


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# Children, Europe and the Media

A comparison between Bulgaria and England

by

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Doctoral Thesis

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the award of  
Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University

(October 2011)

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## **Abstract**

The thesis examines what children know about and how they feel towards Europe, drawing on interviews with 9-10-year-old pupils in Bulgaria and England. Although it is focused on the media, it also takes into account a plethora of other factors by investigating the interplay between social structures, socialization agents, national context and individual agency. The methodology combines qualitative and quantitative methods and involves 174 interviews with children, surveys with their parents, interviews with teachers and head teachers and content analysis of TV news, videos and school textbooks. The contributions of the thesis are both theoretical and empirical. The findings reveal important commonalities and differences in processes of European identity formation in the two countries. In both the new and enthusiastic European Union (EU) member Bulgaria and in the notoriously Eurosceptic England, European identity is largely an elite and racialized identity. However, the meanings of European-ness vary: in England, being European is linked with the idea of belonging to the continent of Europe, while Bulgarian children associate it with being part of the EU as a political unit. The results also provide a better insight into the relationship between knowledge and identity, as well as the role of the media in relation to each of them. The study concludes that the mass media, and television in particular, play an important role in raising awareness and knowledge, especially when the topic has a fairly salient position on the political agenda. In contrast, the media do not seem to play a decisive role in shaping identity as such: although Bulgarian media provide considerably more coverage of European issues than English media, Bulgarian children feel less European than their English peers. Theoretically, the thesis not only provides a detailed, sociologically informed and context-sensitive account of the media's influence in identity construction, but also bridges the gap between contrasting theories in media studies and sociology, including agenda-setting theories and audience-focused approaches to media effects, as well as theories of socialization and social structures.

**Keywords:** children, media, European identity, socialization, Bulgaria, England

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## **Acknowledgements**

I am deeply grateful to my supervisors Dr Sabina Mihelj and Prof Michael Pickering for their unwavering support and encouragement. To Dr Sabina Mihelj, for providing invaluable advice and direction from the very beginning of my studies, for promptly replying to my numerous emails at all hours, for the continual understanding she showed towards my very inflexible working arrangements and for her productive criticisms throughout. To Prof Michael Pickering, for his constructive guidance initially as my Director of Research and then as my supervisor in my third year, for his willingness to become more fully engaged with my work at this very tedious but important last hurdle of the PhD process – the writing-up stage - and for constantly bringing me down to earth by reminding me that completing the thesis is only a part of the PhD. I would like to thank my two examiners as well – Prof Máire Messenger Davies and Prof David Buckingham for their challenging but constructive feedback.

My gratitude goes also to my family – my husband Tsvetan - and my three children – my daughters Zoya and Nadezhda and my baby son Jordan – for supporting me and putting up with me through all these years. I am deeply indebted to my parents Zoya and Yordan for their logistic, financial and personal support. Last but not least, I would like to thank all pupils, their parents, teachers and head teachers who agreed to take part in the study.



## Introduction

- Mummy, Britain is not in the European Union, is it?
- Why do you think so?
- Because they have a Queen.
- And what do you think the European Union is?
- It is like – in Ally McBeal on TV – a group of lawyers sitting around a big round table and talking.

This 7-year old girl's idea of the European Union (EU) prompted the researcher's initial interest in the topic about the media's influence on children's perceptions of the EU, which has evolved into the current PhD thesis. The year was 2007 – a historical year for the country, which the girl originally comes from – Bulgaria. The Eastern European state then joined the EU as part of the last wave of enlargement of the organization. As is obvious from the quotation, however, the pupil was also interested in another member-state – a much older and bigger one – the United Kingdom. After having spent two years in England, at the age of 9, this little girl asked a very different question, which came as a huge surprise to her parents. 'Are we in Europe?', she wondered.

What the above real-life example illustrates is that children's ideas about the EU and Europe (when they have any) can be quite interesting and different from adults' views and can 'evolve' in an unexpected direction under the influence of various factors. Yet, children's views are generally under-studied in academic research and are not rendered particularly significant for policy-makers if a judgment is to be reached on the basis of the existing Eurobarometer surveys - the European Commission Public Opinion Analysis sector. Moreover, in spite of the dominating claims that the mass media play a major role in identity formation, there are hardly any papers that deal with their influence on children's collective identities. Instead, the bulk of studies end up searching for a European public sphere or concentrate on media representations of the Union. The latter category focus extensively on (predominantly print) media coverage of specific EU events or topics such as the euro, the EU Constitutional Treaty and enlargement (e.g. Anderson and Weymouth 1999, De Vreese 2001, Bruter 2003, Triandafyllidou 2003, Trenz 2004, Aboura 2005, De Vreese 2006, Mihelj et al. 2008, Van Cauwenberge et al. 2009, Vettters et al. 2009). The former engage in theorizing on the possibility for emergence of a

European public sphere (Eriksen 2005, Trenz 2005, Splichal 2006, Baisnée 2007, Lauristin 2007) or search for empirical evidence (e.g., Trenz 2004, Neverla 2007, Wright 2007, Bee et al. 2008, Triandafyllidou et al. 2009) - often ending up on a negative note with the ‘implication’ ‘that to continue researching the EPS will bear little future fruit’ (Schlesinger 2010). Habermas (2006) himself, as the author of the concept of the public sphere, states that ‘the European public sphere does not exist.’ Scholars (Bee et al. 2008) engaged in work on the European public sphere also recognize that it is a notion not easily ‘graspable’ both ‘empirically’ and ‘conceptually’ and hence, certainly in need of ‘further refinement.’ There is no agreement either as to whether by contributing to the public sphere, the media will also be a ‘source for...feelings of belonging’ or whether the existence of a European identity is a prerequisite for the emergence of a public sphere (an overview in Lingenberg 2006: 123).

On the other hand, separate studies have been devoted to children’s perceptions of or identifications with Europe/EU (among others, Barrett 1996: 349–370, Convery et al. 1997, Nasman and Ross 2002, Philippou 2005, Savvides 2006). Commentators (Howard and Gill 2001) recognize the presence of media bias in promoting or discouraging national identity but do not attempt to evaluate the extent to which this bias actually influences children’s perceptions. Furthermore, scholars have not asked the question of whether in a nation where the media are Eurosceptic, the children are also less likely to be aware of the EU and to feel part of it. The research aims, therefore, at establishing the importance of the mass media for children’s European perceptions, knowledge and identifications in England and Bulgaria by also taking into account the impact of the other main socialization agents such as school and parents, national context and social structures.

Hence, a few main issues are explored in the current chapter. First, an explanation of why the issue of European identity should be studied is provided. Second, an indication of why children are considered to be important actors in the process is given. Third, a further allusion to the media’s importance also vis-à-vis the other main socialization agents and social structures is made. Fourth, a few words on the choice of countries in the comparative study and the significance of the national context are provided. Finally, the structure of the thesis is outlined.

To start with, the EU is a ‘unique’ (Bache and George 2006: 1) international organization, whose very existence has shattered many theorists’ notions of the

nation-state. Created initially as a six-country post-World War II project for cooperation in the coal and steel industries, today the Union encompasses 27 states and its influence has spread to a wide range of economic and political areas. Its development has led some commentators to conclude that ‘at least in some areas of activity the EU displays properties more akin to national political systems than to those of international organizations’ (ibid). Furthermore, the Union has expanded at an unprecedented pace in the past years. The number of member-states has more than doubled from the collapse of communism in 1989-1990 – from twelve in 1994 to twenty-seven in 2007. It is quite clearly an elite project whose future existence and development, however, very much depends on establishing a better connection with its citizens. There is an ongoing talk of a lack of democratic legitimation of the EU, often labeled as a democratic, legitimacy (Grundmann 1999: 125–146, Lord 1998: 165, Eriksen and Fossum 2002) or communication deficit (Meyer 1999). Quite a few events in its recent history suggest that without a proper level of support from the European people, the future of the European project becomes uncertain. The clearest indications of this phenomenon are the painful negotiations over the latest EU treaty. It was initially quite ambitiously proposed as a potential constitution for Europe, which would facilitate the day-to-day workings of the organization, but after the two unsuccessful referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005, its scope was significantly reduced and its title was changed to the Treaty of Lisbon. The issue of how best to overcome the democratic gap has been extensively discussed among policy-makers and academics. Many scholars and practitioners (among others, Beus 2001, Decker 2002, Bache and George 2006: 66, Sigalas 2010) believe that the best way of gauging support for the European idea among the European people is through establishing and promoting a sense of belonging to the Union as an organization and/or at least to Europe as a continent and civilization– in other words, a European identity among children, adolescents and adults (Philippou 2005).

Yet, collective identity formation is a complicated process than involves not only activities on the part of society or its leaders but ‘appropriation’ on an individual level. An increasing number of commentators (among others, Breakwell 1996: 13–30, Beetham and Lord 1998, Bruter 2005, Szokolczai 2007) have researched aspects of the European identity over the years, albeit from quite different perspectives and by not necessarily adopting a bottom-up approach. Even when interested in people’s European identities, academics (Breakwell and Lyons 1996, Cinnirella 1996: 253–

274, Castano 2004: 40–58) have largely focused on adults rather than children (notable exceptions are Krzywosz-Rynkiewicz et al. 2002: 339–351, Philippou 2005, Barrett 2007). As Convery et al. (1997) claim, however, ‘the long-term success of the European Union and indeed of Europe as a unified whole will depend on present and future younger generations making an emotional as well as a rational response to the notion of being European.’ Put simply, children, although largely neglected both by institutions and academics, are the future of the Union as well as active participants in the identity formation process and their role should not be underestimated. Identity is clearly not something that happens overnight once adolescents ‘officially’ become adults (Bennett et al. 1998). Jenkins (1996: 62) even claims that identities developed during infancy and childhood are ‘less flexible,’ because they are accepted as ‘part of the individual’s cognitive furniture: “the way things are.”’ Barrett and his associates (for a summary Barrett 2007) demonstrate that by the age of 9-10 (and quite often much earlier) children already possess a national identity and might aspire towards a supranational one. Nonetheless, the few available studies on children’s (potential for) European identifications (Hengst 1997, Philippou 2005, Barrett 2007: 202–203) assert that although young people occasionally show an interest in the European identity, it is hardly salient and certainly not more important than national identity.

Obviously, quite a number of factors are seen to be playing a role in the identity formation process, or as Barrett (2000) summarizes ‘the child’s identity development is driven by influences from the child’s social environment, especially parents, schooling and the mass media.’ Parents, school and the media are indeed perceived to be among the main agents of socialization (Wartella et al. 1979) – a process that is inevitably of importance (Marshall 1995, Sheets and Hollins 1999). On the other hand, as Barrett (2000) alludes in the quotation, apart from socialization, the social environment – namely social structures – are also to be taken into account as a potential influence on children’s identifications. In fact, as Kniveton (1976: 256) puts it, ‘evidence suggests that children who are, for any reason, limited in their opportunities for getting experience in life will turn to television as a source.’ In other words, TV’s influence appears to be more significant when youngsters come from less advantaged backgrounds.

No known current study, however, investigates the importance and the interrelation of the different agents of socialization, let alone social structures, with respect to children’s collective identifications in general or their European and

national identities in particular. Instead, scholars tend to concentrate on one factor and only acknowledge in passing that other agents might play a role. Thus, Convery et al. (1997) and Savvides (2006) research the effects of EU-related teaching material and the school curriculum on pupils' perceptions of Europe. With a similar focus on education, a pan-European network gathers together researchers interested 'in the way in which children and young people learn about citizenship in the European context, and how they construct their identities' (CiCe 2010). In Barrett's (1996: 363) account, 90% of the 10-year olds say they have learnt about Europe and European people from television, 88% from parents and 80% from teachers, but he only lists these findings without elaborating on them. In his latest book, he (Barrett 2007: 258) tries to account for the media's significance in related areas such as national identity, knowledge about the state and foreign countries and peoples by drawing on other studies but does not conduct own research in this area, nor is his study focused on European identity. Bennett et al. (1998: 903) also indicate that 'through a variety of sources, such as communicative interchanges with others, media presentations, and formal pedagogical contexts, young children make informally guided discoveries of their group's representation of itself and, to a lesser extent perhaps, its views of out-groups.'

The mass media's role is further implied by the fact that 'research indicates that for young children, their first contact with politics comes through television' (Austin and Pinkleton 2001). Studies have shown that pupils are interested in and exposed to both adult news and programmes targeted at them such as BBC's *Newsround* in the UK (Messenger Davies 2008). 'Their answers are a strong riposte to those who argue that children and young people are apathetic and not concerned about current affairs,' the authors (Carter et al. 2009) of a recent study claim. Commentators (Gauntlett 1997, Buckingham 2003: 163–180) add that children should not be underestimated as media users, because they are not 'passive dupes' subjected to media effects but instead actively make sense of what they view and can be highly critical. As Messenger Davies (2001: 200) summarizes, 'in every age, behind public representations of childhood, stand actual children, looking and sounding rather different from the official public versions.' Children are indisputably frequent, often heavy media users (especially viewers), and over their youth they will spend more time watching TV than in schools (Huntemann and Morgan 2001: 311) or with peers (Larson 1995). Moreover, agenda-setting theorists (Rogers and Dearing 1988) postulate that the media's influence is even more important when there is a lack of

information on an issue. Nowadays, it is also regarded as almost commonsensical to claim the significance of initially the press (Anderson 1991) and then of other means of mass communication for 'the production of national identity' (Gripsrud 2007) as well as in the daily 'flagging' of 'nationhood,' which Billig (1995b: 6–8) labels 'banal nationalism.' Cram (2001, 2009) even sees potential instances of banal Europeanism.

What often remains overlooked in media studies on children and identity, however, is the importance of mediation mostly by parents but also potentially by teachers and peers, especially on topics that are not perceived to be of high salience in pupils' lives such as Europe. Academics have discovered that parents in combination with the media play a very important role in political socialization – they influence the children's patterns of media use, whilst the media give them 'additional opportunities' to 'develop public affairs awareness,' and thus the media 'serve as a bridge between the micro-social environment, such as the home, to the larger society' (Austin and Pinkleton 2001).

Finally, another factor that cannot be ignored is nationality. The EU motto is 'united in diversity' and the diversity aspect should by all means be taken into account. As already indicated, at present the EU encompasses 27 member-states – all peculiar with their own histories, cultures, geopolitics as well as positioning vis-à-vis and public opinion on Europe and the EU. The expectation is then that the potential for and the salience of the European identity can be quite different within the EU as a result of national variations. It is very important to probe this assumption, because the key decision-making processes in the Union are still very much based on intergovernmentalism (Hoffmann 1966). In other words, the national governments are largely in charge of the major developments and each state's voice is of equal weight. This means that even a single country's strong opposition to an issue of significance can lead to a standstill in the Union's affairs – a tendency quite clearly illustrated in past years. Furthermore, if measures are to be taken on an EU-wide level for the promotion of European identity, then they should be based on an understanding of the complexity of factors that come into play. Nonetheless, the search for national differences is not an end in itself but a means to also understanding what the similarities are. Put simply, the question is what factors apply beyond national borders and how national context interplays with the socialization agents and the social structures. This complicated relationship can only be illuminated through comparative research. Ideally, a variety of countries should be researched for a better picture but

since the practical limitations of a PhD study are numerous, for the time being it is feasible to concentrate on only two member-states.

But why are exactly Bulgaria and England compared in the study? Obviously, they are two very different countries. For a number of decades they were part of two blocs on opposite sides of the Iron Curtain, ‘engaged’ in a Cold War. Bulgaria is a representative of the Eastern European bloc. It is an average-sized EU member, one of the newest entrants with the last wave of enlargement and the poorest at present. In general, support for European integration in the country is among the highest in the Union, though declining with membership. England, on the other hand, is part of the United Kingdom – one of the richest, biggest and oldest EU members, situated in Western Europe. Support for European integration is among the lowest in the UK and England is perhaps the most Eurosceptic of the four nations. There are a few reasons why it makes sense to compare such different countries and they will be elaborated upon in more detail in the methodology chapter. For now, suffice it to mention two aspects briefly. First, if the EU is indeed about ‘unity in diversity,’ and European identity is the unifying characteristic the study is interested in, then it is far better to compare two seemingly quite varied members than similar ones because they will provide a better illustration of the impact of the diversity aspect. Second, it will be much easier to conclude on the ‘universality’ of significance of social structures or socialization agents or the interplay between any of them for children’s European knowledge and identifications if similar trends are found in two such different countries. In other words, it is highly likely that if certain patterns and influences stand out in spite of all national differences, then they are really important for the process of European identity formation.

The aim of the current study is exactly to reveal this multi-faceted relationship between pupils, their parents and teachers as well as their nationality and overall social structures in relation to children’s European knowledge and identifications. The research will contribute to the existing literature by not only adopting a novel approach of actually linking children’s perceptions of the EU to the media representations of the organization, but also by attempting to account for the plethora of factors that come into play and the relationship between society as structure, socialization as a process and the nation as a context. Thus, conclusions can be drawn on a wider level about the impact of these factors in the general process of collective identity formation. Furthermore, the study can also eventually benefit policy-makers

in the EU by giving indications about the potential for existence of a European identity, the ‘components’ that enhance and promote European knowledge and identifications as well as the pitfalls that should be avoided in the process, along with the implications of the European identity for the development of the Union.

Finally, a question often asked in presentations and talks, especially among more Eurosceptic and non-academic ‘audiences,’ is ‘Why should we be interested in encouraging a European identity when we don’t care about the EU?’ The answer to this question is quite simple. Like it or not, the EU exists, it has been around for decades and despite recurrent media and politicians’ talk in some member-states of pulling out of it or dissolving it, no such event is likely to happen in the near future. Even in the most Eurosceptic countries, the politicians do not dare to put up the issue of EU membership for voting in referenda. Legally speaking, in the EU treaties there is no option of pulling out for a specific country or an overall dissolution of the EU. Furthermore, one does not need to visit the European quarter in Brussels to realize that EU policies affect numerous aspects of people’s everyday lives in each member-state. Even if its powers are never to be extended further, the organization still needs to function efficiently in order to serve its citizens well in the spheres in which it already has vital functions. Its functioning, however, is very much contingent on its democratic legitimacy, which in turn ‘depends on the development of a more robust common European *identity*’ (Bache and George 2006: 66). If European identity is indeed a means to this end – an assumption also to be probed in the current thesis – then it is certainly worth researching the topic for the benefit of Europhiles and Europhobes alike, who all live in the Union.

In light of the above tasks, the thesis will be organized in the following way. First, chapters one and two will introduce the overall theoretical framework of the study through the literature review. Chapter one will focus on the process of identity formation with a specific emphasis on European identity and its relationship with national identity and the impact of social structures in this respect. Chapter two will then move to the importance of socialization as a process and the media as key agents also with regard to children’s collective identifications. Second, chapter three will explain how the study is conducted in methodological terms and why this specific research design is chosen. Third, the main findings will be presented in chapters four, five and six. Chapter four will set up the scene. It will provide an overview of the current state of identification with Europe/the EU among Bulgarian and English

children by also searching for potential explanations as to why children feel the way they do - linking identity with the available knowledge on the European topic, the meanings children attach to Europe as well as their attitude towards European membership and the relationship between the national and the European identities. Chapters five and six will then attempt to account for the social factors that influence all these processes of European knowledge and identifications – the former by exploring the impact of social structures and the latter by investigating the significance of socialization as a process. Finally, the last chapter will be devoted to the conclusion where the analysis of all these aspects and the interplay between them will be conducted.

## **Part I: Theoretical Framework/Literature Review**

### **Chapter 1**

#### **Identity and Social structures**

##### **1. Introduction**

The aim of chapters one and two is to present the main theories and analytical concepts that guide the thesis. The theoretical framework results from the literature review and the chapters represent the theoretical framework through the literature review. What unifies the two chapters is the overriding interest in establishing the relationship between society as a structure and socialization as a process in identity formation – an overarching topic for the thesis. Hence, the theoretical framework will draw on a combination of identity, social structures and socialization theory while also particularly addressing the media's role. The reason the literature review is split into two separate chapters is to allow for a clearer focus on each of the main aspects separately. As already became clear in the introduction, a similar division is evident in the presentation of results in the subsequent chapters. Thus, in the current chapter the notion of identity and the role of social structures in the process of identity formation are explored, whereas in the next one the focus is on socialization's importance as a process that potentially influences the acquisition of European knowledge and identifications. In the socialization chapter the impact of the media is also investigated in detail through the prism of theories such as agenda-setting and audience research. The role of the media is further narrowed down to its influence on children and the prospective importance of parental mediation as well as the mass media's significance in promoting symbols of nationhood.

## **2. Identity**

### **2.1 Identity as a concept**

The concept of identity has been the subject of constant and vehement debate and for decades different and often contentious theories have dominated it. The discussion has revolved around three dilemmas: who the key player in identity formation is – the individual or society, whether identity is fixed (a ‘thing’) or flexible (a ‘process’) and ultimately, whether it should be used as a concept at all. In the following paragraphs each of these three dilemmas is reviewed by presenting the main contending positions and their relative merits and drawbacks, and outlining the understanding of identity the thesis will draw upon. The discussion is limited primarily to collective identities since these are the main concern of the research.

The first main dilemma on the identity academic ‘battlefield’ is who the key player in the formation of identities is – the individual or society. Psychologists have focused predominantly on the personal aspects and particularly on the ‘workings of the unconscious’ (Woodward 2002: 17). The most widely used social psychological theoretical framework in European identity studies is provided by Tajfel (1981) and Turner et al.’s (1987) social identity and self-categorization theories, which focus on inter- and intra-group relations and stress the individual’s ‘self-concept’ of the social group membership and the ‘value and emotional significance’ of that membership (Tajfel 1981: 255).

Sociologists and social anthropologists, on the other hand, have emphasized the importance of the social world. Prominent examples are modernist theories such as Marxism and Durkheim’s sociological functionalism, which ‘view humans as manipulated by their cultures’ and identity as ‘something given by the group rather than created by the individual’ (Kidd 2002: 51). Other key theories of identity, such as those developed within cultural studies by Stuart Hall, also tend to downplay the individual’s role in the identification process and focus instead solely on discourse. According to Hall (1996: 5), identity is:

the meeting point, the point of suture, between on the one hand the discourses and practices which attempt to “interpellate”, speak to us or hail us into place as the social subjects of particular discourses, and on the other hand, the processes which produce subjectivities, which construct us as subjects which can be “spoken.”

Hall's anti-humanist approach is hardly surprising when bearing in mind that in building his notions of articulation and suture, he draws extensively on the work of two prominent anti-humanists – Louis Althusser's (1971) interpellation theory and Jacques Lacan's mirror stage. In theory, it appears that Hall's position is much more agency-oriented than Althusser's or Lacan's, since he (Hall 1996: 5) argues that 'suturing needs to be thought of as an articulation, rather than a one-sided process.' In practice, however, this preoccupation with discourse is perhaps rightly labeled as one of the 'dead ends' in media and cultural studies (Philo and Miller 2001: 33–38). Philo and Miller (*ibid.*) object not only against the 'weak conception of agency' (Hammond 1999) but also against the inadequate link with the social world in which the discourses are created:

Subjects are conceived as constructed by or temporarily inhabiting discourses. Discourses in effect speak through people. Human agency seems to have no role in constituting and reproducing culture and society. The key problem with this formulation is the inability to show how cultures emerge and how they change. It is as if the 'first' play or book ever written involved only the 'speaking' of pre-existing discourses. We ask where did the discourses come from, how do they change and how do they relate to experience and the development of social interests (Philo and Miller 2001: 75).

This thesis also advocates the view that discourses do not speak for themselves but 'through people' (*ibid.*) They are indeed very much context-dependent, namely the messages they hold can be understood only if the social world in which they are created and circulated is researched with all its complexities. The study of society's influence should go hand in hand with that of the individual's role. Hence, if 'one of the key debates within contested theories of identity is the extent to which people, whether as individuals or within collectivities, participate actively in shaping their identities' (Woodward 2002: 3), the right approach is in the middle: the individual is certainly no passive observer of his/her own identification processes, but at the same time, no human is a self-sufficient being, completely detached from socialization. Identity, and especially collective identities, are very much influenced by the social world and 'produced between persons and within social relations' (Lawler 2008: 7), but each individual has a role to play in internalizing the identifications the social world offers. Hence, identity is a useful concept only if defining it takes into account the importance of the role of the individual and the influence of society. Jenkins (2004: 23–25) captures this dual relationship by claiming that identity provides a

‘unified model of the dialectical interplay of processes of internal and external definition’ - the ‘self-image’ and the ‘public image.’ Individual identity as embodied in selfhood is not separate or isolated from the social world, because selfhood is ‘socially constructed: in the process of primary and subsequent socialization, and in the ongoing interaction through which individuals define and redefine themselves and others throughout their lives’ (ibid.: 18).

In line with this understanding, Jenkins (1996, 2004) differentiates between the nominal and the virtual identification. The nominal is the label with which the individual or the group/category is defined by society and the virtual is what the nominal ‘means to its bearer’ or in the case of collectivities how the ‘members behave or are treated’ (Jenkins 1996: 77–87). Although individual identities are to a large extent constructed through collective identifications, there is always some aspect of the virtual, which is ‘individually idiosyncratic’ (ibid. :78). Or, as Weedon (2004: 19) puts it, ‘identity presupposes some degree of self-recognition on the part of the subject, often defined in relation to what one believes one is not.’ These two layers of identity – the virtual and the nominal – correspond to the two aspects of the identification process: on the one hand, the members of a group identify themselves (self-categorization) with a group, but at the same time, they are also socially categorized: the social world puts a label on a collectivity (Jenkins 1996: 77–89).

Such understanding of identity is also adopted in this research. Thus, when researching European identities, the study will be interested both in the social world’s representations of the EU in the media and in the individual children’s perceptions of Europe and what (if anything) this group membership/identification means to them. Put simply, the representations of Europe and the EU provided by society - the media, school and parents - will be compared to those internalized by the children on an individual level.

The second key dilemma often addressed in theories of identity is whether identities are fixed or flexible. Social scientists of different disciplinary backgrounds tend to agree that identity is not a stable, unchanging essence possessed by individuals or groups, but a transient and changing outcome of a continuous process of construction. The proponents of cultural studies, for instance, see identification as a ‘construction, a process never completed’ (Hall 1996: 2–3), and claim that identities are ‘always unstable, fragmented and contingent’ (Hammond 1999). In identity politics, on the other hand, the focus is on ‘fixed’ identities such as gender and

ethnicity that need 'defense' from marginalization or oppression (for a critique see Dimitrov and Kopra 1998). One of the major objections towards 'identity politics' (Hammond 1999), however, is that its hidden aim is manipulation. Dimitrov and Kopra (1998) argue social control cannot function without fixed identities:

Society prefers to operate with fixed identities - they help to divide people into groups, to 'push' the groups into separated 'boxes' and computer files (hierarchical or nested into one another), to label these boxes and files with names, numbers and codes, and then to do with them all sorts of manipulations. And above all, to exercise control.

A case in hand is the way that European identity as such is treated in the official EU documents. In the latest treaty (EurLex 2010) in which the topic is addressed, the tendency is for European identity to be tied up to a specific policy area, namely the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as if identity is indeed a thing that can be fixed and limited to one sphere in particular. The issue will be further addressed later in the chapter but suffice it to say for the time being that current research clearly shows that this is not the way European identity 'operates.' Throughout his book, Barrett (2007), for example, shows vividly that children do not hold fixed national and European identities but are constantly renegotiating them and they can change considerably over time.

In line with the prevailing view in the social sciences, this research project adopts the view that, whether individual or collective, identity is a process, a 'series of identifications' (Woodward 2002: 17) and hence, identities are flexible rather than fixed. The process is not, however, entirely fluid and fragmented as Hall (1996: 4) argues, because at the moment of identification people acquire 'a limited and temporary fixing' of 'a particular mode of subjectivity' (Weedon 2004: 19). In other words, although identity is in constant process, people endorse certain identities rather than others at particular points of their lives. A most typical example is the strength of national identity in crisis situations such as wars when, as Grant (2004) claims, the 'dead ... who remained on the battlefields or were later interred in the new national cemeteries validated the American nation... The many monuments and ceremonies that followed were all predicated on that epiphany: the American nation made manifest through its dead.' The range of identities can also be somewhat limited by national context and social structures. Thus, by virtue of the fact that English children are born in and live in England they are highly unlikely to define themselves as

Bulgarian unless they have some connection with this country. That is not to say that this cannot change at a later point in their lives if they move to Bulgaria for some reason or develop an interest in it. This link between identities, national context and social structures will be subsequently explored in more detail.

A further characteristic of identity that helps explain its (relative) fluidity is the fact that identity virtually never appears in the singular. Or, as Weedon (2004: 19) argues: 'identity in all its forms, even national identity, is never singular but is plural.' Arguably, if identities always appear in the plural, it is feasible to assume that the relative salience of a particular type of identity in an individual's life will change depending on circumstances. Indeed, several studies (Risse 2001, Bruter 2005) show that people can hold multiple identities and can mould, model and altogether alter them depending on context. For instance, children in Barrett's studies (for an overview 2007) self-categorize themselves in many different ways: as pupils, of a certain age, living in a certain town/city/village, sons, daughters, etc. Moreover, the identities a 6-year-old endorses might be different from the ones the same child appropriates at a later age. This is why the current study is prepared in such a way that children are offered multiple identity labels to 'choose' for themselves if they want to and these are further explored and enriched in open questions.

The final trait of identity that is often discussed in relation with its fluid and plural nature is the link with difference and exclusion. As several authors have argued, identity is not only about similarity but also about difference – the existence of 'us' presupposes the existence of 'them'. In fact, quite a few influential theorists regard difference as more important than similarity. Fredrik Barth (1969: 15) emphasizes the relevance of the social '*boundary* that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses,' and Hall (1996: 4) insists that identities are 'more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion, than they are the sign of an identical, naturally-constituted unity.' Acknowledging the unavoidable link between identity and difference, inclusion and exclusion, is particularly important when dealing with transnational identities such as the European one. European-ness is often promoted as an alternative to national identities, and politicians in particular but some scholars as well are keen on emphasizing its inclusiveness and openness to diversity. Yet as the study shows, European identity is not immune to exclusion and discrimination – a trait that becomes clearly visible once its relationship with ethnicity and class is taken into account. Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate the role

of difference and boundary-making in the process of identity construction. On balance, both difference and similarity matter and identities are indeed constituted on the basis of this 'internal-external' dialectic (Jenkins 2004: 18). Some scholars (Barrett et al. 1999) even suggest that for children having an out-group in order to identify with an in-group is not as important as it is for adults.

The dilemmas outlined in the first two sections clearly indicate the lack of academic consensus on the subject as well as the term's multiple applications. The last but not least important bone of contention is on the definition of identity and its usefulness as an analytical concept. Brubaker and Cooper (2000) argue that although identity exists as a category of practice, it is misused as a category of analysis due to its multiple and often opposed applications and therefore should be discarded because of its 'multivalent, even contradictory theoretical burden.' Their main objection is to the alleged reification of the concept, which they admit can be avoided through a constructivist approach, namely by theorizing identities as multiple, fragmented and fluid. Nonetheless, Brubaker and Cooper's (ibid.) claim is that even when constructionist analytical language is used, it is in tension with 'the foundationalist or essentialist message that is required if appeals to "identity" are to be effective in practice.' They propose substitutes of the term such as identification and categorization, self-understanding and social location, commonality, connectedness and groupness, yet admit that some of the terms, such as self-understanding and social location, cannot do all the analytical work identity is expected to do because of a number of limitations, such as a focus on the self and failure to account for others' understanding.

At first glance, Brubaker and Cooper's (ibid.) argument looks quite persuasive because identity is indeed used inconsistently and sometimes contradictorily by academics. A more thorough analysis reveals at least one major flaw. It seems that although Brubaker and Cooper (ibid.) try to encompass all the analytical diverse applications of identity, they are entrapped by the use of the concept in practice in identity politics. It comes as no surprise that even though they recognize the lack of reification in what they call the 'soft' or constructivist meaning, they seem incapable of actually linking the 'soft' analytical to a 'soft' practical use of identity. Arguably, if they fail to recognize the use of identity as a category of practice in any other way but as identity politics, they will be unable to embrace its 'softer' analytical use. By discarding the concept altogether and instead offering seven substitutes, they make the

link between the categories of practice and analysis even harder to tackle, not facilitating but encumbering further the researchers' job. As Jenkins (2004: 5) rightly puts it:

As social scientists, therefore, keen to avoid reification, we should probably only ever talk about 'identification'. High-mindedness of that kind, however, might make talking to the rest of the world more difficult.

By the same token, Michaels (2002) is also preoccupied with the use of identity in identity politics. He (*ibid.*) is against the commitment to difference that in his view dominates 'certain postmodern or historicist discourses', because it is 'theoretically confused' and 'politically bad.' Unlike Brubaker and Cooper (2000), Michaels (2002) does not elaborate on his theoretical critique but rather focuses on the political aspect. As a whole, he objects to the organization of the world around identity groups, which in his view is nothing more than a continuation of the race-gender-class trilogy. It is not right, however, to discard an analytical concept because of its misuse in certain circumstances or by politicians, bureaucrats, civil society activists and even some academics. It is also wrong to assume that by simply adopting the concept of identity, scholars are actually involved in the reproduction of identity politics. Obviously, the validity of the notion very much depends on the way it is used.

Malesevic (2006: 7) adopts a similar view by arguing that identity 'has filled the vacuum created by the demise of three other master concepts': race, national character and social consciousness. He is the only one who attempts to offer a singular conceptual alternative, namely ideology. His (*ibid.*: 3) argument, however, is not particularly persuasive, because it proposes to substitute an allegedly 'conceptually and operationally deeply porous' concept such as identity with another at least equally problematic one - ideology. It is clearly beyond the scope of the paper to adopt a stance on the usefulness of ideology as a concept. It should suffice to point out that some scholars use a combination of identity and ideology (e.g., Billig 1995b). Arguably, Malesevic (2006) has (mis)used identity in order to defend ideology, thus claiming the application of ideology as possible only if identity is discarded and without acknowledging that some authors actually employ the two concepts simultaneously.

Clearly, collective identity remains a useful analytical concept – not only because abandoning it would risk making the researchers' work impenetrable, but also

because, if adequately defined and applied, identity helps capture an aspect of social reality that is highly important. As Kidd (2002: 24) argues, identity is vital for social life because ‘without knowing who I am, how can I begin to understand what I do, and therefore what others around me do?’ Or, in Jenkins’s (1996: 6) persuasive formulation:

Without frameworks for delineating social identity and identities, I would be the same as you and neither of us could relate to the other meaningfully or consistently. Without social identity, there is, in fact no society.

It is evident that different scholars provide often contradictory definitions of the concept, yet the lack of an agreed definition and the misuse of identity for political purposes is by no means a justifiable reason to altogether abandon the notion. Defined as a relatively flexible and changing outcome of continuous encounters between social categorization and individual’s self-identification, identity is a powerful analytical concept. It not only provides the basis for the study of the relationship between the individual and the collective but also accommodates ‘the complex possibilities of an interplay between agency and social construction or even constraint’ (Woodward 2002: 3). This interplay between agency and structure is also at the heart of the so-called ‘critical realist politics of identity’ that Sanchez (2006: 31) proposes. In her (ibid.: 32) view, identity should be researched ‘in direct relation to social structures, noting how social structures configure, condition, limit and constrain agency and never forgetting that agency has the potential to transform social structures.’ This is also the approach adopted in this study, as it will look closely at the relationship between identity and social structures later on in this chapter. Now the focus will turn to the European identity and the particularities of identity-formation among children.

## **2.2 European identity**

‘It is not possible to talk about a European identity, which currently exists’ (Breakwell 1996: 23). ‘We know now that there is such thing as a European identity, which is certainly developed by a significant part of the European polity and is more widely held than has often been supposed’ (Bruter 2005: 131). ‘Most commentators are agreed that a sense of European identity and loyalty is embryonic at best among the European electorate’ (Beetham and Lord 1998: 29). As these quotations indicate,

existing literature on European identity is beset by a similar lack of coherence and consensus as the literature on identity in general. The scope of issues raised is staggeringly wide and ranges from European identity's religious-philosophical and mythical dimension (Szakolczai 2007) to its use in official documents (Bakir 1996: 177–201) and the relationship between EU identification and the economic well-being of a member-state (Duchesne and Frogner 1995: 193–227) to focusing on Russia as a 'candidate for the role of the leading European "Other"' (O'Dowd 2001: 107). Paradoxically, even though many studies on European identity and its relationship with national identity are similar both theoretically – a majority draw on Tajfel's social identity (1981) and Turner et al.'s (1987) self-categorization theories (among others, Barrett 1996, Breakwell and Lyons 1996, Cinnirella 1996: 253–274, Castano 2004: 40–58) – and empirically, tending to analyze the same Eurobarometer surveys, the conclusions they reach are often entirely contradictory. Moreover, quite a few authors barely acknowledge that others before them have researched the subject and the result is a bulk of papers that repeat previous findings without complementing them or advancing beyond them.

This lack of coherence is compounded by the confusion over the definition of European identity. In the EU official documents the concept bears different meanings – from the initial all-encompassing formulation in the 1973 'Document on the European identity' (European Navigator) where identity covers all the community is about ('common heritage, interests and special obligations,' relations with the 'rest of the world' and the 'dynamic nature of European unification') – to the latest consolidated version of the Treaty on the EU (EUR-Lex 2010) in which European identity is closely linked with the CFSP. To add to that, the word 'European' has two main uses – Europe as a continent, including with its cultural implications and the EU as an organization – and the meanings of European identity often differ accordingly.

Some researchers (Bruter 2005: 13) have tried to capture this diversity of meanings by arguing that European identity consists of a civic and a cultural component – the civic implying a reference to the EU and the cultural to Europe as a 'continent or civilization.' In practical terms such a differentiation is deeply problematic, especially on the internal level of identification, since identity is indeed a flexible process (Burgess 2002). Put simply, identity is not a fixed thing that once adopted because of certain reasons – civic, cultural or others - will remain unchanged throughout the individual's life. Furthermore, the civic and the cultural component are

not always easy to distinguish. How, for instance, should one classify an individual who is proud to be a citizen of the EU because he feels this confirms his or her nation is developed and civilized, as the study will show some children actually do? Rather than starting with preconceived expectations of possible differences and ‘types’ of European identity, the study adopts a bottom-up approach. The questionnaire differentiates between the EU and Europe, and includes several open questions, with the aim to reveal the multidimensionality in people’s identifications and knowledge. The media content analysis is conducted along similar lines. The responses and relevant news items are then thematically coded using the constant comparison method (Glaser 1965, Dye et al. 2000), based on relevant differences and similarities in the available material rather than those derived entirely from the literature.

Bruter’s (2005) study deals with another key topic that any research on European identity can hardly avoid, namely the relationship between national and European identity. Some studies (among others, Duchesne and Frogner 1995: 193–227, Martinotti and Stefanizzi 1995: 163–189, Licata 2000, Castano 2004: 40–58, Citrin and Sides 2004: 170–172) argue that people who identify strongly with nation(-state)s also identify strongly with Europe and with their local communities and hence, the European and national identities are complementary. Building on Hoffmann (1966) and Inglehart (1970), Duchesne and Frogner (1995: 194) claim that national identity is the ‘the springboard, not the gravedigger, of European identity’ because it provides a model for it. Others defend the view that European and national identities are ‘mutually incompatible’ (Cinnirella 1996: 258), and that the ‘unfinished’ formation of the European identity might represent a potential threat to current identities, particularly in cases where ‘regional or local categories are striving to gain independence from the nation-state’ (Breakwell 2004: 34–5).

Yet, is it necessary to come up with a one-size-fits-all model of the relationship between the European and the national identities? Commentators such as Medrano and Gutiérrez (2001) and Risse (2004: 247–273) would probably disagree. Risse (*ibid.*: 250) conceptualizes European and national identities as ‘nested and/or cross-cutting.’ ‘While a convergence toward a unified European identity is not to be expected, several versions of European nation-state identities are possible, depending on how much ideational space there is for “Europe” in given collective identity constructions’ (Risse 2001: 202). This nestedness resembles the ‘Russian Matruska doll’ where ‘national identities form the core and European identity the outer

boundary of the Russian doll' (Risse 2004: 250). This is a useful approach, since it acknowledges that the relationship between the national and the European is likely to vary from country to country, and may also change over time. This understanding also fits with the conclusions of those researchers who suggest there is no singular pattern across the EU or within nations (Hedetoft 1995, Malmborg and Stråth 2002, Triandafyllidou 2002, Jamieson et al. 2005).

In line with this, one of the key aims of the study is to find out whether children's European and national identities are antagonistic, complementary or nested, and whether and how the relationship between the national and the European varies depending on the particularities of the national context. The two countries' historical trajectories including vis-à-vis Europe have been quite contrasting and this disparity will probably influence children's European identities not least because of the meanings they attach to Europe. As Llobera (2001: 170) indicates, Europe is indeed a 'rather hazy concept.' Commentators (Mihelj 2005, Kuus 2007, Katsikas and Siani-Daview 2010: 1–23, Ranova 2010: 155–173) have argued that one of the main differences between Eastern and Western Europe is exactly in the definition of what Europe is about or put simply, what the 'ideal' Europe is and who (which countries) represent it. Thus, Kuus (2007: 22) claims that 'the East has been Europe's constitutive Other since the inception of the European idea.' Moreover, he says that when the concept 'Eastern Europe' was originally coined in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, it was defined 'as being a part of Europe by geography but still in process of becoming fully European in the political and cultural sense' and 'the region's difference from Western Europe became conceptualized as distance from an idealized Europe.' Furthermore, in Kuus's (ibid.) view, 'the premise of otherness has persisted' despite the 'transformations' Eastern Europe has undergone. Katsikas and Siani-Daview (2010: 15) and Kuus (2007: 27) also point out that in Eastern and Central Europe, EU membership is viewed as a 'return to Europe,' although in effect this return is a 'transition to the West while being coached by the West' – a 'graduation from Eastern Europe to Europe proper' (ibid.: 27–28).

In the Bulgarian case, as Ranova (2010: 155–172) says, this return is linked with an ideological battle between what she calls the 'cultural establishment' and the 'elite-in-the-making.' For the former, Bulgaria's national identity should be enhanced rather than demarcated by the processes of Europeanization, whereas the latter 'creates its recognizable identity by enunciating a direct critique of nationalism' (ibid.: 156).

Both groups have one thing in common – ‘an inferiority complex’ towards Europe. They feel they are lagging behind the Europe they are aiming towards, despite the fact that rhetorically they argue differently – the first group by focusing on Bulgaria’s greatness as a nation, and the second by claiming they are the true Europeans of today. Ranova (ibid.: 157) also makes another very important point in stating that ‘embracing’ European identity will not equally ‘benefit’ all social groups. Her (ibid.) expectation is that the people located ‘at the margins of society’ will

find themselves at the greatest distance from the aspired model of the upper classes and their emulation of an imagined Europe, and are most likely to reject aspirations for Europe and to embrace national history, tradition, Eastern Orthodoxy and nationalism as source of pride, value and self-respect.

It will be interesting to see whether this inferiority complex is present in the socialization agents’ accounts of Europe and whether it is reflected in children’s notions of Europe, namely whether Bulgarian children are likely to feel being European is not for them, because despite their geographical and now geopolitical positioning they are still not ‘fully European,’ or as Kuus (2007: 29) puts it, ‘becoming European always happens at a “later stage.”’ Another issue to be born in mind is whether European-ness is spread unevenly among the social strata – a topic to be further addressed later on in this chapter.

Similar questions are to be asked in England, although led by different reasoning. Even if in many aspects England is a fairly typical representative of Western Europe, this is hardly the case in terms of its positioning vis-à-vis Europe as a whole. Situated geographically off the main land of Europe – there is an often present discourse of ‘them’ in ‘continental Europe’ and ‘us’ on the island. EU-wise it is an even more difficult situation. The UK is often labeled as the ‘awkward partner’ (Blair et al. 2001) in a ‘troubled relationship’ with the EU (Minford et al. 2005: 20). A question that keeps popping up both in the media and in the academic literature is ‘should Britain leave the EU’ (ibid.: i) More importantly on the symbolic level, the issues are whether Britain is indeed a ‘stranger in Europe’ (Wall 2008: 204–221) and whether Europe is the friendly ‘other’ (Risse 2004: 266) rather than the British being ‘core Europeans’ (Rovisco 2010). Furthermore, of all four nations in the UK, the English are often given as an example of being ‘less supportive of the EU than those identifying with the minority identities. This suggests that the English resist the threat the EU poses to

their identity, whereas the Scottish, Welsh and Irish perhaps see the EU as a positive force for the expression of theirs' (Carey 2002).

All these points have important implications for the methodological design of the empirical study. First of all, it is not only essential to differentiate between the EU as a political and economic organization and Europe as a geographical and/or cultural entity, but also to bear in mind that children's ideas of Europe might vary depending on the respective member-state's geographical, political, cultural and overall, historical development. To gain an insight into that, a comparison will be made between the different meanings attached to Europe and the EU both at the level of identity categories offered to children by the socialization agents (in particular the media and parents) as well as at the level of self-identifications among children themselves. The main question to be addressed, therefore, is what the children's ideas of Europe are – is it a continent, a supranational organization or something else. Next, the study will examine whether similar ideas appear in the media and in the parents' answers, how these ideas differ depending on the national context, and finally, how they relate to children's sense of European-ness.

The ability to ascribe particular meanings to Europe or the EU implies a level of knowledge about the two. It is tempting to assume that a high level of knowledge about Europe and the EU will go hand-in-hand with a strong attachment to Europe. Yet it is better to tread carefully here. Eder (2009), for example, claims that the preoccupation of most European identity studies with social identity theory leads to what in his view is the wrong assumption that 'strong identifications' with key symbols such as the flag or buildings and 'good knowledge' automatically imply 'strong identities'. The importance of symbols will be further addressed in the literature review, but for the time being, it is vital to note that this study will avoid assuming a strong and unavoidable link between knowledge and identification, and will instead ask: Are children who know more about Europe and/or the EU indeed more likely to feel more European?

Another unquestioned assumption often found in studies of European identity is the one that posits a necessary link between European identity or knowledge about Europe on the one hand, and support for European integration, and hence democratic legitimation, on the other. This assumption is used as a starting point in many European identity studies (among others, Beus 2001, Decker 2002, Sigalas 2010) but is hardly ever deeply explored. A rare exception is a study by Henjak and Gosselin

(2008) who find out that in most of the Central and Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004, knowledge about the EU usually leads to more support for their country's EU membership. Therefore, the final question to be addressed in the study is: Are the children who feel European also likely to be in support of the EU and further integration in specific areas such as the introduction of the euro, for example? The reverse question is perhaps also valid, namely are the children who are pro-European also likely to feel European?

### **2.3 Children's collective identifications**

The final set of issues to consider before moving to the discussion of social structures involves children's collective identifications. To start with, 'identification works for children much as it does for adults. Children actively construct their own identities – and, indeed, the identities of others' (Jenkins 1996: 58). Two aspects of identity formation in childhood are particularly important. First, identities established during infancy and childhood are seen as 'less flexible than identities which are acquired subsequently', because in early life they are 'experienced as more authoritative', and because 'assumed during the most foundational learning period, they become part of the individual's cognitive furniture: "the way things are"' (ibid.: 62). Secondly, studies show that other collective identifications apart from national and/or European identities are more influential in those early years. Jenkins (ibid.: 19) defines as 'primary identities' 'selfhood, human-ness, gender and under some circumstances, kinship and ethnicity.' He (ibid.) claims that the primary identities are 'more robust and resilient to change in later life than other identities.'

Hengst's (1997) empirical study to a large extent confirms these assertions, although he does not make that explicitly clear. When asked 'What are you?' English and German children:

characterize themselves as human beings, people, children, girls, boys, brothers and sisters, sons, schoolchildren, 10- and 11-year-olds...Only three children – and one of those only after the question 'what else are you?' was repeated several times – referred to their nationality (ibid.)

Hengst's (ibid.) findings clearly show that children's national identity is not a primary identity adopted in early childhood and even in the pre-adolescence period it is hardly the most salient collective identity, with the notable exception of children of

migrant parents. As far as national identities are concerned, as Hengst (1997) puts it, children ‘do not object to their nationality’ but ‘neither are they particularly proud of being German or English.’ His conclusion with regard to European identity is, however, a bit more arguable. In Hengst’s (1997) view, collective identities ‘are developing primarily within a national framework’ and a shift towards a European identity is possible only if ‘Europe succeeds in establishing a common immigration policy’. Furthermore, he (ibid.) claims ‘there is empirical evidence that boundaries between nation-states are playing an ever decreasing role in the construction of collective identities.’

As already indicated, there is no academic consensus on the relationship between European and national identities. While the empirical work may provide some insights into this, existing research makes clear that national and European identities do not play a major role in the first years of a child’s life. For most children they cannot be defined as primary identities, as with gender or age, which are expected to be more ‘resilient to change’ (Jenkins 1996: 19) in later years. This means that influences from the social world such as the media can be potentially particularly important for the formation of these non-primary identities in later childhood and adolescence when socialization continues and children’s identifications are more ‘malleable.’

Martyn Barrett and his research associates (Barrett and Whennell 1998, Barrett et al. 1999, Barrett and Davey 2001, Forrest and Barrett 2001, Barrett 2002, Barrett 2006, Barrett 2007) confirm to a large extent those assumptions and actually offer a useful time-line of the process of national and potentially European identities in children in a number of European countries. Their empirical studies show that by the age of five children ‘acquire an awareness of their membership of their own national group’ (Forrest and Barrett 2001). At six, they are usually able to select a ‘correct national identity’ but do not ‘attribute very high importance to their national identity’ in most of the studied European countries (Barrett 2006). More important at this age are gender, age and even city identities. By nine, however, the importance of national identity increases significantly and remains high or even increases further at the ages of twelve and fifteen (ibid.) Thus, by mid-adolescence children hold very detailed stereotypes of the people who live in many different countries, including their own (Barrett 2002). Furthermore, national identity is found to increase and become ‘more important with age’ (Barrett and Davey 2001) although there is variability –

between and within nations and depending on the children's ethnicity (Barrett 2006). At all ages, however, age and gender identities are more important than national identities (Barrett and Whennell 1998).

Convery et al. (1997) make a strong point about young people's role for the future of the EU. 'The long-term success of the European Union and indeed of Europe as a unified whole will depend on present and future younger generations making an emotional as well as a rational response to the notion of being European' (ibid.) Overall, children 'have been found to aspire, to some extent, to the European identity' (Philippou 2005). Barrett (1996: 364) claims that by the age of ten they acquire a supranational identity. Thus, for example, only 3% and 22% of the 6-year-olds in his sample replied 'yes' to the questions 'Are you European' and 'Is England/Britain part of Europe' as opposed to 70% and 65%, respectively of the 10-year-olds (ibid.: 357–358). 'There appeared to be a fundamental shift in the children's awareness of the supranational group to which they belonged between six and ten years of age' (ibid.: 363). 'The relative importance of the children's national identity increased with age, along with the relative importance of their European identity' to the detriment of their age, local and ethnic identities (Barrett et al. 1999). In any case, national identity seems to be more salient than European identity. In fact, Philippou (2005) found out that Greek-Cypriot pupils 'attributed little significance to the European identity' whereas their national identities 'were extremely important.'

To sum up, most studies on children's identity formation processes show that although national and European identities are not primary identities to be developed in early childhood (Jenkins 1996: 19, Hengst 1997), children nevertheless begin to adopt their national identities from the age of five and the importance of both national and European identities increases with age (Barrett et al. 1999, Forrest and Barrett 2001,). Hence, national and European identities are roughly seen to be more salient from the age of nine and above, which is why it makes sense to research children's European identities exactly at that age. Nonetheless, variations apply both within and between nations, and in countries such as Spain and Italy, national identity is attributed a high level of importance as early as the age of six (Barrett 2006). Furthermore, even in EU member-states such as Germany and the UK, where national identifications among children are generally weak, exactly the opposite findings apply to children of immigrants (Hengst 1997). Building on the insights from this body of literature, the

study will pay attention both to differences in children's European identifications between as well as within nations – which brings in the issue of social structures.

### **3. Social structures**

National variations are indeed one of the external factors that might potentially influence children's European identities but along with them, social structures are also expected to have an impact. As Sanchez (2006: 33) argues, identity is 'ultimately grounded in social reality, that is, social structures and realities.' Scholars (for a summary see Barrett 2007) have found out that children's socio-economic status (SES) and ethnicity influence their geographical knowledge (Barrett et al. 1996, Rutland 1998), including knowledge of other countries (Jahoda 1962 and Wiegand 1991 as quoted in Barrett 2007: 47–49) as well as travel experiences (Convery et al. 1997, Rutland 1998) but also their 'understanding of and attitudes to government and the state' (Barrett 2007: 92). Convery et al. (1997) also conclude that ethnic minority children know less about Europe and feel less European. An important point Barrett (2007: 284) makes, however, is that the impact of social structures is a direct reflection of the parents' social class and ethnicity that 'influence the range of children's personal experiences of other countries and national and state groups.' Gender is also a factor that might potentially play a role albeit perhaps at somewhat different levels. In Barrett's (ibid.: 295) summary, boys know more about 'countries, nations and states' than girls, show higher pride in their country and sometimes 'higher levels of national and/or state identifications.' Since Barrett's (ibid.) focus is not explicitly on social structures, let alone European identities, it will be interesting to reveal whether children's SES and ethnicity do in fact influence their national and European knowledge and identities as well.

Hence, it is inevitable that the sample is prepared in such a way as to make possible the analysis of potential national, socio-economic, ethnic and gender differences. An important factor that needs to be taken into consideration, however, is the need to account both for the different social structures in the two researched countries and come up with a methodology that can be used for comparative purposes. In England social class seems to be a far less problematic concept than in Bulgaria, although even in Western European countries in recent decades its death 'was

regularly reported, in popular and scholarly publications alike' (Marshall 1997: xi). Prominent sociologists in the field such as Gordon Marshall and John Goldthorpe have defended a completely opposite view, namely that 'such pronouncements were as exaggerated as they were untimely,' and that social class is still very important (ibid.) In fact, Goldthorpe and his colleagues (e.g., Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero 1979, Goldthorpe 1980, Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992, Goldthorpe and Heath 1992) have developed a detailed class schema based on occupational groupings. A revised version has been used cross-nationally, including in two Central European states – Poland and Hungary (Evans and Mills 1999). Most notably, on the basis of the Goldthorpe schema, an ambitiously labeled European socio-economic classification for use in the whole of the EU was proposed in 2006 by a consortium of institutions, funded by the European commission. All nine universities, however, are situated in Western European countries.

In Bulgaria, on the other hand, the question is not whether social class is dead, but whether it was even born in the first place in the post-communism era. Thus, in the Eastern European country there is an ongoing debate as to whether it is valid to talk of class at all, with scholars questioning the very existence of a middle class (among others, Daynov 2005, Todorova 2009). Sociologists have argued that in the period of transition between communism and market economy, there was a 'class chaos' (Raichev and Stoychev 2008: 54). The main issue is not whether there is an ongoing process of formation of a middle class, but whether this process is already completed and whether the country can be classified as a class society. Thus, when a group of sociologists (ibid.) concluded in 2006 that the post-communism transition is completed and hence, the middle class is already formed, there was major disagreement on the topic. Nonetheless, even in one of the most recent studies on post-EU accession social inequalities in Bulgaria, the authors (UNDP 2007) claim that if there is a middle class, it is virtually incomparable to the traditional middle classes of Western Europe, for example. 'It is a particularly "Bulgarian" middle class as income levels are in no way comparable to those in the older EU members,' the report (ibid.: 5) states. Consequently, as Tilkidjiev (2010) argues, in most stratification studies in Bulgaria there is a 'wide variety' of classifications used. In fact, unless a researcher is part of an international project with a unified methodology, the majority of studies tend to rely on 'their own practice' or 'exotic attempts' to create such (ibid.)

It is beyond the scope of the thesis to deal in any detail with the debates about the birth and death of social class. What is pertinent for the present analysis is that no one denies the existence of social inequalities, and it is therefore important to account for their impact on children's European knowledge and identities. This leaves the practical question of how best to define and measure social stratification in the two countries, and how to do so in a manner that is capable of capturing the particularities of the national context while at the same time providing the basis for comparison. The most widely adopted approach in recent research involves measuring SES rather than social class as such – though the two are believed to be closely related. The distinction between class and status has a long history in the social sciences – it was introduced, as Chan and Goldthorpe (2007a) explain, by Max Weber – yet is 'commonly forgotten in research' (ibid.) Nevertheless, Chan and Goldthorpe (ibid.) argue that it is important to distinguish between the two, and define them in the following manner:

By a status order we understand a structure of relations expressing perceived and typically accepted social superiority, equality, or inferiority of a quite generalized kind that is linked not to the qualities of particular individuals but rather to social positions that they hold or to certain of their ascribed attributes (e.g., "birth" or ethnicity). A class structure, in contrast, we would see as being grounded specifically, and quite objectively, in the social relations of economic life—that is, in the social relations of labor markets and production units.

SES is of course closely linked to class and many authors seem to use the two concepts interchangeably, namely they put class labels to the SES grades (e.g. Livingstone and Helsper 2008). For example, when adopting the Market Research Society (MRS) scale commentators assume that grade A refers to the upper middle class, B to middle class, C1 to the lower middle class, C2 to the skilled working class, D to the working class and E to the people who do not work regularly but rely on the state benefits for their subsistence. Yet as Chan and Goldthorpe (2007a) point out, there is a 'good deal of overlap in status between the classes, and at the same time the spread of status within classes is in some cases quite considerable,' which means that the distinction between the two is not at all 'redundant.' Furthermore, in another study, they (Chan and Goldthorpe 2007b) use a combination of class and status categories to show not only that the differentiation is theoretically pertinent but also to demonstrate that when incorporated empirically it contributes to a better understanding of stratification. Due to that, the distinction should also be kept in this study. Although sometimes class references will be made in the analysis – mainly

when discussing English schools when there seems to be an overlap with SES, and for clarity of presentation purposes – they should not be accepted as a substitute of SES.

Chan and Goldthorpe's (ibid.) findings also suggest that there is no inherent antagonism between class and status but the research questions of a particular study should determine whether to employ one concept and/or the other. In their (ibid.) study, for example, class seems to have greater influence over 'economic life-chances' whereas status has greater influence over 'at least one major aspect of lifestyle: level and pattern of cultural consumption.' Therefore, the thesis does not claim that class is an irrelevant notion or one that is definitely less valid than status but simply that there are certain advantages that SES has over class, which makes it more suitable for the current study. Some of them were already outlined but two more should be briefly mentioned. First, as already became evident, class is linked mainly to the 'social relations of labor markets and production units' (Chan and Goldthorpe 2007a), which are quite different in the two national contexts researched and therefore, practically impossible to compare in a meaningful way. Status order is, on the other hand, present in both societies and even class theorists such as Goldthorpe (Chan and Goldthorpe 2007b) do not deny that but attempt to come up with typologies that capture it in Britain. In Bulgaria, as Ganzeboom and Nieuwbeerta (1999) rightly point out, 'one of the largest-scale destratification experiments in the history of the human race' took place in communism but this experiment did not actually lead to the abolishment of status order, which was still alive and kicking even during communism - albeit of a different type to the one observed in Western societies.

Another advantage status has over class in comparative studies is its hierarchical nature (Giddens 1973: 106, Marshall et al. 1997: 29, Chan and Goldthorpe 2007a). Chan and Goldthorpe (2007b) explain that they 'do not envisage classes as always falling into a simple hierarchical ordering,' because 'individuals in different classes may be advantaged and disadvantaged in differing, and, perhaps, not entirely commensurable respects as a result of the employment relations in which they are involved.' To prove their point, the sociologists (ibid.) give as an example certain representatives of the 'intermediate classes' such as a bank clerk, a self-employed electrician and a factory foreman, who have different advantages and disadvantages such as job security, promotion opportunities, etc, which cannot be 'readily ordered.' Marshall et al. (1997: 29–30) also claim that Goldthorpe's class schema is not

hierarchical, although it is said to possess ‘a strong hierarchical element’ at its three broader levels – the working, the intermediate and the service classes. By contrast, SES has a hierarchical nature because the very way in which the relevant occupation categories are structured is hierarchical. Thus, ‘in general, occupations that require working with symbols and perhaps people, confer the highest status, while those that require working directly with material things confer the lowest status’ (Chan and Goldthorpe 2007b). The hierarchical structure of SES will allow for a more meaningful quantitative examination of the impact of the respective status categories on children’s European knowledge and identifications both nationally and hopefully, cross-nationally.

It is now time to turn to the practical question of how best to measure SES. As already alluded, the most telling indicator of status is the occupation a person holds (Chan and Goldthorpe 2007a). Importantly, Chan and Goldthorpe (*ibid.*) differentiate between status and SES, because what their study has found out is that ‘there are some occupational categories whose status appears incongruent with their income or education.’ This distinction is quite pertinent for the current study where an attempt will be made to capture SES from at least three perspectives rather than focusing on occupations solely. The purpose is to account as fully as possible for the variations of social structures, which might or might not be a result of national distinctions and overall different structures. Thus, SES will be composed of three elements – parents’ occupation, education and the school the children attend. Instead of developing a composite measure, the impact of the three will be evaluated both separately and collectively, to allow accounting for similarities and differences in the nature of SES in the two countries.

Occupation or school cannot be used on their own, as some studies do, because of national differences. Thus, even if the same ‘synthesized’ occupational categories are adopted, education is still an important indicator especially in post-communist Bulgaria where higher occupational status is not necessarily a reflection of higher education. Estimates show (Raichev and Stoichev 2008: 50) that roughly 30% of the population is in jobs not equivalent to their qualifications due to the restructuring of both the public and the private sector and as a result of the high level of unemployment. Thus, many people have ended up in jobs that require lower qualifications. The opposite is also true sometimes as the process of initial accumulation of capital often involved ‘informal activities’ (International Labour

Organization 1992: 20), which is perhaps an euphemism for ‘illegal’ actions (Dikov 2010, Guineva 2010).

Furthermore, while some researchers in the UK measure SES solely through the school the children attend, this will hardly be possible in Bulgaria. In fact, different segregation patterns are evident in the two societies. In England, it is more a question of social (Smithers and Robinson 2010) rather than ethnic segregation. A recent report (ibid.) concludes that ‘the 2,679 state comprehensive schools in England are highly socially segregated,’ or as a *Guardian* commentator (Millar 2010) puts it, ‘after 20 years of education reforms most of our schools are still conspicuously divided along class lines.’ Thus said, the report also finds instances of ethnic clustering but mainly as a result of parents’ choice, namely parents are ‘seeking out schools’ that take ‘children mainly from a similar ethnic background’ (Smithers and Robinson 2010). Other researchers (Burgess and Wilson 2004), however, are more critical and clearly claim that the ‘levels of ethnic segregation in England’s schools are high.’ On the whole, school seems to be a reliable indicator of SES in England, but is not that tightly linked to ethnic segregation.

In contrast, schools in Bulgaria are segregated primarily along ethnic lines – although these sometimes coincide with SES as well. Bulgaria has been criticized widely by international organizations in recent years for the ethnic segregation of one of its biggest minority groups, namely the Roma:

According to the Bulgarian Ministry of Education, in Bulgaria there are 106 schools and pre-school facilities in which the student body is 100% Roma. Most of these schools are located in or close to segregated ghetto-like Roma neighbourhoods. According to estimations by experts, around 70% of the Roma children of school age are currently educated in the Roma ghetto schools. These schools were established in the period of 1950-1970 and were labelled by the authorities at that time as ‘schools for children with inferior lifestyle and culture,’ schools called until today ‘Gypsy schools’ (Ivanov 2006).

Although allegedly a process of desegregation (Nounev 2006) is under way, even in the town where the research was conducted the head teacher of one of the schools declared that it was 100% Roma. On another level, however – that of SES - school is not believed to play the same role in perpetuating social class inequalities in the Eastern European country as it does in England. The main reason for that is the legacy of communism where the strategies of ‘destratification’ of society and reduction of social reproduction were indeed concentrated in and executed through the school

(Ganzeboom and Nieuwbeerta 1999). Whether or not the ‘destratification experiments’ (ibid.) were successful is quite another matter, but it seems that some of the repercussions are still evident, at least at the level of schools.

Overall, the school the children attend will provide a useful indicator of social segregation among pupils, albeit in slightly different ways in each of the two countries, and will offer a helpful basis for comparing the different forms of inequalities and their impact on children’s European knowledge and identification, as well as media use patterns along with other socialization agents.

As the above discussion of social segregation and schools suggests, differences in SES are often closely intertwined with ethnic differences. Furthermore, some of the language used both in Bulgarian and English reports suggests a link between ethnicity and SES. Thus, Ladányi and Szelenyi (2001) say that the definition of Roma social experts and interviewers often adopt ‘conflates poverty and Roma ethnicity’. Brooks (1999) even argues that ‘ethnic differences in post-communist Bulgaria generally arise from class inequalities.’ In fact, quite a number of authors claim there is a mutual reinforcement of social inequalities, which has been labeled as intersectionality in recent literature. The term is a fairly new one, coined originally by Crenshaw (1989) as ‘the various ways in which race and gender interact to shape the multiple dimensions of Black women’s employment experiences.’ Later, she (Crenshaw 2004) clarifies that ‘intersectionality simply came from the idea that if you’re standing in the path of multiple forms of exclusion, you are likely to get hit by both.’ Ever since its formulation two decades ago and initial application by mainly black feminist scholars, the concept has been widely used as a means of investigating the possible links between different forms of inequalities - ethnic, gender, class, etc.

One of the debates within the field is whether to examine the simultaneous impact of inequalities or rather treat each form of inequality on its own merits and only then turn to their ‘intersections.’ In an attempt to address this issue, McCall (2005) creates a categorization with three possible ways in which intersectionality can be studied. She labels them ‘anticategorical,’ ‘intracategorical’ and ‘intercategorical’ complexity. The anticategorical approach is based on a ‘methodology that deconstructs analytical categories’ (ibid.), namely puts into question the need for categorization and the categories themselves. McCall (ibid.) gives as an example of such an approach Ruth Behar’s *Translated Woman* (1993) ‘in which the complexity of a single individual’s life and the complicated nature of the researcher’s relationship to the

individual/subject are the central themes of the book.’ The intracategorical approach, on the other hand, involves a ‘focus on particular social groups at neglected points of intersection’ (McCall 2005). She situates this approach between the other two because in it the attitude towards categories is ambivalent. They are both used as starting points of analysis when choosing the social group on which to place the focus but are simultaneously regarded ‘as misleading constructs that do not readily allow for the diversity and heterogeneity of experience to be represented’ (ibid.) In this approach an attempt is made to analyze the respective social group in ‘all its detail and complexity’ rather than by focusing on specific categories (ibid.) Finally, the intercategorical complexity approach that McCall (ibid.) supports and uses herself ‘requires that scholars provisionally adopt existing analytical categories to document relationships of inequality among social groups and changing configurations of inequality along multiple and conflicting dimensions.’ Put simply, this is perhaps the most exhaustive of the three approaches because it starts with pre-given categories – for example, male and female gender, upper, middle and working class - and then the analysis proceeds into comparing every single combination of categories, or as McCall (ibid.) puts it:

It is not the intersection of race, class, and gender in a single social group that is of interest but the relationships among the social groups defined by the entire set of groups constituting each category.

This third approach seems to be the most relevant for the current study, but only if the analysis reveals that intersectionality plays a role at all. In other words, the focus of the study is certainly not on intersectionality itself but rather on the impact of each of the social structures in its own right. If there appear to be some overlaps, such as the ones suggested in terms of ethnicity and SES for Roma children, these will be subsequently investigated. The issue of how the impact of social inequalities will be measured will be addressed further in the methodology chapter.

## Chapter 2

### Identity, Media and Socialization

#### 1. Socialization theory

Of key importance in children's identifications is the process of socialization. It is through their socialization agents that children are 'hailed' to endorse certain collective identities rather than others. We begin with a brief definition of socialization and an outline of the main agents that are expected to play a role. To start with, socialization is the process of 'development of the individual as a social being and a participant in society' (Clausen 1968: 3). Put simply, through socialization a person 'develops, forms and is formed as part of society' (Sulova and Gillernova 2008: 5). As in identity studies, socialization research has a psychological and a sociological strand. The former intrinsically links socialization with 'child development' theories by 'focusing on the child, rather than from the viewpoint of the larger family-community-society perspective' (Kagitcibasi 1984). In its early sociological usage, on the other hand, socialization was seen to a large extent as a functionalist and deterministic theory (Clausen 1968, White 1977). As Clausen (1968: 4) puts it,

Socialization does imply that the individual is induced in some measure to conform willingly to the ways of his society or of the particular groups to which he belongs...Clearly they do so by fitting their behavior to the expectations of others, thereby acknowledging and to a degree conforming to social norms.

Criticisms of the functionalist bias of socialization theory have not come only from the field of psychologists but even nowadays the main critics of the theory within sociology, media and cultural studies tend to emphasize its assumed functionalism. Thus, Buckingham (1993: 14) claims that socialization 'regards children as passive recipients of "external" social forces, rather than active participants in the construction of their own social lives and identities.' Yet, in practical terms theorists of socialization theory such as Clausen (1968) and White (1977) strongly emphasize the agency element, which they consider to be an essential part of the socialization process:

Diversity and a measure of deviance from social norms are to be found in all societies. Such diversity is a condition for social change and a reflection of the fact that man is to a degree his own agent: he evaluates, chooses among alternatives, creates his own goals, and remakes his world (Clausen 1968: 4).

Consequently

In psychology, as in sociology, attention moved from the effects of socialization and the social engineering approach, towards the study of the process and the recognition that behind the action of the individual there did after all lie an actor, not just a pliable respondent (White 1977: 14).

While there is ongoing talk of a ‘life-long socialization’ rather than a “‘full socialization’” occurring at some unspecified time around the conclusion of formal education’ (ibid.: 5), the importance of childhood and adolescence socialization should not be underestimated. It is indeed in childhood and adolescence that much of socialization takes place. It is equally important, however, to recognize that especially in relation to identities there is no permanent fixity, for even though identities developed in early childhood are ‘less resilient to change’ (Jenkins 1996: 19), they are still subject to transformations.

Another major criticism of socialization, particularly in reference to children, is that it is very much an adult-focused theory. It investigates mainly ‘the process through which the young learn the ways of a society and social groups’ but has a limited interest in the reverse – how ‘children influence adults’ (Handel et al. 2007: 9). This claim was perhaps valid especially in the ‘traditional’ socialization research, but in recent years academics have turned their focus exactly to the reciprocal aspects of the relationship (McDevitt and Ostrowski 2009). As Livingstone (1998) puts it, ‘childhood and youth are not simply stages through which individuals pass but are sociological phenomena in their own right, neither prior to nor separate from society as a whole.’ Hence, ‘children and young people – both individually and as a market – not only respond to but also influence changes in their immediate environment, including their mediated environment’ (ibid.) Nonetheless, by taking into account what are seen as two main flaws of socialization theory – an overlooking of the role of the individual and an adult-based approach – it is possible to overcome them by paying attention in practical terms to these influences. Put simply, socialization on its own may be not enough to explain how children’s identities are formed and what factors and structures influence them, but by adding to it other more child-centered and action-focused approaches, a fuller picture can be built.

The present study will indeed be conducted in such a way as to capture the importance of agency in the process of socialization through adopting a child-centric approach. To this end, the role of socialization agents will be revealed not solely through analyzing the content of the European messages they produce and distribute, but also by looking at the degree of reception of those messages by the children. The process will be facilitated by the use of the concept of collective identities as developed in the previous chapter, which encompasses the importance of both structure and agency. Furthermore, children will be at all times regarded as active participants in these processes rather than passive recipients of ‘pre-packed’ social norms and messages. The child-centric approach, which largely dominates the so-called new sociology of childhood, is indeed a valid means of studying children because they are truly ‘active, creative social agents’ (Corsaro 2005: 3).

This child-centric approach should not be an excuse for overlooking the importance of societal factors and social structures. The significance of societal factors can be established exactly by looking at the impact socialization agents have. The issue to be subsequently addressed, therefore, is who the main socialization agents are and what role they are expected to play.

Socialization theorists seem to produce long lists of possible agents, but the four main ones usually present in most (especially recent) accounts are family, school, peers and mass media (among others, Wartella et al. 1979, McLeod 2000, Handel et al. 2007). Other might be religion, the state and the military. Depending on their research questions, academics choose to investigate the importance of some or one of the socialization agents; most are expected to play a role in certain stages of the process. Nonetheless, many studies are devoted to the role of families (among others, Umaña-Taylor et al. 2006, Benner and Kim 2009, Studsrød 2009) and school (among others, Ehman 1980, Homan 1982, Banks 1994, Sergeichik 2004, Conchas 2010) or the relationship between them (for example, Stolz 2004, Bikmetov 2008). This emphasis on family and school is attributed to the wider research focus ‘on childhood and adolescence as critical periods for socialization, often at the expense of the life stages that follow’ (McLeod and Shah 2009). The media’s role, on the other hand, has been often researched in the context of political socialization (e.g., Conway et al. 1981, Austin and Nelson 1993, Buckingham 1997, Wei and Leung 1998, McLeod 2000). The current study is not necessarily positioned within the field of political socialization, at least insofar as this is understood as a process that is ‘fundamentally

concerned with the mechanisms that create and maintain democratic institutions and practices' (McLeod and Shah 2009). It is hard to predict whether EU/Europe-socialization is strictly a political form of socialization, because it is unclear what a definition of Europe children will ultimately give – it may well be that they understand Europe as a continent, without any added political significance. The only assumption made at this stage is that stories about Europe and/or the EU are more likely to appear in news programmes, but this is an issue to be considered in the media section of the literature review.

Suffice it to say that the way the topic is approached in the thesis is again in a children-as-actors-driven approach. The questionnaire is developed in such a way that young people are first asked about their sources of information on Europe, the EU and important European people and symbols as well as their definitions of Europe and the EU. Then, the focus is oriented to the role of the main agents, which children indicate play a key importance on the topic. Based on existing research findings on children and adolescents' European knowledge and identities (Convery et al. 1997) and the pilot study, three main socialization agents were identified: the media, the school, and parents/ the family. In line with the previous discussion, the role of SES, ethnicity and gender was also taken into account, in particular their impact on the functioning of socialization agents, and, through that, on children's sense of European-ness.

It is vital to recognize that the socialization agents in the two countries might play different roles not only because they 'choose' to do so – a main issue the respective chapter in the thesis will deal with – but also because of their different histories and structures. It is, therefore, worth exploring briefly the relevant characteristics of the media and education systems as well as family structures in order to keep an open eye about the possible influences those might play in moulding children's knowledge and identification.

The role of schools in reinforcing or overcoming social inequalities was already elaborated upon in the structures' section of the literature review. On another level, what might be different is the relationship between the school and the state in terms of regulations and autonomy over the implementation of the national curriculum and the extent to which the state is keen on promoting itself through embedding patriotism not only in the school curriculum but in the everyday school life.

On the first point, in both countries there is a national curriculum as proposed by the government but in England teachers have much more leeway in how to implement it, namely they have ‘flexibility’ ‘to adapt the curriculum to their needs’ (Qualification and Curriculum Development Agency 2010). In Bulgaria, on the other hand, teachers hardly have any freedom in that respect. Pre-approved textbooks by the Ministry of Education are compulsory in all subjects and at all stages. Although teachers can choose between a few textbooks on a subject, most of them have the same topics, even ordered in the same way. In this manner, all information children receive in schools is censored in advance by the state.

On the second point, the pledge of allegiance in the USA provides a useful illustration of the phenomenon. There are ongoing ‘debates over the role schools should play in educating “world citizens” versus national patriots’ (Mitchell and Parker 2008). In the UK, however, as Hand and Pearce (2009) point out, there is

no statutory requirement on schools to promote patriotism, while there is a statutory requirement on them to ensure that ‘where political issues are brought to the attention of pupils ... they are offered a balanced presentation of opposing views’ (Education Act 1996, Section 407).

The University of London’s Institute of Education recent research (Hand and Pearce 2009) found out that both teachers and pupils prefer the topic to be debated neutrally in class, so currently patriotism is discussed rather than promoted. Some teachers even report feeling uneasy when the subject is brought up by their students. In Bulgaria, on the other hand, the school was actively engaged in state propaganda during communism and nowadays it openly embraces patriotism. One of the first poems children learn by heart after they start school is ‘I am Bulgarian’ by Ivan Vazov. Moreover, in 2004, the President George Parvanov took part in a campaign initiated by a non-governmental organization that urged every school in Bulgaria to fly the national flag on top of its building. ‘This was an impressive campaign as a result of which the national flag was waved in every single Bulgarian school,’ said the President (Parvanov 2005).

Linked to patriotism’s ‘place’ in schools is the issue of whether the state is interested in encouraging Europeanism as well. As Llobera (2001: 185) puts it, ‘if the school made the nation, it should also be a key factor in promoting Europeanness.’ Convery et al.’s (1997) cross-national study reveals, for example, that in spite of the EU education ministers’ initiative in 1998 for a ‘European dimension’ to be

introduced in the national curricula, teaching about Europe is still left to the initiative of the teacher. This is a topic that will be researched through the interviews with teachers and children as well as through the analysis of textbooks in Bulgaria.

It is not an easy task to decide which aspects of the family life and structures might actually impact on children's European knowledge and identifications also vis-à-vis school and media. Some scholars (Austin and Pinkleton 2001 quote Connell 1972 and Beck 1977: 124 on the issue) have argued, for example, that in relation to political socialization parents play an indirect rather than a direct role by placing the 'child in a socio-political context that might provide some reinforcement of parental views.' On the basis of findings in existing literature (McLeod and Chaffee 1972, McLeod et al. 1982: 272–286), Austin and Pinkleton (2001) conclude that 'family communication patterns, therefore, tend to affect children's media use patterns, which then contribute to the child's political development.' Following Corder-Bolz (1980), Austin (2001: 386) also indicates that children's knowledge of politics or geography is often the result of 'parent or teacher mediation of television content.' Hence, the context is seen as very important and the claim is that a great deal of the political information children acquire is not as a result of political discussions per se but of 'general discussions of the media' (Austin and Pinkleton 2001). Consequently, two main aspects of the potential role families play will be explored. First, the wider context issue, namely how much time parents actually spend with their children or in other words, how they 'juggle' family and work arrangements. This is important, because it can give a preliminary indication of the level of parental control they exert over children's spare time. Related to this first issue is the second one, namely about the possibilities of parental media use mediation as well as the opportunities for discussions on general topics and on a specific topic such as Europe.

To start with, Tang and Cousins (2005) provide a useful comparison of the family and work patterns in Bulgaria and the UK among a number of other European countries, which serves as an illustration of the different pressures parents experience, and the amount of time they actually spend with their school children. Thus, Bulgaria is characterized by 'a downward spiral of negative population growth, mass impoverishment, employment decline, a worsening health status and high emigration rates' (ibid.) In terms of flexibility of working time, the arrangements are labeled as 'forced' flexibility as 'people have been thrown onto their own resources to survive' (ibid.) The UK, on the other hand, is given as an example of a European country with

high levels of part-time work, especially for women, which is considered ‘a deregulated form of flexibility’ (ibid.) As a result of these patterns, mothers in Bulgaria are working for much longer hours than in the UK – an average 40 hours a week as opposed to 26. Moreover, as a whole in Eastern unlike in Western Europe, for mothers with children under the age of 6 the choice is either full-time employment or staying at home:

The presence of children in the East has little impact on the hours worked by mothers. In particular, part-time working in the CEE countries is much less developed than in the West, and the presence of children does not have an impact on the proportions of those who are working 30 hours or less per week (ibid.)

In both countries, the mother is the main person responsible for the childcare arrangements. A main difference is that in the new EU member-state ‘both sexes contribute to the survival of the family economy. In Bulgaria the need to earn more money and concerns with family and individual survival strategies are more important than work and family balance’ (ibid.)

Put simply, it seems that mothers in Bulgaria are under much more pressure to work full-time as they are expected to provide for their families as much as fathers are. This leads to longer and less flexible working hours than for English mothers and hence, less time to spend with their children for the working mums. Fathers in both countries work similar hours – 42 per week in Bulgaria and 46 in England - but they are not expected to be responsible for looking after their children in the majority of cases. A solution more often found in Bulgaria involves relying on other people to ‘babysit’ after school. Notably, these are more often informal arrangements rather than paying for childcare as is the case in the UK (ibid.)

Furthermore, the school system in Bulgaria imposes more pressures on the mothers than in England. Children in the two countries at the researched age of 9-10 finish school at a completely different time and their holidays have a different duration. In England, school ends between 3 and 3:30 pm while in Bulgaria that happens much earlier - between 12 and 1 pm. Moreover, in most schools in England the school authorities will not let primary school pupils go home on their own while in Bulgaria, especially in the small towns and villages, this is a common practice. The summer holiday for primary school children is also much longer – three and a half months as opposed to approximately a month and a half in England. As a result of that, after school and during their summer holidays, Bulgarian children often end up

staying at home on their own or with their siblings or grandparents till their parents arrive from work. The children's school and parents' working patterns have an important implication especially for the young people's media use patterns, because the level of mediation is perhaps much lower when no parent is around for hours. Moreover, very often more hours at home mean more media use.

It is not surprising then that increasingly both academics (an overview in Valkenburg et al. 1999) and regulatory bodies (for example, the British Ofcom, the European Commission) have become interested in the role parents play as mediators of the messages the children are exposed to in the media. Livingstone and Helsper (2008) define mediation as 'the parental management of the relation between children and media.' By citing Austin (2001: 377–397) as an example, they (Livingstone and Helsper 2008) clarify that sometimes mediation implies 'parental discussion without also including rule-making or co-viewing.'

Valkenburg and his colleagues (1999) distinguish between three main styles of mediation: 'instructive', 'restrictive' and 'social coviewing.' In the first type, parents 'set rules for viewing or prohibiting the viewing of certain content' (ibid.) The second involves 'discussing certain aspects of programmes with children' (ibid.) Finally, 'covieing refers to occasions when adults and children watch television together, sharing the viewing experience, but not engaging in any discussion about the programme' (ibid.) A similar classification is offered by Livingstone and Helsper (2008). They (ibid.) talk of 'active', 'restrictive' mediation and 'co-using.' The first 'consists of talking about media content while the child is engaging with (watching, reading, listening to) the medium' (ibid.) The second is fairly similar to Valkenburg et al.'s (1999) restrictive mediation and the third to their co-viewing concept.

In the present study the focus will be mostly on the so-called 'active' (Livingstone and Helsper 2008) or 'instructive' (Valkenburg et al. 1999) mediation especially in relation to Europe/EU. It is essential to establish whether and to what extent parents deem the topic important enough to prompt discussions with their children about it. No study so far suggests a significant salience of the European topic in children's lives, and it is therefore vital to investigate whether parents actually mediate messages on the subject, because this would give a good indication of the salience of Europe on the public agenda. This alleged importance of comparing the views of the public to those expressed in the media is actually part of a broader theoretical framework that looks at media's role in general, namely agenda-setting. Nonetheless, the topic will be

addressed in more detail in the main media section. Questions about restrictive mediation and co-viewing will also be asked, mainly to determine parents' input into children's media use patterns. However, the latter will be analyzed only if it turns out they contribute significantly to the major research questions. Finally, the mediation questions will be asked both in the parents' survey and the children's interviews, because it will be interesting to compare the extent to which the two groups' accounts are similar. Researchers (an overview in Buijzen et al. 2008) have reported a 'substantial disagreement between parent- and child-reported measures.' The causes for that disagreement have not been thoroughly investigated. Some suggest it is a result of social desirability while others conclude that factors such as 'perceptual differences' play a role. Put simply, the more the child understands the purpose of mediation and the message his mother or father aims to deliver, the more children and parents tend to report similar mediation patterns (ibid.)

As already indicated, there is a separate section devoted to the role of the media in the literature review. For the time being, it makes sense only to briefly outline some main features of the two countries' media systems. Much more has been written about the British than the Bulgarian media system. Hallin and Mancini (2004: 11) categorize Britain's media system as representative of the Liberal model, 'characterized by a relative dominance of market mechanisms and of commercial media.' The UK is famous for its 'strong public service broadcaster, the BBC,' which 'attracts about a third of the total TV audience' (Bromley 2008). 'Overall around 70% of UK households have access to multi-channel television, and around 400 channels are available thus audience fragmentation is commonplace' (ibid.) Another feature of the UK system is 'the existence of a large national newspaper sector, comprised of ten daily and ten Sunday titles' (ibid.) There is a concentration of ownership both at the national and the local level (ibid.) Two owners control 55% of the market (News International and Daily Mail and General Trust). There are three types of newspapers - 'quality,' 'middle market' and 'red-top tabloid' (ibid.) The total average circulation per 1 000 people was 289.75 in 2004 (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2008a). The British press is also notorious for its Euroscepticism (Anderson and Weymouth 1999, Anderson 2004: 151–171), which Grant (2008) labels as 'uniquely powerful' and claims is one of the explanations for 'Britain's hostility to the EU.'

No known categorization is available for the Bulgarian media system, and it is clearly beyond the scope of the thesis to attempt to categorize it. As a whole, the

media market was liberalized shortly after the fall of communism and at present there are three national terrestrial channels – two private and one public. Their collective market share and the overall low number of cable operators suggest there is no such big market fragmentation as is evidenced in the UK. The public TV station – BNT – is very weak and has a considerably lower market share than the private TV channels bTV and Nova TV – 8.9% in 2009 as opposed to 33% and 23%, respectively (Central European Media Enterprises 2010). Both private TV channels are owned by foreign corporations. The TV with the largest market share – bTV – was part of Rupert Murdoch’s Balkan News Corporation until 2010 when it was bought by the Bermuda-based Central European Media Enterprises. Similarly, the second private TV – Nova tv – was initially owned by the Greek Antenna Group until October 2008 but is now part of the Swedish media group MTG. Regarding the national press, ‘as of October 15, 2006 there were 15 national dailies’ (Tabakova 2008). Most of them are defined by Tabakova (ibid.) as ‘hybrid tabloids,’ combining ‘elements of both tabloids and quality press.’ The two dailies with the largest market share – *Trud* and *24 Chasa* - were owned by the German group Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (WAZ) till December 2010. WAZ owned a number of other newspapers and magazines and its market share in 1997 was 41.7% (ibid). Although legally attacked for its alleged monopoly of the market, WAZ won all proceedings. Unlike its neighboring countries Romania and Serbia, there are no major instances of political interference in editorial affairs in recent years in Bulgaria. At the end of 2010, however, WAZ sold all its newspapers, magazines, printing press facilities and distribution agency to the Vienna-based BG Privateinvest GmbH - a newly formed company with joint ownership by a few Bulgarian businessmen and the German Karl von Habsburg. It is yet unclear whether the new owners will continue the policy of editorial non-interference. The total average circulation per 1000 people as of 2004 is 78.98 – 3.8 times lower than the one in Britain (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2008b). The issue of European reporting in the Bulgarian media is under researched, however, and it remains to be seen whether its direction is as positive as the one registered by public opinion surveys as well as whether the topic is indeed more salient in the Bulgarian rather than the English media due to the recent accession of the country.

## 2. Media's role

The mass media definitely influence collective identities and processes of identification among adults, adolescents and children. This is the unequivocal conclusion that most research on the relationship between media and collective identities reaches. There seems to be an academic consensus on the issue. Numerous studies indicate that media play a role in the process of adult identity formation, be it gender (e.g., Morley 2000: 56–86, Gauntlett 2002), racial/ethnic (e.g., Ferguson 1998, Georgiou 2001, Downing and Husband 2005), national (e.g., Schlesinger 1991b, Schlesinger 1993, Schields 1996, Hengst 1997), European (e.g., Schlesinger 1993, Hengst 1997, Schlesinger 1997, Bruter 2005) or other. Barrett (1996: 363, 2006) clearly states that the media are also a factor in children's collective identifications and suggests that further research could deal with this issue. Bennett et al. (1998: 903) also acknowledge that 'through a variety of sources, such as communicative interchanges with others, media presentations, and formal pedagogical contexts, young children make informally guided discoveries of their group's representation of itself and, to a lesser extent perhaps, its views of out-groups.' Similarly, Buckingham (2008: 5) indicates that 'media provide young people with symbolic resources for constructing or expressing their own identities.'

What most studies lack, however, is an explanation of how this happens – they make the claim that media indeed have an impact on identity formation and depict representations which assert, enhance or promote a certain identity without giving an account of how exactly people's collective identities are influenced by the media. This pitfall should be attributed not only to the researchers' methodologies and the scope of their studies, but also to the recognition that it is difficult to establish empirically exactly how much a person's collective identities are influenced by the mass media, on the one hand, and by all other respective factors, on the other. The purpose of this chapter is not to resolve this difficulty, but rather to concentrate on the claims made in the literature about the role media play first, vis-à-vis Europe, second, in children's lives, and third, in general.

## 2.1 The Media and Europe

Schlesinger (1991b: 139) develops a persuasive argument that European identity is only possible if the information role of the media is enhanced:

Information is a decisive, perhaps the most decisive, factor in European unification...European unification will only be achieved if Europeans want it. Europeans will only want it if there is such a thing as European identity. A European identity will only develop if Europeans are adequately informed.

In recent years there has been a proliferation of micro studies that investigate the media representations of the Union on topics such as the euro, the EU Constitutional Treaty and enlargement (e.g., De Vreese 2001, Triandafyllidou 2003, Aboura 2005, De Vreese et al. 2006). Of relevance in the current research, however, are two broader theoretical assumptions, which relate to the media's role vis-à-vis the nation – Benedict Anderson's (1991) notion of the nation as an 'imagined community' and Michael Billig's (1995b) theory of banal nationalism. First, Anderson (1991: 5–7) strongly emphasizes the role of the printing press for the development of the nation as an 'imagined community,' imagined in the sense that 'the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.' In his view, the creation of the printing press is one of the key factors that made possible the 'imagining' of the nation. If the nation is an 'imagined community,' the development of which was very much stimulated by the printing press (Anderson 1991), then what about Europe? Is it also an imagined community and what role do or can the media play in the spreading of European identity?

Cram (2001: 231–246, 2009) attempts to answer this question by building on Billig's (1995b) 'banal nationalism' theory and exploring the possibilities for 'banal Europeanism.' At the heart of Billig's (ibid.: 6–8) theory is the view that there is a 'continual "flagging", or reminding, of nationhood through the daily reproduction of "ideological habits."'

The national flag hanging outside a public building in the United States attracts no special attention...Daily the nation is indicated, or 'flagged', in the lives of its citizenry. Nationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in established nations, is the endemic condition...The metonymic image of banal nationalism is not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building (ibid.: 6, 8).

Billig (ibid.: 9) makes it quite clear that the flagging takes place very much through the mass media. 'In routine practices and everyday discourses, especially those in the mass media, the idea of nationhood is regularly flagged. Even the daily weather forecast can do this.' There are many aspects involved in this interweaving of banal nationalism into the everyday practices of the media and from there to the flagging in front of the public. One feature is obviously the use of symbols such as the national flag (ibid.) In fact, symbols are 'extensively used' both in the formation of nation-state and European identities and are seen to be especially influential (Von Benda-Beckman and Verkuyten 1995: 18–19). Therefore, it makes sense to investigate what national, European and international symbols are recognized by the majority of children and whether the young people can recall any particular places in the 'real' and the virtual worlds where they have actually seen these symbols. For example, children will be asked whether they recognize the EU flag and where they have seen it. Then, their level of recognition of the flag will be compared to the frequency with which the flag is present not only in the media reports but also in children's immediate surroundings such as school. The recognition of symbols and important people might provide for a useful indication of whether there are indeed processes of banal nationalism and Europeanism.

Cram (2001: 353) claims that it 'seems undeniable' that, 'at a basic level,' 'a degree of banal Europeanism already exists within the EU.' To further her argument, she builds on Billig (1995b) and argues that news coverage of EU politicians and events has become to a large extent 'home' news (Cram 2001: 353) but does not actually back her claim with empirical evidence. Cram (ibid.) also assumes that people no longer notice the EU flag waved on buildings alongside their national flags or their EU driving licenses and passports. However, she (ibid.: 357) admits that in order to confirm the assumed existence of banal Europeanism, 'considerable empirical data is required.' In a later article, Cram (2009) seems to accept the banality of Europeanism as a given, though she adopts a different approach to its study than the one initially proposed. She briefly looks at the way the EU has influenced identities in different contexts. Her conclusion is that 'the facilitating role which the EU plays in allowing diverse identities, even those previously quashed or non-existent, to flourish appears to encourage the development of a sense of banal as opposed to heroic Europeanism. Membership of the EU increasingly becomes the norm' (ibid.) This conclusion is based on a few case studies, which examine the

impact of European integration on national identities. The empirical evidence is hardly enough to prove a point for banal Europeanism even in these contexts, let alone generally. In the 2009 article there is no mention of the role of the media, which was assumed in the 2001 book chapter. It will be interesting to see if the empirical data in Bulgaria and England actually support the claim that there are processes of banal Europeanism and to investigate the media's role in these processes.

## **2.2 Media's role in children's lives**

Even a perfunctory glance at the body of literature on children's relationship with the mass media suggests that the media play a very important role in children's lives. As Messenger Davies (2010: 54) summarizes, 'public and academic policy debate' 'tends to fall into two categories': the 'Child Rescue'/'toxic' cultures of the screen' discourse versus the "empowerment" one. In other words, the question debated is whether children are media victims or whether the media is 'enabling children to exercise their *rights* when it comes to participation in their culture.' This section and the one that follows will provide an elaboration on the approach this study adopts. But it is vital to start with an outline of aspects of the relationship between children and the media that are expected to be of relevance to the current study.

A first key indicator of the media's role is their substantial presence in children's lives. A number of studies show that children are frequent, often heavy media users (predominantly viewers), and over their youth they will spend more time watching TV than in schools (Huntemann and Morgan 2001: 311) or with peers (Larson 1995). Research both in European countries (Livingstone and Bovill 2000) and in the USA (Paik 2001: 15) indicates they are in front of the screen for at least 2.5 - 3 hours every day. 'The peak in viewing was reached at age 9, and from 9 to 17, the time teenagers spent with television declined' (ibid.: 14-15). Consequently, an appropriate age for researching children's patterns of media use is perhaps 9-10 when they are said to already possess a national and potentially a European identity and are also quite frequently exposed to the media. The statement should not be taken at face value, however, since media consumption has probably changed due to the recent advent of the Internet. Until a few years ago, it seemed clear that television played the most important role in children's lives or at least this was the impression most studies created. A similar trend is recorded in adult research as well where television is

considered to be ‘the major form of communication’ (Barker 1999: 2). With the advent of the Internet the trends have changed and scholars’ interest in the last few years has been re-directed from TV to the Internet. An international project such as EU Kids online, for example, measures the risks and opportunities the online space provides for children in more than 20 countries. A 2008 Eurobarometer survey shows that 64.4% of the 6-10-year olds in Bulgaria and 87% in the United Kingdom use the Internet. A qualitative survey conducted a year earlier, however, reports that at the age of 9-10 the majority of children are unlikely to use the Internet every day (Eurobarometer 2007). The 2007 Safer Internet study claims the frequency of Internet use is ‘correlated with age’ (ibid.) Hence, the 9-10 year olds say they ‘connect several times per week’ whereas the ‘12-14 year old children generally use the Internet daily’ (ibid.) Similar findings are reported in the latest Ofcom (2010) media literacy report. 94% of the 8-11 year old British children report they watch TV almost every day, but only 54% say they are online that often.

Apart from TV and the Internet, a number of academics also talk of the importance of radio and teenage magazines, especially among girls. The exposure to newspapers and their reception is, however, not investigated. Livingstone and Bovill (2000) mention that ‘each of the print media has a niche market amongst young readers, but none are a daily habit for the majority in any age group,’ but they do not elaborate further on the issue. Ofcom’s (2010) study puts magazines, comics and newspapers under the same category. 45% of the 8-11 year old British children report they read them almost every day. Yet, newspapers have played a very significant role for national identity development as Anderson’s (1991) pioneering work indicates. Brookes (1999) study also shows ‘the press can be effective in reinforcing national identity.’

The research will, therefore, explore not only children’s patterns of TV viewing and Internet use (as most studies focus on the two) but also their exposure to the other main channels of mass communication, namely radio, newspapers and magazines. The sample for the content analysis will be ultimately selected on the basis of the media use findings. A question that will further reduce its size is what their actual sources of information on Europe and the EU are, because even if they use some medium but never hear about Europe from it, then there is not much point in analyzing it. Moreover, as Pasek et al. (2006) state, media use ‘may not be monotonically related’ to awareness and engagement. In fact, what they find out in

their study with adolescents is that while watching TV news leads to political awareness and civic engagement, heavy viewing of entertainment such as movies and shows has an opposite effect, namely it ‘interfered with gaining political awareness’ (ibid.) In other words, in this specific case study it is not so important how much time children spend as media users, but whether they are actually interested in the kind of media formats such as news, which are likely to produce Europe-related stories.

Another relevant trend is that the mass media are perhaps the first and therefore quite influential source of political information for children and especially for adolescents. Chaffee and Kanihan (1997) claim that television is ‘unquestionably the predominant channel by which young people first encounter politics.’ By drawing on previous research (Drew and Reeves 1980), Austin and Pinkleton (2001) clarify that ‘for young children, their first contact with politics comes through television.’ In Von Feilitzen’s view (1976: 102), children do not simply learn about current events from TV, but this is ‘perhaps more a sort of “reality orientation” in the adult world.’ Moreover, according to Gillespie (1995: 101):

It is often in the sphere of news consumption and TV news talk that young people most clearly articulate the complexities and ambivalences of their relation to dominant, national modes of identification – complexities and ambivalences which are closely bound up with teenagers’ ambiguous status, on the margin between childhood and adulthood.

Media influence is found to be important when there is a lack of information on a certain issue (Rogers and Dearing 1988). ‘In general, evidence suggests that children who are, for any reason, limited in their opportunities for getting experience in life will turn to television as a source’ (Kniveton 1976: 259). McCombs and Weaver (1973 as quoted in Rogers and Dearing 1988), for example, argue that greater agenda-setting effects are recorded when an individual has a need for orientation, so that media exposure is higher when both the relevance of the issue and the uncertainty are high.

Yet, there is ongoing talk of growing estrangement from the news (Buckingham 2000: 9, Seaton 2005). Building on previous research (Howitt 1982, Katz 1993) and his own findings, Buckingham (2000: 9) reveals that despite the often expressed ‘indifference’ or even ‘dislike’ towards the news, ‘children may often have little choice but to watch it’ and ‘to absorb information’ ‘in fragments, during the course of other activities.’ Recent findings (Carter et al. 2009) suggest that despite the advent of

the Internet, TV remains the main source of news for British children as indicated by 52%, if chosen by itself, or 67.3% in combination with other media. By contrast, only 6.9% quote newspapers or Internet only and 6.4% radio. Quite interestingly, as many as 61.8% of the 8-15-year-olds say they find the news interesting, and 34.8% say news are definitely interesting (ibid.) 'Their answers are a strong riposte to those who argue that children and young people are apathetic and not concerned about current affairs,' the authors (ibid.) claim. Unfortunately, the study's focus on BBC's children news programme *Newsround* makes it impossible to conclude what children's exact sources of news are apart from *Newsround*. An attempt to answer this question will be made in the current study where children will not only be asked whether they watch news, but also what news and current affairs programmes they regularly view. Subsequently, only the ones the majority of children are exposed to will be analyzed. For triangulation purposes children's responses will be compared to those of their parents on the same questions.

In fact, one of the means through which children acquire awareness of current affairs is by being exposed to programmes not specifically targeted at them. Researchers (Schramm et al. 1961: 42, Stevens 1982, Livingstone and Bovill 2000) have found out that children are interested in adult programming. Moreover, scholars (Gauntlett 1997, Buckingham 2003: 163–181) claim they should not be underestimated as media users. Thus, Buckingham (ibid.: 165) is highly critical of the 'dominant assumptions in public debates' that children's relationship with television is 'fundamentally negative and damaging.' Instead, he argues that young people actively make sense of what they view (Buckingham 1993: vii). Gauntlett (1998) is also a vehement critic of the effects paradigm not least because it 'treats children as inadequate.'

In short, children's relatively high exposure to mass media is obviously important not because children are television victims, but because as Huntemann and Morgan (2001: 311) claim, 'the potential contribution of the media to identity development is immense.' This is potentially valid in the realm of national and European identities as well. Thus, when describing the findings of a UK study she did with her colleagues as part of a BBC/AHRC Knowledge Exchange Programme, Messenger Davies (2010: 63) points out that:

All of the children demanded more information about their own nation/region in the news, and complained that neither their age group nor their locales were

sufficiently represented in news coverage. These ‘citizens in the making’ saw one of the primary functions of news as reinforcing their sense of identity.

Unfortunately, in the context of identities and/or socialization, media academics have been much more interested in adolescents than in children (among others, Signorielli 1993, Brown et al. 1994, Arnett 1995, Larson 1995, Giles and Maltby 2004, Buckingham 2008), though the distinction between the two is often blurred. Moreover, many studies are dominated by gender (Signorielli and Lears 1992, Huntemann and Morgan 2001: 309–323) and ethnic (ibid.) identities’ research.

If looked at from the good side, the gaps in academic literature open up a number of opportunities. Indeed, there are hardly any studies that investigate the relationship between media, national and European identities and children. There is obviously scope for researching that link since media are key socialization agents (Wartella et al. 1979) and a major source of political information for children who are frequent users (among others, Livingstone and Bovill 2000, Paik 2001: 15).

### **2.3 Media effects, agenda-setting and/or audience research**

Not only is there a lack of studies on media’s role in children’s collective identifications, but even those on adults lack an explanation of how exactly identifications are influenced by the media. One of the key problems is establishing empirically how much a person’s collective identities are influenced by the media and by all other factors. As Madianou (2005: 5) argues:

Media/identity relationship is not a causal one. Media consumption is a complex process that involves a number of parameters, material, social and individual. Although the media do not shape identities, they do contribute, through a number of practices, to the creation of symbolic communicative spaces.

A wider controversy related to the search for cause and effect relationships has plagued media and communication studies for decades – mass media have seemed to play a tremendous role in people’s lives, but this role has been very hard to prove in social scientific research.

The ridiculous thing about mass communications research is that in circumstances where it would seem incontrovertible that the mass media have an effect, such as on political knowledge, it is very difficult to actually prove using the methods of social science. There are correlations between political knowledge and media exposure but how are we to know what is cause and what is effect (Howitt 1976: 329).

Thus, a major dichotomy over the years has been between those researchers in search of direct media effects on people (among others, Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955, Brown 1975, McLeod et al. 1996: 235–266), and another major group who deny any possibility of a direct correlation between media texts and/or messages and viewers/readers/listeners' behavior and beliefs (for example, Morley 1981, Jensen 1987, Lull 1990, Moores 1993). Instead, this second group has argued for an audience-focused approach with an emphasis on the reception and interpretation of symbols and/or messages. Audience researchers are thus 'treating media use as an integral part of something more fundamental, namely the patterns of everyday social interaction and experience that not only influence specific media behaviors but that also govern the meaning that media use has for its audiences' (McQuail 1997: 88).

Following this oversimplified dichotomy, a number of theories have been developed which more or less focus on a few key contentions such as how active people are in their media uses and reception or put reversely, how powerful the media are in influencing their audiences. Logically, those focused on direct effects have employed more quantitative methods such as experimental designs and surveys as opposed to a more qualitative methodology in audience research such as in-depth individual or group interviewing, ethnography and discourse analysis, thus often borrowing terminology and ideas from semiotics or anthropology. In aiming triangulation, however, sometimes in both groups of studies a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods has been used but with different weight in the design.

It is certainly beyond the scope of this review to set a firm foot in the broader debate briefly outlined above. Instead, a few relevant arguments will be used in an attempt to develop a methodological design that would best grasp the relationship between children's exposure to mass media, the mass media's dominating coverage of the EU in the respective member-states and ultimately, children's perceptions of the organization and their conceptualization (or lack of such) of a sense of belonging to the EU and potentially a European identity. As already made clear, such a relationship can be established only if other identities such as national, local, ethnic, etc. are taken into consideration as well in the course of the research.

It seems an effects paradigm will not be relevant when studying such a complicated relationship, especially if 'effects' does mainly 'refer to changes in

behavior after viewing' (Brown 1975: 24). No known study has yet proven that there is a direct and simultaneous correlation between media representation of a national/local/European or any other identity and the person's respective identity. A crude experimental design precipitated and/or followed by questionnaires will not reveal a useful trend and could in fact be quite misleading.

The irrelevance of the effects paradigm is best exemplified by the most notorious, yet still used studies on children, namely those related to TV violence and its effect on children. In its crudest form, such studies ask children to watch a certain video and then as part of an experiment attempt to evaluate if the youngsters have become more violent after being exposed to this form of televised violence (a very famous example is Bandura et al.'s Bobo doll experiment). There are variations in the approaches – from natural to artificial settings, to the use of control groups and violence-indicating devices or victims (for a review see Cramond 1976: 267–284).

The reliability and validity of such approaches has been subjected to numerous criticisms and self-criticisms (among others, McLeod et al. 1996: 235–266, Gauntlett 1997). The main point is that it is clearly inapplicable in identity studies, though some researchers have made fruitless efforts to establish such a connection (e.g., Howitt and Cumberbatch 1976: 170). Identity is indeed a process in which many factors interfere and a crude experimental design in search of immediate direct effects will not lead to meaningful conclusions.

Consequently, agenda-setting theory seems to capture better the above relationship since as Rogers and Dearing (1988) assert, 102 studies have proven that the 'media do indeed have important indirect effects in setting the public agenda.' At its core is the claim that the press 'may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about' (Cohen 1963: 13). As McCombs and Shaw (1972) summarize, 'while the mass media may have little influence on the direction or intensity of attitudes, it is hypothesized that the mass media set the agenda for each political campaign, influencing the salience of attitudes towards the political issues.' Moreover, they talk of a 'composite definition' of the mass media of what is important, namely the argument is that despite their differences the various outlets seem to have similar news values, which means cumulatively they put the same issues on the agenda (ibid.) Hence, the more salient an issue/person/party, etc. is in the media, the more it is present in people's lives.

Therefore, the salience of the EU in the media will be compared to the salience of European identity in children's lives. On the one hand, in the content analysis of media publications the aim will be to establish how salient Europe and the EU are. Different means of measurement will be used such as through establishing the visibility and domesticity of the main actors, symbols, and institutions in European publications. On the other hand, when researching children's identities, the questionnaire will consist of semi-structured questions, which will aim to rank the salience of the different identities present in children's lives. Social psychologists have established meaningful strategies in that respect. Knowledge is a key indicator of the agenda-setting function of the media (Rogers and Dearing 1988), which means that children and parents' knowledge (or lack of such) of the EU will also be researched.

The main difficulty that remains is in establishing how important the media are in agenda-setting. Two main pitfalls should be avoided. First, children will definitely be asked about their media use, but self-reports are not without their limitations. Which is why audience researchers such as Moores (1990) and Lull (1990) have argued for an ethnographic approach in which the context of TV viewing is put at the centre of attention. Thus, some academics have employed a purely ethnographic approach where research is conducted over a long period of time (Lull 1990, Drotner 1992) or as Gillespie (1995: 55) puts it, 'anthropological ethnography requires long-term immersion and investigation: eighteen months is the standard length of fieldwork.' Others (for example, Moores 1990) have developed a quasi-ethnographic methodology, namely the use of in-depth individual interviewing.

The purely ethnographic approach has been quite revealing in a number of areas but could not be practically employed in this study. The family context of TV viewing is not likely to reveal much about European and national identity formation, because this is a long-term process. Thus, a proper ethnographer should probably spend years in a family before actually establishing the above relationship – a clearly implausible strategy. What is worth borrowing from the ethnography-related methodologies, however, is the detailed interviewing of children.

Since triangulation is key in any study, the self-reports of children will not be the only source of information with regard to their media use. Parents will also be asked to fill in questionnaires in which they will report their observations and opinion in four main areas: own and children's media use and own and children's identities.

Thus, comparisons will be possible on quite a few levels as for example, the relationship between media use and European identities and the influence of parents in that relationship.

Finally, it will be quite difficult to avoid another potential pitfall of agenda-setting, namely the question of the origin of influence – the chicken and egg debate (for example, Iyengar and Simon 1993). Clearly, ‘there is undoubtedly a two-way, mutually dependent relationship between the public agenda and the media agenda’ (Rogers and Dearing 1988).

Rogers and Dearing (ibid.) argue that the influence of the mass media depends on whether the event is of major importance and a ‘rapid-onset type versus a gradually, slowly developing topic.’ In the former, the media ‘place the news event high on the public agenda quickly’ whereas in the latter, they ‘play an important role in “creating” the issue’ (ibid.) Moreover, Rogers and Dearing (ibid.) claim there is a third component in the equation, which they call the policy agenda of ‘elite decision makers.’ In the present research, only the first two main components of the agenda-setting process will be researched, because even if policy makers play a key role, they have no or rare direct contact with the public, and it is through the media that people learn of the policy makers’ priorities.

Thus, the media agenda as exemplified by the content analysis will be juxtaposed to the public agenda as shown in the surveys and individual interviews. In this way, a main problem in agenda-setting studies will be avoided, namely reliance on a single survey question in establishing the public agenda (McCombs and Shaw 1972, Rogers and Dearing 1988).

To sum up, the crude dichotomization between effects and audience researchers introduced earlier is by no means an attempt to underestimate the importance of the work conducted by either group. Many studies have elaborated critically on the advantages and disadvantages and have been highly self-critical. A successful methodological design can borrow arguments from both broader approaches because the relationship between mass media texts/messages and their receivers/audiences is indeed not a simple black and white one but quite complicated with different factors interfering in every step of the process.

All in all, the question is how to best capture the media’s influence on children’s European awareness, knowledge and identifications. Theoretically, agenda-setting seems to fill the gap, but practically it would be better if it is ‘married’ with

more qualitative approaches such as in-depth interviewing. This is vital because children are not passive ‘dupes’ subjected to media agendas, but as ethnographers suggest, media use is ‘an integral part of something more fundamental’ (McQuail 1997: 88).

To sum up, in a complicated study such as the current one, which not only investigates two distinct sets of issues, namely media representations of the European Union and children’s identifications, but also aims at establishing a link between the two, an interdisciplinary approach will probably work best, as Livingstone (1990: 189) argues. Thus, by combining quantitative and qualitative methods from media, sociology and social psychology and comparing the findings with existing research, a media-centric approach as evident in numerous effects and audience research studies will clearly be avoided and hence, a fuller picture will be drawn.

### **3. Conclusion**

All in all, the thesis will draw on a combination of identity, social structures and socialization theory with a particular focus on the media’s importance also vis-à-vis the other main socialization agents. The chosen theoretical framework takes into account both the role of social structures and processes. Put simply, the approach adopted is neither completely deterministic nor completely individualist but attempts to combine the two. The expectation is that both children’s social structures and socialization as a process will play a role in prompting, guiding, reinforcing and maintaining but also moulding and constantly changing children’s collective identifications as well as European awareness and knowledge. It remains to be seen in the results’ chapters whether structure or process is more important in that respect or whether the two play a role only in combination with one another. It might also turn out that certain social structures such as SES or ethnicity or certain socialization agents such as parents, school or indeed the media are more important than others. Ultimately, the impact of nationality will also be researched throughout the thesis. While separate chapters will be aimed at clarifying the importance of all these factors, it is only in the concluding chapter of the thesis that an attempt will be made to return to this essential question about the relationship between society as structure, socialization as a process, nation-states as a context and individual agents.

## **Part II: Methodology**


### **Chapter 3**

#### **Methodology**

##### **1. Introduction**

‘We now need to turn around the terms of the conventional argument: *not* to start with communication and its supposed effects on collective identity and culture, but rather to begin by posing the problem of collective identity itself, to ask how it might be analyzed and what importance communicative practices might play in its constitution’ (Schlesinger 1991b: 150). Schlesinger (*ibid.*) illustrates an important trend in communication research to be taken into consideration before a proper methodology is designed. He (*ibid.*) offers an alternative to the prevailing media-centric approach in collective identity studies – to actually start with collective identity and then turn to the media. This is exactly the approach of this study, not least because the media-centric studies have not been really successful in explaining the relationship between media and identity, especially when a search for correlations has dominated them.

The main aim is to grasp the relationship between children’s exposure to mass media, the media coverage of Europe/EU and ultimately, children’s European perceptions and identifications also vis-à-vis the other main socialization agents. Apart from the media coverage, the study takes into account other structural and contextual factors that can help explain the diversity of children’s identifications – nationality/country, gender, SES and ethnicity (Graph 3.1).



Graph 3.1 Key factors influencing children's European identity and knowledge

In this chapter, first, a justification of the cross-national comparison approach adopted in the research is provided. Second, the main research questions are outlined. Third, the choice of data collection methods and the sampling procedures are summarized. Fourth, the focus shifts to the data analysis methods. Finally, a few issues such as ethics and response rates are tackled.

## 2. Most different systems design: Why Bulgaria and England?

It has already been made clear that the study is conducted in two member-states – Bulgaria and the United Kingdom (UK). The former is a representative of Eastern and the latter of Western Europe and some of the implications of their different cultural, political and overall historical trajectories vis-à-vis Europe were already outlined in the literature review. To reiterate briefly, Bulgaria is one of the newest entrants in the EU from the last wave of enlargement in 2007. The former communist country is considered to be middle-sized and the poorest at present in the EU. Membership was endorsed by the majority of the population and the EU has been one of the hottest issues on the public, policy and media agenda. The UK, on the other hand, is one of the oldest members, which joined the EU in the second wave of

enlargement (if the founding states are counted as first) in 1973. It is one of the biggest and richest states, yet notorious for its Euroscepticism, expressed both by public opinion and by dominant print media discourses. The choice of those seemingly different countries was determined by theoretical, methodological and practical reasons.

To start with, the EU is a unique international organization encompassing 27 member-states – all peculiar with their different histories, reasons for joining, perceptions and identifications with the EU. Any study that concentrates on cross-national comparison on such a topic can hardly make generalizations about the Union exactly because of the multiplicity of viewpoints. ‘United in diversity’ is indeed a key motto of the EU and one of the most challenging tasks for policy makers is to identify those aspects that unify the people. Connecting with the citizens is in turn even more difficult to achieve, because any measures for ‘implanting’ or reinforcing a sense of belonging to the Union and a European identity have to take into consideration the diversity of European visions and identities and the complex factors that influence them. By comparing two different countries such as Bulgaria and the UK, situated in what are historically, culturally and politically considered to be two distinct parts of Europe, a fuller picture of the potential factors that play an important role on a more general level can be drawn than if two relatively similar countries are compared. On the one hand, more factors are likely to emerge and on the other, it is expected that those that are key and present in more than one country are the ones that will ‘come to the surface’ and stand out. As Hallin and Mancini (2004: 3) put it,

Comparative analysis makes it possible to notice things we did not notice and therefore had not conceptualized, and it also forces us to clarify the scope and applicability of the concepts we employ.

One of the main advantages of comparative research is exactly the potential for revealing the importance of new and unexpected findings or ‘opening up new venues’ (Blumler et al. 1992: 8).

It is clear, however, that the proponents of comparing similar case studies/countries will disagree with the statement that the study of different cases is more revealing. They will instead argue that it will be difficult to establish the relationship between the independent and dependent variables in two countries in which the dependent variables are also likely to differ, thus making it potentially impossible to draw conclusions about the factors that are ‘universally’ important. The

claim would be that the ‘extent of the differences may overwhelm meaningful comparison’ (ibid.: 13), and the study is likely to be descriptive rather than comparative – ending up with relatively superficial statements such as in Bulgaria the children feel that way, but in the UK the situation is different (Przerwoski and Teune 1970, Anckar 2008).

The issue of whether it makes sense to compare similar or dissimilar case studies – apples with oranges – has been key, predominantly in political science, and has also occasionally been present in sociology and media and communication studies. Different models and theories have been built with the attempt of providing guidelines on what kind of countries to choose depending on the theoretical aims - whether the study is inductive or deductive, idiographic or nomothetic, the primary focus and the consequent relationship between the variables (for prominent examples see Livingstone 2003, Anckar 2008 and Livingstone forthcoming 2011).

Three important aspects of this debate are pertinent. First, as Teune (1990: 45) states, regardless of the nature of the study, each choice of countries has to be ‘theoretically justified.’ Consequently, this theoretical justification has to be built into the research. Second, as Przeworski and Teune (1970) claim, the systemic differences or similarities between the countries do not unequivocally matter in all studies. Thus, when the researcher is interested in the ‘variation of the observed behavior at a level lower than that of systems’ such as individual actors, groups, local communities, social classes, etc., ‘systemic factors are not given any special place among the possible predictors of behavior’ (ibid.: 34). This is in fact the so-called ‘most different systems design’ (MDSD), which they propose in contrast to the most widely used ‘most similar systems design’ (MSSD). The present study focuses exactly on a level lower than that of systems, namely children at the age of 9 - 10 as individuals and a specific collectivity/age group and therefore, endorses the view that systemic factors are potentially only one of a number of possible ‘predictors of behavior’ (ibid.) but not necessarily the key one.

Furthermore, cross-national differences are not by any means more substantial than differences within member-states, or as Oyen (1990: 7) puts it:

Within all countries, even the very old and fairly homogeneous ones, we may find several sub-societies which on some variables may show greater variation than comparisons across national boundaries can demonstrate: that is, within-variation may sometimes be greater than between-variation.

The study is, therefore, equally interested in within-national as well as cross-national variations and does not preclude the potential for meaningful comparisons and analysis on the basis of systemic (national) differences, which in the end might turn out not to be important at all or at least not as important as sub-systemic variations. As Livingstone (forthcoming 2011) claims, ‘to compare nations is not necessarily to commit the “sin” of methodological nationalism, provided it is an explicit strategy not to presume the nation’s importance but rather to test it.’

Nonetheless, the MSSD has definitely dominated academic research especially prior to Przeworski and Teune’s (1970) pioneering study, because as some authors recognize, it is almost ‘folk wisdom’ to advise against ‘comparing apples and oranges’ (Beniger 1992: 36, Livingstone 2003). Przeworski and Teune (1970: 10), however, object by stating that you can actually compare apples with oranges because they are both fruits. Moreover, Beniger (1992: 36) even argues that ‘in fact, it is through just such comparison of disparate things that social science has made its greatest advances.’

The insistence on comparing similar countries has been driven by the ongoing ‘attempt to imitate the logic of experiment’ (Oyen 1990: 12–13). This positivist approach is still very much a driving force in political science. As a whole, MSSD is based on the notion that the research compares ‘systems that are as similar as possible, except with regard to the phenomenon, the effects of which we are interested in assessing’ (Anckar 2008). The idea is ‘to keep constant as many extraneous variables as possible’ (ibid.) In practice, however, this is hardly feasible, because ‘it will never be possible to keep constant all potential explanatory factors’ and because there are only a limited number of countries (ibid.), or as Lijphart (1971) puts it, ‘many variables, few cases.’

Over the years, commentators have found out that comparing ‘similar’ countries is not as straightforward as it might sound. A major issue is how similar they are – most studies have ended up comparing states within the same region – Latin America, Eastern Europe, Western Europe. Regionalization is part of a wider trend towards ‘typologies or groupings of countries on dimensions asserted to be theoretically significant: wealth, democracy, size, culture, socialism and so on’ in an ‘effort to categorize countries in order to reduce variance tried to use similarities that cut across culture and history’ (Teune 1990: 43).

Needless to say, this approach has backfired in quite a number of occasions, because researchers have discovered far more systemic differences than expected even within the same region. As Teune (*ibid.*) argues:

Selecting a type to reduce variance made it impossible to find out what difference the category of inclusion meant... Further, some of the groupings by area that were used by scientifically committed comparative researchers, such as for Western Europe or Latin America, obscured altogether what was significant theoretically about those countries, other than being close to one another, relatively speaking.

In addition, Western commentators have often faced criticisms from their colleagues in other regions of the world for putting in the same equation countries they hardly know and hence, merely ignoring important differences because of looking at them through a 'Western lens' (Livingstone 2003).

All in all, despite its flaws, the MSSD beyond any doubt still has its applications and is widely used in a number of areas especially when comparisons are made on a systemic level. A prominent example in media and communication studies is the theoretical framework for comparing media systems, which Hallin and Mancini (2004) proposed. It is exactly based on the MSSD but this study will not delve into its advantages and disadvantages, because it is a framework for comparing media systems on a systemic level and therefore not applicable. A key problem throughout the social sciences is that many researchers do not try to account for the MSSD's limitations but instead adopt it without any justification, as if it is indeed 'folk wisdom' (Livingstone 2003). Hence, the main point this research defends and endorses is that scholars should not accept by default that MSSD is a better approach than MSDS but should instead choose the better strategy on the basis of the study's aims.

In general, nearly forty years after the launch of the MDSD, it has been found out that it is the better approach when the 'focus is on variables below the system level' (Anckar 2008) – as in the current study. Przeworski and Teune (1970: 35) make, however, two important qualifications, which need to be taken into consideration. On the one hand, the samples have to be drawn from the same population, namely 'although the samples are derived from different systems, they are initially treated as if the population from which they are drawn is homogeneous.' On the other hand, researchers have to keep their eyes open for the potential influences that the systemic differences might play.

The test of whether systemic differences play a role is rather simple: it regards the relationship between the dependent and the independent variable. The systemic differences do not matter if either the dependent variable does not differ in the countries studied or if the relationship between ‘an independent and the dependent variable is the same within the subgroups of the population’ (ibid). If those two conditions are not met, then an analysis of the systemic differences is by all means required (ibid.)

The predominantly qualitative nature of the current study will facilitate this process. The researcher will indeed start with the aim of accounting for a few key factors and their influence on children’s perceptions and identifications of the EU but will keep her eyes open for any other factors, potential relationships and constant interplay between them. On one level, the media, parents and the school curriculum are all expected to be potential influences. On the other hand, differences are possible as a result of children’s SES, gender, ethnicity and nationality. Nationality is, however, only one of a plethora of factors.

Systemic differences might also ‘interfere’ in the media content analysis part of the study. Many commentators have managed, however, to successfully overcome the variability that could prevent meaningful comparisons by creating coding frames, which focus on the ‘unambiguous, objective matters as who was speaking, what themes were mentioned, and what countries were mentioned’ (Blumler 1983: 33–34 as quoted in Swanson 1992: 27). Such a strategy is clearly applicable in the current study, where the key focus in the content analysis will be on the visibility and domesticity of EU actors and topics.

Consequently, as a first step, the results in each country will be thoroughly reviewed separately and the interplay of factors will be investigated. Only after the individual country’s results are analyzed will a comparison between the two countries be made so that the differences are not wrongly attributed to nationality when they might be a consequence of other factors. If the findings suggest that national differences matter, which should not be accepted by default, then a subsequent analysis of those differences and their importance will be conducted. Ideally, this comparative study will be a first step in a wider research among EU countries when similar as well as dissimilar countries will be compared.

That leads to the third main pertinent point from Przeworski and Teune’s (1970: 35) study, which is that:

The difference between the two strategies should not be overemphasized. Both strategies can result in the confirmation of theoretical statements and both can combine intrasystemic and intersystemic levels of analysis.

In fact, commentators have used a combination of both (among others, Collier and Collier 1991 as quoted in Anckar 2008, De Meur and Berg-Schlosser 1994), especially when a project includes cross-national collaboration between researchers.. In identity and media and communication studies, there are also quite a few studies that compare both similar and dissimilar countries (among others, Livingstone 1998, Livingstone and Bovill 2001, Barrett 2007).

Livingstone (2003), for example, illustrates that it is possible to compare both and the research question should determine which approach to adopt. She (ibid.) builds on Kohn's (1989) four-model typology, which differentiates the studies depending on whether the nation is the 'object of study,' 'context of study,' 'unit of analysis' or 'part of larger system.' In her (Livingstone 2003) view, it makes sense to analyze similar countries only when the nation is the 'object of study,' namely when the 'primary focus' is 'idiographic' – to 'understand each country' in its 'own terms.' In all other cases, the researcher should be looking for diverse cases, albeit at different levels and degrees of variability (ibid.)

Ultimately, Livingstone (ibid.) clearly emphasizes the purpose of both Kohn's (1989) and her typology is not 'to argue for one over others, but precisely in order to invite researchers to explicate and justify which one they adopt.' All in all, one of the main aims of the current study is to be prepared and conducted in such a way that with only slight alterations to be applicable in all EU countries both on an individual and on a comparative level. In fact, as Livingstone (forthcoming 2011) observes, in Habermas's perspective if the so-called civic/democratic approach is adopted, then nations are selected 'because of a common democratic structure or institutional membership, such as membership of the EU.' EU-membership is certainly the unifying characteristic for the two chosen countries. It is a key one, because the interest of the research is exactly on European identity – a notion important for the future of the Union.

There is a third reason why exactly Bulgaria and England were chosen for the first stage of what might become future wider research. First, the researcher has lived in both countries and knows them better than any other EU states. Insider knowledge is especially important when conducting qualitative research, because comparative

research should not be conducted out of context (Livingstone 2003). Second, practical considerations had to be taken into account. Initially, the research proposal included four member-states but then a decision was made that it was plausible to research only these two, because otherwise the thesis would have lacked the depth and sophistication that was possible to achieve for such a short period of time. Moreover, the focus in the UK falls solely on the biggest nation – England not only because it is the most Eurosceptic of the four as well as most different from Bulgaria, but also because it would not have been possible to interview enough children from all four nations in order to make meaningful comparisons between them. This is especially valid when researching the relationship between national and European identities.

Finally, although the merits of comparing different countries were first outlined by Przeworski and Teune (1970: vii) in a book targeted at ‘scholars in the various behavioral science disciplines’ who conduct predominantly ‘cross-disciplinary studies,’ political scientists more than any other group of academics have used and debated on the distinction between the most similar and different design systems. The guidelines developed by them (an outline in Anckar 2008) are only partially useful, because they are often dominated by a positivist approach, which this study does not embrace. It is virtually impossible to control for all variables in advance and to make causal inferences at any cost, because no study on such a topic can be conducted in a laboratory(-like) setting. Furthermore, political scientists as well as leading media theorists (Hallin and Mancini 2004) in comparative analysis concentrated on systemic rather than inter- and intra-systemic differences, which are not the focus of this study. Therefore, the current research builds much more on the original propositions of the authors of MDSD than on the subsequent elaborations on the design by political scientists. Rather than taking the differences between Bulgaria and the UK at face value, the aim of the study is to overcome as many theoretical, methodological and practical pitfalls from the onset, and attribute significance to the differences not by default but only after a careful consideration of all relevant factors. Ultimately, as Livingstone (forthcoming 2011) argues, ‘contextualization, while vital for interpreting findings and avoiding misunderstandings, is no more important than standardization, for it is in cross-national, standardized terms that a supranational organization such as the EU operates.’

### 3. Research questions

The research questions can be divided into four sections. The results chapters will address the first three sections, whereas in the conclusion an attempt will be made to answer the main question of the thesis, outlined in section four.

#### I. Children's European knowledge and identities in national context

The overriding issue is what the relationships are between children's knowledge and identifications on the one hand, and the meanings and attitudes associated with Europe on the other, and how the national context influences those relationships. The specific questions are:

1. Have the children heard of, and what do they know about, Europe and the EU? Do they feel European? If yes, how salient are their European identities? What is the relationship between children's European awareness, knowledge and identifications?

2. What meanings do children attach to Europe and/or the EU? What is their understanding of being European? Are these descriptions influenced by the national context and do they in turn impact on children's identifications?

3. What is the relationship between support for European integration and European identities?

4. What is the relationship between children's national and European identities – are they mutually inclusive or exclusive?

#### II. Social structures' impact:

The key task is to establish whether and to what extent intra-national differences in children's identifications, knowledge, attitudes and meanings can be explained with reference to social structures, in particular SES, gender and ethnicity. In other words, is the European identity equally endorsed by children of different background or is it structured along socio-economic, ethnic and gender lines? Do structural differences apply universally or are they context-dependent? To this end, the following specific questions will be addressed:

1. Do social structures influence children's European knowledge and identities and if yes, how? Are there instances of intersectionality?

2. Do social structures influence the meanings children attach to Europe and if yes, how?

3. Do social structures influence children's support for European integration and the relationship between their national and European identities and if yes, how?

### III. The impact of socialization agents

The main purpose is to reveal the importance of the key socialization agents as well as the interplay between them for children's awareness and knowledge of Europe and the EU as well as in relation to their European identities. Where relevant, the impact of social structures is researched as well. The main questions are:

1. Which agents of socialization are important for children's European awareness, knowledge and identification?

2. What role do the media, parents and school play in the process of formation of European awareness, knowledge and identification? Is there an interplay between the different agents of socialization and if yes, what is the nature of this interplay?

3. Do the socialization agents operate differently as a result of social structures and if yes, how?

IV. Relationship between national context, social structures, socialization as a process and individual agency: What is the relationship between national context, society as structure, socialization as process and individual agency in influencing children's European awareness, knowledge and identification?

## **4. Data collection methods and sampling procedures**

### **4.1 Data collection methods**

The methodological design combines quantitative and qualitative approaches, because as Deacon et al. (2007: 3) argue, 'many of the most interesting questions facing communications research are best tackled by combining different research methods.' This is especially valid when researching European and national identities, because 'this hybrid approach can enhance our understanding of why citizens in different countries perceive European integration with differing levels of enthusiasm, rather than just reporting whether they accept it' (Cinnirella 1997).

Table 3.1 summarizes the key methods used and indicates how they relate to the key factors outlined in Graph 3.1 and the main research questions. In the section

that follows each of the methods is explained in more detail. Finally, attention is shifted to the sampling procedures.

<b>Research questions</b>	<b>Source of data – method of data collection</b>
Children’s European knowledge and identification	Semi-structured face-to-face individual interviews with children
Children’s patterns of media use and parental mediation	Interviews with children, Self-completed questionnaires by parents
Parents’ role: patterns of media use, mediation and European knowledge and identifications	Self-completed questionnaires by parents
School’s role	National curriculum, textbook analysis, interviews with teachers and head teachers, interviews with children
Media’s role	Content analysis of media texts and images
Social structures, national context	Interviews with children, surveys with parents, official reports (e.g. Ofsted)

Table 3.1 Research questions and methods of data collection

To start with, children’s perceptions and knowledge of the EU together with their media use and parental mediation patterns are researched through semi-structured individual interviews, because ‘qualitative interviewing is able to achieve a level of depth and complexity that is not available to other, particularly survey based approaches’ (Byrne 2004: 182). The semi-structured format was chosen because of its more informal nature in comparison with structured interviews and its accommodation of both open and closed-ended questions.

As Deacon et al. (2007: 69–70) put it, the ‘less structured questioning techniques hold a significant advantage’ – they ‘give the interviewer freedom to elaborate and rephrase questions to ensure they have been properly understood.’ This is clearly a plus when interviewing children of different backgrounds on topics that are not necessarily salient for them. Moreover, ‘their informality makes them more responsive and flexible, and permits the researcher to adjust and develop their interview schedule to accommodate and explore any new issues that arise’ (ibid.: 73).

Individual interviews are a better option than focus groups because in focus groups only one or a few topics can be covered (Neuman 2006: 412) and not in as much detail. Moreover, peer group pressure and the group dynamics on non-salient topics might have a counter-productive effect. Self-completed surveys are also not suitable for the study not only because of all limitations alluded to so far, but also because children are often intimidated by formats that resemble school tests,

especially with so many questions and on topics that are not necessarily familiar to them. Furthermore, the children's level of reading comprehension might differ at the age of 9-10 and certain social groups might be at a comparative disadvantage. The issues covered are quite wide and a short questionnaire is not appropriate, whereas a long one might prove too tiring for the children. Finally, many of the topics, especially on identity formation, are impossible to capture by a survey at this age.

There are three main groups of questions in the interviews – on personal details, on media use and parental mediation, and on knowledge and identification with Europe and the EU (Appendix 7). The personal questions aim to establish the structural status of the children. In the media questions, pupils are asked to report on their media use patterns, to recall their sources of information on and instances of and topics of parental mediation on news, Europe and the EU. In the knowledge and identification questions, they are asked to choose their most salient identities, to reveal what they know and think about Europe and the EU, whether they feel European, whether they recognize key European symbols and people and what they know about and their attitude toward other European nations and EU membership.

The interviews consist of a combination of closed- and open-ended questions. Mixing the two reduces the disadvantages of either 'form' and 'offers a change of pace and helps interviewers establish rapport' (ibid.: 288). The closed questions are extensively used in the media use and knowledge parts, while the open ones cover mostly the identification aspects. The closed questions are obviously quite 'quicker to answer' and easily 'coded and analyzed' (ibid.: 287). They also allow for better comparisons between the key social structures and national context. The open questions, on the other hand, facilitate the analysis by mainly explaining why the children feel they way they do about their European and national identifications and what their ideas of European-ness are. They reveal the 'respondent's logic, thinking process, and frame of reference' and add 'creativity' and 'richness of detail' (ibid.)

Apart from the traditional formats, the interviews also employ a number of strategies applied by psychologists and social psychologists, mostly the use of cards and photographs. Cards are especially useful when asking children to choose and then rank the salience of their identities. Most of the identification questions are directly borrowed from Barrett's (a summary in Barrett 2007) studies because they have demonstrated their applicability in a number of countries. Adjustments had to be made mainly because in them no differentiation is made between the EU and Europe.

The questionnaire was tested in a pilot study with 50 pupils in two schools in England and three in Bulgaria and revisions were made afterwards.

Since triangulation is key to any study, the self-reports of children are not the only source of information on their media use and mediation. Parents are also asked to fill in questionnaires in which they report their observations and opinion about their own and children's media use, parental mediation, and European knowledge and identities (Appendix 8). Thus, comparisons are possible on the relationship between media use and European identities and the influence of parents. Most of the questions are adopted from the children's interviews or directly borrowed from Eurobarometer surveys and previous studies. Some were even seen as overlapping by the parents, but the reason was to avoid a main problem in agenda-setting studies, namely reliance on a single survey question in establishing the public agenda (McCombs and Shaw 1972, Rogers and Dearing 1988). The questionnaires for parents were distributed either in paper form or by email. They were quite lengthy in the pilot study and were subsequently considerably reduced.

To account better for all the factors that influence children's knowledge and identification with Europe and the EU, the school's role is investigated not only on the basis of the interviews but also by researching the national curricula (Appendices 5 and 6), analyzing textbooks in Bulgaria and interviewing teachers and head teachers. The aim is to see whether the European topic is present at all and how teachers approach it, and to compare the available evidence with children's accounts.

Finally, the representations of the EU and Europe in the media are researched through content analysis. The research design was developed on the basis of a combination of key techniques as outlined by Berelson (1971), McQuail (1977), Krippendorff (1981) and Weber (1990), and actual research studies on EU-related topics (among others, Fundesco 1997, Grundmann et al. 2000, De Vreese et al. 2001, Kevin 2003, Gleissner and De Vreese 2005, De Vreese et al. 2006, Machill et al. 2006). The coding book (Appendix 9) was developed on the basis of two matrixes, provided by the Royal Commission on the Press (McQuail 1977) and the University of Essex (2001).

A main aim is to compare the salience of the EU in the media to the salience of European identity in children's lives as well as to contrast the media depictions of Europe and/or the EU to those present in pupils' accounts and parental mediation discussions. Which is why, in the content analysis the aim is to establish how salient

the EU is in the media also in comparison with all other topics that dominate the agenda. Different means of measuring salience are used such as through establishing the frequency, visibility (prominence) and domesticity of the main actors in publications that use one of the following references: European, Europe, EU, Europa or Euro. The main unit of analysis is any news item with one of the above references. Another aim is to establish what kind of topics dominate the European stories, namely how Europe/the EU is described by the media and to compare these themes to the descriptions the respondents give.

Content analysis as a quantitative method is especially appropriate, because the aim is to reveal how often and what the dominating discourse is rather than why the media report the way they do. It also provides a ‘systematic description of what documentary sources contain’ (Deacon et al. 2007: 20). Moreover, it allows for the quantification of large samples (Neuman 2006: 324, Deacon et al. 2007: 119) and a clear focus on the questions at hand, namely the ‘salient and manifest features’ of the texts (ibid.) In its ideal form, content analysis is ‘a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication’ (Berelson 1952: 18).

A set of other sources such as official reports from institutions as Ofsted are used to help examine other relevant factors, in particular social structures. The role of social structures and national context can only be explored if available data is analyzed from all perspectives available – interviews, surveys and secondary data.

To sum up, the media agenda as exemplified by the content analysis is juxtaposed to the public agenda as shown in the surveys and individual interviews. Additionally, the influence of school is analyzed through a brief overview of the curricula and the relevant textbooks as well as interviews with teachers and head teachers. All in all, the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods as well as the different sources of data not only yield a more comprehensive picture, but also allow for an explanation that is not media-centric and takes into account a plethora of factors.

## **4.2 Sampling procedures**

The method of sampling used for the recruitment of participants is theoretical sampling. This is a form of sampling in which:

the researcher seeks out respondents who are most likely to aid theoretical development. Instead of looking for typical cases, the researcher seeks people who are most likely to extend and even confound emerging hypotheses. This search continues until nothing new emerges from the sampling, and respondents only start to reiterate issues that have already emerged ('the saturation point') (Deacon et al. 2007: 54).

There are several reasons that guided this choice. First, as it had already become clear from the elaboration on the research questions and methods, it would have been practically impossible to opt for simple random sampling in such a small-scale study, because it is not feasible for a single person to interview personally thousands of pupils in two countries. Furthermore, even random sampling is not without its limitations, because 'the benefits of increasing the statistical accuracy of sample measures by sampling more extensively may be seen to be outweighed by the cost and inconvenience of greatly increasing the sample size' (ibid.: 45). Nonetheless, when the sample was constructed, every effort was made to achieve a degree of randomness in drawing the sub-populations within the sample. In other words, the theoretical saturation aim was achieved with the help of the principles guiding disproportionate stratified sampling - a form of probability sampling in which 'the researcher draws a random sample from each subpopulation' (Neuman 2007: 152), which he or she is interested in. The aim is to be able to control 'the relative size of each stratum, rather than letting random processes control it. This guarantees representativeness or fixes the proportion of different strata within a sample' (ibid.: 154). More will be mentioned about the disproportionality aspect of the sample in the next paragraph where an explanation is provided about the theoretical reasons that guided it. As a whole, this kind of sampling combines some of the virtues of random sampling, namely the likelihood of each person in the sub-population having an equal chance of being selected and hence, achieving a certain degree of generalization, with the benefits of allowing considerable leeway for the researcher to achieve the theoretical saturation goal.

Second, the nature of the study is more qualitative than quantitative, namely the researcher is 'less concerned with generating an *extensive* perspective (producing findings that can be generalised more widely) than with providing *intensive* insights into complex human and social phenomena in specific circumstances' (Deacon et al. 2007: 45). One of the main aims of the study is exactly to provide an explanation of why children feel the way they do and how social structures and societal factors

influence their perceptions. Thus said, relevant statistical tests are nonetheless used, where applicable, not only because the stratified sampling approach requires them but also because in this way more precise conclusions can be drawn about the relationships between the respective factors under investigation and the possibility for generalization of the corresponding trends.

Children were recruited through schools, as this is a procedure considered to be most ethically appropriate. The head teachers of schools whose catchment areas cover different socio-economic characteristics (as determined by their Ofsted reports in England) were approached in both countries in order to make sure that there is a fair representation of socio-economic groups. Once the first consent forms were returned and interviews conducted, the further choice of schools was based on the same principle, namely inclusion of as many diverse backgrounds as possible. In terms of ethnicity, the focus in both countries was in comparing children from the ethnic majority and at least one dominating ethnic minority. Again, for practical reasons, it would not have been possible to include big numbers of children from different ethnic minorities, because then it would have been difficult to draw conclusions about ethnicity's influence. Moreover, in both countries the sample was ethnically boosted (and hence disproportionate) to guarantee there are enough children of ethnic minority so that a meaningful analysis can be conducted – 32.7% in Bulgaria and 35.8% in the UK (see Appendix 1). Theoretical saturation was again the guiding principle in deciding when to stop recruiting more ethnic minorities. Another main advantage of theoretical sampling is flexibility, namely although the researcher starts with specific questions in mind, often the data guide her choice of subsequent enquiries. For example, in the pilot study there were no questions on SES apart from the school children attended, but since the results showed SES might potentially turn out to be quite an important factor a number of questions were included later to ensure it was measured as entirely as possible. Gender-wise, the sample consists of a roughly equal number of boys and girls – 51.4% and 48.6% in Bulgaria and 47.8% and 52.2% in England, respectively.

Two towns of fairly similar size and distance from the capital city were included although regional variation was not an aim of the sampling, because studies so far (Barrett 2007) do not attribute considerable significance to geographical location for children's national and European identifications in England and Bulgaria. Hence, the choice of location for the interviews was not considered to be of major

importance, because the main objective in the sampling procedure was to achieve a variation along socio-economic, gender and ethnic lines. Nearly all schools in the respective town in England were approached<sup>1</sup> but given the low response rate and the lack of ethnic minorities as well as representatives of lower SES among the respondents who agreed to participate, a few other schools in a nearby village, a town and a city were included (Appendix 1). Overall, six out of the twelve head teachers approached in England agreed to participate. Only two who did not agree gave reasons for their decisions – one on the grounds it was not the ‘right time’ for him and the other because she never let researchers in her school since she received ‘nothing in return.’ All others simply did not respond to the numerous email and calls. By contrast, in Bulgaria, the head teachers of all four primary schools in the respective town agreed to participate and the response rate was so high that all socio-economic groups and a big minority group were represented, so there was no need to contact any further schools. Overall, 107 children in Bulgaria and 67 in England participated in the study.

Two caveats are due here prior to explaining in more detail the interviewing procedures. The first one concerns the size of the sample and the second one its ethnic composition. To start with, given that the sample consists of 174 pupils, it is clear that it is a fairly small, non-representative sample and therefore generalizations on a wider level are hardly possible. Neither is the purpose of the study to reach such generalizations. This means that all reported figures in the thesis relate to the children in the sample rather than to the whole population of Bulgarian or English pupils at that age. Therefore, even when references are made to Bulgarian children or English children, it means they are valid for the children in the sample. This applies even more fully to the parents’ sample, which is smaller.

Second, as far as the ethnic composition is concerned, as explained above, given the size of the sample, it was not possible to include representatives of a variety of ethnic minority groups. Hence, in both countries the focus was on one major ethnic minority group: Roma children in Bulgaria and children with family origins in India in England. Obviously, the label ‘ethnic minority’ is hardly telling given that the two ethnic minorities groups are quite different from each other: historically and culturally but also in relation to Europe and potentially to the EU. These differences

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<sup>1</sup> The names of the towns will not be revealed because of ethical considerations.

undoubtedly have repercussions on the level of European and even national identities. The simplification of variables for clarity of presentation purposes, namely labeling both groups as ethnic minority, is by no means an attempt to blur or ignore the differences between them and the importance of these differences for the processes studied in the thesis. Which is why, disregarding the common label, the analysis is conducted in such a way that it first, addresses all national differences on their own merits, also in relation to ethnic minorities. Put simply, in chapter 5, which is devoted to the role of social structures, the results for each country are separately reviewed and mainly in the conclusion an attempt is made to draw meaningful comparisons between the two contexts. Attempts are consistently made not only to report on the role of ethnicity but also to account for the possible reasons that explain that role, including differences between the two ethnic groups and the two national contexts, respectively. It is interesting to note, however, that in spite of the immense differences between the two ethnic minority groups, quite a few similarities were found among them in relation to European identities.

Next, in terms of interviewing procedures, all interviews took place in the period between 23 February 2009 and 21 January 2010. The interviews were conducted by the PhD student and each interview lasted between 45 minutes and an hour and a half. All interviews in England were conducted at school at a time arranged in advance with the respective (deputy) head teacher. The setting of the interviews differed from school to school. In some schools, a separate room was provided such as a mobile room, a library or a music room, but there were usually other people present, though at a distance, which means that they did not interfere in the process. In other schools, the interviews were conducted in the corridors but again there was no interference in the interviews themselves. There were interruptions from time to time but mainly from pupils who expressed interest in taking part and asked questions accordingly. Usually, the more time the researcher spent in a school, the more pupils subsequently agreed to participate. In Bulgaria, some of the interviews were conducted in schools: again usually in a separate room and there was no interference. Some of the interviews took place during the summer holidays, however, which meant that they were conducted either at the child's home or in a public place such as a café or a park. In the cases when parents were present at the interviews, there were some isolated cases when the parent attempted to interfere. There was one mother in particular who was constantly irritated by her daughter's perceived lack of

knowledge and often made remarks such as: 'How come you don't know that?' Needless to say, this had a negative effect on her daughter: the interview with this child lasted for nearly an hour and a half and on some of the questions the girl required considerably more time than her peers because she made every effort to provide an answer. All this suggests that the setting of the interviews influenced partially the pace of the interviews and potentially their content. Given that identity is a process rather than a thing, this development should not be viewed as necessarily compromising the findings but rather as an indication about the importance of context.

Another factor that should be taken into account in that respect is the length of the questionnaire (Appendix 7). The questionnaire was quite long and every child had the option of not answering all questions or taking a break. All children, however, chose to complete the whole interview and no one asked for a break. Moreover, the time frame was agreed in advance with the teachers who did not object against the length of the interviews. The interviewer tried to change pace by alternating verbal with card and photographs questions. Some interviews were conducted in two time slots because of school routine considerations: lunch breaks, end of school day, etc. All children were promised a bag of sweets and a certificate as an award for agreeing to participate and in accordance with the ethical plan, approved by the respective committee at Loughborough University. This was perhaps also an incentive for the children to complete the interviews. In hindsight, it should be noted that the questionnaires were indeed perhaps too long, given that quite a few of the questions asked were not used in the analysis. However, since the study was partly qualitative and hypotheses and theoretical developments were built in the course of research rather than in advance, it was necessary for a range of issues to be covered in the preliminary questionnaires so that the phenomena in consideration are better explained in the end. Media-wise, the sample is entirely determined on the basis of the pilot study findings, largely confirmed by the final figures. It is essential to define the sample on the basis of actual media use patterns revealed by interviews, because thus the research will indeed start with identity and then move to the media (Schlesinger 1991b: 150). Children were first asked in detail about their media use patterns in terms of time and content with a specific focus on interest in news and current affairs and sources of information on Europe and the EU. What the pilot study showed is that at the age of 9-10, TV was the main source of news for children and the most

important source on Europe and the EU among all mass media for the majority of children (Table 10.1 in Appendix 10). Furthermore, even if some of the quantitative figures suggest that some children also learn about Europe and/or the EU from other media sources such as radio and the Internet, in their qualitative answers pupils could not say where exactly (for example, which websites) they heard about Europe. In the case of TV they quite clearly knew which news or other emissions reported European stories. Which is why only TV programmes were ultimately included in the sample: two ‘adult’ news editions and a breakfast show in Bulgaria, all aired by the two main private TV channels, and two children’s - a news programme and a magazine show - and two adults’ news programmes in England.

Bulgaria (N=107)	England (N=67)
1. <i>BTV News (BTV Novinite)</i> – 69.2% (N=56)	1. <i>BBC’s and CBBC’s Newsround</i> – 56.7% (N=38)
2. <i>Nova’s Calendar</i> – 55.1% (N=59) <i>Nova’s Hello, Bulgaria (Zdravey, Bulgaria)</i> – 55.1% (N=59)	2. <i>BBC’s and CBBC’s Blue Peter</i> – 51% (N=34)
	3. <i>BBC News</i> – 32.8% (N=22)
	4. <i>ITV News</i> – 31.3% (N=21)

Table 3.2 News and current affairs programmes: reported viewing

The media sample was collected on 7 different days of the week in 7 different weeks between 18/11/2009 and 7/02/2010, excluding the Christmas holidays’ period. The news emissions were the ones children were most likely to watch given their school routine (Appendix 3). The aim was to catch a snapshot of typical coverage in a fairly average, non-event period. Bryman (2004: 186) claims this is one of the possible approaches in cases when the research question ‘entails an ongoing general phenomenon.’ Other researchers (among others, Stempel 1952, Riffe 1993 as quoted in Wang and Riffe 2010) also argue that constructed week sampling is one of the most efficient ways of sampling in media content analysis – ‘more efficient than simple random sampling or consecutive day sampling’ (Hester and Dougall 2007).

## 5. Data analysis methods

All interviews with children were fully transcribed and initially entered into an online database – Bristol Online Surveys. The parents were asked to fill in the questionnaire either online or in a print form. If a print option was chosen, the replies

were also entered into the online system. Subsequently, all data was exported to PASW Statistics 17. Similarly, all media texts were fully transcribed and visual images described in a Microsoft Word file and then coded in PASW Statistics 17 using the coding frame (Appendix 9).

The analysis of the quantitative questions in the interviews and the media content analysis was conducted in PASW Statistics 17 using the relevant statistical procedures. All media clips were initially coded by the principal investigator and a 10% random sample was re-coded by a second independent coder. Inter-rater reliability was tested by using Krippendorff's (2004: 211–243) alpha, which is considered to be a very good measure of reliability in media content analysis by 'handling any number of coders; nominal, ordinal, interval, ratio, and other metrics; and in addition, missing data, and small sample sizes' (Krippendorff 2009: 353). Krippendorff's alpha is .8012, which means that the reliability achieved is within the acceptable limits (ibid.: 354).

Statistical tests were conducted for all correlations and for the cross-tabulations, which suggested significant differences between the respective groups that were studied. In general, the findings from the quantitative questions were described as highly statistically significant when the probability (p) is <0.001, but given the size of the samples all cross-tabulations with a p of <0.05 were also considered as fairly significant, which is a standard practice (Bryman 2004: 238, Neuman 2007: 270).

Next, the open questions in the interviews and the surveys and all sentences with European/EU/Europe/Europa/Euro reference in the media texts were thematically analyzed, namely 'the data are read for analytic themes, which are listed' (Fielding 2001: 159). The procedure is often labeled in qualitative research as grounded theory. The authors Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1967) defended the view that theories should be developed 'from research grounded in data rather than deducing testable hypotheses from existing theories' (Charmaz 2006: 4). Hence, in the practical application qualitative data is coded in 'at least two phases: initial and focused coding' (ibid.: 42). In the former stage, 'fragments of data – words, lines, segments, and incidents' are examined 'closely for their analytic import' (ibid.) There are different ways of doing that but the approach in the current study is to use the so-called '*in vivo*' codes – namely the 'participants' special terms' (ibid.: 55). Since the qualitative questions focus mainly on children's definitions of Europe, the EU and

what it means to be European, it is vital to preserve as closely as possible the children's own terms. Similarly, in the media texts it makes sense to stick as closely as possible to the immediate context in which the European reference is made. Then, in the second stage of focused coding, 'decisions' are to be made 'about which initial codes make the most analytic sense to categorize' the 'data incisively and completely' (ibid.: 57). Needless to say, in the final interpretation links are made between the disparate categories and some might come under a common umbrella, if the data indicate this is feasible. Ultimately, in spite of the emphasis on keeping as close as possible to the findings rather than relying on testing existing hypotheses, preconceptions are inevitably present since even the initial formulation of the questions is based on theoretical assumptions. Nonetheless, the contribution of grounded theory in making sense of the open questions is immense since, as it will become evident from the data analysis, some of the terms used by the children when describing Europe come as a big surprise.

Finally, a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods was used to establish the relationship between children's European awareness, knowledge and identification. Using a constant bottom-up comparison (Glaser 1965, Dye et al. 2000), children's quantitative answers on the three sets of questions were analyzed and after a few main patterns were established, children were grouped accordingly. Then, given the established patterns, a further search for similarities in the answers was conducted on the basis of some of the qualitative answers on what it means to be European and what Europe and the EU were.

Overall, the combination of quantitative and qualitative procedures for analyzing the data is also an important asset of the study. On the one hand, it is possible to test existing claims in the literature such as, for example, about the relationship between the national and the European identities. On the other hand, the research is expected to illuminate children's views on important issues such as what Europe is for them, which are entirely based on young people's own conceptions, including own words rather than adult-created pre-existing categories.

Lastly, a point should be made about the way SES is measured. Three main indicators are used – the school children attend, the main family breadwinner's occupational status and the education of the parent with highest degree in the household (Appendix 1). Regarding the occupations, a categorization adopted is the Market Research Society scheme (2006). It is not only commonly used in market

research and scientific studies, but it also makes no class-loaded claims as other classifications do, such as Goldthorpe and Heath's (1992) class schema. This was an important factor to be taken into consideration when choosing the scheme because of the problematic use of class as a concept especially in Bulgaria, as already elaborated upon in chapter one. The educational categories in Bulgaria and England are also different because of the different structures. An attempt at unification would have been fruitless not only because some parents would have ended in categories that do not clearly describe their educational status but mainly because the analysis would have been impeded by such an attempt to equate clearly different structures.

## **6. Ethical issues and response rate implications**

Since the research focuses on one of the most vulnerable categories of participants – children, an ethical clearance by the Ethical Advisory Committee at Loughborough University was conducted prior to fieldwork. The researcher also underwent a Criminal Record Bureau disclosure procedure, which is a requirement for working with children in most schools in England. Whenever possible the interviews were conducted in open areas in the schools or in the presence of chaperons as a precautionary measure. In Bulgaria, ethical concerns were hardly of any importance for the head teachers and no further procedures were required. Some of the interviews were also conducted during regular school holidays either at the houses of the children or in cafes but again in most cases in the presence of a chaperon. All children were interviewed only after a written consent form was signed by a parent or a guardian. Children were also encouraged to sign a 'willingness to participate' form to ensure that nothing is done against their will. At the beginning of each interview, pupils were advised they could withdraw from the interview at any stage and that they had the right not to reply to every single question. None of these options was chosen by any of the children.

A note should be made about parental participation and obtaining permissions to interview their children. Getting parental permission was very difficult, especially in England, although on the form it was quite clearly written that parental participation was not a prerequisite for children's involvement. Different factors came

into play – from reports by head teachers that parents were put off by the big number of studies in which they were asked to participate to a tendency for more forms to be returned if the potential respondents were given less time to do that (which was largely a decision made by the head teachers) and complaints about the length of the initial consent forms. The latter concern was addressed and the consent form was considerably shortened. In some schools more children joined in at a later stage when they already got used to the presence of the researcher. The response rate was considerably raised in a school where the research topic was introduced in advance at a meeting with the pupils.

The final issue is the response rate from parents who received the questionnaires. 117 out of 174 surveys or 67.2% were actually returned. The response rate in England was much lower than that in Bulgaria – 48% vs. 79.4%. A few explanations are possible. In Bulgaria the researcher met most of the parents during the pilot study and quite a few of them filled in the questionnaires during the interviews. Second, the head teachers and teachers in Bulgaria were very active in urging the parents to return the surveys. In England, getting back the responses from parents was a very difficult task. It was easiest when the researcher spent more time in a school and could personally remind the pupils. Every parent who did not return his or her questionnaire also received a reminding phone call, which did not significantly raise the return rate. This was especially valid for ethnic minorities and households with lower SES. The implication of this low response rate is clear – there is a tendency for parents of higher SES and ethnic majorities to be overrepresented in the parents' sample – an issue to be born in mind during the data analysis.

## **Part III: Results and Analysis**

### **Chapter 4**

#### **Children's European Knowledge and Identities in National Context**

##### **1. Introduction**

This chapter is the first of three in which the results from the empirical work are presented. The main theme is the relationships between children's knowledge and identifications on the one hand, and the meanings and attitudes associated with Europe, on the other. The chapter seeks to explain these relationships by focusing on the role of national context, showing how the particularities of Bulgaria's and the UK's geopolitical position and experiences with Europe give rise to different meanings of Europe and how these, in turn, prompt different patterns of identification and knowledge in the two countries. Given what is known about the two countries' recent involvement with Europe and the EU – in particular Bulgaria's enthusiastic embrace of European membership, and the UK's notorious Euroscepticism – the expectation was to find high levels of identification with Europe among Bulgarian children, and much lower levels among English children. Yet the results show a rather different, far more intriguing picture, which requires a more nuanced understanding of the relationships between identification, knowledge, meaning-formation and the political and historical context.

To develop such an understanding, the chapter explores four key issues. First, whether Bulgarian and English children possess a European identity and whether awareness and knowledge of Europe and the EU are one of the factors that affect the levels of identification. Put simply: Are children who are more aware of Europe and/or the EU also more likely to know what Europe and/or the EU are and hence, to feel (more) European? This is an important question not only for theorists of European identity but also for policy-makers, because if knowledge about Europe is a necessary prerequisite of European identity, then it would obviously make sense to invest in nurturing and developing such knowledge. Second, after establishing


children's identifications and the relationship between awareness, knowledge and identification, the issue is whether children's European identities and knowledge depend on their definition of Europe. It is interesting to reveal whether different meanings attached to Europe lead to different levels of identification with it. For instance, when do children tend to feel more European – when they perceive Europe as a political entity (i.e., the EU) or as a continent? A third purpose is to investigate whether support for European integration goes hand-in-hand with stronger European identification. In other words, are those who are more supportive of integration and think it is good for their country also more inclined to identify as European? Finally, the aim is to reveal what the relationship between children's national and European identities is, how salient they are in relation to one another and also in relation to the children's other identities and ultimately, whether European and national identities are mutually exclusive. A related task is to find out whether it is possible to establish a universal model that explains the relationship between national and European identities across the whole of Europe, or whether a different approach might yield better results.

To be sure, the fact that the analysis starts by focusing on the impact of the national context is not meant to suggest that systemic factors are the only relevant ones to consider. Rather, the aim is to see whether they influence levels of identification at all. If the relationships between identification and other factors such as knowledge about Europe, for example, are similar in both countries, then quite obviously, systemic factors should not be overestimated. As the analysis reveals, however, the characteristics of the national context, although important, provide only a partial explanation of the nature of children's knowledge and identities. To develop a fuller picture, other elements need to be taken into account, in particular children's SES, ethnicity and gender – issues addressed in the following chapter.

## **2. Identification with and knowledge about Europe/EU**


The European identity is evidently not a particularly salient identity among either Bulgarian or English children in the sample. When asked to choose the words that best describe them among a plentitude of identities, only 23.6% of all children pick up the word European. Later, when the pupils have to respond to the direct

question of ‘Are you European’, the figure increases to a still rather low 43%. What is surprising, however, is that the expressions of European belonging are far more common in the traditionally Eurosceptic country than in the new member-state that, by all accounts, has embraced its European membership wholeheartedly. While only 20.6% of Bulgarian children choose the word ‘European’ to describe themselves, the proportion of English children is 28.4% (Graph 4.1). Similarly, while only 37.4% of Bulgarian children reply yes when asked ‘Are you European,’ the proportion among English children is 52.2% (Graph 4.1).



Graph 4.1 Children’s European identity (N=174)


At first sight, it is tempting to think that these results suggest that the relatively low proportion of Bulgarian children identifying as European may be an outcome of Bulgaria’s recent membership and the fact that the awareness of European-ness and knowledge about Europe and the EU has not yet trickled down to all of its youngest members. Yet, other data imply that the lack of European self-identifications among Bulgarian children is not a direct result of a lack of awareness or knowledge. Although only a third of Bulgarians and half of English children define themselves as European, many more have actually heard of Europe and the EU (Graph 4.2).



Graph 4.2 Children’s awareness of Europe and the EU (N=174)

Nearly all English children and three-fourths of Bulgarians have heard of Europe. The answers to the main awareness questions on Europe and the EU: ‘Have you heard of Europe?’ and ‘Have you heard of the European Union?’, however, reveal an interesting national difference. The EU is obviously a much more visible actor for Bulgarian than for English children as 30% more Bulgarians have heard of the EU. Roughly the same number in Bulgaria have also heard of Europe whilst in England twice as many have heard of Europe as they have of the EU. In fact, the reverse trend is noted with Europe – more English children have heard of it although the difference is a bit smaller – 20%. These differences in awareness especially of the EU can perhaps be explained by the fact that Bulgaria is a new member of the EU and the topic is indeed high on the agenda, and thus potentially also high on the agenda of the key socialization agents (the media, parents and schools) that shape children’s knowledge – an issue discussed later in the analysis.

The same picture emerges with regard to knowledge about Europe and the EU. Again, while English children are more knowledgeable about Europe, Bulgarian children are more knowledgeable about the EU. A comparison between the data on awareness and knowledge also shows that awareness does not necessarily imply knowledge. This applies mostly to Bulgarian children’s knowledge of the EU. Interestingly enough, only half of the children who say they have heard of the EU feel confident in declaring they know what the EU is (Graph 4.3). In England, on the other hand, the percentage is higher – two thirds are able to provide an explanation of what it is. On Europe, virtually all English children who are aware of it also know what it is, whilst in Bulgaria the percentage is slightly lower – 86%.



Graph 4.3 Children’s knowledge of Europe and the EU (N=174)

Quite revealing as indicators of knowledge and awareness are also the questions in which children are shown photos of key EU symbols and people such as the euro, the flag, the European institutions' buildings and main institutions' presidents as well as the founding fathers. The names of the people are also read out in a separate question. Yet again, results are compatible with the ones just presented, as Bulgarian children are on average much more familiar with the EU symbols and personalities than English ones.


To start with, in terms of EU symbols, the flag is clearly recognized by considerably more children in Bulgaria than in England – 84.1% vs. 49.3% (Graph 4.4). 72% of those who recognize it in Bulgaria are also able to explain what it is – for 43% of them it is the flag of the EU, for 29.3% of Europe and 27.7% define it as the 'European' flag. By contrast, in England only 54.5% of those who say they have seen the flag know what it is. Half of them describe it as the European flag, a third as the EU flag and the rest as Europe's flag. Quite of few mistake it for another country's flag – the list includes countries such as America, Australia, Sweden, Turkey, Pakistan and Brazil.

Bulgarian children are also more familiar with their national representatives at European level. In England, only three children say they have seen their Commissioner Catherine Ashton and for four, her name rings a bell, but no one knows who she is. In Bulgaria, 11% recognize the photo of Meglena Kuneva, who was a European commissioner at the time of interviewing, and 43.9% her name. 34% of the latter know she is a politician and six children think she is a TV presenter. Furthermore, more Bulgarian than English children tend to recognize their MEPs. Nonetheless, the Bulgarian children know these people are politicians but no one actually mentions they are MEPs. All of the recognized MEPs have been either MPs or ministers before.

The euro, on the other hand, seems at first to be a bit of an exception, as it looks familiar to 20% more English than Bulgarian children, but in both countries they tend to think it is the currency of a particular nation-state rather than of Europe. This is certainly the case for nearly 71.2% of English children. 41% say it is French money, 10% Spanish and 5% Italian. In Bulgaria, however, the number of children who think the euro is Europe's currency is higher than in England – 33% as opposed to 13%. Only two children mention it is the EU money, the rest use the words Europe or European. Still, 57% indicate it is the national currency of a certain country. Here,

Italy tops the table by 33%, followed by Greece with 8.6%. Interestingly enough, the country the majority of English children mention – France – is not present at all in Bulgarian children’s accounts.

Finally, the EU main institutions’ buildings are hardly recognizable for children in both countries and even when they say they have seen the building they do not know what it is. The EU figures – both past and present - are virtually unrecognizable. No one in England and five children in Bulgaria say they have heard the name of the European Commission President Jose Barroso. No one knows, however, who he is. The same trends are evident for the European Parliament Presidents Hans-Gert Pottering and Jerzy Buzek as well as the EU founding fathers. The only person whose name rings a bell is Jean Monnet in England. All think, however, he is a French painter.



Graph 4.4 Children’s recognition of symbols and people (N=174)

Evidently, Bulgarian children are on average more aware of and knowledgeable about the EU and its symbols than their English peers, yet at the same time, the levels of European self-identification among them are lower. How can this be explained and what do these results tell about the relationship between awareness, knowledge and identification, in general? To answer this question, it is worth first looking closely at the possible patterns of relationship between awareness, knowledge and identification. Using a bottom-up constant comparison, the following typology of five possible patterns was developed:

### How are awareness, knowledge and identity related?

Pattern	Heard of Europe and/or EU	Know Europe and/or EU	European
A	Yes	Yes	Yes
B	Yes	Yes	No
C	No	No	No
D	Yes	No	No
E	Yes	No	Yes

Table 4.1 Patterns of relationship between awareness, knowledge and identification

It should be stressed that the above patterns are entirely based on the relationships evidenced in the children's responses rather than on any sort of logical links between the three 'variables'. There are clearly two main patterns that stand out in both countries, although in Bulgaria there is a wider variety (Table 4.2). In fact, an equal number of children in total fall into both categories – one is of those children who have heard of Europe and/or the EU, know what Europe and/or the EU is but do not feel European, and the other one is the same in terms of awareness and knowledge but these pupils actually define themselves as European. The main difference between Bulgarian and English children, however, is that more English pupils who are aware of and know about Europe and/or the EU tend to define themselves as European, whereas in Bulgaria the top group is exactly of those children who have heard of and know about Europe and/or the EU but do not feel European. Put simply, the relationship between knowledge and identity does not appear to be as straightforward as assumed in the literature, especially in the Bulgarian scenario. Some of the reasons for this phenomenon will be subsequently sought in the qualitative answers in the next section.

### Is knowledge about Europe and/or the EU linked with European identity?

	Bulgaria			England			Total (BG and EN)		
	Pattern	%	n	Pattern	%	n	Pattern	%	N
1	B	37.4	40	A	53.7	36	B	39.1	68
2	A	29	31	B	41.8	28	A	38.5	67
3	D	18.7	20	D	3	2	D	12.6	22
4	E	8.4	9	C	1.5	1	C	5.8	10
5	C	6.5	7	E	0	0	E	4	7
Total		100	107		100	67		100	174

Table 4.2 Most common patterns of relationship between awareness, knowledge and identification

The additional analysis on the separate answers to the EU and Europe questions reveals an ever wider range of possible patterns. 40% of English children

have heard of and know only what Europe is, but half of them define themselves as European, half do not. In contrast, the group of children in England who has heard of *both* Europe and the EU and know what they are also tend to define themselves as European. In Bulgaria, this pattern does not apply: awareness and knowledge about both Europe and the EU do not necessarily prompt identification for all Bulgarian children.

All in all, the relationship between awareness, knowledge and identity is not an easy one to pin down to a unified pattern. Logically, without awareness and knowledge of at least Europe, there is no European identity. Yet at the same time, awareness and knowledge do not necessarily imply identification – a finding that goes against the grain of many empirical studies of European identity, where awareness and knowledge are taken as indicators of identity. Given the different patterns of relationship between the levels of knowledge and identification, it is feasible to assume that both of them are affected by other factors. Some of these potential factors will be subject to analysis in the next sections, namely the meanings of Europe, the attitudes to and support for European integration and the salience of national identity and knowledge about the nation-state.

### 3. Identification, knowledge and the meanings of Europe

The thematic analysis of the open-ended questions shows that English and Bulgarian children hold rather different perceptions of Europe and the EU. English children provide a relatively unified description of Europe as a continent – a word used by 48% (Table 5.3). A further 27% depict it in similar terms as a ‘few countries’ and for 15% it is simply a country. Thus, a boy (10110) says, Europe is ‘lots of countries in an area of the world’, while another one (20107) quite simply defines Europe as ‘one of the seven continents.’

What do you think Europe is?

Europe	Bulgaria		England	
	%	n	%	n
A continent	20	21	48	32
A state	29	31		
EU	18	19		
A few countries			27	18
A city	12	13		

A country			15	10
Other	6	7	6	4
Don't know	15	16	4	3
Total	100	107	100	67

Table 4.3 Children's descriptions of Europe

Bulgarian children's accounts of Europe are, however, qualitatively different. The word 'continent' is used only by a fifth of the children and another fifth specifically talk about Europe being equal to the EU. The biggest thematic group involves those children who actually volunteer the word state. It is unclear whether by state they actually mean a nation-state or a super/supra-state organization such as the EU – an issue explored in the forthcoming analysis.

Furthermore, even some of the Bulgarian children who use the word continent in their explanations include vocabulary more typical for the EU and especially for its pre-accession process. For example, a girl (70228) says Europe is 'a continent, in Europe they accepted Italy, Bulgaria, Austria.' A boy (90226) also says Europe is a continent with many states but adds that it is: 'created.' 'Accepted' and 'created' clearly clash with the geographical meaning of the word 'continent', implying there is more to Europe than geography (the EU?). The geographical aspects are also linked with the political ones in another girl's (80207) account: 'I know you can enter the European Union, we entered in 2007. I know there are a few peninsulas and Bulgaria is in the middle of one.' Ultimately, a boy (80217) who tries to explain how exactly Europe and the EU are linked in fact ends up equating them: 'I know that Bulgaria is part of Europe. Europe is countries that have become one; they have joined the European Union.'

A compatible pattern emerges in children's descriptions of the EU. Even when talking about the EU in specific terms, English children hardly stress any political implications (Table 4.4). On the other hand, only a fifth of Bulgarian children see Europe mainly as a geographical entity. For the majority of Bulgarians, Europe is predominantly a political entity – a state or the EU itself, which they depict as a union of European states – like a parliament or a building in which important people gather and discuss the future of Europe or in fact the future of their own country. Thus, some children give quite specific examples. A girl (70228) thinks that the EU is 'a building in which important European personalities gather and discuss the financial future of Bulgaria.' The implication is: not only is the EU a gathering of 'important' people but

these people actually have an important say on the future of her own country. A boy (100212) also emphasizes a key aspect of membership: ‘The people who live in that state have to obey certain rules.’ For a girl (80203), the political dimension of the EU is even clearer: ‘I think it is the political part of Europe. There the people who rule gather together.’ What is evident in these quotations is that the children who use the word state do not do that arbitrarily: they know that a state implies having important personalities who rule and discuss the future of the respective countries, including their own, and having the people in the state who need to obey the rules. The underlying assumption in these accounts, however, is: these children feel they are more among the people who need to obey the rules rather than among the important personalities who create the rules.

By contrast, in England even when children move beyond a geographical description of Europe, the vocabulary they use suggests they see their and their country’s role in a different manner. Thus, a boy (10103) says the EU is ‘a group of countries that have set up to help other countries’. Another one (10102) explains that the EU is ‘lots of countries in Europe that have joined together so that hopefully there won’t be a WWIII’. A girl (60104) clarifies that ‘some countries unite to get people travel without getting into fights.’ All in all, the discussion in the English case reveals not only a slightly different understanding of the EU but also a different role for their country and certainly not an inferior one as in the Bulgarian case: it is a matter of ‘joining together’ or ‘setting up’ rather than important personalities ‘ruling’, war prevention and facilitation of travel rather than ‘obeying’ rules.

#### What do you think the European Union is?

Bulgaria on EU			England on EU		
Description	%	n	Description	%	n
A big union of states (in Europe)	38	21	A group of countries (like a parliament for 14%)	39.5	17
A building where people gather and talk	22	12	Another word for Europe	18.6	8
Like a parliament	20	11	A union	11.6	5
Other – e.g., where policemen arrest people; Gypsy language is forbidden; nice	20	11	A capital city (of France, of Europe)	7	3
			Other – e.g., the EU flag; a charity; London Olympics	23.3	10
Total	100	55	Total	100	43

Table 4.4 Children’s descriptions of the EU<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> n in both countries equals the no. of children who have responded to this question. 48.6% (n=52) in Bulgaria and 19.4% (n=34) in England did not attempt to answer the question at all.

These results enable us to make sense of the different patterns of identification, knowledge and awareness in the two countries. For children who define Europe as a continent, it is most likely easier to identify with it, because they accept that simply by virtue of living on that continent they qualify as European. By contrast, for pupils who associate Europe with a political entity, identification is not that straightforward, since it probably implies complying with certain rules and regulations or living up to certain standards. Given that English children are more inclined to see Europe as a continent than Bulgarian children, it is feasible to argue that these different meanings shape their sense of European-ness, making English children on average more willing to self-identify as European, even if they do not know much about the EU.

The follow-up question of ‘What does it mean to be European’ provides additional support for this interpretation, and offers further insights into why some children feel European while others do not (Table 4.5). The thematic analysis (Table 4.6) shows that a significantly higher proportion of English pupils - 50.7% as opposed to 35.5% in Bulgaria - defines being European as being from Europe: living in Europe, being born in Europe in some accounts and speaking a European language in others – an understanding that is compatible with the perception of Europe as a continent. Furthermore, a proportion of Bulgarian children (8.4%) associate European-ness with the EU, while English children link it more loosely to a ‘community’ of countries that ‘are friends with each other’ (9%).

What does it mean to be European? (n=107)	% <sup>3</sup>	n
To live in Europe/from Europe	35.5	38
Don't know, haven't met any Europeans	23.4	25
From a different country	10.3	11
From the EU	8.4	9
Nice, good, e.g., people behave well and work long hours	9.4	10
Other	15.9	17

Table 4.5 Bulgarian children's ideas of European-ness

What does it mean to be European? (n=67)	%	n
To live in Europe/from Europe/born in Europe	52.2	35
Don't know, haven't met any Europeans	14.9	10
A different country, e.g. America (New York), France and Germany	14.9	10

<sup>3</sup> The percentages do not add to 100, because the table represents the most common categories, which some of the children's answers do not fit into. Furthermore, some of the accounts are overlapping and can be categorized as including more than one meaning. The same applies for table 4.6.

Lots of different countries, which are friends with each other and are also equal, a community	9	6
Nice, good, safe, happy and rich place	6	4
Other	6	4

Table 4.6 English children's ideas of European-ness

As a whole, the largest group in both countries, who by and large define being European as living in Europe, do not unequivocally define themselves as European. For some their knowledge leads to identification, for others – it does not. Part of the explanation as to why the fairly similar definition of being European as living in Europe does not categorically lead to European identification, is hidden in the relationship between knowledge, identity and meaning. First, for some pupils, this relationship is fairly straightforward – they define being European as living in Europe, they realize they live in Europe and hence, they say they are European themselves. As a girl (10111) puts it, Europe is ‘home.’ These are the pupils who provide the most straightforward answers to both the ‘Are you European’ and ‘What does it mean to be European?’ questions. The reply to the former is usually a simple ‘yes’ and to the latter ‘to live in Europe,’ or ‘to be born in Europe’. The quotation below is indicative of this point:

- *Are you European?*
- Yes, because Britain is part of Europe, which makes me European.
- *What does it mean to be European?*
- You live in Europe, you are from a European country, which includes Germany, France, England, Wales, Portugal and Spain (30105).

This kind of unproblematic endorsement of the European identity is much easier for the young people who by and large say Europe is a geographical entity. In opposition to the plain embrace of the European identity, the second-sub category of pupils who think being European is about being from Europe, find it problematic to define themselves as European, because they do not realize their country is actually part of Europe. Hence, in spite of defining Europe in similar terms to their peers, for them their lack of knowledge about their country's belonging to Europe, makes them consider Europeans to be an out-group:

- *What does it mean to be European?*
- To be born in Europe.
- *Were you born in Europe?*
- No, I was born in Sofia, Bulgaria (80210).
- *Are you European?*

- From Europe?
- *Do you feel European?*
- No.
- *What does it mean to be European?*
- To be like - I don't know.
- *Why did you say you are not European?*
- Because I am Bulgarian, actually Gypsy.
- *Are Gypsies and Bulgarians European?*
- I don't know.
- *What does it mean to be European?*
- From Europe (70218).

For the third sub-category in this first largest group, the difficulty comes from defining Europe itself, namely deciding on which countries actually comprise Europe and whether their nation is part of it. Many of these children do not actually reject the European identity, but express doubts about it. Common replies to the 'Are you European?' question are: 'Probably', 'Sort of', 'Mostly', 'Not much', 'What do you mean European?':

- *Are you European?*
- Probably. I don't exactly know. Not much probably.
- *What does it mean to be European?*
- I don't know. It means you're born and brought up in a European country, culture.
- *So, were you born and brought up in a European country?*
- No, I was born and brought up in an English country, in England. It's a bit hard to say if you are European because you might be from all other countries, you might be from just one.
- *How do you feel?*
- I don't exactly know. Probably neutral.
- *Are you European?*
- No, I feel more English than European (40102).

As a whole, in this first largest group, the definition of being European as living in (mainly) the continent of Europe leads to European identification for those children who are clearly aware of the fact that their country is indeed part of this continent. When pupils do not know what Europe is, they fail to identify themselves as European.

The second largest group is of the children who say they do not know what European means – 23.4% in Bulgaria and 14% in England. When asked subsequently: 'Have you met a European person,' they all reply negatively, which implies they do not realize their country is part of Europe. In contrast to the first group, here the lack of knowledge is complemented with a lack of definition of Europe and hence, lack of identification.

The third group is similar in this respect, in the sense that lack of knowledge leads to lack of identification, but the difference is that they clearly define Europe as an out-group. 8.4% in Bulgaria and 15.6% in England think Europe is a different country or countries such as France, Germany, Egypt or America (New York) in English accounts and simply a country by the name of Europe in Bulgarian descriptions.

The fourth group introduces a discursively different definition. For 8.4% of Bulgarians, being European means being from the EU. 9% of English children also describe a notion of European-ness that is close to what the EU stands for – lots of different countries that are friends with each other and are equal. A child (10108) puts it, as ‘being part of a community, sticking up to other people.’ Nevertheless, none of the English children mention the EU as such whereas in Bulgarian children’s accounts it is clearly present as an actor:

- What does the word 'European' mean?
- *That I am in the European Union (100206).*

However, it is often mingled with Europe as the example below demonstrates:

- *Are you European?*
- I don't know.
- *What does it mean to be European?*
- To live in Europe.
- *Do you live in Europe?*
- Yes, because Bulgaria entered the European Union in 2007.
- *But you are not sure whether you feel European or not.*
- Yes (80222).

The link with European identification is not straightforward in that category. For the majority of English children who equate being European with being part of a team, and who actually possess the knowledge that their country is indeed part of this team, endorsing the European identity is the norm. Usually, these are children who possess a high level of knowledge about both Europe and the EU and endorse the European identity both because of the definitions they give and because of their multi-layered knowledge. For the Bulgarian children, this identification is far more problematic. It is related to the ‘ideal Europe’ definition of the EU they often give – the one they have not yet experienced in practice, though they should have in theory. Children’s expectations and hopes about the EU, therefore, guide their self-categorization (or lack of such) as European. Below are two contrasting examples of this phenomenon – the first child (70228) refuses to identify herself as European exactly, because she fears Bulgaria will be forced to accept the euro, which in her

opinion is something bad, whereas the second one (80217) defines himself as European, because he believes his country is on the right path to becoming more advanced:

- *Are you European?*
  - No.
  - *Why?*
  - Because after a while the European Union will make us abandon the leva and have euros instead. I feel bad about it; I don't accept it and I don't define myself as European (70228).
- 
- *What does it mean to be European?*
  - I am happy that Bulgaria has entered the EU. It means that your country is advanced because it is already in Europe (80217).

The latter example also provides an illustration for the final category of children - 9.4% of Bulgarians and 6% of English children talk of being European as something nice and good. There are variations in the cross-national replies. Thus, for a few Bulgarian children being European is 'good, there is nothing criminal about it' (90231). Europeans 'work a very long period of time' and do not do 'whatever you want,' a Roma boy (70214) says. For another boy (90219), being European means behaving well and not speaking 'bad words.' For English children, the good aspects of being European involve to 'be happy and not poor, Europeans are rich' (60101) and to live in a 'safe place' (10104), although the same boy realizes not all of Europe is safe and gives Ukraine as an opposite example. The levels of European identification also differ in that group, but they clearly depend on children's knowledge of whether their country is actually part of Europe – for those who do, it is easy to identify with the 'nice' Europe. Still, there is an underlying topic that guides Bulgarian children's descriptions – they again talk about hopes and expectations rather than a default reality. Thus, two Bulgarians (70216 and 90215) do not consider themselves as European, because only mayors, politicians or famous people are Europeans. They perceive Europe as an ideal they do not render themselves important enough to be part of.


Finally, a few children bring up different issues to the ones already outlined. Some assign importance to language – some see it as an advantage that Europeans can speak their own languages, while others (especially in Bulgaria) think Europeans speak only a foreign language they do not understand – English or 'European'. A Roma child

(70233) in Bulgaria even says that being European means ‘speaking Bulgarian, not Gypsy.’ The issue of European as equivalent to being Christian is brought up by only one girl (20206) in England. Consequently, these children’s identities very much depend on the definitions of Europe they give. If they think Europeans speak a different language or have a different religion to their own, then they fail to self-categorize themselves as European.


All in all, children’s cross-national accounts of what it means to be European are quite similar. For the majority, it is equivalent to living in Europe although not all realize they actually do. Almost inevitably the children who lack knowledge about their country’s involvement in Europe also tend not to categorize themselves as European since they perceive it as an out-group. Yet, knowledge about being part of Europe does not necessarily lead to identification. Children’s accounts of why this is the case are not unequivocal. For quite a few, it is simply a matter of not feeling European without accounting for the reasons, or as a Bulgarian girl (90225) puts it: ‘I have no idea what it feels like.’ Similarly, an English girl (50102) says she does not ‘feel like it.’ Common replies are: ‘I was born in Europe’ or ‘I live in Europe but I don’t feel European.’ For a few English children, it is simply too much to hold multiple national identities and a supranational one. ‘It feels weird being British, English and European all at once. I can’t get my head around it,’ a boy (50101) says. For Bulgarian children, on the other hand, it is more a question of perceiving the European identity if not as a dream identity, at least as an identity they aspire towards but have not yet attained - largely connected to their country’s recent acceptance in the EU, which has brought a lot of expectations they yet wait to be fulfilled. Which is why, a common reply for Bulgarian children is: I realize Bulgaria entered the EU in 2007, but I still do not feel European. This idealistic view of Europe, deeply connected with expectations about EU membership, is not present at all in English children’s accounts. As a whole, for the majority of pupils who define Europe as a geographical entity and who possess the knowledge about their country’s belonging to that continent, it is far easier to define themselves as European than for those who connect the idea of European-ness solely with the EU as a supranational organization. Obviously, children’s descriptions of Europe and the EU and what it means to be European influence their identifications and quite a few clues were already provided about the direction of that influence. Still, further analysis is needed to reveal whether

some patterns of the relationship between knowledge, identification and meanings stand out.

Now it is worth taking a more systematic look at the patterns of relationships between meanings on the one hand, and identifications on the other, using the bottom-up constant comparison approach (Graphs 4.5 and 4.6). The analysis reveals the English children who define themselves as European know much more about both Europe and the EU, and tend to provide quite unified definitions of both. Thus, the majority in the “Europeans” group define Europe as a continent and the EU as an organization of European states, which have gathered together to help each other and work as a parliament or a government. In contrast, English ‘non-Europeans’ rarely define Europe as a continent (15.2%), and half do not know what the EU is – some even think it is the London Olympics, a capital city or another name for Europe. All in all, the English children who categorize themselves as European not only know more about both Europe and the EU, but also tend to describe Europe as a continent, and are more likely to be able to tell the difference between Europe and the EU – mainly in terms of Europe being a continent and the EU a political entity. In contrast, those who do not define themselves as Europeans are most often the pupils who know nothing or hold misconceptions about the EU. Among Bulgarian “Europeans”, the focus on Europe as a geographical rather than a political entity is not that strong, though it is still considerably stronger in comparison with the ‘non-Europeans.’ The ‘non-Europeans’ hardly ever say Europe is a continent. Instead, the word ‘state’ is the most common description in their category. There are also a lot of misconceptions – some say Europe is a city, the Balkan Peninsula or a school. More than half struggle to depict the EU but many of those who do exclude themselves from the description, because they think the EU is for rich people and politicians. On the whole, most Bulgarian children see Europe as a good and important political entity, and for many, this perception makes European identification hard to embrace.



Graph 4.5 English children's ideas of Europe and the EU and European identifications<sup>4</sup>



Graph 4.6 Bulgarian children's ideas of Europe and the EU and European identifications


To sum up, meanings clearly intervene in the relationship between knowledge and identification. Among English children, Europe is most often a geographical entity they automatically feel part of, while in Bulgaria, Europe is a political entity or a distant dream that many children exclude themselves from and hence, fail to endorse the European identity. It is due to this that in the Bulgarian case, higher levels of knowledge do not necessarily lead to a greater level of identification.

<sup>4</sup> Percentages do not add to 100 because only the main categories are given in the graph. The same applies for graph 4.6.

#### 4. Identification with and attitudes to Europe

Closely related to the relationship between the different meanings children attach to Europe and their European identification is the issue of whether pupils who are more supportive of integration and think it is good for their country are also more inclined to identify themselves as European. As the study will show, the results suggest that the link between identification and attitudes is not that straightforward, and is instead again dependent on the meanings children attach to Europe.

When asked whether their country should be part of the EU, the majority in both countries are clearly in support of EU membership (Graph 4.7). In fact, there are more supporters of EU membership in England than in Bulgaria – 71.7% vs. 53.3% - a surprising result if the general political climate and attitudes to the EU in each of the countries is considered. 11.9% in England and nearly twice as many – 21.5% in Bulgaria – hold the opposite view and the rest are undecided.



Graph 4.7 Children's support for EU membership (N=174)

The answers to the next questions on whether EU membership is a good or a bad thing in general, and for their country more specifically, confirm children's positive attitudes towards Europe. 74.8% in Bulgaria and 76.1% in England say EU membership is a good thing in general and only 2.8% and 3%, respectively, think it is a bad thing. Slightly lower is the number of pupils who affirm EU membership as something good for their country. This trend is clearly evident in England, when 12.1% fewer pupils say EU membership is good for their country than in general and nearly a third do not know. In Bulgaria, 7.5% think it is bad for their country to be an EU member and 71% say it is good.

In general, the thematic analysis on the good and bad aspects of their country being part of Europe also reveals that children in both countries have similar concerns and expectations. Thus, for nearly a third in Bulgaria and England, being part of Europe means being part of a stronger team, where countries are friendly with and respect each other – an idea present in accounts of Europe/EU in previous sections as well. ‘It is better to be in,’ explains a Bulgarian (90210). ‘They can count on each other when something is going on, the other states can rely on us,’ says another (90218).

However, there are differences in the definition of Europe. For Bulgarians, it is a state, more organized than Bulgaria and with more rules. In this question more than in any other, it is clear that by state children mean the EU. Some pupils even express quite concrete expectations for changes: ‘The road to Rasovo has holes in it and they need to fix it,’ says a boy (70218). ‘The streets won’t be as dirty,’ hopes a girl (80216). 5.6% even expect a rapid recovery from the financial crisis because of their EU membership. Although they are already in Europe and the EU, the children use the future tense – these are changes they hope will happen but have not yet taken place. One boy (90223) even summarizes: ‘I don’t feel the difference.’ For 7.4% of Bulgarian children, being in Europe is a good thing, because it gives Bulgaria a better leverage vis-à-vis the other countries in the world. ‘Bulgaria deserves it,’ says a child (100214). ‘Not all will think that Bulgaria is a weird and stupid country,’ adds another (80207). As a whole, the tendency already evident in previous responses is confirmed – for the majority of Bulgarian children Europe is still an ideal rather than a reality. Even those who realize their country is already part of both the continent and the political union are still waiting to experience the benefits of that ‘belonging’ and ‘membership’ in their everyday lives.

For English children, on the other hand, Europe is a ‘team’ of friendly countries, which can win wars together and all have a say despite their size differences. 14%, however, see a potential danger in being part of a team, namely that the countries ‘might fall out’ (30117) and then another war can erupt. The ghosts of the world wars, especially World War II, are present in a few boys’ accounts and Germany is often mentioned as a potential threat. Some Bulgarian children also worry bad people can cause trouble but they do not fear a war. Nonetheless, quite clearly, for English children Europe is indeed a default rather than a dream or an ideal they aspire towards. They see potential dangers but they have already experienced the


advantages. One advantage English children emphasize much more than Bulgarians is being able to travel to other places. This is a key benefit for a quarter of English pupils and only 5.6% of Bulgarian.

The implications for the country's 'size' are a recurrent topic, albeit with variations. 14% of English children and 3.7% of Bulgarians think being part of Europe makes their country bigger. Occasionally, English children worry about the opposite, namely that Britain will actually be smaller and will not have that much of a say. Another bad aspect for a minority in both countries is the language obstacle. English children also do not like the mix-up of currencies and fear they might have to give up the pound.

To sum up, when elaborating on the good and the bad aspects of EU membership, children paint different pictures of Europe. For Bulgarians as opposed to English pupils, Europe is a dream rather than a default, which explains why support for European integration is not necessarily tied to a strong feeling of European identity. Sometimes, support for integration is motivated precisely by a feeling of *lack* of a European identity, and the *wish* to become fully European.


The cross-tabulation of children's responses on their European self-categorization and support for European integration provides partial support for this interpretation. While the majority of children who tend to define themselves as European are also in support of European integration (77.5% in Bulgaria and 80% in England), the reverse is not necessarily true. Put simply, the 'non-Europeans' in England are clearly in support of their country's EU membership (73.1%), whereas in Bulgaria they are divided in their opinion - 37.3% support membership, 28.8% are against it and 33.9% do not know (Pearson chi-square for Bulgaria is 17.251, significant as  $p=0.002$ , for England, it is 18.020, highly significant as  $p<0.001$ ). On the second issue of whether EU membership is a good or a bad thing (Graphs 4.8 and 4.9), no statistically significant link is evident ( $p$  is considerably  $>0.001$ ). Only 6.8% of the 'non-Europeans' in Bulgaria and 7.7% in England say EU membership is bad for their country. As a whole, the children who possess a European identity are much more likely to be in support of European integration, but support for European integration in itself is not sufficient to help explain some children's identification with Europe, because the majority are in general quite supportive of their country's involvement in Europe, which does not necessarily make them feel European.

How is identity related to support for EU membership in Bulgaria?



Graph 4.8 Children's opinion on own country's membership in Bulgaria – cross-tabulation with identity

How is identity related to support for EU membership in England?



Graph 4.9 Children's opinion on own country's membership in England: cross-tabulation with identity

## 5. Knowledge and identifications between Europe and the nation

As it became obvious, the differences in meanings children attach to Europe help explain why Bulgarian children are on average less likely to self-identify as European, despite knowing more about the EU than their English peers. These different meanings can be connected to the disparities between the two national contexts, in particular discrepancies between the two countries' relationships with the EU. This section continues to explore the influence of the national context. First, children's knowledge of their country's membership in the EU and other member-states is linked to their country's history, geopolitical position and foreign policies. Second, the strength of their national identities vis-à-vis their European identities is examined.

## 5.1 Children’s knowledge about country’s membership in the EU and other member-states

English children know much better which countries make up Europe (Table 4.7). Thus, the ones the majority say are in Europe are: France (81%), Italy (72%), Spain (67%), Germany (67%) and Greece (61%). Yet, as it can be deduced from this list, their knowledge is filtered through national lens: the top countries are not only some of the biggest European states but also ones with which England has had historical ‘encounters’ or are preferred holiday destinations for English tourists. Bulgarian children, on the other hand, are less knowledgeable about the countries that constitute Europe, but their knowledge is also influenced by the national context. Italy leads the Bulgarian table with 45%, followed by Greece and Ireland with 36%, and France, Romania and Russia – 34%. The trend is towards recognizing the biggest nation-states as well as neighbors such as Romania and Greece and most common emigration destinations such as Italy and Spain.

Which countries make up Europe and the EU?

Country	In Europe/EU average <sup>5</sup> (whole sample, N=174)		In Europe/EU average (Bulgaria, n=107)		In Europe/EU average (England, n=67)	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
France	43.7	76	29	31	67	45
Germany	40	69	30	32	55	37
Greece	36.8	64	29	31	49.3	33
Italy	47	82	39	42	59.7	40
Romania	27	47	30	32	22.4	15
Spain	39.4	68.5	28.5	30.5	57	38

Table 4.7 Children’s knowledge of European states


A look at the list of countries children associate with the EU as opposed to Europe reveals that the most notable difference is the considerably lower number of children who actually say a certain country is in the EU. Thus, in England 79% say France is in Europe but only 55% think it is in the EU, for Germany the figures are 66% and 45%, respectively, and for Italy 71% and 45%. In Bulgaria, the same trend is evident although with much lower margins – roughly around 10%. This is in line with the tendency of Bulgarian children to equate Europe with the EU – a fact that is, as

<sup>5</sup> Average of percentages of children who indicate a given country is part of Europe and of the EU, respectively.

argued earlier, also an outcome of the national context. Given Bulgarian’s children greater knowledge about the EU, it is also not surprising to find that more Bulgarian children know the exact number of EU countries – 10.3% as opposed to only one child in England.

## 5.2 Relationship between children’s national and European identities

The figures on children’s national identities are surprisingly similar in Bulgaria and England (Graph 4.8). 73.8% of Bulgarians pick up the Bulgarian card as a description of who they are. In England, 70.1% choose the English card and slightly less – 64.7% - the British card. The replies to the direct questions of ‘Are you Bulgarian/English/British?’ yield identical results. In both countries, the majority of children who do not choose their national identities are the representatives of the ethnic minorities.



Graph 4.10 Children’s national identities (N=174)

As a whole, the national question is a much easier one in comparison with the European one, which often leads to oscillations in the initial response rather than a black and white ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer. The unified picture in terms of the number of children who possess a national identity is re-created partially at the level of importance they attach to their national identities (Table 4.8).

If yes, how important is it to you that you are Bulgarian/English/British?

	Bulgaria		England on English		England on British	
	%	n	%	n	%	n
Very important	55.4	46	19.6	11	12.5	7
Quite important	36.2	30	39.3	22	50	28

A little bit important	4.8	4	28.6	16	23.2	13
Not at all important	3.6	3	12.5	7	14.3	8
Total	100	83 <sup>6</sup>	100	56	100	56

Table 4.8 Importance of national identities

Partially, because the analysis shows that for Bulgarian children their national identity is somewhat more salient than the English and British identities for their English peers. Thus, a third of Bulgarians rank their national identity as being the most important of all their identities, whilst in England for only 10.5% being English and for 3% being British are their most important identities. Consequently, for 70.6% of Bulgarians being Bulgarian is a top three identity. By contrast, only 40.9% and 16.7% rank British-ness or English-ness, respectively, as a top three identity. All in all, the Bulgarian identity seems to be a more salient identity than the English and the British ones especially when its importance is weighted in comparison with children's other identities.


The next issue to be established, after revealing the presence and salience of children's national and European identities, is what the relationship between those identities is. The main question is: Are they mutually exclusive or not, and is it perhaps more appropriate to describe them as 'nested' (Risse 2001)? In other words, does the presence of national identity function as an obstacle to European identification? And finally, does the same type of relationship apply in all countries, or does it vary, as some literature suggests?

The greater salience of national identity among Bulgarian children may lead to the expectation that in their case, national identity is more likely to function as an obstacle to European identification. However, this does not appear to be the case since an equal number of children endorse both the national and the European identity or endorse the national but reject the European identity. Moreover, only one child who rejects the national identity, actually embraces the European one (Graphs 4.11 and 4.12), Pearson chi-square is 17.132, significant as  $p=0.002$ ). In contrast, there is no statistically significant relationship between national and European identity among English children, though this may be due to the size of the sample ( $p=.288$  for a Pearson chi-square of 2.488).

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
<sup>6</sup>  $n=83$  for Bulgaria since this is the number of children who say they are Bulgarian (Graph 4.8). For England,  $n=56$  instead of 57 (Graph 4.8), because one child replied 'important' to both the English and the British questions rather than choosing one of the available options.

Relationship between Bulgarian and European identities



Graph 4.11 Cross-tabulation of European and national identities in Bulgaria


Relationship between English and European identities



Graph 4.12 Cross-tabulation of European and English identities in England

A look at other data suggests that this interpretation may be a bit more nuanced. When faced with a set of questions offering them to choose the option of identifying oneself as both English and European, or Bulgarian and European, a clearer picture emerges (Graph 4.9). Thus, as many as 52.3%, 56.7% and 62.7%, respectively, define themselves through a combination of both a Bulgarian, English or British and a European identity, albeit many say their national identity is more salient than their European one. What these results show is that even some of the children who initially do not define themselves as European (or for that matter as English, British or Bulgarian) choose a combination of national and European identities to describe who they are rather than only one identity. This is an important finding because it confirms the theoretical understanding (chapter 1) of collective identity as a process, constantly influenced by various contextual factors rather than a fixed thing. Thus, for more than half of the children their national and European identities are not mutually exclusive,

since they declare they possess both national and European identities, though many feel that their national identity is stronger.



Graph 4.13 Relationship between national and European identities (N=174)

The argument that national identity is an obstacle to European identity in Bulgaria is also contradicted by the fact that the European identity is actually comparatively more salient for Bulgarian children. When asked to rank their identities in order of importance, though only 4.5% place it in first place, 40.9% consider it a top three identity as opposed to only 15.8% in England, where no one says the European identity is his or her most important identity.

Finally, the analysis of the open-ended questions also implies that the relationship between national and European identity is more complex than either the typologies developed in the academic literature so far (antagonistic, complementary or nested) or the initial cross-tabulations suggest. The main problem with the existing categories is that they are built on the implication that children – first, definitely possess national and/or European identities, and second, the relationship between these identities actually determines the strength or possibility for existence of either and especially of the European one. Yet, in the current research sample, there are children who endorse only a national or a European identity or none, but their identification is not a result of any antagonism between the respective identities. Which is why, the constant bottom-up approach is again endorsed and a few main typologies are developed on the basis of children’s responses in the quantitative question about the relationship between national and European identities (Graph 4.9) and the qualitative one on what it means

to be European, but also by bearing in mind the current debates in the field. The first major category is of mutually inclusive identities, namely children who declare they are both English/British/Bulgarian and European. Within this category is also the category of nested identities – the one perhaps best described in the literature (Risse 2001, 2004), where some pupils define themselves as European because they consider their national identity as part of the European one. The third category is of those children for whom national and European identities are clearly mutually exclusive – they cannot feel European precisely because they feel English, British or Bulgarian. Finally, the last category is the so-called ‘other’, namely all children who do not fit into any of the previous three. For them, it is not really relevant to research the relationship between European and national identity, because there is no such relationship – they define themselves as only British/English/Bulgarian or European or none for reasons other than interplay between the national and the European dimension. Therefore, in terms of percentages the results look like this<sup>7</sup>:

Are national and European identities antagonistic or complementary?

Country	Mutually inclusive				Mutually exclusive		Other					
	In total		Nested				Only national identity		Only European identity		None	
	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n
Bulgaria (n=107)	52.3	56	20.5	22	3.7	4	20.6	22	0	0	23.4	25
England on English identity (n=67)	55.2	37	18	12	6	4	35.8	24	3	2	0	0

Table 4.9 Patterns of relationship between the national and the European identities

To start with, it already has been made clear (Graph 4.9) that 55.2% of English children defined themselves as both English and European and 52.3% of Bulgarian children did the same. For all of them, therefore, the two identities are indeed not mutually exclusive. The thematic analysis of the ‘Are you European’ question also shows that they do not find the two identities antagonistic. For instance, one girl (10111) says she is happy to be European because ‘it is my home and it’s also the place where I like to go on holiday.’

<sup>7</sup> The relationship between the British and the English identity and the European one is quite similar and is often overlapping in the qualitative questions. Therefore, for clarity of presentation purposes only the English-European one is presented.

For 18% of the English children and 20.5% of the Bulgarian children who self-identify both as national and as European, the two can also be classified as nested. These children explicitly explain in their open-ended questions that they define themselves as European exactly because their country is part of Europe and/or the EU, as the quotations below demonstrate:

- *Why did you say you are European?*
- Because I was from Britain.
- *How do you know if someone is European or not?*
- Which country they were born in or kind of they lived there forever (30118).
  
- *Who do you think is European?*
- I am from Bulgaria and Bulgaria is in Europe (90232).

The bottom-up comparison turns out to be the most useful for the category of children who do not define themselves as European but declare they possess a national identity. For the majority of them, the lack of European identification is not a result of any explicit antagonism between national and European identities. In fact, for only four children in Bulgaria and four in England it can be concluded that European and national identities are mutually exclusive, because in their answers to the open-ended questions they clearly state they are not European as they cannot be both English/British and European or both Bulgarian and European. Below are two examples of such replies:

- *Are you European?*
- From Europe?
- *Do you feel European?*
- No.
- *What does it mean to be European?*
- To be like - I don't know...
- *Why did you say you are not European?*
- Because I am Bulgarian, actually Gypsy (70218).
  
- *Why did you say you didn't feel European?*
- I don't really feel European because I like keeping to my two countries. I don't want to feel like I am all over the place. I like to feel in two separate countries (50103).
  
- *Why did you say you are not European?*

- I don't know. I asked my Mum 'Am I European?' No, I am not European. I am either British or English or Hindu. That's what my Mum says. I say what she says (30121).

As the quotations demonstrate, in some rare cases especially in Bulgaria, the reply children give to the 'Are you European?' question is: 'No, I am Bulgarian' or 'No, I am a Gypsy.' When subsequently asked, 'Are Bulgarians/Gypsies European?' they usually say no. A significant proportion of these children are actually representatives of the ethnic minorities – mainly from India in England and Roma in Bulgaria. Some of them endorse a national identity, but fail to embrace the European one perhaps because they do not consider it as inclusive. All this suggests a potentially racialized nature of European identity.

Furthermore, there are indications in the data that for some children even national identity is exclusive and racialized. 22.4% in Bulgaria and 14.9% in England reply no to the 'Are you Bulgarian/English?' question (Graph 4.8). The majority of them also declare they do not have a European identity, which means that the lack of national identification is not a result of the presence of a European one. The underlying factor that explains this lack of national identification is again ethnicity. The impact of ethnicity on the European project will be explored in further detail in the next chapter. As a whole, on the basis of the data available so far it can be concluded that the fact that some children do not possess simultaneously national and European identities does not make the identities mutually exclusive, when the children do not explicitly make it clear that they view them as antagonistic.

In general, the results on the relationship between children's national and European identities show that for the majority of children, the two identities or even three – English, British and European – are indeed not mutually exclusive. More than half of the children categorize themselves as European and English, British or Bulgarian. Moreover, for 18% of children in England and 20.5% in Bulgaria the national and the European identities are 'nested' (Risse 2001, 2004). Nonetheless, the bottom-up constant comparison illustrates that for only 6% of English children and 3.7% of Bulgarians the European and the national identities are clearly mutually exclusive. Ultimately, there is a whole category of pupils for whom the relationship between national and European identities cannot be labeled using the available terminology. What holds true for these children is that they do not possess simultaneously the two or three identities not because they find them antagonistic but

because of different reasons. Put simply, many children say they feel more British/English/Bulgarian than European not because their English/British/Bulgarian identity is in any kind of conflict with their European one but because their European identity is a generally weak identity, as the separate results on its ranking show. Obviously, the variations in the identifications with Europe cannot be explained solely by the significance of the national context, which seems indisputable as both the data on children's knowledge of other EU member-states and identities shows. Other influences such as ethnicity, as alluded in the last few examples, appear to play an important role – a topic to be explored subsequently.

## **6. Conclusion**

To sum up, the results presented in the chapter seem to question some of the tacit assumptions underpinning much existing European identity research. First, the data reveal that awareness and knowledge of Europe and/or the EU are indeed a prerequisite for European identity but knowledge in itself does not imply identification. Many children appear to be knowledgeable about Europe and/or the EU but do not define themselves as European. This is especially valid in the Bulgarian context, where children are considerably more aware of the existence of the EU as a political actor than in England but fewer define themselves as European. However, there is no identification without knowledge. Second, although European identification does lead to support for the country's EU membership, the reverse does not necessarily hold true. In other words, although most children do not object to their country's European-ness, this support does not automatically make them feel European. What these two major findings suggest is that the taken-for-granted links between European identity and knowledge, on the one hand, and between identity and support for European integration, on the other, can be misleading.

The chapter also offers explanations as to why this is the case. The above relationships cannot be properly understood if the importance of the national context is not fully explored. Most studies tend to reduce its significance by concentrating solely on national identities and their relationship with the European one. The current thesis, however, not only attempts to capture the importance of the national context from a variety of perspectives, which take heed of historical and political

particularities, but also shows that these factors can contribute to a much better understanding of the European identity project than a limited focus on national identities allows for. A few main findings seem to lead to this conclusion. First, children's recognition of key EU symbols and knowledge about other European states are sifted through national lens. Thus, Bulgarian children recognize more the EU flag and view the euro as a European rather than a single state currency and in both countries young people tend to know more about the states that their country is historically or geopolitically linked to. Second, the relationship between children's knowledge and identifications cannot be properly explained without taking into account the meanings children attach to Europe, and without considering how these meanings are shaped by the national context, for example, the respective country's geopolitical position vis-à-vis the EU and overall historical trajectory in relation to Europe. Thus, half of English children define Europe as a continent, whereas the word most often volunteered by Bulgarian children is a state and even some of those 20% who describe it as a continent load the depiction with political implications, typical for the EU accession process. All in all, the majority of Bulgarian children put an equation mark between Europe and the EU. Although half realize they are two different things, they often mingle them in their accounts. As a result, it seems easier for English children to define themselves as European than for Bulgarian ones. In fact, 52.2% of young people in the traditionally considered as Eurosceptic old member-state say they are European as opposed to 37.4% in the new member, where all reports suggest that support for European integration is very high. Why the seeming paradox? Obviously, English children tend to define themselves as European when they know both about Europe and the EU and differentiate between the geographical and the political entity. Consequently, they endorse European identity, because regardless of the fact whether they feel 'core Europeans' (Rovisco 2010) or 'a stranger in Europe' (Wall 2008), they realize Europe is a default for them. This realization comes as a result of their knowledge that their country is part of the continent or from an understanding of the implications the EU holds for them mainly in terms of travel opportunities. The Bulgarian 'Europeans', on the other hand, also tend to be more knowledgeable about Europe and the EU but rarely differentiate between the two. In Bulgaria, however, the majority of children struggle to define themselves as European, because they perceive Europe as an ideal they do not feel they are able to fit into at present. In their descriptions, Europe and the EU are often

linked with hopes and expectations about the future rather than perceptions about the present. They do indeed seem to be in the process of 'becoming' rather than being European, because the 'return to Europe' (Kuus 2007: 27-29) might have taken place in theory but the children have not internalized it.

The importance of national context is, therefore, indisputable in relation to children's definitions of Europe and subsequently, the implication of those ideas for their European identifications (or lack of such). More will be revealed about its significance when a comparison between children's ideas and those of their socialization agents is made, as socialization is also a process expected to be influenced by the national context. Finally, most young people are capable of possessing national and European identities and they are rarely mutually exclusive. Nonetheless, there is a whole category of pupils who are left out by the current terminology on the relationship between the national and the European identities. These are children who feel either only British/English/Bulgarian or European or none, not because of the incompatibility between the respective identities but because of the weakness of the European identity, the lack of knowledge about Europe and/or the EU and the potential importance of ethnicity and probably, SES. All in all, as the final points quite clearly reveal, regardless of its indisputable influence, the national context is not enough to explain the nature of the European identification and the significance of other factors such as social structures and socialization as a process will be considered in the next chapters.

## Chapter 5

### Children's European Identities between Class, Ethnicity and Gender

#### 1. Introduction

Most comparative research on European identity is concerned with national differences, and indeed, as shown in the previous chapter, systemic factors undoubtedly play a role in shaping children's knowledge about, and identifications with Europe. Yet to limit the analysis solely to national differences would mean falling into the trap of methodological nationalism. Evidently, neither Bulgarian nor English children hold uniform perceptions of Europe. Without providing an explanation for these intra-national differences, the study is bound to remain incomplete. The task of this chapter is to examine whether and to what extent intra-national differences in children's identifications, knowledge, attitudes and meanings can be explained with reference to social structures, in particular SES, gender and ethnicity. In other words, is the European identity equally endorsed by children of different background or is it structured along socio-economic, ethnic and gender lines? Most studies on European identities do not really attempt to answer this very important question. Furthermore, by actually conducting the research in two different EU member-states, it will be interesting to reveal whether the impact of social structures is context-dependent or likely to apply universally.

Following the logic of the previous chapter, the first task is to examine the role of SES, gender and ethnicity in influencing children's European awareness, knowledge and identifications. In the second section, the question is whether these differences in identification and knowledge are linked to variations in the meanings children attach to Europe. Then in the third section, the emphasis is on potential links between social structures and pupils' attitudes to Europe. The chapter concludes by examining the significance of SES, gender and ethnicity in shaping the relationship between children's national and European identities.

As was evident from the literature review, the socio-economic, ethnic and gendered structures of the two countries differ significantly, and it is reasonable to expect that their impact on children's European identifications and knowledge will

differ accordingly. To assess whether that is the case, the data from the two countries are reviewed separately – in each section the discussion starts with Bulgaria and continues with England.

## 2. European identity as a class-bound, racialized and gendered identity?

Regardless of which indicator of SES is examined, the results confirm that children from socio-economically poorer backgrounds are less likely to identify as European, and know less about Europe and the EU than their peers from wealthier households. In Bulgaria, the children from school 7, located in a district with the lowest SES, tend to be less aware of both Europe and the EU and to know less about Europe and their country's belonging to Europe and the EU than their peers in the other schools (Table 5.1).

School-based differences in knowledge and identity in Bulgaria

School	Heard of Europe		Heard of EU		Know Europe		Know EU		European	
	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n
7 (n=33) – lowest SES <sup>8</sup>	48.5	16	45.5	15	45.5	15	30.3	10	6.1	2
9 (n=39)	82.1	32	76.9	30	64.1	25	28.2	11	48.7	19
10 (n=13)	69.2	9	92.3	12	61.5	8	46.2	6	38.5	5
8 (n=22) – highest SES	90.9	20	86.4	19	81.8	18	45.5	10	63.6	14
Total (n=107)	72	77	71	76	61.7	66	34.6	37	37.4	40


Table 5.1 European knowledge and identification by school in Bulgaria

Moreover, both the EU flag and the euro look familiar to considerably fewer pupils in this school than in any other: only 60.6% say they have seen the EU flag (Pearson chi-square is 20.413, significant as  $p < 0.001$ ) and 45.5% the euro coin (Pearson chi-square is 10.868, less significant than for flag since  $p = 0.012$ ) as opposed to an average of 94.87% and 76.67%, respectively, in the other schools. The most notable distinction is, however, in the level of identification with Europe and/or the EU where only 6.1%

<sup>8</sup> The ranking of schools in terms of SES is very tentative given the situation in Bulgaria, where, as the literature review indicated, an experiment in desegregation was conducted through schools during communism. For a detailed description see Appendix 1.

of the pupils in school 7 actually define themselves as European as opposed to an average 51.4% in schools 8, 9 and 10 (Pearson chi-square is 34.337, significant as  $p < 0.001$ ). School 7 is actually the Roma-minority school, which suggests that the pronounced difference between children from this school and their peers from the remaining three schools may be a result of the joint impact of both ethnic and SES-related divisions – a topic to be addressed later. The European identity is clearly most salient in the school with children of highest SES, namely school 8.

Similar patterns of association appear when the links with parents' occupation are examined (Graph 5.1). Although links with awareness and knowledge of the EU are not that clear-cut (there are no strong correlations), there is a clear association with awareness (correlation of .353, significant as  $p < 0.001$ ) and knowledge about Europe (correlation of .327, significant as  $p < 0.001$ ) and especially identification: children of parents in lower-paid occupations definitely tend not to define themselves as European as much as their peers (correlation of .325, significant as  $p < 0.001$ ). For instance, as many as 76% whose parents are in highest-paid jobs - grades AB - define themselves as European as opposed to only 9.5% of those whose parents are in lowest-paid jobs - grades DE (Pearson chi-square is 29.264, significant as  $p < 0.001$ ). Also, pupils whose parents are in higher occupation groups are more likely to recognize the EU flag (correlation of .328, significant as  $p < 0.001$ ). Thus, all children whose parents' jobs are in occupational grades AB have seen the EU flag in contrast to 61.9% of those whose parents are in occupational categories DE (Pearson chi-square is 12.688, significant as  $p = 0.005$ ). Therefore, obviously children from different social backgrounds 'hear' messages about Europe and the EU but whether this awareness transfers into knowledge and identification depends largely on their status in society. The flag also tends to be recognized more often by the pupils whose parents are in higher occupation groups.



Graph 5.1 European knowledge and identification by occupation groups in Bulgaria

These trends are confirmed also when the comparison is made on the basis of the parents' education. Again, this is evident both from the frequency table (Table 5.2) and from the correlation figures (between parental education and awareness of Europe and of the EU they are .370 and .337, respectively, and between education and identification it is .345, all significant as  $p < 0.001$ ). Those children whose parents have higher education tend to be more aware of both Europe and the EU and to feel more European.

#### Differences in knowledge and identity based on parental education in Bulgaria


Parental education	Heard Europe		Heard EU		Know Europe		Know EU		European	
	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n
Graduate or postgraduate degree (n=26)	88.5	23	88.5	23	84.6	22	50	13	61.5	16
Secondary high school (n=19)	84.2	16	84.2	16	57.9	11	31.6	6	52.6	10
Secondary vocational-technical school (n=26)	69.2	18	69.2	18	61.5	16	26.9	7	42.3	11
Primary school (n=16)	62.5	10	56.3	9	50	8	37.5	6	0	0
Uncompleted primary school (n=8)	25	2	37.5	3	25	2	12.5	1	12.5	1

Total (n=95) <sup>9</sup>	72.6	69	72.6	69	62.1	59	34.7	33	40	38
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Table 5.2 European knowledge and identification and parental education in Bulgaria

These trends are quite interesting indeed, because they run against some of the arguments encountered in the literature. Despite the alleged problematic existence of class in Bulgaria, as discussed in chapter 1, and the high percentage of people who work in jobs not equivalent to their qualifications, the European identity is quite obviously stronger among the children whose parents are in better paid jobs that require higher qualifications. In other words, even in a less class-divided society such as the Bulgarian one, the European identity is a class-dependent identity.

The results also suggest, however, that the class-related divisions in part coincide with, and are also reinforced by, ethnic ones (Graph 5.2). Nearly two times more Bulgarians than Roma have heard of Europe and the EU (correlations are .387 and .433, both significant as  $p < .001$ ), and only two Roma define themselves as European in contrast to more than a half of ethnic Bulgarians (correlation of .315, significant as  $p < .001$ ). Moreover, three times more ethnic Bulgarians than Roma realize their country is part of Europe – 73.6% versus 22.9% (Pearson chi square is 9,616, significant as  $p = 0.002$ ). The recognition of the EU flag is also considerably higher among ethnic Bulgarians than Roma (Pearson chi-square is 22.629, significant as  $p < 0.001$ ).



Graph 5.2 European knowledge and identification by ethnicity in Bulgaria

<sup>9</sup> n=95 rather than 107 because of missing data on parental education for 12 children.

It is interesting to note that the discrepancy between Roma and ethnic Bulgarian children is higher when looking at European identification than in the case of knowledge about Europe and the EU. To explain that, other factors have to be taken into account, in particular children's national identifications. It is quite possible that the Roma do not realize Bulgaria is part of Europe, but even if they do, not all of them define themselves as Bulgarian and hence, do not consider themselves to be European. Indeed, the results support such an interpretation: only 40% of the Roma say they are Bulgarian as opposed to nearly all ethnic Bulgarians – 94.4% (Pearson chi-square is 44.574, significant as  $p < 0.001$ ). This link between the Bulgarian and the European identity will be further explored in the chapter.

The most recent attempts to more fully integrate the Roma minority, which have been boldly labeled 'the decade of Roma inclusion,' have obviously not yet fully succeeded. It became evident that even one of the schools in the sample, located in a town that is often paraded as an excellent example of Roma integration, is nearly 100% Roma. This alone confirms Ivanov's (2006) claim that ethnic segregation in the schools is still alive and kicking. As evident from the results, this segregation has repercussions in the realm of European identifications. Quite clearly, in Bulgaria feeling European is not only a class-bound identity, but also a racialized one.

A closer look at the relationship between SES and ethnicity among Bulgarian children also shows that the two forms of segregation often coincide and reinforce each other. To start with, the occupational distribution by schools (Table 1.4 in Appendix 1) shows a definite link between ethnicity and SES: none of the parents from the ethnic minority school are in highest-paid occupations (grades AB) as opposed to an average 40% in the other schools. In contrast, as many as 42.4% of the parents in the predominantly Roma school are in the lowest occupation categories (DE), as opposed to an average 9.5% of children's parents in the other schools (Pearson chi-square is 36.578, significant as  $p < 0.001$ ).

These trends are confirmed both by the existence of associations between ethnicity and parents' occupation (differences in Table 5.3 are significant as  $p < 0.001$  for Pearson chi-square of 26.578) and between ethnicity and parents' education (differences in Table 5.4 are significant as  $p < 0.001$  for a Pearson chi-square of 56.968). On the whole ethnic majority children are more likely to have parents who are better educated and are in higher-paid occupations (correlations of .688 and .476 respectively, both significant as  $p < 0.001$ ).

### Intersectionality: ethnicity and parental occupation in Bulgaria

Occupation groups	AB		C1		C2		DE		Total
	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	
Ethnic majority	34.7	25	16.7	12	40.3	29	8.3	6	72
Ethnic minority	0	0	14.3	5	42.85	15	42.85	15	35
Total	23.4	25	15.9	17	41.1	44	19.6	21	107


Table 5.3 Ethnicity and occupation groups in Bulgaria

### Intersectionality: ethnicity and parental education in Bulgaria

Education	Graduate degree		High school		Vocational school		Primary school		Uncompleted primary		Total
	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	
Ethnic majority	40	26	26.2	17	30.8	20	1.5	1	1.5	1	65
Ethnic minority	0	0	6.7	2	20	6	50	15	23.3	7	30
Total	27.4	26	20	19	27.4	26	16.8	16	16.8	16	95

Table 5.4 Ethnicity and parental education in Bulgaria

In contrast to SES and ethnicity, gender does not appear to make much difference in whether children feel European and know about Europe and the EU (Graph 5.3). The only notable distinction is that in spite of similar levels of knowledge, more Bulgarian boys than girls tend to define themselves as European – 43.6% versus 30.8% (but cross-tabulation is again insignificant as  $p$  is considerably  $>0.001$ ).



Graph 5.3 European knowledge and identification by gender in Bulgaria

As a whole, European identity and knowledge about Europe and the EU among Bulgarian children vary significantly with the child's SES and ethnicity. Can similar conclusions be drawn for English children? Broadly speaking – yes, though some

important differences between the two countries are also worth noting. Similarly to Bulgaria, children from different schools in England differ in their levels of European identification and knowledge about the EU (Table 5.5). The lowest level of awareness and knowledge of Europe is in school 2 – the one situated in the most deprived area of the county (for awareness Pearson chi-square is 20.250, significant as  $p < 0.001$ , for knowledge – Pearson chi-square is 11.190, not that highly significant as  $p = .048$ ). The differences are even more notable when it comes to knowledge about the EU, which appears to be highest in the first middle-class school 1, the catholic school 5 and the other middle-class school 6, and lowest in the poorest area school, where no one knows what the EU is (Pearson chi-square is 22.116, significant as  $p < 0.001$ ). Another finding that suggests higher salience of the EU for the middle-class children is the level of recognition of the EU flag where 90% in school 1 and 75% in school 6 tend to recognize it, in contrast to only 12.5% in school 2 (Pearson chi-square is 19.084, significant as  $p = 0.002$ ). The same trend is repeated in terms of European identification (Pearson chi-square is 49.273, significant as  $p < 0.001$ ). Thus, all children in the two predominantly middle-class schools 1 and 6 define themselves as European as opposed to slightly more than a fifth on average in the other schools. No one in the most disadvantaged area school says he or she is European.

#### School-based differences in knowledge and identity in England


School	Heard of Europe		Heard of EU		Know Europe		Know EU		European	
	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n
2 (n=8) – lowest SES <sup>10</sup>	50	4	25	2	62.5	5	0	0	0	0
4 (n=7)	85.7	6	28.6	2	85.7	6	14.3	1	42.9	3
3 (n=22)	95.5	21	36.4	8	91	20	9.1	2	22.7	5
5 (n=4)	100	4	50	2	100	4	50	2	25	1
1 (n=10)	100	10	80	8	100	10	80	8	100	10
6 (n=16) – highest SES	100	16	37.5	6	100	16	31.3	5	100	16
Total (n=67)	91	61	42	28	91	61	27	18	52.2	35

Table 5.5 European knowledge and identification by school in England

Parents' occupational status implies a similar conclusion. Children whose parents are in better-paid jobs tend to know more about Europe and the EU and to feel more European (Graph 5.4). Correlation analysis partially confirms this (correlation

<sup>10</sup> The ranking of schools in terms of SES is very tentative – it is based on Ofsted reports and researcher's observation. For a detailed description of each school see Appendix 1.


between parents' occupation and knowledge about Europe is .333, fairly significant as  $p=0.012$ , between occupation and knowledge about the EU it is .373, more significant as  $p=0.005$  and between occupation and recognition of EU flag it is .403, significant as  $p=0.002$ ). Similar to Bulgaria, the positive correlation is strongest for European identity (.498, significant as  $p<.001$ ). A comparison of correlation figures in the two countries also suggests that the association between European identity and parents' occupation is stronger in England (.325 in Bulgaria as opposed to .498 in England), which is quite likely a result of more substantial class differences in the English rather than the Bulgarian society. In reality, these tendencies are likely to be even stronger: results presented here actually do not even include the children from the school in the most deprived area, as none of the parents from this school returned the questionnaire.



Graph 5.4 European knowledge and identification by occupation groups in England

The relationship between parents' education and children's European knowledge and identification is less clear-cut. On the whole, children whose parents have a higher education diploma or degree do seem to be more aware of both Europe and the EU and to feel more European (Graph 5.5). However, these results should be approached with caution: although significant correlations appear to exist between parents' education and awareness and knowledge of the EU as well as European identities, the low number of responses and the lack of complete information on the topic prevent any firm conclusions. In this respect, the English sample differs


significantly from the Bulgarian one, where associations with parents' education were rather clear.



Graph 5.5 European knowledge and identification by parental education in England

The examination of ethnicity also reveals significant differences between England and Bulgaria: while ethnic differences are certainly present, they operate differently than in Bulgaria. For instance, ethnic majority and majority children are equally aware of and knowledgeable about Europe, but differ in their knowledge about the EU (Graph 5.6), as well as in their ability to recognize the EU flag and the euro. As many as 92.9% and 57.1% respectively of ethnic majority children are able to recognize the flag and the currency, as opposed to 80% and 36% of minority children (both differences are not particularly statistically significant, however, as for the flag  $p=0.094$  for Pearson chi-square of 2.803 and for the euro  $p=.116$  for Pearson chi-square of 2.464). As in Bulgaria, the most considerable discrepancy is in the levels of European identification: 66.7% of the ethnic English define themselves as European in contrast to 28% of the minority (Pearson chi-square is 14.338, significant as  $p<0.001$ ). However, unlike in Bulgaria, ethnic majority and minority children in England are equally aware of their country's belonging to Europe and the EU, and minority children are also more likely to embrace the national identity of their 'host' society. As many as 60% of ethnic minority children identify as English (though difference with majority is still statistically significant as  $p<0.001$  for Pearson chi-square of 19.747), and 68% as British – as opposed to only 40% ethnic minority

children in Bulgaria who identify as Bulgarian (Pearson chi-square is 44.574, significant as  $p < 0.001$ ).



Graph 5.6 European knowledge and identification by ethnicity in England

Hence, for some their lack of European identification is not a result of a lack of knowledge or national identity, but it is a more subtle conflict between their geographical origins and current 'home addresses'. Here are two particularly telling excerpts from the interviews:

- *Why did you say you are not European?*
- I live from Asia, I go to Asia, I am Asian British, not British.
- *Are British people European?*
- Yes, they would be, because they are part of Europe (30119).
  
- *Why did you say you are not European?*
- I don't know. I asked my Mum 'Am I European?' No, I am not European. I am either British or English or Hindu. That's what my Mum says. I say what she says.
- *Who is European?*
- No one in my family is European. I don't know anyone who is European (30121).

Despite these differences between the impact of ethnicity in Bulgaria and England, however, ethnicity is closely intertwined with class in both countries. To start with, like in Bulgaria, in England the distribution by schools (Table 1.4 in Appendix 1) shows a definite link with ethnicity (Pearson chi-square is 56.884, significant as  $p < 0.001$ ). Similarly, the lowest percentage of parents in highest-paid jobs (grades AB) is again in the ethnic minority school 3: 23.8% as opposed to an average 68.6% in the other schools for which data is available. By the same token, the

highest percentage in the lowest job categories DE is again in the same school – 28.6% as opposed to an average 5.7% in the other schools (Pearson chi-square is 31.693, significant as  $p=0.002$ ). The results of cross-tabulations between ethnicity and parents’ occupation (differences in Table 5.6 are significant, as  $p<0.001$  for Pearson chi-square of 16.431) and education (differences in Table 5.7 are significant, as  $p<0.001$  for Pearson chi-square of 15.433) and related correlation figures lead to the same conclusion. Again, ethnic majority children are more likely to have parents in well-paid occupations (correlation of .529, significant as  $p<.001$ ) and with higher levels of education (correlation of .536, significant as  $p<0.001$ ).

Intersectionality: ethnicity and parental occupation in England

Occupation groups	AB		C1		C2		DE		Total
	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	
Ethnic majority	71.9	23	15.6	5	9.4	3	3.1	1	32
Ethnic minority	25	6	12.5	3	33.3	8	29.2	7	24
Total	51.8	29	14.3	8	19.6	11	14.3	8	56

Table 5.6 Ethnicity and occupation groups in England

Intersectionality: ethnicity and parental education in England


Education	Graduate degree		Higher below		A levels, NQV level		GSCE/0-level A* - C		Total
	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	
Ethnic majority	48	12	24	6	4	1	24	6	25
Ethnic minority	7.1	1	0	0	21.4	3	71.4	10	14
Total	33.3	13	10.3	6	10.3	4	41	16	39

Table 5.7 Ethnicity and parental education in England

The findings however, should be treated with caution, mainly because there is no data about the occupational status and educational level of the parents in school 2, which, given that it is situated in the most deprived area of the county (yet is not dominated by ethnic minority children) would have probably changed the overall picture. To sum up, although the mutual reinforcement of class and ethnic inequalities is present in both countries, there is reason to suspect that the association between the two is stronger in Bulgaria than in England.

The analysis of gender differences also shows notable differences between the two countries – in England gender seems to matter more than in Bulgaria. Boys’ awareness and knowledge of both Europe and the EU is higher than girls’, and so is their level of European identification (Graph 5.7). This trend applies most strongly in

terms of knowledge about the EU where nearly half the boys say they know what the EU is as opposed to slightly more than a tenth of the girls (Pearson chi-square is 9.431, significant as  $p=0.002$ ). Considerably more boys than girls also report they feel European – 65.6% versus 40% (difference is not that statistically significant, however, as  $p=0.070$  for Pearson chi-square of 5.328).



Graph 5.7 European knowledge and identification by gender in England

However, as the statistical significance tests show, what appear to be gender differences might be, at least in part, a result of SES disparities. The gender distribution of the English sample (Appendix 1) indicates that most of the children interviewed from the lowest-SES school 2 are female, while most of the children interviewed in the more affluent area school 1 are male. Due to the lack of data on children's parents in the lowest-SES school, it is impossible to come to a firm conclusion on this matter, though the separate analysis of gender and SES in the other schools did not show any statistically significant correlations. Therefore, any such potential association seems unlikely, and it can be concluded that gender is not such a significant factor in shaping children's knowledge and identifications with Europe in England.

To sum up, in both England and Bulgaria, children's identifications with Europe and knowledge about Europe and the EU vary significantly with children's SES and ethnicity. On the whole, an ethnic majority child who comes from a privileged background will be more likely to feel European than an ethnic minority one who comes from a low socio-economic background. However, the relative weight of each of these factors differs, and by and large, the results are in line with some of

the existing literature on this matter: in Bulgaria, ethnic segregation seems to be stronger than social segregation (Ivanov 2006, Nounev 2006), whereas in England a reverse pattern is noted (Smithers and Robinson 2010). Gender also appears to play a more significant role in England than in Bulgaria, though the trend should not be overestimated as it appears to be a consequence of sampling.

### **3. Children's perceptions of Europe between SES, ethnicity and gender**

As argued in the previous chapter, the differences in the levels of identification and knowledge are closely intertwined with the different meanings children attach to Europe. Bulgarian children are most likely to associate Europe with a political formation (i.e. the EU), while English children see it primarily as a continent, and these variations stem from peculiarities of the national context. It is reasonable to expect, however, that the meanings attached to Europe vary also at a sub-national level. Are they linked to children's gender, ethnicity or SES? In other words, is it possible to argue that children's perceptions of Europe are shaped not only by their nationality, but also by their gender, ethnicity or SES?

The results seem to confirm that. In Bulgaria, children from the highest-SES school tend to describe Europe as a continent – this is the depiction that tops up the table in school 8, situated in the most affluent area of town. In contrast, children from the lowest-SES school 7 either do not know what Europe and the EU are or describe them as a state – this is true for about a third of pupils from this school. A comparison based on parents' occupations brings a similar result. When describing Europe, the majority of children whose parents are in well-paid jobs (grades AB) use the word continent, 28% equate Europe with the EU and the third most common description, used by a fifth of children, is a state. The lower the occupational grades, the less common the perceptions of Europe as a continent are. In the next grade down the scale (C1), an equal number of children use the words state and continent, while in the third group (C2) continent comes only fourth, after both state and even city. In the final category – children whose parents are in lowest-paid jobs (DE) – not a single child uses the word continent and nearly half of all pupils use state as a depiction. Also common among these children is the perception of Europeans as an out-group.

Similar trends are evident when children's ideas of Europe are compared on the basis of their parents' education. The word 'continent' tops up the table of Europe descriptions for the pupils whose parents have a higher education degree. It is also present, albeit in smaller percentages, among the children whose mothers and/or fathers have completed their secondary school education. No geographical associations are to be recorded, however, among the pupils whose parents have been only to primary school. Interestingly enough, a much more politically loaded term such as a 'state' is present in the accounts of children in all categories. In fact, the word tops up all educational tables but the first one.

Overall, the analysis of the impact of SES shows that status is indeed likely to influence children's ideas of Europe, the EU and what it means to be European. The pupils from more advantaged backgrounds tend to define Europe not only as a political but also as a geographical entity and to be more knowledgeable about the EU and in some cases about what it means to be European. In line with arguments developed in the previous chapter, it is feasible to argue that the perception of Europe as a continent makes identification with Europe easier. The close links between children's perceptions of Europe and parents' education and occupational levels suggest that parental mediation might provide an important explanation about these differences – an issue to be explored in the next chapter.

The thematic analysis of the European definitions children give also shows a clear ethnic-based differentiation. Thus, for a quarter of ethnic Bulgarians Europe is a continent while only one Roma uses the geographical depiction. Overall, the majority of Roma (61.1%) do not know what the EU is, and among those who attempt to answer the open question, the biggest group think the EU is about (rich) people gathering and talking, and more than a third define Europe as a state – a word also volunteered by 22.2% of the ethnic majority children. A description present only in the majority group is a union. Also quite telling is the fact that the majority of Roma who reply to the question about what it means to be European consider the Europeans to be an out-group. Evidently, Roma children's perceptions of Europe and European-ness facilitate the understanding about the lack of European identifications in this group – the majority does not even know what Europe is, and those who do, associate it with an exclusive club.

Finally, the descriptions of Europe are also marked by gender differences. To start with, boys appear to be more geographically oriented than girls. Thus, nearly a

quarter of boys define Europe as a continent as opposed to half that number of girls. For girls, the most often volunteered word is a state – 30.2% - also a favorite label for boys but on roughly equal terms with continent. With regard to the EU the differences in meanings are less obvious, though it is important to note that slightly more girls than boys – 53.9% as opposed to 41.9% - fail to define the organization. Among boys who answer the question, two depictions prevail – of the EU as lots of states gathered together (14.5%) or a union of states in Europe (10.9%). Girls also talk of a union (9.6%), but a few of them say the EU is a building in which important people discuss the future of Europe. These differences provide clues about the somewhat lower percentages of European identifications among girls in Bulgaria.

It is also worth noting that the findings are compatible with those mentioned in existing research, in particular the higher level of geographical knowledge among boys (for an overview see Barrett 2007). One hypothetical explanation offered in the literature (*ibid.*: 62-64) points to the role of the media and specifically to ‘the different mass media sources to which boys and girls attend’, for instance boys’ interest in televised international football matches (*ibid.*: 62). It will be interesting to reveal in the socialization chapter whether boys and girls actually tend to learn about Europe from different places and hence, to describe it differently.

In England, similar patterns of variations arise. To start with, comparisons between children from varying socio-economic backgrounds reveal clear differences in meanings attached to Europe. As in Bulgaria, the word continent when describing Europe dominates the accounts of the pupils in the middle-class schools, and is hardly ever used by children from the school situated in the most deprived area of the county. Again, the children from school 2 appear to be far less knowledgeable than their peers. Differences between children on the basis of their parents’ occupations are not that striking – most likely due to missing data – but nonetheless confirm the general tendencies noted thus far. The word continent is much more often used as a description of Europe among children whose mothers and/or fathers are in better-paid jobs (grades AB and C1) than among children whose parents are less well paid (C2 and DE), who tend to think Europe is simply a country. Also, like in the Bulgarian case, children whose parents are in lowest-paid occupations (group DE) tend to perceive Europeans as an out-group. A comparison based on parents’ education produces compatible results, though the differences are again not as striking as in the case of schools – again most likely due to missing data. Children whose parents have

a higher education degree are thus somewhat more likely to use the word continent when describing Europe (84.6%) than pupils whose parents have been to higher education below degree level (66.7%).

A comparison between ethnic majority and minority children also reveals trends that are similar to those seen in Bulgaria, though some differences are worth noting as well. Unlike the Bulgarian ethnic minority children, the pupils of Asian origin in England seem to be much more knowledgeable about Europe and the EU and their descriptions of Europe are not as different from those provided by the majority, as in the Bulgarian case. This finding is perhaps not so surprising given that many of them explain they have travelled to Asia and realize Europe is different from it. Nonetheless, it is still interesting to note that 1.7 times more majority than minority children describe Europe as a geographical entity.

Finally, the gender trends in England are also fairly similar to the ones observed in Bulgaria. Boys are much more inclined than girls (57.6% as opposed to 25.7%) to describe Europe as a continent. In fact, while the majority of boys use the word continent, girls most often talk of a group of countries. Another depiction present only in girls' accounts is of Europe as a country. EU-wise, only girls describe it as a union and only boys speak of political implications.

On the whole, children's perceptions of Europe in both countries vary depending on children's SES, ethnicity and gender. On average, a boy of ethnic majority origin from an affluent background is more likely to perceive Europe as a continent than a girl of ethnic minority origin from a disadvantaged background. Or, put differently: the lower their position in the social structure, the more likely it is that children will perceive Europe as a rather exclusive, elite-led political entity – and hence something they do not belong to. Some differences between the two countries are to be noted as well: both ethnic and SES-related divisions in children's ideas of Europe are clearer among Bulgarian rather than English children, though the findings on SES-related differences in England should be treated with caution due to the lack of data on parents' education and occupation.

#### **4. Social structures as factors shaping children's attitudes to Europe**

The next issue to be explored is whether children's SES, gender and ethnicity also exert an influence on their general support for EU membership and their attitude to their country's membership. As in the previous chapter, both quantitative and qualitative data are considered.

In Bulgaria, a quantitative comparison between children from varying socio-economic background shows considerable differences. To start with, only the pupils in the lowest-SES school – which also happens to be the Roma minority school - are predominantly against EU membership (Pearson chi-square is 21.698, significant as  $p < 0.001$ ). Pupils from this school are also least inclined to think that membership in the EU is a good thing, though differences are not as striking as in the case of direct questions about support for EU membership (Pearson chi-square is 3.283, not statistically significant as  $p$  is considerably  $> 0.001$ ). These results are quite telling, because the children in this school are exactly those who do not define themselves as European. Only two out of 33 or 6.9% say they are European as opposed to an average of 51.4% in the other schools.

It is important to note, however, that the low levels of support for EU membership among low-SES children are not necessarily guided by specific arguments against the EU, but rather by the simple lack of knowledge about it – which is, as seen earlier in this chapter, rather high among this group. The thematic analysis of children's thoughts about the advantages and disadvantages of European involvement confirms that assumption. As many as 75.6% in the school in the poorest area are unable to find a bad aspect of Bulgaria's being part of Europe but neither are they able to find good aspects. This trend is evident in all other Bulgarian schools, though the proportion of children who cannot quote any advantages or disadvantages of Bulgaria's European-ness is lowest in the lowest-SES school. Differences in children's perceptions of the positive aspects of EU membership are also telling. Two main themes dominate: first, expectations about positive changes EU membership is likely to bring, and second, pride about Bulgaria's membership. Children from schools located in poorer areas are significantly less likely to mention such aspects – in fact, no child from the lowest-SES school seems to associate EU membership with national pride. In contrast, a

child (80207) from one of the schools in the town centre thinks EU membership changed people's perceptions about Bulgaria: 'Not everyone thinks Bulgaria is a weird and stupid country,' while another one (90207) believes that being a member-state means that 'Bulgaria is not separated from the other states.'

Comparisons made on the basis of parents' occupation and education lead to a similar conclusion. The degree of support for membership is higher among children whose parents are in highest job occupations (grades AB) – 76% as opposed to an average 34.1% among children whose parents are in lower job grades (Pearson chi-square is 23.995, significant as  $p < 0.001$ ). Similarly, the percentage of supporters is highest among the children whose parents have completed at least secondary school (Pearson chi-square is 21.399, significant as  $p = 0.018$ ). Thematically, children of parents in highest occupational grades and children of parents with highest education are more likely to describe the good aspects of Bulgaria's being part of Europe – again mainly in terms of expectations for the future and pride in Bulgaria's new role on the world stage. Overall, children from disadvantaged backgrounds are thus less likely to support EU membership, and less likely to be aware of any positive changes that European integration might bring to their lives or their country.

Ethnicity makes a difference as well. Twice as many ethnic Bulgarians as Roma say Bulgaria should be part of the EU and the percentage of those against is nearly four times higher among the ethnic minority group (Pearson chi-square is 15.705, significant as  $p < 0.001$ ). The results on the question of whether EU membership is a good or a bad thing, however, contradict what appears to be a strong ethnic rift because a substantial majority of 65.7% of the Roma actually says membership is a good thing both in general and for their country. Qualitatively, the differences are not that strong. Slightly more Roma (62.9%) than Bulgarians (55.6%) cannot think of a benefit of Bulgaria being part of Europe. Nonetheless, the advantages an equal number of children in both categories can think of are linked with expectations about changes in their everyday lives. A topic present only in the majority group, however, is of Europe as a union of countries that can count on each other.

Finally, some gender differences in the attitudes towards Europe are apparent as well. Slightly fewer girls - 48.1% - than boys - 58.2% - think Bulgaria should be part of the EU (Pearson chi-square is 4.866, not particularly statistically significant as  $p = 0.088$ ) and that membership is a good thing for their country - 65.4% of girls versus 76.4% of boys (difference is not that particularly significant as  $p = 0.070$  for Pearson

chi-square of 5.306). Qualitatively, there is also one interesting distinction. Among those who are able to find some advantages, the largest group in the male category is of the boys who think Europe is about countries that are united and can count on each other. There is no such dominant theme in the female accounts. Instead, the girls' attention is oriented towards the benefits for Bulgaria: mainly in terms of a perceived better positioning vis-à-vis the other states or concrete expectations about changes in their everyday lives.

Results for the English sample differ considerably from those noted in Bulgaria. Only children's SES makes a difference, while gender and ethnicity do not seem to have much of an impact. Similarly to the Bulgarian scenario, the pupils from the school located in the most deprived area are far less likely to support EU membership. Only the young people from this school think Britain should not be part of the EU. 62.5% in school 2 are against Britain's membership and 37.5% support it versus an average 19.44% and 75%, respectively, in the other schools (Pearson chi-square is 25.299, significant as  $p=0.005$ ). Thematically, however, the differences are not as clear as in the Bulgarian sample, and the accounts children give are quite similar, except that children from the deprived area school are less able to identify any particular negative or positive aspects of EU membership.

Compatible results are reached when comparing children based on parents' occupation and education, though variations are less clear-cut than in Bulgaria. In both cases, a quantitative comparison does not yield any significant differences. The qualitative analysis of children's accounts, however, shows that the most knowledgeable pupils are usually those whose parents are in best-paid occupations and/or have achieved highest levels of education. These are also the children who are most likely to associate EU membership with travel opportunities and friendship or team-like behavior among countries. On the negative side, children whose parents are in the best qualified jobs are worried about Britain's unequal or disadvantaged position vis-à-vis the other member-states. Two boys (50103, 60116) are thus concerned Britain is off the mainland of Europe, one (60109) does not like the fact that others have a say in his country's affairs, and a girl (60106) is not happy that the UK does not get many votes in the Eurovision song contest. These speculations about Britain's role are hardly present in pupils' accounts in any of the other occupation groups. It can therefore be concluded that like in Bulgaria, English children from privileged backgrounds are more capable of imagining the relative advantages of EU

membership, which helps explain the higher levels of support for membership among them.

Unlike in Bulgaria, however, there are no evident gender- or ethnicity-based differences in children's attitudes. The figures of support of Britain's membership are similar or even slightly higher on some of the issues for the ethnic minority children, and the thematic groups that come out of the analysis of the advantages and disadvantages are also the same. Similarly, an equal number of boys and girls - 71% - think Britain should be part of the EU, and their accounts of benefits and drawbacks are dominated by similar themes. The only minor difference is that among the positive aspects of membership, travel opportunities come first for girls, followed by the notion of countries acting as a team. For boys, the sequence is reversed: friendliness leads, travel is second.

To sum up, the factor that appears to exert considerable influence on children's attitudes to the EU in both countries is children's SES. Generally speaking, children of higher SES are more supportive of EU membership, and also more able to think of positive aspects EU membership could bring to their lives or to their country as a whole. In contrast, gender and ethnicity seem to play a role only in Bulgaria. These results could be interpreted as additional evidence of the relatively stronger impact of socio-economic differences in the UK, and comparatively higher levels of ethnic segregation in Bulgaria.

## **5. National identities as hooks for European identifications?**

As argued in the previous chapter, the relationship between national and European identities cannot be described in uniform terms, but varies significantly with national context. In some cases, strong national attachments may be an obstacle to European identification, and in others they may facilitate it. Already at that point, the importance of sub-national factors was highlighted – in particular ethnicity – in explaining these differences. This issue came up again earlier in this chapter, when examining the impact of ethnicity on children's European identifications. It was suggested that the low levels of European identification among Roma children are likely to be connected with their feeling of being excluded from the imagined community of Bulgarians – hence, even if they know Bulgaria is a part of Europe,

they may still feel they do not really qualify as European. In this section, a closer and more systematic look is taken at the impact of ethnicity, but also SES and gender, on shaping the relationship between national and European identifications.

The analysis of the Bulgarian sample suggests that SES is indeed an important factor to consider. First, the school comparison shows that pupils from the higher-SES schools are significantly more likely to describe themselves as *both* Bulgarian and European (Pearson chi-square is 60.797, significant as  $p < 0.001$ ). This is the case for half of the children in school 8, a third in school 9 and a sixth in school 10. In contrast, children from the school located in the most deprived area either say they are only Bulgarian or more Bulgarian than European. This may lead to a suggestion that for children from the lowest-SES school, national identity is in conflict with European identity. Yet this is not the case. Rather, what the data show is that these children are actually *least* likely to define themselves as Bulgarian – 39.4% as opposed to an average 93.2% in the other schools (Pearson chi-square is 42.775, significant as  $p < 0.001$ ). Being Bulgarian is the most salient identity only for two pupils in this school, whereas in schools 8 and 9 it is the first top identity for around half and in school 10 for a quarter of all children. By contrast, the most important identity for children from the lowest-SES school is being pupils. Also telling is the fact that the lowest-SES school is the one where European identity is least salient: no one assigns it a top three status while in the other schools 9-15% of the children do. In short: in this school, many children describe themselves *neither* as Bulgarian *nor* as European. To fully explain this, of course, the fact that this is the Roma minority school needs to be taken into account – an issue discussed more fully later on.

The comparison based on the parents' occupations shows similar patterns. Again, both Bulgarian and European identifications are most common among pupils whose parents are in highest and best paid occupational grades, and lowest among those from lowest grades. The children in the first category are also more likely to feel European *and* Bulgarian rather than only Bulgarian or more Bulgarian than European. In contrast, children whose parents are in the least qualified jobs are much more likely to say they feel only Bulgarian – this is the case for 38.1% in the lowest occupational grades and only 4% in the highest occupational grades (Pearson chi-square is 30.424, significant as  $p < 0.001$ ). Overall, it seems that the better job the mother or father has, the more likely it is for the child not only to possess more salient Bulgarian and European identities, but also to feel that the national and the European are

complementary. This is an interesting finding, because it shows that the strength of the national identity is in no way an obstacle in the way of the European one, but, quite to the contrary, helps enhance it.

Fairly similar trends are evident from the comparison based on the parents' education. Again, the more educated the parents are, the more salient the Bulgarian identity is. Thus, being Bulgarian is ranked as the top identity by 46.2% of children whose parents have a higher education degree, 63.2% of those whose parents have been to high school, only 12.5% of those whose mothers and fathers have attended only primary school and none of the children whose parents have not completed their primary school. The same applies even more strongly for the European identity, ranked third by an average 12.7% of the pupils whose parents have at least completed their secondary school education and none of the children whose parents have only been to primary school. Finally, the children of the better educated parents are also much more likely to say their national and European identities are complementary. This is the case for 50% in the first educational category, 31.6% in the second, 15.4% in the third and 0% in the last two (Pearson chi-square is 50.078, significant as  $p < 0.001$ ).

As a whole, the SES's impact on children's national identity and the relationship between the Bulgarian and the European identities seems to be tremendous. The children whose parents are better educated and in jobs that require higher qualifications are also more likely not only to define themselves as Bulgarian and attribute more significance to their national identity, but also to consider their European identity as very important and complementary to their national identity.

What should not be forgotten is intersectionality. The above trends apply most fully to the children in school 7, who also happen to be representatives of the Roma minority and whose parents are at the lower end of the social scale. In other words, the social structures seem to reinforce each other. The separate analysis of ethnic differences confirms this. 94.4% of the ethnic majority children define themselves as Bulgarian as opposed to 40% of the Roma children (Pearson chi-square is 44.574, significant as  $p < 0.001$ ). Moreover, being Bulgarian is the top identity for 45.8% of ethnic Bulgarians and only two of the minority pupils. At the same time, no one from the Roma children says being European is his or her most important identity, whereas 12.6% of the majority think so. Most telling is perhaps the fact that none of the minority pupils say the European and the national identities are of equal importance to

them, whereas 34.7% of the majority define themselves as both Bulgarian and European (Pearson chi-square is 48.322, significant as  $p < 0.001$ ).

In contrast to ethnicity and SES, the impact of gender is less clear-cut, though it cannot be discounted entirely. Both national and European identifications are more common among boys than among girls. More boys than girls define themselves as Bulgarian – 83.6% versus 69.2% (difference not particularly statistically significant as  $p = 0.080$  for Pearson chi-square of 5.047) - and they also tend to assign a higher salience to their Bulgarian identity - 40% of boys say the national identity is their most important one as opposed to 25% of girls. Similarly, boys say their European identity is more important for them than for girls. It is a top three identity for 12.7% of the pupils in the male category and only 3.8% in the female one. Nonetheless, the relationship between the national and the European identities seems to be similar for boys and girls – around a quarter declare they feel both Bulgarian and European, another quarter define themselves as only Bulgarian and the rest either possess none of the two identities or say they feel more Bulgarian than European.

In England, there are also several indications of the importance of SES for children's national identities and their relationship with the European one. Again, in the two schools situated in the most affluent areas, the national and the European identities seem to be more complementary than in the other schools. Thus, 60% in school 1 and 25% in school 6 say they are both British and European in contrast to only three children (7.3%) in the other schools (Pearson chi-square is 57.901, significant as  $p < 0.001$ ). Similarly, 50% of children from school 1 and 31.3% in school 6 say they are both English and European, as opposed to only one pupil in all other schools (Pearson chi-square is 36.379, significant as  $p = 0.014$ ). The separate analysis of European and national identifications is, however, less clear-cut: children from the most disadvantaged area school all identify as English, yet none of them feels European. To explain this, the intersections between SES and ethnicity need to be taken into account again – a topic addressed later on.

The impact of parents' occupational status does not appear to be as straightforward again perhaps due to missing data. Children whose parents are in better qualified jobs seem more likely to define themselves as both English and European. This applies for 20.7% and 25% of children whose parents are in the two highest occupational grades, in contrast to 9.1% and 12.5% of those whose parents are in the two lowest grades. At the same time, children of parents in lower occupational

grades are more prone to saying they are only English – 45.5% and 62.5% respectively as opposed to only 27.6% in the highest occupational grades. The same observations are valid in the relationship between the British and the European identity. The differences are not statistically significant, however, as  $p$  is considerably higher than 0.001 for both cross-tabulations and should be treated with caution.

Comparisons based on parental education' analysis show very similar trends. Again, the more educated the parent is, the more likely the child is to say he or she is both English and European or British and European. This trend is not spread evenly among the categories, however, as it applies to 46.2% and 38.5% respectively in educational group 1, 33.3% in group 2, 0% in group 4 and 18.8% in group 4. Likewise, the children from the last two groups are also more prone to saying they are only British or only English. The statistical significance of these results is not particularly high ( $p$  is considerably higher than 0.001) perhaps due to missing data in the sample.

On the whole, European identity thus enjoys higher ranking as well as endorsement on equal terms with the national identities among children who go to schools in more affluent areas and to some extent whose parents are better educated and have jobs that require higher qualifications.

Ethnicity is also an indisputably important factor, and occasionally takes precedence over SES. The number of ethnic majority children for whom the national and the European identities are of equal importance is twice as high as that of ethnic minorities. 23.8% of the ethnic English pupils say they are both British and European and 21.4% both English and European versus 12% and 8%, respectively, of the ethnic minorities (the differences are not particularly statistically significant, especially for Britishness: Pearson chi-square is 6.702,  $p=.244$  and for Englishness: Pearson chi-square is 8.530,  $p=0.074$ ). The separate analysis of national and European identifications supports these results. Ethnic minority pupils are significantly less likely to define themselves as English and British, and less keen on identifying as European. All majority children say they are English and 88.1% British as opposed to 60% and 68% of ethnic minorities (Pearson chi-square is 19.747, significant as  $p<0.001$  for Englishness and Pearson chi-square is 4.091, not that significant as  $p=.129$  for Britishness). The English identity is also a bit more salient for the majority – 14.3% say it is their most important one in contrast to 4% of ethnic minorities (Pearson chi-square is 8.381, significant as  $p=0.039$ ). The trend applies even more

fully with regards to the European identity, ranked in a top three position by 7.1% of the ethnic English pupils and no one in the minority group.

Finally, gender also seems to play a role in England, although the results are not conclusive. Boys seem to more easily endorse both identities with equal weight, whereas girls tend to consider their Englishness more important. Thus, 21.9% of boys and half that percentage - 11.4% of girls - say they are both English and British. On the other hand, 48.6% of girls define themselves as only English and 40% as more English than European as opposed to 34.4% of boys (though differences are not statistically significant as  $p$  in both cases is much  $> 0.001$ ). The separate analysis of national and European identifications also does not yield clear-cut results, which is why the data should be interpreted with caution. The percentages of boys and girls who say they are English and British and consider the national identities as most important are fairly similar: 84.4% of boys and 85.7% say they are English. Exactly the same percentage of girls declares their Britishness as opposed to slightly fewer boys – 75%. Roughly the same number of boys and girls also place the European identity in a top three place.

In a nutshell, what the findings from both Bulgaria and England show is not only that the European identity is a predominantly elite identity, endorsed by the ethnic majorities rather than minorities, but also that its relationship with children's national identity is inevitably influenced by children's status in society. The higher the children's status is, the more likely it is for them to possess complementary national and European identities. The strength of the national identity is thus not an obstacle in the way of the European identity. Rather, it can actually function as a 'hook' for European identifications, and help facilitate the feelings of belonging to Europe. The analysis of ethnic differences leads to the same conclusion. In Bulgaria, the lack of European identifications among Roma children is closely tied to their lack of attachment to the Bulgarian imagined community. In England, the ethnic minority children also seem to be left out from both the national and European imagined community, but not to such a great extent, especially with regards to the British identity. Finally, in both countries boys rather than girls seem to endorse more easily the European identity and accept it as equally important to their national identities, though the data are not conclusive in this respect.

## 6. Conclusion

To sum up, children's SES, gender and ethnicity seem to impact their European knowledge and identifications and the meanings they attach to Europe, the strength of their national identities as well as the relationship between the national and the European identities. In spite of the many differences between Bulgaria and England, the influence of social structures seems to be quite similar in the two countries. As a whole, the European identity is endorsed much more easily by the ethnic majority children, who live in more affluent areas and whose parents are better educated and in better paid jobs. The less socially advantaged children, on the other hand, tend to know less about the EU and to feel less European. The children with higher social status are also more likely to consider the national and the European identity are of equal importance to them. The same distinctions are valid when the ethnic majority children's views are compared to those of ethnic minorities, but the rift between the ethnic groups is considerably bigger in Bulgaria than in England. Furthermore, the understanding of Europe as a continent is more prevalent among the former rather than the latter in both the Eastern and the Western European country. There are also some indications of more European knowledge among boys than girls but the differences between the two sexes are not that significant.

All in all, the European identity is indeed a predominantly elite, racialized identity and this is largely due to the fact that children's initial interest in the topic as well as the kind of knowledge they receive is very much sifted through their social structures. It is feasible to suggest that the impact of socialization agents will differ accordingly and that, for instance, parental mediation will be higher or will function differently among children from wealthier socio-economic backgrounds compared to those from poorer ones. The tight associations between children's identifications and knowledge on the one hand, and parents' educational and occupational levels on the other, certainly warrant such a conclusion. Yet at the same time, despite all the differences, many aspects of the children's overall thematic accounts of Europe, the EU and what it means to be European remain similar. For instance, in spite of the fact that the pupils of higher SES also tend to approve more of their countries' EU membership than their peers of lower SES, the advantages and disadvantages they see of EU membership are fairly identical. This suggests that other socialization factors apart

from parents need to be taken into account when providing a full account of children's identifications. In particular, these results point to the media as important agents in the distribution of European messages and hence considerable socialization agents shaping children's European identifications and knowledge – an assumption to be tested in the next chapter.

## Chapter 6

### The Impact of Socialization Agents

#### 1. Introduction

The main purpose of this chapter is to reveal the importance of the key socialization agents – the media, parents and school – for children’s awareness and knowledge of Europe and the EU as well as in relation to their European identities. As already indicated, a major question in the thesis concerns the relative role of the mass media vis-à-vis other socialization agents in shaping children’s knowledge of and identification with Europe and the EU. But why are these three socialization agents deemed important? This is addressed in the first section where children’s main sources of information on Europe and the EU are outlined. On the basis of the results in this part, the next sections are devoted to the three main sources of information as reported by children, starting with the media and then moving on to the parents, school and other factors. Since the influence of these factors cannot be studied in isolation, due attention is also paid to their interplay. Where relevant, the impact of social structures is outlined as well. The purpose is to show how and why the socialization agents operate differently depending on the children’s SES, gender and ethnicity, and how this interplay influences their European knowledge and identifications. In addition, as in the previous chapters, a constant comparison will be drawn between Bulgarian and English children and parents.

#### 2. Sources of information

TV is indisputably the main source of news for children in both countries – every four in five declares he or she learns the news from TV (Table 6.1). This finding is consistent with existing research, which claims that television is children’s ‘favourite place for news’ (Carter et al. 2009). Parents come second but 20% more pupils in England cite them as sources of information than in Bulgaria. Differences come to the surface in terms of children’s other means of finding out the news.

English children tend to rely on a wider variety of sources than Bulgarians. Thus, radio, newspapers, Internet, friends and school are all used by twice as many children in England than in Bulgaria.

Bulgaria (n=107)			England (n=67)		
Source	%	n	Source	%	n
TV	80.4	86	TV	77.6	52
Parents	31.8	34	Parents	52.2	35
Newspapers	21.5	23	Radio	49.3	33
Internet	20.6	22	Newspapers	43.3	29
Friends	18.7	20	Internet	38.8	26
School	16.8	18	Friends	38.8	26
Radio	15	16	School	35.8	24

Table 6.1 Children's sources of information on news

It is important to compare children's sources of information to those of their parents (Table 6.2). Studies (Cantor and Nathanson 1996) have shown that children often watch the news unwillingly, namely not because they want to but because their parents are watching. The question is then how likely it is that children learn the news from the same sources as their parents – are mothers and fathers to a large extent shaping children's information-seeking behaviour? The data do indeed show quite a few similarities. TV is again the leader for both parents and children, as indicated by a considerable majority. For most of Bulgarian parents, however, TV is the only source whereas English parents tend to learn the news from a wider variety of sources and both newspaper readership and radio listening appear to be considerably higher in comparison with Bulgaria. The same pattern was also evident in children's responses.

Bulgaria (n=85)			England (n=32)		
Source	%	n	Source	%	n
TV	95.3	81	TV	90.6	29
Newspapers	49.4	42	Radio	78.1	25
Internet	30.6	26	Newspapers	65.6	21
Radio	24.7	21	Internet	47	15
Colleagues at work	15.3	13	Friends	15.6	5
Friends	11.8	10	Colleagues at work	9.4	3

Table 6.2 Parents' sources of information on news

These findings are also consistent with previous studies, which indicate a much greater prominence of newspaper reading in the UK than in Bulgaria. For

example, according to the UNESCO Institute for Statistics and Newspaper Circulations (2008a, b) 289.75 per 1000 people read newspapers daily in the UK as opposed to only 78.98 per 1000 people in Bulgaria. Such differences are usually indicative of wider differences in the media systems as Hallin and Mancini (2004) demonstrate. It seems that the results indicate that Bulgaria is similar to other Southern European countries, discussed in their (ibid.) typology. Unfortunately, they (ibid.) do not cover Eastern European countries so it is difficult given the limited data and existing research to say anything more specific about the impact of Bulgaria's media system on patterns of media use and exposure to news.

Regardless of differences between the two countries, the similarities between children's and parents' information-seeking behaviour point to the importance of parents in shaping children's media use.<sup>11</sup> As the analysis will show, parents also play a significant role in 'filtering' the information children acquire about Europe and the EU – in fact, the role of the media in influencing children's knowledge and identifications with Europe cannot be adequately assessed without taking into account the role of parents.

The importance of television, parents and school is further confirmed by the data on children's sources of information on Europe and the EU (Table 6.3). However, there are interesting differences between the two countries, which seem entirely consistent with the different levels of knowledge and identification among English and Bulgarian children noted in Chapter 4. In both countries, TV is the main source of information about the EU, although it is quoted by considerably fewer children in England (22.4%) than in Bulgaria (50.7%). With respect to Europe, differences are equally telling: in Bulgaria, TV again tops the table, while in England school is considered a more important source than TV, and parents are accorded the same importance as television. It is also worth noting that the majority of English children hardly indicate they have any sources of information on the EU, while they do mention a number of sources on Europe – a result that can help account for their lower levels of knowledge about the EU. It is feasible to suggest that these disparities result from the lower salience of Europe and in particular the EU in British media, as well as the relatively greater prominence accorded to Europe (as opposed to the EU)

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<sup>11</sup> This is confirmed also by the similarities in parents' and children's exposure to different types of media in the two countries. Bulgarian children spend considerably more time in front of television than their English peers, and the same is true also for their parents. Media use patterns will be further discussed later in the chapter. Full table of media use patterns is available in Appendix 10.

in English schools and among English parents. To ascertain whether this is indeed the case, a closer look at the role of each individual socialization agent is needed – which is exactly what the subsequent sections of this chapter will provide.

	On Europe				On EU			
	Bulgaria (n=107)		England (n=67)		Bulgaria (n=107)		England (n=67)	
	%	n	%	n	%	N	%	N
TV	45.8	49	50.7	34	54.2	58	22.4	15
Parents	21.5	23	50.7	34	24.3	26	9	6
School	24.3	26	56.7	38	15.9	17	11.9	8
Radio	5.6	6	16.4	11	3.7	4	6	4
Newspapers	2.8	3	10.4	7	4.7	5	4.5	3
Internet	9.3	10	20.9	14	5.6	6	6	4

Table 6.3 Children's sources of information on Europe and the EU

It is also instructive to analyze the relationships between children's different sources of information on Europe and EU, as this can provide further insight into the relative role of each socialization agent. The statistical analysis indeed shows a few possible links. Both on Europe and the EU it seems that the Bulgarian pupils who quote parents as their sources also tend to rely on other means of getting information about the EU, such as grandparents (.489 correlation, significant as  $p < .001$ ), teachers (.409 correlation, significant as  $p < .001$ ), the Internet (.430 correlation, significant as  $p < .001$ ) and newspapers (.391 correlation, significant as  $p < .001$ ). In England, on the other hand, the only visible links at the EU level are potentially between parents and grandparents (.438 correlation, significant as  $p < .001$ ) and grandparents and newspapers (.696 correlation, significant as  $p < .001$ ). Regarding Europe, the children who have heard about it from their grandparents also tend to have done so from their parents (.439 correlation, significant as  $p < .001$ ) and teachers (.379 correlation, significant as  $p < .001$ ). These results might mean that in Bulgaria, parents play a greater role in directing children's attention to information about the EU and Europe in the media. However, it is unclear how the initial interest on the topic was prompted – did children hear about the EU from their parents and then paid more attention to it elsewhere, or did they become interested in the topic and then asked their parents about the EU? This question will perhaps be answered in the analysis of the qualitative accounts about the kinds of mediation discussions on Europe/EU where parents' initiative will be better grasped.

Parents' sources of information about Europe and/or the EU are worth examining as well (Table 6.4). As with children, TV is by far the most important source in both countries, and newspapers play a greater role among English parents. Also telling are the results listed towards the bottom of the table. The only sources that are present solely in Bulgarian parents' accounts are relatives in one or more European countries. By contrast, in England holidays in European countries crop up as sources of information on Europe/EU. This difference can perhaps be best interpreted as a result of the different countries' geopolitical positioning as well as current state of affairs. Obviously, English people live in a more affluent nation-state and have more opportunities to travel abroad. As the poorest European member-state, on the other hand, Bulgarians have a strong emigration pattern towards Western European countries. Hence, many of them quote relatives in other European countries as sources of information on Europe/EU. It is worth remembering as well that children's knowledge of European states was also largely based on a similar pattern. English children knew more about traditional holiday destinations while Bulgarian pupils' knowledge revolved around current emigration targets. To sum up, national context apparently has an impact not only on children's knowledge of Europe and European states but also on parents' means of getting informed about Europe and/or the EU.

Bulgaria (n=85)			England (n=32)		
Source	%	n	Source	%	n
1. TV	91.8	78	1. TV	81.3	26
2. Newspapers	45.9	39	2. Newspapers	62.5	20
3. Internet	27.1	23	3. Radio	59.4	19
4. Radio	16.5	14	4. Internet	40.6	13
5. Relatives in European countries	14.1	12	5. Holidays in European countries	18.8	6
6. Colleagues	10.6	9	6. Colleagues	12.5	4

Table 6.4 Parents' sources of information on Europe/EU

As evident from the data presented so far, national differences in children's sources of information on Europe and the EU are consistent with differences in their knowledge about Europe and the EU. However, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, children's knowledge and identifications differ not only *between*, but also *within* nations. Do these sub-national differences also have a counterpart at the level of sources of information used? The data suggest that this is indeed the case. In

Bulgaria, ethnicity seems to be the most important factor, followed partially by SES, while gender does not seem to play a role. Virtually on all sources of information on Europe and the EU the ethnic majority children report higher percentages than the minority ones. Thus, twice as many ethnic Bulgarians as Roma – 56.9% and 65.3% in contrast to 22.9% and 31.4% – report they have heard about Europe (Pearson chi-square is 11.024, statistically significant as  $p < 0.001$ ) and the EU (Pearson chi-square is 10.071, statistically significant as  $p < 0.001$ ) on TV. Similarly, only 5.7% and 14.3% of the Roma say they have learnt about Europe and the EU from parents in contrast to 29.2% and 29.2% of ethnic Bulgarians (for Europe: Pearson chi-square is 7.676, significant as  $p = 0.006$  and for the EU: Pearson chi-square is 2.835, not that significant as  $p = 0.092$ ). In relation to SES, parents seem to play a bigger role among children of higher SES. In terms of parental education, the biggest discrepancy seems to be between the children whose parents have a higher education degree and those who have not even completed their primary school education. Thus, no one in the latter category says he or she has heard of Europe on TV or from parents as opposed to 73.1% and 38.5%, respectively, in the former category (for TV: Pearson chi-square is 18.782, significant as  $p = 0.002$  and for parents: Pearson chi-square is 12.592, significant as  $p = 0.028$ ). The most educated parents are also most often quoted as sources of information on the EU by 46.2% – twice as many as in the second most educated category (Pearson chi-square is 11.742, significant as  $p = 0.038$ ).

In England, SES and ethnicity also seem to be important, though the role of ethnicity is less pronounced than SES, and works differently than in Bulgaria – which is all consistent with the already noted greater prominence of class segregation in England, and stronger impact of ethnicity in Bulgaria. It turns out that TV and parents seem to play a more significant role for ethnic minority rather than majority children. Thus, 66.7% and 59.3% of the former as opposed to 40% and 45% of the latter report they have heard about Europe on TV (Pearson chi-square is 7.208, significant as  $p = 0.007$ ) and from parents (Pearson chi-square is 2.803, not that significant as  $p = 0.094$ ), respectively. The ethnic differences, however, do not appear to be as significant and straightforward as in Bulgaria – in line with the findings about ethnic variations in European knowledge in the previous chapter. The role of SES appears to be more significant, especially in relation to sources of information about the EU. The major differences are between the children from the middle-class schools and the catholic school and the other schools especially on parents (Pearson chi-square is

5.006, not highly statistically significant as  $p$  is much  $>0.001$ ) and teachers as sources of information (Pearson chi-square is 26.775, significant as  $p < 0.001$ ). With respect to parents' occupation, only children whose parents are in the highest occupational grades (AB and C1) say they have heard about the EU from their parents. In contrast, no one in the lowest category actually says he or she has heard about the EU from TV or parents. Finally, parents and teachers are quoted on the EU only by the children whose parents have been into higher education. Similarly, many more of them have heard about the EU on TV – 30.8% in group 1 and 33.3% in group 2 as opposed to 0% in group 3 and 13.3% in group 4. Given the very small number of children who actually report they have heard about the EU from any of these sources, and the respectively low statistical significance as a result of that ( $p$  is much  $>$  than 0.001 for all cross-tabulations), all these trends should be interpreted with caution. In relation to Europe, the major difference appears to concern the children in the most deprived area of the county, who tend to report lower percentages in comparison with their peers. Thus, 25% have heard about Europe from TV as opposed to an average 48.3% in the other schools, 25% from parents in contrast to an average 48.7% in the other schools, and 37.5% from teachers as opposed to an average 60% in other schools (overall differences between all schools are not statistically significant, however, as  $p$  is considerably  $>0.001$  for the three cross-tabulations).

These results are fully in line with differences noted at the level of children's knowledge and identification. Children from poorer socio-economic backgrounds are less likely to identify as European and know less about Europe and the EU – and their use of (and perhaps also access to) sources of information about Europe and the EU is limited as well. If a rounded understanding of the role of socialization agents on children's knowledge and identification is to be developed, it is vital to keep in mind that their impact differs not only depending on national context, but also in relation to sub-national social structures.

### **3. Media's role**

The data in the previous section already implied the media's and especially TV's importance in raising and shaping awareness and knowledge about the nation as well as Europe and other states outside Europe. In this section, the role of the mass media will be explored in more detail. First, children's media use patterns will be

described briefly, primarily to identify any relevant differences that might help explain the differences in children's knowledge and identification with Europe. If, for instance, Roma children in Bulgaria spend less time watching TV news than their ethnic majority peers, or have more limited access to media, then this could be one of the reasons for their relative lack of knowledge about Europe and the EU. Second, attention will turn to the results from the media content analysis. The European salience in the media will be analyzed and compared with the salience of Europe in children's lives, and a comparison will also be drawn between the topics that dominate European coverage and those appearing in children's accounts of Europe and European-ness. Throughout the section children's responses will be compared to parents' ones on similar topics, both for triangulation purposes and to establish more precisely the role of parents.

### **3.1 Media use patterns**

To start with, the data on media use patterns again confirm that TV is indeed the mass medium children at the age of 9-10 most frequently use (Table 9.2 in Appendix 10). In terms of national differences, the heavier TV users appear to be from Bulgaria – they spend more time in on average in front of their TV screens and more of them (70% vs. 44.8% in England) have the opportunity to watch TV on their own – as they have a TV set in their bedrooms. These findings are consistent with the expectations set out in chapter 2, because in general, Bulgarian children have more spare time in the afternoons as they finish school considerably earlier than English pupils and they are also more likely to be on their own as their mothers are often in full-time employment. Another clear trait of the media use patterns is the fact that TV's presence in both children's and parents' lives especially vis-à-vis the other mass media – mainly newspapers and radio – is more prominent in Bulgaria than in England.

Given the available data, it is difficult to interpret the results unequivocally. At first glance, it is tempting to conclude that the greater exposure to TV in Bulgaria can in part account for the somewhat greater levels of knowledge about the EU among Bulgarian children - especially if the media content analysis shows that the EU is a more salient actor on Bulgarian rather than English TV. On the other hand, however, greater exposure to TV does not mean greater exposure to news and current affairs


programmes where the EU topic is more likely to be present. In fact, existing research suggests that the reverse may be the case. Thus, Buckingham (2000: 4) claims that studies have found ‘a consistent correlation between exposure to print media and higher levels of political knowledge, as compared with exposure to television.’ Yet the studies mentioned by Buckingham are based on UK and US data and it may well be that his argument is not applicable to a TV-centered media culture such as the Bulgarian one, or at least that it does not apply when trying to account for national (as opposed to sub-national) differences. Another important qualification to be made is that these trends are not the same along all age groups and for younger children exposure to TV news leads to higher levels of political awareness and knowledge (Atkin 1981 as quoted in Buckingham 2000: 11). Hence, to better understand the relationship between children’s media use patterns and European awareness, it is important to take into account also their interest in and exposure to news rather than solely the general viewing habits, and examine what the nature of the relationship between the two is. In fact, roughly an equal number of children – 58.5% in Bulgaria and 59.7% in England – report they are interested in news and current affairs. Although a greater proportion of Bulgarian than English children reports watching the news (56.1% as opposed to 47.8%) this difference is not statistically significant ( $p$  is much  $>0.001$ ). The only notable difference is that three times more Bulgarian than English children report they are interested in the political stories on the news (Pearson chi-square is 11.877, significant as  $p=.003$ ), which is an interesting trend that could potentially lead to a higher political awareness (in the case of the current study EU-awareness). Given the available data, it is reasonable to assume that in the Bulgarian case the generally greater exposure to TV is also linked to greater interest in politics. Since the topic of the thesis is not on the relationship between media use and interest in politics and news exposure per se, the aim is not to make any major claims but to search for the implications of those differences for children’s European awareness.

The data also show considerable sub-national differences in media use patterns, but it is again difficult to see how these might help explain sub-national differences in knowledge and identification. Rather than having limited access to television, children from lower-SES backgrounds in both countries actually spend more time in front of television than their peers whose families are better off. In Bulgaria, the same is true for Roma children (difference is not highly statistically significant as  $p=.061$ ), while in England, ethnicity does not seem to be related to

exposure to television. At the same time, these are also children whose interest in news is considerably lower. The ethnic minorities in both countries (especially in Bulgaria) appear to be considerably less interested in news and current affairs programmes. The same applies for children of lower SES – especially the ones from the school in the most deprived area of the county in England. This seems to suggest that Buckingham's (2000: 4) argument about the association between TV exposure and lower levels of political knowledge applies at the level of sub-national differences. Of course, this is not to say that lower levels of political awareness are a consequence of higher media exposure. Rather, these results imply that in each of the countries, children from all walks of life in principle have access to similar media outlets but in practice the ethnic minorities and those of lower SES are not as interested in the programmes where most images of Europe and the EU are likely to appear, namely news and current affairs. The sub-national differences can therefore probably be better explained not only by looking at the media, but also at the other socialization agents – parents and school – including their influence on children's engagement with the media.

### **3.2 European coverage in the media**

Before moving to the other socialization agents, the next task is to see whether the differences in the media coverage of European topics correspond to those found at the level of children's knowledge and identifications. To start with, in terms of frequency, Europe/EU stories tend to appear much more often on Bulgarian rather than British TV (Graph 6.1). Thus, there are only 14 stories out of 202 items in total with reference to Europe, EU or European in England whereas in Bulgaria 67 out of the 355 items have European reference. Moreover, in further 27 Bulgarian stories the EU flag appears in the video footage without any textual reference to EU or Europe. Therefore, there are roughly two and a half times more Europe/EU stories both in terms of time share and number of stories in Bulgaria than in England. Furthermore, the least number of Europe references are exactly in the news English children watch the most, namely *Newsround*, and the EU flag appears in only one story. In contrast, programmes popular among Bulgarian children are among those where European stories are most frequent, and the EU flag is used for illustration purposes in nearly a fifth of all news stories.




Graph 6.1 Frequency of Europe/EU stories<sup>12</sup>

To sum up, there is definitely a considerably higher frequency of Europe/EU stories in Bulgarian media as a cumulative percentage out of total number stories and in terms of time share. This finding is in accordance with previous findings on children’s awareness of Europe and the EU. Bulgarian children were clearly much more aware of the existence of the EU than their English counterparts, and more likely to recognize the EU flag. However, it is important to recall that awareness about the EU did not necessarily lead to knowledge and identification with it. As argued earlier in the thesis, this has to do with the meanings Bulgarian children attach to the EU and Europe – which differ considerably from those invoked by English children. As expected, the thematic analysis of the news items shows that similar differences in meanings appear also in the media.

To start with, there is a clear EU focus in Bulgaria: half the stories are with specific reference to the Union (Graph 6.2). Half of these EU-focused stories are about EU policies and policy-making. Examples include stories about European directives – from the replacement of bulbs to the compulsory percentage of independent productions on TV. A few are about EU funds and subsidies or rules and regulations to do with the single market. A third are specifically about certain implications as a result of Bulgaria’s membership. The dominating storyline in this category is the nomination of the Foreign Minister Rumiana Jeleva for a Commissioner and her failed hearing in the European Parliament. Jeleva was the only originally proposed commissioner in the new Barroso commission who had to resign

<sup>12</sup> Overall number of stories is 355 in BG and 202 in EN. From them, 67 in BG and 14 in EN have some European reference. In terms of time share, the footage analyzed was 48,586 seconds (13 h 29 minutes 46 seconds) in BG and 26,623 seconds (7 h 23 min 43 s) in EN. Of them, 11,680 seconds (3 h 14 min 40 s) in BG and 2 908 seconds (48 min 23 s) in EN had European reference.

as a result of the MEPs' disagreement with her nomination. Finally, the remaining third major category is about the political aspects of EU membership such as summits, help for Haiti after the disastrous earthquake, and Turkey's membership. As a whole, the majority of EU stories are about the daily business in the Union and most of them are reported through Bulgarian lenses, namely what certain EU events or decisions mean for Bulgarians and how they will affect their lives.




Graph 6.2 European media coverage in Bulgaria

The second biggest category includes the stories that use the words 'European', 'Euro' or 'Europa' without a specific reference to either Europe or the EU. Roughly a third of the news items fall into this category. The majority of these stories are sports news, mainly football ones such as the Euro 2012 draw or the Europa League.

Finally, the third major category - 16.4% - has specific reference to Europe as such. It is interesting, however, that in nearly two thirds of these stories Europe is depicted as something Bulgaria is looking up to – an excellent example to be followed but not yet accomplished. Often the main topic is entirely unrelated to Europe but the reporters insert a sentence or two to justify a certain policy-maker's decision through reference to the European example. Thus, one of the news items was about the health reform in Bulgaria, which led to a reduction in the number of hospitals. 'The European example shows that there are too many hospitals in our country, which is why there should remain less, but better equipped,' a reporter (Tsoneva, *BTV News*:

30/01/2010) concludes without backing her remark with any facts. Similarly, in another story on possible new traffic regulations in the centre of Sofia, the journalist says that the driving idea behind the new rules was for Sofia to become as one of the 'European capitals with developed infrastructure' (Grozev, *BTV News*: 10/12/2009). Other examples include stories in which Bulgaria is described as the country with the 'most ageing population in Europe' (*Calendar* 10/12/2009) or 'first in Europe in number of heart and brain diseases' (BTV News, 12/01/2009) or 'most corrupted' (Gancheva, *Calendar*: 18/01/2010). A similar 'putting down' is even evident in the sports news where once the presenter says that the auto union calendar is 'in contradiction with the European one' (*BTV Sports News*: 12/01/2010). In all stories the comparison between Bulgaria and Europe is definitely detrimental for Bulgaria. Europe is also depicted as an out-group, whose example the new EU member should follow in order to truly become European.

By contrast, in England, when Britain is perceived as part of Europe, it is depicted as an equal and fully-fledged part. Obviously, it is difficult to generalize about the kind of Europe/EU stories that tend to appear on British TV, given the overall low number of references. Nonetheless, roughly half are specifically with reference to Europe as such and only three are about the EU (Graph 6.3). Half of the Europe stories are indeed about England being part of Europe. Examples include a news item about a cancer drug that will be available in the UK 'as well as the rest of Europe' (Murphy, *ITV Central News*: 10/12/2009) or ringtone website payments, which are seen as a 'big problem in this country and around Europe' (*Newsround, BBC1*: 18/11/2009). Similarly, two of the three EU stories are about Britain's EU membership. One is about the failed nomination of Tony Blair for the newly created post of EU President (Manning, *ITV Central News*: 18/11/2009), and the other one focuses on the new UK visa rules for non-EU students (Watson, *BBC News*: 7/02/2010). The third one is about the EU pledge to help Haiti after the earthquake (*ITV News*: 01/2010). As a whole, Europe and/or the EU are mostly depicted as an in-group on British TV in the few stories that ever appear on the topic.



Graph 6.3 European media coverage in England

Finally, it is also important to outline briefly what kinds of actors and illustrations dominate the stories. The purpose is two-fold. First, the aim is to establish if a domesticity trend does indeed prevail, as current studies claim. A second target is to find out whether the EU actors are as invisible in the media as they are in children's eyes, as chapter 4 demonstrates. The first trend is actually confirmed by the data in both countries. In Bulgaria, domestic actors prevail in 58% and in England in all but one story. Nevertheless, there are certainly more stories with reference to European actors in the new rather than the old member-state. Although in Bulgaria only two EU representatives appear in more than one story, the European commission as such is an actor in nearly a quarter of the stories and the European Parliament in 12%. As already became clear, a quarter include footage of the EU flag and it is considerably more recognizable among Bulgarian children. This is hardly surprising given that in most rooms in which press conferences are given by officials, usually the Bulgarian and the EU flag are displayed behind the backs of the speakers. Hence, it is almost inevitable when including a direct quote from an authority figure to actually show footage of the flags. The flags are always there but hardly anyone notices them. Their constant appearance is a perfect example of banal nationalism and perhaps Europeanism in the making where indeed the symbols of nationhood and Europe are daily 'flagged in the eyes of its citizenry' (Billig 1995b: 6). Yet, it is still a banal Europeanism in the making because, as the results in chapter 4 show, the European identity is certainly not yet accepted as a banal identity. It might have the potential to

become such especially if it follows the logic of banal nationalism. Billig's (ibid.) discussion of banal nationalism is in relation to long-established nations and hence, probably banal Europeanism will first be found in old rather than new member-states. As the English case shows, however, this expectation does not apply fully to all old members and there are obviously quite a number of factors that interfere in the process, but at least for Bulgaria it seems there is some potential for banal Europeanism to develop. By contrast, in England there are no traces of banal Europeanism. Quite the contrary, the EU flag is shown in only one of the stories – as much as the US flag. None of the EU institution buildings is ever included in the footage.

To sum up, the kind of discourses and actors that tend to appear in Europe-related stories, especially in Bulgaria are similar to the kinds of discourses and actors evident in children's accounts. Broadly speaking, in Bulgaria the EU is much more often present as an actor on the news and children are much more aware of its existence. They often describe Europe as equivalent to the EU and it is more often a distant dream or a political entity they are aiming to become part of, not only in flesh but in spirit as well. Hence, the strong agenda-setting role the media play on the European topic in Bulgaria seems indisputable. This role, however, is not that straightforward in England. It is much more difficult to claim a close link between children's descriptions of Europe and the media messages there mainly because the topic is hardly ever present on the agenda. Awareness especially about the EU is very low - hardly surprising given the very low frequency of the topic on TV. Therefore, the preliminary conclusion that can be reached about the role of the media at that stage is that its agenda-setting function is much stronger when a certain topic is rendered important enough to prompt a significant proportion of coverage. The higher the salience of an issue, the more important role the media play not only in raising awareness about it but also in 'telling' the viewers 'what to think about' (Cohen 1963: 13) and hence, less room is left for the interference of other socialization agents and social structures.

If the association between children's awareness and the salience of the European topic on the media agenda seems fairly straightforward, this is hardly the case when delving deeper in search of a relationship between identification and topic prominence. In spite of the fact that Bulgarian rather than English media report considerably more on EU-related topics and Bulgarian children are therefore much

more knowledgeable about the EU, their European identities still seem to be considerably weaker. Why is this the case? The simplistic explanation is that the media in Bulgaria offer an idealistic description of Europe and hence, a wishful identity, which is very difficult to endorse, while in England Europe is described as a reality, not an ideal and therefore, it is much easier to appropriate this collective identity. Yet, even if there are some merits in this largely media effects account, it hardly grasps the complexity in the relationship between identity construction and the media.

The best illustration for that comes from the qualitative questions in the Bulgarian interviews where children often describe their notions of Europe in relation to what they have heard on the news about it (since they are indeed regularly exposed to the subject-matter). Thus one boy (100201) says: ‘Europeans were much more developed before, now we are catching up. That's what they said on the news.’ This child appropriates a notion of Europe similar to the one the media actively promote – of an ideal Bulgaria needs to catch up with, but for him this is hardly problematic. Quite the contrary, he actually says he is European and in the follow-up questions mentions that he is quite happy that his country is part of the European project. By contrast, another boy (70218) says he has heard on TV that ‘there are more things there, life is better but people are more hardworking and lonely.’ His is also an idealized description of Europe but he does not endorse this wishful identity and says he is not European. Similarly, four children (70216, 80221, 90208, 90210) mention they know from the news that Europe is ‘beautiful’ but two of them define themselves as European whereas the other two do not. So, obviously even when children are fairly frequently exposed to media messages about Europe as in Bulgaria, they do not unequivocally endorse the European identity not only because to an extent the media depict an idealized identity that is difficult to embrace but mainly because young people draw on their other available resources and make an active ‘decision’ of whether to internalize the respective collective identity.

Obviously, as Madianou (2005: 5) argues, the relationship between children’s identities and media discourses is indeed not a causal one. Children are not passive dupes, easily appropriating dominating ‘take-away’ media discourses but they actively make sense of what they view. TV certainly appears to be an authoritative source of information on European topics as both the quantitative data on children’s sources of information on the EU (Table 6.3) and the qualitative questions in the

interviews confirm this, but children use it actively to endorse or reject their own sense of European-ness. They utilize the media representations of Europe as a resource in their construction of meanings and attachments to Europe. Individual agency is not the only factor that explains how this process works, because as it became obvious in previous sections as well as in chapter 5, agency goes hand-in-hand with social structures in the process of identity construction. Apparently, children of lower SES and ethnic minorities to a great extent have much more limited symbolic resources for identity construction – they are not as interested in news and current affairs and do not notice the European stories as much as their peers from more advantaged backgrounds. Now, it is also worth further exploring this link between agency, structures and socialization by looking at the potential authoritative role another socialization agent – namely the family – plays in the identity construction process and the impact of social structures in that respect.

#### **4. Parents' role**

Hence, in the section that follows, parents' role will be explored in more detail. First, parents' own awareness and knowledge of Europe and the EU as well as the extent to which mothers and fathers feel European will be investigated. By doing that, it will be revealed whether parents and children have a relatively similar degree of European knowledge and identification. Second, the process of parental mediation will be studied to understand how exactly parents become involved in shaping their children's knowledge of Europe and their sense of European-ness.

##### **4.1 Parents' European knowledge and identifications**

As expected, parents' knowledge about Europe and the EU matches rather closely the patterns found among children. 81.2% in Bulgaria and 78.1% in England know their country is part of Europe and 66.7% and 71.9% respectively know Europe and the EU are two different things. Similarly, roughly the same number of Bulgarian and English children knew these things – albeit much smaller percentages in comparison with parents. This discrepancy between parents and children is at least in part due to the fact that the majority of parents who did not return their questionnaires, especially in England, are from lower SES and ethnic minority families. Nonetheless,

in terms of the qualitative, content-related aspects of knowledge about Europe, similarities between children and parents are unmistakable. To start with, parents' knowledge about EU member-states tends to revolve roughly around the same countries as children's (Table 6.5). Thus, the top ones for English parents are Spain, France, Italy, Belgium, Germany and Ireland while for their children the top five were France, Italy, Spain, Germany and Greece. Similarly, the top six for Bulgarian parents are Germany, Romania, France, Italy, Greece and Spain and for their children - Italy, Greece, Ireland, France, Romania and Russia. Furthermore, 34% of Bulgarian parents as opposed to only 19.4% of English ones know the number of EU member-states is 27 – a result compatible with the one found among children, where Bulgarian children were also generally more knowledgeable about the EU than English ones. Yet, a much higher percentage of parents in both countries state a certain state is part of the EU whereas the majority of children were not knowledgeable about the exact European states especially with regard to the EU members.

Country	In EU (whole sample, N=117)		In EU (Bulgarian sample, n=85)		In EU (English sample, n=32)	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
Germany	76.1	89	74.1	63	81.3	26
France	75.2	88	71.8	61	84.4	27
Italy	74.4	87	70.6	60	84.4	27
Spain	71.8	84	66	56	87.5	28
Greece	66.7	78	66	56	68.8	22
Romania	66.7	78	74.1	63	47	15

Table 6.5 Parents' knowledge of EU member-states

Second, parents' descriptions of the EU are also very similar to their children's accounts. For more than half of the respondents in Bulgaria the EU is quite simply a union of European states (Table 6.6). By the same token, the biggest group of children – 38% - used the word 'union' when depicting the EU. 20% of parents clarify it is guided by common rules and laws, which 'we are obliged to obey' (90221) and 15.5% think it is a union for mutual help and assisting poorer countries. Further 15.9% form a different group in which the political implications of EU membership and more precisely the common laws dominate its description. In these accounts, parents talk of the EU as 'an organization for the introduction of laws' (70212). Other reports include comparing the EU to a parliament (70212) and one

parent (80201) actually calls it ‘the European version of USA.’ Similarly, a fifth of children compare the EU to a parliament.

In England, on the other hand, the word union is volunteered only by 15.4%. The largest group – 26.9% - talk about a ‘collection’ or a ‘group’ of countries. Similarly, 41% of the children described the EU as a group of countries. 27% of parents mention these countries are bound by legal and trade agreements. Further 26.9% emphasize the importance of ‘working together to bring Europe together and compete in the world market’ (60111) and helping each other. Only one father (10102) brings up an issue present in a few boys’ accounts from the same school – war prevention. He (10102) describes the EU as ‘a post-war political project to contain Germany.’ Furthermore, only one English parent (40105) explicitly mentions the EU is ‘good’ whereas in Bulgaria 9.1% clearly depict the EU as something ‘better’ (100204) and ‘more modern and contemporary’ (70215). A mother expects ‘a better life for us’ (100212) and another one concludes: ‘perhaps a dream’ (90217).

#### What do you think the European Union is?

Bulgaria – 51.8% (44 out of 85 parents) answered question	England – 81% (26 out of 32 parents) answered question
A union of European states – 59.1% <sup>13</sup> (n=26)	A union within Europe–15.4% (n=4)
Organization for laws and borderless movement - 15.9% (n=7)	European nations working together (‘an agreement’, a ‘certain sameness’) – 26.9% (n=7)
Something better, ‘perhaps a dream’ – 9.1% (n=4)	Good – 3.9% (n=1)
Other – 15.9% (n=7): e.g., to do with garbage fines (n=2), ‘like a parliament’ (n=2), a big family (n=1), an ‘old idea with an open end’ (n=1)	A collection, group or committee of countries – 53.8% (n=14)

Table 6.6 Parents’ descriptions of the EU

As a whole, the parents’ and children’s EU descriptions are quite similar nationally. Bulgarians stress the EU is a union with political implications. For some parents and their children, the EU is indeed more of a dream than a reality. In contrast, in England most parents and children avoid the word ‘union’ and opt for less loaded descriptions such as a group or a collection of countries.

The relationship between parents’ and children’s European identifications, however, is less straightforward. Intriguingly, both English and Bulgarian parents are

<sup>13</sup> Percentage out of those who responded to the question.

more or less equally keen to identify as European – 65% in England and 67.1% in Bulgaria – yet Bulgarian parents seem less able to ‘pass’ their sense of European-ness onto their children. Although the percentage of English children identifying as European is lower than the percentage among their parents - 52.9% as opposed to 65% - the difference is far more striking in Bulgaria, where only 37.4% of the children say they are European as opposed to 67.1% of the parents. Even when a comparison on an individual basis is conducted between parents’ and children’s responses, the same trend is confirmed. In other words, in the majority of cases in England when a parent says he or she is European, the child also defines him or herself as European. This does not apply to only one child. The opposite is not necessarily true, however, namely not all parents of children who define themselves as European say they are European themselves. No such trends are evident in Bulgaria where 57% of the children whose parents say they are European also possess a European identity but the remaining 43% do not. Yet, there are hardly any children who say they are European if their parents have said they are not.

As argued earlier in the thesis, the lower levels of European identification among Bulgarian children appear to be connected to the meanings they attach to the EU and Europe – which are also the meanings endorsed by the media and by parents. The dominating EU discourse as something Bulgaria recently joined in flesh but not in spirit perhaps makes it more difficult for children to endorse a dream rather than a default identity. In fact, this terminology is even used by some of the parents. Thus, a father (50103) in England who ticked the ‘yes’ box of the ‘Are you European’ question, added to it in his handwriting ‘by default.’ By contrast, a Bulgarian mother (90217) described the EU as ‘perhaps a dream’ but still defined herself as European.

The data suggest one plausible explanation of why Bulgarian parents do not find it as problematic to endorse the European identity as their children in spite of the fact that even in their accounts Europe is largely idealized. The relationship between knowledge and identification among parents is actually different than among children. It became clear in chapter 4 that although knowledge is a prerequisite for European identity for Bulgarian pupils, it does not unequivocally lead to it mainly because the meanings they attach to Europe interfere in the process. For Bulgarian parents, however, knowledge about the EU and more importantly about their country’s belonging to the EU is strongly related to their European identification. Thus, 74.6% of the parents who know Bulgaria is part of the EU define themselves as European as

opposed to only 38.9% of those who do not know that (Pearson chi-square is 16.762, significant as  $p < 0.001$ ). Furthermore, there is a positive correlation (.440) between knowledge about Bulgaria's EU membership and European identities (significant as  $p < 0.001$ ). Hence, for parents, the meanings they attach to Europe are not such an obstacle in the way of their European identifications as for their children, because their knowledge about their country's membership makes them almost automatically feel European. Again, their European identity is hardly the most salient one, but it is nevertheless endorsed.

Other factors that might play a role are the different patterns of news viewing and the time aspects of the process of Europeanization in Bulgaria. News viewing is different in adults as opposed to children. Buckingham (2000: 9) claims, for example, that 'young people's viewing of news may be accidental rather than purposeful, distracted rather than concentrated.' Hence, although parents and children's levels of European knowledge appear to be similar, especially thematically, the data also reveal that adults' knowledge is a bit more sophisticated especially on the EU. For example, as already indicated, parents know much better than children which countries are part of the EU. Simply because of their age mothers and fathers have also been perhaps much more involved in the whole process of Europeanization and have had considerably more opportunities to reflect on it and make up their minds. The interviewed children, on the other hand, were only 7-8-years old when Bulgaria joined the EU and collective identities become more pronounced at a later stage. In other words, for them the meaning-making and identity construction is still a much more active process than for their parents and it will be interesting to see how it evolves with age. Of course, this is only one possible explanation. Another one is that, as Hengst (1997) suggests, the European, unlike other identities such as gender, is seen more as a 'grown-up' identity – not something you endorse as fairly unproblematic at an early age but something you acquire with time as your nation is expected to 'grow up' and become European. Given the available data and the fact that the process of parents' identities' construction is not a subject of analysis per se, but solely in relation to children, it is difficult to delve deeper into the issue about the differences in European identities between Bulgarian parents and their offspring. A separate study is perhaps needed on adults' identity construction and the factors that influence it to be able to offer a more grounded interpretation. Nonetheless, the search for a more

nuanced understanding will also continue in the next section on parental mediation discussions.

Before going into the topic of parental mediation, it is worth looking at another potential factor – social structures. Social structures also seem to have an impact on parents' European knowledge and identifications, albeit seemingly to a somewhat lower extent than on children's. This difference might be more the result of the lack of available data for a considerable proportion of the parents, especially in England. Thus, 81.8% of ethnic majorities in Bulgaria and 90.9% in England as opposed to 68.4% of minorities in Bulgaria and 50% in England know their country is part of the EU (the difference is statistically significant only in England where  $p=0.009$  for Pearson chi-square of 6.732). The trend is again more pronounced in terms of European identification where 72.7% of the majority in Bulgaria and 77.3% in England as opposed to 47.4% and 20%, respectively, define themselves as European (for Bulgaria: Pearson chi-square is 7.772, significant as  $p=0.021$  and for England, it is 9.349, significant as  $p=0.002$ ). In both countries as in the case of children, SES also appears to influence more parents' European identifications than their knowledge. The percentage of European identification decreases hierarchically down the social grade in Bulgaria, from 88% in AB to 45.5% in DE (Pearson chi-square is 14.481, significant as  $p=0.025$ ). In terms of knowledge, there is no such hierarchical relationship, and the major differences are between the parents in the highest and the lowest ends of the scale. 81% in AB in England and 100% in Bulgaria know their country is part of the EU as opposed to 33.3% and 63.6%, respectively in DE (for England, difference is not statistically significant as  $p$  is much  $>0.001$ , and for Bulgaria, Pearson chi-square is 9.893, significant as  $p=0.019$ ). Similar trends are evident in the parental education comparison in Bulgaria and the one based on schools' in England. All in all, the data cumulatively suggest not only that parental knowledge and especially identities are also potentially more pronounced in more well-off and predominantly ethnic majority households but also that children of lower SES tend to rely on a more restricted range of resources for European identity construction because neither their parents nor the media are likely to act as sources of information they could use to construct a sense of European-ness. As already indicated, more evidence about the interrelation between socialization and social structures will also be sought in the next section on parental mediation.

## 4.2 Parental mediation

All English parents and three quarters of Bulgarians say they sometimes discuss news stories with their children. Yet, parents from the two countries appear to engage in mediating different kinds of stories. The thematic analysis shows that roughly a quarter of English parents say they discuss ‘all kinds,’ namely they are mainly answering their children’s questions. In Bulgaria, only 11.5% fall into this category, which suggests that Bulgarian parents are possibly more directive in their mediation than English ones. A fifth in England talks about politics and world affairs and 13.8% about the weather. In Bulgaria, on the other hand, crimes dominate mediation in a third of the cases, violence and bullying at schools is a topic of concern for a quarter and car crashes, safety on the roads and parenting for a fifth, while politics is present in 15.9% of the news conversations between parents and children<sup>14</sup>. On the whole, then, politics is not a particularly prominent area of parental mediation in either country. Also, none of the children or parents specifically lists Europe and/or the EU as a topic of discussion.

Yet when asked directly, a significant proportion of Bulgarian and English parents - 42% and 43.5%, respectively - report they discuss Europe/EU related stories with their children. The pupils themselves, however, paint a different picture. Only 21% of Bulgarians report they talk with their parents about Europe and 17.2% about the EU. In England, the Europe percentage is similar – 24.5% – but only four children say they have ever discussed an EU-related story with their parents. The discrepancy between parents’ and children’s reports may indicate that even if there is some level of mediation on Europe/EU, the majority of pupils cannot recall the discussions. The fact that the discrepancy is highest with respect to the EU in England is probably not a surprise – this result is consistent with the lower levels of awareness of the EU among English children.

Thematically, 18.7% of Bulgarians are able to recall what exactly their parents told them about Europe and 14.3% remember what they said about the EU. In England, however, only three children remember they were told something about the EU by their mother or father and 15% about Europe. Also telling is the content of mediation discussions, as recollected both by children and their parents (Graphs 6.4

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
<sup>14</sup> Percentages do not add up to 100% because some parents mention more than one topic of mediation.

and 6.5), which matches the differences in meanings attached to Europe identified earlier. In Bulgaria, most mediation accounts, like media discourses, revolve around hopes and expectations as a result of EU membership. Although parents realize Bulgaria has become a member a few years ago, they still wait for these changes to happen, or as a mother (70208) recaps, ‘Nothing shows we are in the EU.’ The quotes below demonstrate the variety of expectations brought about by the process – from recognition of the Cyrillic alphabet to a higher standard of living:

Bulgaria is a European state and it has to be part of the European community. I hope that as a member-state of the EC, our discipline will change, corruption will be dealt away with, life will be ordered, and the working hours will be used efficiently (100210).


When Bulgaria was accepted in 2007, we became part of a big family - the European one. We are going to travel without visas in the EU countries. The Cyrillic alphabet will be recognized as an official language. Our membership will make our life, shopping, work and education in any of these countries easier (90230).

As the quotations indicate, the mediation talks are in the future tense and dominated by an EU focus, though both parents and children often put an equation mark between Europe and the EU. This finding is consistent with the last qualitative Eurobarometer media study (2007) in which respondents were asked to recall what European stories they had heard on the news. There (ibid.) Bulgaria, unlike England, falls in the category of countries for which ‘Europe and the EU appear to be two notions closely and spontaneously linked.’



Graph 6.4 Mediation on Europe/EU stories in Bulgaria as reported by parents<sup>15</sup>

By contrast, in England the EU is not present as a mediation topic either in children's or in parents' accounts. The only thing pupils can recall is talking about European countries – mainly ones they have already visited. The EU is clearly absent from parents' narratives as well (Graph 6.5). Moreover, none of the parents actually mention in the discussions with their children that England is part of Europe or the EU, let alone emphasize this fact as strongly as in Bulgaria.



Graph 6.5 Mediation on Europe/EU stories in England as reported by parents<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> n=31 because this is the number of parents who responded to the qualitative question. The figures do not add up to 100% as some parents' responses are coded in more than one category.

Both the quantitative and the qualitative questions also partially reveal how parents' knowledge is 'passed' onto their children and how it consequently affects their identities. First, Bulgarian parents tend to approach the European topic in a much more active and engaged way than English mothers and fathers. As the data so far show, half of the few available discussions in England are actually at the children's initiative – parents simply follow their queries rather than set the debate. By contrast, in Bulgaria the majority of the discussions seem to be prompted by the parents themselves. The general message English children receive is that Europe is not an important topic in their lives while Bulgarians tend to get exactly the opposite impression. Furthermore, Bulgarian parents are often directive and didactic. Many of them not only explain to their children what the EU is about and that Bulgaria is a member but also give them instructions on what to expect and how to feel and behave as Europeans. For some it is a matter of feeling citizens of Europe, being equal, not feeling inferior (90239, 100208). EU membership also holds a political message they want to pass on to their offspring because 'We are already citizens of the European family and not only of Bulgaria and Russia' (90221)<sup>17</sup>. Yet, for others it is a question of obeying rules, a hope for 'a better future' (90217) and 'easier life' (90230), or simply a matter of working 'for more money in Italy or Germany' (70224). This is often reflected in children's accounts of EU/Europe and their explanation of what it means to be European. For many it is something good, yet they are not clear exactly why, whilst others provide quite detailed accounts of why it is better than Bulgaria. Thus, one boy (80217) simply heard from his Mum and Dad, 'That, if Bulgaria enters the European Union, it will become more advanced,' whereas another child (90207) was told by his parents that in order for this to happen 'we need to tighten up our belts.'

Second, the above quotations quite vividly show that parents are an authoritative source of information on the topic for their children since they quote them when explaining their own ideas and knowledge about Europe and/or the EU. More importantly, however, other excerpts suggest that pupils do not simply


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<sup>16</sup> n=8 because this is the number of parents who responded to the qualitative question.

<sup>17</sup> It is interesting that a parent chooses to bring up Russia as a topic. Russia was, of course, the major political ally for Bulgaria during the 45-year communist period till 1989. Even nowadays, however, especially after the socialist party was the main partner in the ruling coalition in Bulgaria from 2005 till 2009, there is a recurring talk about Russia's continuing role in Bulgarian politics.


reproduce the knowledge they obtain from their mothers and fathers but they actively use it in the process of identity construction. A few pupils, for example, share their recollections of what their parents told them about Europe after they visited other European countries. 'It's nice, but when you are on your own, you don't have friends,' explains a boy (70218), whose mother has worked in Italy. 'My Dad tells me because he travels a lot. He said it is very nice there, but he doesn't like Spain and England because there are many thieves on the roads. He likes Austria and Germany very much,' another boy (80208) remembers. These children's accounts show not only that they were able to develop a more nuanced understanding of Europe as a result of their parents' accounts, namely one that involves an explanation of why Europe is indeed (not) as 'nice' as they expected it, but also to use this understanding when deciding whether to endorse the European identity. In fact, in the majority of cases these young people fail to define themselves as European and treat Europe and/or the EU as an out-group, because they got the impression their parents were telling them stories about a different Europe – the one they visited abroad rather than the one they experience at home.

Third, it is possible to further elaborate on the question of how exactly parents influence their children's European knowledge and identification by looking at the influence of social structures in parental mediation. As argued earlier, the relative importance of parents as sources of information about Europe and the EU varies considerably not only between, but also within the two countries. It is therefore important to consider whether and in what ways parental mediation may be inflected by social structures. In Bulgaria, both ethnicity and SES seem to play a role. Parental mediation is more common among ethnic Bulgarians rather than the Roma families (Graph 6.6, difference significant for news:  $p=.019$  for Pearson chi-square of 5.457, but not that significant for Europe:  $p=.263$  for Pearson chi-square of 1.254 and for the EU:  $p=0.083$  for Pearson chi-square of 3.005).




Graph 6.6 Ethnicity and parental mediation in Bulgaria

The parents of higher SES also tend to mediate more on news stories including EU ones (Graph 6.7). The same trend is not replicated entirely when it comes to Europe stories, although again parents and children in grades AB tend to discuss the topic more than in any other category (statistical difference is not high as  $p$  is much  $>0.001$ ).



Graph 6.7 Parental mediation by occupation groups in Bulgaria

An even clearer discrepancy between the children of the least educated versus the most educated parents is evident (Graph 6.8). Hence, no one in the category of children whose parents have not completed their primary education says they discuss EU or Europe stories, whereas the biggest percentage of parental discussions is in the top educational category (overall statistical differences between the categories are not particularly high as  $p$  is  $>0.001$ ).



Graph 6.8 Parental mediation and education in Bulgaria

In England, marked differences in parental mediation are apparent primarily in relation to the EU. Thus, mediation on the EU is more common in ethnic majority families and of higher SES, and in cases where the child is male rather than female. Thus, conversations about EU news are led only in those households in which one of the parents has a degree. Similarly, no child in the ethnic minority group reports they have discussed at home EU stories in contrast to more than a quarter of ethnic majority children. Finally, boys seem to recall twice as many cases of mediation on Europe as girls – 38.1% versus 19%. On the EU, the trend is even stronger, where 30% in the male group report they discuss stories with their parents as opposed to no one in the female group. The statistical tests in all categories do not show considerable significance ( $p$  is much  $> 0.001$ ) but should not nevertheless be taken at face value because of the generally very low number of children who report parental mediation discussions. All in all, the investigation of parental mediation patterns especially on the EU as a result of social stratification, suggests that yet again the children of lower SES and the ethnic minorities are less likely to be able to develop further knowledge and understanding of the topic or be facilitated in their identity construction process by their parents. Their meaning-making resources appear to be considerably more limited than those of their peers of higher standing in society. In fact, even though there are considerably more European stories on the news in Bulgaria, the less socially advantaged children might not even notice them or at least not to the extent than their peers in more well-off and ethnic majority households do because first, they are not as interested in watching the news and second, their parents are highly unlikely to alert their attention to the topic.

## 5. School's role

After having established the role of parents and the media, it is time to turn to the school's role in harnessing knowledge about and identification with Europe and/or the EU. The analysis of the curricula and teachers' and head teachers' interviews on the subject shows that until the researched age children in both countries do not learn anything about the EU. Evidently, differences in school education can thus hardly be seen as a factor explaining the higher level of knowledge about the EU among Bulgarian children – except in cases where teachers decide to discuss the EU on their own initiative, outside the curriculum. In contrast, school curriculum seems to be important when considering differences in children's knowledge about Europe: while Bulgarian children are not even taught about Europe as a continent, English children of the same age do have Europe as a geography topic. School also appears to play a role in shaping children's national attachments: Bulgarian schools are explicitly required to encourage the development of patriotic feelings among pupils, while no such requirement exists in the UK. The following paragraphs provide more in-depth information about the curricula and teacher's experiences in the two countries.

In Bulgaria there is a very strong emphasis on national symbols from the year children start school at the age of seven. Thus, one of the main standards of the national curriculum in Year 1 (Ministry of Education and Science 2000) is 'recognition of the national symbols – the child should be able to name the country in which he or she lives and to recognize the flag of Bulgaria.' Another task for the little ones is to know two of the main official holidays – the national day and the day devoted to the Cyrillic alphabet. In Year 3 the children have to learn where Bulgaria is situated, including that it is part of Southern Europe. Teachers have to start developing a 'patriotic feeling' in their pupils through the 'building up of systematic knowledge about the cultural and national heritage of our people's' (Ministry of Education and Science 2003a). A strong emphasis is again put on the national symbols – flag, anthem and coat of arms. The target is for children to 'identify themselves through the national symbols' (ibid.) Quite clearly, patriotism and developing a national identity is a key priority in the geography curriculum for young Bulgarian pupils.

Consequently, Europe and the EU as separate topics are introduced at the end of Year 4 for 11-year-olds and the task then is for children to understand that Bulgaria

is a 'European and a Balkan country' and to recognize not only the Bulgarian symbols but also those of the EU (Ministry of Education and Science 2003b). One of the expected outcomes is 'working with elementary concepts about the European Union' (ibid.) What these concepts are does not become clear from the teaching instructions. Nevertheless, the children researched in Bulgaria were either in the beginning of Year 4 or middle or end of Year 3, which means that none of them has yet had the EU topic in class. Furthermore, in the textbooks, the EU is the very last lesson. Two teachers (7011 and 10011) from different schools explain this means they will hardly be able to cover the topic at all because the allocated time they have for the subject is only one academic hour a week, which is not enough for them to teach on all topics. A few teachers also complain about the language used in the textbook, which they think is too complicated and hence incomprehensible for their pupils. The lesson itself (Ivanova and Tsvetkova 2009: 84–85) is called 'Bulgaria in the European Union.' It is separated in three sections – the building up of united Europe, the EU and Bulgaria on its way to the EU. In the Bulgarian part, the following is explained: 'After the democratic changes all Bulgarian governments work for the big aim – becoming part of united Europe' (ibid.: 84). A few sentences later it is added, 'On 1 January 2007 democratic Bulgaria went back to the common European home' (ibid.) Consequently, the flag of the EU and the euro coin are used as illustrations together with a photo from Brussels and from the signing of the Accession Treaty with Bulgaria.

Nevertheless, this is not a lesson any of the interviewed children has covered and some class teachers comment that since the topic is not on the curriculum, there is not much they can do about it. The only lessons in which they can potentially engage the children in discussions about Europe are the so-called class-teachers' lessons. 'We were given a CD about the EU when Bulgaria entered in 2007. It is a very nice CD but I haven't really used it because in the class- teacher lessons we mainly deal with housekeeping issues,' a teacher (7012) explains. Only one (9011) of the seven teachers interviewed actually showed initiative on the subject and repeatedly sent additional emails with information about the EU to her pupils. She also has put up a poster about the EU in their classrooms with the main symbols of the supranational organization. As a result, the children from her class were definitely more knowledgeable about the EU than their peers, and also significantly more often mentioned school as a source of information about the EU.

In England, on the other hand, most teachers report they have had Europe as a geography topic on the curriculum. ‘European Union is being studied at the moment as part of a geography topic. Learning about different countries in the European Union but not much more,’ a head teacher (1021) clarifies. Similarly, in another school, they decided to make it more fun for the children by devoting special sessions to learning about foreign countries as if they were going on a trip round the world. In the geography curriculum itself for key stage 2, Europe is part of the so-called ‘locational knowledge’ (Department for Education and Employment 1999). There, Europe is separately studied as a continent and there is also a devoted section called Europe. The theme is to ‘study a range of places and environments in different parts of the world, including the United Kingdom and the European Union’ (Department for Education and Employment 1999). Hence, the following examples of ‘significant places and environments’ are given:

What do English children learn about Europe at primary school?

<b>Europe</b>	<b>Significant places and environments</b>
The two countries of the British Isles and their capital cities	The United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland; London, Dublin
The three countries in the European Union with the highest populations and their capital cities	France, Germany, Italy; Paris, Berlin, Rome
The three countries in the European Union with the largest areas and their capital cities	France, Spain, Sweden; Paris, Madrid, Stockholm
The largest mountain range in Europe	The Alps
The longest river in the European countries identified above	River Rhine
The two largest seas around Europe	The Mediterranean Sea, the North Sea

Table 6.7 Reprinted from *Geography: the National Curriculum for England*, published by the Department for Education and Employment, available at: [http://curriculum.qcda.gov.uk/uploads/Geography%201999%20programme%20of%20study\\_tcm8-12055.pdf](http://curriculum.qcda.gov.uk/uploads/Geography%201999%20programme%20of%20study_tcm8-12055.pdf).

What becomes obvious from the table is that the subject of study is indeed specific countries as determined on the basis of geographical parameters rather than the Union as an organization. Consequently, none of the teachers or head teachers interviewed mentioned covering additionally the topic in class or showing any initiative. In one of the schools the majority of children reported they were taught about the EU but their head teacher clarified they had a topic about the UN. ‘There may be a major confusion between the EU and the UN!’, she (1021) concluded. The

only example of teacher's initiative was a French teacher who was actively promoting the personality of the French President Nicolas Sarkozy as well as some national symbols of France. There was a photo of Sarkozy in one of the classrooms and most of the children clearly knew who he was. Moreover, no patriotic emphasis is explicitly evident in any of the curriculum topics in England.

To sum up, parallels can definitely be drawn between what children are taught at school about Europe and the EU and children's knowledge. Thus, English children know more about Europe as a continent as well as some of the biggest countries in it, because they study Europe as a continent and explore in more detail the biggest states in it. In fact, the states that top up the table of European countries (in chapter 4) are exactly the same ones as outlined in the curriculum. Bulgarians, on the other hand, are more ignorant about the continent but more aware of the EU. However, it is obvious that they do not derive knowledge about the EU at school unless it is a result of the teacher's own initiative. Therefore, children's awareness of the EU in Bulgaria should be traced indeed to the other socialization agents – as the initial data on the sources of information clearly suggested. Finally, there is an explicit emphasis in the curriculum on the importance of teaching Bulgarian pupils about national symbols and instilling a sense of patriotism and national identity in them. An example is the national flag, which pupils have to know from as early as Year 1. No such explicit emphasis on patriotic education is present in the UK, which can perhaps partly account for the considerably lower salience of national identity among English as opposed to Bulgarian children.

## **6. Other factors – holidays in Europe**

A final factor that seems to be related to children's knowledge of Europe and/or the EU is traveling in Europe. For instance, there are also clear overlaps between the countries children have visited and those they tend to list when asked to name European states. The top destinations for English children are France (59.1% of those who have been abroad) and Spain (52.3%), while Italy (50%), Greece (44.5%) and Germany (33.3%) top up the Bulgarian table. The same countries topped up the tables of the most recognized European states. The additional analysis reveals that the majority of children who have traveled abroad are also likely to say they know what

Europe is. This applies to 83.4% of Bulgarians and 93.2% of English pupils who visited European countries. EU-wise the percentages are lower, especially in England – 45.5% as opposed to 66.7% in Bulgaria – which is not surprising given that lower levels of knowledge about the EU among English children. It is also worth noting that traveling abroad is far more widespread among English than among Bulgarian children: 65.7% of English children report they have been on holiday in a European country or countries as opposed to only 16.8% of Bulgarians. Arguably, traveling abroad – along with the greater emphasis on Europe in geography lessons in school – is one of the factors that can account for higher levels of familiarity with Europe among English children.

The link between European holidays and European identifications, however, is less straightforward. European holidays seem to imply stronger European identification only for English pupils as two-thirds of those who have been abroad define themselves as European. In Bulgaria, only half does and the other half does not. This is most likely related to the already amply discussed lack of European identifications among Bulgarian children: given that Europe is perceived as a dream, traveling to other European countries may well enhance children's perception of Europe as a 'better place,' and thus discourage them from identifying as European. Although the topic was not explicitly discussed in the interviews, some excerpts suggest that this might indeed be the case.

## **7. Conclusion**

Finally, the focus is to be turned back to the main question of this chapter, namely what the relative role of the mass media is vis-à-vis the other socialization agents in shaping children's knowledge of and identification with Europe and the EU. Obviously, the media, especially TV, play a major role in raising awareness and shaping knowledge about Europe/EU but to a different degree and in a different relation to parents and school in Bulgaria and in England. In Bulgaria, TV is the key source on both Europe and the EU for children and parents. The kinds of messages the media convey on the topic are very similar to the ones that dominate parental mediation discussions and are hence, reproduced by children. Thus, the percentage of European stories with an explicit focus on the EU is much higher in Bulgaria than in

England and children's awareness of the EU tends to be much higher there as well. The fairly high salience of the topic on the media agenda leads not only to considerably higher awareness of the EU but also to more knowledge. Still, the degree of knowledge is not solely dependent on the topic salience on the media agenda. Children in ethnic majority households of higher SES tend to develop more nuanced and sophisticated knowledge because they are more interested in watching the news in the first place and also because their parents are more prone to alerting their attention to the European topic and subsequently discussing it with them. Consequently, these children's knowledge is enhanced and they also have more resources at their disposal to make sense of the messages they get and self-identify themselves.

Undoubtedly, the kind of slightly confusing message of what Europe is about Bulgarian children receive from their socialization agents also influences their identity constructing process, which partially explains why in quantitative terms fewer Bulgarians define themselves as European than English children. In Bulgaria, Europe is described as an entity that exists out there with unified standards and a better way of living than in Bulgaria. Their home country, on the other hand, is constantly trying to 'catch up' but is still lagging behind significantly. As a result, the majority of Bulgarian children much more than their parents find it difficult to endorse this 'wishful' identity. Some of them also do not realize they are actually in Europe and think Europe is a distant state, different to Bulgaria, probably exactly because of this constant talk of catching up with a different reality to the one they experience in their everyday lives. Overall, the European depictions presented in the media and reflected in children's and parents' accounts are very similar one to the one academics (Kuus 2007, Ranova 2010) claim are typical of Eastern European countries – of a 'return' to an ideal Europe, which is ongoing but never completed. Bulgarians seem to be indeed in 'the process of becoming' rather than being 'fully European' (Kuus 2007: 22).

In England, on the other hand, the media's role on Europe and/or the EU is not that important for children – the potential is there but it is not realized. There are two and a half times less stories on the topic on TV and hardly any in the news children watch most. Therefore, English children are definitely less aware of the existence of the EU and quote TV less often as a source of information on both Europe and the EU. Still some thematic similarities in the descriptions of Europe are evident - Britain is often depicted as part of Europe in the media but definitely a fully-fledged part. Nonetheless, given that the topic is not that salient on the media agenda, children have

to draw their knowledge and subsequently, use it from different sources in order to construct their identities in relation to Europe. Unsurprisingly, there are hardly any parental discussions that children can recall about Europe/EU. In general, parents themselves do not deem the topic important enough and unlike Bulgarian parents rarely show any initiative in acquainting their children with it. In the cases when this happens, however, it is again structured along ethnic and social lines. But, parents provide their offspring with another resource that the majority of Bulgarian mothers and fathers cannot afford – the opportunity to travel in other European countries and get first-hand experience. In England, these travel experiences are definitely positively related to children's self-identifications as European.

Another socialization agent that facilitates children's identity construction process much more than it does in Bulgaria is school. English children know more about Europe as a continent because they are taught about it and its biggest states at school. Their knowledge especially of some of the European states is a direct reflection of what they have been taught. School's potential to raise European awareness seems indisputable both in Bulgaria and in England because in the two schools in which teachers showed initiative on the topic, children were considerably more knowledgeable. It is also interesting to note that these were not schools in advantaged neighborhoods. In other words, social and/or ethnic inequalities were not in fact perpetuated by the schools in these particular instances. This is an interesting observation – yet hardly one that should be overestimated given that these were only two isolated instances.

To sum up, all three socialization agents do indeed play a role in shaping knowledge and awareness about Europe and/or the EU in Bulgaria and England. The degree of importance of their role, however, very much depends on how much attention they have devoted to the topic in their broadcasts, conversations and lessons, respectively. Hence, children report different degrees of awareness of Europe and the EU in Bulgaria and in England. In Bulgaria, there is a clear EU focus due to all the attention devoted to the topic in the news and in parental mediation discussions, while in England the attention is shifted towards Europe as a continent due to its presence in the curriculum and children's personal experience. Even if the impact of socialization agents is fairly indisputable and to an extent linear in raising European awareness and knowledge as well as promoting certain ideas about what Europe and the EU are about and what it means to be European, this is hardly the case when looking at the

impact of the media, parents and school on children's European identities. Part of the explanation is, of course, hidden in the kind of messages children get from their socialization agents. Thus, although awareness about the EU is much higher in Bulgaria, there are fewer children who define themselves as European than in England or in comparison with their parents. Apparently, Bulgarian children find it difficult to endorse the kind of ideal identity they are offered by their socialization agents – the Europe they hear about is not the Europe they live in, although they aspire towards it. They have experienced mainly the diversity and still wait for the unity, if the EU is indeed about 'unity in diversity.' In England, on the other hand, those who have travelled abroad and who are more knowledgeable about Europe and/or the EU also tend to feel more European because although they are not oblivious to the differences between them and other European people, they still realize they are indeed part of Europe in which it is OK to be different – diversity is a given, not an obstacle to belonging.

Still, the different meanings attached to Europe are not enough to explain the variations in identification, as the Bulgarian example shows, where in spite of the similar media messages they are exposed to considerably more parents than children describe themselves as European. Young people are active media users who construct their sense of European-ness by making sense of the messages they get from their socialization agents rather than endorsing them unequivocally. The differences in the degree of influence of the socialization agents over children's perceptions and especially identifications with Europe are, therefore, not simply a reflection of the different public, policy and media agendas in the two EU member-states and the different salience and driving ideas behind the dominating messages but also a result of the interplay between national context, individual agency, socialization agents and social structures. This interplay will be further explored in the next chapter when a broader conclusion will be drawn on the basis of all data presented so far.

## Conclusion

### 1. Introduction

1. It feels good, England is quite small in Europe but to us it is quite big, in Europe we feel quite big (60106).
2. I don't think I am from New York (20101).
3. That sort of - they are sort of with me, so culture in a way, they are not such as or the same, they would know me because I am European (10110).
4. From this continent and that I love Europe as a continent, community, culture (90221).
5. I am happy that Bulgaria has entered the EU. It means that your country is advanced, because it is already in Europe (80217).
6. You come from that particular continent, you have that particular genes, you've seen that particular things like the Eiffel Tower, Madam Tussauds, big museums, and it's just different from being South American or North American (60116).
7. From our country no one is European (70239).

The opening quotations answer the same question of ‘What does it mean to be European?’ They represent different examples of children’s European knowledge and identifications (or lack of such). What the thesis attempted to do was not only to provide a snapshot of the current state of European identities among children in two very different EU member-states but also to account for the possible reasons that help explain these identities. To this end, the relationship between children’s European identities and their awareness, knowledge, definitions of and attitudes towards Europe and/the EU as well as the interplay between the national and the European identities was explored in the previous chapters. Furthermore, the impact of national context, social structures and key socialization agents such as parents, school and the media was also investigated. The aim of this concluding chapter, therefore, is to summarize the main findings of the thesis by explaining how all these elements interplay and whether some of them are more important for children’s identities than others, notwithstanding the initial aim of revealing more about the media’s role vis-à-vis pupils’ collective identities.

The conclusion will be organized around five main broader themes, related to the key original contributions of the thesis. It will start by briefly indicating how and why the research showed children should be taken seriously, namely what the advantages of studying identity formation among young people are. Second, the focus

will shift to the question of why it was important to study the meanings of Europe by demonstrating how the qualitative, bottom-up examination of the discursively different descriptions of Europe in England and Bulgaria not only enriched current knowledge but also questioned some of the tacit assumptions in European identity research. Third, the wider theoretical issue of how a process such as socialization ‘dovetails’ with society as structure and the nation-(state) as context in collective identities formation will be addressed. Fourth, an explanation will be offered as to how the study elaborated upon some of the theoretical claims about the relationship between structure and agency in collective identity formation. The sections will conclude by explaining what some of the limitations of the project are and what future research tracts they might potentially lead to. Finally, a few policy implications will be outlined.

## **2. Taking children seriously: the advantages of studying identity formation among children**

The first major contribution of the thesis is to show that in spite of the fact that children are largely ignored by both academics and policy-makers, research on European identity formation among young people has much to offer. There might not be ‘such a thing’ (Bruter 2005: 131) as a European identity, but children are actively engaged in the process of European identity construction, which is under way in two very different national contexts – in the new and fairly enthusiastic EU member Bulgaria and in the old and notoriously Eurosceptic England. 37.4% of Bulgarians and 52.2% of English children in the sample do indeed ‘possess’ a European identity if identity is defined as a two-stage process that involves self-categorization of the individual as a member of a group and categorization of the individual/group by the social world (Jenkins 1996: 77–99). The interviews with children and parents and the media and textbook content analyses support this claim. For the time being, it is mainly an elite and racialized identity in both contexts. Moreover, the national and the European identities are not mutually exclusive for the majority of children, though the European is hardly the most salient one. The national identities are clearly more important, as existing research (Hengst 1997, Philippou 2005, Barrett 2007) illustrates. Nonetheless, the study demonstrates that identity is a flexible and active

process, which involves an interplay between different factors such as socialization, social structures and national context – an issue to be addressed in more detail in part four of the conclusion. Furthermore, at the age of 9-10, children are quite capable of not only endorsing certain identities but also reflecting on the reasons that guide their choices.

An invaluable benefit of researching children rather than adults is the opportunity to trace the origin of certain influences on European identities such as the socialization agents, for example. It is hardly surprising that children can much more easily than their parents recollect how and when they (first) heard about Europe and the EU and what they actually heard, because their European awareness and knowledge do not stretch as far back in time as adults' do. The implication of this peculiarity for researchers is immense since it allows for a better investigation of the impact of societal factors on children's identifications. The study shows that children's European identities are much more flexible than their parents', especially in a new EU member-state such as Bulgaria, because they are still in the early stages of their European identity construction, or as Kuus (2007: 29) puts it, 'becoming European' does indeed happen 'at a "later stage."' Thus, in Bulgaria considerably more parents than children define themselves as European, which means that the significance of the socialization agents' messages at this age is even more important than for adults. The project also illustrates how the relationship between European knowledge and identification among children and adults can be different and hence, how any policy strategies should take into account these potential age differences. Although adult identity construction is not a specific topic of concern for the thesis, by comparing parents' to children's identities, some implications for the understanding of identity formation among adults are also inevitably revealed. It turns out that grown-ups' European perceptions and identifications are very much influenced by the dominating media messages on a topic such as Europe, especially in a country like Bulgaria where the issue is fairly salient on the agenda. The meanings parents attach to Europe and the overriding EU focus are quite similar to the ones found in the media.

Further separate research on adults is needed, however, to be able to draw well-grounded conclusions about the differences in the identity construction processes between children and grown-ups and the factors that influence those processes.

### **3. The importance of meanings: European identity as a dream or a default?**

Another major contribution the thesis makes is to demonstrate the importance of adopting a qualitative, bottom-up examination of the meanings people attach to Europe. The contribution can be more clearly understood by looking at three key points. First, the findings, prompted by this approach, challenge some of the tacit assumptions underpinning much of European identity research – mainly about the taken-for-granted relationship between knowledge and identity. Second, they also show that the descriptions of Europe play a decisive role in determining the salience of the European identity. Third, the results also demonstrate that it is a good idea to adopt a bottom-up approach to categorizing meanings instead of sticking rigidly to a pre-defined typology, because more is revealed in this way about the internal nature of European identification and also subsequently about the factors that impact on it.

To start with, the findings suggest that Bulgarian and English children not only possess different levels of European identification but also vary in their degrees of European awareness and knowledge and describe Europe in contrasting ways. In Bulgaria, the EU is a much more visible actor than in England where children's knowledge revolves around Europe mainly as a continent. Thus, as many as 71% of pupils in new EU member say they have heard of the EU as opposed to 30% less in the old member-state. Bulgarian children's levels of knowledge about the EU are, however, considerably lower than their awareness, albeit still higher than in England. By contrast, in England more than 90% of the children demonstrate knowledge about Europe. Most intriguingly, however, the investigation of the relationship between awareness, knowledge and identity, reveals that knowledge does not necessarily prompt European identification. This applies more fully in Bulgaria than in England, where children who possess knowledge about both Europe and the EU tend to also define themselves as European - a trend not applicable in Bulgaria where half who have that knowledge say they are European and half do not. This finding is of major importance, because it does indeed question a basic premise, which often goes untested in current European identity research and is accepted as a given, namely that knowledge is an indicator of identity. If this is often the case among adults, as the findings on parents' European knowledge and identifications imply, it certainly does

not apply to children. Hence, other factors clearly come into play and the results suggest that meanings and the way they are shaped by the national context - the respective country's geopolitical position vis-à-vis the EU and overall historical trajectory in relation to Europe - are key to the understanding of this phenomenon.

This leads to the second main point in this section - the dominating descriptions children give of Europe are quite different in the two national contexts. In Eastern Europe, Europe is often equated with the EU. A word the biggest group of Bulgarians volunteer is a state and for a fifth, it is straightforwardly the EU. In the Western European context, however, Europe is simply a geographical entity – a continent. When further probing in children's accounts and investigating the parents' and media' descriptions as well, it turns out that Europe is often described as a dream in Bulgaria. A recurring emphasis is placed on 'an idealized Europe' (Kuus 2007: 22), which the respondents are constantly aiming towards but have not yet reached. Hence, the 'unity in diversity' motto the EU prides itself in seems problematic for Bulgarian children, because they have so far experienced only the diversity and still wait for the unity to happen and this really makes them struggle to define themselves as European. By contrast, in England, Europe is more accepted as a default rather than a dream – 'home' and 'the place where I like to go on holiday' (10111). Thus said, children are by no means oblivious to the differences between them 'off the mainland' and the Europeans in 'continental' Europe. They do, however, willingly or unwillingly take for granted the diversity element in the European unity, although both the majority of parents and children avoid linking this motto to the EU as such but prefer to focus on Europe as a continent and civilization in certain cases. The references to Europe seem to be safer for them. Hence, regardless of whether the British are accepted as 'core Europeans' (Rovisco 2010) or a 'stranger in Europe' (Wall 2008), for those who know Britain is part of Europe there seems to be no denial of the fact that they are Europeans. Yet, it is interesting to note that sub-national differences also influence children's definitions of Europe and European identifications. Even in Bulgaria, the children who say they are European are also more likely to perceive Europe as a continent.

Third, all these results suggest that it is quite problematic to delimit European identity to just a few or one component as some policy-makers (EurLex 2010) and academics (Bruter 2005) attempt to do. Children's European identities rarely encompass only a civic or a cultural reference but often the pupils with the strongest

European identities are the ones who adopt a Europe definition that combines both. Moreover, in a country like Bulgaria, 'Europe and the EU appear to be two notions closely and spontaneously linked' (Eurobarometer 2007). Hence, it is very difficult to distinguish between the alleged 'political' and 'cultural' components. More importantly, however, the study shows that children's European identifications do not depend so much on what the exact components of the European identity are – whether it is focused on Europe as a civilization, culture and a continent or on the EU as a supranational entity. Identity is a flexible process and the study confirms that such a differentiation is truly problematic on an internal level (Burgess 2002). Regardless of what Europe they hear about, it is important for children to realize this is the Europe they live in rather than a distant dream, which is hard to 'catch.' Therefore, the differentiation between children's ideas of Europe as a dream versus a default is perhaps more useful in accounting for their respective levels of European identification (or lack of such). Evidently, the meanings children attach to Europe are one possible explanation of their varying levels of European identification, but, as some of the findings already suggested, other factors clearly come into play as well – a subject for the next section.

Before moving into this issue, however, it is worth briefly mentioning some of the limitations of the current research in the study of identity and how they can be potentially overcome. For example, instead of providing a straightforward 'yes' or 'no' answer to the 'Are you European?' question, many children responded with a more nuanced reply such as 'Perhaps', 'Maybe', 'I'm not sure', 'What do you mean European?' Subsequently, they were often negotiating their potential European-ness and the ideas they had of Europe through discourse. All this suggests that in future research the current methods can be complemented by discourse analysis, focus groups or ethnographic approaches in order to reveal more fully how these processes of identity negotiation take place on an individual level and/or in context. Another area to which such purely qualitative methods can add more insight is the relationship between national and European identities. The study shows that for the majority of children two (or three) identities are not mutually exclusive, but further work is needed to reveal when and why one dominates over the other and whether there are certain circumstances under which two (or three) identities are definitely exclusive or inclusive – for example, in conflict situations or ones that involve representatives of potentially strong out-groups such as Americans, Chinese, etc.

#### **4. Beyond mono-causal explanations: Nation-state as context, society as structure and socialization as process**

The third and perhaps most important contribution the thesis makes is to move beyond the mono-causal explanations for the process of collective identity formation. This is one of those rare studies which try to account for a plethora of factors that impact on identity construction, rather than concentrating on one. For instance, the majority of existing research on European identity focuses on national differences (often limited to national identities) in the salience and meanings of Europe in different member-states, without showing how national differences may intersect with gender, ethnic or class variations. In contrast, this study takes into account both national and sub-national differences and factors. Similarly, when examining the influence of the media on identity formation (whether European or of another kind), existing literature is often rather media-centric, and fails to explain how the influence of the media is shaped or moderated by the influence of other factors. Rather than simply assuming the existence of a relationship between children, the media and Europe, the project therefore set out to examine whether such a relationship exists, and what exactly the media's role is in the process of collective identity construction vis-à-vis other factors. The conclusion is that collective identity formation takes place as a result of an interplay between the nation(-state) as context, society as structure, socialization agents as resources, and the individual as an active agent. First, a brief recap of the impact of all these factors will be provided. Second, a more detailed account of the interplay between them will be given. Finally, a reflection on some of the limitations of the current study will be made.

First, as the previous sections quite clearly demonstrated, the importance of the national context seems indisputable when looking at the considerable differences in the levels of European awareness, knowledge and identifications between Bulgarian and English children as well as the meanings they attach to Europe. Bulgarian children's awareness and knowledge tends to revolve around the EU as such whereas in England the focus is more on Europe. The definitions children give of Europe and/or the EU also follow a similar pattern with the additional implication that in Bulgaria Europe is often depicted as a dream whereas in England it is largely accepted as a default for those children who know their country is part of Europe.

Hence, the national context, especially when defined not solely in reference to national identities but from a variety of perspectives that take heed of the historical and political peculiarities, is also a key explanatory factor for the lack of uniformity in the relationship between knowledge and identity.

The national context is hardly the only factor, however, that explains the variations in knowledge and identifications. Social structures obviously have an impact as well. Identities are indeed ‘grounded’ in social structures’ (Sanchez 2006: 33) since in the two different national contexts children of lower SES and of ethnic minority background are equally unlikely to endorse the European identity. By contrast, their peers from higher SES and ethnic majority origin especially in Bulgaria also tend to know more about the EU and to consider the national and the European identities as complementary. The definition of Europe as a continent is more prevalent among the latter rather than the former group. Moreover, trends of intersectionality are evident in Western and Eastern Europe alike.

A third key explanatory factor for the differences in knowledge and meanings is socialization. The media, parents and school are the main socialization agents that influence children’s European awareness and knowledge and act as authoritative resources in the identity construction process. Thus, the media are key in a country like Bulgaria where the EU topic is fairly salient on the agenda. Nearly a fifth of all news stories in Bulgaria have European reference in contrast to more than two and a half time fewer stories on English TV with the least number of references appearing in the news programme children watch the most – BBC’s *Newsround*. TV definitely raises awareness and knowledge, especially of the EU, as Bulgarian children are much more knowledgeable about it than their English peers. Parental mediation discussions with an EU focus are also much more common in Bulgaria than England, where hardly any children or parents can recall such talks, let alone topics covered. ‘Active mediation’ (Livingstone and Helsper 2008) is very important, because it reveals the significance of the topic on the agenda, raises awareness and potentially shapes children’s ideas about the EU. In the Bulgarian case this mediation also tends to be directive and didactic. The role parents play in England is more indirect – they enhance their European-ness by taking them much more often to trips in European countries. The study shows that children who have traveled abroad are also much more likely to define themselves as European. Furthermore, the definitions young people give of Europe are fairly similar to the ones dominating the media and parents’

discourses, especially in Bulgaria. The ‘return to Europe’ (Kuus 2007: 27 and Katsikas and Siani-Daview 2010: 15) is portrayed as an ongoing process yet to be completed despite the fact that Bulgaria is geographically part of the continent of Europe and politically a member of the EU. The media’s constant comparisons between Bulgaria and the ‘true’ Europe result in a particular focus on hopes and expectations for the future in parental mediation discussions and own definitions of the EU, which is indeed labeled as a ‘dream’ (90217). In England, on the other hand, neither the socialization agents’ nor the children’s accounts are emotionally or politically loaded in the rare instances when they are present. In the few available references, they talk about the UK ‘as well as the rest of Europe’ (Murphy, *ITV Central News*: 10/12/2009) or ‘us’ as part of Europe, namely being in Europe is truly accepted as a ‘default’ (50103). In England, however, another socialization agent – school – plays a much more important role because of its focus in the curriculum on Europe as a continent.

All three socialization agents provide the resources for children’s meaning-making and identity construction processes instead of causally affecting them. Put simply, despite the higher salience of the European topic on both the media and parents’ agenda, Bulgarian children feel less European than in England. The reasons for that are multi-fold. One explanation is the generally confusing message they get about the Europe they should be part of but are still catching up with. Another one is the fact that the whole process of European identity construction has started much more recently for them than for their parents and they actively engage in it rather than being ‘sponges’ that absorb pre-prepared identities. Both explanations are guided by an overriding theme – the impact of the fourth major factor in the process, namely individual agency. The somewhat confusing messages apparently leave more leeway for individual agency in the socialization agents’ reception process. Children with fairly equal levels of awareness and knowledge about Europe and the EU and of similar socio-economic background, sometimes end up defining themselves differently probably because they struggle to make sense of the messages or do so in contrasting ways. This trend quite vividly illustrates that socialization is not a deterministic ‘social engineering approach’ but a process in which individual agency is very important, because ‘behind the action of the individual there did after all lie an actor, not just a pliable respondent’ (White 1977: 14).

Second, if the relationship between national context, social structures and socialization should be schematically summarized, then it broadly looks like that. The national context, or what Przerwoski and Teune (1970) call systemic factors, influences both the socialization agents and social structures. Thus, depending on the salience of the European topic on the public, media and policy agenda, the socialization agents such as the mass media, school and parents devote varying degrees of visibility to the issue and thematically focus on different aspects. Thus said, of the three socialization agents school appears to be the most conservative one – and hence, least affected by the current agenda. The different salience of the topic on the agenda leads to different levels of awareness of both Europe and the EU in the two countries researched and thematically distinctive definitions of Europe and the EU – closely related to the ones prevailing in the respective socialization agents' accounts. It is only fair to say that the more a socialization agent devotes attention to a certain topic especially in comparison with the other agents, the more the particular focus chosen by that socialization agent dominates children's accounts. This applies equally in England and Bulgaria, which suggests that although national differences influence the agents and their degree of importance, the way they impact upon the process of socialization as such is quite similar in the two different national contexts.

It is important to stress the last point because the kinds of messages distributed on the topic might be more important for the development and strength of the European identity than the degree of proliferation of information about it. The frequent reoccurrence of the subject certainly guarantees higher awareness. Awareness is in turn a prerequisite for knowledge and without awareness and/or knowledge, there is no European identity. Thus, the data fully support Schesinger's (1991: 139) claim that a 'European identity will only develop if Europeans are adequately informed.' Yet, in a country like England where children hardly ever hear about Europe or the EU from the media, there are still more of them who say they are European, because of the messages they have appropriated through their socialization agents on the basis of their social structures. Thus, English children have acquired knowledge both about Europe and the EU from a combination of sources such as school and travel experiences mainly, but also through parents indirectly. Consequently, they develop an interest in the topic and tend to pay more attention to its scarce coverage in the media. For those who possess the relevant knowledge and experience, Europe is an in-group and despite differences with the other Europeans,

they still define themselves as European. In Bulgaria, on the other hand, in spite of the higher salience of the EU on the agenda, children get confused by the kind of main message they get – about a Europe they are aiming towards but have not reached – a Europe they rarely have personal experience of themselves because of the lack of travel opportunities and because in their socialization agents’ and hence, their own eyes, their own country is often seen as an out-group.

The significance of the social structures also depends on the national context, which determines not only the salience of a certain issue but also partially the direction of social inequalities – more along ethnic lines in Bulgaria and social in England. Given that Bulgaria is the poorest EU member-state, its ‘income levels’ are indeed ‘in no way comparable to those in the older EU members’ (UNDP 2007). This national inequality along structural lines has its implication for children’s European identities, because the Bulgarian children of high SES have considerably fewer travel opportunities than their English peers of similar social standing. This lack of personal experience implies even higher importance for the socialization agents. Media’s agenda-setting function is stronger when there is a lack of information on an issue (Rogers and Dearing 1988), because as Kniveton (1976: 256) puts it, ‘evidence suggests that children who are, for any reason, limited in their opportunities for getting experience in life will turn to television as a source.’

In fact, the Bulgarian scenario actually confirms this trend and also provides an illustration for a broader tendency. In cases where a topic such as the European one is fairly salient on the media and hence parental agenda, the levels of awareness are not that much contingent on social structures as on social factors, influenced by national context. The same can be said in relation to knowledge about Europe as mainly a geographical entity, especially in England, where school plays a significant role. In cases when the topic is not that high on the media agenda such as in the UK, for example, even awareness about the EU very much depends on the children’s social structures. Still, even though SES and ethnicity do not have such a tremendous impact on children’s levels of European awareness because of the salience of the topic in Bulgaria, they nevertheless significantly influence their knowledge and identities. Children of lower SES and ethnic minorities are less interested in news and political stories, and even if they are in theory equally exposed to stories about the EU as their peers, they do not pay as much attention to these stories. Furthermore, their parents do not alert their attention to the topic in the first place. In other words, even if pupils of

different SES, ethnicity and gender possess equal levels of awareness, because the topic is high on the media agenda, quite significant differences are to be noted in knowledge and then identification as a result of social structures. This is clearly evident in Bulgaria but to a large extent in England as well, where despite the seemingly equal levels of knowledge about Europe, there are considerable structural differences in children's qualitative definitions and obvious variations in identities. Social structures are also contingent on the national context as the example with the travel opportunities, which in turn influence substantially children's European knowledge and identifications, demonstrates. The better off an English family is, the more they have traveled abroad, the more the children know about both Europe and the EU, and hence, the more likely they are to feel European. All in all, European identities are very much influenced by the social structures in both countries because of the limited resources less advantaged children draw on when actively construing their identities.

The last point alludes to the importance of the final factor that cannot be ignored in this multifold relationship – individual agency. Children are indeed not passive recipients of pre-packaged socialization agents' messages, which are distributed unequally on the basis of their different social structures, but they 'participate actively in shaping their identities' (Woodward 2002: 3). The Bulgarian case reveals that young people are not media sponges, who passively accept the kind of identifications offered when a topic is high on the media agenda, but they try to make sense of those messages and identify themselves on the basis of this meaning-making process. This leads to the fourth major contribution of the study – the elaboration on some of the theoretical claims about the relationship between structure and agency.

Again, before going further into this elaboration, it is worth mentioning some of the limitations of the study and potential research directions. The thesis concentrates on a specific age group – 9-10-year old pupils - and on two specific EU member-states – Bulgaria and England. It will be beneficial in the future to see whether the situation is substantially different in varying age groups and to follow up the current study with a longitudinal one. Researching different age groups will give a better idea of the time-scale of development of national and European identities also vis-à-vis children's other identities (Barrett 2007). More importantly, the potential usefulness of such comparisons, especially if a longitudinal design is applied, can be quite substantial, because it will show how and why children's perceptions change.

The thesis started with a quotation from a girl who seemed to be far more knowledgeable about the EU at a younger age when she tried to reconcile the idea of a monarchy such as the UK being part of the EU as a supranational organization, whereas a few years later she was not even sure whether she lived in Europe. The importance of socialization as a ‘life-long’ process (White 1977: 5) can be perhaps even better revealed if such a study is conducted, because the expectation is that at a later stage children’s (future adolescents’ and adults’) main source of information on news will not only be TV but Internet and newspapers as well. Newspapers in the UK, especially tabloids, have a reputation for being overtly Eurosceptic and it will be interesting to see if they do indeed influence young people’s attitudes in a negative direction. It was pointless to look at their impact in the current study, given that it is not common for children of this age group to read them regularly. Furthermore, in both countries the EU topic is covered later in school – in Bulgaria for the first time at the end of primary education and in England, as part of the citizenship subject in secondary school. Including other member-states in the study is also a good idea, because it will give even more indications about the diversity of factors that influence European identities and the interplay between them and the national identities. England, for example, as a nation, is part of a nation-state, which includes three other nations where the situation could be quite different. In other member-states such as the founding ones variations might also apply. A longitudinal study should certainly be accompanied by additional media content analysis in order to compare the coverage in at least two different time periods. Given the time and resources limitations linked to any PhD research and the predominantly qualitative nature of the study, it is difficult to confidently generalize on the proliferation of the European identity. This problem can be overcome by conducting a much larger-scale cross-national study, involving a network of researchers. Such a project will also allow for additional use of quantitative methods in the data analysis stage, when the interplay between the different factors can be more subtly explained than is feasible at present.

## **5. Collective identity formation between structure and agency**

The research was built on the premise that collective identity is a useful concept exactly because it provides the basis for the study of the relationship between the individual and the collective and accommodates ‘the complex possibilities of an interplay between agency and social construction or even constraint’ (Woodward 2002: 3). A major contribution this study makes is to elaborate some of the theoretical claims about this relationship. To start with, the results make it possible to ‘unpack’ the influence of the social on identity construction, and distinguish more clearly between its different components – the nation-state context, sub-national social structures and socialization agents. As demonstrated earlier, each of these factors plays a distinct role in the process. Rather than limiting the discussion to general claims about the role of the ‘social,’ it makes sense to be more precise and clarify what exactly is meant by the ‘social.’ At the same time, it is also essential not to lose sight of how the different aspects of the social fit together – instead of isolating one factor, for instance the media, it is important to keep an eye on the interactions between the varying influences.

Second, the study helps clarify the role of individual agency. Evidently, individuals (in this case children) are actively involved in the construction of their identities, but this process is delimited by the opportunities and constraints set by the individual socialization agents, the national context and social structures. While each child has a degree of choice in constructing his or her (European) identity, the resources available to young people from poorer or ethnic minority background are likely to be more limited than the resources at the disposal of a pupil from an ethnic majority, well-off background. Finally, the structure versus agency dilemma underpins some of the central debates in the media and communications field of studies, as becomes obvious in the contrasting approaches sometimes adopted in the search for media ‘effects.’ What the results of this thesis suggest, however, is that the contrasting theories of media influence – for example, agenda-setting, on the one hand, and the active audience approach, on the other, are not mutually exclusive. The ‘marriage’ of the two is not only possible but also leads to a better understanding of the way media influence children. Thus, the study demonstrates that the impact of the media’s agenda-setting role should not necessarily be studied by a single, general

survey question but it is much more precise to actually look for that impact among specific audiences rather than in general. This audience-focused approach does not undermine the significance of agenda-setting but allows for a better understanding of its significance also in relation to other societal factors. By the same token, the presupposition that audiences such as children are indeed active media recipients rather than passive dupes should not lead to an assumption that because of this active role social structures and socialization agents are not important elements of the process mainly by providing opportunities or constraints in collective identity formation.

Unfortunately, given the data collection methods used, not much more can be said about the impact of individual agency, which again suggests that its importance could be perhaps much better understood if in future research the current methods are complemented by more qualitative methods, as already indicated in previous sections.

## **6. Policy implications: Mould Europeans of the future?**

The final contribution the thesis makes is to convey a number of potential policy implications. If top-down strategies are to be implemented, they should certainly take into account the numerous limitations involved. On the one hand, the case studies show that a top-down approach can be quite successful in raising knowledge about Europe and/or the EU and ‘twisting’ that knowledge in particular directions. Obviously, the English school curriculum with its focus on Europe as a continent is rather influential in shaping children’s sense of European-ness, while in Bulgaria the elite-led drive to concentrate on the EU and its institutions, and the emphasis on Europe as a dream, also appears to have trickled down to children, and influences their perceptions of Europe. On the other hand, the study also reveals that the exact components of the European identity as fixed and directed from the elites do not necessarily create allegiances but might have an opposite effect to the one that is anticipated. Thus, the general EU focus in Bulgaria, regardless of the fact of whether it is connected with a degree of enthusiasm about EU membership, has not actually led to stronger levels of attachment to Europe but on the contrary, has resulted in less endorsement of European-ness, because the aspect children have focused in their self-

identifications is the ‘otherness’ rather than the sameness of Europe. This phenomenon might be translated into three particular policy suggestions.

First, it is perhaps necessary to create strategies for more cross-country travel opportunities and/or exchanges especially for young people in less advantaged families and ethnic minorities and for information dissemination about Europe as a whole – not focused on the EU solely, let alone on its CFSP, as the most recent EU document with reference to the European identity suggests (EUR-Lex 2010). Awareness about the EU only rarely leads to European identification and it is more often in combination with knowledge about Europe that this happens. Given the current state of affairs in the Union where public opinion in many member-states is publicly hostile to any allusions to further development of the EU’s importance, it is highly unlikely that such measures will be endorsed unequivocally if they focus narrowly on the EU. This leads to the second main recommendation, namely about what kind of Europe children should hear about. Obviously, a simple EU focus does not work. Concentrating on the common aspects of being European, as in living in Europe, ‘expecting a certain sameness from all participating countries’ (10111), but also recognizing that it is good to be different and unique in certain aspects, could be much more productive. A more historically-oriented approach to the original reasons for the European countries’ decision to get together after the Second World II as well as an emphasis on the important symbols – founding fathers of the EU, flag, euro, etc., accompanied by knowledge about the diverse member-states, even if based on simple facts such as food, tourism, etc., can yield to positive results. In the open-ended questions about other Europeans, children often explained they liked certain country rather than another one exactly because they thought there were more sunny days in it and beaches or ski/resorts or the food (meat, puddings) was better.

Finally, it is not feasible to assume that the media will actively disseminate or promote any kind of general information on EU topics, but the role of another socialization actor, namely school, should be more fully utilized than at present. What the current study shows is that those children who learn about Europe and especially about the EU at school are not only more knowledgeable on the topic but are also much more likely to pay attention to it if they hear something on the news. They even tend to initiate European discussions with their parents. Therefore, school should indeed ‘be a key factor in promoting Europeanness’ (Llobera 2001: 185). The current vague focus of introducing a ‘European dimension’ in the national curricula obviously

does not work (Convery et al. 1997) not least because first, the member-states educational systems are autonomous and not contingent on EU legislation, and second, public opinion especially in certain countries is strongly in opposition against any measures coming from Brussels, let alone ones aimed at promoting Europeanism. Therefore, the best way to enhance the role of schools in the process without having to tackle what seem to be insurmountable obstacles is to introduce programmes similar to the Erasmus and Socrates exchanges for university students and ones that encourage cross-national cooperation between the schools, which are centrally operated by the EU and involve quite a number of organizations within member-states. These programmes can actually combine the first two elements proposed as policy recommendations – more travel opportunities and a particular emphasis on certain aspects of European-ness. In this way, children will get a much better, insider's knowledge about other Europeans and European countries but also about their common history and interests. They will ultimately have an increased set of resources at their disposal for the constructions of their European identities and when making sense of the media messages they hear about Europe. The more knowledge and awareness children possess, the more likely it is for them to develop a European identity.

Overall, the study shows that policy makers should be interested in promoting the development of the European identity, because it is indeed positively related to support of European integration. When the children already feel European, they are much more likely to be interested in European issues, to have a strong opinion on them and to in support of European integration. This might indeed be the way forward for overcoming the notorious democratic deficit of the EU, as many academics (among others, Beus 2001, Decker 2002, Bache and George 2006: 66, Sigalas 2010) assume. This finding has an important implication because it supports the claim left open at the end of the introduction of the thesis, namely that promoting the European identity could be a means to an end. The stronger the European identity is, the more democratically legitimized the Union is and the better it functions in the areas in which, like it or not, it already has significant competencies for the benefit of Europhiles and Europhobes alike.

All in all, despite its limitations, the study makes a number of important empirical and theoretical contributions, as the separate sections of the conclusion demonstrate. It provides a better understanding of the importance of studying collective identity

formation among children - a group almost completely ignored by academics, politicians and policy-makers, and more specifically, about the process of European identity construction. At present, there is a European identity emerging among young people in the two different national contexts, but its strength and salience does not depend so much on children's European awareness and knowledge, as is widely assumed, as on the meanings they attach to Europe – a finding made possible only because of the innovative qualitative, bottom-up approach adopted when examining these meanings and their relationship with knowledge and identifications. Moreover, the European identity is predominantly an elite and a racialized one. Trends of intersectionality are evident in Western and Eastern Europe alike – ethnic minority children, who also happen to be less socially advantaged, 'get hit' by 'multiple forms of exclusion' (Crenshaw 2004) from the European identity project.

The study also illuminates the need to move beyond a mono-causal explanation of collective identity formation and not be afraid to challenge the often taken-for-granted assumption that structure and agency cannot go hand-in-hand. It is better to research the impact of the different social factors and structures and the role of individual agency in relation to rather than in isolation to one another. Young people's European identities cannot be explained solely by the impact of society as structure, socialization as a process, the national context and the individual as a potent agent. The importance of none of these factors can be truly understood if investigated on its own. Collective identity formation is in fact a result of the interplay between socialization as a process and society as structure within individual national contexts. The comparative nature of the study allows the researcher to conclude that national differences are important, because they influence the visibility of the European topic on the public, policy and media agenda and lead to qualitatively distinct messages in the socialization agents' accounts in the respective country. The impact of social structures, on the other hand, increases as the salience of the topic on the socialization agenda decreases. The important role the mass media play for European identities is affirmed (Schlesinger 1993, Hengst 1997, Schlesinger 1997, Bruter 2005) and the study provides an explanation of how it happens. The 'media/identity relationship' is indeed 'not a causal one' (Madianou 2005: 5). TV does not have a direct effect on children's identities but a long-term, indirect influence, contingent on national context and social structures. TV mainly provides pupils with the necessary resources: awareness and knowledge to make sense of the topic, but young people are 'active

and creative social agents' in general (Corsaro 2005: 3) and media users in more specific ways (Gauntlett 1997, Buckingham 2003), who are capable of deciding when and what collective identities to endorse.

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# APPENDICES

## Appendix 1

### Children's Sample

174 children were interviewed – 67 in England and 107 in Bulgaria. The distribution of the sample with detailed explanation about the separate categories is included below.

#### 1. SES

##### 1.1 School

The participants were recruited from four schools in Bulgaria and six in England. The descriptions of the schools are as follows:

##### **England<sup>18</sup>:**

**School one<sup>19</sup>** – an above average sized primary school in the largest town of the county, which serves a mixed community of rented and private housing. 510 pupils on roll. 49% of pupils are out of catchment area – most of them are the children of adjacent university staff and students. The vast majority of pupils are of White British heritage although 19% are ethnic minority children with several groups represented at the school. 15% of free school meals. Good Ofsted report.

**School two** – a small primary school in a former coal-mining town. 155 pupils on roll. Students come from a local estate on the eastern outskirts of the town from an area labeled by the deputy head teacher as the most deprived in the county with 89% deprivation. Ofsted report also confirms there is ‘some very significant deprivation’<sup>20</sup>. More than 90% of the parents are reported to be unemployed. Almost all pupils are of White British heritage. Only 2% come from an ethnic minority background. Over a third has special educational needs and/or disabilities. 48% are eligible for free school meals, which is significantly above average. Good and satisfactory grades in Ofsted report.

**School three:** an above average primary school in a big multi-cultural city. 430 pupils on roll. Most pupils are from minority ethnic backgrounds, mostly Asian and Asian British with family roots in India, and many come from homes where English is not the first language. The percentage of pupils with learning difficulties and/or

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<sup>18</sup> All data are based on Ofsted reports and head teachers' statistics.

<sup>19</sup> The reason the schools are numbered in this order is because of the order in which the children were interviewed in the respective county. Since the interviews first started in England, the English schools are with numbers from 1 to 6 in the order of interviewing and Bulgarian schools are with numbers from 7 to 10.

<sup>20</sup> In order to preserve the anonymity of the pupils, no reference will be provided about the Ofsted report.

disabilities is above average. 25% of pupils are entitled to free school meals, which is above average. Good Ofsted report.

**School four:** an above average community primary school in the largest town in the county. 293 pupils on roll. 15 different ethnicities are represented, with the majority of pupils of either White British or Bangladeshi heritage. Over two thirds of pupils speak English as an additional language. The proportion of pupils who have learning difficulties and/or disabilities is well above average. 30% of pupils are entitled to free school meals, which is above average. Good Ofsted report.

**School five:** a small Roman Catholic primary school in the largest town in the county. 203 pupils on roll. The majority of pupils are from Catholic families but about 15 per cent are not. Most pupils come from White British backgrounds and some come from minority ethnic backgrounds, often from families where little English is spoken. Other than English, the most commonly spoken languages are Polish, Filipino and Tamil. The proportion of pupils with special educational needs and/or disabilities is average. The percentage of free school meals is below average. Satisfactory Ofsted report.

**School six:** an average Church of England primary school in a large affluent village. 345 pupils on roll. The majority of pupils come from the village and are from a white British background. Only 1.5% are ethnic minority children. Less than 1% of pupils are eligible for free school meals. The proportion of pupils with special educational needs and/or disabilities is below average. Good Ofsted report with one area of provision ranked as excellent.

#### **Bulgaria<sup>21</sup>:**

**School seven:** an average municipal comprehensive school. The school is situated in the outskirts of a middle-sized town in what once was a separate village. Head-teacher reports 100% come from an ethnic minority Roma background although not all children define themselves as Roma. The majority live in the most deprived area of the town.

**School eight:** an average municipal comprehensive school. 510 students on roll – 238 in primary school and 272 in secondary school. The school is situated in the centre of a middle-sized town in a relatively affluent area. The majority of children are of ethnic Bulgarian origin. Very low percentage of ethnic minority Roma. Even on the school's website a note is made about the Roma, which says 'These citizens are ignorant, unemployed and their children do not attend school.'

**School nine:** an average municipal comprehensive school. 554 students on roll. The school is situated in the outskirts of a middle-sized town in a catchment area that includes both ethnic majority and ethnic minority children. A higher percentage of ethnic minority children than in school eight.

**School ten:** an above-average municipal school. 543 students on roll in three key stages: primary school, secondary school and high school. The primary school is situated in a separate building. Otherwise, the secondary school and the high school share a building with another high school in town. The school is situated near to the Danube Park in town and not too far away from the town centre. Many of the primary school pupils come from out of catchment area from nearby villages. Low percentage

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<sup>21</sup> All schools are municipal and all data are based on information from the municipality, schools' websites and head teachers' reports. Again in order to preserve the anonymity of the pupils, no concrete references are provided. No free school meals in Bulgaria.

of ethnic minority primary school pupils. Higher percentages in secondary and high schools.

Therefore, the distribution of pupils school-wise is as follows:

Bulgaria (n=107)			England (n=67)		
School	%	n	School	%	n
7	30.8	33	1	14.9	10
8	20.6	22	2	11.9	8
9	36.5	39	3	32.8	22
10	12.1	13	4	10.4	7
			5	6	4
			6	23.9	16

Table 1.1 Children's sample distribution by school

After the next few sections are introduced, a further break-down of schools along ethnic, socio-economic and gender lines will be conducted.

## 1.2 Occupation groups

Below are the six NRS general categories as described by the Market Research Society (2010). For a precise placing of each parent in a certain category the *Occupation Groupings: a Job Dictionary* (2010) was used. The data were extracted from both children's and parents' questionnaires and comparisons were made with the income indicated by parents.

Occupation groups	Description
A	Professional people, very senior managers in business or commerce or top-level civil servants. Retired people, previously grade A, and their widows.
B	Middle management executives in large organisations, with appropriate qualifications. Principal officers in local government and civil service. Top management or owners of small business concerns, educational and service establishments. Retired people, previously grade B, and their widows.
C1	Junior management, owners of small establishments, and all others in non-manual positions. Jobs in this group have very varied responsibilities and educational requirements. Retired people, previously grade C1, and their widows.
C2	All skilled manual workers, and those manual workers with responsibility for other people. Retired people, previously grade C2, with pensions from their job. Widows, if receiving pensions from their late husband's job.
D	All semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers, apprentices and trainees to skilled workers. Retired people, previously grade D, with pensions from their job. Widows, if receiving a pension from their late husband's job.
E	All those entirely dependent on the state long-term, through sickness, unemployment, old age or other reasons. Those unemployed for a period exceeding six months (otherwise classify on previous occupation). Casual workers and those without a regular income. Only households without a Chief Income Earner will be coded in this group.

Table 1.2 Occupation groups, extracted from *Occupation Groupings: a Job Dictionary*, 6 ed, 2006: The Market Research Society. Available at <http://www.mrs.org.uk/publications/downloads/occgroups6.pdf> (Accessed on 1 July 2010).

Therefore, along occupation lines, the sample looks like that:

Occupation groups	Bulgaria		England	
	%	n	%	n
AB	23.4	25	43.2	29
C1	15.9	17	11.9	8
C2	41.1	44	16.4	11
DE	19.6	21	11.9	8
NA <sup>22</sup>	0	0	16.4	11
Total	100	107	100	67

Table 1.3 Children's sample distribution by occupation groups

School-wise, the distribution is as follows:

School (N=174)	Occupation groups									
	AB (n=54 or 31%)		C1 (n=25 or 14.4%)		C2 (n=55 or 31.6%)		DE (n=29 or 16.7%)		NA (n=11 or 6.3%)	
	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n
1 (N=10)	60	6	10	1	0	0	10	1	20	2
2 (N=8)									100	8
3 (N=22)	22.7	5	13.6	3	31.8	7	27.3	6	4.6	1
4 (N=7)	28.6	2	0	0	57.1	4	14.3	1	0	0
5 (N=4)	50	2	50	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
6 (N=16)	87.5	14	12.5	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
7 (N=33)	0	0	15.2	5	42.4	14	42.4	14	0	0
8 (N=22)	50	11	27.3	6	18.2	4	4.5	1	0	0
9 (N=39)	23.1	9	15.4	6	51.3	20	10.2	4	0	0
10 (N=13)	38.5	5	0	0	46.1	6	15.4	2	0	0

Table 1.4 Children's sample distribution by occupation groups in schools

### 1.3 Education groups

The education categories are somewhat different in the two countries because of the different educational systems. The distribution is as follows:

Parental education in Bulgaria	%	n
1. First graduate (BA) or higher postgraduate degree (MA, PhD, etc.)	24.3	26
2. Secondary high school education	17.8	19
3. Secondary vocational-technical school education	24.3	26
4. Primary school education	14.9	16
5. Uncompleted primary school education	7.5	8
NA	11.2	12
Total	100	107

Table 1.5 Children's sample distribution by parental education in Bulgaria

<sup>22</sup> These were all children interviewed as part of the pilot study when data on SES in terms of parental occupation were not gathered at all. Most of them (8) come from school two and the expectation is that they will fall into categories DE.

Parental education in England	%	n
1. First graduate (BA) or higher postgraduate degree (MA, PhD, etc.)	19.4	13
2. Higher education below degree level	9	6
3. A levels, vocational qualification NQV level 3 or equivalent, City and advanced Guilds craft	6	4
4. Vocational qualification below NQV level 3 or equivalent, GSCE/0-level grade A*-C	23.9	16
NA	41.7	28
Total	100	67

Table 1.6 Children's sample distribution by parental education in England

School-wise, the distribution is as follows:

Parental education in Bulgaria (n=107)	School 7		School 8		School 9		School 10	
	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n
First graduate (BA) or higher postgraduate degree (MA, PhD, etc.)	0	0	54.6	12	23.1	9	38.4	5
Secondary high school education	3	1	18.2	4	28.2	11	23.1	3
Secondary vocational-technical school education	18.2	6	13.6	3	33.3	13	30.8	4
Primary school education	39.4	13	0	0	7.7	3	0	0
Uncompleted primary school education	24.2	8	0	0	0	0	0	0
NA	15.2	5	13.6	3	7.7	3	7.7	1
Total	100	33	100	22	100	39	100	13

Table 1.7 Children's sample distribution by parental education in Bulgarian schools

Parental education in England (N = 67)	School 1		School		School 3		School		School		School 6	
	%	N	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n
First graduate (BA) or higher postgraduate degree (MA, PhD)	40	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	25	1	50	8
Higher education below degree level	30	3	0	0	0	0	14.3	1	0	0	12.5	2
A levels, vocational qualification NQV level 3 or equivalent, City and advanced Guilds craft	0	0	0	0	9.1	2	14.3	1	25	1	0	0
Vocational qualification below NQV level 3 or equivalent, GSCE/0-level grade A*-C	10	1	0	0	40.9	9	28.6	2	0	0	18.75	3
NA	20	2	100	8	50	11	42.8	3	50	2	18.75	3
Total	100	10	100	8	100	22	100	7	100	4	100	16

Table 1.8 Children's sample distribution by parental education in English schools

## 2. Gender

The gender distribution is as follows:

Country	Boys		Girls	
	%	N	%	n
Bulgaria (n=107)	51.4	55	48.6	52
England (n=67)	47.8	32	52.2	35

Table 1.9 Children's sample distribution by gender

School-wise, the gender distribution is the following:

School (N=174)	Boys		Girls	
	%	N	%	n
1 (n = 10)	70	7	30	3
2 (n = 8)	25	2	75	6
3 (n = 22)	40.9	9	59.1	13
4 (n = 7)	57.1	4	42.9	3
5 (n = 4)	50	2	50	2
6 (n = 16)	50	8	50	8
7 (n = 33)	45.5	15	54.5	18
8 (n = 22)	50	11	50	11
9 (n = 39)	59	23	41	16
10 (n = 13)	46.2	6	53.8	7

Table 1.10 Children's sample distribution by gender in schools

## 3. Ethnicity

In Bulgaria, two ethnic groups were included in the sample – the ethnic Bulgarian children and the Roma. The Roma minority is one of the biggest in the country and widely represented in the town in which the research was conducted.

In England, apart from the ethnic English, a few minority groups are represented as well, the largest group (88%) being of Asian children mainly from India.

Country	Ethnic majority children		Ethnic minority children	
	%	N	%	n
Bulgaria (n=107)	67.3	72	32.7	35
England (n=67)	64.2	43	35.8	25

Table 1.11 Children's sample distribution by ethnicity

School	Ethnic majority children		Ethnic minority children	
	%	N	%	n
1 (n=10)	100	10	0	0
2 (n=8)	100	8	0	0
3 (n=22)	4.5	1	95.5	21
4 (n=7)	71.4	5	28.6	2
5 (n=4)	100	4	0	0
6 (n=16)	93.8	15	6.2	1
7 (n=33)	3	1	97	32
8 (n=22)	100	22	0	0
9 (n=39)	92.3	36	7.7	3
10 (n=13)	100	13	0	0

Table 1.12 Children's sample distribution by ethnicity in schools

#### 4. List of participants

ID no.	Country	School	Gender	Ethnicity	Social grade	Parental education	Parent returned survey
10101	England	1	Boy	Majority	NA	4	Mother
10102	England	1	Boy	Majority	AB	1	Father
10103	England	1	Boy	Majority	AB	1	Mother
10104	England	1	Boy	Majority	AB	2	Mother
10105	England	1	Girl	Majority	AB	1	Mother
10106	England	1	Boy	Majority	AB	2	Mother
10108	England	1	Girl	Majority	DE	2	Mother
10109	England	1	Boy	Majority	AB	4	Mother
10110	England	1	Boy	Majority	NA	NA	No
10111	England	1	Girl	Majority	C1	1	Mother
20101	England	2	Girl	Majority	NA	NA	No
20102	England	2	Girl	Majority	NA	NA	No
20103	England	2	Boy	Majority	NA	NA	No
20104	England	2	Girl	Majority	NA	NA	No
20105	England	2	Girl	Majority	NA	NA	No
20106	England	2	Girl	Majority	NA	NA	No
20107	England	2	Boy	Majority	NA	NA	No
20108	England	2	Girl	Majority	NA	NA	No
30101	England	3	Girl	Minority	C1	4	No
30102	England	3	Boy	Minority	AB	3	Mother
30103	England	3	Girl	Minority	DE	3	Mother
30104	England	3	Girl	Minority	C2	4	Mother
30105	England	3	Boy	Minority	NA	NA	No
30106	England	3	Girl	Minority	AB	NA	No
30107	England	3	Boy	Minority	DE	NA	No
30108	England	3	Boy	Minority	DE	NA	No
30109	England	3	Boy	Minority	C2	NA	No
30110	England	3	Boy	Minority	C2	4	Father
30111	England	3	Girl	Minority	C1	NA	No
30112	England	3	Girl	Minority	C2	4	Mother
30113	England	3	Girl	Minority	C1	NA	No
30114	England	3	Boy	Minority	AB	NA	No
30115	England	3	Girl	Minority	C2	4	No
30116	England	3	Girl	Minority	AB	4	Mother
30117	England	3	Boy	Minority	DE	NA	No
30118	England	3	Girl	Minority	AB	4	Mother
30119	England	3	Girl	Minority	DE	4	Mother
30120	England	3	Boy	Minority	C2	4	No
30121	England	3	Girl	Minority	DE	NA	No
30123	England	3	Girl	Minority	C2	NA	No
40101	England	4	Boy	Majority	C2	NA	No
40102	England	4	Boy	Majority	AB	2	Father
40103	England	4	Boy	Majority	C2	NA	No
40104	England	4	Girl	Majority	AB	NA	No
40105	England	4	Boy	Minority	C2	3	Mother
40106	England	4	Girl	Minority	DE	4	No
40107	England	4	Girl	Majority	C2	4	Mother
50101	England	5	Boy	Majority	C1	NA	No

50102	England	5	Girl	Majority	AB	NA	No
50103	England	5	Girl	Majority	AB	1	Father
50104	England	5	Boy	Majority	C1	3	No
60101	England	6	Boy	Majority	C1	1	Mother
60102	England	6	Boy	Majority	AB	1	Mother
60103	England	6	Girl	Majority	AB	4	Mother
60104	England	6	Girl	Majority	AB	1	Mother
60105	England	6	Girl	Majority	AB	4	Mother
60106	England	6	Girl	Majority	AB	1	Father
60107	England	6	Boy	Majority	AB	NA	No
60108	England	6	Girl	Majority	AB	NA	No
60109	England	6	Boy	Majority	AB	2	No
60110	England	6	Girl	Majority	AB	1	No
60111	England	6	Boy	Majority	AB	1	Mother
60112	England	6	Girl	Majority	AB	1	Mother
60113	England	6	Boy	Majority	AB	4	Mother
60114	England	6	Girl	Majority	AB	2	Mother
60115	England	6	Boy	Majority	C1	NA	No
60116	England	6	Boy	Minority	AB	1	Mother
70201	Bulgaria	7	Girl	Minority	C2	NA	No
70202	Bulgaria	7	Boy	Minority	DE	NA	No
70203	Bulgaria	7	Boy	Minority	C1	NA	No
70204	Bulgaria	7	Girl	Minority	DE	NA	No
70205	Bulgaria	7	Girl	Minority	C1	4	Mother
70206	Bulgaria	7	Boy	Minority	DE	3	Father
70207	Bulgaria	7	Girl	Minority	C2	4	No
70208	Bulgaria	7	Boy	Minority	DE	4	Mother
70209	Bulgaria	7	Boy	Minority	DE	4	No
70210	Bulgaria	7	Boy	Minority	C2	4	Father
70211	Bulgaria	7	Girl	Minority	DE	5	Mother
70212	Bulgaria	7	Boy	Minority	C2	3	Mother
70213	Bulgaria	7	Girl	Minority	DE	5	No
70214	Bulgaria	7	Boy	Minority	C2	3	No
70215	Bulgaria	7	Girl	Minority	C2	4	Mother
70216	Bulgaria	7	Boy	Minority	DE	4	No
70217	Bulgaria	7	Boy	Minority	C1	2	Father
70218	Bulgaria	7	Boy	Minority	C2	4	Mother
70220	Bulgaria	7	Girl	Minority	C1	5	No
70221	Bulgaria	7	Girl	Minority	C2	4	Mother
70224	Bulgaria	7	Boy	Minority	DE	5	Father
70225	Bulgaria	7	Girl	Minority	DE	4	Father
70227	Bulgaria	7	Boy	Minority	DE	3	No
70228	Bulgaria	7	Girl	Minority	DE	4	No
70229	Bulgaria	7	Girl	Minority	C2	NA	No
70230	Bulgaria	7	Girl	Minority	C1	4	Father
70231	Bulgaria	7	Girl	Minority	DE	3	No
70232	Bulgaria	7	Boy	Minority	C2	3	No
70233	Bulgaria	7	Boy	Minority	C2	5	Father
70234	Bulgaria	7	Girl	Majority	C2	5	Mother
70235	Bulgaria	7	Girl	Minority	DE	4	Mother
70236	Bulgaria	7	Girl	Minority	C2	5	No
70239	Bulgaria	7	Girl	Minority	C2	5	Mother
80201	Bulgaria	8	Girl	Majority	AB	3	Father

80202	Bulgaria	8	Girl	Majority	AB	1	Father
80203	Bulgaria	8	Girl	Majority	AB	1	Mother
80204	Bulgaria	8	Boy	Majority	C1	2	Mother
80205	Bulgaria	8	Girl	Majority	DE	NA	No
80206	Bulgaria	8	Boy	Majority	C1	2	Mother
80207	Bulgaria	8	Girl	Majority	AB	1	Mother
80208	Bulgaria	8	Boy	Majority	C1	NA	No
80209	Bulgaria	8	Boy	Majority	AB	1	Mother
80210	Bulgaria	8	Boy	Majority	C2	NA	Mother
80211	Bulgaria	8	Boy	Majority	C1	3	Mother
80214	Bulgaria	8	Girl	Majority	AB	1	Mother
80215	Bulgaria	8	Girl	Majority	C2	2	Mother
80216	Bulgaria	8	Girl	Majority	AB	1	Mother
80217	Bulgaria	8	Boy	Majority	C1	1	Mother
80218	Bulgaria	8	Boy	Majority	C1	2	Mother
80219	Bulgaria	8	Boy	Majority	AB	1	Mother
80220	Bulgaria	8	Boy	Majority	AB	1	Mother
80221	Bulgaria	8	Boy	Majority	C2	1	Mother
80222	Bulgaria	8	Girl	Majority	AB	1	Mother
80223	Bulgaria	8	Girl	Majority	C1	3	Mother
80224	Bulgaria	8	Girl	Majority	AB	1	Mother
90201	Bulgaria	9	Boy	Majority	C2	4	Mother
90202	Bulgaria	9	Boy	Majority	AB	1	Mother
90204	Bulgaria	9	Boy	Majority	C1	3	Father
90205	Bulgaria	9	Boy	Majority	C2	2	Mother
90206	Bulgaria	9	Boy	Majority	C1	3	Mother
90207	Bulgaria	9	Girl	Majority	AB	2	Mother
90208	Bulgaria	9	Girl	Minority	C2	2	Mother
90209	Bulgaria	9	Girl	Majority	C1	2	No
90210	Bulgaria	9	Girl	Majority	C2	2	Mother
90211	Bulgaria	9	Girl	Minority	DE	4	Mother
90212	Bulgaria	9	Boy	Majority	C2	2	Mother
90213	Bulgaria	9	Boy	Majority	C2	3	Father
90214	Bulgaria	9	Girl	Majority	C2	3	Mother
90215	Bulgaria	9	Boy	Majority	C2	NA	No
90216	Bulgaria	9	Girl	Majority	C2	2	Mother
90217	Bulgaria	9	Boy	Majority	C1	1	Mother
90218	Bulgaria	9	Boy	Majority	C2	3	Mother
90219	Bulgaria	9	Boy	Majority	C2	NA	No
90220	Bulgaria	9	Girl	Majority	C2	2	Mother
90221	Bulgaria	9	Boy	Majority	C2	3	Mother
90222	Bulgaria	9	Boy	Majority	C2	3	Mother
90223	Bulgaria	9	Boy	Majority	C2	3	Mother
90224	Bulgaria	9	Girl	Majority	AB	1	Mother
90225	Bulgaria	9	Girl	Majority	C2	1	Mother
90226	Bulgaria	9	Boy	Majority	C1	1	Mother
90227	Bulgaria	9	Boy	Majority	C2	2	Mother
90228	Bulgaria	9	Girl	Majority	AB	1	Mother
90229	Bulgaria	9	Girl	Majority	AB	1	Mother
90230	Bulgaria	9	Boy	Minority	C2	4	Mother
90231	Bulgaria	9	Boy	Majority	DE	3	Mother
90232	Bulgaria	9	Girl	Majority	AB	3	Father
90233	Bulgaria	9	Boy	Majority	AB	1	Mother

90234	Bulgaria	9	Boy	Majority	DE	3	Father
90235	Bulgaria	9	Boy	Majority	DE	NA	Social worker
90236	Bulgaria	9	Boy	Majority	AB	3	Mother
90237	Bulgaria	9	Girl	Majority	C2	2	Mother
90238	Bulgaria	9	Boy	Majority	C2	2	Mother
90239	Bulgaria	9	Girl	Majority	AB	1	Mother
90240	Bulgaria	9	Girl	Majority	C1	3	Mother
100201	Bulgaria	10	Boy	Majority	AB	2	Mother
100203	Bulgaria	10	Girl	Majority	C2	3	Father
100204	Bulgaria	10	Girl	Majority	DE	3	Father
100205	Bulgaria	10	Girl	Majority	C2	2	Mother
100206	Bulgaria	10	Boy	Majority	AB	1	Mother
100207	Bulgaria	10	Girl	Majority	C2	2	Mother
100208	Bulgaria	10	Boy	Majority	AB	1	Mother
100209	Bulgaria	10	Boy	Majority	C2	1	Mother
100210	Bulgaria	10	Girl	Majority	C2	3	Mother
100211	Bulgaria	10	Girl	Majority	AB	1	Mother
100212	Bulgaria	10	Boy	Majority	C2	3	Mother
100213	Bulgaria	10	Boy	Majority	DE	NA	No
100214	Bulgaria	10	Girl	Majority	AB	1	Mother

Table 1.13 List of participants

## Appendix 2

### Parents' sample

All parents/guardians were approached with surveys. The number of returned surveys was 117 – 32 in England and 85 in Bulgaria.

#### 1. SES

##### 1.1 School

The distribution of parents/guardians who returned the surveys by school their child attends is the following:

Bulgaria (n=85 or 79.4% response rate)			England (n=32 or 47.8% response rate)		
School	%	n	School	%	n
7 (n=33)	51.5	17	1 (n=10)	90	9
8 (n=22)	90.9	20	2 (n=8)	0	0
9 (n=39)	92.3	36	3 (n=22)	36.4	8
10 (n=13)	92.3	12	4 (n=7)	42.9	3
			5 (n=4)	25	1
			6 (n=16)	68.75	11

Table 2.1 Parents' sample distribution by school

##### 1.2 Occupation groups

The parents who responded to the survey fall into the following social grades:

Occupation groups	Bulgaria		England	
	%	n	%	n
AB	29.4	25	65.6	21
C1	15.3	13	6.3	2
C2	42.4	36	15.6	5
DE	12.9	11	9.4	3
NA	0	0	3.1	1
Total	100	85	100	32

Table 2.2 Parents' sample distribution by occupation groups

##### 1.3 Education groups

The educational distribution is as follows:

Bulgaria	%	n
1. First graduate (BA) or higher postgraduate degree (MA, PhD, etc.)	30.6	26
2. Secondary high school education	21.2	18
3. Secondary vocational-technical school education	25.9	22
4. Primary school education	14.1	12
5. Uncompleted primary school education	5.9	5
NA	2.3	2
Total	100	85

Table 2.3 Parents' sample distribution by education in Bulgaria

England	%	n
1. First graduate (BA) or higher postgraduate degree (MA, PhD, etc.)	34.4	11
2. Higher education below degree level	18.7	6
3. A levels, vocational qualification NQV level 3 or equivalent, City and advanced Guilds craft	12.5	4
4. Vocational qualification below NQV level 3 or equivalent, GSCE/0-level grade A*-C	34.4	11
NA	0	0
Total	100	32

Table 2.4 Parents' sample distribution by education in England

## 2. Gender

The gender distribution of parents/guardians is provided below:

Country	Male		Female	
	%	n	%	n
Bulgaria (n=85)	17.6	15	82.4	70
England (n=32)	15.6	5	84.4	27

Table 2.5 Parents' sample distribution by gender

The gender distribution of the children whose parents returned their questionnaires is as follows:

Country	Boys		Girls	
	%	n	%	n
Bulgaria (n=85)	51.8	44	48.2	41
England (n=32)	50	16	50	16

Table 2.6 Children's distribution by gender based on returned parents' questionnaires

## 3. Ethnicity

The ethnic distribution of the parents who returned their surveys is as follows:

Country	Ethnic majority		Ethnic minority	
	%	n	%	n
Bulgaria (n=85)	77.7	66	22.3	19
England (n=32)	68.75%	22	31.25%	10

Table 2.7 Parents' sample distribution by ethnicity

## Appendix 3

### Media sample and recording schedule

#### 1. Bulgaria

Date	Day of the week	TV Channel	Name of programme	Start time <sup>23</sup>	Recorded time in seconds
18/11/2009	Wednesday	<i>Nova TV</i>	<i>Zdravey, Bulgaria (Hello, Bulgaria)</i>	7 am	2,580
18/11/2009	Wednesday	<i>bTV</i>	<i>bTV Novinite (bTV News)</i>	7 pm	2,618
18/11/2009	Wednesday	<i>Nova TV</i>	<i>Calendar</i>	7 pm	2,594
18/11/2009	Wednesday	<i>Nova TV</i>	<i>Nova Sports News</i>	After the news at 7 pm	279
18/11/2009	Wednesday	<i>bTV</i>	<i>bTV Sports News</i>	After the news at 7 pm	312
10/12/2009	Thursday	<i>Nova TV</i>	<i>Hello, Bulgaria</i>	7 am	2,340
10/12/2009	Thursday	<i>bTV</i>	<i>bTV News</i>	7 pm	2,510
10/12/2009	Thursday	<i>Nova TV</i>	<i>Calendar</i>	7 pm	2,465
10/12/2009	Thursday	<i>bTV</i>	<i>bTV Sports News</i>	After the 7 pm news	329
10/12/2009	Thursday	<i>Nova TV</i>	<i>Nova Sports News</i>	After the 7 pm news	296
18/12/2009	Friday	<i>Nova TV</i>	<i>Hello, Bulgaria</i>	7 am	2,279
18/12/2009	Friday	<i>bTV</i>	<i>bTV News</i>	7 pm	2,535
18/12/2009	Friday	<i>Nova TV</i>	<i>Calendar</i>	7 pm	2,372
18/12/2009	Friday	<i>bTV</i>	<i>bTV Sports news</i>	After the 7 pm news	282
18/12/2009	Friday	<i>Nova TV</i>	<i>Nova Sports News</i>	After the 7 pm news	260
12/01/2010	Tuesday	<i>Nova TV</i>	<i>Hello, Bulgaria</i>	7 am	2,701
12/01/2010	Tuesday	<i>bTV</i>	<i>bTV News</i>	7 pm	2,583
12/01/2010	Tuesday	<i>Nova TV</i>	<i>Calendar</i>	7 pm	2,535
12/01/2010	Tuesday	<i>bTV</i>	<i>bTV Sports News</i>	After the 7 pm news	381
12/01/2010	Tuesday	<i>Nova TV</i>	<i>Nova Sports News</i>	After the 7 pm news	351
18/01/2010	Monday	<i>Nova TV</i>	<i>Hello,</i>	7 am	2,648

<sup>23</sup> According to TV schedule.

			<i>Bulgaria</i>		
18/01/2010	Monday	<i>bTV</i>	<i>bTV News</i>	7 pm	2,573
18/01/2010	Monday	<i>Nova TV</i>	<i>Calendar</i>	7 pm	2,551
18/01/2010	Monday	<i>bTV</i>	<i>bTV Sports News</i>	After the 7 pm news	393
18/01/2010	Monday	<i>Nova TV</i>	<i>Nova Sports News</i>	After the 7 pm news	286
30/01/2010	Saturday	<i>bTV</i>	<i>bTV News</i>	7 pm	1604
30/01/2010	Saturday	<i>Nova TV</i>	<i>Calendar</i>	7 pm	1535
30/01/2010	Saturday	<i>bTV</i>	<i>bTV Sports News</i>	After the 7 pm news	386
30/01/2010	Saturday	<i>Nova TV</i>	<i>Nova Sports News</i>	After the 7 pm news	362
7/02/2010	Sunday	<i>bTV</i>	<i>bTV News</i>	7 pm	1462
7/02/2010	Sunday	<i>Nova TV</i>	<i>Calendar</i>	7 pm	1445
7/02/2010	Sunday	<i>bTV</i>	<i>bTV Sports News</i>	After the 7 pm news	393
7/02/2010	Sunday	<i>Nova TV</i>	<i>Nova Sports News</i>	After the 7 pm news	346

Table 3.1 Recording schedule for Bulgaria

## 2. England

Date	Day of the week	TV Channel	Name of programme	Start time <sup>24</sup>	Recorded in seconds
18/11/2009	Wednesday	<i>CBBC</i>	<i>Newsround</i>	8:25 am	240
18/11/2009	Wednesday	<i>BBC1</i>	<i>Blue Peter</i>	4:35 pm	1423
18/11/2009	Wednesday	<i>BBC1</i>	<i>Newsround</i>	5 pm	455
18/11/2009	Wednesday	<i>BBC1</i>	<i>BBC News</i>	6 pm	1527
18/11/2009	Wednesday	<i>ITV1</i>	<i>News</i>	6:30 pm	1205
10/12/2009	Thursday	<i>CBBC</i>	<i>Newsround</i>	8:25 am	210
10/12/2009	Thursday	<i>BBC1</i>	<i>Newsround</i>	5 pm	388
10/12/2009	Thursday	<i>BBC1</i>	<i>BBC News</i>	6 pm	1611
10/12/2009	Thursday	<i>ITV1</i>	<i>News</i>	6:30 pm	1268
18/12/2009	Friday	<i>BBC1</i>	<i>Newsround</i>	5 pm	437
18/12/2009	Friday	<i>BBC1</i>	<i>BBC News</i>	6 pm	1592
18/12/2009	Friday	<i>ITV1</i>	<i>News</i>	6:30 pm	1525
12/01/2010	Tuesday	<i>CBBC</i>	<i>Newsround</i>	8:25 am	240
12/01/2010	Tuesday	<i>BBC1</i>	<i>Blue Peter</i>	4:35 pm	1290
12/01/2010	Tuesday	<i>BBC1</i>	<i>Newsround</i>	5 pm	453
12/01/2010	Tuesday	<i>BBC1</i>	<i>BBC News</i>	6 pm	1599
12/01/2010	Tuesday	<i>ITV1</i>	<i>News</i>	6:30 pm	1320
18/01/2010	Monday	<i>CBBC</i>	<i>Newsround</i>	8:25 am	240
18/01/2010	Monday	<i>CBBC</i>	<i>Newsround</i>	5 pm	492
18/01/2010	Monday	<i>BBC1</i>	<i>BBC News</i>	6 pm	1607
18/01/2010	Monday	<i>ITV1</i>	<i>News</i>	6:30 pm	1290
30/01/2010	Saturday	<i>CBBC</i>	<i>Blue Peter</i>	11 am	1447
30/01/2010	Saturday	<i>CBBC</i>	<i>Newsround</i>	12:55 pm	276

<sup>24</sup> According to TV schedule.

30/01/2010	Saturday	<i>ITVI</i>	<i>News</i>	4:45 pm	555
30/01/2010	Saturday	<i>BBC1</i>	<i>BBC Weekend News</i>	5:10 pm	658
7/02/2010	Sunday	<i>CBBC</i>	<i>Blue Peter</i>	11 am	1490
7/02/2010	Sunday	<i>CBBC</i>	<i>Newsround</i>	2:55 pm	285
7/02/2010	Sunday	<i>BBC1</i>	<i>BBC Weekend News</i>	5:35 pm	907
7/02/2010	Sunday	<i>ITVI</i>	<i>News</i>	6:05 pm	593

Table 3.2 Recording schedule for England

## Appendix 4

### Teachers' and Head Teachers' Sample

An attempt was made for at least one representative from each school to be interviewed – either in person or by email or through a combination of both. Below is the list of teachers and head teachers interviewed with only basic information about them in order to preserve their anonymity.

ID	Country	School number	Gender	Job Position
10101	England	1	Female	Head teacher
20101	England	2	Female	Deputy head teacher, also Year 5 teacher
30101	England	3	Female	Deputy head teacher, also Year 5 teacher
40101	England	4	Male	Head teacher
50101	England	5	Female	Head teacher
60101	England	6	Female	Head teacher
70101	Bulgaria	7	Female	Year 3 teacher
70102	Bulgaria	7	Female	Year 3 teacher
80101	Bulgaria	8	Female	Year 4 teacher
90101	Bulgaria	9	Female	Year 4 teacher
90102	Bulgaria	9	Female	Year 4 teacher
90103	Bulgaria	9	Female	Year 4 teacher
100101	Bulgaria	10	Female	Year 4 teacher

Table 4.1 Teachers' and head teachers' sample

## Appendix 5

### National Curriculum in Bulgaria

1. Native Land Year 1

[http://www.minedu.government.bg/opencms/export/sites/mon/top\\_menu/general/educational\\_programs/1klas/roden\\_kraj\\_1kl.pdf](http://www.minedu.government.bg/opencms/export/sites/mon/top_menu/general/educational_programs/1klas/roden_kraj_1kl.pdf)

2. Humans and Society Year 3

[http://www.minedu.government.bg/opencms/export/sites/mon/top\\_menu/general/educational\\_programs/3klas/obshtestvo\\_3kl.pdf](http://www.minedu.government.bg/opencms/export/sites/mon/top_menu/general/educational_programs/3klas/obshtestvo_3kl.pdf)

3. Humans and Society Year 4

[http://www.minedu.government.bg/opencms/export/sites/mon/top\\_menu/general/educational\\_programs/4klas/obshtestvo\\_4kl.pdf](http://www.minedu.government.bg/opencms/export/sites/mon/top_menu/general/educational_programs/4klas/obshtestvo_4kl.pdf)

## **Appendix 6**

### **National Geography Curriculum in England**

[http://curriculum.qcda.gov.uk/uploads/Geography%201999%20programme%20of%20study\\_tcm8-12055.pdf](http://curriculum.qcda.gov.uk/uploads/Geography%201999%20programme%20of%20study_tcm8-12055.pdf)

## Appendix 7

### Questionnaire for Children

#### I. General questions:

1. What is your name and postcode?
2. Are you a boy or a girl?
3. How old are you? What is your place and date of birth?
4. How many people live in your home, including yourself?
  - a. Who do you live with? Pick up as many as apply to you.  
My mother My father My brothers and/or sisters My step-mother My step-father  
Don't know Refused to reply Other (please specify):
  - b. If you have any brothers and sisters, are they?  
Older than you Younger than you Same age as you Some older, others younger  
than you Don't know Refused to reply
  - c. Do you have your own room?  
Yes No Refused to reply
5. What is your mother's job and education? (*not in pilot study*)
6. What is your father's job and education? (*not in pilot study*)
7. Describe carefully the sort of job you would like to do when you leave school.
8. What kind of music do you listen to? (*not in pilot study*)  
Rock, including Indie Modern Jazz World Music, including Reggae and Bhangra  
Classical music, including Opera Country and Western Electronic Dance music,  
including Techno and Dance Heavy metal Urban, including Hip Hop and R and B
9. Please say how often you go there (*not in pilot study*).  
At least once a week Less often but at least once a month Less often but at least  
several times a year Once a year or less Never
  - a. Museums b. pubs c. rock concerts d. cinema e. theatre f. musicals
  - g. opera h. bingo i. orchestral or choral concerts j. stately homes or  
historic sites k. art galleries l. night clubs m. somewhere to eat out n. public  
library o. church p. gym, swimming pool or other sports venue
10. Roughly how many, if any, of the following do you have in your home? (*not in  
pilot study*)
  - a. music CDs, DVDs, tapes or records b. books c. original paintings or  
limited edition prints by original artists

#### II. Media use questions

Now, let us move to a different topic - mass media use.

11. Do you know what the words mass media mean?  
Yes No Refused to reply  
If yes, could you please tell me what you think they mean?
12. Which of the following do you like best doing? Please give me first the card with  
the activity you like doing best.  
Likes best Second best Third best Fourth best Fifth best Likes least
  - a. Watching TV b. Reading newspapers c. Reading magazines d. Using  
the Internet e. Listening to the radio f. Reading books and comics g. Refused  
to reply
13. How much would you say you like doing the following?

Very much    Much    Sometimes I do, sometimes I don't    Not much    Not at all    I don't do it    Refused to reply

a. Watching TV    b. Reading newspapers    c. Reading magazines    d. Using the Internet    e. Listening to the radio    f. Reading books and comics

14. Do you have a TV set at home?

Yes    No    Refused to reply

a. If yes, how many TV sets do you have at home?

b. Do you have a TV set in your room?

Yes    No    Refused to reply

15. Do you watch TV?

Yes    No    Refused to reply

a. If yes, how often do you watch TV?

5 hours per day or more    4 hours per day    3 hours per day    2 hours per day    1 hour per day    Less than an hour per day    Don't know    Refused to reply    Other

b. Who do you watch TV with?

On my own    With my mother    With my father    With my brothers and sisters    With my step-mother    With my step-father    Sometimes on my own, sometimes with other family members    Don't know    Refused to reply    Other (please specify):

c. Where do you watch TV?

In the living room with my family    In the living room on my own    In the living room, sometimes on my own, sometimes with my family    In my own room    Sometimes in the living room, sometimes in my own room    Don't know    Refused to reply    Other (please specify):

d. If yes, which TV channels do you regularly watch? *First, let the child answer the question in their own words, then show them a set of cards with the name and the logo of the TV channels and ask them:* Here is a list of TV channels. Can you please pick up all TV channels you watch -- even the ones someone else in your house likes and switches the TV on when you are in the room.

BBC1    BBC2    BBC3    BBC4    ITV1    ITV2    ITV3    ITV4    Channel 4    FIVE    SKY1    Channel 4+1    E4    SKY2    SKY3    SKY SPORTS1    SKY SPORTS NEWS    VIRGIN1    4MUSIC    BBC News    BBC Parliament    MORE4    FIVER    FIVE US    DAVE    HALLMARK    LIVING    BOOMERANG    BOOMERANG +1    CARTOON NETWORK    CARTOON NETWORK TOO    CARTOONITO    CBBC    CBEEBIES    CITV    DAVE    DISNEY CHANNEL    DISNEY CHANNEL +1    DISNEY CINEMAGIC    PLAYHOUSE DISNEY    PLAYHOUSE DISNEY PLUS    E4 +1    FILM4    G.O.L.D.    ITV 2+1    JETIX    JETIX +1    MORE 4    MTV    NICKELODEON    NICKELODEON REPLAY    NICK JR    NICK JR2    NICKTOONS    NICKTOONSTERS    TMF    Other (please specify):

From the TV channels you picked up which one do you most often watch? Ask the question five times.

From the TV channels you picked up which do you watch least often? Ask the question five times.

e. What kind of TV programmes do you prefer watching?

News and documentaries    Sports    Movies    Soap operas    Reality shows    Talk shows    Music    Cartoons    Talent contests    Quizzes    Other (please specify):

f. Which of the following TV programmes do you regularly watch?

BBC News    Panorama    Breakfast    Newsround    Watchdog    ITV news    Tonight    GMTV    Channel 4 News    Five News    Sky News    Eurovision Song Contest    Blue Peter    A Place in the Sun    Other (please specify):

16. Are you allowed to watch whatever and whenever you want to watch? (*not in pilot study*)

Yes No

If no, what restrictions do your parents set?

17. Do you read newspapers?

Yes No

a. If yes, how often do you read newspapers?

Every day, please specify for how long Twice a week or more Once a week Once a fortnight Once a month Less than once a month Don't know Other (please specify)

b. Which newspapers do you read?

*The Sun Daily Mail Daily Express The Daily Telegraph The Guardian The Mail on Sunday Loughborough Echo Leicester Mercury News of the World The Times Times on Sunday Daily Mirror The Independent Daily Star Financial Times Daily Record Sunday Mirror The People Daily Star Sunday Sunday Mail Sunday Express The Sunday Telegraph The Observer* Other (please specify):

*First, let the child mention newspapers him/herself, then show them a list of newspapers*

c. Which sections of the newspapers do you read?

Comics Front page Movie reviews/listings Sports Arts/style Local/state news Games and puzzles Horoscope TV reviews/listings National news International news Advertising Automotive/cars Classified ads Computers/technology Business/stocks Crimes and Accidents Celebrity news Editorials/Opinions Other (please specify)

*First, let the child mention the sections him/herself, then show them a list of sections.*

18. Do you have a computer with an Internet connection at home?

Yes No, please move to the next question

a. Do you use the Internet?

Yes No I don't know Refused to reply Other (please specify):

How often do you use the Internet (both at home and at school)?

Every day for more than two hours Every day for less than two hours Twice a week or more Once a week Once a fortnight Less than once a fortnight Don't know

What do you do online?

(select all that apply)

Search for information as a part of (school) work Search for information on subjects which interest me/surfing for fun Read the news Send and receive emails Use instant messaging (MSN)/chatting with friends Engage in open chatrooms Create my own blog/homepage and post my own texts, photos, music on the Internet Read and respond to friends'blogs/homepages Read and respond to blogs/homepages of someone I have never met Play on-line games Download music, films, videos, games or other files Share files (music, films, videos, games or others) Share photos Download ring tones/images for my mobile phone Take part in competitions Make phone calls through the Internet Don't know Other (please specify):

Which websites do you visit most often?

b. Are you allowed to spend as much time as you want online and to visit all kinds of websites? (*not in pilot study*)

Yes No

c. If no, what restrictions do your parents set?

19. Do you read magazines?

Yes No

If yes, which magazines do you read?

20. Do you listen to the radio?

Yes No

If yes, which radio stations do you listen to?

21. Are you interested in news and current affairs?

Yes No

Why?

22. How do you learn the news? (select all that apply)

From TV From the newspapers From the radio From the Internet From school

From friends From parents Don't know Refused to reply Other (please specify):

23. What kind of stories do you hear most often on the news?

24. Do you sometimes talk with your parents about some stories from the news? (*not in pilot study*)

Yes, often Yes, sometimes No, never

If yes, what kind of stories do you most often discuss with your parents? What do they tell you?

25. For each of the following topics of the news, will you please tell me if you are interested, or not interested.

Interested Not interested Don't know

a. Sports b. Politics c. Science and technology d. Economics e. Culture, Entertainment (movies, music, theatre) f. Celebrity news (music and movie stars, etc.)

26. Please tell me have you heard anything on the news about the country you live in.

Yes No I don't know Refused to reply

Please tell me what you heard most recently on the news about the country you live in

### **Europe questions**

In the last section I would like you to answer a few questions about Europe and/or the European Union.

27. Have you heard of Europe?

Yes No I don't know Refused to reply

a. Please tell me what you remember hearing most recently on the news about Europe.

b. If yes, how did you hear about Europe and European people? (select all that apply)

TV Newspapers Radio Internet Teachers Friends at school Parents Holidays

in one or more European countries Relatives in one or more European countries

Friends in one or more European countries Books Comics Siblings Grandparents

Don't know Refused to reply Other (please specify):

28. Do you sometimes hear a story about Europe on the news and talk with your parents about it? (*not in pilot study*)

Yes, often Yes, sometimes No, never

If yes, what do they usually tell you?

29. Have you heard of the European Union?

Yes No I don't know Refused to reply

a. If yes, how have you heard of the European Union? (select all that apply)

TV Newspapers Radio Internet Teachers Friends at school Parents Holidays

in one or more European countries Relatives in one or more European countries

Friends in my own country Books Comics Siblings Grandparents I don't know

Refused to reply Other (please specify):

b. Do you sometimes hear a story about the EU on the news and talk with your parents about it? (*not in pilot study*)

Yes, often Yes, sometimes No, never

c. What do they usually tell you?

30. *A list with cards is laid down on the table:*

Thank you for replying to so many questions. Now we will move to the fun part. Have a look at these cards. All of these words can be used to describe people. Which ones do you think could be used to describe you? Which ones do you think you are? You can choose as many as you like.

9 years old Living in (name of town) Living in (name of county) English or Bulgarian British Boy Girl European Pupil Christian Muslim Hindu (*only in England*) Jewish Roma (*only in Bulgaria*) Gypsy (*only in Bulgaria*) Turkish (*only in Bulgaria*) 10 years old Child Human Student Other (please specify):

If you had to choose just one of these cards because it was the most important to you, which one would you choose? And which one is the next most important to you?

The card which the child chooses is removed from the set. The process continues until all the cards are chosen by the child.

31. Let's imagine you are on holiday in America. If someone from there asked you where you were from, what would you say?

32. Can you tell me what country we live in?

33. Are you English? (*in Bulgaria: Are you Bulgarian?*)

Yes No I don't know Refused to reply

a. If yes, how important is it to you that you are English/Bulgarian?

Very important Quite important A little bit important Not at all important Don't know Refused to reply

b. Which one of these do you think best describes you?

Very English/Bulgarian Quite English/Bulgarian A little bit English/Bulgarian Not at all English Don't know Refused to reply

c. How do you feel about being English?

*Use a set of smiley faces, printed out and ask the child to pick up one of them.*

Happy Neutral Sad Don't know Refused to reply

d. How would you feel if someone said something bad about English people?

*Use a set of smiley faces, printed out and ask the child to pick up one of them.*

Sad Neutral Happy Don't know Refused to reply

e. What does it mean to be English?

34. Are you British? (asked only in England)

Yes No I don't know Refused to reply

a. If yes, how important is it to you that you are British?

Very important Quite important A little bit important Not at all important I don't know

b. Which one of these do you think best describes you?

Very British Quite British A little bit British Not at all British Don't know

c. How do you feel about being British?

*Use the set of smiley faces.*

Happy Neutral Sad Don't know Refused to reply

d. How would you feel if someone said something bad about British people?

*Use a set of smiley faces, printed out and ask the child to pick up one of them.*

Very sad Quite sad Neutral Quite happy Very happy Don't know Refused to reply

e. What does it mean to be British?

35. Are you European?

Yes No I don't know Refused to reply

a. If yes, how important is it to you that you are European?  
Very important    Quite important    A little bit important    Not at all important    Don't know

b. Which one of these do you think best describes you?  
Very European    Quite European    A little bit European    Not at all European    Don't know

c. How do you feel about being European?  
*Use a set of smiley faces, printed out and ask the child to pick up one of them.*  
Happy    Neutral    Sad    Don't know    Refused to reply

d. How would you feel if someone said something bad about European people?  
*Use a set of smiley faces, printed out and ask the child to pick up one of them.*  
Sad    Neutral    Happy    Don't know    Refused to reply

e. What does it mean to be European?  
36. Which one of these do you think best describes you? *Prepare a set of cards. Lay them out in a randomized order (asked only in England).*

British    More British than European    Both British and European    More European than British    European    Don't know    Refused to reply    Other (please specify):

37. Which one of these do you think best describes you? *Prepare a set of cards. Lay them out in a randomized order (asked only in England).*  
English    More English than British    Both English and British    British    More British than English    Don't know    Refused to reply    Other (please specify):

38. Which one of these do you think best describes you? *Prepare a set of cards. Lay them out in a randomized order.*  
English/Bulgarian    More English/Bulgarian than European    Both English/Bulgarian and European    More European than English/Bulgarian    European    Don't know    Refused to reply    Other (please specify):

39. Let us now play a simple game. I will show you many photographs of people. I would like you to tell me which faces look familiar to you even if you don't know who the person is. If you know who the person is, could you please tell me who you think this person is, what you know about him/her, how you learnt about him/her. If you don't know, just tell me.

Do you recognize the face?    Who is that person?    What do you know about him/her?    Where have you heard of him?

Yes    No

List for England:

1. Gordon Brown    2. Tony Blair    3. David Cameron    4. Jose Barroso    5. Barack Obama  
6. George W. Bush    7. Winston Churchill    8. Elizabeth II    9. Henry VIII  
10. Robert Schumann    11. Prince Charles    12. Prince William    13. Prince Harry  
14. Angela Merkel    15. Nicolas Sarkozy    16. Hans Pottering (*in pilot study*), Jerzy Buzek  
17. Mirek Topolaneck (*in pilot study*), Fredrik Reinfeldt  
18. Gunter Verheugen    19. Catherine Ashton    20. Derek Roland Clark    21. Christopher Heaton-Harris (*in pilot study*), Emma McClarkin  
22. Roger Helmer  
23. Robert Kilroy-Silk (*in pilot study*), Didier Drogba    24. Bill Newton Dunn.  
25. Glenis Willmott    26. Andy Reed    27. Mayor of town/city    28. Romano Prodi  
29. Adolf Hitler    30. Jean Monnet    31. Alcide de Gasperi  
32. Konrad Adenauer    33. Peter Mandelson    34-39 *not asked in pilot study*  
34. Thierry Henry    35. Zinedine Zidane    36. Cesc Fabregas    37. Eric Cantona    38. Cristiano Ronaldo  
39. Fernando Torres

List for Bulgaria:

1. Sergey Stanishev
2. Boyko Borisov
3. Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha
4. Jose Barroso
5. George W. Bush
6. Vasil Levski
7. George Parvanov
8. Robert Schumann
9. Angela Merkel
10. Nicolas Sarkozy
11. Hans-Gert Pottering (*in pilot study*), Jerzy Buzek
12. Mirek Topolanek (*in pilot study*), Fredrik Reinfeldt
13. Meglena Kuneva
14. Olli Rehn
15. Penka Penkova
16. Rumiana Jeleva
17. Slavi Binev
18. Dimitar Stoyanov
19. Filiz Husmenova
20. Iliana Iotova
21. Metin Kazak
22. Nikolay Mladenov (*in pilot study*), Ivaylo Kalfin
23. Biliana Raeva (*in pilot study*), Antonia Parvanova
24. Kristian Vigenin
25. Dushana Zdravkova (*in pilot study*), Emil Stoyanov
26. Alexander Radoslavov (*in pilot study*), Plamen Tsekov
27. Borislav Velikov (*in pilot study*), Iskra Fidosova
28. Emil Georgiev (*in pilot study*), Dimitar Avramov
29. Zhorii Alexiev (*in pilot study*), Lubomir Ivanov
30. Margarita Kaneva (*in pilot study*), Biserka Petrova
31. Marin Marinov (*in pilot study*), Stanimir Ilchev
32. Romano Prodi
33. Adolf Hitler
34. Jean Monnet
35. Alcide de Gasperi
36. Konrad Adenauer
37. Barack Obama

40. I will read a list of people to you. Can you please tell me for each of them whether you have heard the name - yes or no, where have you heard it and who do you think this person is?

Have you heard the name? Who do you think this person is? Where did you hear the name?

Yes No

*The lists are the same as in question 39.*

41. *A set of photographs of buildings is prepared.*

Now, I am going to show you a few more photos – this time of buildings, objects and things like that. Please tell me again which ones you recognize, what you think they are and where you saw them. If you don't know, just tell me - it is perfectly all right.

Have you seen this building? Where did you see that building? What is that building? What do you know about it?

Yes No

*List in England*

1. EP Parliament Building in Strasbourg
2. 10 Downing Street
3. European Commission Building
4. Buckingham Palace
5. The Houses of Parliament
6. Euro coin
7. British pound
8. US dollar
9. British flag
10. US flag
11. German flag
12. French flag
13. EU flag
14. English flag

*List in Bulgaria:*

1. EP Parliament Building in Strasbourg
2. National Parliament Building
3. Council of Ministers Building
4. Presidency Building
5. European Commission Building
6. Euro coin
7. Bulgarian lev
8. US dollar
9. Bulgarian flag
10. French flag
11. German flag
12. EU flag
13. US flag

42. Do you know what Europe is?

Yes No Refused to reply

a. What do you think Europe is?

b. Can you tell me if England/Britain/Bulgaria is bigger or smaller than Europe?

Bigger Smaller Don't know Refused to reply

c. Can you tell what countries make up Europe?

*First let the child mention the countries they can think of, then show them a list of all European countries plus a few others and ask them to tick those they think make up Europe.*

Austria Australia Belgium Belarus Bulgaria Canada The Czech Republic Croatia Cyprus China Denmark Estonia Finland France FYROM Georgia

Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Iceland India Italy Japan Latvia  
Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Mexico The Netherlands Norway Poland  
Portugal Romania Russia Serbia Slovenia Slovakia Spain Sweden  
Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States Ukraine Other (please  
specify):

d. If England/Britain/Bulgaria has not been mentioned in the answer, then ask: Is  
England/Britain/Bulgaria a part of Europe?

Yes No Don't know Refused to reply

e. If no, why?

43. Do you know what the European Union is?

Yes No Refused to reply

a. What do you think the European Union is?

b. Is Europe the same or different than the European Union?

The same, please move to question 35. Different Don't know Refused to reply

c. How many countries does the European Union consist of?

6 9 12 15 20 25 27 30 I don't know Refused to reply

d. Can you tell me what countries make up the European Union? First let the child  
mention the countries they can think of, then show them a list of all European  
countries plus a few others and ask them to tick those they think make up the EU.

Austria Australia Belgium Belarus Bulgaria Canada The Czech Republic  
Croatia Cyprus China Denmark Estonia Finland France FYROM Georgia  
Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Iceland India Italy Japan Latvia  
Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Mexico The Netherlands Norway Poland  
Romania Russia Serbia Slovenia Slovakia Spain Sweden Switzerland  
Turkey United Kingdom United States Ukraine Other (please specify):

e. If England/Britain/Bulgaria has not been mentioned, then ask: Is  
England/Britain/Bulgaria a part of Europe?

Yes No Don't know Refused to reply

f. Why?

44. Should Britain/Bulgaria be part of the European Union?

Yes No Don't know Refused to reply

a. Can you think of a good and a bad thing about Britain/Bulgaria being part of  
Europe?

b. What do you think European people are like, can you tell me anything about them?

c. What do you think is good about being a European person?

d. What do you think is bad about being a European person?

e. In what ways do you think European people are different from Americans?

f. In what ways do you think British/Bulgarian people are different from European  
people?

g. In what ways do you think European people are different from Chinese people?

h. In what ways do you think European people are different from Africans?

i. Would you rather be European, American, Chinese or African?

European American Chinese African I don't know Refused to reply

j. Why?

k. Do you think European people are? Prepare a set of cards (select all that apply)

Friendly Not friendly Happy Unhappy Nice Not nice Dirty Clean  
Aggressive Peaceful Good Bad Clever Not clever Hardworking Lazy

l. *Prepare a set of cards:*

Do you think British/English people are?

Friendly Not friendly Happy Unhappy Nice Not nice Dirty Clean  
Aggressive Peaceful Good Bad Clever Not clever Hardworking Lazy

45. Is membership in the European Union a good or a bad thing in general and for your country if it applies?

A good thing A bad thing I don't know Not applicable

a. In general b. For my country

46. Should the United Kingdom/Bulgaria replace the pound/the lev with the euro?

Yes No I don't know Refused to reply

Why?

47. Which countries would you like to visit?

48. Which European countries have you been on holiday to?

49. Which country would you like to live in?

50. Who rules the European Union?

*First let the child provide the answer in their own words. Then show them the following cards:*

I am going to show you a few cards of major institutions who might or might not rule the European Union. Some of them are fake, some real. Can you please first tell me which of the following you think are real.

Of those, you have picked up, can you tell me which one is the most important?

European Parliament European Commission European Government European President European King/Queen European Court of Justice European Council of Ministers I don't know Refused to reply

51. Who rules the UK?

*First let the child provide the answer in their own words. Then show them the following cards:*

I am going to show you a few cards of major institutions, which might or might not rule the United Kingdom. Some of them are fake, some real. Can you please first tell me which of the following you think are real.

Of those, you have picked up, can you tell me which one is the most important?

Parliament Government Queen/King President Prime Minister I don't know Refused to reply Other (please specify):

52. Do you know when Europe's birthday is?

Yes No Refused to reply

When do you think Europe's birthday is?

1 January 9 May 30 November 25 December I don't know

53. For each of the following countries, can you please tell me if you like it, don't like it or don't know?

I like it I don't like it I don't know

a. Austria b. Australia c. Belgium d. Belarus e. Bulgaria f. Canada  
g. The Czech Republic h. Croatia i. Cyprus j. China k.  
Denmark l. Estonia m. Finland n. France o. FYROM (Macedonia)  
p. Georgia q. Germany r. Greece s. Hungary t. Ireland u. Iceland  
v. India w. Italy x. Japan y. Latvia z. Lithuania aa.  
Luxembourg ab. Malta ac. Mexico ad. Netherlands ae. Norway af.  
Poland ag. Romania ah. Russia ai. Serbia aj. Slovenia ak. Slovakia al.  
Spain am. Sweden an. Switzerland ao. Turkey ap. United Kingdom aq.  
United States ar. Ukraine

## Appendix 8

### Questionnaire for Parents in Main (Not Pilot) Study

Dear Parent,

Thank you very much for agreeing to take part in this research. Please bear in mind that there are no right and wrong answers. If you don't know the answer to a particular question, I would really appreciate it if you choose the 'I don't know' answer or simply leave blank when relevant. Don't be embarrassed if you don't know the answers to many questions – that is quite all right and it is exactly what I want to find out – what people really know and how they really feel. Otherwise, it is clear that all of you can find the answers to all of my questions but this will make the study irrelevant if all people answer all questions in an ideal manner. Your honesty will be highly appreciated. Your and your child's anonymity is fully guaranteed.

#### PERSONAL INFORMATION

**1 Identification number**.....

**2. What is your and your child's place and date of birth?**  
.....

**3. What is your gender?**

Male  Female

**4. What is your ethnicity?**

*In England:*

White English  White Northern Irish  
 White Scottish  White Welsh  White Irish  
 White European  White Other  
 Black Caribbean  Black African  
 Black Other  Chinese  Indian  
 Pakistani  Bangladeshi  African-Asian  
 Asian Other  Mixed ethnicity  
 Other (please specify): .....

*In Bulgaria:*

Bulgarian  Turkish  Roma/Gypsy  Other (please specify):

**5. What is your religion?**

*In England:*

I am not religious  Church of England (Anglican)  
 Presbyterian Church  Sikh  Baptist  
 Methodist  Adventist  New Testament Church of God  
 Church of God of Prophecy  Roman Catholic  
 Jewish  Hindu  Muslim  Buddhist  
 Confucian  Taoist  Other (please specify): .....

*In Bulgaria:*

Eastern Orthodox  Catholic  Protestant  
 Muslim Sunni  Muslim Shiite  Other, please specify  
 I am not religious

**6. What is your national identity?**  
.....

**7. Which of these qualifications do you have? (select all that apply)**

*In England:*

1+ O levels / CSEs / GCSEs (any grades), Basic Skills  NVQ Level 1, Foundation GNVQ  5+ O levels (any grade)/ CSEs (grade 1), GCSEs (grades A\* - C), School Certificate, 1 + A levels/ AS levels/ VCEs  NVQ Level 2, Intermediate GNVQ, City and Guilds Craft, BTEC First / General Diploma, RSA Diploma  Apprenticeship 2+ A levels, 4+ AS levels, Higher School Certificate  NVQ Level 3, Advanced GNVQ, City and Guilds Advanced Craft, ONC, OND, BTEC National, RSA Advanced Diploma  First graduate degree (e.g. BA, BSc),  Higher postgraduate degree (e.g. MA, PhD, PGCE) NVQ Level 4 – 5, HNC, HND, RSA Higher Diploma, BTEC Higher Level  Professional qualifications (e.g. teaching, nursing, accountancy)  Other vocational/work-related qualifications  Foreign qualifications  No qualifications  Don't know  Other (please specify)

*In Bulgaria:*

Higher postgraduate degree – 'Doctor'  
 Higher postgraduate degree – 'Master'  
 Higher degree – 'Bachelor'  Higher degree – 'Specialist'  Secondary vocational-technical education  Secondary high school education  Primary education  Uncompleted primary education  Other, please specify

**8. What is your occupation? Please provide your job title:**  
.....  
.....

Please choose one of the categories:  
 Self-employed  Full-time employee

- Part-time employee  Student  
 Retired  Looking after the home  
 Seeking a job  Other (please specify).....

**9. In England:**

**What is your personal annual gross income (before deductions)?**

- £0  £1 to £3,999 (£1 to £79 a week)  
 £4,000 to £7,999 (£80 to £149 a week)  
 £8,000 to £11,999 (£150 to £229 a week)  
 £12,000 to £16,999 (£230 to £329 a week)  
 £17,000 to £23,999 (£330 to £459 a week)  
 £24,000 to £36,999 (£460 to £709 a week)  
 £37,000 or more (£710 or more a week)  
 Other (please specify):.....

*In Bulgaria:*

**What is your personal monthly gross income (before deductions)?**

- 0 lv  1 to 240 lv (1 to 4,800 lv per annum)  
 241 to 500 lv (4,801 to 6,000 lv. per annum)  
 501 to 750 lv (6,001 to 9,000 lv per annum)  
 751 to 1,000 (9,001 to 12,000 lv. per annum)  
 1001 to 1,500 lv. (12,001 to 18,000 lv. per annum)  
 1,501 to 5,000 lv (18,001 to 60,000 lv per annum)  
 5,001 lv or more (60,001 or more per annum)

**10. How many people live in your household, including yourself? .....**

**11. Which party do you support?**

*In England:*

- Conservative Party  Labour Party  Liberal Democrats  British National Party  
 None  Other (please specify):  
 .....

*In Bulgaria:*

- GERB (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria)  BSP (Bulgarian Socialist Party)  DPS (Movement for Rights and Freedoms)  Ataka (National Union Attack)  NDSV (National Movement Simeon II)  The Blue Coalition  Leader  Order, Law and Justice  Other, please specify  None  I don't know

**12. Did you vote in the last...?**

	Yes	No	I don't remember
General Elections	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Local Elections	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
European Elections	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

**13. Can you please tell me approximately when the following elections will be held?**

- a. General Elections.....  
 b. European Elections.....  
 c. Local Elections.....

**CULTURAL PREFERENCES AND MEDIA USE**

**14. Please say how often you go there:**

	At least once a week	At least once a month	At least a few times a year	Once a year or less	Never
Museums	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Pubs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Rock or pop concerts	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Cinema	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Theatre	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Musicals	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Opera, orchestral concerts etc.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Bingo	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Stately homes or historic sites	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Art galleries	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Night clubs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Somewhere to eat out	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Public library	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Church	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Gym, pool or other sports venue	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

**15. How often do you do the following?**

	5 hours a day or more	4 hours a day or more	3 hours a day or more	2 hours a day or more	1 hour a day or more	Less than an hour a day	At least twice a week	At least once a week	At least once a fortnight	At least once a month	I don't do it
Watch TV	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>								
Read newspapers	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>								
Read magazines	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>								
Listen to the radio	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>								
Use the Internet	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>								
Read books	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>								

**16. What kind of music do you listen to?**

- Rock, including Indie and Pop Rock  
 Modern Jazz  World Music, including Reggae and Bhangra  Classical Music, including Opera  Country and Western  
 Electronic Dance Music, including Techno and Dance  Heavy Metal  
 Urban, including Hip Hop and R and B  
 Other (please specify):.....

**17. Roughly how many, if any, of the following do you have in your home?**

- a. Music CDs, DVDs, tapes or records .....
- b. Books.....
- c. Original paintings or limited edition prints by original artists .....

**18. Do you have a TV set at home?**

- Yes  No  
How many TV sets do you have? .....

**19. Which TV channels do you regularly watch? (select all that apply)**

*In England:*

- BBC1  BBC2  BBC3  BBC4  
 ITV1  ITV2  ITV3  ITV4  SKY2  
 Channel 4  FIVE  SKY1  E4  
 SKY3  SKY SPORTS1  SKY SPORTS NEWS  BBC News  BBC Parliament  FIVER  FIVE US  DAVE  
 BOOMERANG  CARTOON NETWORK  CBBC  CITV  DISNEY CHANNEL  FILM4  FIVER  FIVE US  
 G.O.L.D.  JETIX  Other (please specify) .....

*In Bulgaria:*

- BNT1  bTV  Nova TV  Diema  Diema family  ProBg  Fox life  bTV Comedy  Skat  Jetix  Disney Channel  Planeta TV  DKTE Evrokom

- Boomerang  Cartoon Network  Tv7  
 Diema 2  Folklore  Jetix play  Other (please specify)

**From the channels you chose, which five do you watch most often? Please rank them in order of importance.**

- 1.....2.....  
3.....4.....  
5.....

**20. Does your child watch TV?**

- Yes  No

**a. If yes, how often does your child watch TV?**

- 5 hours a day or more  4 hours a day  
 3 hours a day  2 hours a day  1 hour a day  Less than an hour a day

**b. Do you set any restrictions on your child's TV viewing (about time, content or others)?**

- Yes  No

**21. Which newspapers do you read?**

*In England:*

- Sun  Daily Mail  Daily Express  
 Daily Telegraph  Guardian  Mail on Sunday  Loughborough Echo  People  
 Leicester Mercury  News of the World  
 Times  Times on Sunday  Daily Mirror  Independent  Financial Times  
 Daily Star  Daily Record  Sunday Mirror  Daily Star Sunday  Sunday Mail  Sunday Express  Sunday Telegraph  Observer  Other (please specify): .....

*In Bulgaria:*

- Trud  24 Chassa  Telegraph  Standard  Monitor  Sega  Novinar  Dnevnik  Capital  Shock  Weekend  
 Show  Paparazi  Sensations  Contra  Zalt trud  168 Chassa  Lom press  Ataka  Other (please specify)...

22. Does your child read newspapers?  
 Yes  No

a. If yes, how often does your child read newspapers?

Every day  At least twice a week  At least once a week  At least once a fortnight  At least once a month

b. If yes, which newspapers does your child read?

*In England:*

Sun  Daily Mail  Daily Express  
 Daily Telegraph  Guardian  Mail on Sunday  
 Loughborough Echo  People  Leicester Mercury  News of the World  
 Times  Times on Sunday  Daily Mirror  
 Independent  Daily Star  
 Financial Times  Daily Record  
 Sunday Mirror  Daily Star Sunday  
 Sunday Mail  Sunday Express  Sunday Telegraph  
 Observer  I don't know  Other (please specify): .....

*In Bulgaria:*

Trud  24 Chassa  Telegraph  Standard  
 Monitor  Sega  Novinar  Dnevnik  
 Capital  Shock  Weekend  Show  
 Paparazi  Sensations  Contra  
 Zalt trud  168 Chassa  Lom press  
 Ataka  Other (please specify)...

23. Do you have a computer with an Internet connection at home?

Yes  No

a. Does your child use the Internet?

Yes  No

b. If yes, how often?

Every day for more than 2 hours  
 Every day for less than 2 hours  At least twice a week  Once a week  
 Once a fortnight  Less than once a fortnight  Don't know

c. Do you set any restrictions on your child's Internet use?

Yes  No

24. Do you listen to the radio?

Yes  No

If yes, which radio stations do you listen to? .....

25. Does your child listen to the radio?

Yes  No

26. Are you interested in news and current affairs?

Yes  No

27. How do you learn the news?

From TV  From the newspapers  
 From the radio  From the Internet  
 From work  From friends  From colleagues  
 Other (please specify) .....

28. What kind of stories do you hear most often on the news?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

29. Do you talk with your child about stories from the news?

Yes, often  Yes, sometimes  No, never

If yes, what kind of stories do you usually discuss with your child and what do you explain to him/her?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

30. Do you hear/read stories about the European Union on the news?

Yes  No

31. What are your sources of information about Europe/the European Union?

TV  Newspapers  Radio  Internet  
 Colleagues  Parents  Books  
 School/college/university  Holidays in European countries  
 Relatives in European countries  Friends in my country  
 Other (please specify) .....

b. Do you talk with your child about news stories about Europe and/or the EU?

Yes, often  Yes, sometimes  No, never

c. If yes, what do you usually explain to your child?

.....  
.....

## EUROPE, THE EU AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY

31. Is Europe the same as or different than the European Union?

The same  Different  I don't know

32. What do you think the European Union is? Please explain in your own words:

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

33. Which of the following words can be used to describe you?

Adult Living in (name of city/town/village) Living in (name of county) English/Bulgarian Woman Man European Employee Employer Housewife Mother Father Daughter Son Christian Muslim Husband Wife Jewish Other (please specify):.....

*Only in England:*

British Hindu

*Only in Bulgaria:*

Turkish Gypsy Roma

**34. Are you English/Bulgarian?**

Yes No

**a. If yes, how important is it to you that you are English/Bulgarian?**

Very important Quite important A little bit important Not at all important

**b. Which one of these do you think best describes you?**

Very English/Bulgarian Quite English/Bulgarian A little bit English/Bulgarian Not at all English/Bulgarian

**35. Are you British? (only in England)**

Yes No

**a. If yes, how important is it to you that you are British?**

Very important Quite important A little bit important Not at all important

**b. Which one of these do you think best describes you?**

Very British Quite British A little bit British Not at all British

**36. Are you European?**

Yes No

**a. If yes, how important is it to you that you are European?**

Very important Quite important A little bit important Not at all important

**b. Which one of these do you think best describes you?**

Very European Quite European A little bit European Not at all European

**37. Which one of these do you think best describes you? (Only in England)**

British More British than European Both British and European More European than British European

**38. Which one of these do you think best describes you? (Only in England)**

English More English than British Both English and British British More British than English

**39. Which one of these do you think best describes you?**

English/Bulgarian More English/Bulgarian than European Both English/Bulgarian and European More European than English/Bulgarian European

**40. How many countries does the European Union consist of?**

6 9 12 15 20 25 27 30 I don't know

**41. Which of the following countries are member-states of the European Union?**

Austria Australia Belarus Belgium Bulgaria Canada Croatia Cyprus China Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Georgia Germany Greece Hungary Iceland India Ireland Italy Japan Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Mexico Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Romania Russia Serbia Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States Ukraine Other (please specify):.....

**42. Is membership in the European Union a good or a bad thing in general and for your country if it applies?**

	A good thing	A bad thing	I don't know
In general	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
For my country	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

**43. Should the United Kingdom/Bulgaria replace the pound/the leva with the euro?**

Yes No I don't know

**44. Would you rather be European, American, Chinese or African?**

European American Chinese African Other (please specify):.....

**45. Which European countries, if any, have you been on holiday to?**

.....  
.....  
.....

**46. Which country would you like to live in and why?**

.....  
.....

.....  
 .....  
**47. Which country holds the current presidency of the European Union?**  
 .....

.....  
**48. What is the name of the Commissioner who represents the United Kingdom in the European Commission and/or his/her portfolio?**  
 .....

.....  
**49. Who is the President of the European Commission?**  
 .....

.....  
**50. Who is the President of the European Parliament?**  
 .....

.....  
**51. Who is the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom/Bulgaria?**  
 .....

.....  
**52. For each of the following statements about the European Union could you please tell me whether you think it is true or false?**

	True	False	I don't know
The EU currently consists of fifteen member-states	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Every six months, a different member-states becomes the President of the Council of the European Union	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The euro area currently consists of twelve member-states	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

**53. Have you heard of...?**

	Yes,	No	Tend to trust	Tend not to trust
European Parliament	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
European Commission	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Council of the European Union	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
European Ombudsman	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
European Central Bank	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
European	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Court of Auditors				
Committee of the Regions of the European Union	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Economic and Social Committee of the European Union	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Court of Justice of the European Communities	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

**54. Please have a look at the following names. Please indicate first whether you have seen the name before even if you do not remember who that person is/was. If you know who that person is/was, his or her position or anything at all, please write it down.**

*In England:*

	Do you recognize the name? Yes No	What do you know about this person?
Gordon Brown	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Tony Blair	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
David Cameron	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Jose Manuel Barroso	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Barack Obama	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
George W. Bush	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Winston Churchill	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Elizabeth II	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Henry VIII	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	

Robert Schumann	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Prince William	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Angela Merkel	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Jerzy Buzek	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Gunter Verheugen	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Catherine Ashton	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Derek Roland Clark	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Emma McClarkin	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Roger Helmer	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Bill Newton Dunn	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Andy Reed	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Roy Brown	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Glenis Willmott	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Romano Prodi	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Konrad Adenauer	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Adolf Hitler	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Alcide de Gasperi	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Jean	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	

Monnet		
Prince Charles	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Fredrik Reinfeldt	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Nicolas Sarkozy	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Peter Mandelson	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Didier Drogba	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Thierry Henry	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Zinedine Zidane	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Eric Cantona	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Cristiano Ronaldo	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Fernando Torres	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Cesc Fabregas	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	

In Bulgaria:

	Do you recognize the name? Yes No	What do you know about this person?
Boyko Borisov	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Sergey Stanishev	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Jose Manuel Barroso	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
George W. Bush	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
Vasil Levski	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	

George Parvanov	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Robert Schumann	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Angela Merkel	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Nicolas Sarkozy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Jerzy Buzek	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Gunter Verheugen	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Meglana Kuneva	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Olli Rehn	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Penka Penkova	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Rumiana Jeleva	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Slavi Binev	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Dimitar Stoyanov	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Filiz Husmenova	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Iliana Yotova	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Ivaylo Kalfin	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Emil Stoyanov	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Antonia Parvanova	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Adolf Hitler	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Metin	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	

Kazak			
Stanimir Ilchev	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Cristian Vigenin	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Fredrik Reinfeldt	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Jean Monnet	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Nadezhda Mihailova	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Barack Obama	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Alcide de Gasperi	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Konrad Adenauer	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Cristiano Ronaldo	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Fernando Torres	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Plamen Tsekov	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Zinedine Zidane	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Iskra Fidosova	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Ianaki Stoylov	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Dimitar Avramov	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Lubomir Ivanov	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Biserka Petrova	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Herman van Rompoy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Catherine Ashton	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	

**Thank you very much for taking part in the survey. Please provide feedback if you want to .....**

## Appendix 9

### Media Coding Frame

**Unit of analysis:** An article or news item with any reference to Europe, the European Union (EU), European, Europa or Euro (as an abbreviation not as in the currency euro).

#### **V1 NO**

Unique identification number allocated to each article or news item

#### **V2 TVPROGTYP**

Type of TV programme

- |   |                                      |
|---|--------------------------------------|
| 1 | Central news                         |
| 2 | Children's news                      |
| 3 | Morning programme                    |
| 4 | Sports news                          |
| 5 | Children's programme other than news |

#### **V3 DATE**

Date of article

- |   |            |
|---|------------|
| 1 | 18/11/2009 |
| 2 | 10/12/2009 |
| 3 | 18/12/2009 |
| 4 | 12/01/2010 |
| 5 | 18/01/2010 |
| 6 | 30/01/2010 |
| 7 | 07/02/2010 |

#### **V4 COUNTRY**

Country of origin of the news item

- |   |          |
|---|----------|
| 1 | Bulgaria |
| 2 | England  |

#### **V5 MEDNAME**

Name of the medium

- |   |      |
|---|------|
| 1 | BBC1 |
| 2 | CBBC |
| 3 | ITV1 |
| 4 | BTV  |
| 5 | Nova |

#### **V6TVPROGNAME**

Name of the TV programme

- |   |                                     |
|---|-------------------------------------|
| 1 | Newsround                           |
| 2 | BBC News                            |
| 3 | ITV News                            |
| 4 | Blue Peter                          |
| 5 | BTV Novinite (bTV News)             |
| 6 | Calendar                            |
| 7 | Zdravey, Bulgaria (Hello, Bulgaria) |

#### **V7 DAY**

Day of week in which the news item was aired

- |   |           |
|---|-----------|
| 1 | Monday    |
| 2 | Tuesday   |
| 3 | Wednesday |
| 4 | Thursday  |
| 5 | Friday    |
| 6 | Saturday  |
| 7 | Sunday    |

**V8 LENGTHTOT**

Total length of emission in seconds

**V9 LENGTH**

Length of TV item in seconds

**V10 HEADLINE**

The exact headline

**V11 TVSTORYSEQ**

The order of appearance of the story in the TV news, for example if 4<sup>th</sup> item out of 10, record as 4/10

**V12 TVSTORYTYP**

- |    |                                |
|----|--------------------------------|
| 1  | News                           |
| 2  | Feature                        |
| 3  | Comment                        |
| 4  | Press preview                  |
| 5  | Direct line with viewers       |
| 10 | Not applicable/Can't determine |

News – ‘hard news, current events, and issues’. Elements of ‘timeliness’ and ‘importance’.

Feature – ‘personality profiles, holiday stories, and other soft news. News values of human interest or novelty will often be present.

Comment – use for analyses and other stories devoted primarily to an anchor/reporter’s opinion or interpretation’ (Buddenbaum and Novak 2001: 285).

**V13 AUTHOR**

Author

- |   |           |
|---|-----------|
| 1 | Given     |
| 2 | Not given |

**V14 AUTHORNAME**

The name of the author

**V15 THEMEG**

General theme of the news item

- |   |               |
|---|---------------|
| 1 | Politics      |
| 2 | Economy       |
| 3 | Culture       |
| 4 | Social issues |
| 5 | Sports        |
| 6 | Crime         |
| 7 | A few themes  |

8 Other

**V16 THEME**

Specific theme

**V17 EUMENT**

Mention of the EU in general – number of times in the article

**V18 EUROPEMENT**

Mention of Europe – number of times in the article

**V19 NonEUment**

Mention of non-European actors (*list created in the process of coding*)

- 1 USA
- 2 Former Soviet Union
- 3 Israel and Palestine
- 4 Turkey
- 5 Iraq, Somalia
- 6 Israel
- 7 China, Macedonia and Belarus
- 8 Ukraine
- 9 Montenegro, Switzerland, Serbia, Faroe Islands, Liechtenstein, Egypt
- 10 NA
- 11 Montenegro, Switzerland, Serbia, Faroe Islands, Liechtenstein, Ukraine
- 12 Montenegro, Switzerland
- 13 Haiti
- 14 Australia
- 15 Belarus, Georgia
- 16 Russia
- 17 Asia, Abu Dabi
- 18 Switzerland, Montenegro, Ukraine, Croatia
- 19 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, Albania, Moldova, San Marino, Israel, Georgia, Norway, Iceland, Lichtenstein

**V20 EUROPEANMENT**

Mention of the word European – number of times

**V21 EUDESC**

Whole sentence containing the words Europe, EU or European

**V22 ACTOR**

Names of the actors mentioned in the story

**V23 EUINSTMENT**

Mention of EU institutions

- 1 European Commission
- 2 European Parliament
- 3 European Council
- 4 Council of Ministers
- 5 Presidency
- 6 European Court of Justice
- 7 European Central Bank
- 8 European President (to be)
- 9 New European President and Foreign Minister

- 10 NA
- 11 European Parliament, Council and Commission
- 12 European Parliament and European Commission

**V24 EUPOLMENT**

Mention of European political parties

- 1 European Democrats/People's Party
- 2 European Socialists
- 3 European Liberals
- 4 Green Party
- 5 EPP and Socialists
- 6 EPP and Liberals
- 7 All 8 fractions in the European Parliament
- 10 NA

**V25 EUOFF**

EU officials mentioned – names

**V26 NATMENT**

Mention of/Reference to EU member-states (*List added subsequently in the process of coding*)

**V27 NATMENTINS**

Mention of/reference to national institutions

- 1 Bulgarian government
- 2 Bulgarian parliament
- 3 Bulgarian Chief Prosecutor
- 4 Bulgarian President
- 5 British Queen/Royal Family members
- 6 British Prime Minister
- 7 British Parliament
- 8 Other

**V28 NATMENTOFF**

Mention of/Reference to national officials - names

**V29 NATPOLMENT**

Mention of national political parties

- 0 No mention of political parties
- 1 Bulgarian Socialist Party
- 2 Bulgarian Movement Simeon II
- 3 Bulgarian GERB
- 4 Bulgarian Union of Democratic Forces
- 5 Bulgarian Movement for Rights and Freedoms
- 6 Bulgarian Democrats for Strong Bulgaria
- 7 Bulgarian Ataka
- 8 British Conservative Party
- 9 British Labour Party
- 10 British Liberal Democrats

**V31 LOC**

Location of main theme – where does the action/event/story depicted in the article take place? (*List can expand in the process of coding*)

- 1 Bulgaria
- 2 England
- 3 Brussels
- 4 Strasbourg

**V32 EVENT**

Is the article linked to a major EU event?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

**V32 EVENTTYP**

Which EU event? (*List can expand*).

- 1 EU leaders' meeting
- 2 Copenhagen climate change summit
- 3 EP Hearing of Rumiana Jeleva
- 4 European Agricultural Ministers Council
- 5 European Development Ministers' Council

**V32 ILLUSTUSE**

Use of illustrations or video footage

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

**V33 ILLUSTTYPE**

Type of illustrations

- 1 Photographs
- 2 Cartoons
- 3 Charts/Graphs/Tables
- 4 Video
- 5 Video + letter from the European Commission
- 6 Video + charts
- 7 Video + maps
- 8 Flag
- 9 Press clips
- 10 NA
- 11 Internet + photos

**V34 ACTNAME**

Name(s) of the main actors in the video footage or photographs

**V35 ILLUSTACT**

Actors in the illustrations

- 1 Domestic
- 2 EU
- 3 Other
- 4 Domestic, EU and US
- 5 Both domestic and EU
- 10 NA

**V36 IMAGESOTH**

Other images in the video footage or photographs

**V37 EUFLAG**

EU flag in the illustrations

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

**V38 EUNUM**

Number of occurrences of the EU flag

**V39 NATFLAGNUM**

Number of occurrences of the national flag

**V40 EMOTTERMS**

Use of emotional terms in the article – loaded adjectives and verbs

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

**V41 EMOTTERMSLO**

Loading of emotional terms

- 1 Negative
- 2 Mixed/Both
- 3 Positive
- 4 Neutral
- 5 Can't determine
- 10 NA

**V42 DIRECTEU**

Direction/Tone/Favorability of EU treatment - overall

- 1 Negative
- 2 Mixed/Both
- 3 Positive
- 4 Neutral
- 5 Can't determine
- 10 NA

**V43 DIRECTNAT**

Direction/Tone/Favourability of national authorities treatment - overall

- 1 Negative
- 2 Mixed/Both
- 3 Positive
- 4 Neutral
- 5 Can't determine
- 10 NA

**V44 DIRECT**

Overall direction/tonne/favorability of treatment in the article

- 1 Negative
- 2 Mixed/Both
- 3 Positive
- 4 Neutral
- 5 Can't determine
- 10 NA

## Appendix 10

### Media Use and Coverage Tables

	Bulgaria (n=31)		England (n=19)		Total sample (n=50)	
	%	N	%	n	%	n
Watch TV every day	100	31	100	19	100	50
Watch news	51.6	16	31.6	6	44	22
Read newspapers every day	0	0	5.3	1	2	1
Use Internet every day	67.7	21	42.1	8	58	29
Read news online	6.5	2	10.5	2	8	4
<i>Heard about Europe from:</i>						
TV	58.1	18	36.8	7	50	25
Newspapers	6.5	2	10.5	2	8	4
Internet	22.6	7	10.5	2	18	9
Radio	19.4	6	26.3	5	22	11
<i>Heard about the EU from:</i>						
TV	71	22	26.3	5	54	27
Newspapers	16.1	5	15.8	3	16	8
Internet	19.4	6	10.5	2	16	8
Radio	12.9	4	5.3	1	10	5
<i>Most regularly viewed TV news and current affairs programmes:</i>						
<i>Newsround</i>			63.2	12		
<i>Blue Peter</i>			47.4	9		
<i>ITV News</i>			36.8	7		
<i>BBC News</i>			21.1	4		
<i>Zdravey, Bulgaria (Hello, Bulgaria)</i>	74.2	23				
<i>bTV Novinite (News)</i>	61.3	19				
<i>Calendar</i>	61.3	19				

Table 10.1 Pilot study findings on children's media use

	Bulgaria						England					
	Children				Parents (n=85)		Children				Parents (n=32)	
	Reports by children (n=107)		Reports by parents (n=85)				Reports by children (n=67)		Reports by parents (n=32)			
	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n
Watch TV	100	107	96.5	82	100	85	100	67	100	32	100	32
TV set in room	73.8	79	NA	NA	NA	NA	44.8	30	NA	NA	NA	NA
Watch TV for 1h or less a day	21.5	23	4.7	4	9.4	8	38.8	26	34.4	11	37.5	12
Watch TV for 2h a day	16.8	18	14.1	12	23.5	20	29.9	20	47	15	37.5	12
Watch TV for 3h a day	25.2	27	27	23	21.2	18	9	6	9.4	3	12.5	4
Watch TV for 4h a day	10.3	11	27	23	20	17	10.4	7	3.1	1	9.4	3
Watch TV for 5h + a day	20.6	22	23.5	20	25.9	22	6	4	3.1	1	3.1	1
Read newspapers	50.5	54	27	23	84.2	64	61.2	41	34.4	11	87.5	28
Read newspapers every day	2.8	3	1.2	1	36.5	31	6	4	0	0	34.4	11
Internet connection at home	67.3	72	72.9	62	71.1	54	95.5	64	100	32	100	32
Use Internet	86	92	78.8	67	76.5	65	95.5	64	100	32	93.8	30
Use Internet for 2h or + a day	24.5	26	40	34	40	34	9	6	6.3	2	31.3	10
Use Internet for less than 2h a day	29.9	32	22.4	19	36.5	31	29.9	20	28.1	9	59.4	19
Read the news online	7.5	8	NA	NA	NA	NA	14.9	10	NA	NA	NA	NA
Listen to the radio	56.1	60	34.1	29	71.8	61	68.7	46	53.1	17	90.6	29

Table 10.2 Media use patterns – whole sample

TV Programme	Total no. of stories	EU, Europe, European reference		EU flag		UK flag		US reference	
		n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
<i>BBC News</i>	65	5	7.7	1	1.5	4	6.1	9	13.8
<i>ITV News</i>	49	5	10.2	0	0	4	8.1	5	10.2
<i>Newsround</i>	75	3	4	0	0	1	1.3	10	13.3
<i>Blue Peter</i>	13	1	7.7	0	0	1	7.7	1	7.7
Total	202	14	6.9	1	0.5	10	5	25	12.4

Table 10.3 Frequency of European stories in British TV programmes

TV Programme	Total no. of stories	EU, Europe, European reference		EU flag		UK flag		US reference	
		n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
<i>BTV News</i>	123	24	19.5	23	18.7	20	15.9	4	3.3
<i>Calendar</i>	126	20	15.9	20	15.9	16	12.7	7	5.6
<i>Hello, Bulgaria</i>	24	5	20.1	2	8.3	3	12.5	4	16.7
<i>BTV sports news</i>	39	11	28.2	0	0	1	2.6	2	5.1
<i>Nova sports news</i>	43	7	16.3	0	0	0	0	3	7
Total	355	67	18.9	45	12.7	40	11.3	20	5.6

Table 10.4 Frequency of European stories in Bulgarian TV programmes