*

(6.3.1.2)

K = in the [less guarded] group (area). Yeah, then five, six metre away, eeh, the car of ***Tenno Heika*** is moving (passing)...

Extracts 6.3.1.1 and 6.3.1.2 are taken from the answer of a young activist when he was asked whether he had ever seen any members of the Imperial Family. Since he was a student of a college founded by a Shinto organisation (i.e. *Kokugakuin*), he was watching the coronation parade from a very short distance. It was his first experience of seeing the Emperor 'without any screens except air'. His uses of *Tenno Heika* and *Heika* are in the repertoire (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell and Potter, 1992) of the traditional view of the Emperor.

(6.3.1.3)

K Something, such as traditions, represent national characters, aha, what is to say, for example **Hirohito *Sentei Heika***, or ahh what...

Extract 6.3.1.3 is taken from a discussion between the same activist and a young lady, who was working as an editor of the party propaganda paper. The young lady doubted that a mortal could represent a nation state. In return, the young activist claimed that 'a mortal person does not represent the nation, but tradition and (some kind of) constitution does. Individual Emperors are part of (national) continuity'. It is the only one of his utterances which refers to the previous Emperor by his first name. *Sentei* means previous Emperor. As discussed in *section 6.2.1*, Japanese speakers tend to employ a variety of indirect namings. Hence, naming somebody by his/her name may sound like a deviant formulation (Heritage, 1988). However, I believe this extract is not. There is no repair (neither self nor other initiated repair; Nofsinger, 1991; Schegloff, 1997) after his utterance. His *Hirohito Sentei Heika*, literally means 'His Majesty the Previous Emperor Hirohito', was heard as a deferential naming for the previous Emperor by the other participants. In this naming, the speaker attempts to stress the individuality of the Emperor, so he employs the Imperial first name, Hirohito. At the same time, to exalt the monarch, he adapts the exclusive Imperial title *Heika*. Thus, the rhetorical formulation of his *Hirohito Sentei Heika* is well elaborated to specify an individual person with his first name. Overviewing the three extracts in this section, the key term used by strong minded royalists to show deference to the Emperor is the Imperial title of honour, *Heika*.

6.3.2. Right-Wing (2)

Ultra conservatives can sometimes refer to the Emperor without *Heika* titles. In the extract below, the same young royalist represents the Emperor in a collective notion. In Extract 6.3.2.1, he is talking of his excitement when he saw the Emperor 'without any screens except air'. In seeing the Emperor, he also claimed to see many historical Emperors behind the present one. Extract 6.3.2.1 follows Extracts 6.3.1.1 and 6.3.1.2. Extract 6.3.2.2 concerns the legitimacy of the Emperor, following Extract 6.3.1.3. The

young right-winger suggests that the 'continuity and constitution' of the Imperial house could represent the nation.

(6.3.2.1)

K Until now, reading history text books, (we / I know) there are tons of ***Tenno***s, a lot of ***Tenno***s, well, ↑'Aha, this is that', like something...

(6.3.2.2)

K Because, therefore, recent eras, *Meiji*, *Showa*, for example, cutting out (examining) one period, even if one individual [seems to represent a period], but precisely, well, individual persons are not representing, yeah, [but] successive ***Tenno***s in the history....

As pointed out above, right-wingers tend to refer to the Emperor with the *Heika* title. However, in these two extracts, the speaker uses *Tenno* without the *Heika* title. It can be argued that here the speaker is specifically using a general historical repertoire (cf. Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell and Potter, 1992), rather than referring to a particular individual Emperor (cf. 6.3.1.3). In the discourse of 6.3.2.1, what is represented by *Tenno* is a group of Emperors (which are described as 'tons of') within Japanese history in the 'history text books'. Also, they are not specified by names. What is more, by his self quotation, 'Aha, this is that', he claims that he found the living *Heika* as part of a historical continuity and this is the reason for his excitement. His excitement is well represented by the self quotation in a loud voice (Maynard, 1996a). By using a louder voice (represented by '↑'), the speaker dramatises the event (Tannen, 1990). The deixis 'this' and 'that' in this extract are discourse deixis (Levinson, 1983) which address the 'present *Heika*' and 'tons of *Tenno*s in history book' respectively.

One may find that *Tenno* in 6.3.2.2 belongs to the same repertoire as 6.3.2.1. The term 'successive *Tenno*s' represents a group of Emperors in history. In recent Japanese year periods (i.e. *Gengo*) such as *Meiji* and *Showa*, each *Gengo* corresponds to an individual Emperor's reign. (about *Gengo* system, *see section 3.7.0*). What the speaker is arguing about is that individual *Tenno*s represent the nation in the particular periods

of national history, and thus the historical continuity makes Emperors special. Individual Emperors, such as the current one, are part of this historical continuity. This system is represented by an adjective 'successive' in this discourse, and, in return, this continuity makes the Emperor special.

Another illustrative example we will consider is one of the party leaders who is in his forties. He is talking of seeing the Emperor some twenty years before, when he joined a voluntary weeding scheme at the Palace. One day the volunteers were invited into a hall in the Palace and had an audience with the present Emperor and the Crown Prince. Bowing deeply, he looked at the Emperor furtively.

(6.3.2.3)

1. J Looking [at the Emperor] furtively, so, as expected, [I] felt the strong
2. → presence of ***Tenno Heika***, whereas [he was still] ***Kotaishi***, at that
3. time. Then a bit later, [we were told that] '***Hiro-no-miya Denka***'* [who
4. → is] the current ***Kotaishi*** 'comes'. When ***Hiro-no-miya Denka****
5. appeared, I, hmm, felt a kind of aura. Sort of shining bright, gallant, in
6. fact [I] felt like that [from him]...

* Imperial title of honour except for the Emperor, Empress or Empress Dowager are not *Heika* (Majesty) but *Denka* (Highness).

Talking of his Imperial 'aura' experience, he follows general rules of namings which have been discussed before. The middle aged royalist refers to the individual Imperial members, such as the Emperor and the Crown prince, who is known as Prince Hiro (Hiro-no-miya), with *Heika* and *Denka* titles. In contrast, he refers to *Kotaishi* (Crown Prince) without the *Denka* title. The first *Kotaishi* (line 2) is to explain the (present) Emperor's position at the event and the second *Kotaishi* (line 4) is to describe the present position of Prince Hiro. In order to indicate the time of the event, he uses the original tense (present tense) and Imperial title at that event to report the announcement '***Hiro-no-miya Denka*** comes'. There are two repertoires, or different ideological resources, in 6.3.2.3: 'monarchy as institution' and 'monarch as individual' (cf. Billig, 1992; Billig *et al.*, 1988; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell and Potter, 1992). Using the repertoires which were not indicating individual Imperials, the right-winger refers to the Imperials without *Heika* or *Denka* titles.

These examples suggest some regularities in the talk of ultra conservatives, when referring to the Imperials. (1) They use Imperial titles of honour to refer to the individual members of the Imperial family. Generally they avoid the use of personal names, but if these are used the speakers are careful to use terms of honour in addition. (2) However, they may not use Imperial titles of honour when they are talking of monarchs in institutional terms. In these cases, they omit Imperial titles of honour.

6.3.3. Left-Wing

In contrast to right-wingers' expressions, left-wing speakers frequently refer to Imperials without Imperial titles of honour such as *Heika* or *Denka*. Their formulations are similar to the royalists' references to monarchs in an institutional or historical sense. The extracts below are uttered by an academic couple in their early thirties, who repeatedly claim that Emperor Hirohito should have admitted his war responsibility. According to them, because of the Imperial system and the weakness of Imperial apologies, Japan has failed to gain good will from its Asian neighbours. The first extract in this section, 6.3.3.1, is taken from the wife's utterance. She explains that her father was a left-wing activist. In the second extract, 6.3.3.2, after the wife's explanation about her father, the husband is talking of his family background.

(6.3.3.1)

B Being left, my father has criticised ***Tenno*** in earnest.

(6.3.3.2)

A My parents are rather normal, so, they like to [salute] ↑'***Tenno Heika***', same as the normal people.

The speaker (B), in talking of her father's influence in 6.3.3.1, refers to the Emperor without the *Heika* title. The criticised figure is named as neither *Heika* nor *Tenno Heika*, but simply *Tenno*. On the other hand, in extract 6.3.3.2, her husband (A), who is as liberal as his wife, refers to the Emperor with the *Heika* title. What is significant in his utterance is that it is the reported speech of his parents. He is making a contrast

between his 'normal' parents and his wife's father, who 'has criticised *Tenno* in earnest'. In 6.3.3.2, reporting his parents' reference to the Emperor, he provides evidence of the 'normality of parents' generation' and the 'normality of his parents' simultaneously. By this reported speech, the speaker conveys his parents' thoughts (Holt, 1996). 'Normal' people of his parents' generation would salute the Emperor, referring to him as *Tenno Heika*. Therefore, this *Tenno Heika* utterance by a liberal academic works to distance the view of his parents and their generation from his own.

In the same way, as his wife (i.e. 6.3.3.1), the speaker of 6.3.3.2 also refers to the Emperor as *Tenno* without the *Heika* title as his own term, see 6.3.3.3, below. According to him, the ideological strength of the Emperor system has increased in recent years. He says that nation-wide media spectacles, such as the Imperial funeral, reinforce the Emperor system throughout the nation. Today is the first time in Japanese history that *all people* know the face of the Emperor (cf. Pomerantz, 1986).

(6.3.3.3)

A All people know, know ***Tenno***'s face, [everyone] know what [he] does, well, there has never been not such a time [in history], thus....

By saying *Tenno*, the narrator refers to an individual Emperor (i.e. *Hirohito*), since he is talking of the media spectacle of the Imperial funeral. *Hirohito*'s funeral has been the only Imperial funeral broadcast in history.

Even though there is a taboo on direct reference in Japanese (*see section 6.2.0*), 6.3.1.3 shows that extreme royalists may refer to the Emperor by his name such as *Hirohito Sentei Heika*. In contrast, in my interview data, even left-wing speakers rarely referred to the Emperor by his name. Instead, they often use a reference which clearly suggests an individual Emperor, such as *Showa Tenno*. The academic husband, for example, says that Japanese society would have been better if the Emperor had been executed at the end of the war.

(6.3.3.4)

A Well, [I] suppose there should have been an execution, in regard of ***Showa Tenno***, mmm, troublesome...

Since the late 19th Century, one *Gengo*, Japanese year period, is used for the reign of each Emperor. Thus, *Gengos*, such as *Showa*, associated with the title *Tenno* indicate individual Emperors (*see section 3.7.0* about *Gengo* system). Accusing an individual Emperor of being responsible for the war, the speaker does not refer to him by his name, Hirohito, but his *Gengo* (i.e. *Showa Tenno*).

There are a few exceptions to the rule. Extract 6.3.3.5 is taken from a different interview: a young editor in his thirties, who also criticises the Emperor for his responsibility for the war.

(6.3.3.5)

D =if [there were a person who had to] take responsibility [for the war], the very person who would have to do so would be **Hirohito**, wouldn't it? **Hirohito** remained [on the throne] without taking responsibility, since he seemed to be useful...

Again, 6.3.3.5 is an exception, and in most cases, Hirohito is referred to as *Showa Tenno*, as in 6.3.3.4. In contrast to the old Emperor, the younger generation of Imperials, such as Prince Akishino, the second son of the Emperor, are often referred to by their names without an Imperial title of honour. The interviewee in 6.3.3.6 below is the same speaker as in 6.3.3.5. The interviewee is talking of his experience of reporting on Prince Akishino when he (D) was working for a weekly photo magazine, some ten years before.

(6.3.3.6)

D Well, that's the present **Akishino-*no-miya***. [When] It (he) was still single.

After their marriages, Imperial sons establish their own houses. The Emperor's second

son also established his own house, the House of Akishino after his marriage. In the context of 6.3.3.6, the prince had not done so, at the time when D was working as a reporter. The liberal minded editor refers to the prince as his present (house) name without the *Denka* title. At the same time, the speaker indicates the time of the event by two discursive devices, 'present' and 'it (he) was still single'. The Imperial person who is now the head of the House of Akishino, did not have his own house at that time. To explain the time of the event, the narrator refers to him just by his name. A further point is that, after that, the pronoun used for Akishino-*no-miya* is not 'he' (*kare*) but 'it' (*kore*). In other words, discourse deixis is used instead of person deixis (Levinson, 1983). Consequently, this editor's formulation qualifies the prince less than an ordinary person who could be referred to by person deixis. In a critical context, a speaker may refer to the young Imperials by their names. Furthermore, Japanese people often refer to the Imperials (e.g. younger generation Imperials or former commoners, such as the Empress) with suffixes, such as *-san* and *-sama*, but there are no Hirohito-*san*, Hirohito-*sama*, *Tenno-sama* references found. Examples of Imperial reference with inclusive suffixes (titles) will be discussed as they arise.

6.4.0. Speech Accommodation Theory and Naming

As there are different naming terms for the Emperor (and Imperials), then one needs to account for the various patterns of usage. One can ask why speakers might choose one name rather than another. A simple explanation would be that the speakers' choices reflect their attitudes: right-wing speakers choose formal descriptions and left-wing speakers use less formal ones. This would imply that the choice is determined entirely by the attributes of the speaker (*see section 4.2.2*). However, the choice may also be determined by the speech context and also by the relations between speaker and hearer. In particular, under some circumstances, speakers may adjust their use of terms depending upon the characteristics of the listener. Speech accommodation theory can be used to understand how this might happen.

Giles and Smith (1979) claim that language is not only used to distinguish different group memberships, but also to create communicators' group identity and solidarity. They suggest that a speaker's speech style is influenced by the addressee. In order to

gain social approval, a speaker may converge his/her speech style to that used by the addressee (Coupland, 1984; Azuma, 1997). In order to emphasise distance from the addressee, speakers may diverge from the addressee's style of speech. There are many aspects of Speech Accommodation Theory (e.g. Giles and Smith, 1979; Giles, Coupland and Coupland, 1991). Speech accommodation theorists see that, on the one hand, speakers may encode signs of in-group membership by converging their speech style to that of their addressee. Hearers, in the same way, decode group membership from the speaker's style of speech. It is generally understood in relation to similarity attraction theory (Byrne, 1971). Speech accommodation and divergence may be accomplished by use of stereotyped speech styles, including variation in accent and grammar (Giles et al., 1987, Hewston and Giles, 1986). In order to recognise speech accommodation, we need to be able to understand the prototypicality of the speech styles (Turner, 1987).

Naming practices are important elements of speech style, because descriptions are not merely descriptions. For instance, a change of the self-reference and address terms can help to gain social approval from the interlocutor (Azuma, 1997). Moreover, references to particular subcultural things determine newly developed youth subculture (in-group) memberships (Sacks, 1979; Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1995). From the point of view of speech accommodation theory, the selection of namings could be a way of signalling distance or closeness to the addressee. Thus, if a speaker seeks to signal agreement or lack of distance with an addressee, they may select a naming device which converges with that (potentially) used by the addressee. What is more, speakers may strategically employ particular namings to gain expected reactions from the hearer. For example, if the speaker is favourably disposed to the hearer or, simply, the speaker does not wish to risk the hearer's disapproval, he/she will converge his/her naming practices with the ones of the interlocutors. In this section, firstly, I shall overview an example of Japanese studies of speech style. Next, I will attempt to analyse the naming practices for the Emperor found in my data, in the light of speech accommodation theory.

6.4.1. Speech Accommodation and the Japanese Emperor

Azuma (1997) studied documented Emperor Hirohito's speech style during his Imperial visits between 1949 and 1954, which were conducted in order to encourage war-defeated Japan and its industrial activities (cf. *sections 3.3.0, 3.8.4 and 6.5.0*). It was the first time that any Emperor had spoken to ordinary Japanese people face-to-face. According to Azuma, documents suggest that in his court, Hirohito's speech style used forms to convey his authority over the listeners. These speech forms are distinct from those used by ordinary people. Using speech accommodation theory, one might say that such speech patterns show divergence between speakers: one speaker (the Emperor) uses forms which convey authority while the other speaker (the commoner) uses patterns which convey distance. However, according to Azuma, such divergence was not displayed during the post-war Imperial visits. Hirohito showed a downward convergence (Giles and Smith, 1979), by using speech styles which were similar to those used by his addressees, namely the local people. It is reported that the Japanese people then reacted enthusiastically to the way the Emperor spoke and treasured it (*see section 6.2.0-6.2.3* about honorifics).

In his radio speech at the end of the war, he used two significantly distinguished person referent terms, a self-reference, *chin*, and the address term, *nanji*. Such terms are exclusively used by the Emperor and would not be used by a non-Imperial speaker. In using such exclusive terms, the Emperor was displaying a form of divergence: he was using forms which would not be used by his audience. Also, in the court the Emperor used a special address term for his chamberlains, *mina* (you all), which implied his superiority and which would not be used in return by his hearers (Azuma, 1997; p 194). In contrast to this, Azuma's paper provides a couple of examples of Hirohito's use of convergence of namings in his post-war visits. On questioning a woman about her husband, Hirohito chose the vocabulary which linguistically functions to show his respect for the addressee (i.e. local woman) and the referent (i.e. her husband). Azuma, however, says that 'the woman and her husband logically did not deserve any respect from the Emperor in terms of their relative social status, yet the Emperor framed his question in the way he did, showing his convergence to the addressee' (p 195).

The Emperor addressed the second-person as *anata* (you; more accurately, *anata-no*

o-ie, 'your *respectable* house'; cf. Hayashi, 1997), not *nanji* or *mina*, and is another example of his downward convergence. The Emperor's speech accommodation showed that he presented himself as a mother-like figure to the beaten nation. In so doing, the Emperor's namings converged to the local people's feminine (mother-like) speech style. Hirohito converged his speech style by means of his first person reference and address terms. The same may be said of the third-person references.

6.4.2. Initial Convergence (1)

If the Emperor himself used different speech styles in different contexts, one might predict that ordinary speakers might also do so, when speaking about the Emperor. In particular, speakers may change their description of the Emperor (and Imperial Family) in order to accommodate to the usage of their audience. In order to investigate the change, I shall, first of all, analyse a variety of references to Imperial matters by one speaker. I shall analyse the interviewer's speech styles in different interview situations. As the interviewer was speaking in a similar context to different speakers, one could examine whether the interviewer's pattern of namings changes, depending on the addressee. Did the interviewer use more formal terms to describe the Emperor when talking to right-wingers than left-wingers? In short, did the interviewer accommodate to the patterns of use displayed by the hearer?

One preliminary point must be emphasised. The interviews were conducted before the interviewer (S) had considered analysing the interviewer's own speech styles. In fact, the topic of speech accommodation had not even been considered when the interviews were conducted. As such, the interviewer's patterns of speech in this respect were not influenced by any knowledge of speech accommodation theory.

6.4.3. Initial Convergence (2)

In the first example, the interviewer is questioning a conventional royalist. Prior to this extract, 6.4.3.1, a sixty five year old retired business executive was talking of his beliefs on conventional royalism.

(6.4.3.1)

1. S Well, aha, it is all right to think very frankly, have you had a personal
2. → experience of the ***Heika***, well, the most personal thing, [had a]
3. → chance to see the ***Heika*** in reality, or see **Michiko-*san***, or has
4. → **Akishino-*no-miya*** come up [to you] when [you were] walking in front
5. of *Gakushu-in**. First of all, [either] have you [or have you not] had
6. such experiences, and what meaning did they have in your life, what
7. can I say...
8. I [it's a] Sensitive [topic]....
9. S I'd like to know sensitive things more...

* *Gakushu-in* is one of private schools in Tokyo, which was peer school in pre-war era. Prince **Akishino** studied and graduated from *Gakushu-in* University.

The interviewer, S, names the Emperor as *Heika*, using the Imperial title of honour. He refers to the Empress as Michiko-*san*, citing her first name and adding the *-san* suffix. Also the Emperor's second son is referred to as Akishino-*no-miya*, without the Imperial title of honour, *Denka*. His namings are a mixture of the prototypical naming of extreme right and liberal speakers.

It must be noted that this question (6.4.3.1) is the very first part of the interview, and the interviewer has not had an opportunity to monitor the participants' naming before he spoke (cf. Berger, 1979). As discussed, to express the deference to the Emperor and Empress, the *Heika* title is a key term. Right-wingers, would not refer to them without such an Imperial title of honour. In contrast, liberals usually refer to individual Imperials without Imperial titles of honour (i.e. 6.3.3.5). So, the *Heika* reference for the Emperor can be seen as showing the speaker's deference to the Emperor. In contrast, the *-san* suffix implies the in-groupness of the referent and speaker (Harada, 1976, Morean, 1988; also *see section 6.2.2*). As such it is an informal reference, especially when used to refer to the Empress. This *-san* suffix increases solidarity not only between the speaker and the referent (Empress), but also between the speaker, addressee and referent.

Analysing speakers' identifications of British royals, Billig (1992) examines a middle aged lady's discourse, telling a story that a princess held her baby girl 'just like a

normal person' (p 77). Also, there is a lady who claims she noticed a bald patch on the Queen Mother. These stories of 'royal normalities' are told to demystify royalty, while at the same time expressing its speciality. I think the *-san* suffix for the Empress functions as 'reduction of majesty' (ibid.; p 86), which, together with the use of the *Heika*, illustrates the speaker's dilemma of mystification and demystification of Imperials.

Also the speaker uses names without Imperial titles of honour for describing the young generation of Imperials (i.e. Akishino-*no-miya*): this is similar to the pattern of namings by liberals (e.g. 6.3.3.5). There is an asymmetrical deference in the language to describe the Imperials. Similar asymmetries of royal references are found in the British royal family. For instance, the (former) Duchess of York is often referred to as 'Fergie', but the Queen would not be referred to by her first name or by nicknames (Billig, 1992). However, what matters in terms of speech accommodation theory is not whether the interviewer used different terms to refer to different members of the Imperial family. The crucial issue is whether he changed his pattern of reference according to the identity of his addressee. It is necessary, therefore, to compare the same interviewer's namings in different interview situations.

6.4.4. Initial Convergence (3)

In 6.4.4.1, the interviewees are right-wing party members. J is the party leader, whose aura discourse was analysed in 6.3.2.3.

(6.4.4.1)

1.	S	Well, very frankly speaking, mmm, have you all had a chance to :
2.	→	really see [both/either] ***Tenno Heika***, [and/or] ***Kozoku-no-kata***
3.		(Imperial members) : or seen [them] in town...
4.	J	In my case, [I've] done (seen them), a lot...
5.	S	A lot...

The interviewer (S) employs *Tenno Heika* and *Kozoku-no-kata* to refer to the Emperor and Imperials. *Kata* is originally a place deixis, but can be used as an indirect person

deixis. In addition, *-no* is an attributive particle which connects two nouns. Because of its indirect expression, *-no-kata* as a person deixis constitutes a polite way to refer to a person. In short, *Kozoku-no-kata* ('*Kata* of Imperials' or 'Honoured Imperial members') can be attributed as a politer form than just *Kozoku* (Imperials): the Imperial terms of S, both *Tenno Heika* and *Kozoku-no-kata*, represent traditional forms of Imperial deference. As discussed previously, *Heika* is the key term of the right-winger's Imperial naming; and the interviewer, in using this form, is displaying convergence towards the language of the right-winger. He does not refer to the Imperials with plain namings, but in polite indirect ways.

This can be compared with the initial questions asked by the same person when interviewing young liberal people. In 6.4.4.2, the interviewees are the liberal academic couple mentioned in 6.3.3.1, 6.3.3.2 and 6.3.3.3. The participant A is the husband who states that it would have been better if the Emperor had been executed at the end of the war (*see section 6.3.3*).

(6.4.4.2)

1.	S→	Eeh, have you all seen ***Tenno***? Have you seen ***Tenno*** or ***Kozoku***;
2.		[I'd like to] begin with this question...
3.	A	Live (Not on media)?
4.	S	Live.

In 6.4.4.2, the same interviewer (S) is asking about the Imperial experiences of the interlocutors, referring to the Emperor as *Tenno*, without the *Heika* title, and just *Kozoku* not *Kozoku-no-kata*. In 6.4.4.1, posing the same interview question to the right-winger, the interviewer uses titles of honour for the Emperor. What is more, when S addresses the right-winger the term used to denote 'other members' of the Imperial Family is a politer form, *kata* (cf. A casual person deixis *hito, see section 6.5.1*). He shows his respect for the monarch by using honorific forms, which belong to the traditionalist repertoire. In contrast, in 6.4.4.2, the same interviewer shows his convergence to the liberal interviewees. Making a comparison between these two questioning turns, one point becomes clear. With regard to the theory of speech accommodation, the interviewer changes his naming practices according to his

interlocutors. The changes are not random. The pattern of changes fits a model of convergence to the assumed prototypicality of the interlocutors' usage (Turner, 1987). Accordingly, the interviewer treats his hearers as if they are prototypical liberals or ultra conservatives and adjusts his own speech patterns accordingly.

The comparison between 6.4.4.1, 6.4.4.2 and 6.4.3.1 suggests that conversations with non-extremists, conventional conservatives (such as F) require the interviewer to use more elaborately designed namings. The interviewer's initial naming practice is a part of initial convergence to the prototypical speech styles of the interlocutors. Thus in 6.4.3.1, the interviewer could illustrate dilemmatic aspects of modern monarchy (Nairn, 1988), by using a combination of formal and less formal naming practices.

6.5.0. Posing the Questions

The theory of speech accommodation differs from that of discursive psychology. According to the theory of speech accommodation, speakers' usage of flexible terms is determined by their wish to converge or diverge. It assumes that the speakers, having settled on the desired amount of social distance, will be constant in their usage of key terms. By contrast, it is a key feature of the discursive approach that speakers constantly and flexibly negotiate their ways of talking. Thus, according to the discursive perspective, speech accommodation theory should not be able to explain all the variation in the use of names when Japanese speakers talk about the Emperor. There will be a greater variety of names in the discourse than can be explained by convergence and divergence.

The data I am focusing upon is a part of the interview which we have already examined, such as Extract 6.2.0.1 and 6.4.3.1. This is the interview with a conventional conservative person and his family members (see Appendix 3-1 for an extended transcript). The interviewer (S) asked the participants about their experiences of Imperial events. In posing his question he mentioned some examples of 'national Imperial events' such as Imperial weddings and funerals. S poses a similar question to 6.4.3.1.

(6.5.0.1)

1. S I would like to ask about [some] familiar things, for example (.) at the
2. time of the wedding of ***Kotaishi*** and **Masako-*san***** and, eeh (.) the
3. wedding of the ***Heika*** and the current ***Kogo Heika*** which you (F and
4. G) watched, and, mm (.) and the time when the previous ***Tenno***
5. died...
6. G *Taiso-no-rei* (grand Imperial Funeral)
7. S Big confusion [everywhere]...
8. F→ I've seen ***Tenno-Heika***, I once waved at him on the road...
9. S When was it?
10. F in my childhood, in Kyushu**

* Masako is the first name of the Crown Princess.

** The southern most of the four main islands of Japan.

In particular the interviewer asked what the respondents were doing at the time of important Imperial events (lines 1-5). The question seems to be eliciting an answer in terms of the respondents experiences of witnessing these events at second hand on the television. To respond to the interviewer, F, introduces a story of his own direct Imperial experience, 'I've seen ***Tenno Heika***', referring to an Emperor by the exclusive honorific term. The reference, *Tenno Heika* is more formal than *Tenno*, which could indicate his positioning to the Emperor. In this way, F establishes his royalist credentials. In the interview question, the current Emperor is referred to by his title of honour, *Heika*, but his father is referred to without the *Heika* title. The interviewee, then, subtly repairs (Nofsinger, 1991; Schegloff, 1997) the lack of traditional royalism shown by the younger interviewer ('previous *Tenno*') and thereby positions himself as a traditional royalist ('*Tenno Heika*'). This is a formal term, which situates the speaker in a position of deference with regard to the Emperor and communicates this deference to the other speakers, including the interviewer.

In response to questioning from the interviewer, F explains the background of his Imperial experience. After the Second World War, the Emperor visited almost all regions of Japan to encourage industrial activities (*see section 3.3.0*). As a secondary school student standing at the roadside of his hometown, F had seen the Emperor. F

does not specifically identify which Emperor he is talking about. However, S asks: 'Was that at the time of ***Tenno***'s, so called post war [Imperial] visit?'. This question functions to confirm which Emperor is being indicated and, in doing so, the interviewer implies that he understands F is referring to Hirohito. Thus, he frames his questions as if expecting an agreement that the *Tenno Heika* in question was the Emperor in the post-war years. In this way, the question and the answer accomplish the identification of the particular Emperor without referring to the Emperor by name. The interviewer in this exchange does not use the *Tenno Heika* formulation. He repeats the formulation that he had used previously, *Tenno,* which situates him as less deferential than F, but more conventionally respectful than would have been the case had he referred to the Emperor by name (Hirohito). Thus, both F and S display their different positions by the use of the different formulations. Neither challenges the other's use. In this sense, F's correction (line 8) of the interviewer's original formulation is not a correction as such: he gives no sign that he expects the interviewer to alter his formulation.

6.5.1. Ano-Hito (person) Reference

Next, F explains what he saw or experienced during the Imperial visit. In 6.5.1.1, he provides some descriptions of the Emperor's appearance, including his clothes and the particular Imperial wave (see Appendix 3-1 and 6.2.0.1). F says that the Emperor shook people's hands. The interviewer asks whether F had shaken the Emperor's hand.

(6.5.1.1)

1. S Did [you] shake [his] hand?
2. F [I] didn't shake [his] hand.
3. G ⌊Just [*Tenno*] passed before [you / F] =
4. F→ = using (waving) a hat like this, ((F waves his hand))* because ***ano-***
5. ***hito*** (that person) did often do like this.
6. S Yeah (.) how did you find, did you find [him], in reality.
7. F→ Ya [he was] a small ***hito*** (person) (.) a little bit round shouldered (0.4)
8. looked older than [his real] age =
9. S =Yeah, hah,

* This is a repeated action, which imitates the particular Imperial wave (Extract 6.2.0.1).

Here, I shall briefly discuss what may appear to be a deviant way of describing the Emperor, which F uses. He refers to the Emperor as *ano-hito* ('that person'; line 4) or *hito* ('person'; line 7). *Hito* means 'human being' as well as 'person' in Japanese. It is acceptable in Japanese to use *hito* as person deixis associated with demonstratives, '*ano-*' or '*kono-*', as gender neutral personal pronouns. This *hito* reference can be attributed as a more casual reference than *kata* (*see section 5.4.4*), which is a less direct reference than *hito*. In addition, '*ano*', '*kono*' are common Japanese deictic demonstratives, which correspond to 'that' and 'this' in English. One may notice that, '*ano*' (that) in this context is a form of 'discourse deixis' (Levinson, 1983). According to Levinson, *this* can be used to refer to a forthcoming portion of the discourse, and *that* to a preceding portion (p 85). The same English rule can be applied to the Japanese. Therefore, '*ano*' in 6.5.1.1 is not used to refer to a person in their sight, but to a person who has just been mentioned in the discourse. In so doing, F's use of '*ano-hito*' is referring to the Emperor as a casual Imperial reference.

6.5.2. Shift of Namings

In this extract, the speaker uses 'unconventional' terms, such as '*ano-hito*' and '*hito*', to refer to the Emperor. He switches from the deferential, exclusive honorific terms. Far from using a term which can only be applied to the Imperial figure, F is using language to suggest that the Imperial figure is an ordinary person: he is, literally 'that man'. What I will stress here is that the Emperor is described as an equal figure but is still discursively distinguished in lines 4 and 5. First, I shall point out the context of this utterance. From lines 1 to 3, F's participation in the Imperial visit was downgraded. The interviewer asked whether F shook the Emperor's hand. Not only does F admit that he did not shake the hand, but his wife (G) emphasises the point: 'Just [*Tenno*] passed before [you / F]' in line 3. The adverb 'just' weakens the importance of her husband's position in the story, diminishing his contact with the Emperor. She suggests her husband was a by-stander, rather than an important actor. The word 'just' emphasises this point. It indicates that she is doing more than providing a detail of the scene. She is downgrading F's ability to report exclusive events. His contact was not particularly special. It was 'just' that of an onlooker, one of the crowd. One might say

that she is downgrading his category entitlement (Edwards, 1991) as an eyewitness: although he is still an eyewitness, he becomes comparatively less important. It must be problematic for the narrator, because 'building a category entitlement for the producer of a description can be an important way of building a factuality' (Potter, 1996a; p 15).

F may recover his status as a qualified story-teller with special information in several ways. He could argue back against his partner, suggesting that he was more than just an onlooker; or he might outwardly ignore her intervention and use further rhetoric to support the specialness of his story. He takes the latter way. In line 4, F refers to the Emperor as *ano-hito*. The same speaker who previously referred to the same Emperor in the same situation, by the exclusive honorific, *Tenno Heika*, now uses an informal (unconventional) reference. This change of naming does not indicate that his stance (or 'attitude') towards the Emperor has suddenly been changed. He has not suddenly become an anti-Imperialist. The point of his story is to convey special information about a special person. The same narrator may use different references for accomplishing different rhetorical purposes (*see section 4.3.2*).

If we consider the theoretical background of F's utterance, he is engaged in delivering a story of special 'exclusive' knowledge. He presents information about the Emperor as a man, with this knowledge being claimed to be first-hand. He is telling a story of the person behind the royal role. Discursive psychologists claim that 'common-sense' tends to be dilemmatic, containing contrary themes (Billig *et al.*, 1988). Furthermore, this frequently produces what could be called a 'kaleidoscope of common-sense' in discourse (Billig, 1992). In this kaleidoscope, speakers use contrary themes as they discuss the dilemmatic issues. From this point of view 'an ordinary person underneath the Emperor's role' is part of the modern common-sense of being the constitutional monarch. Therefore, royalists (Imperialists) will not merely talk about the monarchy using deferential discourse. They frequently have stories to tell about the human qualities of the monarchical family. Indeed, because they are interested in the monarchy, they may have more human-interest stories than those who are less committed to the monarchy. This is, in fact, the other side of the coin of that formality of the modern monarchies. One would expect this duality to be expressed in naming practices. Not only will Imperialists use formal, deferential terms (ie. *Tenno Heika*)

which differentiate the Emperor from commoners, but they will be ready to tell stories about the person behind the role. To tell such stories, they must use language which identifies the ordinariness of the monarch: even the super-ordinariness of royalty. A single naming practice would be insufficient for this dilemmatic flexibility.

6.5.3. Norm and Counter-norm

These ideas can be expressed in terms of Merton's idea of 'sociological ambivalence' (1976). Deference and formality might be thought to constitute the dominant norm in relation to the Emperor. In calling the Emperor, *Tenno Heika*, the speaker is orientating himself towards this norm. However, the counter-norm of informality is also possible. As Merton emphasises, counter-norms do not necessarily subvert the dominant norm, but they may reinforce it. For example, a respectable doctor must do something more than playing the formal role of a doctor. If a doctor is merely a medical expert, he/she will not be fulfilling the role adequately. Good doctors must appear friendly to their patients, combining the norms of formality (norm) and informality (counter-norm).

The interviewee does not suddenly become a non-Imperialist because he exchanges formal description for informality. Quite the reverse, his use of informality is a rhetorical means for telling the story of his Imperial contact, which for him is an important experience. Examining British Royal matters, Billig (1992) finds that 'to be a good royal, one must do more than act royally: one must be known as an individual personality. This means being distinguishable from the royal role' (p 71). British royalists, who come into contact with royals, often tell stories about the human qualities of the royals, just as F was telling of *ano-hito*'s personal characteristics and physical weaknesses (*see section 2.4.5*). A close look at a royal figure has enabled them to see, and talk about, the human person behind the formal royal position. As an example, an old lady reported that she had 'got the biggest shock' when she saw the Queen Mother at the Trooping of the Colour. She claimed to notice that the Queen Mother was bald, but the revelation 'did not spoil the day out or diminish their affection for the Queen Mother' (Billig, 1992; p 74). In the same way, Nairn (1988) discusses this paradox of 'being (British) royals' as a mystique (*see section 2.4.4*).

> It is precisely this mystique which concerns us here: the 'glamour' (in an ordinary Scottish sense) of persons and symbols ordinary in appearance but quite super ordinary in significance. In a far more extensive, emotionally-powerful manner than any of the other surviving monarchies, Britain's Windsors are like an interface between two worlds, the mundane one and some vaster national-spiritual share associated with mass adulation, the past, the State and familial morality, as well as with Fleet Street larks and comforting daydreams. (p 27)

There could be some debate about his point that the British House of Windsor is far more emotionally powerful than another monarchies. However, what I would like to emphasise is that there is a common feature in modern constitutional monarchies: the ordinariness of the individual monarchs supports their positions, which is neither to be completely ordinary nor completely extra-ordinary. Equality and deference constitute the 'ambivalence' of the 'profession' (or role) of the Emperor being both more than and merely an ordinary person.

This ambivalence is not only voiced directly, through describing the formal and informal properties of the Emperor. In Extract 6.5.1.1, it is also indirectly represented in the naming practices. The speaker not only describes the Emperor's personal, unremarkable qualities, such as his round shoulders and lack of height, but the speaker also switches his term of reference. *Tenno Heika* is now described as merely *ano-hito* in his utterance. Significantly the speaker does not describe '*Tenno Heika*' as being short, round-shouldered, old-looking, only '*ano-hito*' as having these human characteristics.

6.5.4. Discursive Context

I shall examine the discursive context of F's utterance in line 4. It overlaps the previous speaker's (G) voice. He does not outwardly respond to line 3, in which his partner attempts to downgrade his status to onlooker. He does not wait for his wife to finish her turn. Instead, he describes some more details of the event, using the

unconventional or non-Imperial naming device, *ano-hito*. Following this formulation, in line 6, other participants do not draw any attention to F's '*ano-hito*' reference.

In line 4, F imitates the Imperial wave, as he says '*ano-hito*'. In addition, in line 6, S does not comment on F's *ano-hito* formulation. Instead, he encourages the interviewee to speak about the 'reality' of the Emperor's personal characters: 'Yeah (.) how did you find, did you find [him], in reality'. F's answer indicates that the phrase 'in reality' is being interpreted in terms of individual characteristics. Moreover, the interviewer accepts F's answer as being appropriate for his question. In this way, the speakers demonstrate that they share the same common-sense assumption that, in this context, 'reality' about the Emperor refers to his human characteristics: that is, what he is 'really' like as compared with the outward appearance of the Imperial role. In this respect, the interviewer, having accepted that F has a personal anecdote story to tell, cues F to tell the story about the Emperor's 'real' characteristics, which only someone with personal experience would be in a position to relate. Moreover, as with the English speaker talking about the baldness of the Queen Mother, reality is being described in terms of the human weakness or frailty behind the image of royal splendour. As the speaker has claimed credentials as an eyewitness and his royalist/imperialist credentials have been established, this talk is not interpreted as showing disrespect. This response is accepted by the interviewer as an acceptable answer: '=Yeah, hah' (line 9). These interactions imply that the interviewee immediately understands that the 'reality' required is the Emperor's personal characteristics, and, most importantly, that descriptions of human weakness are perfectly in order, and are not a contradiction of the deference which was being displayed a moment previously.

What one may observe in this extract is that 'norm' and 'counter-norm' can be developed in discursive interactions. In line 4, the Emperor's ordinariness is represented by the absence of special naming. In fact, F imitates the wave, which is not an ordinary wave, but a well-known 'Imperial wave'. In this turn, F uses 'inclusive' grammar to accompany the 'exclusive' Imperial gesture. However, in line 7, in response to the question about 'reality', the narrator describes the details of the Emperor's human characteristics. He offers some evidence about 'what the real

Emperor was'. In this turn, a totally ordinary person's 'inclusive' characteristics are associated with the 'inclusive' naming device, *hito*. In lines 7 and 8, again, there are 'inclusive' descriptions with 'inclusive' reference. To reflect the dilemmatic common-places of modern constitutional monarchies, the interview participants (i.e. F and S) are now looking at the aspect of 'ordinariness' rather than 'deference' to the Emperor.

6.5.5. Varieties of Informality

It should not be thought that there is a single informal way of referring to the Emperor. Just as there are different formal naming devices, so there can be different informal namings. What needs to be examined is what a speaker is doing when using one informal naming rather than another. In order to illustrate this, the interaction which follows 6.5.1.1. can be analysed. The male speaker (F) has been speaking of the Emperor. In this extract, 6.5.5.1, two different informal namings of the Emperor are used by the speaker's wife (G). She describes the Emperor as 'helpless *ojisama*' and 'poor looking *kata*'. What is interesting is that neither term '*ojisama*' nor '*kata*' is then used by her husband (see Appendix 3-1).

(6.5.5.1)

10. F Supposed to be distressed himself. [He] looked somewhat helpless...
11. G→ ⌊Helpless ***ojisama***? ((laugh)) ***ojisama***?
12. F→ [It is an] impression, impression, isn't it? Essentially ***ano-hito*** is round
13. shouldered...
14. G→ Poor looking ***kata***, poor looking ***kata***. ((laugh)) I didn't know [if his]
15. face was noble or not, but [his] height, mmm, if there is [an] old
16. person like [him, what would I do for him]=
17. F =There's no relation between facial impression [and nobleness]

In this extract, there are three different informal references to the Emperor: *ojisama*, *ano-hito* and *kata*. This illustrates that there is not a simple dichotomy of 'formal' and 'informal' references which correspond to 'norm' and 'counter-norm' of the modern monarchy. Even within a range of 'informal' Imperial references, there is not a single criteria of 'informality', but varieties which belong to different ideological resources.

We shall consider G's informal references of *ojisama* (line 11) and *kata* (line 14). First of all, *ojisama* is a fictive kinship term (Suzuki, 1978), which describes a middle aged man, the 'age of uncles'. Note that *ojisama*, assembled with a deferential suffix *-sama* (Harada, 1976) is politer form than *ojisan* (*see section 6.2.2*). Secondly, *kata* is originally a place deixis, which can be used as a gender neutral personal reference term. It means 'person' like the *hito* reference, but is politer than *hito* (*see section 6.4.4*) because it is an indirect expression. These terms, *ojisama* and *kata*, can be regarded as being part of the feminine speech styles.

They are terms which would not be used by a male speaker like F. It has been shown that Japanese women tend to employ politer speech styles than male speakers (Hayashi, 1997; Smith, 1992). For instance, Smith (1992) collected various sources, such as boys' and girls' cartoon programmes, as well as television cooking and DIY shows in Japan. She examined the language which male/female characters, chefs and instructors used in the programmes. Smith's data shows the tendency of women to use more polite forms than men, even if these women were in authoritative positions. In consequence, in modern Japan, women's polite language is not dependent on their (social) positions, but on their gender. That being so, there is no need to look further than gender in order to explain why, in 6.5.5.1, the wife (G) uses *kata* but the husband does not converge to her politer form. He continues to use *hito* as his informal description of the Emperor. *Ojisama* and *kata* are not terms which would be expected for the husband in family arguments. *Ojisan* and *hito* are the terms expected to be used by him. In this respect, there are limits to speech accommodation. Even when speakers accommodate, they are likely to do so within the confines of their gender roles. Furthermore, if there is speech accommodation, the husband would reply appropriately: in this case, he would respond to *ojisama* by using a masculine equivalent, such as *ojisan.*

What has to be noted in this context is that the wife uses *ojisama*, a fictive kinship term, but the husband does not. This difference may be a component of the rhetorical part of the dialogue and does not simply reflect a different position by each in relation to the Emperor. In line 10, F does not specify who looked helpless. The subject is an

open slot to be filled by the hearer (Morean, 1988), which is contextually attributed as the Emperor. F preserves a grammatical ambiguity in describing who looked helpless. Then in line 11, his partner (G) repeats a description, 'helpless', with an inclusive reference of *ojisama*. The fictive kinship term, *ojisama*, stresses the equality between the referent and the speaker, similar to F's term *ano-hito*. They, however, suggest imaginary blood relations. In this respect, *ojisama* is not just a middle aged man but a man as old as an uncle. Consequently, the wife downgrades the Emperor with her *ojisama* reference, by implying that he has equal status to a relative. In so doing, she is upgrading her husband. She implies that Hirohito is old enough to be his uncle, and, thus, she is implicitly placing her husband in a fictive relationship with the Emperor, a fictive nephew. In contrast, F's *ano-hito,* as a deictic term, carries less implication about the nature of the *hito* (person). A demonstrative '*ano-*' and '*hito*' reference is as an informal reference as *ojisama*, although it conveys nothing about the referent's age, generation and sex, and especially about the relationship between the speaker and hearer.

One can ask why F picks up neither his wife's use of *ojisama* nor the more casual and masculine fictive kinterm, *ojisan*. At first sight, the wife seems to be engaging in conversational solidarity or in-groupness, which characterises Japanese conversation (Morean, 1988). She is honouring her husband by implying a familial, fictive relationship with the Emperor. In so doing, she is, at the same time, honouring the whole family, of which she is a part. One might think that F would stress the in-groupness of the immediate conversation, as well as the solidarity and honour of the family, by accepting her fictive kinship term formulation. However, he does not show speech accommodation in this regard. To understand why, one needs to examine the extract in more detail and to appreciate the subtlety of naming devices, in which upgrades and downgrades of honour might be simultaneously given to the referent (i.e. Emperor) and the addressee (i.e. the husband).

6.5.6. Discursive Context of Informalities

In order to understand the interactional context of the reference, one should note what occurred immediately prior to that. In line 3 of 6.5.1.1, the wife (G) mocked her

husband, who was about to tell the story of *Tenno*'s visit: 'Just [*Tenno*] passed before [you / F] =.' In this way she challenged F and undermined his authority. Her comment implied that her husband was 'just' an onlooker, who could not claim a special Imperial experience. Again, in 6.5.5.1, she challenges him. This time, she downgrades the qualification of the Emperor. If the character, humanity and personality of the Emperor was not special, her husband's story becomes less noteworthy. Her husband is recounting his discovery of finding the Emperor old looking, round shouldered and so on; in doing so, the Emperor is described as 'that man', *ano-hito*. The wife emphasises the human quality of the Emperor, too, but in a more exaggerated way. Using the *ojisama* reference, she suggests that the Emperor might be even more ordinary. The repeated description of 'helpless' and the fictive kinship term support her attempt: the story is not special enough, because it is not about '*the* person' (deictic), but about just '*an* uncle like man' (fictive kinship term).

What has to be noticed here is that her formulation is in a question form with rising intonation (represented by <u>underlining</u>). Question forms come in adjacency pairs, so that an answer slot would be immediately relevant and expected (Atkinson and Drew, 1979). To answer the question, therefore, the narrator is required to make a selection: the Emperor can be described as either *ojisama* (*ojisan*) or not. In this respect, the question offers 'an invitation' (Antaki, 1994) for the narrator to be even more familiar in his description of the Emperor. The wife's invitation, however, presents a dilemma for the husband: while he is talking of the human quality of the Imperial spectacle, if the Emperor is just an 'uncle-like' man, then F's Imperial story may not be worth telling. In this way, his acceptance of the term would be to admit his wife's criticism of himself.

What can be seen is that G's seeming honour of describing F in terms of a fictive relationship with the Emperor is, in this context, a way of undermining his immediate status as narrator of a special story. Thus, we can see that the choice of term to describe the Emperor is not a simple reflection of the speaker's position (i.e. 'attitude') in relation to the Emperor. It also reflects the speaker's relation to the addressee. Moreover, immediate rhetorical and relational business can be conducted by the use of terms, even in choosing between different informal terms.

In the event, in his answer (line 12), F stays with *ano-hito*, neither adopting his partner's *ojisama*, nor other fictive kinship terms (e.g. *ojisan*). In such an interchange, one can see the limits of speech accommodation. F does not accommodate to his wife's usage, even though, by the use of a fictive term, he would be able to stress their common family membership. She suggests implied or imagined family relationship between the Emperor and them. If F accepted her invitation (if he converges to her fictive kinship term), he could admit that he is a nephew of the Emperor, too, but he resists her suggestion. Hence, he shows the rhetorical subtlety of interaction which the husband and wife are conducting through their talk about the Emperor. As such, the Imperial namings achieve much more immediate interactional business than merely describing the Imperial Family. They are implicitly talking of their own family and their own relationship, too.

The extract might be even more complicated. In one sense the wife appears to be honouring her husband. In lowering the Imperial status, she is raising her husband to the level of fictive Imperial relative. However, there may well be irony in her usage, which is accomplishing, in fact, a downgrading of her husband's status. The laughter which accompanies G's formulations is an evidence of this. In line 14, G seems to converge to F's informal Imperial reference: 'Poor looking ***kata***, poor looking ***kata***. ((laugh))', since *kata* is a feminine (and politer) variation of *hito*. There is, however, a continuing argument about the human quality of the Emperor. The point is that the wife's 'invitation' (line 11) and the husband's 'resistance' (line 12) indicate some interactional business between them. She has already laughed at him in line 11. Her laughter showed that she was downgrading the story which her husband was telling. G indicated that F was not favoured by any special treatment from the Emperor. The more the Emperor is depicted as an ordinary person, the less special becomes the story her husband is telling. In this sense, her invitation to further informal naming is part of this downgrading of the husband's narration. Her repeated laughter in line 14 suggests G's further invitation for a formulation, which is even more informal. In line 17, F finally refuses her: 'There's no relation between facial impression [and nobleness]'. F claims that the Emperor's human qualities, which he has specified before, are not the essential nature of the Emperor, but an 'impression'. The conventional royalist returns

from 'counter-norm' to 'norm' of the Emperor, and the point is that he does not name the Emperor in this utterance. In his defensive discourse, he uses grammatical ambiguities.

6.6.0. Conclusion

This chapter has explored the Imperial namings in my Japanese interview data. I examined how speakers may show their 'views' (Billig, 1991; *section 4.3.2*) of the Emperor by their selection of naming practices. In my interview data, the Japanese Emperor and Imperials are sometimes referred to by 'inclusive' and sometimes by 'exclusive' references. Speakers often indicate to their audience a position in relation to the Emperor. For instance, a position of formality can be displayed by use of an exclusive term, such as the *Tenno*, *Tenno Heika* or *Heika*. Analysis of referential selections in ultra conservative and liberal discourses reveals that there are systematic tendencies in the use of these Imperial references. For example, right-wing discourses suggest that an Imperial title of honour *Heika* is the key term to show the speaker's deference to individual Emperors (i.e. *sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2*). However, there are exceptions. When right wingers refer to the Emperor without the *Heika* title, they are often referring to the Emperor in an institutional sense. Left-wingers, in contrast, tend to omit the *Heika* title when they refer to individual Emperors. The selection of the references, either inclusive (casual) or exclusive (formal), as one might expect, can show the speaker's position, stance and view of the Emperor and Imperial matters.

However, the use of the Imperial terms is not sufficient to predict the speaker's view of the Emperor. One may find the same speaker using a variety of Imperial namings (i.e. *sections 6.4.0-6.4.4*). Formal and informal Imperial references are not used in order to indicate the speaker's attitudinal position, but are often used to indicate the speaker's effort to accommodate to the hearer's prototypical position, as indicated in their use of Imperial terms. This aspect seems to be explained by the theory of speech accommodation (Giles and Smith, 1979). From this point of view, the Emperor's own casual speech style in his series of Imperial visits has been explained as convergence to local Japanese language usages (Azuma, 1997). Also, examining my data, the same interviewer shows initial convergence in his selection of naming with different

interlocutors. While the interviewer uses the *Heika* title to refer to the Emperor with right-wingers, he does not do so with liberals. These empirical data suggest that speakers are not selecting their language according to their attitudinal positions, but elaborating their speech styles interactively in relation to their understanding of their hearers' positions. In this respect, the choice of names can fulfil the function of creating interactional solidarity between speakers and hearers, which, according to Morean (1988), is even more crucial in Japanese conversations than in British or American interaction (cf. White, 1989).

The theory of speech accommodation is not sufficient to explain all the switching of namings. Detailed examinations of conventional royalists' rhetorical formulation (i.e. *sections 6.5.0-6.5.4*) reveal that a speaker could employ both formal (e.g. *Tenno Heika*) and informal (e.g. *ano-hito*) references in order to show his/her respect for the Emperor in the same series of interactions. What is more, different informal references (e.g. *ano-hito*, *kata* and *ojisama*) can be used to establish a speaker's own story about his/her personal experience with the Emperor (i.e. *sections 6.5.5 and 6.5.6*). The demands of formality and informality create an ideological dilemma (Billig *et al.*, 1988) in a way which is characteristic generally of the modern monarchy (Billig, 1992), as speakers balance the demands of describing the Emperor as a human being with the demands of demonstrating respect for the special status of the Emperor. Speakers use a variety of interpretative repertoires (Potter and Wetherell, 1987) to support their argument and the relevance of their stories. They frequently shift between repertoires of formality and informality, in ways which resemble the phenomenon which Billig (1992) calls 'kaleidoscope of common-sense'.

Accordingly, these complexities show that speech style is determined not only by the relationship between the speaker and addressee, as would be predicted by speech accommodation theory; nor merely by the speaker's attitudinal position. But in conversation, the speaker has to work out a complex relationship between self, addressee and referent. As an example, in 6.5.5.1, a conventional royalist and his wife orientate to the speaker-addressee relationship when they talk of the referent (Emperor), negotiating whether to name or not to name the Emperor by a fictive

kinship term. In so doing, they are not merely expressing their own positions nor accommodating to those of each other. They are engaging in their own interactional business and the choice of names is part of this business.

Chapter 7

Exaltation and Humility: Where is the Emperor?

-Japanese Honorifics in Imperial Discourse-

7.1.0. Introduction

This chapter explores Japanese linguistic politeness, paying particular attention to the grammar of honorific expressions. Japanese has a developed grammatical system of honorifics, in which not only pronouns, such as, T/V pronouns which stand for different French second person pronouns *tu* and *vous*, or TLN as namings, Title with Last Name (Trudgill, 1974/1995), but also verbs, adjectives, nouns and so on are put into honorific forms. A cultural anthropologist, Hendry (1995) examines the Japanese social hierarchy and the importance of using 'appropriate' language (polite or casual) in given contexts. She stresses that in Japanese conversation, 'the way something is said - the way it is wrapped in appropriate language - is as important, sometimes more important, than what is said' (p 92).

7.1.1. Honorifics in Japanese Discourse

In this chapter, it will be suggested that appropriateness is not solely contained within the content of the discourse, but it is something that has to be accomplished in ongoing interaction. There are several reasons for discussing Japanese politeness. First of all, as a linguist, Ide (1989) argues that honorifics are a matter of constant concern for Japanese speakers and:

> ... the speaker of an honorific language has to be sensitive to levels of formality in verbalizing actions and things, just as a native speaker of English, for example, must be sensitive to the countable and non-countable property of things because of grammatical distinction of property of the singular and plural in English. (p 231; cf. Kuno, 1987; Hori, 1986)

The speakers are, by necessity, faced with choices between different linguistic forms of honorifics and between honorific and plain forms of copulas, verbs, nouns, adjectives and adverbs.

Japanese honorifics have attracted the attention of several linguists (e.g. Trudgill, 1974/1995) and anthropologists (e.g. Hendry, 1993, 1995). They have studied how Japanese speakers encode power relations in their way of 'wrapping' (Hendry, 1995) the contents of information. They see, in other words, that the encoded power relations in the use of honorifics are straightforward reflections of the actual social structure (e.g. Harada, 1976). The point is, as far as I am concerned, not as simple as this. We have seen, for example, Japanese speakers may represent the Emperor as their fictive relative (*see section 6.5.5*). People do not always describe something as an objective 'fact', but descriptions are often used as rhetorical devices. Thus, secondly, I attempt to investigate the possibility that Japanese use of honorifics is a way of reproducing power relations and social hierarchy. In other words, a detailed discursive examination of the honorifics is necessary to reveal the important part of rhetorical formulations of Japanese Imperial discourse.

In this regard, Japanese speech about the monarchy presents a particular ideological dilemma (Billig *et al.*, 1988) for the speaker. In the previous chapter, we studied the idea that modern monarchies, which comprise contrary themes, such as Imperial formality and its informality, let interview participants name the Emperor differently (e.g. *Tenno Heika*, *ojisama* and *ano-hito*). One may predict that analysis of Japanese linguistic politeness would show similar dilemmas. Who is being honoured is as important as the grammatical form of honouring. A speaker can honour, or not honour, the addressee; and simultaneously the speaker can use the same grammatical

constructions to honour the referent of the talk. As will be shown, these two ways of doing honour (or dishonour) can come into conflict in talk about the monarchy. However, before discussing the pragmatics of using honorifics, I will outline the grammatical features, as studied by linguists. As will be seen, a purely grammatical description is insufficient for understanding how honour is actually accomplished in Imperial talk.

In the following sections, first of all, I shall outline the linguistic system of Japanese honorifics, such as honorific prefix and the selection of the verbs which exalt the addressee or referent, as well as humbling the speaker him/herself. Some verb-endings and copulas, also, form honorific expressions, and they often formulate particular honorific forms. I shall review several works of linguists and pragmatists. To understand Japanese honorifics more, Brown and Levinson's study on the universality of linguistic politeness (1978) will be re-examined. Next, I shall investigate transcribed data which I have collected, especially Imperial discourses uttered by extreme right-wing and liberal people. This investigation could reveal that there are different tendencies in the use of honorific language, referring to the Emperor or Imperials. Thirdly, I shall look at the discourse of a conventional royalist, which was examined in the previous chapter. A 'kaleidoscope of common-sense' (Billig, 1992) of the conventional royalist discourse will be re-examined in the light of Japanese politeness. As seen in the previous chapter, from the different naming practices, we could recognise the dilemma of modern monarchy. In this section, we will analyse the dilemma by the use of honorifications. Finally, Imperial discourses by extreme royalists (*see section 6.3.2*) will be re-analysed, to show the right-winger's dilemma of polite language use for the Emperor.

7.2.0. Japanese honorifics

I shall discuss, in this section, several aspects of Japanese honorifics: honorific prefixes, verb variants, verb-endings and copulas. First of all, I shall discuss honorific prefixes, particularly honorific prefixes which are derived from the Sino-Japanese '*go*' and native morphemes '*o-*' (Harada, 1976). These prefixes can be added to nouns as well

as verbs, in order to convey a sense of beautification (Hayashi, 1997; Harada, 1976). Secondly, I shall examine variants of verbs. There are some varieties of verbs in English, such as 'eat' and 'dine' to be used in different contexts. Such types of variant are more prevalent to express politeness in Japanese, which can be distinguished in terms of being 'casual' or 'polite'; also there are subcategories of 'exalted', 'humble' and 'neutral' under the 'polite' category. Thirdly, I shall discuss copula and verb endings, such as '*-desu*' and '*-masu*' and some affix formulations, such as '*o-...-ni naru*' and '*o-...-suru*', which can convert base verbs into polite verbal varieties.

Harada (1976) calls these linguistic forms 'honorifications'. Honorification cannot be avoided by Japanese speakers. They have to adjust their grammar, relative to the status of speaker, addressee and referent in conversations, in order to fit into socio-cultural contexts.

7.2.1. Prefixes

Harada (1976) notes that 'the most important characteristic of honorific forms is the recurrent use of the honorific prefix' (p 504). There are two major variants, '*o-*' and '*go-*'. The choice depends on the lexical class of the following element. If the element is a Sino-Japanese morpheme, the prefix takes form of '*go-*', otherwise it takes another form '*o-*'. Hayashi (1997) says that such prefixes, attached to verbs, adjectives and nouns, express the speaker's respect, modesty or politeness. This can be illustrated by the following examples quoted by Hayashi.

(7.2.1.1) **o**-kaeri-desu-ka? (Are [you] going to home?)

In this sentence, the speaker expresses his/her respect for the addressee, who is going home, by the prefix '*o-*'. In this extract, 'going home' (kaeru; kae*ri* is a verbal inflection) is used with the prefix. Consequently, this sentence exalts the addressee, who is 'going home'. One might note that in this sentence the referent and the addressee are the same person. In consequence, there is no ambiguity or conflict about who is being honoured by the prefix.

These prefixes can also be used with nouns, such as '*o-benkyo*' (study), '*o-shigoto*' (job), '*go-katei*' (family) and so forth. By adding a prefix to nouns associated with the second person, the speaker is honouring the addressee. These linguistic practices have the nontrivial stylistic effect of making the utterance sound soft and feminine. Some 'beautified' nouns, such as '*o-biiru*' (beer) sound 'womanly' and are not to be used by male speakers (Harada, 1976). The frequency of the usage can be important. Hayashi (1997) argues that over-use of these honorific prefixes can convey a meta-message of dependency. For example, these forms are often used by nursery and kindergarten (female) teachers. Also, Harada (1976) points out that absence of these beautifications is usually taken as token of virile speech. As he notes, their frequency and usage can also demonstrate subtle signs of both class and gender (cf. Maynard, 1995).

Since some of the honorific prefixes are conventionally considered to be appropriate only for female speakers (e.g. *o-biiru*), their use by men can be seen as deviant formulations (Heritage, 1988). What has to be noted is that, although inappropriate over-use of the honorific prefix by a woman may convey some negative implications for the status of the speaker, a male speaker's use can be regarded as a means of maximising deference. For instance, if 7.2.2.1 were spoken by a woman, it could be interpreted as a form of sophisticated speech, or perhaps an attempt by a speaker to appear more sophisticated than she is; but if the same extract were spoken by a male, it would represent politeness, in which deference is being paid to the addressee.

7.2.2. Verb Variants

A Japanese verb can be broken down into three parts: the stem, the base and the ending. The stem of the verb gives the general meaning. Except for two irregular verbs, *kuru* (to come) and *suru* (to do), the stem of a verb never changes. The base links the 'stem' with the 'ending'. The bases have no intrinsic meaning, but use of inappropriate bases or verb-endings for a particular verb can result in mis-communication. The verb-endings give the specific functions of the verb, for example past or present tense, negative or positive and, importantly, polite or casual. The base

of the verb is dictated by the verb endings, and the endings can characterise the verbs in the given sentences (Lampkin, 1995). For instance, *hataraki-masu* ([I] work) consists of its base '*hatara(k)-*', stem '*-(k)i-*' and the ending '*-masu*'. Some pragmatists, such as Smith (1992), conceptualise a 'base-verb', which is the combined 'stem' and 'base' of a verb. In this chapter, as detailed analysis of morphemes is not necessary, I shall use Smith's terminology (base-verb), since only the specific functions of verbs (namely 'neutral', 'exaltation' or 'humility' in polite language use) by verb endings are important for my discussion. The function of the verbs are determined by the selection of the endings, and sometimes prefixes (e.g. *o-* and *go-*) which are added to the 'base-verbs'.

While linguists have proposed several ways of categorising Japanese verbal honorifications, I shall concentrate on their discursive functions. In Japanese, status can be conveyed by the choice of verbs in the description. As discussed, there are sub-categories of 'exalted', 'humble' and 'neutral' honorifications, under the category of polite (formal) expression. Maynard (1997b) states that 'when using style as a persuasive strategy, the speaker's understanding of the social values associated with given styles plays a role and reflects the speaker's sociolinguistic ideology' (p 61). Speakers, by using exalted or humble forms, can represent their own ideological relation to the addressee and referent.

When a Japanese speaker is talking with someone who is an SSS ('socially superior to the speaker'; Harada, 1976), he/she will customarily employ exalted forms of the verb to describe the actions of the addressee. When the speaker is describing his/her own action addressing an SSS, he/she will use a humble verb form. In this way, the verb form reproduces the social relations between speaker and SSS, and the same action performed by the speaker or SSS will be described using a different verb. Also, whoever the addressee, Japanese speakers are expected to apply the same rule for his/her speech style when he/she is talking of the SSS. To put it another way, speakers employ honorification for an SSS, whether the SSS is the addressee or referent. In so doing, Japanese speakers select appropriate languages to fit into the socio-cultural context. Matsumoto (1989, pp 210-212) gives examples of different verbs conveying

'to eat' in Japanese in different contexts. Extracts 7.2.2.1 to 7.2.2.4 are slightly simplified from Matsumoto's original in order to concentrate on specific points.

(7.2.2.1) Ore -wa banmeshi -o *kuu.*
I (*vul.*) -SUB dinner (*vul.*) -OBJ eat (*vul.*)

(7.2.2.2) Watashi -wa yuuhan -o *tabemasu.*
I dinner eat-polite

(7.2.2.3) Tanaka-sensei -wa o-yuuhan -o *meshiagarimasu.*
Prof. Tanaka dinner (*beautified*) eat-polite (*exal.*)

(7.2.2.4)Watashi -wa o-yuuhan -o *itadakimasu.*
I dinner (*beautified*) eat-polite (*hum.*)

In a straightforward English translation, 7.2.2.1, 7.2.2.2 and 7.2.2.4 would all be rendered as 'I eat dinner'. Extract 7.2.2.3 would be translated as 'Professor Tanaka eats dinner'. One may notice that in 7.2.2.3 and 7.2.2.4, the dinner (*yuuhan*) is beautified by the honorific prefix '*o-*', which was discussed previously. On the other hand, '*-o*'s following 'dinner' (*banmeshi*, *yuuhan* and *o-yuuhan*) are object markers, not beautification devices, marking out the dinner as being the object of the verb 'to eat'. Also '*-wa*', which is found in all extracts, is a subject marker, showing the subject of the sentence. In the English translation, the verb 'to eat' is constant. However, in the Japanese examples different verbs are used, not to convey different actions but to convey the status of the person who is to eat the dinner.

As will be found in 7.2.2.2, 7.2.2.3 and 7.2.2.4, a verb-ending, *-masu*, is a key term which formulates polite sentences. In other words, when *-masu* is found to be associated with verbs, the sentences are formal (polite) expressions, either neutral, exalted or humble (The verb-ending and copula will be discussed again in a following section. Also another perspective for the *-masu* form will be discussed later in this section). Extract 7.2.2.1, which is not associated with the verb-ending, is likely to be said by a male to another male in casual conversation with someone who is in his close group or in a less powerful position. *Ore* is a 'vulgar' or 'manly' term of self-address, and in this example it is accompanied by the familiar variant of 'to eat', *kuu. Banmeshi* is also the familiar and manly variant of 'dinner'. *Taberu* and *yuuhan* in 7.2.2.2 are

more refined ways of describing eating and dinner respectively. Extract 7.2.2.2 can be used by any speaker, male or female, as a standardised way of speaking, which can be found in text books for Japanese conversation (Matsumoto, 1989; Maynard, 1997a). This is a polite and formal speech style but it is neither exalted nor humble. It is, therefore, one of the safest speech styles for most occasions (e.g. Maynard, 1990, 1995, 1997b; Lampkin, 1995).

The verb in 7.2.2.3 represents more than a refined way of speaking. In this sentence, Professor Tanaka is in a position which warrants the speaker's respect and probably the respect of the addressee. He is an SSS, being referred to by TLN (Title with Last Name; Trudgill, 1974/1995). The verb *meshiagaru* in 7.2.2.3 is never interchangeable with *kuu* (7.2.2.1) and scarcely so with *taberu* (7.2.2.2). It is a much more polite form of 'to eat'. The verb *itadakimasu* in 7.2.2.4 is derived from a verb, which means 'to honorarily receive'. Thus it can be described as a synonym for the verb *taberu* (7.2.2.2) together with an expression of humility on the part of the speaker in relation to either the addressee or referent. It is a verb for eating that conveys respect, indicating that what is to be eaten must be spoken of with respect. In other words, the speaker humbles him/herself at the same time as exalting the dinner that he/she is about to eat. Consequently, this sentence implies that the dinner has been prepared (or presented) by someone for whom the speaker wishes to show his/her respect. Thus it is accountable that Japanese people commonly use an idiomatic compliment phrase '*itadakimasu*' before their meals, functionally equivalent to the French '*Bon Appetit*'. In the example of 7.2.2.4, it is not specified whether respect is being shown to the addressee or some other referent, the verb is commonly used with respect to the addressee.

Matsumoto's example of 'to eat' is not an isolated example of an activity having several words, distinguished in terms of exalting and humility. There are more than ten verb-pairs like *meshiagaru* and *itadaku* that express either 'elevating addressee/referent' (exalted variants) or 'lowering speaker' (humble variants) towards the action expressed by different verbs (Maynard, 1997b; Kuno, 1987; Matsumoto, 1988, 1989; Harada, 1976; Lampkin, 1995). Matsumoto (1989), for example, lists verb pairs, *ossyaru* vs. *mouse* (to say), *goran-ninaru* vs. *haikensuru* (to see), *kudasaru*

vs. *sashiageru* (to give) and so forth, which express meta-messages of 'exaltation' and 'humility'.

7.2.3. Verb-endings and Copulas

Apart from the use of different verbs for exaltations and humilities, Japanese verbs can also be formulated to express exalting-humbling variations by adding the honorific prefix '*o-*' with some affixations to base verbs, such as '*-ni naru*' or '*-suru*' (Matsumoto, 1997). In this section, we shall consider verb-endings and copulas, for example, *-desu* and *-masu*, which are frequently used to make honorifications in Japanese discourses.

As discussed, the verb-ending '*-masu*' is one of the key terms for formulating polite speech style in Japanese. Examination of the examples below quoted from Smith (1992) shows how *-masu* formulates neutral, exalted or humble honorifications with the same base-verb by different formulation of 'to call' (*yobu*). To be more precise, it is not always necessary to select different verb variants for honorification (e.g. 7.2.2.3 and 7.2.2.4), but some affixations can convert the same base-verb into verbal honorifications. *Yobu* in 7.2.3.1 is a base verb, and a verb-ending *-masu* can be added to its continuative form. These examples of 7.2.3.3 and 7.2.3.4 contain the subject marker '*-ga*' and object marker '*-o*'. These examples can be identified as exalted and humble polite sentences respectively. Examples 7.2.3.1 and 7.2.3.2 do not specify their subjects.

(7.2.3.1) Yobu. ([I] call)
call

(7.2.3.2) Yobi-*masu*. ([I] call)
call-polite

(7.2.3.3) Sensei -ga o-yobi ni nari-*masu*. (The professor will call [somebody])
-SUB call-polite (*exal.*)

(7.2.3.4) Sensei -o o-yobi si-*masu*. ([I] will call the professor)
-OBJ call-polite (*hum.*)

Smith (1992) notes: 'When the subject or implied subject of an utterance is to be shown deference, the base verb is altered by the affixation of the discontinuous morpheme string *o-...ni naru*' (p 60) as in 7.2.3.3. Also when one of the other nominals in the sentence is to be shown deference, then the verb form exhibits the changes in humble form like in 7.2.3.4. To put it another way, in 7.2.3.3, the speaker is talking of an SSS (the professor), in so doing, he/she employs an exalted expression rendered by the *o-...ni naru* formulation, in addition to the base verb (e.g. *yobu*) and the verb-ending *-masu*. On the other hand, 7.2.3.4 illustrates that the speaker employs humble honorification by the *o-...suru* formulation with the same base verb. In this case, it is not clear whether the speaker is honouring his/her addressee or the professor. The point is, either way, the speaker employs humble honorification to describe his/her own action related to the SSS (addressee or the professor). The speaker discursively lowers his/her positioning.

As discussed in 7.2.2.1 to 7.2.2.4, to express deference in humble or exalted sentences, a Japanese speaker could use different verbs, such as '*meshiagaru*' and '*itadaku*', both of which pay deference. At the same time, the *-masu* verb-ending implies politeness when it is associated with a given verb (cf. 7.2.3.1). What has to be noted in this section is that even using the same base-verb (e.g. *yobu*), a Japanese speaker can convert exalted or humble honorifications, such as 7.2.3.3 and 7.2.3.4. These sentences often consist of an honorific prefix for the verb '*o-*' with particular formulations, such as '*-ni naru*' or '*-suru*', in addition to the verb-ending '*-masu*'. One has to note that, therefore, if the verb-ending *-masu* is found in Japanese discourse, there is a possibility of honorific expression. In addition, Japanese honorification may employ exalted or humble variants of base-verbs (e.g. 7.2.2.2, 7.2.2.3 and 7.2.2.4) or honorific formulation with base-verbs (e.g. 7.2.3.3 and 7.2.3.4). Needless to say, even if there is no *-masu* verb-ending, there could be a possibility of honorification with '*o...ni naru*' or '*o...suru*' formulations. Even if they do not use honorific variants of the verbs, close examinations of the subject and object markers could reveal that the sentence uses either exalted or humble honorifications.

Apart from the verb-ending *-masu*, one should note another popular honorification device, the different uses of copulas. The extracts below are reproduced from Matsumoto's (1989) examples to show that copulas can be used to formulate different degrees of honorification (or non-honorification).

(7.2.3.5) Kyo	-wa	doyoobi	*da.*	(plain)
(7.2.3.6) Kyo	-wa	doyoobi	*desu.*	(polite)
(7.2.3.7) Kyo	-wa	doyoobi	*degozaimasu.*	(super polite)

All three sentences can be translated as 'today (*kyo*) is Saturday (*doyoobi*)'. However, the three sentences have different copulas, *da*, *desu* and *degozaimasu*, which mean 'to be', probably the most common Japanese verb. They are respectively plain, polite and super polite forms. Extract 7.2.3.5 would be found in expository writings, in newspaper articles, and in casual speech with a non-SSS. Typically this form would be used in impersonal writing (e.g. newspaper article) or in intimate speech contexts (e.g. a male speaker is speaking with a close friend). On the other hand, 7.2.3.6 is used in a wide range of speech. This copula *-desu* (and comparative verb-ending *-masu*) would be the appropriate form in a conversation with a stranger and an SSS. Another example of this occurs is 7.2.1.1 (i.e. 'o-kaeri-***desu***-ka?'), when the *-desu* copula is found with an honorific prefix. In written forms, it might be found in story books or children's text books. The super polite version, 7.2.3.7, would be used in formal occasions amongst adult interceptors, mainly addressing an SSS. In 7.2.3.7, the honorific copula, *degozaimasu*, contains the verb-ending, *-masu*, which is added to *gozaru*, the polite variant of 'to be' (*gozai-* is a verbal inflection).

There is one more method of honorification which should not to be missed: the popular supplemental verbs, *-reru* and *-rareru*. They are used to formulate passive sentences. They can also be used to express potentiality (in English, *can do* or *can be done*) as well as honorific formulations. The examples below are quoted from Lampkin (1995, p 109). Both 7.2.3.8 and 7.2.3.9 mean, 'did [you] speak to the company president (*Shacho-san*)?'.

(7.2.3.8) Shacho-san -to hanasa*re*mashita -ka?

-OBJ -QUE

(7.2.3.9) Shacho-san -to *o*-hanashi *ni* *nari*mashita -ka?

The president (*Shacho*) is depicted with an 'in-group' suffix *-san* (*see section 6.2.2*). *Shacho-san* is not to be understood as the subject, since it is followed by the object marker, '*-to*' (cf. 7.2.3.7). Also '*-ka*' is the question marker, denoting the addressee as the subject of the inquiry. According to Lampkin, the two sentences could be interchangeable: both of them convey a similar amount of politeness. Also, as Smith suggests, a formulation, *o...naru*, could convert base-verbs into honorific (exalted) expressions, and one may find that 7.2.3.9 shows the features of this type of honorification. A comparison between 7.2.3.8 and 7.2.3.9 suggests that even the base-verb of the sentence, 'to speak' (*hanasu*), without an honorific prefix, but with the supplemental verb '*-reru*' and verb-ending '*-masu*', also indicates an exalted honorification.

Using honorifics, Japanese speakers encode the contextual power relations among the speaker's self, addressee and referent. Similarly, listeners can understand what contextual power relations are being indicated by the speaker's use of honorifics. In 7.2.3.8 and 7.2.3.9, for example, the addressee is likely to be an SSS, because of the honorifications which are being used. It can also be implied that the company president is not the president of the speaker's own company, since the object (*Shacho*) is referred to with the suffix *-san*. As a result of this deference, a third party listener might predict that the president, of which the speaker is talking, is not the president of the speaker's own company.

Japanese speakers, hearing such utterances, would not only get such information according to the contents of the information, but also the relative social status and relationships of the speakers, auditors and referents. That is to say, if *-desu* or *-masu* are found, there are possibilities of polite speech, in either exalted, humble or neutral forms. If an honorific formulation, such as '*o...suru*' or '*o...ni naru*' is found, there may also be status differences. We can find that everyday Japanese speech is

extremely sensitive to group identity, social ranking, gender, age and so forth (Loveday, 1986; Morean, 1988).

7.2.4. Universals of Linguistic Politeness

It has been claimed by Matsumoto (1988, 1989) that the Japanese system of honorification has implications for the theory of politeness proposed by Brown and Levinson (1978). According to Matsumoto (1989), there is no neutral form in Japanese, which is neither polite nor impolite. As has been outlined, Japanese honorifications are not additions to a neutral utterance which conveys particular prepositional content (e.g. 7.2.3.7). As a result of this, it has been argued that Brown and Levinson's conceptualisation of 'negative politeness' does not fit Japanese pragmatics (Matsumoto, 1988, 1989; Ide, 1989). Brown and Levinson suggest that negative politeness is a linguistic strategy, which a model person (MP) employs to reduce potential inter-personal conflict when he/she performs potential FTAs (face threatening acts), such as giving orders or making requests. To be more precise, MPs try to minimise the threatening of face by choosing an appropriate strategy, such as avoiding the FTA, or performing a redressive act along with the FTA.

According to Matsumoto (1988), the MP is conceptualised in terms of Western individualism, which primarily is concerned with keeping individual territory. However, 'what is of paramount concern to a Japanese is not his/her own territory, but the position in relation to the others in the group and his/her acceptance by those others' (p 405). Loss of face in Japan is associated with the perception by others that one has not comprehended and acknowledged the structure and hierarchy of the group. A Japanese MP must be social-rank sensitive, and his/her face is maintained by displaying his/her understanding of social-rank (Matsumoto, 1988; Ide, 1989; cf. Nakane, 1970). Japanese honorifics are, accordingly, used as relation-acknowledgement linguistic devices (Matsumoto, 1988). Any Japanese utterances must convey information about the speaker's recognition of social contexts and the status of the addressee. Thus, there is always the possibility that speakers may offend the addressee and/or embarrass

themselves. In other words, any utterances in Japanese could be face-threatening. Therefore, Matsumoto (1989) suggests:

> As it stands, Brown and Levinson's theory of politeness fails in Japanese not because the strategies for achieving politeness are different, but because the postulated motivation underlying politeness phenomena seems unsuited to Japanese culture and language. (p 219)

Matsumoto's argument emphasises the complex pragmatics of Japanese honorifics, as linguistic systems of honouring and humbling are used in conjunction. As will be seen, this leads to dilemmas which have to be managed by speakers addressing others about Imperial topics. Here, honouring the Emperor as referent can lead to threats of face to the addressee, such that politeness is not easily managed within the discourse-in-action (cf. Hill *et al.*, 1986).

7.2.5 Depicting Dilemma: Honourable Addressee and Imperial Referent

In Japanese conversation, there are complex patterns for honouring addressees and referents. Morean (1988) claims that there are four factors which determine Japanese speech levels: 'out-groupness', 'position', 'age' and 'sex'. Maynard (1997b) adds one more to these factors, 'formality of the occasion'. Speech levels can vary according to the context, such as in private or official settings. What has to be noted is that pragmatists consider these four or five factors to be speech level determinants. Linguistic and socio-linguistic studies, however, do not consider sufficient other possibilities; these demands can lead to dilemmas, as competing demands of politeness conflict with one another.

Although there are well established codes of politeness, speakers have to manage these codes to fit into the present discursive situation. Crucially the codes could conflict, thereby creating dilemmas for speakers. The dilemma of simultaneously honouring an addressee and referent is not mentioned by linguists who study Japanese. In regard to Imperial discourse, for example, a particular dilemma can be created when speakers

talk about the relations between the Emperor and an addressee, when both addressee and the Emperor are to be honoured. The dilemma is that the speaker may find him/herself in a conflict, where honouring the one is to dishonour the other. I will attempt to illustrate this situation graphically.

In the following diagrams (which are distinguished from extracts by their initial 'D-' signs), arrows (→) represent discursive actions. Thus, speakers are placed on the left of arrows. A speaker, in making an utterance, will have an addressee on the right of the arrows. Also the utterance might refer to another person: the referent. The simplest situation will be considered first. The speaker addresses an utterance to a close friend or non-SSS without honorifications. A diagram could be drawn to depict such a 'neutral' relationship.

(D-7.2.5.1) speaker → addressee

These sorts of utterance might be made between friends, who wish to convey a sense of equality, informality or in-groupness between themselves. In the first utterance, the speaker is addressing another on equal terms, neither humbling him/herself nor using honorifics to the addressee. For instance, in my data, a liberal editor and his wife are talking of the day of the Emperor's death. The husband talks of the day of Imperial death and he does not have any idea why 'so many young people came to the Palace to mourn the Emperor'. In 7.2.5.1, the interviewer (S) asks whether the interviewee (D), who is a former colleague of a similar age, understood the motivation of young people who gathered at the Palace. No verbs used in 7.2.5.1 employ honorification nor beautification devices (e.g. prefix '*o-*'). Verbs marked as '(*plain*)' show that they are not in forms of honorification but in plain forms.

(7.2.5.1)

1. S Don't [you] **understand** (*plain*) [the reason]?
2. D [I] don't **understand** (*plain*) [the reason].

In 7.2.5.1, the interviewer (S) addresses the interviewee (D) without honorification (line 1). The interviewee also replies without honorifications (line 2). Line 1 shows an example of informal address, which is depicted in D-7.2.5.1.

A speaker may refer to a third person in his/her utterances. In the case of a 'neutral' relationship, the speaker does not intend to convey a formal relationship between the speaker's self and the referent. This would occur, for example, if the referent is the speaker's close friend (D-7.2.5.2). The addressee and referent can have different relations with the speaker, and the speaker might want to convey respect by the use of honorifics to either addressee, referent or both. The simplest situation will again be examined first. We may draw diagrams to show the relationships between the speaker, non-SSS addressee and non-SSS referent (D-7.2.5.3). The utterance might depict the referent and addressee in some sort of relation which is represented by a sign, '≈R≈'.

(D-7.2.5.2) speaker → (speaker ≈R≈ referent)

(D-7.2.5.3) speaker → (addressee ≈R≈ referent)

A few seconds later than 7.2.5.1, the interviewer suggests that 'young people seemed to think as if their own grandfather had died'.

(7.2.5.2)

1. S [They] would have **thought** (*plain*) [Emperor's death] like their own
2. grandpa's death, wouldn't they? Or [they might be] **thinking** (*plain*)
3. something other. You couldn't **imagine** (*plain*) such things (young
4. people's thought / them)?

In 7.2.5.2, the speaker addresses someone of equal status and again seeks to convey informality or equality. In the first two sentences, S is talking of referents (i.e. young people) and conveys informal/equal relationship with them (e.g. D-7.2.5.2). In the third sentence, by not using honorifics to depict this relationship between the addressee and the third person, the speaker is conveying the impression that the third person is also in an informal/equal relationship with the addressee. The speaker implies that the third

person (i.e. young people) is of a similar status to the speaker's self and the addressee. In this way, such a statement depicts the relations (i.e. 'to imagine') between speaker, referent and addressee without differentiation (e.g. D-7.2.5.3). In these examples, the three way relations are all in harmony and all conveyed as equal.

In the following examples, the speakers use honorifics to an addressee, thereby conveying respect. The use of honorifics is indicated by the different fonts (i.e. LARGER TYPES or reduced fonts). Within a single utterance, the honorific conveys an unequal relationship. Although, in practice, the inequality within the conversation can be countered, if the addressee also uses a similar honorification.

(D-7.2.5.4a) speaker → ADDRESSEE

In such an utterance, the speaker is conveying that they are humbler than the addressee. As such the speaker is conveying difference between him/herself and the addressee. Although the speaker may not specifically be using a humbling form when describing themselves (e.g. exalting the addressee), they nevertheless are humbling themselves in relation to the addressee. As a result, the conveyed status of the speaker is different in D-7.2.5.1 than it is in D-7.2.5.4a. One might say that the effects of uttering D-7.2.5.4a is to convey a relationship which could be depicted as the following:

(D-7.2.5.4b) speaker ≈R≈ ADDRESSEE

The difference in status is, thereby, emphasised according to type faces. It is the same if the speaker is talking to an addressee about a referent, without conveying any relationship between the addressee and referent. This would occur, for instance when the speaker is describing his/her relationship with an SSS, such as the Emperor.

(D-7.2.5.5a) speaker → (speaker ≈R≈ REFERENT)

Extract 7.2.5.3 below is the very first portion of the interview with the liberal academic. In this discussion, there is a young woman (C), who is almost ten years younger than the rest of the participants. She saw a prince (one of the cousins of the current Emperor) when she was in an English speech contest, The Prince Takamatsu Cup (*Takamatsu-no-miya Hai*), sponsored by the Prince. She employs '*o...ni naru*' formulation (*see section 7.2.3*) to exalt the prince's action. She says that she saw the prince *exaltedly* speaking to the contest participants (i.e. *o-hanashi ni natteita*).

(7.2.5.3)

C Well, [the prince was] **speaking to** (*exal.*) about one out of ten participants, like that...

Again, she emphasises a difference between herself (i.e. speaker; C) and the prince (i.e. referent). The speaker is in a humbler position, which the speaker is not in 'neutral' statements, such as 7.2.5.2 and D-7.2.5.2. Therefore, again, the effect of the utterance is to convey the relationship between the speaker and referent as below:

(D-7.2.5.5b) speaker ≈R≈ REFERENT

The dilemma arises when the speaker wishes to convey an unequal relationship between the addressee and an SSS. In such cases, contrary demands can conflict. First, there is the demand to honour the addressee (i.e. D-7.2.5.4b), unless the addressee is a friend, child or someone to whom the speaker wishes to convey equal informality. Second, there is another demand to honour the SSS referents, such as the Emperor or Imperials (i.e. D-7.2.5.5b).

To see how these demands can come into conflict, and create a dilemma for the speaker, the simplest 'neutral' case of balanced informality can be re-examined. As seen in 7.2.5.2, when the interviewer addressees a friend, an editor of a similar age, talking of the 'young people' who gathered at the Palace when the Emperor died, he is conveying informal equality between the addressee and referent (e.g. D-7.2.5.3). As seen, the third sentence of 7.2.5.2 conveys a three way equality: the speaker (i.e.

interviewer) conveys equality with the addressee (i.e. young editor) and referent (i.e. young people), while depicting similar equality between addressee and referent.

The dilemma arises when the speaker wishes to convey that the addressee and referent are not in an equal relationship, for example, if the referent is socially superior to the addressee. In such a case, the speaker will depict a relationship in which the addressee is relatively humbled in relation to the referent. This can be represented diagrammatically:

(D-7.2.5.6a) speaker → (addressee ≈R≈ REFERENT)

This sort of statement occurs, for example, when the speaker is talking of the addressee meeting someone socially superior to him/her (e.g. the Emperor), and is using honorifications for the Emperor while depicting the addressee's meeting or observation. It may occur when a conservative minded person depicts the addressee's action related to the Emperor in humble form, since the speaker could hypothesise that this should be a great honour for the addressee. The implication of such a statement is to depict a relationship between the addressee and referent, in which the addressee is relatively humbled in relation to the Emperor. Therefore, the implication can be depicted as below. The addressee is 'reduced' in relation to the referent:

(D-7.2.5.6b) addressee ≈R≈ REFERENT

As the speaker has not humbled him/herself in relation to the referent, then the utterance has, as it were, moved the addressee downwards to the social position below that of the speaker. To put it another way, the speaker has seemed to remain 'neutral' in relation to the referent (i.e. 'speaker ≈R≈ referent'), while the addressee has been humbled. Accordingly, the effect is to convey the implication of inequality between the speaker and addressee.

(D-7.2.5.6c) speaker ≈R≈ addressee

If this is the implication of depicting the unequal relationship between the addressee and referent, then the dilemma is clear. The speaker, in depicting the addressee in a humbler position, has used forms which imply that the addressee is humbler than the speaker. In this way, the addressee has not been honoured by the speaker.

Another dilemma may occur when the speaker honours the addressee. When the relationship between addressee and referent is conveyed, then the referent is humbled. In the case when the referent is the Emperor, then the Emperor is placed in an inferior status. This would occur, for example, when a speaker describes a meeting between the Emperor and the addressee and only honours the addressee. As will be seen in this chapter (*see section 7.5.0*), when the interviewer asks a senior interviewee, he employs honorification only for the addressee's Imperial experiences, such as: 'did you (*exal.*) see [TV programmes when] the Emperor died (*plain*) ?'. Honouring both equally would not be a solution, for it would imply a relationship of equality between the addressee and the Emperor. That would constitute a dishonouring of the Emperor, for the Emperor should be portrayed as being in a superior position to the addressee. Such dishonouring of the Emperor is something a royalist addressee would not wish to convey.

In this way, the demands of honouring both addressee and referent can be seen to conflict when a speaker conveys an unequal relationship between addressees and referents; one or other should be depicted in a socially superior and honoured position. This dilemma is likely to arise in cases where speakers are talking to an honoured addressee about the addressee's relations with a respectable referent, such as the Emperor/Imperials. Examples will be given in later sections to show how Japanese speakers seek to manage these dilemmas. It will be suggested that the dilemma ensures that honorification is something that has to be managed in the context of conversations. It is not an automatic system, which reflects social structures, such as 'out-groupness', 'position' and so on. We will find that there will be occasions when even extreme right-wingers will avoid using honorifications when depicting the Emperor/Imperials.

7.3.0. Honorifications for the Emperor; Right and Left

As examined previously, Japanese speakers have to choose styles of speech, either plain or polite. In addition, there are sub-divided categories of honorification, humility and exaltation. As was seen in the previous chapter, the choice of namings of the Emperor was related to the speaker's 'view' towards the Imperial system. Left-wingers tended to use less formal terms than right-wingers, although, as was stressed, this was by no means an automatic rule. Therefore, one might predict that speakers' views on the Emperor will not merely be reflected in the naming devices but will affect the complex use of honorification devices. As a general rule, one might predict that extreme right-wing activists, when referring to the Emperor, will use honorification devices, in contrast to liberal speakers who will use plain forms. Similarly the extreme right-wingers will use humbling devices in referring to themselves in relation to the Emperor to a greater extent than will left-wingers. In this section, I shall examine some ultra conservative and liberal discourses, paying particular attention to the complex grammar of honorification .

7.3.1. Right-Wing (1)

In examining the honorification of extreme right-wingers, the same extracts as were examined in the previous chapter will be re-analysed, and some new ones will be presented and examined. In the first of these extracts, a young right-wing activist is telling the story about how he looked at the Emperor 'without any shield except air' (*see section 6.3.1*) at the Imperial Coronation Parade.

(7.3.1.1)

K Well, at the time of the ***go-sokui*** (coronation: *beautified*) of present *Heika*, of that parade, at that time, well, my [college was] *Kokugakuin...*

(7.3.1.2)

K = in the [less guarded] group (area). Yeah, then five, six metre distance, eeh, the ***o-kuruma*** (car: beautified) of *Tenno Heika* is moving (passing)...

In referring to the Imperial coronation, *sokui*, and to the car in which the Emperor travelled, *kuruma*, the speaker uses honorific prefixes, such as '*go-*' and '*o-*'. The original Japanese in 7.3.1.1 is '*go-sokui sareta*' (to have coronation) which exalts the Emperor not only by prefix, but also supplemental verb '*-reru*' (*see section 7.2.3*). The Imperial car in 7.3.1.2 is not just a car, but is depicted as *the* respectable vehicle, beautified by the honorific prefix, '*o-*'. The speaker refers to the Emperor with the *Heika* title, the key term for expressing deference in both examples (*see section 6.3.2*). In this way, the right wing activist reinforces the formality of his Imperial talk, elevating the Imperial status.

The honorific prefix '*o-*' for verbs and supplemental verb '*-reru*' can be seen in the extract below, 7.3.1.3. Here, the party leader (J) is talking of his 'aura' experience of Prince *Hiro*, when he joined a voluntary weeding scheme some twenty years previously (*see section 6.3.2*). Prior to telling his aura story (i.e. 6.3.2.3), he explains the background to his experience. He was working hard in the Palace, ecstatic at working close to the Imperial residence.

(7.3.1.3)

1. J = because of the time of *Showa Tenno*, it was [the place he weeded]
2. in the Palace, [so called] *Fukiage-Gyoen**, where, well, *Tenno Heika*
3. ***suma-warete-iru*** (lived: ①). [I was] Working in earnest, such as
4. weedings:: then, certainly, I'm coming close the house [which] *Tenno*
5. *Heika* ***o-sumai*** (lives: ②) thus [I was] excited (.)

* Imperial residence in the Palace.

The speaker uses two polite variants of '*sumu*' (to live) in the extract: *suma-warete-* in line 3 and *o-sumai* in line 5. Details of the original Japanese utterances are given below in ① and ②.

① *Fukiage Gyoen* to iu, sono, *Tenno Heika* -ga ***-sumawarete** iru*
named (well) -SUB live-polite (*exal.*)

② Jibun -ga sono, *Tenno Heika* -ga ***o-sumai ni natte** iru ie*
I -SUB (well) -SUB live-polite (*exal.*) Residence
no soba made ***kita**'n da*
near come-plain (isn't it?)

In ① and ②, exalting honorifications are applied for *Tenno Heika,* indicating the Emperor's action of 'living', *sumu,* as being formal. In sentence ①, the right-wing leader uses the '*-reru*' supplemental verb, and in sentence ②, he uses the '*o...ni naru*' formulation. Both of these convert the base-verb into exalted polite forms. This is a contrast between the formulation of the Emperor's action and that of the speaker himself. In ②, the description of the Imperial action (to live: *sumu*) is in an exalted form (i.e. *o...ni naru*), while the speaker's own action (to come: *kuru*) is in a plain form. In extracts 7.3.1.1, 7.3.1.2 and 7.3.1.3, the right-wingers convey the status difference between the Emperor and themselves, which can be depicted in diagram D-7.2.5.5a and D-7.2.5.5b: humbling the speaker's self in relation to the Emperor.

7.3.2. Right-Wing (2)

The previous chapter showed that naming does not always follow the same rule. A conventionalist speaker, for example, might use an informal way of referring to the Emperor, which, in context, would not indicate a lack of respect (*see sections 6.5.0-6.5.6*). Much depends on the complex relations between speaker, referent and addressee. Similarly the customs of politeness are not fixed, such that an extreme right-wing speaker would always feel the necessity to use the most polite grammatical forms possible. The following extract is a re-quoted discourse of the right-wing leader, talking of his aura experience when he saw the Crown Prince (i.e. 6.3.2.3). Verbs are emphasised in **bold** type, and the type of honorification (non-honorification) is explained for each of them in round brackets.

(7.3.2.1)

1. J **Looking** (*plain*) [at the Emperor] furtively, so, as expected, [I] **felt**
2. (*plain*) strong presence of *Tenno Heika*, whereas [he was still]
3. *Kotaishi*, at that time. Then a bit later, [we were announced as] '*Hiro-*
4. *no-miya Denka*' [who is] current *Kotaishi* '**comes** (*exal.*)'. When *Hiro-*
5. *no-miya Denka* **came appear** (*plain*), I, hmm, **felt** (*plain*) that a
6. somewhat aura. Somewhat shining bright, gallant, in fact [I] **felt** (*plain*)
7. like that [from him]...

The right-wing leader expresses deference to the Imperials in his Imperial naming. With regard to grammatical honorifications, however, he uses plain forms for his own actions as well as the actions of Prince Hiro (line 1, 5 and 6). Thus, he does not use a form which would humble his own action, nor a form to exalt that of the prince. He uses the exalted form only in reported speech, which re-constructs the utterance of a courtier. The diagram for honorification for this extract can be depicted as D-7.2.5.2: in which both the speaker and referent seem to be of equal status.

The interviewer asks whether Prince Hiro's aura was stronger than the Emperor's or not. The interviewee replies after a half second pause, and states that Prince Hiro had a stronger 'energy' than the Emperor. In answering thus, the speaker could be heard as criticising the Emperor, or displaying insufficiently his royalist credentials. Significantly, he then employs more honorifications than 7.3.2.1 to describe the Emperor, contrasting his past (plain) impressions with his present (exalted) ones.

(7.3.2.2)

1. J (0.5) ...the impression at that time was so, mmm, at the general
2. greeting scheme at the Palace, [I've] **got** (*plain*) such impressions.
3. (Prince *Hiro*'s aura is stronger than the Emperor's) But, nowadays, in
4. terms of *Tenno Heika*, since [he has] **sat** (*exal.*) on the ***mi-kurai****
5. (status or throne; *beautified*), [his] presence can be **seen** (*plain*) in
6. relation to [his] ***o-tachiba*** (position; *beautified*), well:: however, it was
7. true that [I] **felt** (*plain*) undoubted energy by *Hiro-no-miya-sama* at that
8. moment.

* This *mi-* is an exceptional pronunciation of honorific prefix '*go-*'.

The party leader claims that he felt the strong aura of Prince Hiro not only twenty years ago, but also at general greetings. At the same time, J is mitigating (Edwards and Potter, 1992) his former statement, by maximising the grammatical honorifications for the Emperor. He carefully avoids comparing the individual quality of the Emperor with that of the Crown Prince. Instead, he orientates towards the Emperor's formality: sitting on the throne is an extremely exalted business (line 4). Whereas the speaker's own actions are described in plain forms, both the Imperial action (to sit) and the throne (or position) are honoured. In other words, the position of *Tenno Heika* is depicted with maximum grammatical honorification, which accords with diagrams D-7.2.5.5a and D-7.2.5.5b.

To sum up, ultra conservatives tend to use the range of honorifications to exalt Imperial actions and attributes (e.g. 7.3.1.1, 7.3.1.2 and 7.3.1.3). However, there are many exceptions, such as 7.3.2.1. Right-wingers are not always obliged to describe their own actions humbly (e.g. 7.3.2.1), and, in addition, the level of grammatical honorifications can vary according to context (e.g. 7.3.2.2).

7.3.3. Left-Wing

If honorifications are frequent in right-winger's pro-Imperialist talk, then one might predict that they will only rarely be found in the talk of left-wing critics. This would parallel the use of formal names. The extract below (7.3.3.1) is reproduced from the previous chapter (cf. 6.3.3.3).

(7.3.3.1)

A All people **know** (*plain*), **know** (*plain*) *Tenno*'s face, [all] **know** (plain) what [he] **did** (*plain*), well it was not such a age (it is he first time) [in the history], thus...

In this extract, actions of 'all people' (to know) as well as the Emperor's (to do) are described in plain verb forms. He uses *shiru* (to know) and *sita* (to do) in the plain

forms rather than in the humble or exalted variants. In other words, the speaker does not use verb forms to differentiate between actions, which are attributed to the Emperor and those attributed to ordinary people.

In 7.3.3.2, the liberal minded editor, who once interviewed the second son of the Emperor at a ski site, offers the criticism that the Emperor was responsible for the war, referring to him by his first name (cf. 6.3.3.5).

(7.3.3.2)

D =if [there were a person who had to] ***take*** (*plain*) responsibility [for the war], the very person who would have to ***take*** (*plain*) [responsibility] was *Hirohito*, wasn't he? *Hirohito* ***remained*** (*plain*) without ***taking*** (*plain*) responsibility, since he seemed to be an useful...

It can be seen that in this critical discourse there is a complete lack of honorification devices, as compared with right-wing discourses, such as 7.3.2.2. All verbs of 'taking responsibility' are in plain forms. The use of this form underlines the critical nature of the speaker's discourse. The plain form is not used merely to make specific criticisms of the Emperor, but is also used to tell descriptive stories.

In 7.3.3.3, the young editor is talking of his first 'Imperial contact'. When he was a pupil of a nursery school, he welcomed the Emperor (Hirohito) near the station of his hometown. He was relating how the Emperor visited his prefecture to attend the National Arbor Day ceremony.

(7.3.3.3)

D First time [I] **saw** (*plain*) [the Emperor / Imperial] was, at the time of nursery school...

In this extract, the speaker's own actions, in relation to the Emperor (seeing the Emperor) are described in plain forms. As seen in 7.3.1.4, right-wingers tend to use the humble variant of 'to see' (*haiken-*) in relation to seeing the Emperor, but in this liberal

utterance, the verb forms are plain (*miru-*), without any grammatical (humble) honorifications.

Sometimes, liberals employ not only plain forms (non-honorification) but also vulgar formulations. The editor and his wife are arguing about the police's security checks before the Emperor's visit. He hates such police activities. He says that he would not bother the Emperor, but he should not be bothered by him, either. The speaker uses a form which Maynard (1996a) has called 'self-quotation'. It is as if he is addressing the Emperor, by saying that he would not 'bother you'. In this way, he is quoting his own imaginary words towards the Emperor. In so doing, he refers to the imagined Emperor by a vulgar version of the second person reference (*omae*) in a casual speech style.

(7.3.3.4)

D ***Boku*** would not **trouble** (*plain*) you, thus ***omae*** (you; *vulgar*) would not **make** (*plain*) **any trouble** [on me], like that.....

In *section 6.2.1*, the self-referential term, *boku*, was discussed in detail. In referring to the Emperor as a counterpart of *boku*, the editor employs *omae*, a vulgar addressee term, which implies an intimate or less powerful addressee. Also, this vulgar address term is accompanied by a plain form of 'not to make (trouble)'. Consequently, his formulation suggests that the Emperor is less powerful, even inferior to him. Moreover, in this discourse, only casual (plain) verb forms are found. Thus, it sounds like a caricatured command in an imagined informal setting.

One can compare the details of two self-quotations: the right-winger's in 7.3.1.3 ('I'm coming close (*plain*) the house [which] *Tenno Heika* ***o-sumai*** (lives; *exal.*)') and 7.3.3.4. In the self-quotation of 7.3.1.3, J's respect for the Emperor is represented by (1) formal Imperial namings (*Tenno Heika*) and (2) a verbal form of grammatical honorification (*o...naru*). Both of them work together to exalt the Emperor. In contrast, D does not refer to the Emperor formally, but in a very casual manner (*omae*). Moreover, he does not employ any grammatical honorifications. Since self-quotation serves to qualify speech-acts as it mitigates, parodies and/or emphasises the

act of 'saying' (Maynard, 1996a), these speakers are emphasising their views on the Emperor by their honorifications (or non-honorifications) in these self-quotations.

It could be said that unlike right-wingers, liberals tend not to employ grammatical honorifications (either exalted or humble) to describe Imperial matters. Consequently, they would avoid implying status differences when referring to the Imperials in their speech (i.e. D-7.2.5.2). The Emperor is described without grammatical honorifications (e.g. 7.3.3.1, 7.3.3.2 and 7.3.3.3) and sometimes even with vulgar formulations (e.g. 7.3.3.4). The complex structure of Japanese grammatical honorifications enables the speakers, therefore, to engage in self-positioning in relation to the Emperor, as they describe the actions of the Emperor. Also, in a similar way, honorifications would allow a speaker to position his/her addressee in relation to the Emperor in his/her Imperial discourses.

7.4.0. Conventional Royalist

This section will explore honorifications of a conventional royalist, the narrator of his Imperial experience in the previous chapter (F; 65 retired business executive). In the previous chapter, we examined his Imperial namings, which represent different perspectives of the modern monarchy. Examination of a variety of namings reveals that the conventional royalist shifts common-places (Billig, 1987, 1988, 1992) of the modern monarchy fairly often. In addition, these common-places represent dilemmatic aspects of the modern monarchy, such as Imperial spectacle and humanity. To demonstrate the value of the story and the speaker's own qualification to relate it, F has a good command of different namings in his discourse. In this section, I shall focus on his use of honorifications.

In the previous sections, we learnt that the extreme right-wingers tend to employ honorification in deference to the Emperor. Left-wing people, on the other hand, use common verbs to describe Imperial related matters. One may predict, therefore, when representing the formality of the monarchy, the conventional royalist would use honorifications, but when talking of the informality of the Emperor, he may not. As

discussed in the naming chapter, the conventional royalist could represent the dilemma of the Emperor by different namings. What will be addressed in the following sections is how the same conventional royalist speaker uses honorifications when talking of a dilemmatic notion of modern monarchy, the informality of the Emperor.

7.4.1. Honoring Addressee: Initial Interactions

The first extract (7.4.1.1) is re-quoted from the previous chapter, at the point when the narrator (F) is about to relate his Imperial experience. (i.e. 6.5.0.1; see Appendix 3-1; also, this extract is illustrated with a diagram, *see section 7.2.5*) This shows that, in posing questions, the interviewer (S) uses honorifications carefully, honouring F and his wife (G). The interviewee (F), however, does not use an honorification.

(7.4.1.1)

1. S→ [I] would like to **ask** (*hum.*) [some] familiar things, for example (.) at the
2. time of wedding of *Kotaishi* and *Masako-san* and, eeh (.) the wedding
3. → of *Heika* and current *Kogo Heika* which you (F and G) **watched**
4. → (*exal.*), as well as, mm (.) and the time when the previous *Tenno* **died**
5. (*plain*)...
6. G *Taiso-no-rei* (Grand Imperial Funeral)
7. S Big confusions...
8. F→ I'**ve seen** (*plain*)*Tenno Heika*, [I] once **waved** (*plain*) [him] on the road...
9. S When was it?
10. F In my childhood, in Kyushu

The interviewer employs honorifications, such as *ukagau* (humble variant of 'to ask'; line 1) and *goran-ninaru* (exalted variant of 'to watch/see'; line 3), which elevate F's status. On the other hand, the previous Emperor's action ('to die' in line 4) is depicted in the plain form. What is more, the Imperial weddings are referred to without an honorific prefix. Weddings (*kekkon*) are often beautified (i.e. *go-kekkon*), but the interviewer does not employ the prefix. As was discussed in the previous chapter, the interviewee (F) subtly repairs the interviewer's lack of respect, when he referred to the previous Emperor without the *Heika* title (*see section 6.5.0*). Examination of the

interviewer's non-honorification (i.e. line 4) and non-use of an honorific prefix for the Crown Prince's wedding (i.e. line 2) suggest that his lack of traditional respect is not only implied by the lack of Imperial title of honour, but also by the lack of honorifications to describe Imperial actions (to die) and events (wedding).

Further considerations may be necessary to analyse the verb 'to die' in line 4. The interviewer uses *nakunaru*, which is a rather formal (polite) variant of 'to die' (*shinu*). However, there is no simple dichotomy of 'polite (formal)' and 'impolite (plain)' to describe someone's death. The point is that its casual verb variant, *shinu*, can be used for the death of any living creature. However, *nakunaru*, which is derived from 'being lost', is used exclusively for human death (*see also section 8.2.0*). Accordingly, even though *nakunaru* is a polite variant of *shinu*, it can be also attributed as a casual verb to describe the death of people. In this respect, one may find that the interviewer does not use a polite formulation, such as '*o...ni naru*' with *nakunaru* to refer to the Emperor's death (e.g. *o-nakunari-ni naru*). Moreover, as will be seen in the following chapters, there are several exclusive vocabularies to describe Imperial related matters, such as an Emperor's death (Chapter 8), but the speaker does not use exclusive honorification to refer to the Imperial death. In line 4, the interviewer neither uses exclusive titles nor honorifications to refer to the previous Emperor.

In line 8, referring to the Emperor as '*Tenno Heika*', the interviewee repairs the interviewer's formulation, which suggests respect for the Emperor. As seen previously (*section 6.5.0*), the interviewee repairs the young man's 'incorrect' reference, according to his traditionalist perspective. However, the young interviewer's lack of honorifications is not repaired. The conventional royalist, also, describes his own Imperial related action (to see the Emperor) with the base-verb of *au*; a casual variant of 'to see'. It is neither in a polite formulation such as *o-ai shita*, nor in a humble formulation or verb variants, *o-meni kakaru* or *haiken-suru*. Despite the fact that he honours the Emperor by the naming, he employs inclusive grammar to describe Imperial matters. In this respect, F does not completely repair the young interviewer's lack of traditional respect. It suggests that F is a conventional royalist who prefers

formal Imperial namings, but is not as extreme as some right-wingers, who employ exclusive namings *and* grammar to refer to the Emperor.

Extract 7.4.1.1 shows how the interviewer (S) honours the addressee (e.g. *ukagau* and *goran-ninaru*), but not the Emperor (e.g. *nakunaru*). It would be worthwhile, therefore, to see the interviewee's (F) commands of honorifications when addressing the interviewer (S).

(7.4.1.2)

F ((tape starts)) As you **say** (*exal.*), there **are** (*polite-neutral*) certainly questions about, well, how *Tenno-sei* (Imperial system) **could coexist** (*plain*) with democracy...

(7.4.1.3)

F It **is** (*polite-neutral*) my reality:: what I'd like to **say** (*hum.*) is what [I mentioned] above, now, I'**m answering** (*plain*) [your] **questions** (*beautified*)...

Extract 7.4.1.2 is the very beginning of the interview, and F is expressing his view of the dilemma of monarchy and democracy as a general topic. Extract 7.4.1.3 is a coda (Leith and Myerson, 1989), after he has expressed his opinion on the Japanese monarchy, and is preparing. In both extracts, he honours the addressee. For example, in 7.4.1.2, the interviewer's previous statement (which is not tape recorded) is described in the exalted form, *ossharu*, the exalting variant of *iu* (to say). On the other hand, he describes his own action with the humble variant of 'to say', *moushiageru*, in 7.4.1.3. In the case of 7.4.1.3, moreover, to refer to possible (interviewer's) questions, he uses '*go-shitumon*' rather than '*shitumon*', adding the prefix '*go-*' for beautification. Extracts 7.4.1.2 and 7.4.1.3 suggest that the interviewee (continuously) exalts the interviewer's status. On the other hand, F uses plain or humble forms when referring to his own action.

To sum up, according to the extracts above, the interviewer and the interviewee exalt each other. This politeness strategy is frequently used when addressing 'out-group'

members (Brown and Levinson, 1978; Morean, 1988). The interviewer (S) is an outsider for this family discussion, thus, it is conventional that S and the elderly couple (F and G) honour each other. The encoded power relations can be drawn as in D-7.2.5.4a and D-7.2.5.4b. The point is, while they honour each other, the interviewer does not honour the Emperor (line 4 of 7.4.1.1). Whereas the sixty five year old speaker names the Emperor formally, he does not use honorification for the Emperor (line 7 of 7.4.1.1). There is a dilemma in that the Emperor is referred to by the exclusive naming but described by inclusive grammar (husband ≈R≈ tenno heika). The conventional royalist's formulation shows traditionalism (e.g. exclusive Imperial reference) and modernism (e.g. casual grammar). There is no simple dichotomy of 'formality' and 'informality' in F's discourse. Complicated discursive business is taking place beneath the argument.

7.4.2. Informal Namings and Non-Honorification (1)

The following extract is, again, re-quoted from the previous chapter, in which the emergence of unconventional Imperial references, such as *hito* and *ano-hito*, was analysed (*see section 6.5.1*). In this section, the same interactions are re-analysed with respect to grammatical honorifications (see Appendix 3-1). Through this further analysis, we may expect to see further details of the discursive background of unconventional Imperial naming, *hito* and *ano-hito*.

(7.4.2.1)

1. S **Did** [you] **shake** (*exal.*) [his] **hand?**
2. F [I] **didn't shake** [his] **hand** (*plain*).
3. G ⌊Just [*Tenno*] **passed** (*plain*) before [you / F] =
4. F = **using** (waving) (*plain*) [a] hat like this, ((F waves his hand)) because
5. *ano-hito* (that person) **did often do** (did) (*plain*) like this.
6. S Yeah (.) how **did [you] find, did [you] find** [him] (*plain*), in reality?
7. F Ya [he] **was** (*plain*) a small *hito* (person) (.) a little bit **round**
8. **shouldered** (*plain*) (0.4) **looked older** (*plain*) than [his real] age =
9. S =Yeah, hah,

As examined previously, in this extract the Emperor is depicted with a degree of informality, as represented by casual namings, *hito* and *ano-hito*. At first sight, there are three points of importance with regard to honorifications: (1) even F's action is exalted by the interviewer (i.e. line 1); (2) the Emperor's action is always depicted without honorifications (i.e. line 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8) by the participants; (3) the interviewee does not humble himself in relation to the Emperor (i.e. line 2). To put it another way, arguing the counter-norm (Merton, 1976) of the modern monarchy, the participants solely honour the interlocutors but not the Emperor. Use of honorifications could be illustrated as below.

(D-7.4.2.1) interviewer → (HUSBAND ≈R≈ emperor)

(D-7.4.2.2) husband → (husband ≈R≈ emperor)

In line 1, F's action (shaking the hand of the Emperor) is referred to in an exalted form by the young interviewer. Here the interviewer is honouring the interviewee, not the Emperor (i.e. D-7.4.2.1). To respond to this interview question, the sixty five year old man replies in the plain form in line 2. If he had replied with honorification, he might have employed the humble form (showing his humility for the Emperor), for instance, *akushu sasete-itadakimashita* (to have the honour to shake his hand). He does not, however, honour either the addressee (S) or the referent (Emperor). At the same time, according to the context, he takes preventive measures against downgrading his own credentials. Seeing the Emperor would be a great honour for some people, such as extreme right-wing activists (e.g. 7.3.1.4). The interviewee's non-honorification implies, however, that F is not such a person. Line 2 suggests that he is a modern man, who would not lose face, even he did not shake the Imperial hand. Also, it implies that he positively decided not to shake the Imperial hand. He does not portray himself as a passive subject, waiting for (and missing) the honour.

In line 3, according to its contextual sense (Thomas, 1995), the subject is the Emperor, although the wife (G) does not specify this. The wife says that the Emperor passed before her husband. She referred to the Imperial action with the base-verb, *tooru* (to pass), but could have used a more polite formulation, such as '*o-toori ni naru*'.

However, she does not do so. As seen in the previous chapter, the Emperor's passing is described with an adverb, 'just'. It is formulated as an extreme case (Pomerantz, 1986), which downgrades her husband's participation from being a qualified observer, to that of an onlooker. From the view of honorification, her non-honorific formulation, too, downgrades the importance of F's story. The Emperor and the Imperial event are suggested to be not worth honouring. Consequently, it seems to be less formal and less important. The Emperor 'just' passed before her husband in an indistinguishable manner. In line 3, not only F's participation, but also the spectacle (and formality) of the event are downgraded by G's non-honorification.

After the wife's attempt to downgrade the Imperial event, the husband (F) needs to retain the noteworthiness of his Imperial experience. In the following exchange, as seen in the previous chapter, he relates the informality of the Emperor with unconventional Imperial namings; *hito* and *ano-hito*. By emphasising the other side of the Imperial spectacle, the husband retains his credentials. Non-use of honorifications, also emphasises the point. He does not only employ unconventional namings for the Emperor (i.e. *ano-hito*) in order to stress the latter's ordinariness, but also uses neutral formulations (i.e. D-7.4.2.2) which stress equal status between 'an ordinary person underneath the Imperial role' and the speaker's self. Consequently, his plain forms represent himself as a relatively powerful (and positive) speaker, who describes 'a person who plays the Imperial role'.

Referring to the well-known Imperial waving in a plain form (line 4), he is talking of contradicting notions. The husband does not state that the Emperor distinctively waved his hand, because he does not honour the referent (i.e. D-7.4.2.2). Without using honorifications, his discourse implies that the Emperor waved his hand in the same way as other people. There are contradictory common-places in F's description. The famous wave, on the one hand, characterises the Emperor. The idea of the Imperial wave is shared amongst all participants; and evidence of this comes from the fact that there are no objections or questions about it. On the other hand, the Emperor's famous waving is indistinguishable from other wavings. Since the husband refers to the

Imperial wave in the plain form, the Emperor is represented as a famous distinctive figure, but indistinguishable from a non-SSS.

7.4.3. Informal Naming and Non-Honorification (2)

When the Emperor is referred to as *ano-hito* (line 5), the speaker does not use honorification. His unconventional naming and non-honorification together stress Imperial informality. As seen (*see section 6.5.2*), he needs to stress the noteworthiness of the event, claiming Imperial humanity as his first-hand information. What has to be noted is that whilst the Emperor is not grammatically honoured, the speaker's non-honorification does not downgrade the extraordinariness of the event. By listing the physical weaknesses of the Emperor without honorification, the speaker is claiming that the Imperial humanities are his notable findings, and therefore, his story is worth being told.

According to Nairn (1988), it is a 'mystery' that the British monarchy have an ordinary appearance.

> A dose of naughtiness, tantrums, fainting fits and familial squabbles feeds the appearance of intimacy without really threatening the faith. To be like normal mortals in this way means that it's even more wonderful that They are who They are, do what They do, and so on. (p 45)

Nairn calls this 'faith' the 'British Cult of Personality'. Billig (1992) also discusses the paradox in people's royal discourses. Demystification of the royals results in mystification, because of people's desires: 'First, the ordinariness of royals, rather than their extraordinariness, is a popular object of desire. Second, this desire is framed by assumptions of the extraordinariness of this ordinariness' (p 72). As the third theme, Billig claims that the majesty is accepted as display, an image, which is more real, rather than less real, for being such. A 'glimpse of the back stage' is, therefore, a privilege, which heightens the excitement. According to Billig, a woman who noticed the Queen Mother's face was covered with make-up 'like a theatre mask' commented

'Fancy having to wear that every day' (ibid., p 74). There is not a system of honorification in English like Japanese. The woman's utterance, however, does not show status difference between the speaker, addressee and referent. Thus, one may draw the diagram as D-7.4.3.1 from the point of her language usage. The Queen Mother is still a distinctive figure, but not grammatically honoured.

(D-7.4.3.1) woman → addressee / woman ≈R≈ queen mother

Even though the utterances are made in different languages, diagrams can be drawn similarly, between D-7.4.2.2 and D-7.4.3.1. Both of them suggest the 'cult of personality', which lets people believe in personalities under celebrated exteriors. What is more, neither discourse suggests solely respect or disrespect for the monarchs.

Line 6 shows that the interviewer believes in the 'cult of personality' as being common-place (Billig, 1988, 1992). Line 6 is difficult to translate into English, since neither the subject nor the object are clear. Although I translate it as 'Yeah (.) how **did [you] find, did [you] find** [him] (*plain*), in reality?', it can also be translated more simply 'Yeah (.) what**'s** (*plain*) reality, reality?'. The interviewer utters this sentence in a plain form. Consequently, it is likely that the interviewer accepts F's rhetorical formulations, which stress Imperial informality and formality. F has named the Emperor as *Tenno Heika* (line 7 of 7.4.1.1). According to this interaction, the interviewer accepts F's view on the Emperor. If the Emperor is not an important figure at all, it is unnecessary for him to ask about the 'real' personality of the Emperor. The Imperial informal personality is one of the 'common-places' for their fascination.

I shall analyse the original Japanese of lines 7 and 8 of 7.4.2.1, which show slightly complicated non-honorifications. F specifies what he found out about the Emperor. The speaker describes the physical weakness of the Emperor as his new findings.

maa, chiisana ***hito*** de-ne, chotto nekoze
yeah, small COPULA(*plain*)-*ne*, a little round shouldered
de-ne, wari-to toshi yori-wa fuke-te
COPULA(*plain*)-*ne*, comparing with (his) age than old-looking
ita-ne
being(*plain*)-*ne*

In lines 7 and 8, there are some instances of sentence-final *-ne*. According to Cook (1992), this sentence-final particle indexes affective common ground and indirectly indexes various conversational functions, which require the addressee's cooperation. As discussed in 7.2.3.5, 7.2.3.6 and 7.2.3.7, Japanese copulas have different forms to express different degree of politeness. The copula found in this utterance is *-da* (*-de* is an inflection of *-da*), the plain variant of *-desu* (For more details about different uses of copulas, *see section 7.2.3*). Also, *-iru* (*-ita* is a conjugation) meaning 'to exist' or 'to be located' (Lampkin, 1997), operates in a similar way to copulas. To describe the Emperor with non-honorifications, one may find that the speaker reports the Imperial status as being as casual as an ordinary person. To be more precise, the speaker stresses the common-place (Billig, 1988, 1992: according to Cook's term, 'common ground') of the Imperial humanity (e.g. short height, round shoulder and old looking). What is more, the sentence-final particles require the hearer's agreement for his account. Therefore, by adding the sentence-finals, F subtly invites the addressee to agree with his account. Then, in line 9, the interviewer shows his agreement (i.e. '=Yeah, hah'). Both of the participants confirm one of the common-places, Imperial humanity. Analysing the use of honorifications in the interaction of the couple (i.e. F and G), in the next section, we could see a further dilemma in the use of honorifications.

7.4.4. To Be Honoured or Not To Be?

Extract 7.4.4.1 is, again, re-quoted from the previous chapter (see 6.5.5.1 and Appendix 3-1). Where examination of the wife's (G) discourse revealed the gender difference in referring to the Emperor. One may recall that she uses the *ojisama* reference rather than its casual variant *ojisan* (line 12). Consequently, her speech

sounds soft and feminine (*see section 6.5.5*). When she talks of 'counter-norm' of the Emperor and implies a fictive relationship between the Emperor and her husband, she uses a fairly polite fictive kinterm (Suzuki, 1973; Smith, 1992).

(7.4.4.1)

10. F **Suppose to be distressed himself** (*plain*). [He] **looked** somewhat
11. **helpless**(*plain*)...
12. G ⌊**Helpless** (*plain*) *ojisama*? ((laugh)) *Ojisama*?
13. F [It is an] Impression, impression, **isn't it** (*plain*) **?** Essentially *ano-hito*
14. **is round shouldered** (*plain*)...
15. G Poor looking **o-*kata*** (*beautified*), poor looking **o-*kata*** (*beautified*).
16. ((laugh)) [I] **didn't know** (*plain*) [his] face **was** (*plain*) noble or not, but
17. [his] height, mmm, if there **is** (*exal.*) [an] old person (**o-*toshiyori***;
18. *beautified*) like [him]=
19. F =**It's** (*plain*) no relation between facial impression [and nobleness]

In line 10 and 11, the husband talks of 'Imperial helplessness'. Then in line 12, the wife downgrades the nature of the protagonist, referring to him as a fictive uncle (*see section 6.5.5*) without honorification.

What has to be noted is that when the wife downgrades the nature of the Emperor to the level of a fictive uncle, she does so in feminine polite speech. At the same time, paradoxically, she also exalts 'the person underneath the Imperial role' adding the *-sama* suffix. In line 13, F names the Emperor as *ano-hito*. Also, he uses plain copulas twice. To respond to his wife's *ojisama* reference, he stresses that it *is F's* impression (line 13). Next, he claims that *the Emperor* (referred as *ano-hito*) *is* round-shouldered (line 14). So, the first plain copula is used for the speaker's self and the second one for the Emperor (or *ano-hito*). It is syntactically accountable that when the speaker's own impressions and the physical appearance of *ano-hito* are depicted honorific grammar is not used.

From lines 15 to 18, the wife exalts object references, *o-kata* (line 15) and *o-toshiyori* (line 17) using an honorific prefix. (*see section 6.4.4.* about *kata* reference. *Toshiyori*

means 'elderly' as a gender neutral term.) There are complex discursive relationships between the speaker, the hearer and the referent (i.e. Emperor) in this utterance. She does not only exalt the referent, but she does something more, which close examination reveals.

First of all, she refers to the Emperor as *kata*, not as its casual variant *hito*, which her husband uses. Moreover she uses *kata* with the added '*o-*' (line 15). In so doing, she broadens the status difference between the referent and herself. In other words, she exalts *hito* (man) two steps at once. Therefore, her utterance sounds more soft and feminine than her husband's (Smith, 1992). Even though her Imperial naming is still informal and inclusive, the Emperor is given higher status by her *o-kata* reference. In the same way, *o-toshiyori* suggests higher position. In line 2 of 7.4.2.1, the wife downgrades her husband's participation in, and the nature of, the event. A few second later, the same speaker names the same Emperor inclusively but honourably (and formally) with *o-kata* and *o-toshiyori*.

She uses an exalting verbal honorification in line 17. This utterance could give rise to a further dilemma. She uses an exalted verbal variant of 'to be', *irassharu*. In this utterance, she does not honour the Emperor, but an elderly person of the age of the Emperor (*aa-iu o-toshiyori*). Several sociolinguists and cultural anthropologists point out that the respect for elderly people is a crucial matter in Japanese life (e.g. Hendry, 1993, 1995). It is conventional that she exalts elderly people in general. Even the nobleness of the Imperial face is referred to without honorification (line 16; 'face' without beautification), although she uses honorification to refer to an old person (line 17; 'elderly' with beautification). In this regard, the wife exalts the personality of the Emperor as a respectable elderly.

As seen, the husband does not humble himself to describe the Imperial personality (i.e. D-7.4.2.2). When talking of the Emperor (or *o-kata*), the wife, on the other hand, talks of an honoured elderly (*o-toshiyori*). Thus, there are two discursive functions in her use of honorification: (1) feminine speech and (2) honouring the elderly. Her politeness for *o-toshiyori*, can be illustrated in D-7.4.4.1.

(D-7.4.4.1) wife → (wife ≈R≈ *O-TOSHIYORI*)

With regard to (1), feminine speech, the husband does not need to accommodate to her speech style. However, in considering (2), honouring the elderly, the husband may face a dilemma, since an elderly person must be an SSS in Japanese culture. To put it another way, it is not obligatory for the husband to honour *ano-hito* (that man) but he has to honour *o-toshiyori* (elderly). The Emperor, in this regard, must be paid respect, since he is sufficiently old. While the speaker (F) has described Imperial weakness without honorification, he may have to honour when describing the physical weakness of an elderly person (*o-toshiyori*).

(D-7.4.4.2) husband → (husband ≈R≈ *O-TOSHIYORI*)

D-7.4.4.2 is a conceptual diagram, which does not occur in the interview. The point is that it is crucial for a Japanese speaker to change the referential term from *ano-hito* ('that man') to *o-toshiyori* ('respectable elderly'). When the wife refers to the Emperor as *o-kata* or *o-toshiyori*, she is referring to 'the person underneath the Imperial role' in a politer form. In this regard, the husband's usage of the *ano-hito* is not so different from that of the wife's feminine namings. If the husband accepts the Emperor is an elderly person, however, he must honour 'the *elderly person* underneath the Imperial role' as in the conceptual diagram D-7.4.4.2. In this regard, the wife's *o-toshiyori* reference creates a dilemma for the husband, who did not honour the 'person underneath the Imperial role' (cf. D-7.4.2.2).

Whilst she speaks femininely (therefore, representing herself as powerless), she risks downgrading her husband's status in relation to the referent, *o-toshiyori*. As D-7.4.4.2 suggests, the husband can be conceptualised in a humbler position as a result of her feminine speech, therefore his status can be illustrated as in D-7.4.4.3a below in relation to *o-toshiyori*. Her humble formulation (e.g. D-7.4.4.1) is done through feminine speech. She places herself in a humbler position in relation to her husband and *o-toshiyori*. However, one could also interpret that presenting herself in a humble

position is her linguistic technique to represent herself as being feminine, rather than conveying politeness. In this way, she does not specify the relationship between herself and the addressee (i.e. F) but, as discussed above, *o-toshiyori* is formulated as an SSS. She also implies that *o-toshiyori* is socially superior to the addressee (cf. D-7.4.4.2). In so doing, as discussed in D-7.2.5.6c, there is an implication that the speaker (i.e. G) has a higher status than the addressee (i.e. her husband). She is implying that her addressee is in a relatively humbler position (D-7.4.4.3b).

(D-7.4.4.3a) husband ≈R≈ *O-TOSHIYORI*

(D-7.4.4.3b) wife ≈R≈ husband

In line 19, in return, the husband describes the Emperor as neither 'fictive uncle' (*ojisama* or *ojisan*) nor 'honoured elderly' (*o-toshiyori*). He uses plain verb forms. He refuses to specify who the 'the person underneath the Imperial role' is (e.g. *ano-hito* or *o-toshiyori*), but generalises the discussion without honorification. His grammatical ambiguity (i.e. 'It's (*plain*) no relation between facial impression [and nobleness]'), which makes the subject referent unclear, avoids the argument of the controversial topic, 'who is underneath the Imperial role'. One could interpret that, F, who has claimed Imperial humanities, reserves the right to claim Imperial superiority. The husband keeps the topics sufficiently broad and non-specific, as to be able to construct another contradictory theme about the modern monarchy.

Linguists conceptualise the Japanese honorification as reflections of social structures, such as 'age', 'sex', 'status', 'in-/out-groupness' and so forth (e.g. Harada, 1976; Morean, 1988; Maynard, 1997b). Close examination of discourse of the conventional royalist reveals that more complicated rhetorical business is done by honorifications. What we have found in this section is, when the wife employs a feminine (or at least polite) speech style, she encodes a relative status difference between speaker and addressee/referent (wife-husband/Emperor), which could affect the relative status of the addressee-referent (husband-Emperor). The encoded status is not a simple copy of the speaker-referent social relations. People in discussions continuously negotiate the

status of the speaker, hearer and referent by use of honorifications. One will, in the next section, see that the use of honorification may cause a different kind of dilemma.

7.5.0. Dilemma; Who Should Be Honoured?

In the previous section, we have seen that when the speaker-referent relation is represented differently (e.g. feminine speech), addressee-referent as well as speaker-referent relations may not be the same as before. This may cause a dilemma for the speaker. The dilemma of the wife, however, occurs in 'in-group' relations, such as husband and wife. In this regard, the wife's dilemma is not as serious as what can occur with an 'out-group' addressee. In this section, we will consider relation management by honorification again. How does a speaker represent speaker-referent relations, through negotiating the addressee's status? We have learnt that when the speaker honours the referent, there is a risk of dishonouring the addressees. It is worth analysing the extreme right-wing interview, the people who are most likely to honour the Emperor, and thus there is likely to be a dilemma in formulating two distinctive figures: the 'out-group' addressee and the 'divine' Emperor. Prior to analysing the right-winger's own discourse, I think the interviewer's 'initial convergence' (Berger, 1979) toward the right-wingers should be re-examined. This is the same extract which we analysed in the light of naming practice (i.e. 6.4.4.1).

(7.5.0,1)

1. S Well, very frankly speaking, mmm, have you all had chance to : really
2. **see** (*hum.*) [either/both] *Tenno Heika*, [or/and] *Kozoku no kata*
3. (Imperial members) : or **had a look** [of them] (*plain*) in town...
4. J In my case, [I'd] **done** (seen them) (*plain*), a lot...
5. S A lot...

This is the very first portion of the interview. The interviewer (S) begins questioning the party leader (J) and other party members ('you all') about their experiences of seeing Imperials. In the previous chapter, we see the interviewer's initial convergence of his naming (e.g. *Tenno Heika* and *Kozoku no kata*; *see section 6.4.2, 6.4.3 and 6.4.4*). With regard to honorifications, too, the interviewer accommodates to an ultra

conservative speech style. In line 2, S uses 'to see the Emperor' in a humble variant; *o-me-ni-kakaru*, which can be parsed into honorific prefix '*o-*', a noun which means 'eye' (*me*) and a verb which means 'to bath' (*kakaru*). It translates literally as 'to have honour under (bathing) an honorary sight', consequently it becomes a humble variant honorific of 'to see'. In addition another form of 'to have a look', *mikakeru*, is found (line 3), which implies a lack of intention, but somebody by chance. It can be formulated in exalting '*o...suru*' form (*o-mikake suru*; *see section 7.2.3*), but S does not employ honorifications in line 3.

In line 2 of 7.5.0.1, the interviewer (S) fails to honour the out-group senior addressee (J). As discussed, illustrating addressee's humility in relation to the referent could result in dishonouring the addressee. While there is no utterance about status difference between the speaker and referent, it is implied that the addressee is dishonoured. Consequently, there is an implication that the addressee is humbled in relation to the speaker, whereas the addressee is an SSS (out-group senior addressee). D-7.5.0.1a and D-7.5.0.1b are power relations signified in line 2. They show that the speaker violates a rule which requires the acknowledgement of an appropriate speaker-addressee relationship.

(D-7.5.0.1a) interviewer → (leader ≈R≈ EMPEROR)

(D-7.5.0.1b) interviewer ≈R≈ leader

This deviant formulation could be the interviewer's over-accommodation (Giles and Smith, 1979) to the ultra conservatives' speech style, who are most likely humbling themselves while referring to the Emperor (e.g. 7.3.1.1, 7.3.1.2 and 7.3.1.3). Honouring the addressee's value, for example in beliefs or political ideology, could be an important aspect of 'referent honorifics' (Brown and Levinson, 1978). However, it can not be accomplished by simple accommodation to the hearer's speech style. In 7.5.0.1, the interviewer violates the rules of addressee honorifics. On the other hand, shortly afterwards, the interviewer uses another variation of 'to see' (or 'to have look') without honorification (line 3). These two different variations of 'to see' implicate the speaker's dilemma: when using honorifications there is a risk of appearing to look

down on either the addressee or Emperor/Imperials. Without honorification, the speaker fails to honour the respectful Emperor, such as D-7.5.0.2.

(D-7.5.0.2) interviewer → (leader ≈R≈ emperor)

In this regard, the interviewer fails to use appropriate honorification in the given context. It may be useful to re-examine a successful example of speech accommodation. According to Azuma (1997), *Hirohito* over-accommodated his speech to local Japanese people at the post-war Imperial Visits.

> It is interesting to note that the Emperor did not always use the plain verb forms; instead, he often used polite form as well. He could have used the plain blunt form to the addressee all the time, because after all he was the Emperor and all others are below him. (p 196)

Azuma claims that the Emperor downgraded his speech style to that of addressees (e.g. D-7.2.5.1 and D-7.2.5.4a). 'The Emperor, who was a god just a few months previously, was speaking to Japanese people in a very polite form' (p 197). His downgrade convergence worked successfully, since his speech attracted Japanese addressees based upon the similarity-attraction process (Giles and Smith, 1979). By his speech, which is depicted in D-7.5.0.3, Hirohito successfully gained national support for his reign. (cf. D-7.2.5.4a)

(D-7.5.0.3) emperor → LOCAL JAPANESE

In contrast to D-7.5.0.3, in 7.5.0.1 and D-7.5.0.1a, the speaker (S) represents that he is superior to the addressee (J), even the leader is an 'out-group', senior addressee. Thus the relationship must be illustrated as in D-7.5.0.4 below, which may signify both the addressee and referent as SSSs. Also this diagram shows that the referent is socially superior to the addressee.

(D-7.5.0.4) interviewer → (leader ≈R≈ EMPEROR)

Exalting the addressee's humility, such as D-7.5.0.4, could cause some difficulty. However, it is not impossible. For instance, if the speaker used the supplemental verb, *-rareru* (*see section 7.2.3*), to honour the addressee, D-7.5.0.4 could be successfully accomplished: by formulating *o-me-ni-kaka-rareru*, rather than the interviewer's own *o-me-ni-kakaru*. However, 'conversation, like other forms of human behaviour, is not perfect' (Nofsinger, 1991, p 124). In Japanese everyday conversation, misconduct of the honorification, such as D-7.5.0.1, may frequently occur. (I personally suppose that the interviewer would have used the framework of D-7.5.0.4 in written form, or if he had had enough time to consider his utterance beforehand.) In the next section, I would examine a right-winger's response to the interviewer's 'misconduct' of honorification.

7.5.1. Dilemma; The Right-Winger (1)

In line 4 of 7.5.0.1, the party leader's original Japanese is as below. He does not clearly indicate the object, but according to the context, the implied object is 'the chance (or occasion) to see the Emperor/Imperials'.

boku	nanka	ari	*-masu-ne*,	ippai.
I	in case	to be	*-masu -ne*,	a lot

It is an inversion sentence. In the text book format, an adjective *ippai* (a lot) should be inserted between the subject reference (*boku-nanka*) and verb part (*ari-masu-ne*). This sentence is marked as being plain, although the verb-ending '*-masu*' is found. There are a couple of reasons for this. As discussed, the male first person pronoun, *boku*, (*see section 6.2.1*) must be used in informal occasions. Furthermore, *nanka* is a casual word, meaning 'in case of', 'in regard of', 'in terms of' and so on.

In order to analyse this utterance, we may need further attention to the pragmatic use of the *-masu* form. Cook (1997) analyses several Japanese conversations, between caregivers and young children, paying particular attention to their use of *-masu* forms.

She notes: 'Utterances framed for public presentation by means of the *masu* form can be interpreted as a display of a polite attitude in certain social contexts such as talking to a professor or customer' (pp 712-713). However, Cook points out that *-masu* is frequently found in the utterance of caregivers addressing young children. In so doing, Cook claims that *-masu* is not only a speech-level marker, but also 'a form as the mode of self for public presentation' (p 712). In other words, a Japanese speaker can demonstrate his/her socialisation by proper use of the *-masu* form. Cook suggests that by using *-masu* forms frequently, the caregivers help children's socialisation process.

As seen previously, Cook (1992) discusses how the sentence-final particle *-ne* indexes affective common ground and indirectly indexes various conversational functions, which require the addressee's co-operation (*see section 7.4.3*). Maynard (1997b), too, examines frequent use of Japanese particles, and proposes:

> *Ne* is chosen when the speaker assumes that he or she has less (or about the same amount of) access to and/or possession of the information and wishes to concentrate on feelings and attitude more than on information. (p 88)

According to Maynard's analysis, some sentence-final particles such as *-ne* (and another popular one, *-yo*) are equivalents of the English filling phrase, 'you know'. Considering Cook's view of *-mass* and Maynard's '*-ne* as *you know* equivalent' views, even though *-masu* is found in line 4, it does not function as politeness. The object of the sentence is ambiguous. What has to be noted is that his *-masu* form does not honour anyone. In this regard, D-7.5.1.1 illustrates the status encoded by the right-winger.

(D-7.5.1.1) leader → imperials / imperial experiences

Although the interviewer honours the Emperor (i.e. D-7.5.0.1) the party leader does not accommodate him. The royalist does not humble himself to the Emperor/Imperials, but rather denies his own powerless position as represented by the interviewer (i.e. D-7.5.0.1a and D-7.5.0.1b). His non-accommodation to the interviewer may be due to

interviewer's 'misconduct' of honorification. After being depicted as a 'powerless' subject of the Emperor by the interviewer, it is also implied that he is powerless in relation to the interviewer. The party leader, then, regains his status in line 4 (i.e. D-7.5.1.1). He is not a passive subject waiting for the Imperial occasions, but rather positively (and having sufficiently high status), he is able to have chances to see the Emperor. The formulation he used, after 7.5.0.1, will be investigated in order to shed light on this non-honorification: a rather deviant formulation by the ultra conservative in response to the 'misconduct' of the honorification.

7.5.2. Dilemma; The Right-Winger (2)

In 7.5.2.1, the leader is talking about occasions when he has seen the Emperor, a few seconds after 7.5.0.1. He says that there were several chances to see the Imperials, for instance, at general greetings at the Palace. In order to see the delicate nuances, some verbs are retained in Japanese.

(7.5.2.1)

J = at the Palace, where, general greeting scheme, mmm, ***ikarete*** (go: ①), maa, [I / you / we] could ***haiken*** (see: ②) ***o-kao*** (face: ③), well, possibly...

He uses the verb 'to go' with the *-reru* supplemental verb (*ikare-*: marked as ①) in 7.5.2.1 (*see section 7.2.3*). In this context, it is not an unambiguous honorification, since the subject is not fully clear. The subject could be the speaker or people in general, and in this case, this *-reru* suggests possibility. On the other hand, the speaker's general orientation allows the implication of honorification of the addressee. In this way, this *-reru* can be heard as an exalted honorification. If an honorification is not imputed, 7.5.2.1 can be understood as 'well, [we] can go (*plain*) to the Palace at the general greeting, and it is possible to see (*hum.*) the faces (*beautified*)' (i.e. D-7.5.2.1a). With an honorification, the utterance would be understood to mean 'well, [if you] go (*exal.*) to the Palace at the general greeting, [you are] enabled to see (*hum.*) the faces (*beautified*)' (i.e. D-7.5.2.1b).

(D-7.5.2.1a) leader → (leader/people ≈R≈ IMPERIALS)

(D-7.5.2.1b) leader → (interviewer ≈R≈ IMPERIALS)

Having observed *ikareru* (*iku-* + *-reru*) formulation, and noted its possible honorification of the addressee (i.e. D-7.5.2.1b), we will now consider *haiken* (to see: marked as ②), which is unambiguously a humble politeness. As discussed, different verb variants are used to form honorifications. In the case of 'to see' (*miru*), the exalted variant is *goranninaru* and *haikensuru* is the humble one. The one who is described as seeing in 7.5.2.1, is formulated in a position of humility. When the speaker is describing himself as seeing the Emperor, he is humbling himself (i.e. D-7.2.5.5a and D-7.2.5.5b). However, the important point to be noted here is that he is humbling himself in relation to Imperials, not in relation to the addressee (S). He is describing himself as performing the humbled action of seeing Imperials. It is necessary to distinguish whether or not in the context the humbling (and exalting) is being formulated in relation to the referents, namely the Imperials.

In 7.5.2.1, the humble verb form is used in relation to the Imperial face, which is beautified by the honorific prefix '*o-*' (marked as ③). The speaker does not specify whose face, but according to the context, it should be attributed as the Imperial faces. In this way, the ultra conservative speaker exalts the Imperials as well as lowering the relative status of whoever sees the Imperials. Since the subject of the seeing is unspecified and could include others, such as the addressee (e.g. 'I/you/we'), the addressee is, by implication, included in a general formulation of humbleness relative to the honoured Imperials. In this way, the context of the utterance permits the speaker and addressee to be humbled, because the speaker exalts the Imperial referent. The point is that prior to expressing the humility of the speaker and addressee, the speaker can by implication exalt the addressee. Thus, 7.5.2.1 is a successful example of exalting the addressee's humility (i.e. D-7.5.2.1b).

In 7.5.2.2, the same party leader describes his recent experience 'of seeing the Imperials' other than general greetings. This utterance is made a few seconds after

7.5.2.1. Apart from the general possibility of seeing the Imperials, he recently saw Prince Takamado (Takamado-*no-miya*) at a football match.

(7.5.2,2)

1. J = in my case, eeh, to ***au*** (see) Takamado-*no-miya Denka*, well ***au***
2. (see), maa:: ***o-ai*** (see) ***o-ai*** (see), well what can be said, ***haiken***
3. (see) =
4. S = hah hah

The party leader repeats different forms of 'to see'. The first is the plain one, *au*, the second one is a neutral polite formulation, *o-ai*(*-suru*), and finally, there is *haiken-*, a humble variant of 'to see'. The party leader's series of self-repairs (Nofsinger, 1991; Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks, 1977) suggests that 'to see the Emperor' in the plain and the neutral polite forms could be 'trouble sources' (Nofsinger, 1991) for the Imperialist. Also, his inserted phrase 'well what can be said' shows that he was searching for the word to fit in the context. These repairs were at the speaker's own initiation, and finally, he describes his own action in a humble form (*haiken*). In other words, the forms of politeness represented in line 4 of 7.5.0.1 (i.e. D-7.5.1.1) are no longer accepted as the Imperialist speaker's own formulation. What is important is that the Imperialist (J) does not accommodate to the interviewer's formulation immediately after the 'misconduct' honorification (7.5.0.1), but he humbles himself through his own formulation.

In the previous chapter about Imperial namings, we examined that people continuously negotiate the naming of the Emperor in their talk. With regard to honorifications, again, we are also able to see that people in discussion constantly negotiate the status of the Emperor in given contexts. When a conventional royalist talks of his Imperial experience, for example, the different statuses of the Emperor represented by the honorification and non-honorification suggest contradictory common-places of the monarchy. By either honouring or dishonouring the Emperor, a speaker sometimes faces a dilemma, because in negotiating the Imperial status, a speaker is simultaneously negotiating his/her addressee's status. A speaker may humble his/her addressee to the

Emperor but it may result in the addressee being humble to the speaker, thus smooth communication between the speaker and addressee can be obstructed.

Unlike attitude theorists, discursive psychologists see that there are no consistent attitudinal entities, but people constantly negotiate their own 'views' and 'identities' in argument, in which explanations are required. (Chapter 4). With regard to Japanese Imperial discourses, a conventional Imperialist does not always use the language of conventional royalism, neither does an ultra conservative person. The degrees of linguistic politeness to the Emperor are variable according to the speaker's credentials (e.g. 7.4.2.1) or speaker's own positioning to the interlocutor (e.g. 7.5.0.1). Japanese honorifications are 'relation-acknowledging linguistic devices' (Matsumoto, 1988), which are rhetorically used in the discursive contexts.

7.6.0. Conclusion

In this chapter, we have examined: (1) some aspects of Japanese honorifications; (2) the implications of exaltation and humility by honorifications; and (3) the conventional use of the honorifications about the Emperor by extreme right-wing people and liberals. Right-wingers linguistically place Imperial status higher than themselves, but liberal people formulate the Emperor as being the same as ordinary people in their discourse. Then; (4) I examined the conventional royalist's discourse, which represents Imperial humanity. In this section, we saw how the speakers negotiate the Emperor's status in their talk. In addition; (5) in this negotiation, a speaker risks humbling the addressee, which is a serious violation of the rule of honorifications. Finally; (6) investigation of the Imperialist discourse shows the dilemma of the status difference between the speaker, addressee and referent. By use of honorifications, speaker and referent negotiate their own status in relation to the referent, namely the Emperor. Continuous negotiation of the status of the participants, such as (4), (5) and (6), are found as rhetorical devices in arguments.

According to Brown and Levinson (1978), linguistic politeness (especially negative politeness) is used to reduce the risk of threatening the 'face' of the addressee.

However, Japanese linguistic politeness works to confirm the social relationship of the speaker, addressee and referent. The difference between Western and Japanese politeness originates from the structure of the society. Many anthropological studies have revealed the importance of inter-personal relationships in communities (Benedict, 1946/1967; Nakane, 1970; Hendry, 1993, 1995; Hamaguchi, 1998). Based on these findings, some pragmatists looking at the use of Japanese, such as Matsumoto (1989), understand that Japanese language is more concerned with inter-personal relations than personal independence. According to Western cultural values, in which personal individuality is the paramount concern, people insist on protecting individual territories. The notion of 'keeping territory' is closely related to Brown and Levinson's concept of 'face'. In Japanese society, in contrast, individual territory is not as important as in Western society. The prime concern for Japanese people is their individual proper 'place/status' in their communities. Thus, in order to confirm their 'place' in inter-personal relationships, the Japanese language has developed its own linguistic system. In this sense, it is said that Japanese honorifications are 'relation-acknowledging devices' (Matsumoto, 1988, 1989).

Using honorifications, Japanese speakers can encode the status difference between the speaker-referent, speaker-addressee and addressee-referent. Therefore, the encoded status differences may reflect the speaker's view of ideal social relations. As seen in sections 7.3.0-7.3.3, the right-wingers tend to honour the Emperor, and show their own humbleness in relation to the Imperial matters. In other words, their honorifications seem to reflect their traditional Imperialist 'attitude'. On the other hand, liberal people do not do so. They neither honour the Emperor nor humble themselves by using honorifications, when they are talking of the Emperor. In this respect, both royalists and non-royalists discursively demonstrate their own positions towards the Emperor.

As Potter and Wetherell (1987) state, however, people's speech style is not determined by their 'attitudinal entities'. Potter and Wetherell see that discursive actions are not planned in advance, but speakers can (and have to) solve discursive problems within particular contexts. We have re-examined the traditional attitude theory which

conceptualises attitudinal entities from two theoretical points of view; the theory of speech accommodation (e.g. Giles and Smith, 1979) and discursive psychology (e.g. Edwards and Potter, 1992). Speech accommodations are frequently found in discourses. In the previous chapter, we examined speech accommodations with regard to the interviewer's namings, from this chapter, we have seen that there are also accommodations with honorification. In different contexts, the same speaker (i.e. interviewer) may encode different speaker-referent power relations by use of honorifications (e.g. D-7.4.2.1, D-7.5.0.1a, D-7.5.0,1b and D-7.5.0.2). Through the findings above, we can conclude that it is not attitudinal entities which determine people's use of honorification.

Uses of honorification suggest the ambiguous nature of Japanese monarchical ideology. Exatrct 7.4.1.1 illustrates the conventional speaker's dilemma over the monarchy, through his informal grammar (non-honorification) and formal naming (*Tenno Heika* reference). There is no simple dichotomy of formality and informality, and speakers may use honorification, in order to establish their accountabilities. In the same way, the theory of speech accommodation would not be sufficient to explain all the complex usage of honorifications. The wife's feminine speech (e.g. 7.4.2.1), for example, does not require the husband's accommodation. Much more importantly, speakers might be required to manage their use of honorifications to adjust the relative status of addressee and referent. In that process, speakers frequently locate and relocate the status of the addressee and referent simultaneously. In so doing, placements of the addressee and/or the referent in a linguistic hierarchy would not be simple reflections of the social structure or accommodations, but rather, flexibly negotiated within the conversations.

It may be supposed that right-wing discourse should show a more established speaker-referent relationship. However, the right-wing-Emperor relation is also flexible, and must take into account 'speaker-addressee' relationships (e.g. 7.5.0.1 and D-7.5.1.1). We have seen that, a right-wing speaker may also subtly manipulate the Emperor's position within the same discourse. Along with different namings, use of honorifications, which encode status difference beside the content of the information,

are used as effective rhetorical tools. They make Japanese discourse acceptable by locating and relocating participants' relative positions. Even in extreme royalist discourse, we see the local business of negotiation of the speaker's own position: 'who (or where) am I (the speaker)'. We see that Japanese speakers continuously formulate their own views and negotiate their positions by 'relation acknowledging devices' based upon a variety of common-places.

We have examined how the Japanese Emperor is discursively constructed in natural conversations from a constructionist and discursive psychological point of view. Here it must be emphasised that we have analysed the Japanese conversation paying more attention to these grammatical structures than is common in discursive analysis (of English discourse), which was outlined in Chapter 4. The series of analyses above shows the usefulness of combining discursive and grammatical analyses with regard to some grammatically complicated languages, such as Japanese.

Chapter 8

Language of the Emperor's Death

- Making News, Tradition and the Emperor -

8.1.0. Introduction

In this chapter, I shall attempt to examine the media discourse of the Emperor's death, in particular looking at newspaper articles immediately after Hirohito's death. In the previous chapters, we have seen that Japanese is suited for the expression of social hierarchy, through the use of, for example, namings and honorifics. For instance, with regard to namings, there are rules according to the positions of the speaker, listener and third party, and a Japanese speaker/writer selects appropriate namings from a variety of terms, such as different suffixes (e.g. *-san* or *-sama*), different titles, professional naming or fictive kinship terms (e.g. Ishikawa *et al.*, 1981; *see section 6.2.1*). What is more, the Japanese grammar of honorifics often works to highlight the social differences, such as through the grammar of exaltation and humility. In the analysis of Japanese conversations, we have seen that speech levels are not solely determined by the social hierarchy. Speakers flexibly construct their discourse to fit into contexts, and formulate their own accountability.

Here, we shall analyse written texts in rather formal settings, news articles about the Emperor's death, and point out their rhetorical organisation. In one of the previous chapters we looked at exclusive naming practice and showed that speakers shifted between exclusive and non-exclusive names: this shift is determined by ideological dilemmas (Billig *et al.*, 1988), and from this we would expect similar switchings with other aspects of exclusive language usage. Therefore, I shall pay particular attention to

exclusive honorific death descriptions for the Emperor in the pro-monarchist mainstream national newspapers and the communist press.

Field (1991), an American academic, who has an American father and Japanese mother, discusses journalistic attitudes in the reporting of Hirohito's illness and death.

> Journalists, in reporting on the emperor's demise, were still under the spell of the 'chrysanthemum taboo,' so-called after the imperial crest, that crystallized in the 1960's through several episodes of right-wing attack on writers and publishers deemed guilty of transgressing imperial honour. Journalistic language used throughout Hirohito's illness and death revealed the continuing force to the taboo. (pp 22-23)

According to Field's perspective, newspapers employ honorific languages, because of the journalists' self-defence. From a discursive point of view, however, we might be able to find out that honouring the Emperor is not only motivated by the 'chrysanthemum taboo' or fear of extreme right-wing violence. Such language use may be based on some 'common-places' of the modern monarchism. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the ways that exclusive and inclusive terms are used by journalists to describe the Emperor's death.

(1) Death terms which can be found in the news articles are categorised, and (2) 'framings' (Tuchman, 1978) of the news event from the front pages are analysed. At that time, some statistical data is presented. (3) Contexts of exclusive honorifics are examined looking at the first page of newspapers. (4) There is a column which explains the definition and history of the terminology, which gives us a rich resource of common-places behind the term. In so doing, (5) we are able to find out rhetorical formulations in which an honorific terminology is used. Then, (6) we shall consider the same points in the inner pages of newspapers reporting the Emperor's death. At the same time, (7) the communist paper is used to provide a comparison. Comparisons between front and inner pages as well as mainstream dailies and the left-wing press show discursive techniques comprised of 'common-places' of the terminology as well

as the modern monarchism. (8) Analysis of my interview data reveals to what extent the exclusive terminology is used in conversational interaction.

8.1.1. Materials

News articles in three mainstream newspapers, Asahi Shinbun, Mainichi Shinbun and Yomiuri Shinbun, as well as a left-wing daily, Akahata (*Red Flag*), the organ of the Japan Communist Party (JCP) are analysed, looking at the Imperial coverages immediately after Hirohito died in January, 1989.

Statistics show that daily circulation of newspapers in Japan is very high: 584 per 1,000 people (cf. 395 per 1,000 people in the UK). While there is tough competition with the television (256 TV set per 1,000 people) and the radio (788 radio set per 1,000 people) broadcasts, newspapers are still considered to be a primary information resource for Japanese people. It is said that the popularity of newspapers in Japan derives from the home delivery system (twice a day, since most Japanese papers have morning and evening editions), which characterises the Japanese press (cf. Drost, 1991; Tamura and Murase, 1994).

There are some classifications of Japanese newspapers. On the one hand, similar to the British press, there are distinctions according to the distribution area, such as local (based on prefectures), regional (based on regions, to make a distinction between the 'prefectural' local press, some papers are called regional 'bloc' press) and the national press. On the other hand, unlike the British press, there is no clear class or political distinction for target readership, such as tabloids or broad sheets. (There are, however, some specialist papers such as 'economic' and 'sports' newspapers.) Japanese non-specialist 'general' papers (home delivered twice a day) provide full coverage of the whole spectrum of current events, ranging from detailed political, economic and international news to human interest stories. Of the national 'general' papers, according to statistics by the Japan Newspaper Publisher's Association in 1989 (when Hirohito died), the Yomiuri's circulation was 9.65 million, the Asahi's was just over 8 million and the Mainichi's was 4.4 million (cited by Cortazzi, 1993). Drost (1991)

notes that these 'big three' (The Asahi, Mainichi and Yomiuri) dominate the newspaper market: 'they have circulations running into many millions, exceeding 20,000,000 between them (around 43 percent of total daily circulation)' (p 264). The Asahi Shinbun, Mainichi Shinbun and Yomiuri Shinbun can be said to be representative of the mainstream press and national opinion leaders. Japanese mainstream papers (e.g. the 'big three') have a strong emphasis on the objectivity of the reporting and the distance from party politics. They take stances, but their political stances are not as clear cut as British papers, such as *The Guardian* as a liberal paper versus *The Daily Telegraph* as a conservative one (Fujitake and Yamamoto (eds.), 1994; Arai, 1994).

8.1.2. Background of Terms and Analytical Frameworks

It is well known that Japanese people were taught that the Emperor was not only a descendent of the Sun Goddess but also he himself was a living god. This was a dominant Imperialist ideology, which was systematically taught at school from a very young age in pre-war and war-time Japan (Yamamoto and Konno, 1977/1987). The Emperor's sanctity was also legitimated by the pre-war Constitution. For instance, its third article notes, 'The Emperor is sacred and inviolable' (cf. Appendix 2-1). In the first twenty years of his reign, Hirohito ruled Japan and his subjects (nation) as a living god based on the pre-war Imperialist ideology. On the other hand, he reigned as a 'human monarch' and a 'symbol of the national unity' for the remaining forty plus years. In consequence, he was the first Emperor to die under the post-war Constitution. Hirohito's death was the first death of an Emperor in sixty four years. It was a novel experience for most of the nation in 1989.

Tuchman (1978) claims that 'because news imports a public character to occurrences, news is first and foremost a social institution' (p 4). Billig (1995) also remarks that journalists suggest their discourse is based on a national 'we', claiming their stand in the eye of the 'country' (or home nation). Newspapers tend to legitimise their perspectives as representing the national audience's general one. It would be worth examining, therefore, the media discourse at the time Hirohito died: a novel event both for the 'human monarchy' and democratic Japan.

As Field (1991) notes, the manner of reporting the Emperor's death can be seen as an institutional power, which implies 'the Japanese economic miracle was subtly but ineluctably linked to a culture that reveres emperors and provides them with ancient, august burial' (p 26). Field points out that the Japanese media have different reasons for honouring the Emperor. One of them is the self-defence of the journalists. The other one is positive participation in producing a modern Imperialist ideology.

In this regard, the concept of 'invention (or re-invention) of traditions' (Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds.), 1983) is useful for understanding pro-monarchy media discourse. Hobsbawm notes that 'objects or practices are liberated for full symbolic and ritual use when no longer fettered by practical use' (Hobsbawm, 1983; p 4). Examination of the use of old funeral discourses in the post-war era could reveal if extinct traditions are being re-invented in a contemporary context. What is presented in this chapter is, therefore, a rhetorical formulation of this 're-inventing' (as well as 'standardizing' according to Fairclough, 1989) process in the 'big three', in comparison with the Akahata, the left-wing paper.

One more point has to be noted. It is often said that news coverages and editorials immediately after Hirohito died were prepared texts for the foreseeable event. As evidence of this, Mainichi Shinbun relieved the editor in chief and an editor of the Mainichi Daily News, the English edition of the Mainichi, in September, 1988. On 26th September, when Hirohito became seriously ill, there was an editorial to mourn *Tenno*'s death in the Mainichi Daily News (Jurist, 1989; p 217). This suggests that editorials (and presumably parts of the articles, such as the chronicle of Hirohito's life) were prepared before the event (cf. Tuchman, 1978). However, distinctions between prepared and unprepared texts are not important for this chapter. As stated, analysis in this chapter is not about the process of news production, but rhetorical formulation (such as 'common-places') in the news products.

8.2.0. Variety of Death Terms

On the day Emperor Hirohito died, Field (1991) says:

> Hirohito's death was reported as a *hōgyo* by every newspaper in the country except for two dailies of Okinawa Prefecture and the *Red Flag*, the organ of the Japan Communist Party. According to standard dictionaries, only four Japanese can have this special word for death applied to their passing: the emperor, the empress, the dowager empress and grand dowager empress. All other Japanese, all other human beings for that matter die ordinary deaths, linguistically speaking. (p 23)

This chapter focuses upon this exclusive terminology, *hogyo*, and rhetorical organisation which legitimates the use of the term. (Although Field describes the term as *hōgyo*, in this chapter, *hogyo* is used, instead. I think *hogyo* sounds more natural and closer to the original Japanese pronunciation.) Hirohito's death was often reported, as Field notes, as a *hogyo*. However, it has to be noted that a variety of terms other than *hogyo* were also used to describe the death of the Emperor. In order to outline different death terms found in the papers, it may be useful to list these in a table format. The meanings are found in Table-8.2.0.1.

Table-8.2.0.1: Varieties of Death Terms in Japanese

	Term	Meanings
a	*hogyo*	Exclusive for the death of the Emperor, the Empress and the Empress Dowager. This noun is often formulated in verb form with *-suru* and *-reru* supplement verbs as a polite verb. (e.g. ***hogyo-sareru***)
b	*kokyo*	Exclusive death term for high ranking peers; higher than third court rank.
c	*seikyo*	Death description for a respectable person. For instance, death of Imperial members could be described as ***seikyo***. It can be formulated as beautified noun, ***go-seikyo,*** and ***seikyo-sareta*** in honorific verb formulation with *-suru* and *-reru* supplemental verbs. In the following section, its verb form '***iku***' (***Ika-reta***) is also categorised as part of this group.
d	*naku-naru*	Originally derived from 'to pass away'. It may be considered to be a polite variant of '***shi-nu***' below, but it can be viewed as a basic verb for 'human death', since it is used exclusively for human death. Same as ***seikyo***, it can be in a polite form by beautification, honorific formulation or both.
e	*shi-nu*	Inclusive basic description which means 'to die' of any creature. In this chapter, not only the verb '***shi-nu***', but also several nouns which are based on this noun are categorised into this group, such as '***shi***', '***shikyo***' and '***shibo***'.
f	*saigo*	It is a noun, which originally meant 'the final moment', and is used as a metaphor of death for people and in some cases, for final moment of remarkable institutions and objects to be honoured.
g	*rinju*	Originated from religious (Buddhism) term. This noun implies 'to face the final moment', which is used, in most cases, to describe a death with sympathy for a bereaved family.
h	*eimin*	Metaphor; it describes death as a 'sleep'. ***Eimin*** literally means 'eternal sleep'. Expressions of death which use the 'sleep metaphor' such as verb formulation 'fall into asleep' are also in this category.
i	*iki-o-.....*	('***iki-o-hikitoru***') An idiomatic expression, which originally meant 'to have one's last breath (***iki***)'.
j	*dai-ohjo*	A noun which has Buddhism origins; 'peaceful (painless) death of a reverend person who has lived long enough (or achieve something high stage of life)'
k	*shogai-o-..*	(***shogai-o-oeru / -tojiru***) An idiomatic expression which means 'to end one's life (*shogai*)' In case of '***-oeru***' it means 'to finalise'. On the other hand, '***-tojiru***' means 'to draw (curtain) / to close'.

The table presents death terms, both verbs and nouns. For instance, 'a' *hogyo* is a noun, and it can be formulated as a verb with supplemental verbs. If verb forms are derived from the noun *hogyo*, these are also classified as belonging to the *hogyo* group, category 'a'. In addition, 'd' *naku-naru* and its informal variant 'e' *shi-nu* (i.e. *naku-naru* is a polite variant of *shi-nu*) are inclusive terms which refer to death in general. In this regard, terms from 'a' to 'e' are the terms which directly refer to 'death'. The rest of the terms are more or less euphemistic or metaphorical, and all are used inclusively.

It should be noted that 'a' *hogyo* is the exclusive (Imperial) honorific, 'b' *kokyo* and 'c' *seikyo* are also inclusive, but used exclusively for powerful and/or respectable people. Other than the Emperor's death, for instance, reporting the death of Hirohito's younger brother (Prince Takamatsu) in 1987, the Yomiuri used '*go-seikyo*', *seikyo* with beautification, in its headline. (i.e. 'Takamatsu-*no-miya-sama* ***go-seikyo***'; the Yomiuri refers to the Prince with the *-sama* suffix; *see section 6.2.2.*) On the other hand, inclusive death terms, category 'd' *naku-naru* or below, are usually used for anyone with a commoner's origin; for example, when the ex-PM Fukuda Takeo died in 1995, the Yomiuri used *shikyo* (category 'e') in its headline. (cf. The Asahi refers to Prince Takamatsu's death as '*go-shikyo*'; *shikyo*, an inclusive death term with beautification in its headline.) Again, one of the main purposes of this chapter is to examine the context of *hogyo* and other death terms. A comparative analysis of different newspapers (i.e. the 'big three' versus the Akahata) is particularly useful in revealing the use of different death terms in relation to their positions/contexts.

8.3.0. First Pages of the 'Big Three'

In the newspaper analyses below, extracts taken from news articles are indexed in the following way: (Name of Paper-X.Y). In this index, X stands for the page number, in which the article appears and Y stands for the reference number of the article.

On 7th of January, 1989, the evening issues of the 'big three' identically presented a huge headline across the top of the front pages saying '*Tenno Heika Hogyo*'. Underneath the big headlines, there were smaller ones. All of them presented Hirohito's portraits and a slightly smaller picture of the new Emperor, Akihito and the new Empress. It was a time of succession: '*Le roi est mort, vive le roi!*' (Frazer, 1994; p 808). The headlines framed (Tuchman, 1978) the news event almost identically. In examining discourse in headlines and lead lines, one can see how the news stories are framed. As an example, the Asahi's headlines and leading line, Asahi-1.1, illustrate the point.

(Asahi-1.1)

1. Headline 1: *Tenno Heika* ***Hogyo***
2. Headline 2: New *Gengo 'Heisei'*
3. Headline 3: Turbulent *Showa* [era] has ended

4. *Tenno Heika* ***does*** (*exal.*) ***hogyo*** at 6:33 AM of the seventh at *Fukiage-*
5. *Gosho* of the Imperial Palace, of gland cancer of the duodenum. The (his)
6. age (*beautified*) was 87 years old. Acting on the Constitution and the Imperial
7. Household Code, *Kotaishi* Akihito *Shinno* taking over the Imperial line
8. immediately, and ascends (*exal.*) the Imperial throne. The government
9. announcing *Tenno* ***Hogyo*** and the ascendance of New *Tenno*, enacts new
10. *Gengo* as '*Heisei*' and begins to prepare '*Taiso-no-rei*' which is to take place
11. as a national funeral. [Chain of] War and peace, distress and prosperity -
12. (his death) draws the curtain on the turbulent *Showa*-era history.

In the Asahi, not only the headline (line 1) but also the leading lines (line 4 and 9) include *hogyo*. Moreover, one should not overlook that there is no inclusive (non-*hogyo*) death description. Thus the Asahi frames the Emperor's death as an exclusive event, rather than ordinary mortal death. Other examples can be explained on similar lines. The Mainichi's headlines and the first part of its lead line are presented below.

(Mainichi-1.1)

1. Headline 1: *Tenno Heika* ***Hogyo*** -Turbulent *Showa* has ended-
2. Headline 2: New *Gengo 'Heisei'*
3. Headline 3: Of Gland Cancer Around Duodenum
4. Headline 4: 87 Years Old, The longest reign (*beautified*) -62 years 14 days-

5. The Imperial Household Agency announces at 7:55 AM of the seventh
6. that *Tenno Heika* ***does*** (*exal.*) ***hogyo*** at 6:33 AM of seventh at *Fukiage-*
7. *Gosho* of the Imperial Palace. The Government announces ***hogyo*** of *Heika*
8. and ascendance of new *Tenno*...

In line 6 and 7 of Mainichi-1.1, the paper uses *hogyo* as a part of the announcement of the Imperial Household Agency and the government. In this regard, this sentence is not

straightforward. This matter will be examined later (*see section 8.4.1*). The point here is that in its headline and leading lines, the Mainichi refers to the death of Hirohito as *hogyo*, rather than using other non-*hogyo* death descriptions.

The Yomiuri headlines and the first sentence of the leading lines are presented below. Uniformity of the honorific term is found in the Yomiuri, too.

(Yomiuri-1.1)

1. Headline 1: *Tenno Heika* ***Hogyo*** = 87 years old, of gland cancer around
2. duodenum =
3. Headline 2: New *Gengo* is '*Heisei*' = Enacted Tomorrow
4. Headline 3: Akihito *Shinno* Ascends (*exal.*)

5. *Tenno Heika* (124th; The name (*beautified*) [is] Hirohito) ***does*** (*exal.*) ***hogyo*** at
6. 6:33 AM on seventh, of grand cancer around duodenum, at *Fukiage-Gosho*
7. of the Imperial Palace... Here, the turbulent *Showa Era*, which is as long as
8. sixty four years, has finally come to its end....

Examples in this section suggest that the 'big three' have an identical presentation for their headlines, referring to the Emperor's death as '*Tenno Heika Hogyo*'. The frequency of the terms used in the front page of each paper is examined next. Then, the contexts and rhetorical formulations are analysed more closely.

8.3.1. Front Page (Media Discourse And Terms)

The table below (Table-8.3.1.1) counts the variety of death terms categorised in Table-8.2.0.1 in the front pages of the 'big three'. Also, the proportion of each term in relation to the total death terms used by each paper is shown in brackets. (Data for all pages are presented in Appendix 3-2. Data in the graph formats are also presented in the next section; *see section 8.3.3.*) The table shows to what extent the exclusive terminology (i.e. *hogyo*) is used in each front page.

Table-8.3.1.1: Use of death terms in front pages; the 'big three'.

		Asahi	Mainichi	Yomiuri
a	*hogyo*	15 [78.9%]	9 [42.9%]	11 [84.6%]
b	*kokyo*			
c	*seikyo*	1 [5.3%]	12 [57.1%]	
d	*naku-naru*	3 [15.8%]		
e	*shi*			
f	*saigo*			
g	*rinju*			
h	*eimin*			
i	*iki-o-.....*			1 [7.7%]
j	*dai-ohjo*			
k	*shogai-o-..*			1 [7.7%]
	TOTAL	19 [100%]	21 [100%]	13 [100%]

The Asahi, for instance, refers to the Emperor's death as *hogyo* fifteen times on its front page. On the other hand, other death descriptions, such as *seikyo* and *naku-naru* are used just four times. Consequently, 78.9% of death terms are *hogyo*. In the same way, 42.9% and 84.6% of death descriptions are *hogyo* in the Mainichi and the Yomiuri respectively. What is important to keep in mind is that all papers use non-*hogyo* terms, even though all of them frame the news story as an exclusive Imperial event in their headlines (i.e. '*Tenno Heika Hogyo*').

It can be seen from the table above that the Mainichi refers to the Emperor's death as *seikyo* more than *hogyo*. Mainichi-1.2 shows an example how this paper refers to the Emperor's death in the body of the text.

(Mainichi-1.2)
... the name (*beautified*) of *Tenno Heika*, who ***seikyo-sareta*** (exal.) is Hirohito.

One has to note that even though *seikyo* is an inclusive term, it is not an everyday death term, either. It is used to honour the death of someone respectable, such as Hirohito's brother in the Yomiuri (*see section 8.2.0*). Even though the 'big three' employ different proportions of the death terms in their front pages, we have already seen that they framed (Tuchman, 1978) the news event almost identically, with regard to headlines, leading lines and lay-outs. There is often considerable negotiation in

editorial offices to select the top news item and the space for each news article. There are also lively debates amongst editors whilst deciding on the headlines. In this regard, it is a remarkable coincidence that the 'big three' provide almost the same (or 'standardized'; Fairclough, 1989) headlines and lead lines using the same term for the news (cf. Tuchman, 1978).

Although we are not looking at the process of the news production, we could draw inferences about the framing processes (i.e. evaluation of the news value or selection of 'proper' terminologies). Consequently, analysts are able to suppose all of the 'big three' construct the social reality of monarchism by referring to history: 'The institutions, as historical and objective facticities, confront the individual as undeniable facts. The institutions are *there*, external to him [*sic*], persistent in their reality, whether he [*sic*] likes or not' (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; p 78; emphasis original). Berger and Luckmann's suggestion is convincing, inserting 'the Emperor' instead of 'institution'.

8.3.2. What is Hogyo, Why Hogyo?

Hirohito's death was quite a novel event for the majority of the Japanese population. Hence, explanatory columns, which deliver an idea of Imperial terminology to readers are worth investigating closely. One of the 'big three', Asahi Shinbun, provided a small column in the front page, underneath the main article, which gave explanatory comments about the use of *hogyo*. (cf. The Mainichi did not have this kind of column.) The Yomiuri provided an explanatory column on page 4, which explained the terms related to the ceremonies, such as an Imperial funeral and a coronation. It did not, however, explain anything about the death term (i.e. *hogyo*) itself. Cannadine's (1983) discussion of media influence upon formulating and objectifying the British monarchy as a formal institution is very relevant to this. In this way, Asahi-1.2 below could be an example which links different types of 'Japanese-ness', the ancient age with the modern industrial state, or an old monarchism with a 'democratic' society as a part of 'secondary socialization' processes, which require 'the acquisition of role-specific vocabularies, which means, for one thing, the internalization of semantic fields

structuring routine interpretations and conduct within an institutional area' (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; p 158).

(Asahi-1.2)

1. Column title: ***Hogyo***

2. '***Ho***' means 'to pass away' (and) 'to hide'. '*Gyo*' forms honorific form
3. (suffix) [with 'ho']. In '*Nippon-shoki*' in the 8th Century, there is a
4. description of '*Tenno* does ***ho***'; '*Kagaku-shu*', *Muromachi* era's dictionary
5. denoted: '***Hogyo*** means a resignation of *Ten-shi* (Emperor) with (this)
6. world'. According to the pre-war Imperial Household Code [enacted in
7. *Taisho* 15, replaced after end of the war] '***Hogyo***' signified death of
8. *Tenno*, *Kogo* (Empress), *Kotaigo* (Empress Dowager) and *Tai-Kotaigo*
9. (Grand Empress Dowager).

The fact that Asahi-1.2 was presented underneath the big headline '*Tenno Heika Hogyo*', can lead us to deduce the assumptions behind this small column. There is no explanation about 'gland cancer of the duodenum', *Tenno*, *Kogo*, *Kotaigo*, *Tai-Kotaigo* or *Tenno Heika*, but about *hogyo*, which must mean that the Asahi editor assumes readers may not understand the term. As Asahi-1.2 implies, this is not an everyday term, but a special one for exceptional occasions. Furthermore, as it was defined in certain historical documents (i.e. *Nippon-shoki* and *Kagaku-shu*), it is important not only because it is an old term, but also because it is a part of the cultural heritage. In defining the term, the paper conveys the idea that the 'unfamiliar term' is appropriate and therefore that ordinary death terms are inappropriate for this exceptional occasion. Hence, this column is transmitting and constructing 'standardized' (Fairclough, 1989) language for the death of the Emperor.

Asahi-1.2 legitimises the term. Firstly, *Nippon-shoki* and *Kagaku-shu* are assumed to be historically and culturally important properties for the readers. Cannadine (1983) points out there are patterns of 'tradition': so-called traditional customs or ceremonies which claim historical connections with past events. In this regard, *Nippon-shoki* and *Kagaku-shu* are good ideological 'evidence' for the Asahi to claim the long-lasting

historical continuity of monarchism and the language use. The second point is partly connected to the first one, which stresses more short term historical connections. Since the present definition of the term is based on the pre-war Imperial Household Code, there is a presumption that the modern Emperor (Hirohito) has a considerable continuity with the pre-war era.

In this regard, the repeated use of *hogyo* has the character of 'invention (or re-invention) of tradition' (Hobsbawm, 1983). As Asahi-1.2 suggests, the origins of the word are traceable within a dateable period (i.e. 'Imperial Household Code enacted in *Taisho* 15', line 6) and this term is not conventional in everyday life. Needless to say, if it were a routine term, an explanatory column would not have been required. Asahi-1.2, therefore, suggests the re-invention of tradition for the modern monarchism: an institutional system which claims nominal continuity whilst its operational functions are changed drastically. This '(re-)invented' language plays a crucial role in framing the events in the media discourse.

8.3.3. Second Page Onward

Similar to British newspapers, Japanese papers have particular styles. The front page is for hot and 'hard' news (Tuchman, 1978), the second and third pages are usually devoted to political issues. The fourth page is economic matters, and usually, international news is presented on inner pages. Then cultural issues (e.g. book reviews, film critiques) and domestic columns are in the centre folds. Social affairs and town news are usually presented in later parts. The final pages are for the TV/radio programme guide. On the day the Emperor died, this usual format was changed. For instance, cultural and domestic columns were replaced by 'chronicles' of Hirohito. In general, on the day Hirohito died, the first quarter of the papers were allocated to official announcements, political, economic and international news related to the Emperor's death. The centre pages were for chronicles, and some pages at the end were for 'inside reports' and social affairs. The Asahi and the Yomiuri consisted of 16 pages, and the Mainichi 12 pages, and the final page of the Mainichi (i.e. Page 12) was used not only for the TV guide, but also articles introducing Hirohito's humanistic

episodes. Thus, in the charts below, I do not count the terms on page 16 of Asahi and Yomiuri, but I do so for page 12 of Mainichi.

The bar charts below show the general tendencies of language uses by the 'big three'. In order to concentrate on the honorific terms (i.e. *hogyo*), the variety of terms in Table-8.2.0.1 is simplified by categorising them into three groups: (1) *hogyo*, (2) terms exclusively used for respectable people (i.e. *kokyo* and *seikyo*) and (3) other inclusive terms (i.e. From 'd' to 'k' in Table-8.2.0.1). Statistical data in table formats can be found in the appendix (see Appendix 3-2). In the bar charts, the horizontal lines (X axis) represent pages and vertical lines (Y axis) represent the frequency of each category. The quantity of terms used in a particular page are represented by colour areas in each bar.



The chart for the Asahi tells us various things. Firstly, death terms are scarcely found in the inner pages, which were allocated to the life story of Hirohito and a chronicle of the *Showa*-era. Secondly, whereas political and economic pages (page 2 and 3), international news (page 4) and town and social affair pages (pages 13-15) mention the Emperor's death several times, they do not always use *hogyo* (e.g. pages 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 13, 14 and 15). This quantitative chart shows that for instance, on page 15, the social affairs page, the Asahi does not use *hogyo*. Analysis on 'non-*hogyo*' discourse is a point to which we return in later sections (*see sections 8.5.0* and *8.5.1*).



The Mainichi, too, dedicated its centre folds to 'chronicle' type articles, but page 8 is for the 'Imperial obituaries of the world'. In page 9, a liberal philosopher (Prof. *Osamu Kuno*; seventy nine years old then) commented on the death of Hirohito, referring to it as *kokyo*: it is, in fact, the only example in which *kokyo* is used. Similarly to the Asahi, the Mainichi tends to refer to Hirohito's death with 'non-*hogyo* formulations' in later pages, such as the political page (page 3), the chronicle (page 5), international news (page 8), social affairs and town news pages. A similar tendency can also be found in the 'populist paper' (Cortazzi, 1993), the Yomiuri.



In this paper, 84.6% of death terms are *hogyo* in its front page, and it continues to use *hogyo* as its first choice death term. However, as the chart shows, in later pages (i.e. social affairs section which features some 'inside' reports of the sickroom; page 15) the proportion of *hogyo* has fallen dramatically to as little as 21.7% (5 times out of 23 death descriptions).

8.4.0. The Akahata Discourse

Prior to a detailed examination of media discourse of 'non-*hogyo*' formulations in mainstream inner-pages, it would be worth while looking at a deviant media discourse from the day Hirohito died. The Akahata shows a clear contrast to the mainstream 'pro-monarchy' papers, with regard to both its critical stance on the Emperor as well as the language it uses.

Whereas all the 'big three' present large headlines saying '*Tenno Heika Hogyo*', which determine the whole space of the front page, the Akahata deals with the news as only one of a variety of news articles. The prime space of the front page (i.e. top right of the page, since Japanese newspaper texts have vertical format from top right to bottom left) is occupied by the Party Statement about the Emperor's death. Underneath the party statement, there is a report about Hirohito's *shikyo* (category 'd' of Table-8.2.0.1). The presentation of the article is smaller than the other news report which shares the front page, a scandal of PM Takeshita. Akahata-1.1 is dated 8th January, since the Akahata does not have an evening edition.

(Akahata-1.1)

1. Headline 1: Encouragement of human rights oppression and war of
2. invasion:
3. Headline 2: *Tenno* does ***Shikyo.***

4. At 6:33 AM of seventh, *Tenno* (Hirohito; original) ***shikyo*** of gland cancer of the
5. duodenum at *Fukiage-tei* in the Palace. 87 years old... PM Takeshita states
6. [his] '*Kinwa*' (respectful remark) about *Tenno* ***shikyo*** saying such as: '[the
7. Emperor] keenly sought (*exal.*) world peace and Nation's welfare in the (his)
8. era of upheaval: Day by day, [he has] made [his] best effort (*exal.*) [to
9. accomplish these purposes]'... [Positively] Responding to them
10. (governmental efforts to enforce the nation to mourn Hirohito), each TV
11. broadcaster has totally replaced regular programmes into special ones; and
12. using pre-war terminology, such as '*Tenno Heika* ***Hogyo***' and so forth,
13. [broadcasters] began extraordinary campaigns which trample the democratic
14. rule legitimised in the Constitution.

There are several differences between Akahata-1.1 and the 'big three'. Firstly, as noted above, the presentation, such as its size and space of the article and the headlines, were very different. Also, there is no Emperor's portrait. In other words, framing of the news event is totally different. Secondly, exclusive honorific terms are not found except in reported speech (line 12): the Akahata uses an inclusive death term, *shikyo* instead of *hogyo*. *Shikyo* is an inclusive term, which refers to the death of people inclusively: it is not used to refer to Hirohito's death in the 'big three'. However, for instance, when ex-PM Fukuda Takeo died in 1995, *shikyo* was used by the Yomiuri. (*see section 8.2.0*). There are no *Heika* titles in the Akahata, either. Moreover, when Imperial related matters (such as 'name' in line 4 or 'age' in line 5) are introduced, they are not 'beautified' by prefixes (*see section 7.2.1*; Hayashi, 1997; cf. line 5 of Yomiuri-1.1). Furthermore the Imperial residence is referred to *Fukiage-tei* (line 5), rather than *Fukiage-Gosho*. (*Gosho* means an *Imperial* residence, but '*-tei*' inclusively suggests a *grand* residence; cf. line 4 of Asahi-1.1, line 6 of Mainichi-1.1 and line 6 of Yomiuri-1.1) Finally, the Akahata uses reported speech in order to be ironic about PM Takeshita's '*Kinwa* (respectful remark)'. Above all, the Akahata is critical of Hirohito. Also, it is opposed to PM Takesihita and the media, which uncritically employ unconventional honorifics.

The headline 1 ('Encouragement of human rights oppression and war of invasion') is printed in a small font, and it works as an adjective for *Tenno* in headline 2. Consequently, Hirohito is not a peace seeker as stated in PM Takeshita's statement. Hirohito is a cruel person, whose death it would not be necessary to mourn. In this context, it is important that Hirohito is referred to as *Tenno* without the *Heika* title. What is more, his death is described by an inclusive (consequently, disrespectful) death term. In other words, the Akahata refers to the Emperor's death in a conventional way, as an objective fact of a mortal death. More than that, he is not just a mortal, but a rather problematic person. Not only in the front page, but also in following pages, the

Akahata repeatedly refers to the Emperor's death as a mortal one.



Here we see term categories used in the Akahata in all pages. Respectful (unconventional) formulations for Hirohito are limited only to 'reported speech', or with quotation marks. For instance, in page 5, the Akahata blames uncritical pro-monarchical attitudes on 'commercial journalism', quoting articles in which *hogyo* and *seikyo* are used (cf. Akahata-3.1, below).

8.4.1. Quotation For Distancing

Goffman (1981) discusses quotations in terms of *footing*, which is the part of discursive actions which shows the accountability of one's utterances. Goffman distinguishes between the *composer* and *animator* of an utterance. Through using the resource of the utterances (i.e. *composer*), a speaker/writer (i.e. *animator*) could establish his/her accountability since the quoted speech/text is claimed to be like the original one. Paradoxically, presenting a composer's original utterance without dramatisation may result in a partial dramatisation. In certain contexts, quotations can be used ironically: 'People can emphasize their distance from a particular attitude or evaluation by sharply making the animator/origin distinction or they can align themselves with it by blurring the distinction' (Edwards and Potter, 1992; p 38; cf. Levinson, 1988; Clayman, 1992). One of the examples of 'distancing' is that, when talking of the Divine Right of Kings in mundane family talk, the modern British speakers often employ *oratio obliqua*, in order to imply distance (Billig, 1992). They talk of the religious background of the Queen, while distancing themselves from

archaic terminology. Quotations (i.e. *oratio obliqua*) enable modern speakers to talk of the out-dated issue, and thus defend their own rationality.

From this point of view, using quotations, the Akahata detaches itself from the responsibility of using the terms (Clark and Gerrig, 1990; cf. Holt, 1996). Rather, the Akahata maintains a distance from the source writer (or composer), who uses these exclusive honorifics. Akahata-1.1, too, distinguishes news media which uncritically honour the Emperor from its own view (i.e. *shikyo* in line 3, 4, and 6 as well as *hogyo* in line 13) by use of quotations. This aspect of 'distancing' can be found more clearly on the following page, where the Akahata provides an explanatory column which justifies its own 'conventional' use of the death term, whereas the other papers use unconventional ones for the Emperor.

8.4.2. Explanatory Column by the Akahata

To see the point, there is an explanatory column about terminology used in news reports in Akahata. A small column entitled 'About Terminology in *Tenno* Coverage' has a similar function to Asahi-1.2, but conveys a totally different point of view.

(Akahata-3.1)

1. Due to ***shikyo*** of *Tenno* and the ascendance of the new-*Tenno*, commercial
2. journalism has commanded big mourn/praise campaigns; and [we have
3. found that] there are excessive use of honorifics which is reminiscent of the
4. old (totalitarianism) age...For example, while *Tenno*'s ***shi*** is referred as
5. '***hogyo***', this is exclusive terminology from pre-war era and it was used to
6. distinguish ***shi*** of *Tenno*, *Kogo*, *Kotaigo*, *Tai-kotaigo* [from that of others]...
7. Although commercial journalism has used these supreme honorifics without
8. any criticism, 'the *Akahata*' never uses these honorific words [in its] report,
9. which [could] prevent rationality from the nation's common-sense, (also it) is
10. not acceptable according to the rules of democracy.

Asahi-1.2 is a comment which justifies and legitimises the term, whereas Akahata-3.1 criticises the terminology. In other words, Asahi-1.2 encourages the invention of

tradition, but the Akahata resists it. Here, the left-wing paper criticises the conventional way of talking of the Emperor's death. In lines 3 and 4, the Akahata gives the reason for its criticism. Representing *hogyo* in quotation marks, the left-wing paper explains that *hogyo* is pre-war terminology for *Tenno*'s *shi* (i.e. category 'e' of Table-8.2.0.1; *see also section 7.4.1*). Consequently, the term *hogyo* is kept distant from the Akahata's own common-sensical stance and is criticised. Since the Akahata employs ordinary terms, *shikyo* and *shi*, without quotation marks (line 1, 4 and 6), this suggests that his death is viewed objectively and as not being special.

Examples found in the Akahata (i.e. Akahata-1.1 and Akahata-3.1) suggest to us that the left-wing media constructs the reality of the Emperor's death as an objective fact of mortal death. Since language provides 'a ready-made possibility for the ongoing objectification of unfolding experience' (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; p 53), it is relevant that the Akahata warns that uncritical uses of *hogyo* by 'commercial journalism' are opposed to the social norms of democracy. To put it another way, the Akahata declares its own position for typification of the news event by its use of conventional terms. Deviant formulations illustrate the assumptions of the terminology of the 'big three'. Using an exclusive honorific death term, the 'big three' represent the death of the Emperor as an exclusive event (e.g. Field, 1991). Comparison of Asahi-1.2 and Akahata-3.1 illustrates two sides of the same coin of the views on the deceased Emperor.

Looking at the different use of terminologies in the 'big three' and the Akahata, we are able to see the dilemma of the monarchy (Billig, 1987, 1992; Billig *et al.*, 1988; Nairn, 1988). The point is, Hirohito and his death are both special and not special. Using a special term is, according to the pro-monarchy papers, a cultural property which is guaranteed by 'our tradition' (i.e. Asahi-1.2). From a discursive point of view, this dilemma can be seen in the status given to the Emperor's death. Since the 'big three' tend to use *hogyo* less often in the inner pages, the formal term can not be wholly appropriate for describing the death of a human monarch in the pro-monarchy mainstream. In the section below, we shall examine some examples of the Emperor's death, which are represented by the conventional death terms.

8.5.0. Informality By Out-Groups.

Asahi-14.1 shows the distancing of the press from the conventional death term. In the case where the 'big three' employ conventional death terms in reported speech, we may see some people in interviews are permitted to refer to the Emperor's death inclusively, and such language is carefully distinguished from 'ours', that of the writer and the readers (cf. Billig, 1995).

(Asahi-14.1)

1. Jack Boyar (35), an AFP News Agency correspondent who reports
2. 'Japanese *Tenno* Hirohito does ***shi***', comments 'It was as if I was watching a
3. drama...'

It should be noted that referring to a person by his/her first name is unwelcome, because of the taboo of direct namings. Instead, as seen, Japanese has ostensibly developed alternative techniques of namings (*see sections 6.2.0-6.2.2*). A non-Japanese reporter, whose name clearly labels him as an outsider, (there may be Japanese reporters working for the AFP, though) is permitted to refer to the Emperor by his first name and his death as just an objective fact (i.e. line 2). The Asahi distances itself from this language use and is careful to ascribe it to a foreigner. Another example shows another category of people. The extract is taken from 'voices in the town' in the Mainich, which is a series of interviews with 'people on the street'.

(Mainichi-10.1)

1. According to Yumiko Yoshikawa-*san* (17), a second-year high school
2. student, 'Eeh, [has Hirohito] ***shin-da***? [It's a] Pity, although [I] don't know
3. [anything about] him. Is the school going to be closed, [I wonder]?'.

In this extract, the quotation marks guarantee it is an original utterance (Levinson, 1988). A surprising exclamation, 'Eeh', can represent a fragment of the original utterance by the high school girl. Therefore, according to this Mainichi report, the younger generation may also be permitted to refer to the Emperor's death by the

informal death term. Seventeen year-old Yumiko is presented as innocent (i.e. she mourns Hirohito) but immature (i.e. she refers to Hirohito's death as inclusive in line 2). The mainstream papers (i.e. The Asahi and the Mainichi) are distancing themselves from the original utterances, and these discourses suggest the other side of the formality of the Imperial reality.

Above all, there are two rhetorical functions in quotations of Asahi-13.1 and Mainichi-10.1. On the one hand, quotations distance the original term from the newspapers. Therefore, they can mention informality of the Emperor without violating the 'chrysanthemum taboo'. On the other hand, the newspapers can subtly construct Imperial informality as a reality, which, in fact, reinforces modern monarchical ideology (Martin, 1936, 1962; Nairn, 1988; Wilson, 1989; Billig, 1992), and it may be able to resist the con-monarchy common-sense (i.e. Akahata-3.1). We have seen that there is a rhetorical technique which formulates informal 'death (*shi*)' in the formal occasion: constructing Hirohito's death as a mortal death through the eyes and mouths of a non-Japanese or an immature girl. Using the reported speech of 'out-groups', we have seen the mainstream media subtly construct Imperial informality. In order to see the technique used in the Asahi and the Mainichi, we will also consider 'the populist paper', the Yomiuri (Cortazzi, 1993). The Yomiuri ostentatiously suggests 'outsiders' are following the Japanese tradition of honouring the Emperor's death.

(Yomiuri-4.1)

1. Headline: US President's Special Message

2. In the evening of 6th, US President Reagan made a special message to
3. express his deepest sorrow over ***hogyo*** of *Tenno Heika*, representing
4. American nation.... The message is as follows: ... *Heika* who has done (*exal.*)
5. ***hogyo*** visited (*exal.*) the US in 1975..... Mourning over *Heika*'s ***hogyo***, we
6. would never forget that *Heika* has contributed (*exal.*) the [good] Japan-US
7. relationship...

Although there are no quotation marks, the sentence in line 4 and below is a quotation, indicated by the phrase 'The message is as follows:' and the changing of subjects

marks a distinction of Reagan's and the editor's language. The Asahi does not report Reagan's condolence verbatim, but it reports the abstract of the Presidential message. According to the Asahi, Reagan mourns over '*shi* of *Heika*', which corresponds to the second *hogyo* in line 5 of Yomiuri-4.1. In this regard, we may see that selection of the language (e.g. way of translation) may construct different kinds of social realities, which may illuminate contradictory aspects of the modern monarchy between different mainstream papers.

8.5.1. Informality By The Press.

In this section, we shall briefly consider the use of the inclusive death term other than in quotations or reported speeches. In Asahi-15.1 the ceremony for succession is explained. According to the Asahi, the new *Tenno* (i.e. Akihito) 'ascends the throne with enormous sorrow'. Then the Asahi continues:

(Asahi-15.1)

1. [There is] Just one throne. What is more, it is not allowed to leave the
2. seat empty. It is fatalistic that ascendance of *Tenno* and sorrow of (his)
3. father's ***shi*** are two sides of the same coin.

Here we can see that the Asahi itself refers to the Emperor's death in conventional language (line 3). This extract stresses the informality of both 'father' and '*shi*'. It also conveys personal feeling, '(enormous) sorrow', which implies *shi* as an objective fact, like the communist press. Hirohito's death is not attributed as an Emperor's one. Hirohito is the father of Akihito. The previous Emperor's death is described as a part of the general condition of Imperial succession. Thus the Asahi does not refer to the Emperor's death but rather to Akihito's father's death by the inclusive death term. Stressing family ties underneath the Imperial role, this media report uses an informal death term as its own without quotation. This rhetorical organisation without quotations implies that the Emperor's death is the death of a 'father', and it must be terrible for the 'son' to accomplish his duty on the day that his 'father' dies. It is a part of the common-sense of modern monarchy, in which the imperial/royal family has become a model (middle class) family of the nation (Martin, 1936, 1962; Matsushita,

1959; Inoue, 1978/1995; Coward, 1983; Nairn, 1988; Billig, 1992). The eldest son is, now, substantially playing his expected role. However, there is another implication behind this pro-monarchical article. It is not conventional for a 'son' to take over his father's position immediately after his death.

In the mainstream press, we rarely find media discourse which names the Emperor with his first name (Hirohito) as their own term (cf. Asahi-14.1). The points made so far apply in principle to rhetorical organisations of the media discourse. As seen in the front pages of the 'big three', the Emperor is an official person with an official role. Under this condition, he tends to be referred to with the Imperial title of honour (i.e. *Heika*). Also the event (i.e. death) of this official person is referred to officially. On the other hand, in later pages we have found more informal death terms. By emphasising the humanity of the Emperor, the other side of Imperial formality, his death could be portrayed as less official and as a human tragedy. The Emperor is not assigned the role of a person whose name is Hirohito, but can be 'father' (Asahi-15.1), or as shall be seen below, 'human' (Mainichi-11.1).

(Mainichi-11.1)

1. Headline: 'Calm (*beautified*) ***saigo***'

2. ... In [his] bedroom of *Fukiage-Gosho* of the Imperial Palace, *Heika* who had
3. turbulent life, from being 'god' to becoming 'human', ***iki-o-hikito-rareta*** (*exal.*).

This is the headline and leading line of an inside story about Hirohito's sickroom, based on interviews with Imperial relatives. In this context, we see that Imperial relatives are permitted to see the Emperor as a man. In line 1, for instance, the Mainichi quotes the Imperial relative's description of Hirohito's death, which is beautified but inclusive (i.e. category 'f' of Table-8.2.0.1). What is more, in line 3, Hirohito's mortal death is depicted without quotation marks. By pointing out the turbulency of his life, the Mainichi makes it explicit that the Emperor dies as a mortal, rather than a 'god'. In this passage, significantly, *hogyo* is not used.

The Mainichi suspends its own evaluation of his status, either 'god' or 'human being', by using quotation (line 3). One point is, however, clear. Hirohito has become a 'human' and human death can be described as 'terminalising his breath' (i.e. category 'i' of Table-8.2.0.1). As briefly mentioned in Table-8.2.0.1, death descriptions may have evaluative implications. For instance, the Buddhist term of *dai-ohjo* (category 'j') must be associated with a 'good person', since there is a Buddhist idea of retribution: painless death would be a gift for a person who has lived a better life. In this regard, the adjective, 'calm', is a key term in this media discourse: the Emperor is a 'human' who deserves to be gifted with a peaceful death. Although he had two operations in his last two years and 31,685cc of blood transfusion in the last three months (Asahi Shinbun, 07/01/1989 evening), he dies 'calmly' (i.e. line 1), says the pro-monarchy press. The Yomiuri uses metaphoric expressions, such as '*nemuri-ni-tuku*' (falling to sleep; category 'h') and '*iki-o-hikitoru*' (finalising one's breath; category 'i') in its social affairs page, under the headline of 'A Calm ***Go-Saigo*** (*beautified*), Like Sleeping'. *Saigo* means 'the end' or 'the final moment' (category 'f'). In so doing, the Mainichi and the Yomiuri claim that whereas he is no longer a 'god', he is at least a 'good man'. Also his death is described as an inclusive death, but in polite formulations.

Mainichi-11.1 has another popular discursive/rhetorical device which includes evaluative implications for the Emperor: stressing the turbulency of his life (line 3). Without exceptions, as seen, mainstream newspapers emphasise the 'turbulence' of *Showa*-era (i.e. Hirohito's reign) or his life in its front pages (i.e. line 2 of Asahi-1.1, line 1 of Mainichi-1.1 and line 7 of Yomiuri-1.1). This adjective may have some rhetorical functions. Firstly, it suggests there were good and bad events during the era and his life. Secondly, it suggests that this turbulence was not under his control. This adjective makes the readers recognise the difficulty of the Emperor's reign without discussing them. In this regard, stressing the turbulency works as a defensive discourse for the Emperor's past fault or a 'stake inoculation' (Potter, 1996a), which could conceal the negative side of the ideological issue. Employing this adjective, therefore, the 'big three' can formulate pro-monarchy discourse and avoid counter argument.

Mainstream papers attempt to install a new 'tradition' (Hobsbawm, 1983) in post-war Japan. Also, focusing on the humanity of Hirohito, they reinforce the modern monarchical ideology. The discourse of later pages of the mainstream papers are organised to counter potential ideological challenge (e.g. Akahata-1.1 or Akahata-3.1). The selection of language is part of the construction of persuasive discourse in which editors are carefully representing ideological themes with contradiction, concerning the potential counters. Hirohito can be a 'father' (i.e. Asahi-15.1) or 'human' (i.e. Mainichi-11.1); however, he is not just a father, but the father of a special family. At the same time, he is a human who died peacefully as a respectable mortal.

8.6.0. Death Terms in Conversation

Newspaper analysis showed us that despite the almost identical framings of the news event in the headlines of the mainstream 'big three', which refer to Hirohito's death as *hogyo*, this special term was not used exclusively; more ordinary death terms were also used, especially on the inside pages. In this regard, we have found the ideological dilemma (Billig *et al.*, 1988) of the modern monarchy. In this section, I will examine whether the same sort of mixture of death terms is found in mundane talk. This will be done by re-examining my interview data, where participants are talking of the death of the Emperor.

The interviews were conducted about seven or eight years after Hirohito died. The theme of discussion was not strictly controlled to consider particular topics, but was rather mundane talk about general Imperial issues. Thus some interviewees do not refer to the topic of Hirohito's (Emperor's) death. Therefore, for instance, I have no data in which extreme right-wingers are talking of the Emperor's death. In this regard, the data is limited. We will see, in the following sections, the use of terms by the liberals and secondly, by conventional royalists.

8.6.1. In Critical Contexts

A young editor (D), who is critical of the Emperor's war responsibility is talking about the day Hirohito died. His wife (E) was not in Japan at that time. He says that it was curious for him that young people gathered at the Palace and wept. A few seconds later, he says that he would expect right-wing activists to do so. However it was strange that 'even young businessmen with ties' did so.

(8.6.1.1)

1. D That is to say, well, at the time *Tenno* ***shi-nu***, there were young
2. people expressly gathered at *Niju-Bashi** and weeping, weren't they?
3. E Were there young people?
4. D There were, also, young people...
5. E Oh, yeah...

* A stone bridge which is the main entrance to the Palace.

In line 1, the editor refers to the Emperor as *Tenno* without the *Heika* title of honour. The couple claim that weeping over Imperial death is not the fashion of the younger generation (and business people). In so doing, it is not comfortable for them to observe the young people behaving in the same way as the older generations. They do not use exclusive terms to describe the Emperor's death. His death is not distinguished from other mortal deaths (i.e. *shi-nu* in line 1; category 'e'). The organisation of 8.6.1.1 shows the young editor's critical stance towards 'young people', who gave special value to the Emperor's death.

As seen in Table-8.2.0.1, the death term used by the editor (i.e. category 'e') is not a term honouring a dead person, but is used to construct someone's death as an objective fact. The Emperor's death is described as a significant social event, but the speaker is not using an honouring term. It may be relevant that the couple are wondering about young people following the old fashioned custom. D and E are both critical about such 'traditions' (i.e. gathering at *Niju-Bashi*, weeping over Emperor's death, exclusive honorifics and so on) for the post-war Emperor. They avoid the linguistic 'tradition' which potentially links pre- and post-war Imperialism.

In 8.6.1.2, a young academic (A), who supposes that it would have been better to have executed the Emperor after the war, is talking of the relationship between Japan and her Asian neighbours. He says that Japan (i.e. the Japanese conservative government) has not built a proper relationship with Asian nations, since there has been no proper apology. According to him, while the Emperor, the person responsible for the war of invasion, was on the throne, it was impossible to make a proper apology.

(8.6.1.2)

1. A [What Asian countries require is] Just *Tenno* apologises, [even he
2. excused he] did not know at that time, well [we/Japan] missed
3. chance [to reconstruct good relations], because *Showa Tenno* ***shin-***
4. ***jatta*** without apology....

In line 4, he does not only use '*shin-da*' (the past form of the inclusive verb for 'to die'), but also '*shin-jatta*' (the past form of the verb with personal and/or emotional commitment). A colloquial verb expression '*-jatta*' derived from '*-simau*' is rather a casual form. Maynard (1990) explains that '*-simau*' (means 'to put away') is a supplemental verb putting information of 'proposition' and 'modality' for the verb in use. The [verb + *te* + *simau*] combination indicates 'completion' and 'finality' of the verb. In this context, the liberal young man refers to Hirohito's death critically. He died without doing what he had to do. In formulating this thought, he does not formulate the Emperor's death formally as *hogyo*. Nor does he formulate it informally as a personal tragedy. His death was an objective fact, which interrupted a proper apology.

According to 8.6.1.1 and 8.6.1.2, Hirohito's death is not described in the 'traditional' way, which emphasises Imperial historical continuity from the pre-war time. In 8.6.1.1, the Emperor's death was a historical event which stimulated bizarre behaviour in even 'young people', and in 8.6.1.2, it was an interruption which prevented the building of international relationships. Moreover, the choice of terms to describe the death itself reflects this critical stance towards Imperial continuity.

An old communist in his nineties (O), one of the founder members of the JCP, saw the Emperor in pre-war time 'with deep contempt', since he was 'an instrument of

Japanese militarism'. However, because of the potential danger, he saluted Hirohito at that time. He claims that during the *Taisho*-era (the reign of Hirohito's father), Imperialism was not as strict as during Hirohito's reign.

(8.6.1.3)

1. O *Taisho Tenno* was a dementia praecox, well.
2. S ⌊So called disease of *o-no* (brain; *beautified*), wasn't it?
3. O =because of many problems, authority of Imperial system was very
4. much destroyed. Just before my graduation of the university, third
5. → year student, *Taisho Tenno* ***shi-nu***; at that time, everybody thought
6. [he] was a poor (pity) mental disease patient....

In line 2, the interviewer (S) refers to Emperor *Taisho*'s 'brain' with beautification. An inserted phrase, 'so called' suggests 'distancing' in the same way as some uses of quotation marks (*see section 7.2.1*). In this context, the death of Emperor *Taisho* (who was said to suffer from a mental disease) marks the time (i.e. 'that time' in line 5). Similar to 8.6.1.1, this speaker refers to the Emperor's personality in a critical manner: Hirohito's father did not die as an authority but rather as an inferior person, which is represented by the adjective 'poor' in line 6. Emperor *Taisho* is represented as an inferior person on whom compassion can be taken, and his death is referred to as an objective mortal death of a 'poor' person, '*shi-nu*'. Non-monarchist speakers organise the Emperor's death as no different from that of a mortal. They resist the formulation of Imperial death following the 'traditional' ways, which link the 'glorious past' to the modern monarchy. Critical Imperial discourses refer to the Emperor's death as a mortal death, which could happen to any living creature (i.e. '*shi-nu*').

8.6.2. Conventional Royalist

What needs to be examined is whether less critical speakers use exclusive terms to describe the Emperor's death or whether they, too, use more general terms, whether or not they are making critical points. In 8.6.2.1, a couple in their early seventies (M and N), who work as documentary film makers, are talking with the interviewer about a film which they are planning. The wife (N) says that she was a sympathiser of the

Communist Party after the war, but: 'Nowadays, I don't want to wave a flag (agitate) for demolishing the Imperial system like [I did] in the old days', because 'the symbol Emperor system seems to work as a tranquilliser [for Japanese society]'. She was once invited for an unofficial lunch at the Palace by the present Empress, where the Empress requested her to make a documentary film introducing an Imperial treasury (*gyobutu*). In order to avoid heavy inheritance tax, many of Hirohito's possessions were donated to the nation. However, most of them are now in museum storerooms. According to N, the Empress wishes to introduce some of the excellent treasures to the public through, for instance, documentary films. Note that *gyobutsu* is an idiomatic expression referring to the Imperial treasures: '*butsu*' means thing, item or property, and '*gyo-*' is a beautification prefix (Hayashi, 1997; *see section 7.2.1)*.

(8.6.2.1)

1. N [an intended subject of the film is] Originally, it was a *gyobutsu* which
2. was (.) well, an offering from *Ikeda* (feudal) *Clan*, probably *Ikeda Clan*
3. of *Okayama* (name of a region).(.) [I] need to confirm [its precise
4. origin] by the catalogue. Then [offered items] became a *gyobutsu*,
5. → then after *Showa Tenno* ***naku-natte***, the Imperial Household
6. Agency....
7. M ⌊well, a considerable amount of ...
8. N ⌊Then, most of them ...
9. S ⌊deals with ↑ inheritance tax ?

The wife refers to the death of Hirohito as an inclusive human death but with a politer form than *shi-nu* (line 5). Hirohito died as a wealthy man, who left a variety of properties. One of the points to be noted is that she refers to the film subject as *gyobutsu*, which is an exclusive term for Imperial treasure (line 1 and 4). In this way, she distinguishes the treasures which (used to) belong to the Emperor from general properties. In line 4, she claims that after belonging to the Emperor, the property became a *gyobutsu*. In this way, the film director (N) implicitly implicates the institutional power of the Emperor system which may change the nature of a property: from *a* treasure to *an Imperial* treasure. On the other hand, at the same time, the Emperor is represented as a wealthy man, who needed to consider heavy inheritance

tax. In this context, she does not refer to Hirohito's death as *hogyo*, but rather inclusively, which may be used for a polite reference to any person's death (line 5; category 'd' of Table-8.2.1.1). Here again is a dilemma of Hirohito. He was an owner of *gyobutus*, but at the same time, he was a wealthy man, subject to the tax system. In this way, Hirohito's death is described as *naku-naru*, which refers to a mortal death implying respect for the dead person.

Another example of conventional royalists, 8.6.2.2, is the discussion between a retired business executive and his wife. They are talking of Hirohito's war responsibility, and the husband (F) claims that some historical questions are still unsolved as Hirohito never expressed his own opinion. Then the wife (G) replies:

(8.6.2.2)

1.	F	= however, [I think] as far as the very person (Hirohito) does not
2.		speak [by himself], [it is] impossible to reveal real truth, I wonder...
3.	G	= eer, [if he] left (*exal.*) [something] substantial, if there are something
4.		(documents) which [is labelled / acknowledged] 'if I (first person
5.	→	pronoun of Hirohito) ***naku-natta*** [read this]' [the historical questions
6.		may be clearer]. *Tenno* did not think (*exal.*) of it, or [he] might not be
7.		able to write (*plain*), or [due to his] poor writing skill, well, from my
8.		personal point of view, [he] should have left (*plain*) some real things
9.		(memorandums?), to some extent....

According to the formulation of the wife (G), we need Hirohito's personal diaries (i.e. 'something' documents) in order to re-examine modern history. In the same way as in 8.6.2.1, the wife refers to the Emperor's death as *naku-naru*. What has to be noted is that she is referring to imagined phrases, in (or on the envelope of) an Imperial diary. According to the context, the first person pronoun, 'I' in line 4 (*jibun* in Japanese) refers to the Emperor's first-person pronoun (*see section 6.4.1*). In this way, this *naku-naru* is not her own use of reference but she supposes the Emperor's term to refer to his own death. Thus, she suggests that Hirohito would not refer to his own death exclusively.

The speaker is depicting the Emperor as referring to his own death, not as '*shi-nu*' (i.e. category 'e' of Table-8.2.0.1), but as *naku-naru* (i.e. category 'd'). Since *naku-naru* is a polite variant of *shi-nu*, the wife is suggesting that the Emperor would honour his own death (*see section 7.4.1*). This seems to violate a basic rule of honorification (*see sections 7.2.0 -7.2.4*). She also imagines the Emperor's self-definition: she suggests that the Emperor would not have referred to himself exclusively (e.g. using Imperial first-person pronoun, *chin*; *see section 6.4.1*). Secondly, she also exalts the Emperor's imaginary actions. For instance, 'to leave' in line 3 is '*o-nokoshi-ninaru*' with a verb form with a beautification prefix, and 'to think' in line 6 is '*omoi-o-na-saru*' with '*-sa-reru*', a supplemental verb. She uses a complex mixture of formal and informal grammatical constructions to portray the Emperor speaking of himself.

In these extracts, the Imperial death is not formulated as distinguished by exclusive terms, but rather inclusively, a fatal event of human lives. Although referring to it with different degrees of politeness (i.e. '*shi-nu*' or '*naku-naru*'), neither liberal speakers nor conventional royalists use *hogyo*. To confirm this point, we may consider the same interviewer's questions for the young editor (i.e. 8.6.1.1) and the business executives (i.e. 8.6.2.2).

8.6.3. Speech Accommodation and More

We have seen that the same interviewer accommodates his speech levels (*see sections 6.4.0-6.4.4, 7.4.1 and 7.5.0*). In asking different interviewees about Hirohito's death (and funeral), the interviewer uses different death terms. As an example, a few seconds after 8.6.1.1 (with the young liberal editor; D), the interviewer is talking of the media's self-restraint (*jishuku*), regarding music, dance and comedy programmes at the time of Hirohito's illness or death. The liberal editor says that he could not understand why there was such a 'general atmosphere' over society. Next, the interviewer replies as 8.6.3.1.

(8.6.3.1)

S Don't [you] understand the reason [of the self-restraint], due to a ***shi*** of an old man?

The interviewer appears to accommodate to the interviewee's use of *shi-nu* (i.e. line 1 of 8.6.1.1) In this context, the interviewer uses its noun form, which is formulated as an objective death of 'an old man', rather than a dignified person on the throne.

Extract 8.6.3.2 below is a part of the discourse which was examined in the previous 'naming' and 'honorifics' chapters: the interview with a retired business executive and his wife. The young interviewer is posing an interview question about some Imperial events (i.e. 6.4.3.1, 6.5.0.1 and 7.4.1.1).

(8.6.3.2)

1. S I would like to ask (*hum.*) [some] familiar things, for example (.) at the
2. time of the wedding of *Kotaishi* and *Masako-san* and, eeh (.) the
3. wedding of *Heika* and current *Kogo Heika* which you watched (*exal.*),
4. as well as, mm (.) and the time when the previous *Tenno* ***naku-***
5. ***naru***...

Questioning the retired business executive and his wife, the interviewer honours the interviewee (*see sections 6.5,0 and 7.4.1*) and chooses appropriate namings for the Imperials (*see section 6.5.0*). In so doing, the interviewer refers to Hirohito's death in a politer term in line 4 (i.e. *naku-naru*) than when he is talking with the young editor (i.e. *shi-nu*). There are two examples in which the same interviewer accommodates to the interlocutors, which also confirms the finding in the previous section.

It is predictable that the use of death terms by the same person in the same series of discourse might be flexible. In the following discourse, the film director who once met Empress Michiko talks of Hirohito's death. In the previous conversation, the film makers are talking of the 'human rights of Imperials' (i.e. Extract 8.6.2.1). The couple claim that due to their positions, the Imperials are limited in their 'free speech'. In previous conversations, the couple talk of the lack of information that prevents

appropriate evaluation of Hirohito's reign, since either the Emperor was prohibited from speaking or he did not want to speak to the public about politically controversial matters. (cf. Extract 8.6.2.2)

(8.6.3.3)

1. M It's a violation of human rights....
2. N ⌊ There is still [remaining] question what *Showa Tenno* really
3. thought, isn't it? However, *Tenno* maintained not to speak a single
4. → word until [he] ***shi-nu***, because [he] had been disciplined to do so
5. (not to speak what he really thought)...

The wife (N) says that the Emperor's silence was not a matter of 'free speech', but rather the discipline he was given. In this regard, the death is a remarkable event for a person who keeps a 'disciplined' life, since it is his/her final achievement to accomplish his/her given life style. In line 4, this remarkable event of (disciplined) Hirohito is referred to as *shi-nu*, although the same speaker used *naku-naru* previously (i.e. 8.6.2.1). Therefore, we may see that it is conventional for the speaker to see the death (*shi*) as a remarkable but objective fact for the disciplined person (*see section 7.4.1*). While N's namings to Hirohito are almost consistent in this series of discourses (i.e. *Showa Tenno*, *Tenno*), inclusive death terms vary. In 8.6.2.1, the Emperor died (*naku-naru*; category 'd') as a wealthy man, and in 8.6.3.3, the same Emperor died (*shi-nu*; category 'e') as a well disciplined man. In this way, similar to discursive practices of naming and honorification, the selection of death terms may vary according to context. Thus, the use of inclusive death terms is not determined grammatically, but is flexibly used in discursive (continuous) negotiations between the speakers and hearers about the status of the Emperor.

8.7.0. Conclusion

In this chapter, we have examined firstly the terms which are used to describe the death of the Emperor, and secondly the terms which are used in the mainstream newspapers and the contexts of the usages. Amongst various terms for death, we pay particular attention to the term referring almost exclusively to the Emperor. According to one of

the mainstream papers, the use of this term, *hogyo*, is legitimised since it is a part of historical and cultural properties, but it is also a re-adaptation of pre-war Imperial terminology in the post-war period (Hobsbawm, 1983). Comparison with the mainstream papers and a left-wing press has made this point clear. Although, the death terms on the front page of the mainstream papers describe the Emperor's death as an outstanding event, in later pages, we have seen that his death is referred to inclusively, when Hirohito's humanity is emphasised. Therefore, we could point out the ideological dilemmas (Billig *et al.*, 1988) of Hirohito: formal and informal, exclusive and inclusive, superiority and humanity and so forth. In the inner pages of the mainstream papers, the terms and rhetorical organisations are not the same as on the front pages. It is found that the Emperor's humanity and informality tend to be stressed with less formal terms. We also re-examined the interview data, and found it is not conventional for interview participants to use the exclusive formal term for the Emperor's death. They use inclusive death terms referring to the Emperor's death. What has to be noted is that within a range of 'inclusive death terms', speakers may shift the terms and flexibly organise their discourse.

Here, we need to reconfirm some theoretical points. To analyse media discourse, many studies point out the importance of media framings (e.g. Glasgow University Media Group, 1976; Tuchman, 1978; Said, 1981; Maynard, 1997a). To analyse newspapers' framings, we may pay attention to the layout and spaces of the news, such as headline, pictures and so on. From discursive points of view, what is more, it is helpful to look at the use of particular language. Therefore, in this chapter, we have seen the descriptions of the Emperor's death in the media and conversation. As an example of the discursive technique of using various terms, a part of this chapter has explored the use of quotation as a distancing rhetorical device.

In order to see the relations between the media and modern monarchism, we need to consider some more points. Anderson (1983) claims that the size of the media in industrial (developed) nations is large enough for their audiences to guarantee sharing the same information. In this way, the psychological background of national unity can be organised by shared nation-wide media discourses. Billig (1995) also claims that

subtle but repeated emphasis of the 'national we' in the media discourse formulates national awareness amongst the nation. To see monarchism in the historical context, Cannadine (1983) points out that the popular media have played one of the key roles in promoting the modern monarchy as a glorious social institution, portraying it as a symbol of the national unity. The development of radio broadcasting has also helped to invent new tradition for the monarchy, such as Christmas Messages. To quote Cannadine, it is 'emphatic proof of the monarchy's new and unique capacity to call in the old world to redress the balance of the new' (p 124; cf. Martin, 1936, 1962). In other words, modern monarchical ideology needs the (constant) support of the popular media, which (repeatedly) stresses the historical continuity and symbolic value of the person on the throne.

As mentioned, Hirohito was the first Emperor to die in a 'democratic' mass society. As one might expect, it is necessary for modern Imperialists to re-establish a new 'tradition' which supports Imperial superiority under egalitarian social norms. Since Hirohito did not die as an absolute monarch, we found a variety of ways of describing his death in the 'big three' newspapers. In the front pages of the mainstream press, his death was represented as an exclusive event being referred to as *hogyo*. Framings of the event are almost identical, which emphasises the formality and constituency of the Japanese monarchism. However, not all death terms are *hogyo*, especially in the inner pages where less formal (inclusive) death terms are frequently found.

Needless to say, since a monarch is a human being on the throne, death is inescapable for him/her. Even for an absolute monarchist, who believes in the Divine Right of Kings, a monarch is not immortal. In past ages, monarchical ideology has developed ideas to justify the death of a monarch. In this way, the process of succession has been given a special significance within the ideological structure (cf. Frazer, 1890/1994; Shils and Young, 1956; Jennings and Madge (eds.), 1936; Cannadine, 1983). With regard to modern monarchical ideology, however, the death of the monarch can be considered as an occasion which reinforces the individual human quality (or personality) of the (deceased) monarch (e.g. Martin, 1936; Ziegler, 1978). In this respect, in this chapter, we have found that the pro-monarchical discourse is

accompanied by praises for the Emperor's personality. In this way, today's Emperor system is not established only upon the formality of the institutionalised system (which requires '*hogyo*' discourse), but also the personality/individuality of the monarch (which requires 'non-*hogyo*' discourse).

In addition, evaluative discourse on Hirohito's life in non-*hogyo* type formulations, is often found in pro- and anti-monarchical contexts. For instance, Mainichi-10.1, Asahi-15.1 and Mainichi-11.1 use pro-monarchy discourse, which positively evaluates the human quality of Hirohito. In contrast, articles of the Communist paper criticise the Emperor's personality, and negatively evaluates his personality and the Imperial system (e.g. Akahata-1.1). In terms of conversational data, we have examined non-*hogyo* formulations of liberals and conventional royalists. Liberal people often negatively evaluate the Hirohito and his father's personalities, for instance, as a person who did not apologise for his faults (8.6.1.2) or as someone who was mentally ill (8.6.1.3). For conventional royalists, for instance, the Emperor could be a wealthy man (8.6.2.1) or a key person of modern history (8.6.2.2).

Both in pro- and anti-monarchical discourses, there are various death descriptions which formulate fragments of ideological resources (Billig, 1992). Also, the dilemma of modern monarchism (e.g. Hirohito's superiority and humanity) is found in the different language uses and their contexts. Solely stressing the formality of the monarchy leads to the risk of being criticised as anachronistic (i.e. Akahata-1.1 and Akahata-3.1). Therefore, pro-monarchical discourse must emphasise the informality (i.e. personality) of the Emperor as a property (shared by the nation), and employ non-*hogyo* terms. This is similar to what Billig calls 'royal credit' discourse which calculates the privileges and restrictions of royal life (*see section 2.4.5*). Hirohito's superiority (or 'dignity') and human qualities ('familiarity') are carefully balanced by the mainstream newspapers. In this way, the variety of death terms can be seen as fragments of a kaleidoscope of common-sense (Billig, 1992).

Chapter 9

Empire of Rhetorics

- Summary and Development -

9.1.0. Question and Framework

This thesis has explored social psychological and discursive aspects of Japanese monarchism. The starting point of the investigation was the simple question of why non-privileged people seem to accept this institutionalised inequality. As seen in section 3.3.0, young American new-dealers attempted to democratise the Empire of the Sun. Since then, post-war Japan has been, to some extent, distinct from the old Empire and appears to be a 'democratic' nation state based on people's sovereignty. At the same time, for more than fifty years, this 'democratic' nation has retained a throne for a particular family. Most of the Japanese population belongs exclusively to the post-war era, and these democratic minded people, who believe in people's sovereignty, seem to accept this social reality. This is a similar situation to the UK, another example of a 'democratic' kingdom, which preserves extra-ordinary positions for the Royal House of Windsor.

Several thinkers have proposed ideas to account for the dilemma: monarchism based on inequality and democracy based on egalitarianism. As seen in **Chapters 2** and **3**, these studies have looked at historical, political, economic, sociological and/or psychological aspects of the contradictory institutionalised realities in Britain and Japan. The reviews of studies illustrate a gap between studies of the British and Japanese monarchies. The social constructionist approach employed by British discursive psychologists enables the analysis of the ordinary people's voice. Discursive

psychology is a study of language use which consists of people's 'thoughts' (see **Chapter 4**); and through the analyses of monarchical discourses, British psychologists have examined this dilemmatic social reality from non-privileged (non-intellectual) people's points of view. This thesis has attempted to fill the gap between British and Japanese studies, by employing the analytical frameworks developed in Britain to investigate how non-privileged Japanese people accounted for (or constructed) the social reality. In order to do so, I have attempted detailed qualitative analyses of Japanese talk and texts, which concerned the Emperor and the Emperor system.

9.2.0. Naming for Rhetorical Purpose

In **Chapter 6**, I looked at the interview data, and analysed participants' naming practices for the Emperor and Imperials. There are more complicated naming systems in Japanese than English. Due to the taboo of direct namings, Japanese develops indirect suggestiveness for self and other referent terms, and in Japanese discourse, people's actual and hypothetical social roles are often used for the naming (e.g. father/mother in family situation). In particular, a Japanese person frequently refers to a given person according to his/her role within a fictive family relationship ('fictive kinship terms'; Suzuki, 1978). These indirect namings have implications of power structures, reflecting the imputative social roles. Furthermore, popular Japanese suffixes (i.e. *-san* and *-sama*) imply power relations as well as in-/out-group membership distinctions (Harada, 1976; Loveday, 1986). In other words, the naming system of Japanese almost always encodes power relations of speaker-addressee, speaker-referent and addressee-referent simultaneously. In addition, the exclusive term which refers to the Japanese monarch, *Tenno*, and the Imperial title of honour, *Heika*, exalt the monarchy in conversations and texts.

It can be seen from the examination of the data that there is a considerable amount of variation in naming the Emperor, as used by right- and left-wing people. Generally speaking, an Imperial title of honour, *Heika* (Majesty) is the key term for paying deference to the Emperor. Right-wing speakers tended to employ *Heika* to refer to the Emperor as individual monarchs. Although a right-winger referred to Emperor

Hirohito by his first name and in consequence violated the 'taboo of direct namings', he carefully used this Imperial title of honour, and his naming for the late Emperor was attributed as a polite naming because of its discursive contexts. On the other hand, liberal people tended not to employ this title of honour.

To a certain extent, it was found that the theory of speech accommodation (Giles and Smith 1979; Giles, Coupland and Coupland, 1991) accounted for variability in a speaker's naming practices. For instance, the same interviewer converged to the prototypical namings of right- and left-wingers, when he posed initial prepared questions. However, there were further variations of namings in the data, and speech accommodation theory seemed not to be sufficient. For example, a conventional royalist named the Emperor as *Tenno Heika* (H.M.Emperor) and *ano-hito* (that man) within the same discourse. Although the speaker retained his pro-monarchy view, his naming practice was inconsistent, and these different namings encoded different power implications. Qualitative discursive examinations revealed that the speaker employed contradictory rhetorical common-places of modern Emperorship: its ordinary and extra-ordinary qualities. A single naming practice (for instance, which solely exalts the Emperor) was not sufficient for the 'ideological dilemma' (Billig *et al.*, 1988) or 'sociological ambiguity' (Merton, 1976) of modern conventional monarchism. A number of namings were required to represent dilemmatic aspects of Hirohito.

Furthermore, detailed examinations of discourse suggested other notable findings: through the analysis of different namings of the Emperor, it was observed that speakers (implicitly) negotiated the positions (and group memberships) of the speaker, addressee and the Emperor simultaneously. Examining a variety of namings and their contexts, it was found that the Emperor could be represented as an official figure (*Tenno Heika*), that man (*ano-hito*) or even a fictive uncle (*ojisama*). Using different namings in the argument, for instance, a speaker might (or might not) implicitly refer to fictive relationships between their own family and the Imperial Family. In this way, naming devices encoded relations, and their rhetorical performance greatly contributed to the organisation of Japanese (Imperial) discourse. This is a part of the everyday

construction of the institutional reality, and it is also a part of people's acceptance of the social inequality.

9.2.1. Japanese Honorifics in Imperial Discourse

Chapter 7 concerned the use of honorifics. Japanese has developed the complicated grammar of honorifics (e.g. beautification prefix, verb-endings, copulas, supplemental verb forms), which linguistically signify status differences of speaker-addressee, speaker-referent and addressee-referent relationships. In other words, the Japanese grammar of honorifics often conveys meta-messages of exaltation of addressee and/or referent as well as speaker's humility in relation to the addressee/referent. Some pragmatists note that Japanese honorifics are not only devices to reduce threat to the participants' face (Brown and Levinson, 1978), but rather, they are relation-acknowledgement devices (Matsumoto, 1988).

Several Japanese linguistic and socio-linguistic studies (e.g. Morean, 1988; Loveday, 1986) have pointed out 'codes of politeness', established on social distinctions of 'out-groupness', 'position', 'age' and 'sex'. Considering such distinctions, Japanese speakers have to encode power implications in their talk and texts, amongst speaker, addressee and/or referent. It is, at the same time, necessary for them to deal with competing demands of politeness which conflict with one another. In theory, there is a potential dilemma for a Japanese speaker, if he/she addresses an SSS ('socially superior to speaker'; Harada, 1976) whilst referring to another SSS. When a speaker talks with an SSS, the linguistic codes require him/her to humble him/herself or to exalt his/her addressee (speaker ≈R≈ ADDRESSEE). A Japanese speaker also humbles him/herself or exalts an SSS referent (speaker ≈R≈ REFERENT). However, these codes potentially cause a dilemma for the speaker, if his/her addressee and referent are both SSSs. In particular, it is a dilemma for a Japanese speaker whether to describe an SSS addressee's respect for an SSS referent. When the speaker refers to the addressee's humble actions in relation to an honourable addressee, (addressee ≈R≈ REFERENT), the speaker may grammatically imply that the addressee's position is inferior to the speaker's self (speaker ≈R≈ addressee). In doing so, the speaker linguistically dishonours

an SSS. With regard to the analysis of monarchical discourses, this situation could occur when a speaker refers to the (respectful) Emperor in relation to the (honourable) addressee.

According to the examination of data, right-wingers tended to honour the Emperor to a greater extent than liberal speakers. Also, to some extent, speech accommodation theory accounted for different levels of politeness. For instance, when posing initial interview questions, the same interviewer converged his honorific grammar for the Emperor to prototypical levels of different interlocutors. However, people inconsistently used a great number of ways to honour (or dishonour) the Emperor in the conversational data. In this way, the Japanese grammar of honorifics represented the speaker's ideological power relationship, but less significantly so than in the way of naming devices. The codes of politeness are not fixed rules of speech. Close analyses showed that they were used as parts of rhetorical dynamics in conversations. This rhetoric was used to subtly negotiate the relative positions of the speaker in relation to the Emperor and the addressee.

As seen in the chapter on naming, conventional royalists employed a variety of naming practices to refer to the Emperor. From the point of view of honorific grammar, this variety causes dilemmas, because the codes of politeness for 'the respectable Emperor' (e.g. *Tenno Heika*) and an ordinary person (e.g. *ano-hito*) can be in conflict. In the conversation, in acknowledging a relationship, the grammar of honorifics harmonised with namings. Furthermore, another example suggested that there were further negotiations about the status amongst the participants. When right-wingers (who are most likely to honour the monarch) referred to Emperor/Imperials, their commands of honorifics sometimes implied not only their own relationship with the Emperor/Imperials, but also their relationship with the addressees. For instance, when the status of a right-wing speaker was implicitly down-graded by a less powerful interviewer (interviewer ≈R≈ right-winger), in his reply to the interviewer, the right-winger neither linguistically exalted Imperials nor humbled himself (right-winger ≈R≈ imperial). By representing his 'equal status' with the Imperials in his discourse, the right-wing

speaker indirectly claimed his relatively higher status in relation to the interviewer (interviewer ≈R≈ right-winger).

Using the encoded power structures of honorific grammar as 'relation-acknowledgement devices' (Matsumoto, 1988), Japanese participants continuously negotiated their own positions within the discursive contexts. The right-winger's example suggested that a Japanese speaker was not always a strict follower of the rules of 'acknowledgement', but he/she could use them rhetorically, for particular purposes in particular contexts. The right-wing speaker, for example, subtly (and indirectly) negotiated the relative status of the interviewer and himself, whereas he was only concerned with an Imperial matter in his discourse.

Uses of honorifications (and naming devices), therefore, often reflected contradictory common-places of Japanese monarchism and signified discursive power relationships in mundane conversations. Japanese people's command of naming and honorifics are two aspects of a 'kaleidoscope of common-sense' (Billig, 1992). Also, series of analyses show that, from a theoretical point of view, analysts necessitate the grammatical analysis, in order to analyse discursive interactions in a grammatically complex language, such as Japanese. Japanese speakers often (implicitly) use these grammatical features for rhetorical purposes.

9.2.2. Making News, Tradition and the Emperor

In **Chapter 8**, an exclusive term for the Emperor found in Japanese newspaper articles was examined. In the mainstream press, Hirohito's death in January, 1989, was described by an exclusive term for the Emperor's death, *hogyo*. Looking at these contexts, it was found that the exclusive term was a significant part of the construction of social reality, which Hobsbawm (1983) called 'invention of tradition' (see also Cannadine, 1983). Both qualitative and quantitative analyses of the articles illustrated that the front pages of the mainstream dailies identically framed the news event, with the exclusive term and maximised linguistic codes of politeness. What has to be noted is that the pro-monarchy mainstream press did not describe the Emperor's death solely

by the exclusive terminology; in inner pages, they often used a variety of inclusive (casual) death terms.

The organ of the Japan Communist Party was also analysed both qualitatively and quantitatively. Through the comparison between the mainstream and the JCP presses, some differences were highlighted. The JCP paper, which criticised Hirohito himself and attitudes of government and the mainstream press, framed the news event quite differently and tended to use inclusive death terms (i.e. non-*hogyo* terms) and grammars which did not exalt the Emperor.

Detailed qualitative examinations illustrated that when the JCP press used *hogyo* and when the mainstream press used non-*hogyo* formulations, they often employed 'reported speech'. To be more precise, when the JCP referred to the Emperor's death by *hogyo*, it was always represented as a part of someone else's statement to be criticised, such as Conservative politicians or uncritical exaltations of the Emperor by mainstream 'commercial journalism'. On the other hand, when the mainstream press used non-*hogyo* terms, they were often signified as discourses by out-siders, such as a non-Japanese journalist or a young (immature) girl. It was implied that some kinds of people are permitted not to use *hogyo* in referring to the Emperor's death. Therefore, both the mainstream press and the JCP distanced themselves from the original uses of the terminologies.

Furthermore, the mainstream press sometimes did not distance itself from the uses of casual terms. Particularly in the inner pages, they were keen to report humanistic aspects of the late Emperor, and often employed casual terms to refer to the death of the mortal. As seen, there are ordinary and extra-ordinary aspects of the modern constitutional monarchy. The personal background of Hirohito, who had been a living god in the Empire of the Sun, and later became a human monarch, was full of dilemmas of this kind. In the inner pages, it was found that human aspects of Hirohito's life were often emphasised with inclusive terms. For instance, he was a 'respectable person', 'peaceful old gentleman' or 'honourable father', who died inclusively. These formulations never damaged his extra-ordinariness. Or rather, these

inclusive formulations were used to reinforce the extra-ordinary quality of the ordinary person. Examinations of exclusive and inclusive terms and these contexts illustrated the ideological dilemma of modern monarchism.

What is more, examination of conversational data revealed that conventionalists and left-wingers did not use *hogyo*. They referred to the death of the Emperor somewhat inclusively, and to a certain extent, there were variations in the use of the inclusive death terms. In a similar way to the uses of namings and honorifics, the same interviewer converged his use of terms for left-wingers and conventionalist interviewees. Also, according to the analyses, left-wingers referred to the Emperor's death inclusively in critical contexts, and in so doing, the monarch's death was represented as just a mortal death. Conventional royalists, on the other hand, referred to the Emperor's death by inclusive language but emphasised the human qualities of Hirohito, such as being a wealthy, noteworthy or disciplined person. One could, in this way, point out the dilemma or ambiguity of the post-war Emperor system: according to the modern monarchism, a monarch can be referred to as an ordinary and/or extra-ordinary mortal simultaneously. Employing the contradictory common-places, people (and newspapers) co-operatively construct the dilemmatic social reality.

9.3.0. Summary and Development

To sum up, Japanese is a relation conscious language which is quite sensitive about speaker-addressee, speaker-referent and addressee-referent relationships. Japanese has detailed codes of politeness which are fundamental to Japanese speech, and which have little in parallel with English discourse. To put it another way, Japanese conversation and texts often encode power relations as meta-messages in speech, according to, for instance, different naming devices and honorifics. I have also reviewed the contradictory common-places, which form modern monarchism, such as the Emperor's ordinary and extra-ordinary characters; and I have found that they are used as ideological resources when referring to modern Emperor system. These common-places were not always conveyed explicitly, but often voiced implicitly through the features of Japanese language. Through the detailed analysis of Imperial discourse, we

have viewed explicit and implicit rhetorical constructions of contemporary monachical ideology in today's 'democratic' Japan.

Through the analyses from the discursive psychological point of view, we have found that: (1) linguistic theory of speech accommodation can account for some of the variabilities of codes of politeness in practice. However, there can be conflicts between the contradictory demands of honour, for instance, representing honourable addressee's respect for the Emperor. In this way, any linguistic theory, which considers the code of the honour as a fixed framework, is not sufficient to explain all aspects of the variabilities in real conversations. On the other hand: (2) micro-detailed analysis of discourse illustrated the presence of contradictory common-places (theme and its counter-theme) in people's actual talk. Discursive psychology, which analyses the rhetorical dynamism of people's discourse, showed how non-privileged people accept the inequality (i.e. 'pro-monarchy attitude') under the egalitarian social norms. Referring to a variety of socially shared knowledges (i.e. common-sense), people justify, mitigate and make sense of their own non-privileged positions.

I believe the contributions of this thesis can be summarised as follows:

- This thesis has, to a certain extent, filled the gap between Japanese and British monarchical studies, analysing the institutional reality, from ordinary people's points of view.
- In consequence, this thesis has pointed out the rhetorical natures (i.e. ideological dilemma) of today's Japanese Emperor system.
- This thesis is one of the early attempts to apply discursive psychology to Japanese talk and texts, and linguistic systems of 'relation-acknowledgement' (naming and honorifics) in Japanese have been examined discursively. A series of analyses has revealed that these systems are not always strict rules to be followed, but people often use them for rhetorical purposes. In mundane conversations, people use these systems pragmatically.
- In this regard, one may claim that in order to analyse complicated non-English discourse, such as Japanese, discursive psychologists should pay attention to grammatical analyses.

These theoretical frameworks and techniques, such as complicated Japanese codes of politeness ('relation acknowledgement functions'), and, indeed, discursive psychology (discourse analysis), would be applicable for further analyses of several contradictory social realities in Japan. For instance, other discriminations under egalitarianism: discriminations against Japanese-Koreans, under-class people, people originating from the former untouchable caste and so on. Through discursive examinations, linguistic functions which implicitly down-grade these discriminated groups of people could be analysed (cf. Wetherell and Potter, 1992). In this way, such studies could look at our society's dilemma between egalitarianism and inequality, and portray how the inequalities have been reproduced through mundane talk.

Apart from the dilemma of 'equality and inequality', there are, I believe, several other dilemmas to be analysed from discursive/rhetorical points of view. One of them is a conflict between individuality and group membership, such as traits of Japanese-ness. Japanese often refer to some stereotypical self-images (e.g. diligent, efficient, high level of sanitary consciousness, well educated), but needless to say, there are a great number of differences in the group, 'Japanese'. I am particularly interested in the Japanese 'myth' of homogeneous single-racial nationhood (Oguma, 1995). Unlike the US and UK, having almost identical skin, hair and eye colours, the Japanese tend to believe that their nation is constituted of a single cultural and racial group. In this way, by looking at the people's discourse about their own nationhood, I believe discursive psychology could contribute to investigating how Japanese-ness and their group identities are constructed based on their shared 'myth' of homogeneity (cf. Edwards, 1991, 1998; Billig, 1995).

9.4.0. Empire of Rhetorics

Let us, finally, consider the future of monarchism from a discursive/rhetorical point of view. Well known fairy tales often have rich implications, even for academic studies. The protagonist of the story concerned is, coincidentally, an Emperor, too.

> ... all the people standing by, and those at the windows, cried out, "Oh! How beautiful are our Emperor's new clothes! What a magnificent train there is to the mantle; and how gracefully the scarf hangs!" in short, no one would allow that he could not see these much-admired clothes; because, in doing so, he would have declared himself either a simpleton or unfit for his office.
>
> (Andersen/Project Gutenberg, 1999)

According to *The Emperor's New Clothes*, all people including the Emperor claimed that the clothes were visible and magnificent, because *they believed they had to view them in that way.* From a constructionist's point of view, social realities (e.g. monarchy) have something in common with the 'invisible clothes' since both of them are discursively constructed. As seen, Japanese speakers and newspapers (explicitly and implicitly) put 'rhetorical overcoats' on the Emperor.

The bedtime story gives some lessons, for instance, under certain circumstances, people's discourse can be controlled against their intentions. Through a series of analyses, we have learnt further lessons. First of all, the conceptual 'robes' of Hirohito and Akihito were made from certain materials, rhetorical common-places. Secondly, unlike the poor fairy tale Emperor, it was claimed that Hirohito's clothes were not only beautiful, magnificent or graceful, but also 'ordinary'. If merely the Emperor's extra-ordinary aspects were emphasised, the monarchism would be vulnerable in our modern society. Hirohito was not only a monarch, he was, *in reality*, just an old man.

Through the analyses, we have reached a certain place in overviewing the structure of the inequality. The ordinariness and extra-ordinariness of the monarch constitute a firm ideological structure. These contradictory images of the Emperor are orchestrated through mundane discursive interactions. In order to reconstruct better social realities, there is also a suggestive lesson from the fairy tale.

> "But the Emperor has nothing at all on!" said a little child.
>
> "Listen to the voice of innocence!" exclaimed his father; and what the child had said was whispered from one to another. (ibid.)

As seen in the analytical chapters, we have already shared the 'voice of innocence' in the modern 'Empire of Rhetorics', for instance the fragments of 'common-sense' such as the ordinary aspects of the Emperor. The first step to change the present contradictions is to recognise the rhetorical natures of the social reality. For the next step, those who are brave and good rhetoricians are expected to represent another form of reality. If their voices or arguments are persuasive enough (like the father), they may turn the 'kaleidoscope of common-sense' (Billig, 1992) further, and represent another (and hopefully, better) social reality for current and future generations.

Appendix 1-1

Guide to the Transcript

- Notations Used -

⌊	overlapping
= (before utterance)	utterances continue without delay
= (after utterance)	unclear completing intonation
<u>underline</u>	stressed by a speaker
↑	rise in intonation
?	rising intonation for question form
: / ::	extended vowel sound
(0.5)	timed pause
(.)	untimed pause
[square brackets]	supplemental information for translation
((double brackets))	non-verbal action performed
(round brackets)	additional grammatical information
. / ... (full stop)	completing intonation
... (before utterance)	uttered silently at beginning
bold type	grammatical feature concerned

Appendix 2-1

Pre-War Constitution (Extract)

CONSTITUTION OF THE EMPIRE OF JAPAN, 1889

Imperial Oath Sworn in the Sanctuary in the Imperial Palace (Tsuge-bumi)
We, the Successor to the prosperous Throne of Our Predecessors, do humbly and solemnly swear to the Imperial Founder of Our House and to Our other Imperial Ancestors that, in pursuance of a great policy co-extensive with the Heavens and with the Earth, We shall maintain and secure from decline the ancient form of government.

In consideration of the progressive tendency of the course of human affairs and in parallel with the advance of civilization, We deem it expedient, in order to give clearness and distinctness to the instructions bequeathed by the Imperial Founder of Our House and by Our other Imperial Ancestors, to establish fundamental laws formulated into express provisions of law, so that, on the one hand, Our Imperial posterity may possess an express guide for the course they are to follow, and that, on the other, Our subjects shall thereby be enabled to enjoy a wider range of action in giving Us their support, and that the observance of Our laws shall continue to the remotest ages of time. We will thereby to give [*sic*] greater firmness to the stability of Our country and to promote [*sic*] the welfare of all the people within the boundaries of Our dominions; and We now establish the Imperial House Law and the Constitution. These Laws come to only an exposition of grand precepts for the conduct of the government, bequeathed by the Imperial Founder of Our House and by Our other Imperial Ancestors. That we have been so fortunate in Our reign, in keeping with the

tendency of the times, as to accomplish this work, We owe to the glorious Spirits of the Imperial Founder of Our House and of Our other Imperial Ancestors.

We now reverently make Our prayer to Them and to Our Illustrious Father, and implore the help of Their Sacred Spirits, and make to Them solemn oath never at this time nor in the future to fail to be an example to our subjects in the observance of the Laws hereby established.

May the heavenly Spirits witness this Our solemn Oath.

Imperial Rescript on the Promulgation of the Constitution

Whereas We make it the joy and glory of Our heart to behold the prosperity of Our country, and the welfare of Our subjects, We do hereby, in virtue of the Supreme power We inherit from Our Imperial Ancestors, promulgate the present immutable fundamental law, for the sake of Our present subjects and their descendants.

The Imperial Founder of Our House and Our other Imperial ancestors, by the help and support of the forefathers of Our subjects, laid the foundation of Our Empire upon a basis, which is to last forever. That this brilliant achievement embellishes the annals of Our country, is due to the glorious virtues of Our Sacred Imperial ancestors, and to the loyalty and bravery of Our subjects, their love of their country and their public spirit. Considering that Our subjects are the descendants of the loyal and good subjects of Our Imperial Ancestors, We doubt not but that Our subjects will be guided by Our views, and will sympathize with all Our endeavors, and that, harmoniously cooperating together, they will share with Us Our hope of making manifest the glory of Our country, both at home and abroad, and of securing forever the stability of the work bequeathed to Us by Our Imperial Ancestors.

Preamble or Edict (Joyu)

Having, by virtue of the glories of Our Ancestors, ascended the throne of a lineal succession unbroken for ages eternal; desiring to promote the welfare of, and to give development to the moral and intellectual faculties of Our beloved subjects, the very

same that have been favored with the benevolent care and affectionate vigilance of Our Ancestors; and hoping to maintain the prosperity of the State, in concert with Our people and with their support, We hereby promulgate, in pursuance of Our Imperial Rescript of the 12th day of the 10th month of the 14th year of Meiji, a fundamental law of the State, to exhibit the principles, by which We are guided in Our conduct, and to point out to what Our descendants and Our subjects and their descendants are forever to conform. The right of sovereignty of the State, We have inherited from Our Ancestors, and We shall bequeath them to Our descendants. Neither We nor they shall in the future fail to wield them, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution hereby granted.

...

CHAPTER I. THE EMPEROR

Article 1. The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.

Article 2. The Imperial Throne shall be succeeded to by Imperial male descendants, according to the provisions of the Imperial House Law.

Article 3. The Emperor is sacred and inviolable.

Article 4. The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them, according to the provisions of the present Constitution.

Article 5. The Emperor exercises the legislative power with the consent of the Imperial Diet.

Article 6. The Emperor gives sanction to laws, and orders them to be promulgated and executed.

Article 7. The Emperor convokes the Imperial Diet, opens, closes, and prorogues it, and dissolves the House of Representatives.

Article 8. The Emperor, in consequence of an urgent necessity to maintain public safety or to avert public calamities, issues, when the Imperial Diet is not sitting, Imperial ordinances in the place of law. (2) Such Imperial Ordinances are to be laid before the Imperial Diet at its next session, and when the Diet does not approve the said Ordinances, the Government shall declare them to be invalid for the future.

Article 9. The Emperor issues or causes to be issued, the Ordinances necessary for the carrying out of the laws, or for the maintenance of the public peace and order, and for the promotion of the welfare of the subjects. But no Ordinance shall in any way alter any of the existing laws.

Article 10. The Emperor determines the organization of the different branches of the administration, and salaries of all civil and military officers, and appoints and dismisses the same. Exceptions especially provided for in the present Constitution or in other laws, shall be in accordance with the respective provisions (bearing thereon).

Article 11. The Emperor has the supreme command of the Army and Navy.

Article 12. The Emperor determines the organization and peace standing of the Army and Navy.

Article 13. The Emperor declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties.

Article 14. The Emperor declares a state of siege. (2) The conditions and effects of a state of siege shall be determined by law.

Article 15. The Emperor confers titles of nobility, rank, orders and other marks of honor.

Article 16. The Emperor orders amnesty, pardon, commutation of punishments and rehabilitation.

Article 17. A Regency shall be instituted in conformity with the provisions of the Imperial House Law. (2) The Regent shall exercise the powers appertaining to the Emperor in His name.

CHAPTER II. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF SUBJECTS

Article 18. The conditions necessary for being a Japanese subject shall be determined by law.

Article 19. Japanese subjects may, according to qualifications determined in laws or ordinances, be appointed to civil or military or any other public offices equally.

Article 20. Japanese subjects are amenable to service in the Army or Navy, according to the provisions of law.

Article 21. Japanese subjects are amenable to the duty of paying taxes, according to the provisions of law.

Article 22. Japanese subjects shall have the liberty of abode and of changing the same

within the limits of the law.

Article 23. No Japanese subject shall be arrested, detained, tried or punished, unless according to law.

Article 24. No Japanese subject shall be deprived of his right of being tried by the judges determined by law.

Article 25. Except in the cases provided for in the law, the house of no Japanese subject shall be entered or searched without his consent.

Article 26. Except in the cases mentioned in the law, the secrecy of the letters of every Japanese subject shall remain inviolate.

Article 27. The right of property of every Japanese subject shall remain inviolate. (2) Measures necessary to be taken for the public benefit shall be any provided for by law.

Article 28. Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief.

Article 29. Japanese subjects shall, within the limits of law, enjoy the liberty of speech, writing, publication, public meetings and associations.

Article 30. Japanese subjects may present petitions, by observing the proper forms of respect, and by complying with the rules specially provided for the same.

Article 31. The provisions contained in the present Chapter shall not affect the exercises of the powers appertaining to the Emperor, in times of war or in cases of a national emergency.

Article 32. Each and every one of the provisions contained in the preceding Articles of the present Chapter, that are not in conflict with the laws or the rules and discipline of the Army and Navy, shall apply to the officers and men of the Army and of the Navy.

...

(Project Gutenberg (ed.), 1996)

Appendix 2-2

Post-War Constitution (Extract)

THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, 1946

(Promulgated on November 3, 1946; Put into effect on May 3, 1947)

FOREWORD

We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this Constitution. Government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives of the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people. This is a universal principle of mankind upon which this Constitution is founded. We reject and revoke all constitutions, laws, ordinances, and prescripts in conflict here with. We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want. We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that laws of political morality are universal; and

that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations. We, the Japanese people, pledge our national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources.

CHAPTER I. THE EMPEROR

Article 1. The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.

Article 2. The Imperial Throne shall be dynastic and succeeded to in accordance with the Imperial House law passed by the Diet.

Article 3. The advice and approval of the Cabinet shall be required for all acts of the Emperor in matters of state, and the Cabinet shall be responsible therefor.

Article 4. The Emperor shall perform only such acts in matters of state as are provided for in this Constitution and he shall not have powers related to government. (2) The Emperor may delegate the performance of his acts in matters of state as may be provided by law.

Article 5. When, in accordance with the Imperial House law, a Regency is established, the Regent shall perform his acts in matter of state in the Emperor's name. In this case, paragraph one of the article will be applicable.

Article 6. The Emperor shall appoint the Prime Minister as designated by the Diet. (2) The Emperor shall appoint the Chief Judge of the Supreme Court as designated by the Cabinet.

Article 7. The Emperor, with the advice and approval of the Cabinet, shall perform the following acts in makers of state on behalf of the people: (i) Promulgation of amendments of the constitution, laws, cabinet orders and treaties; (ii) Convocation of the Diet; (iii) Dissolution of the House of Representatives; (iv) Proclamation of general election of members of the Diet; (v) Attestation of the appointment and dismissal of Ministers of State and other officials as provided for by law, and of full powers and credentials of Ambassadors and Ministers; (vi) Attestation of general and special amnesty, commutation of punishment, reprieve, and restoration of rights; (vii) Awarding of honours; (viii) Attestation of instruments of ratification and other

diplomatic documents as provided for by law; (ix) Receiving foreign ambassadors and ministers; (x) Performance of ceremonial functions.

Article 8. No property can be given to, or received by, the Imperial House, nor can any gifts be made there from, without the authorization of the Diet.

CHAPTER II. RENUNCIATION OF WAR

Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a mean of settling international disputes. (2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

CHAPTER III. RIGHTS ANO DUTIES OF THE PEOPLE

Article 10. The conditions necessary for being a Japanese national shall be determined by law.

Article 11. The people shall not be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental human rights. These fundamental human rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be conferred upon the people of this and future generations as eternal and inviolate rights.

Article 12. The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavour of the people, who shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing them for the public welfare.

Article 13. All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs.

Article 14. All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin. (2) Peers and peerage shall not be recognized. (3) No privilege shall accompany any award of honor, decoration or any distinction, nor shall

any such award be valid beyond the life time of the individual who now holds or hereafter may receive it.

Article 15. The people have the inalienable right to choose their public officials and to dismiss them. (2) All public officials are servants of the whole community and not of any group there of. (3) Universal adult suffrage is guaranteed with regard to the election of public officials. (4) In all elections, secrecy of the ballot shall not be violated. A voter shall not be answerable, publicly or privately, for the choice he has made.

...

Article 19. Freedom of thought and conscience shall not be violated.

Article 20. Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall receive any privileges from the State nor exercise any political authority. (2) No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious acts, celebration, rite or practice. (3) The state and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious activity.

Article 21. Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press and all other forms of expression are guaranteed. (2) No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of communication be violated.

Article 22. Every person shall have freedom to choose and change his residence and to choose his occupation to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare. (2) Freedom of all persons to move to a foreign country and to divest themselves of their nationality shall be inviolate.

Article 23. Academic freedom is guaranteed.

...

CHAPTER X. SUPREME LAW

Article 97. The fundamental human rights by this Constitution guaranteed to the people of Japan are fruits of the age-old struggle of man to be free; they have survived the many exacting tests for durability and are conferred upon this and future generations in trust, to be held for all time inviolate.

Article 98. This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the nation and no law, ordinance, imperial prescript or other act of government, or part there of, contrary to

the provisions hereof, shall have legal force or validity. (2) The treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully observed.

Article 99. The Emperor or the Regent as well as Ministers of State, members of the Diet, judges, and all other public officials have the obligation to respect and uphold this Constitution.

... (Project Gutenberg (ed.), 1996)

Appendix 3-1

Extracts in Context

- Interactions of 'F' and 'G' in Chapters 6 and 7 -

**Interview 3 (July 1996 in London)*

F (retired exective; 65); G (F's wife; 59); H (son of F and G; 36)

Numbers correspond to:	
①	Extracts 6.5.0.1; 7.4.1.1.
②	Extract 6.2.0.1.
③	Extracts 6.5.1.1; 7.4.2.1.
④	Extracts 6.5.5.1; 7.4.4.1.

①	S	[I] would like to ask (*hum.*) [some] familiar things, for example (.) at the
①		time of wedding of *Kotaishi* and *Masako-san* and, eeh (.) the wedding
①		of *Heika* and current *Kogo Heika* which you (F and G) watched
①		(*exal.*), as well as, mm (.) and the time when the previous *Tenno* died
①		(*plain*)...
①	G	*Taiso-no-rei* (Grand Imperial Funeral)
①	S	Big confusions...
①	F	I've seen (*plain*)*Tenno Heika*, [I] once waved (*plain*) [him] on the road...
①	S	When was it?
①	F	In my childhood, in Kyushu*
	S	Did you came from (*exal.*) Kyushu?
	F	⌊After the war

G ⌊Fukuoka**

S Fukuoka(.) Were (*plain*) you in Fukuoka?

H [F/You] Seemed to live (*plain*) variety of places, didn't you?

F Did you (S) also come from (*plain*) Fukuoka?

S =yeah

G ⌊after the war,

F In my case, I came from a place called Nogata***

S yes, I know [Nogata], I also from the city.

G Yeah?(.) aah, [are you] from Fukuoka-city?

S =ya... (0.5)

F ...But [here] it does not matter...

S Was that at the time of *Tenno*'s, so called post war [Imperial] visit?

F ...ya, ya (.) at that time, coal mines were still prosperous, and the coal industry greatly contributed to restoring Japan [Japanese industries] (.) [*Tenno*] visited the coal mine areas including Nogata...(.)

S Do [you] remember (*exal.*)?

F Yeah, [I] remember (*plain*).

S =Well, were you forced (*plain*) to [welcome *Tenno*]?

F Was forced, forced [to do so].

SFG ha, ha, ha (.)

② S At that time, with Japanese flag, *Hinomaru*?

② F Ya, ya, ya, ya:: in a cold season, putting coat on and a hat, [he was]

② doing like this. ((waving hand)) Shook [his] hands...

S [Were you] a school pupil [at that time]?

G ⌊After the war...

S ⌊[Or] after the war, thus, secondary school? (0.5)

F [It was] post-war (.) immediately after the war.

③ S Did [you] shake (*exal.*) [his] hand?

③ F [I] didn't shake [his] hand (*plain*).

③ G ⌊Just [*Tenno*] passed (*plain*) before [you / F] =

③ F = using (waving) (*plain*) [a] hat like this, ((F waves his hand)) because

③ *ano-hito* (that person) did often do (did) (*plain*) like this.

③ S Yeah (.) how did [you] find, did [you] find [him] (*plain*), in reality?

③ F Ya [he] was (*plain*) a small *hito* (person) (.) a little bit round

③ shouldered (*plain*) (0.4) looked older (*plain*) than [his real] age =

③ S =Yeah, hah,

④ F Suppose to be distressed himself (*plain*). [He] looked somewhat

④ helpless(*plain*)...

④ G ⌊Helpless (*plain*) *ojisama*? ((laugh)) *Ojisama*?

④ F [It is an] Impression, impression, isn't it (*plain*) ? Essentially *ano-hito*

④ is round shouldered (*plain*)...

④ G Poor looking o-*kata* (*beautified*), poor looking o-*kata* (*beautified*).

④ ((laugh)) [I] didn't know (*plain*) [his] face was (*plain*) noble or not, but

④ [his] height, mmm, if there is (*exal.*) [an] old person (o-*toshiyori*;

④ *beautified*) like [him]=

④ F =It's (*plain*) no relation between facial impression [and nobleness]

* One of the four main islands of Japan. The south most one.

** Fukuoka may signify Fukuoka prefecture or Fukuoka-city, the capital city of Fukuoka prefecture. Fukuoka prefecture is a north part of Kyushu.

*** One of the cities in Kyushu, in Fukuoka prefecture. It was famous for coal minings.

Appendix 3-2

Frequency of Death Terms

- Quantitative Data of Chapter 8 -

The tables below give frequencies of terms which describe the Emperors' death appearing in the newspapers. The numbers on the top of each table represent page numbers. Also the alphabets on the left side of each table correspond to those in Table-8.2.0.1 (cf. *section 8.2.0*).

a	*hogyo* (Imperial exclusive)	g	*rin-ju* (Buddhism)
b	*kokyo* (high rank peer)	h	*eimin* (sleep metaphor)
c	*seikyo* (respectable person)	i	*iki-o-hikitoru* (last breathe)
d	*naku-naru* (human death)	j	*dai-ohjo* (Buddhism)
e	*shi-nu* (basic / objective)	k	*shogai-o-oeru* (finalise one's life)
f	*saigo* (the final moment)		

Asahi Shinbun (07/01/1989/Evening Edition: cf. *section 8.3.3*)

	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
a	*15*	*2*	*2*					*1*		*2*	*1*		*10*	*3*		
b																
c	*1*	*6*	*13*	*5*	*1*								*10*	*11*	*3*	
d	*3*	*7*	*4*	*5*	*1*							*2*	*3*	*8*	*5*	
e			*4*											*1*	*1*	
f															*1*	
g															*1*	
h															*3*	
i																
j																
k																

Mainichi Shinbun (07/01/1989/Evening Edition: cf. *section 8.3.3*)

	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12				
a	*9*	*11*		*7*							*1*					
b									*1*							
c	*12*	*9*	*13*	*9*	*3*			*17*		*3*	*6*	*3*				
d		*3*	*1*	*2*				*2*		*5*	*7*	*3*				
e		*1*		*3*				*3*		*1*						
f											*4*					
g											*1*					
h					*1*						*1*					
i											*1*					
j																
k																

Yomiuri Shinbun (07/01/1989/Evening Edition: cf. *section 8.3.3*)

	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
a	*11*	*16*	*25*	*20*	*13*									*9*	*5*	
b																
c			*2*	*2*	*1*									*2*	*1*	
d			*1*	*2*	*2*			*1*						*3*	*4*	
e		*3*			*1*									*2*		
f		*2*													*6*	
g															*3*	
h			*1*												*1*	
i	*1*														*1*	
j		*3*													*1*	
k	*1*							*1*							*1*	

Akahata (08/01/1989/Morning Edition: cf. *section 8.4.0*)

	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
a	*1*	*1*	*5*	*1*	*9*											*1*
b																
c	*1*				*2*											
d												*1*				
e	*9*	*14*	*16*	*27*	*6*	*3*	*1*			*21*	*4*	*5*	*8*	*12*	*19*	*4*
f																
g																
h																
i																
j																
k																

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