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"THE EXPERIMENTER, COVERT PROCESS AND THE LABORATORY GROUP"

BY

R.B.SCOTT

A DOCTORAL THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the Loughborough University of Technology

4 July 1987

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FOR
MY FATHER AND ALISON
SINE QUA NON

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I should first like to especially thank David Mack for his help in formulating the system of recruitment, performing the 'Patriarchal Sovereign', and most of all for his unshakeable patience, faith and encouragement. Also Dennis Howitt for his help in manipulating the University's mainframe computer and reviewing my statistical analyses; Mike Turner for his logistical support throughout the experiments; and all at the AVS Unit for their assistance with the printing and copying of this thesis. Lastly Alison Strasser without whom this work might never have been completed.

ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the proposition that there is a more or less covert dimension to the structure and process of small laboratory groups that is related to their experimenter-observer. The way in which certain tendencies in the historical development of the small group concept have excluded consideration of this area of group life is discussed. A review of research on experimental artifact then highlights work that substantiates the existence of this covert extraneous experimenter influence. A further review of sociological and psycho-analytic group concepts reveals that it can be understood by identifying the experimenter and his laboratory group as a single system; and investigating the implications for the group of the experimenter's executive role in its constituent and then secondary process as a leader-figure, suggests that the laboratory group itself may be a unique instance of experimental artifact.

With reference to the work of Freud (1921), Redl (1942) and Bion (1961), a theoretical framework is developed, within which the experimenter's influence as a leader-figure on a covert emotional subsystem of process in the complete group system might be investigated. This framework then forms the basis for the development of a prototypical set of all-inclusive observational categories.

A "Group Fantasy Story" task is designed and a series of laboratory groups organized wherein the experimenter's role is manipulated in order to determine whether associated changes in subject-group behaviour might be measured by the instrument. A covert artifactoral dimension to laboratory group process is identified and interpreted, although the anticipated relationship between leader-types and the frequency distribution of scores in the relevant categories was not found in all cases.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

page nos

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER ONE: THE EMERGENCE OF THE SMALL GROUP CONCEPT

1.1 Earliest Origins 16

1.1.1 The Origins of Social and Psychological Archetypes

(a) Early limitations in social theory
(b) The Platonic and Aristotelian archetypes

1.1.2 The Freudian Relationship Between the Social and the Psychological 17

(a) Archetypal representation in the primal group
(b) The evolution of fraternal organisation from patriachal
(c) Patriachy as fundamental and perpetual
(d) A metaphor for the historical evolution of the group concept

1.2 The Nursery of Human Nature 20

1.2.1 The Link Between Macro Constructs and Individual Psychology

(a) Breaking the mould of 'simple and sovereign' theories
(b) The negative view of the Gemeinschaft type
(c) The first positive specification of the Gemeinschaft type
(d) Early psychological research on group influence
(e) Early sociological field work on group influence
(f) The return of the macro model
(g) Small group accessibility to macro theorists
(h) Problems in the field for the macro model

1.3 The Preference for Laboratory Groups 25

1.3.1 The Boundary Problem

(a) Limitations of sociometric methods
(b) Limitations of quantifiable observation
(c) Limitations of qualitative observation

1.3.2 The 'Laboratory' Solution 28

(a) Early demonstration of laboratory group atmospheres
(b) The 'arrival' of the small group concept in the laboratory
(c) Sociological advances contingent on artificial boundary closure

CHAPTER TWO: THE GENERIC GROUP CONCEPT

General Introduction 32

2.1 Psychologically Influenced Group Concepts 35

2.1.1 'Substantial' Group Definitions

(a) Distinctive developed sets of social relations
(b) Group formation and survival on a strong motivational basis

2.1.2 Emphases in Types of Commonality 36

(a) Utilitarian
(b) Self-reflexive
(c) Psycho-analytic
(d) Summary of major features

2.2 Sociologically Influenced Group Concepts 38

2.2.1 Concepts Common and Supplementary to the Psychological View

(a) The importance of face-to-face contact
(b) The concept of interdependence as common ground
(c) The insufficiency of the homogeneity concept

2.2.2 Degrees of sociological interdependence 40

(a) Importance placed upon a history of interaction

(b) Minimalistic group definitions

2.2.3 Conclusions 42

(a) The importance of an eclectic view

2.3 A Mixed Marriage of Group Concepts 43

2.3.1 Closer scrutiny of Bales' group concept

(a) Excluded phenomena and major assumptions
(b) Bales hidden hypothesis for group dimensions and structure

2.3.2 A critical psychological perspective on Bales' group concept 44

(a) Problems of external validity
(b) Problems of internal validity
(c) Allowances made in the Balesian scheme
(d) The new organicism
(e) The theoretical confines of Bales' purpose

CHAPTER THREE: EXPERIMENTAL ARTIFACT

General Introduction 52

3.1 Subject Variables 58

3.1.1 The Volunteer Student Sample

(a) The student bias in sampling
(b) The self-selecting volunteer sample
(c) Reasons for volunteering as a variable
(d) The influence of subject variables on task performance

3.1.2 Volunteer Compliance and Experimental Control 60

(a) Volunteer compliance
(b) Compliance as a function of controlled experimentation
(c) An historical perspective on experimental controls

3.1.3 The 'Covert-Deferent' Dimension to Subject Compliance 64

(a) Qualifications to compliance
(b) Deference to unintentional aspects of the experimenter's performances
(c) Deference to experimenter as 'audience'
(d) Solution of subject's 'deutero-problem' as a goal of deference
(e) Sources of information for the solution of the 'deutero-problem'
(f) The covert medium of deference

3.1.4 An Alternative Perspective on the Deferent Dimension 69

(a) Involvement with extraneous variables and involvement generality/permanency
(b) Problems with operationalising the involvement concept

3.2 Situation Variables 71

3.2.1 Introduction

(a) The serviceability of task sets to subject's deutero-problem

3.2.2 The Context and Nature of Experimental Tasks and Subject Involvement 72

(a) A typology of task sets
(b) Situational features that encourage low involvement
(c) Vicarious involvement in problem-solving process

3.2.3 The Coexistence of Overt Compliance and Covert Involvements 75

(a) Assigned and interaction task involvement in Type III groups
(b) Overt compliance covert involvements and experimental control
(c) The frustration of the deutero-problem in Type I groups

3.2.4 The Alleviation of Deutero-problems in Type I Groups 80

(a) Task-ability and self-quality task sets
(b) The self-quality set and the interaction task
(c) Subject avoidance of self-quality sets
(d) A strategy of avoidance
(e) Overt task compliance as means to alleviate deutero-problems

3.2.5 Situational Features that Reinforce Experimenter's as Evaluators 88

(a) The physical environment
(b) The unseen audience

3.3 Experimenter Variables 90

3.3.1 Introduction

(a) Experimenters' influence through subject and situation variables

3.3.2 Experimenters' Performance and Defensiveness in Groups 90

(a) Six categories of behaviour that encourage defensiveness

3.3.3 The Experimenter's Influence on his Group 91

(a) Experimenters as a special 'evaluating others' in social situations
(b) Experimenters' integration into a social situation

CHAPTER FOUR: THE EXPERIMENTER AS GROUP MEMBER

General Introduction 97

4.1 Sociological Membership 98

4.1.1 Experimenters' Inclusion into the Sociological Group Concept

(a) Inclusion into face-to-face systems
(b) The need for 'consistency' in act-to-act sequences
(c) 'Consistency' in terms of a wider system context

4.1.2 Problems With the Overlying System Context 101

(a) Qualifications for application to the laboratory situation
(b) The need for an interpretative frame with an overlying context
(c) Bales' recognition of the laboratory's overlying context

(d) Limitations to Bales' accommodation of observer-related acts

4.1.3 Criteria to Determine Choice of System Context 103

(a) Artifactoral and sociological factors
(b) The experimenter's 'executive' functions
(c) Executive functions and Bales' level of group process
(d) The 'behavioural' and 'primordial' subsystems of group process

4.2 Psychological Conceptualisations 107

4.2.1 Introduction

(a) Focus on a different system of group process

4.2.2 Freud's Perspective on Groups 108

(a) The necessity of integration with later psycho-analytic perspectives
(b) The historical context of Freud's group theory
(c) The 'continuum' of Freud's group types
(d) The 'original' and 'perpetual' group leader

4.2.3 Redl's Group Theory 114

(a) Defining leader-types
(b) Redl's three leader-group relationships
(c) Additional observations
(d) The major exclusion from Redl's view

4.2.4 Bion's Group Theory 117

(a) Constituent and secondary group emotion
(b) Critiques of Bion
(c) In defense of conceptual ambiguity
(d) Configurations of group emotion and work
(e) The three basic assumptions
(f) Features common to the basic assumptions (BAs)

4.2.5 The Experimenter's Psychological Group Membership 123

(a) The psycho-analytic model and the laboratory group
(b) Reformulating the membership issue

CHAPTER FIVE: EXPERIMENTERS' CHANGING INFLUENCE IN GROUPS

General Introduction 127

5.1. Freud and Bion 131

5.1.1 Theoretical Differences

(a) Common ground
(b) Klein's influence on Bion
(c) Leader's relations to groups

5.1.2 Appreciation of correspondences 134

(a) Dynamic features of Freud's and Bion's theories
(b) Group phases and behavioural categories

5.2 Theories of Group Development 136

5.2.1 Summary Reviews of the Literature

(a) Theoretical consensus
(b) Tuckman's summary of heterogeneous group theories
(c) The oedipal paradigm
(d) Sequential analysis of basic assumptions and overall consensus

5.2.2 Dissension to the Consensus 140

(a) The significance of Slater and Shutz's reinterpretation
(b) Basic assumptions and the group revolt
(c) Slater's view
(d) Qualifications to Slater's view

5.3 Silence and Strategy in Groups of Strangers 145

5.3.1 Behavioural Strategies in a Group's First Phase

(a) Introduction
(b) 'Goblet' issues
(c) 'Goblet' issues and related strategies
(d) Interactive silences in nascent groups
(e) Exigencies of group responses to silence
(f) An overview of behavioural strategies

5.4 Work and the Basic Assumptions in a Type I group 151

5.4.1 Constituent Emotionality Underlying Work Strategies

(a) Introduction
(b) Dependency and work
(c) Dependency and an overview of behavioural strategies

5.4.2 Dependency and Work in a Type I Group 154

(a) Introduction
(b) Problems with Bion's perspective in type I groups
(c) Task sets as experimenter's representative
(d) Self-quality task as non-directive leader

5.4.3 Fight-Flight Pairing and Work in a Type I Group 159

(a) Developmental potential of a type I group
(b) The leader-figures of fight-flight and pairing basic assumptions
(c) Pridham's view

5.4.4 Final Integration of Perspectives 161

(a) Redl Bion and Freud
(b) Redl's leader-figures centrifugal to the basic assumptions
(c) Inanimate agencies
(d) Mann's analysis of principal leader-figures and associated emotionality

5.5 Summary View 167

CHAPTER SIX: PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS

General Introduction 174

6.1. The Group Task and Interpretive Framework 177

6.1.1 Projective Instrumentation

(a) The 'Group Fantasy Story' task
(b) The assumptions of projective techniques
(c) Projective instrumentation for groups
(d) Projective techniques and fantasy
(e) Multiple motivation in fantasy

(f) The interpretation of psycho-dramatic fantasy
(g) The 'here and now' significance of fantasy

6.1.2 Self-quality Features of the GFS Task 186

(a) The 'threat' of self-quality GFS tasks
(b) Strategies for resolving threat
(c) The GFS task as non-directive representative of the experimenter
(d) Administration of the GFS
(e) Summary of GFS features tested in the pilot study

6.1.3 The interpretative Framework 190

(a) Analysis in the pilot study
(b) Category summaries

6.2 The Pilot Study 191

6.2.1 Laboratory group procedures

(a) Group format
(b) Recruitment
(c) Instructions and group activity

6.3 Findings 194

6.3.1 General Features of the GFS Task

(a) The self-quality 'tabula rasa'
(b) Theoretical implications of GFS task performance
(c) Group fantasy chains in the GFS
(d) Further general observations

6.3.2 The interpretative Framework and GFS Material 200

(a) Symbolic representation of the group and the experimenter
(b) The 'Crystalization Point' in group I
(c) General implications of findings
(d) Dependency and fight-flight expressions
(e) The 'group revolt' in group II
(f) Dependency and pairing expressions

CHAPTER SEVEN: THE SYSTEM OF CATEGORIES

General Introduction 212

7.1 The Content Categories 217

7.1.1 Subcategories to the Basic Assumptions

(a) Introduction
(b) Fight and flight behaviours
(c) Dependency and counter-dependency behaviours
(d) Pairing and counter-pairing behaviours
(e) Problematic distinctions between subcategories

7.1.2 Category Definitions 221

(a) The dependency basic assumption
(b) 'Loyal' and 'rebellious' behaviours
(c) The fight-flight basic assumption
(d) 'Fighting' and 'withdrawing' behaviours
(e) The pairing basic assumption
(f) 'Active' and 'neutral' behaviours

7.2 The Levels of Inference 228

7.2.1 Adapting Mann's System

(a) Introduction
(b) Level one definitions and examples
(c) Level two definitions and examples
(d) Level three definitions and examples
(e) Level four definitions and examples
(f) Coding practices

7.3 The Unit of Analysis 235

7.3.1 Unit Equivalence

(a) Unit definition
(b) 'Strong' and 'weak' units
(c) 'Weighting' practices

7.4 Contextual Information in Coding 237

7.4.1 The Interactive Context of Meaning in the GFS task

(a) Contextual information and unit equivalence
(b) The manifest interactive context
(c) The constancy of interactive context used
(d) The covert interactive context
(e) The 'identifier' and its use

CHAPTER EIGHT: THE MAIN INVESTIGATION

General Introduction 244

8.1 Subject Recruitment 247

8.1.1 Recruiting Procedures

(a) Limitations on recruitment
(b) Selection of sample
(c) Recruitment by experimenter identities
(d) Assigning recruits to groups

8.2 Procedural Principles 250

8.2.1 Laboratory Procedures

(a) The laboratory and the video record
(b) The experimenter as 'Patriachal Sovereign'
(c) The experimenter as 'Tyrant'
(d) The experimenter as 'Love-Object'
(e) Reinforcing subject expectations

8.2.2 Debriefing 256

(a) The questionnaire
(b) Individual summaries of the GFS

8.3 Coding Procedures 257

8.3.1 Exigencies of Coding Practice

(a) Computer-assisted coding
(b) Reliability

CHAPTER NINE: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

General Introduction 260

9.1 Results 262

9.1.1 Recruitment

(a) General characteristics
(b) Recruitment returns

9.1.2 Distribution of Coding Through Levels of Inference 264

(a) General characteristics
(b) Percentage distribution

9.1.3 Distribution of Content Category Scores 266

(a) General characteristics
(b) Group profiles of content category raw scores
(c) Group profiles of content category scores as a percentage of total number of acts in each group

9.1.4 Responses to Questionnaire 271

(a) Reasons for volunteering

9.2 Analysis and Interpretation 272

9.2.1 Recruitment

9.2.2 Levels of Inference 274

9.2.3 Content Category Scores 276

(a) Dependent and independent variables
(b) The means for main BA categories in each E-condition
(c) Analysis of variance
(d) Comparison of specific means (t-test)
(e) Variation in individual group profiles
(f) Evidence for a failure in the E3 condition
(g) The random uncontrollable quality of unconscious group whims
(h) 'Mismatching' in individual preferences for BAs

9.3 Discussion 295

9.3.1 A Perspective on Experimental Artifact

9.3.2 Implications for Social Psychology 305

APPENDIX I 309

(a) The "Group Fantasy Story" Task

APPENDIX II 310

(a) Condition E1 - Group II - Episode
(b) Condition E1 - Group II - Explanatory Notes
(c) Condition E2 - Group I - Episode
(d) Condition E2 - Group I - Explanatory Notes
(e) Condition E3 - Group II - Episode
(f) Condition E3 - Group II - Explanatory Notes

APPENDIX III 326

(a) The condition E1 recruitment letter
(b) The condition E2 recruitment letter
(c) The condition E3 recruitment letter

APPENDIX IV 329

(a) The debriefing questionnaire

APPENDIX V 330

(a) The 'letter-tags'
(b) The conversion chart
(c) The program in "SUPERBasic"

APPENDIX VI 336

(a) Levels of Inference and Basic Assumptions

APPENDIX VII 338

(a) The Distribution of the Sexes through the Experimenter-Conditions

BIBLOGRAPHY 339

INTRODUCTION

In the late 1970s concern began to be expressed about the interdisciplinary identity of social psychology (e.g. Liska 1977; Stryker 1977); indeed throughout the decade, despite or perhaps because of their continuing polarisation, both the 'sociological' and 'psychological' corners of the field had been experiencing doubts about their respective emphases. For example, House (1977) sugggested that the psychological branch was concerned that research was becoming "... too narrow and specialised ...", while the sociological branch felt that social psychology had become "... too widely diffused and hence dissipated". Boutilier, Roed and Svendsen (1980), however, argued that the "crisis of confidence" (Elms 1975) in each tradition had the same underlying cause and that this amounted to a failure on both sides to develop a coherent, interdisciplinary theoretical framework that might promote research on the structure and and process of the true interface of the 'social' and the 'psychological' - social interaction.

The point of departure for this current tendency towards polarization coincided with apparent failure towards the end of the 1950s in the bold interdisciplinary experiment that had been attempted in the formation of Harvard's Department of Social Relations (1); interestingly Jones (1935) suggests that this failure had more to do with the university politics of tenure and publication than "... intellectual concerns". Given the ambitious and influential attempt that was made by RF Bales, a

---

(1) Jones (1985) also documents how at this time the proportion of psychologists to sociologists (in social psychology) was more equal than at any time before or since.

leading member of this department, to develop in "Interaction Process Analysis" the kind of theoretical framework and research interests prescribed above as the solution to the crisis in social psychology, the question arises as to why there is such a dearth of (albeit critical) references to his work in the 'crisis' literature. The simple answer to this question appears to be the association of Bales' work with the structural functionalist school of theory, that was predominantly concerned with the normative stability, consensus and integration of social systems.

For as the 1960s progressed there was mounting criticism (e.g. Gouldner 1970) of Bales' most influential collaborator Parsons (1953) for a failure to account for the processes by which the complex social structures he outlined came into being, changed and disappeared. Sociological social psychologists, under the influence of a phenomenological Zeitgeist began to turn toward symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology for the study of social interaction in naturalistic settings. Both Stryker (1977) and Boutilier et al. (1980) remarked on this shift in theoretical and methodological perspective. However, they also noted along with House (1977) how, at the same time, a burgeoning, phenomenologically inspired critique of the laboratory-bound experimental methods (e.g. Riecken 1962; Orne 1962; Rosenthal and Rosnow 1969) that were favoured by a rapidly increasing proportion (cf. Jones 1985) of psychological social psychologists, contributed significantly to the crisis of confidence in this branch of the discipline.

There was though another significant shift in the emphasis of mainstream social psychological research through the 1960s and 1970s

that, perhaps surprisingly, has not been directly addressed by those concerned with the bifurcation of the social and the psychological - the decline in small group research relative to the boom years of the 1950s. Steiner (1986) on the other hand, who has been especially concerned with this decline, suggested as early as 1974 that social psychology might "... regain its health ..." through a "... rediscovery of the group". A closer reading of Steiner (1986) however reveals that he was arguing in favour of a return to certain kinds of group research. Although taking note of the common failure of the social system perspective to adequately deal with the specification of system boundaries, he clearly saw this approach as the most fruitful in redressing the bias towards the study of group influences upon the individual (an approach with a psychological flavour), back to the study of group dynamics. Further, although also remarking upon the 'artifactoral' and constraining tendencies of prevailing experimental practice (2) Steiner (1986) argued that there should be more attempts through observation to cope with:

> ".. the multiplicity of simultaneously operating variables, the continuing flow of process, and the mutual impact of variables and actors on one another."

Unlike the 'crisis' literature discussed above that calls for a theoretical framework that would enable just this kind of endeavour,

---

(2) The bias toward experimental methodology <u>and</u> the belief that the "entitativity" (Cambell 1958) of the individual was somehow less marginal than that of the group (a view that fails to consider that each might simply refer to a different level of analysis), were both the result of the five-fold increase in the predominance of psychologists in the social psychology of the 1960s and 1970s (c.f. Jones 1985).

Steiner does refer to Bales' (1951) "... highly commendable ..." attempt to achieve these goals. Given the pivotal role that Bales' work seems to occupy in relation to these recent concerns in social psychology, what then was he doing during the 1960s and 1970s?

Steiner's plea for "a return to the group", however laudable, is in fact a little misleading in so far as the terms in which it was couched are a function of his own psychological orientation within traditional social psychology. For work on the small group did not stop during the 1960s and 1970s, indeed 1968 was coined "The Year of the Group" by the New York Times. As Smith and White (1983) noted, Steiner's view essentially ignored "... a rich set of concepts and methods ..." from other group traditions that flourished at this time.

It was toward these other traditions that Bales moved; by 'coming out' from behind his one-way observation screen to participate in groups whose purpose became 'self-analytic', Bales created his own version of the 'Training Group'. The explosion of interest in certain areas of academia and society in what came to be known as 'T-groups' during the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., Bradford Gibb and Benne 1964) was yet another effect of the phenomenological Zeitgeist - 1968 was the "Year of the Group" because the fascination with it moved out of the universities into society. The generic term 'T-group' encompassed a wide variety of approaches and contexts ranging from Bales' 'self-analytic' version through the popular 'encounter' or 'marathon' groups run on Rogerian, Gestalt or a host of other principles, to the 'group analytic' tradition of the Tavistock Institute concerned for example with family therapy or

organisational phenomena; there was hardly a corner of society, particularly in America that was untouched by some form of training, educational or therapeutic group practice.

Significantly, one of the most influential perspectives to emerge from, in particular, therapeutic examples of T-groups (i.e. the 'group-analytic' approach of the Tavistock Institute) was also 'psychological' - but not in the limiting individualistic and experimental sense described by Steiner. For, perhaps unexpectedly, certain developments in the psycho-analytic approach to groups were very much concerned with group dynamics.

Although aware of the implications of Freud's theories as they related to personality in his early work with Parsons (1953), the shift in Bales' perspective that culminated in "Personality and Interspersonal Behaviour" (1970) was also primarily influenced by the phenomenological Zeitgeist (even though his treatment of fantasy in this work was essentially Freudian). Bales largely kept faith with his basic category scheme in this later work although he appeared to have forsaken the interdisciplinary, structural-functionalist theoretical framework that underpinned the original instrument; the impact and influence of Bales' adjusted position has though never aspired to that which was achieved by his earlier contribution (cf. Jones 1985).(2b).

It was rather students of Bales, the new generation of group researchers at Harvard whose work eventually began to reflect some

(2b) Bales' most recent work, "SYMLOG, A System for the Mutliple Level Observation of Groups" (Bales et al., 1979) was a further development on the three dimensional system that originated in "Personality and Interpersonal Behaviour", however it too had only a limited impact on group research.

of the implications of Freud's group theories. For when in the early 1960s 'experimenters' began to emerge from behind the relative shelter of the one-way screen in the laboratory to take an active role in groups they had previously only observed, emotional and motivational processes (not unknown to the group-analytic tradition at the Tavistock) arose to meet them from the shadows of what had been, in a straightforward experimental context, largely inaccessible areas of group life. Their 'appearance' alone was not of course sufficient to elicit these phenomena, the changing functions T-groups undertook also played a part. For as observer and manipulator became participant-(observer) and leader-(manipulator), groups' goals shifted from work on experimentally assigned problem-solving tasks to the internally generated purposes of 'self-analysis' - and underlying, previously 'covert' emotional patterns rose to the surface.

One of the most consistent findings of the new generation of emergent experimenters like Mills (1964 a&b), Dunphy (1966) and Mann (1967) was the crucial role played by a leader-figure in this revealed emotional dimension. It was Freud (1921) in "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego" who first explored the consequences for the organization and emotional life of groups dominated by a leader-figure; and although the 'group revolt' he described in his 'myth of the primal horde' was highly speculative, it has been found to be a surprisingly pertinent model of certain T-group processes. For example in what has been perhaps the most comprehensive analysis of the 'myths and fantasies' that arise as T-group participants attempt to deny or deal with the " .. empty and threatening environment ..." created by characteristically

non-directive styles of leadership, and a raison d'etre that calls for the internal manufacture of structure; another student of Bales, Slater (1966) commented upon a 'revolt' he observed:

> "... the correspondence between the group revolt and Freud's primal horde myth are quite elaborate, suggesting that the latter reflects a systematic process rather than an historical event ...".

But Slater made a much more telling observation that has crucial implications for the purposes of this thesis; he found that not only did leader-related themes predominate, but closely related to these:

> "... the most common, the most pervasive, the most elaborate of these myths is the notion that the entire group experience is some kind of complicated scientific experiment ... all varieties have two themes in common (1) that the goal of the group leader is acquisitive and inquisitive rather than didactic or therapeutic and (2) the situation is not under the members control ...". (Slater 1966)

Such a insight would seem to suggest that the transformation that had occurred in the experimenters role vis-a-vis his group-subject did not perhaps achieve a corresponding change in their perceptions of him and his likely purposes; further, that the emerging leader-related 'myths and fantasies' might be understood as the clear expression of feelings and attitudes long suppressed in an experimental group context, feelings that had now found an appropriate environment in which they could emerge - for in a traditional social psychological experiment they would necessarily remain 'covert' or somehow 'latent'. It is ironic that a phenomenologically inspired dissatisfaction with 'detached' manipulation roles vis-a-vis subjects that in part caused experimenters to attempt to bridge the 'subject-object' chasm by joining their groups in a methodological spirit of equality, in fact led them into a rediscovery of the extent of their power and

influence over the organization and emotional life of groups; apparently they could not escape the inequality and centrality built into their investigative roles.

Those recent (and perhaps significantly inter-related) concerns of Steiner and the 'crisis' literature discussed above seemed to suggest that it might be valuable to re-examine Bales' work of the 1950s, where an attempted 'solution' in effect anticipated these concerns. Indeed, although the theoretical underpinnings of his enterprise came under increasing criticism in the 1960s and Bales (1970) interests turned more towards personality, there would appear to be some justification for adopting his original theory and method as an albeit flawed paradigm - a point of departure from which to argue - not least because of its highly influential role in small group analysis that is reflected in Borgatta's (1984) listing of those who have adopted his methods and those studies included in "The Diagnostic use of the Interaction Profile" (Bales and Hare 1965) .

Further it is by tracing the development of this work through into a tradition which is not readily associated with mainstream social psychology, that a proposition has arisen that the psycho-analytic perspective might have something significant to say about the 'pre-emergent' role of experimenters in relation to laboratory groups; and one important implication of this proposition is that it enables a re-examination of Bales' 1950's work from a fresh, less holisticly critical perspective. For example, it has a crucial bearing upon the most damning criticism of structural-functionalism by enabling the identification and investigation of the agent of

birth, change and death in Bales' laboratory interaction system - the experimenter (cf. Moore 1963).

The other, more fundamental, implication of this proposition is that which it brings to the critique of laboratory-bound experimental methods referred to above, that also emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, to so unsettle the dominant interests and practices of the mainstream psychological bias in social psychology. For although much of this research had a direct bearing upon the pre-emergent role of experimenters, like the early work of Riecken (1962) where a 'Goffmanesque' perspective revealed ways in which they become involved in the social character of their own investigation, it was invariably (e.g., Riecken 1962; Rosenthal and Rosnow 1969; Silverman 1977) concerned with the unintended bias or broadly 'experimental artifact' caused by the relationship between the experimenter and the <u>single</u> subject. The crucial insight provided by the psycho-analytic perspective is that the relationship between the pre-emergent experimenter and his laboratory group might constitute a unique instance of experimental artifact, for the group-subject is a new collective unit designed and created by the experimenter in a sense that could never be true for the single subject. Mills (1967) in addition to recognising this, succinctly elucidates a critical point of articulation between the 'artifact' and psycho-analytic perspectives, by identifying the central paradox of the laboratory group:

> "... with one hand the experimenter creates the potential for a group, but with the other he takes away its means of becoming one ...".

It is the experimenter's role in creating the potential for his

laboratory group to exist that contains the key to an understanding of his subsequent relationship with it (and of group members' feelings toward him) in terms of a psycho-analytic perspective. And the fact that this role is responsible for a potential that is necessarily truncated, raises questions regarding the external or even internal validity of findings from such groups.

Indeed, both perspectives might be significantly informed by their coincidence. Firstly, the notion that there might have been a 'covert' or 'latent' dimension of experimental group process concerned with the experimenter as a leader-figure is supported by research that documents that significance of his 'influence' from a completely different perspective. Secondly, the notion that there is an artifactoral dimension to experimental findings that is a function of the experimenter's or observer's influence is provided with a unique context (the group) and a frame of reference (leader-centred theories of group structure) within which a previously untried investigation of these elements might proceed - a frame moreover that constitutes a complete theory of small groups. For however widely accepted the notion, this dimension of subject behaviour has never been identified and categorised in the on-going experimental process.

Smith and White (1983) called for just this kind of radical mixture of issues and concepts from "... alternative group traditions ..." as a means of making some headway in dealing with the broader concerns discussed above of improving the state of group research and "... enriching social psychology ..." something that Steiner's pleas had failed to achieve. For example, they remark like Mills

(1967) on how the developmental implications of a psycho-analytic perspective (in this case of W.R.Bion 1966, father of the Tavistock Tradition) draw attention to the truncated nature of decision-making laboratory groups:

> "... typical social psychological knowledge is based upon experimental groups ... it is debatable whether such a collection of individuals ever develops the essential characteristics of a group ...".

Further, on how essentially the same limitation is apparent from a phenomenological perspective, i.e.

> "... if members experience their task as being without meaning or their relationships with others as being superficial, then their behaviour will be an expression of that degree of meaningless and superficiality ...".

Indeed, Smith and White not only suggest the work of Mills (1967) as a valuable alternative tradition, but also refer to the way in which the Tavistock Tradition might draw attention to the "... highly regulated and overbounded ..." nature of laboratory groups and the consequent issues of:

> "... interpersonal openness, the propensity to project negative feelings outside the group, heightened dependency and concern with authority ... and the <u>relationship between the experimenter and subject ... understood in terms of the hierarchical intergroup</u> ...".

All these issues and traditions have an important part to play in this thesis which in line with Smith and White's proposals, attempts to harness the insights of a variety of perspectives to investigate the nature of the influence that the (pre-emergent) experimenter has on or more specifically <u>in</u> his laboratory group.

As the discussion above implies, there is though a subtext to this investigation that relates to the broader concerns of the 'crisis' literature and Steiner. For it begins by tracing the long-standing history of bifurcation between the 'social' and the 'psychological' up to the emergence of the small group concept at their interface in the 1950s laboratories. And it is shown how even the interdisciplinary efforts of Bales and his associates at the time, (i.e, Bales and Strodbeck 1951, Parsons Bales and Shils 1953, and Parsons Bales et al 1956) to take advantage of this pivotal potential of the small group in social psychology, were in fact heirs to a bias in favour of moving towards the development of a sociology of small groups, which however preferable to the current psychological bias (given, for example, Steiner's pleas) was nevertheless unbalanced. Therefore taking Bales' work with discursive laboratory groups as a point of departure, the issue of his (the experimenter's) unintended involvement or influence in these groups might be seen as a fulcrum by which a 'balancing' psycho-analytic perspective is introduced. For although this perspective on groups has remained 'outside' the current mainstream psychological bias in social psychology, it does perhaps have a special relevance to the latter's laboratory group methodology. Moreover, in the same way that the 'social' pole in social psychology is traced through to the work of Bales, the 'psychological' pole is traced through the first specification of the small group concept (at the interface of the social and the psychological) to the psycho-analytic perspective in a demonstration of its own theoretical 'pedigree'.

Ultimately, it is then a balanced, eclectic perspective on groups that is favoured in this thesis, which might be seen as the first stage in an attempt to respond to Boutilier et al's (1980) suggested panacea for the ills of social psychology:

> "... psychological theory that bears on social interaction explicitly related to aspects of sociological theory that also relate to social interaction ...".

CHAPTER ONE: THE EMERGENCE OF THE SMALL GROUP CONCEPT

SUMMARY

The chapter charts the emergence of the small group concept out of the discrete and archetypal social and psychological strands in social psychology. It is noted that Freud's group model includes representations of both and suggests a 'hierarchical' relationship between them. Further to the first considerations of a dualistic basis for social unity, the link between macro constructs and individual psychology is found in the specification of a small group archetypal of the psychological strand (despite a bias in the research in favour of group characteristics archetypal of the sociological strand). A review of difficulties involved in defining group boundaries in the field reveals the convenience and popularity of the laboratory medium to the 1950s' upsurge in small group research particularly for RF Bales' influential work, heir to the sociological archetype. The Freudian metaphor 'the patriarchal begat the fraternal' is found to have substance in theoretical and operational terms.

1.1 EARLIEST ORIGINS

1.1.1 The Origins of Social and Psychological Archetypes

(a) Early limitations in social theory

From antiquity, man has been concerned with determining the basis for the cohesion of people in societies. This activity, in the hands of social philosophers and political scientists, almost invariably until the nineteenth century tied theories concerning man's social nature to theories of the 'state', with explanations operating at the level of the individual psyche. Abstract principles of social organisation (which can survive the individuals that comprise them), and the significant motivational influence of smaller social groupings (for the individual) were only ever touched upon or implied.

Thus Aristotle, although recognising the existence of different social groups in 'families, villages and states' (and broadly modelling the latter on the former), for their social 'glue' proposed a gregarious instinct. He did go further, however, to suggest that instincts of positive affiliation grew stronger as group units became smaller, thereby providing one of the earliest recognitions of a significant property of small groups that distinguishes them from others. Plato, on the other hand, preferred a 'utilitarian' hypothesis to account for social unity rather than one based upon homogeneity and kinship. In his view men came together in groups because they needed to - the division of labour, reciprocity and organic interdependence were the hallmarks of his

ideal state.

(b) The Platonic and Aristotelian archetypes

It has often been remarked that Platonic and Aristotelian principles represent fundamental archetypes in western thinking. For example, the hedonistic psychological assumptions that lay behind Plato's approach to social organisation can be traced through the 'negative' Epicurian variant and Hobbes' 'egoism' (1651) to a century of 'laissez-faire' social and economic policy propounded by such writers as Bentham (1789) and Mill (1863). While Aristotle's notion of instinctive gregariousness can be seen in the work of Spencer (1870 - 1872) through to McDougall (1908), Trotter (1916) and, of course, Freud (1921).

1.1.2 The Freudian Relationship Between the Social and the Psychological

(a) Archetypal representation in the primal group

N.O.Brown (1966) also recognised that these two approaches to social organisation represent important archetypes in social psychology. More significantly, however, he showed how they are both to be found represented in Freud's model for the 'primordial' or 'original' social group in "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego" (1921); the 'individualistic' psychology of the omnipotent leader-centred group and the 'group' psychology of the liberated 'sons' that follows on from their 'revolt' against the father:

> "... fatherhood and brotherhood are the archetypes brooding in the background of such sociological

abstractions as Durkheim's mechanical and organic solidarity ..." (3).

(b) The evolution of fraternal organisation from patriarchal

His discussion is abstract but significant to the interests of this thesis; for from the broader perspective of a comparative analysis of theories of social organisation he was validating Freud's notion of the 'pre-social' era of the Primal Horde myth:

> "... an earlier state of unity before life was sexually differentiated; ultimately going back to a state before living substance was torn apart by separate principles."

In short, Brown saw fraternal organisation with its Platonic characteristics as a development out from the original family group, fuelled by the energy generated in the rebellion against its all powerful father figure. Thus, for example, Hobbes' "social contract" was seen as an attempt to:

> "... establish corporate virtue as the asylum for original sin ... The making of a moral society out of immoral men ... who's natural inclination according to Freud and Hobbes is murder ...".

and, further, that for the sons:

> "... the sense of guilt can be allayed only by the solidarity of the participants - it is the common crime that creates group solidarity ...".

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(3) In Durkheim's "The Division of Labour", mechanical solidarity was specified as union based on likeness and kinship; (with these forms associated with the 'collective conscience' and a repressive system of social control), whereas the interdependence of organic solidarity was characterised by the law of contract based upon principles of equity.

The division of labour was then understood as the distribution amongst rebellious sons of the power estate, or 'body' of the murdered father; with 'fraternities' being 'moieties' or segments of this one body and representing the contrary and complementary halves of the two sexes.

(c) Patriarchy as fundamental and perpetual

Brown therefore, although pointing to the Platonic and Aristotelian principals of social organisation encapsulated in Freud's 'myth' (and further reiterating how these are archetypal of what might broadly be called contrasting sociological and psychological positions in social psychology) proposed that the latter is in some sense more 'fundamental'. In line with Freud his position was that man is a horde, not a herd animal, that 'in the beginning' there was an omnipotent leader-figure and even after this authority was overthrown it could not be accepted - the implication was therefore that for the maintenance of group life, there is always the need for the perpetuation of a symbolic authority-figure that each member nevertheless secretly resents - even after the 'revolt'.

(d) A Metaphor for the historical evolution of the group concept

The relevance of these abstract philosophical arguments to developments toward the small experimental group in the twentieth century might appear obscure. But it will be shown how the theoretical notion of a patriarchal form of social organisation 'begetting' the fraternal, in fact mirrors a literal historical process of development for the small group concept.

1.2 THE NURSERY OF HUMAN NATURE

1.2.1 The Link Between Macro Constructs and Individual Psychology

(a) Breaking the mould of 'Simple and Sovereign' theories

Plato's and Aristotle's theories of social organisation were, as Allport (1968) remarks, characteristic of the 'simple and sovereign' type. Until these models ceased to be discrete approaches (the psychology of the individual detached from the sociology of the State), the emergence of the small group as an intermediate explanatory device could not be realised. The gap between the individual's 'natural urges', and society or the 'state' as the regulator and inhibitor of these, was too wide. This tendency toward monistic explanations persisted in these and other forms until late in the nineteenth century when as precursor to the 'organic' and 'mechanical' distinction offered by Durkheim, Tonnies suggested the possibility of a dualistic basis for social unity with the publication in 1887 of "Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft".

(b) The negative view of the Gemeinschaft type

However,the implications of this work were not fully exploited for nearly 50 years; for Tonnies saw the Gemeinschaft societal type as belonging to a bygone era and felt that its function at the time was mainly a negative one in that the existence of these kinds of bonds hindered the development of the Gesellschaft society. This feeling was echoed by most social thought at the time. The major interest was in broad societal trends, and the significant influence of the

historicism and political orientation of Marx and others contributed to a situation where sociological interest focused upon what new social structures were forming in the wake of the industrial revolution, rather than those that were breaking up. The achievement of the 'Great Society' was being pursued, and although the existence of intermediate groups, between the dislodged individual and the larger social system were accepted, the underlying new psychology was still individual rather than social psychological.

An exception to this tendency was to be found most notably perhaps in the work of Durkheim who in "Suicide" stressed the importance of primary group ties for the operation of personal control, and in "The Division of Labour" for societal control. However, although the importance of micro units was emphasised, Durkheim was primarily concerned with the negative effects on individuals deprived of these bonds, not the nature of the bonds per se.

(c) The first positive specification of the Gemeinschaft type

It is Cooley (1909) who is most frequently accredited with having first given the Gemeinschaft concept consideration for its own sake; although recognition of the significance of the strong affiliative ties in the family (its model form) had been a persistent underlying theme in social thought. In his structured specification of the 'Primary Group' he outlined two principal hypotheses. Firstly, that the family unit acted as a vehicle for the internalisation of societal norms in the child that persisted into adult life; and, secondly, that primary groups continued to sustain and direct the individual. His emphasis on the plasticity of human nature,

originating in the small social group, plugged the 'gap' that had existed between individual psychology and the sociology of the state; these could now be understood as overlapping systems with the primary group as an intermediary unit for the socialisation of the former into the latter - "the nursery of human nature".

(d) Early psychological research on group influence

There was, however, other research that fuelled a growing interest in the small group. For example, at the turn of the century there was a number of psychologists who usefully demonstrated the influence that the group had upon individuals' behaviour. In 1897 Triplett concerned himself with a 'dynamogenic' effect that occurred when people were together in competition rather than alone. And both Moede (1914) in Germany and Allport (1924) in the USA, although not dealing with groups as vehicles of socialisation, indicated the importance of groups as anchorages of individual behaviour.

(e) Early sociological field work on group influence

However, the seeds for the 1950s boom in small group research, sown by Cooley, were cultivated by a series of studies from a more sociological perspective that took place 'in the field'. For example, Mayo (1933) in his industrial studies emphasised the positive importance of informal groupings in a formal context by suggesting not only that individual output could be affected by group ties, but also (more in line with Cooley's suggestion) that a general state of anomie could be avoided in a work situation by the introduction and encouragement of informal groupings. In addition, there was research born of the realisation that there were other

kinds of small groups with which the individual could have binding relations. These studies, unlike Mayo's (1933), were motivated by the idea that the social control of a wider society had failed and that certain small groupings re-established it for deviant ends. Thus, Thrasher in "The Gang" (1927) demonstrated the influence of primary group membership in the facilitation of criminal activities. Along with Whyte's similar (and particularly influential) study of "Street Corner Society" (1943), the significance of the 'peer group' (hinted at in Cooley's specification by his reference to 'play-groups') was also emphasised.

Modelled initially on recognition of the special nature of solidarity in the family group, it was then the systematic specification of Gemeinschaft characteristics (also referred to as 'mechanical' or 'patriarchal') that provided an intermediary socialising unit to link the constraints of macro societal constructs to the psychology of the individual.

(f) The return of the macro model

It is ironic, but perhaps only to be expected, therefore that ultimately researchers like RF Bales would be led via these theoretical advances and the empirical studies (for he was greatly influence by Whyte's work) to seek the Gesellschaft characteristics of macro constructs in this unit of transmission; thus his analysis of small groups proceeded:

> "... according to the model provided by full scale social-systems ...". (Bales 1951)

One might almost conclude that the bias that hindered the

realisation of the full implications of Tonnies' original distinction re-surfaced after a brief, but crucial, corrective detour. The question therefore arises as to how, or why, it was that this kind of analysis apparently proceeded without appropriate consideration of Gemeinschaft characteristics, the original specification of which had enabled it. The answer may lie in the fact that 'patriarchal begat the fraternal' in terms other than the theoretical. For Bales' research took place primarily in the laboratory medium (as indeed did the majority of studies that constituted the 1950's boom in small group research); and there is a sense in which neglected 'patriarchal' features of this medium actually underwrote, in practical terms, his most crucial theoretical assumptions.

(g) Small group accessibility to macro theorists

There were issues other than the theoretical behind the growing attraction of the small group concept in explaining behaviour - almost so obvious as to be missed; its operational accessibility, that is, its size, and 'face to face' character. It is for this reason that Simmel's early work (1908) stipulating size as an important determinant of the form of social relations was so significant. For not only had propositions regarding social influence upon behaviour been in theoretical difficulty when using macro constructs, but they could rarely have an empirical base. Whereas in the small group it seemed self-evident that social processes and influences (including the reflection of macro Gesellschaft characteristics) could actually be observed and attributed to an identifiable source.

(h) Problems in the field for the macro model

This was one of the main reasons for the impact of the rash of community studies in the 1920s and 1930s mentioned above. However, the empirical problem was not so easily solved. For although this research seemed to offer a solution to the failure of macro units of analysis to account for wide variations in behaviour (by demonstrating the practical utility of micro units), in 'the field' a new problem arose. It was soon realised that there were few, if any, systematic methods available which were capable of unambiguously isolating and identifying natural-state groups from their social milieu. After Cooley's original specification, therefore, the almost wholesale shift in small group research to the laboratory medium (that in effect provided the solution to this problem) represented the next important landmark in the development of small group theory.

1.3 THE PREFERENCE FOR LABORATORY GROUPS

1.3.1 The Boundary Problem

(a) Limitations of sociometric methods

Cooley was also one of the first to offer tentative proposals for an operational definition of a primary group - a feeling of mutual solidarity expressed in the term 'we'. Moreno (1943), too, was notable in this respect; for his 'sociometric' research tool not only attempted to tap the important dimension of emotional relations

among group members in a quantifiable way, but the technique seemed to present the possibility of distinguishing between the 'in group' and the 'out group', in these informal terms. Unfortunately, this early promise was not realised. For the emphasis was primarily upon dyadic relations and major innovators of the method did not afford full conceptual reality to the group; "... the group is only a metaphor and does not exist by itself ..." (Moreno 1949). Translation of the dyadic choices found within formal groups into choice clusters that might reveal the informal 'in group', was not satisfactorily achieved, for although reciprocated choice clusters within a formal organisation often seemed to suggest a grouping that had more Gemeinschaft characteristics than the formal organisation, precise membership boundaries and particular kinds of groups could not be identified.

(b) Limitations of quantifiable observation

Another developing set of methods available at the time for the identification and study of the natural-state group involved the observation of interaction. Development of these techniques was though restricted in scope by the need to maximise the reliability of the instruments, and reduce their reliance upon the ability, sensitivity and interpretative stance of the observer. In response to these demands, early observation methods concentrated on working with 'non-evaluative' categories like the length and frequency of interactions.

Representative of these 'time and frequency' types of analysis was the work of Chapple and Arensburg (1940). But such attempts did not manage to overcome the problems encountered by the sociometricians.

For, broadly speaking, they too were only concerned with the actions of individuals, and when attempts were made to delineate groups through specifying that there was a greater incidence of interaction between members of the in-group than between others in a given field, it became apparent that they could not determine what degree of interaction specified what kind of group. Therefore, as Homans (1947), an 'interactionist' himself, noted, these group definitions were indeterminate and "entirely relative".

(c) Limitations of qualitative observation

With emphasis upon description rather than quantification, there was also the research mentioned above with an anthropological flavour that adopted techniques of participant observation. These techniques could successfully identify the group in natural surround, but their effectiveness relied heavily upon the skill of the particular observer in question - between different observers the groups isolated could vary. Whyte's "Street Corner Society" (1943) once again proved to be one of the most influential of this type of study. But his account through its attention to detail seemed more objective than it really was, for there was in fact no attempt to collect quantitative data. His influence upon later interactionists, including Bales (1951), arose from the fact that he not only demonstrated the importance of groups for individuals and the larger social systems in which they embedded, but also analysed group properties in terms of the interaction among individuals.

1.3.2 The Laboratory Solution

(a) Early demonstrations of laboratory group atmospheres

The advances small group study made in the laboratory medium seemed to endorse its potential for transcending these kinds of problems encountered by research in the field. Two of the most influential of the early researchers in the laboratory were Sherif (1935) and Lewin and his colleagues at the Iowa Child Research Station. Indeed, their classic studies set the scene for the post-war boom in small group analysis. In particular, Lewin, Lippitt and Whyte's experiments (1939) which attempted to study the effects of experimentally induced social climates and different styles of leadership upon the group as a whole (and upon individual members) had wide influence. For apart from simply stimulating interest in the area of small groups through the political implications and possible applications of their work, they firmly demonstrated that a group atmosphere could be created in the laboratory and experimentally manipulated. Further, they managed to help make the 'group' concept more acceptable to psychologists - by handling groups experimentally they showed that groups per se embodied intrinsic characteristics.

(b) The 'arrival' of the small group concept 'in the laboratory'

The 'arrival' of the small group concept therefore coincided with, and was confirmed by, an upsurge in laboratory research in the 1950s. For the medium constituted in effect a new research tool, the use of which was encouraged both by the self-evident advantages of experimental control and the impressive results of Sherif and Lewin. But, equally important, shifting research to the laboratory solved

the problem - still pertinent today - of identifying group boundaries in the natural-state. With an early (and now more recent, cf. Steiner 1986) concentration of interest in groups' influences upon the individual, these could not be unambiguously specified without a clear idea of how far a group boundary extended in its social milieu, or how substantial it was in psychological terms.

(c) The contingency of sociological advances on artificial boundary closure

The emerging theoretical advances toward a 'sociology' of small groups, exemplified by Bales' (1951) work, achieved a relatively short-lived pre-eminence by turning this emphasis around to concentrate upon how person and situation variables influence the group/social system. But there is a sense in which these 'advances' were also contingent on the convenient guarantee of 'boundary closure' provided in the experimental situation. For one of the most important theoretical components of Bales' functionalism was the notion of a 'closed system' (cf., Znaniecki 1934) of (in this case) interaction; and the artificial, bounded environment of the laboratory provided a concrete operational counterpart to this essentially analytical construct. With the circumscription of the small group system coinciding so conveniently with the 'boundary closure' of controlled experimentation, experimenters were unlikely to consider an overlying system context that might include the fraught methodological implications of their own involvement in the experimental process - especially if the nature of this 'involvement' (as the group's creator) strongly suggested the relevance of a model of group life contrary to their own.

The laboratory medium of research therefore had an important part to play in establishing the small group concept, by allowing for and promoting its efficacy as an explanatory device. However, even though it was firmly established at the interface of the social and the psychological to the relative satisfaction of each discipline, attempts to define what constituted the formation of 'group' phenomena during the period, illustrate the persistent tendency for approaches to the small group to reflect a social or psychological bias. These definitions will therefore be compared and discussed for theoretical assumptions, as well as practical guarantees of 'boundary closure', can continue to distract attention away from what might be the necessary antecedents to this event.

CHAPTER TWO: THE GENERIC GROUP CONCEPT

SUMMARY

The chapter reviews a range of 1950s and 1960s opinion divided in terms of psychological and sociological conceptualisations of what constitutes the formation of group phenomena. The problematic nature of group phenomena to the former view and the assumption of the omnipresence of group life to the latter are noted. Psychological definitions are found to reflect a concern with groups' emotional and motivational evolution and the existence of a substantive commonality in utilitarian, self-reflexive or psycho-analytic terms. The sociological view is characterised by a size-specific contentless definition of face-to-face interactive interdependence with some instances of a concern with a history of interaction. It is noted that this perspective precludes the consideration of significant artifactoral factors in laboratory group life that coincide with the major areas of concern in the psychological view on group formation.

General Introduction

The term 'Group' has unfortunately been hopelessly generic. The precise specification of a class of phenomena that includes the variety of groups in evidence, and yet distinguishes these from other social entities, has not proved a straightforward task. Moreover, the divergent social and psychological perspectives that have been brought to bear on the phenomena have only served to confuse the issue further.

For example, Cartwright and Zander (1968) approached the problem by noting that the tendency in group study had been to restrict the area of enquiry to a manageable form by classifying groups according to the predetermined presence or absence of certain properties, so that generalisations about a particular category would necessarily apply to pre-specified kinds of groups. As a result, this approach generated a series of dichotomies to describe different group 'types' (e.g., primary-secondary, formal-informal). They proposed that it would be more fruitful if the criteria that have been used to identify these types were rather considered as 'variables' within a general theory of groups (e.g., amount of physical interaction, kind of objective, or size) and that these variables should be examined with a view to "... discovering how they affect group life" (1968).

The problem with this approach is that 'variables' like, for example, 'amount of face-to-face interaction' have also been used to define what is conceptualised as 'group life' in the first instance. It is debatable therefore whether it is logically consistent to ask how the same variable affects 'group life', if there is a threshold

for this kind of interaction that must be attained before the phenomena under study can properly be considered the function of a 'group' - unless, of course, the notion of 'group life' is meant to include considerations prior to the group's inception. Where, then, does 'group life' begin in this view?

The approach is in fact representative of the functional, 'sociological' perspective of Bales (discussed above) that assumed the omnipresence of 'group life' and therefore reduced the problem of 'boundary closure' (or identifying the point where 'group life' begins) to the analytical task of system circumscription. For it was a basic tenet of this branch of sociological theory that society was prior to the individual. The 'socialised' individual was never in isolation 'outside' omnipresent social systems at one level or another; as he moved between them boundaries dissolved around one only to immediately re-include him into another. In short, there was an essential 'continuity' assumed between all social systems. The evolutionary origins of the small group system, from this perspective, were therefore considered a 'given'.

A 'psychological' perspective on groups would not, however, be automatically consentient to this basic tenet; for approached from this standpoint the very notion of a 'group' is inherently problematic. This difference in theoretical emphasis was exemplified in the 'Group Mind Debate' around the issue of how a group can be greater than the sum of its individual parts and yet equal to them. Of the two main protagonists, Allport's (1924) 'psychological' position was that: "... the individual in a crowd behaves as he would alone, only more so ..." (1954) . In other words, conceiving

the 'reality' of the 'greater part' was problematic in terms other than the 'collective individual'; for his interest in the group was in its influence upon the individual. McDougal (1920), on the other hand, argued that individuals can develop an organisation that survives them (an 'individual collective'). This latter position was on occasion seduced into the temptation of reasoning by analogy to the 'living' organism (i.e., Spencer 1876) (4); while the former in a spirit of logical positivism decried 'armchair speculation' but came close to an absurd denial of the validity of 'field' or 'relational' concepts.

Contemporary, mainstream 'sociological' and 'psychological' perspectives are not, of course, still overtly engaged in this debate, but their respective emphases remain. For although equal, 'reality' can now be attributed to the group and the individual, in the sense that both are analytical constructs not concrete entities with the study of each simply demarcating a different 'level' of analysis; theoretical preferences continue to infiltrate, as they did, for example, when Krech and Crutchfield (1948) distinguished three such 'levels' but then went on to afford a more basic nature to the individual.

A discerning eclecticism can be advantageous with regard to the 'group' concept; where, for example, social psychological data is examined from both the concrete individual point of view as well as the more abstract sociological perspective. This approach is

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(4) With the removal of these analogical implications, the debate's resolution paved the way for the advance of the sociological perspective on groups.

favoured here with regard to experimental groups, for it may be that a strictly sociological frame of reference actually precludes the identification of certain crucial phenomena occurring at the point of their 'boundary closure' - that stand in stark relief in the psychological frame. By taking up again the traces of 'patriarchal' and 'fraternal' archetypes, and following through the respective group definitions of each perspective, key principals can be identified that demand the recognition of these phenomena.

2.1 PSYCHOLOGICALLY-INFLUENCED GROUP CONCEPTS

2.1.1 'Substantial' Group Definitions

(a) Distinctive developed sets of social relations

Because there is no assumption of 'continuity' between social systems, this perspective tends to give the evolutionary processes that conspire toward the development of a group (from a collection of individuals) serious consideration in each case; this is reflected in what tend to be more 'substantial', 'fully-fledged' definitions of groups. Characteristic of these was Sherif's (1954) statement that stressed a developed social unit - one with a history:

> "A group is defined as a social unit which consists of a number of individuals who at a given time stand in (more or less) definite interdependent status and role relationships to one another and which explicitly or implicitly possesses a set of norms or values regulating the behaviour of individual members, at least in matters of consequence to the group."

(b) Group formation and survival on a strong motivational basis

The point emphasised by Sherif was that in order for a group to be properly distinguished from any blanket term that might be used to refer to an aggregate of individuals, there was need of a "distinctive set of social relations". However, Sherif (op. cit.,) and Sherif and Sherif (1964) also emphasised that such relations only had a chance of developing where:

> "Individuals come together ... and stay together, because they experience some strong motivational basis for doing so."

2.1.2 Emphases in Types of Commonality

(a) Utilitarian

There seem to be three broad emphases in the psychological trend which stress some form of substantive common purpose or commonality binding group members one to another: they will be referred to here as the 'utilitarian', the 'self-reflexive' and the 'psycho-analytic'. Cattell's (1952) formulation is characteristic of the first:

> "... a group is an aggregate of organisms in which the existence of all is utilised for the satisfaction of each."

Or, alternatively, groups are formed because:

> "its members are better able to satisfy their personal needs by being members than by being isolates" (Tyron 1950)

In these cases groups were seen as satisfying individual needs through some common purpose; individual motivation was linked to, and thus influenced by a group goal. The emphasis was clearly upon the value of the group to the individual through this central goal. There were others however who stressed the significance of this common purpose in more general terms, as in the case of Mills (1967)

> " .. small groups are .. units composed of two or more persons who come into contact for some purpose, and consider their contact meaningful .."

(b) Self-reflexive

Characteristic of the 'self-reflexive' emphasis was Olmstead (1959) who, in addition to stressing the quality of the common goal, introduced another factor by stating that the group is:

> "... a plurality of individuals who are in contact with one another, who take one another into account, and who are aware of some significant commonality."

The implication here (also found in the early Greek philosophers) was that it is an important feature of groups that there should be the perception of unity by each individual. Deutsch (1968) too placed emphasis here but, unlike Olmstead, was careful to specify the nature of the goals required for the group to be interdependent:

> "A sociological group exists (has unity) to the extent that the individuals comprising it are pursuing promotively interdependent goals. A psychological group exists (has unity) to the extent that the individuals comprising it perceive themselves as pursuing promotively interdependent goals."

(c) Psycho-analytic

The final and most explicitly psychological definition, not only in

its formulation but also in regard to the interests in the psychological consequences of groups upon individuals that lay behind it, came from Freud (1921). He, too, felt that there was need of some essential 'commonality', but centred this around a focal idea or, more especially, person:

> "A primary group ... is a number of individuals who have substituted one and the same object for their ego-ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego."

(d) Summary of major features

Broadly speaking then, 'psychological' conceptualisations in one way or another have tended to emphasise the necessity of some meaningful motivational and emotional grounds for group formation, and continuation, and the need for psychological awareness of membership. This 'commonality' inherent in groups (i.e. goals, values, norms, or Freud's ego-ideal) is clearly a crucial part of their make-up, for it is apparent that groups that form of their own volition must by definition meet in order 'to do' or 'be' something in common, and with no volition common fate will generate a common purpose. However, emphasis purely on 'commonality' produces too broad a class of phenomena, for it is quite possible to conceive of a number of persons with a common purpose who never meet. A crucial feature of sociological conceptualisations corrects this flaw.

2.2 SOCIOLOGICALLY-INFLUENCED CONCEPTUALISATIONS

2.2.1 Concepts Common and Supplementary to the Psychological View

(a) The importance of face-to-face contact

For the satisfaction of a sociological conception of the group, persons must at least come into contact with one another, ideally through face-to-face contact. The accent upon this criteria can though be seen as representative of a movement away from the definitions above that delineate more developed, substantive kinds of group.

(b) The concept of interdependence as common ground

There is, however, a concept that perhaps more than any other, outlines some common ground between the two types of group definition - the notion of interdependence, although the variation in degree and quality of interdependence conceived is enormous. For example, the utilitarian emphasis noted above, explicitly describes a common understanding of the term as each member of a group being necessary to the other for the satisfaction of 'needs'. Whereas a sociological perspective by approaching the group as a closed social system considers interaction therein to be by definition a form of 'minimal' interdependence in the sense that any change in the state of group member X1 is necessarily followed by a change in member X2, which in turn leads to a change in X1. In other words, persons' acts are meaningfully inter-related (or interdependent) one to another in the interaction process.

However, even within this perspective there are those who at least imply that 'boundary closure' requires more than analytical circumscription, by insisting that interdependence is a more developed consequence of a history of interaction (in the form of

interlocking roles, or controlling norms).

(c) The insufficiency of the homogeneity concept

In addition to the 'interaction' and 'common goals' factors, another necessary condition for a group must be that the use of the term as a description of homogeneous characteristics is not sufficient. Kurt Lewin (1948), a gestalt psychologist who moved toward sociological functionalism, pointed to this feature in addition to subscribing to the interactive view of interdependence, and therefore provides a useful starting point for 'sociological' definitions:

> "The essence of a group is not the similarity or dissimilarity of its members, but their interdependence. A group can be characterised as a 'dynamic whole'; this means that a change in the state of any subpart changes the state of any other subject. The degree of interdependence of the subparts or members of any group varies all the way from a loose mass to a compact unit."

This formulation also outlined clearly the variance that exists within the sociological notion of interdependence. From this point, therefore, group definitions will be dealt with by moving down a continuum from those that strive to be more complete, towards those that only aim to describe a 'minimum', size-specific, but content-less kind.

2.2.2 Degrees of Sociological Interdependence

(a) Importance placed upon a history of interaction

Hare (1962) also recognised that there is no definite cutting point along the continuum between a collection of individuals and a fully

organised group; but went on to stress that there must be some history of interaction and outlined another four group features that emerge from this:

> "They share a common goal and set of norms, which give direction and limits to their activity. They also develop a set of roles, and a network of interpersonal attraction, which serve to differentiate them from other groups."

Merton (1957), in attempting to differentiate conceptually the notion of the 'reference group' from reference persons and other social categories, also implied the necessity for a history of interaction:

> "... one objective criterion of the group ... (is) ... the frequency of interaction."

Further, he remarked that the sociological concept of the group should refer to interaction according to some patterned form, or social relations of some kind, while recognising that these structures often only remain implicit in this kind of definition. A re-statement therefore included:

> "... enduring morally established forms of social interaction, self-definition as a member and the same definition by other."

(b) Minimalistic group definitions

It is clear then, that sociological definitions have on occasion stressed the importance of the consequences of a history of interaction that lead to a 'fully-fledged' group (and even 'self-reflexive criteria, e.g., Merton above) , but rarely it seems the origins of some substantive 'commonality'. McFeat (1974),

for example. in a more recent formulation designed to permit the comparative analysis of the cultures in experimental and natural-state groups, quite explicitly glosses over these processes:

> "Groupings emerge in situations, thus making them both perceptual and measurable events. Participants may experience groupings without any commitment to a group nor in any sense of group membership. We refer, for example, to meetings or encounters wherein each person at least perceives some impressions of others."

This formulation owes much to the work of Bales whose influential approach defines a group in a way that is only marginally more substantial:

> "A small group is defined as any number of persons engaged in interaction with another in a single face to face meeting or series of such meetings, in which each member receives some impression or perception of each other member distinctive enough so that he can, either at the time or in later questioning, give some reaction to each of the others as an individual person, even though it be only to recall that the other person was present." (1951)

The boundary closure of such a 'group' is clearly contingent on very little; for this 'definition' is only an outline of the prerequisites for 'minimal' interdependence, where acts are meaningfully inter-related one to another in analytically closed interactive systems. As such it is the least 'substantial' but in a sense the 'purest' representative of the sociological perspective.

2.2.3 Conclusion

(a) the importance of an eclectic view

A more eclectic view of the 'group' concept must reconcile the fact

that this approach is one where the 'social system', although used interchangeably with the 'group' concept, is in reality a deductively derived analytical frame of reference brought to bear in the service of theoretical universality and the operational convenience of Bales' observational method. In so far as this frame of reference and the method it underscored were paradigmitic in the advances toward a sociology of small laboratory groups, further investigation of his 'group' concept, when set against a background of 'psychological' group criteria, reveals significant areas of group life that have tended to be analytically excluded.

2.3 A MIXED MARRIAGE OF GROUP CONCEPTS

2.3.1 Closer Scrutiny of Bales' Group Concept

(a) Excluded phenomena and major assumptions

Bales' (and McFeat's) stated purpose was then only to specify the kind of phenomena that would be accessible to his method of on-going, all-inclusive behavioural classification through which a group and its properties were inferred:

> "... the immediate purposes of definition are to determine the kind of group to which the technique may be applied ..." (Bales 1951).

Factors like the emotional and motivational grounds for group formation stressed by the 'psychological' perspective, were not accessible to Bales' technique of 'Interaction Process Analysis' and were therefore excluded by him. But, as intimated above, it is

difficult to determine the extent to which an experimental guarantee of boundary closure enabled (or created an artifactoral equivalent to) the theoretical assumptions that underwrote this approach. Clearly, the emphasis functionalism placed on the 'continuity' and integration of social systems, distracted attention from sources of change and the "fruitless quest for origins" (Moore 1963). but from a psychological perspective, this amounts to an assumption of the inevitability of group formation, or the omnipresence of group 'influence' being in evidence. For Bales' sociological advance of concentrating upon how person and situation variables influence the group, meant focusing on the group process and internal dynamics of an entity that must already by definition exist.

(b) Bales' hidden hypothesis for group dimensions and structure

Indeed, implicit within the theoretical underpinnings of Bales' observation system, there was necessarily incorporated this 'influence' of a group upon its members, in the sense that group members were conceived as having to address particular and universal functional problems of the system/group in order to ensure its survival. The acts he categorised were interpreted in terms of how they represented attempted solutions to these problems. In short, his all-inclusive system of categories constituted a set of hypotheses about the main structure and dimensions of a 'group', deductively derived from sociological principles. It is here that Bales' underlying, true notion of a group is to be found.

2.3.2 A Critical Psychological Perspective on Bales' Group Concept

(a) Problems of external validity

Sherif (1956) from a 'psychological' perspective was particularly concerned in his research with the necessary antecedents to group formation in the natural-state, and was therefore well placed to point to one of the problems with this notion of a group; and his concern with the external validity of Bales' findings has found support (i.e. Liek 1963, O'Rourke 1963):

> "Such research does not embody the conditions essential to group formation in actual life namely, interaction over a time span in relation to goals which are significant to all individuals. Therefore direct extrapolations of findings from such transitory situations to behaviour in organised groups is usually not warranted. However in some studies interaction and communication are seen in the process of stabilisation." (Sherif 1956)

The ambivalence in this statement reflects one of the more subtle, but pervasive problems that can arise with the generic nature of the 'group' concept, due to different theoretical perspectives. For Sherif recognised that these 'transitory' groups did not fulfil the conditions necessary for group formation in the natural state - then hinted to the contrary with his statement on 'stabilisation'. It seems that Sherif was at least implying that if the 'stabilisation of communication and interaction' constituted the inevitable formation of a 'group', then it represented a substantially different kind of 'group' from those that concerned him.

Homan's (1950) 'proximity-conviviality' hypothesis, that in a closed system frequency of interaction will somehow necessarily lead to a 'structure of relations', 'solidarity' or a 'group', might well constitute further support for the validity and efficacy of this

kind of 'transitory' group phenomena. However, reference for example to psychological criteria like 'awareness of group membership' or more specifically 'awareness of the expected duration of a group' to be found in Merton's (1957) provisional list of group properties, raises further doubt. For example, in the experimental groups to which these assumptions have been applied, participants awareness of the transitory and artificial nature of their group may profoundly restrict the integrity or meaning of their resultant 'solidarity'.

(b) Problems of internal validity

There may though be a more fundamental problem related to the internal validity of Bales' hypothesis regarding the main dimensions of group process and structure contained in his system of categorisation - especially in its application to the laboratory group. For Bales' instrument abstracts only the 'top line' of a complex 'score' of interaction (5); he approaches social psychological phenomena only from the abstract sociological perspective. And although his system was designed to be exhaustive at this chosen level of abstraction, he provided no independent criteria to facilitate a decision on whether the patterns of established relations found at this level are necessarily the most important to either the sociology of groups in general, or the internal lives of the laboratory groups upon which his original research was based.

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(5) Because his categories were deduced from a functional interpretation of the essential properties of a problem-solving interaction system.

However, the psychological group criteria discussed above (especially given their peculiar relevance to the laboratory groups that are of interest here) can to some extent independently inform the latter of these two issues by questioning the extent to which the meaningful application of Bales' problem-solving frame of reference necessarily pre-supposes a population, psychologically 'involved' in, or 'committed' to the internal or external functional problems of the system/group (cf. Smith and White 1983). For with no such psychological 'grounding' it might follow that the 'structure of relations' that emerges from this frame of reference is of little relevance or importance to the groups' internal life. Clearly, the satisfaction of psychological criteria like emotional and motivational grounds for group formation, the meaning or significance of goals to members, and an awareness or anticipation of more than transitory membership, would provide this kind of grounding.

(c) Allowances made in the Balesian scheme

With characteristic thoroughness, Bales was himself aware of the consequences of the fact that his group did not fulfil these criteria:

> "... the experimental system is evanescent in time and does not deeply engage the constituent personalities, i.e. requires only slight commitments from them, it is a 'minor' subculture ..." (1956)

Indeed, the issue could be accommodated while retaining the integrity of his frame of reference by posing the question: what other system context might "... engage the constituent personalities ..." more than the problem-solving interactive system that

constituted his notion of a group? The answer has important implications, for in Bales' laboratory groups the immediate overlying system context within which his interactive system is embedded (and from which it is circumscribed) includes the experimenter himself, and by implication the practices of controlled experimentation.(6)

Bales, at least initially, saw no problem with his loci of boundary closure. There are a number of reasons for this, not the least of which is that because he was concerned with codifying the universal properties of all social systems, his 'experimental system', however 'minor', was thought to reflect these as much as any other; he was explicitly:

> "... developing a more adequate body of theory relevant to the analysis of full scale social systems." (1951)

(d) The new organicism

Martindale (1961) is not alone in recognising that this perspective on small groups is in effect only a reformulation of classical nineteenth century 'organicism':

> "It is difficult to escape the impression that with sociological functionalism, the field has come full circle. The concept of organicism has been refurbished and upholstered with new analogies and terminology...".

But what has been the fate of those principles of social

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(6) As will be seen below (see p. 102) Bales was also fully aware that his laboratory group members were: "... first and last 'subjects' vis-a-vis the 'experimenter .." (1956)

organization which stressed the patriarchal family archetype, as opposed to these fraternal principles - Gierke's (1881) 'Herrschaft' (as opposed to Genossenschaft)? H Maine's (1901) 'Patriarchal' (as opposed to contractual authority systems)? And Sir Robert Filmer's 'Patriarcha' (attacked by Locke's version of 'brotherhood' in the "First Treatise of Civil Government") - those principles that informed Tonnies' 'Gemeinschaft' and subsequently Durkheim's 'mechanical' forms of solidarity? They can be found, as Brown (1966) suggested, clearly expressed in Freud's essentially problematic conception of the group, with its emphasis upon a leader-centred organisation and emotional life; or, more generally, a 'psychological' perspective on small groups.

(e) The theoretical confines of Bales' purpose

The theoretical confines of Bales' stated purpose precluded adequate consideration of this perspective. If he had been more concerned with his laboratory groups satisfying the kinds of psychological criteria discussed above, he might well have spotted his own crucial role in their evolutionary origins. Alternatively, had his frame of reference been informed by these principals he might have looked for and found the leader of a patriarchal archetype in the experimenter. As it was, the "... shadow .." of patriarchy may in reality (as well as in philosophical abstraction) have underwritten his elaboration of the fraternal archetype.

It is also tempting to speculate that had the research discussed in the introduction, on 'artifact' in the laboratory group, pre-dated and informed Bales' original work, he might well have given more than passing consideration to an overlying system context that

included the most important source of this artifact - the experimenter; and therefore be forced to come to terms with the peculiar relevance of a 'patriarchal' model to laboratory groups. As it was, his eventual response ("Personality and Interpersonal Behaviour" 1970) to the implications of artifact research (or the phenomenological influences that lay behind it) was like many small group researchers, to emerge from behind the one way mirror, changing his role from 'observer' to that of 'trainer', rather than investigate the artifactoral influence of his pre-emergent role. He never returned to explore the implications for his original 'sociological' frame of reference, of subsequent research on experimental artifact. This has been attempted here via a review of this body of work.

CHAPTER THREE: EXPERIMENTAL ARTIFACT

SUMMARY

The chapter surveys the 1960s and 1970s research on experimental artifact from the point of view of subject situation and experimenter variables to validate the existence of a covert dimension to subject behaviour that is a function of their controlled relationship with experimenters. Characteristics of the volunteer-student sample are reviewed and a covert dimension to their compliance with the experimenter that defers to him for information or as an evaluating audience is identified. Situational factors that discourage involvement in assigned tasks and the additional interaction task of a type I group are noted. Covert involvements are found to be accentuated by experimental controls and frustrated in a type I format. A task-ability/self-quality distinction in tasks is used to demonstrate the parallel existence of overt task compliance and covert involvements where the former is used as a vehicle for the solution of the concerns of the latter. The accentuation of the experimenters influence through situational and performance factors is discussed to the point where he might be considered in some sense a part of a system of interaction with his subject(s).

General Introduction

The variation in theoretical conceptualisations of small group phenomena detailed in the last chapter is to some extent mirrored in the different ways in which groups are actually manipulated by investigators. Therefore prior to an investigation of some of the artifactoral influences created by Bales' 'pre-emergent' experimenters role in the 1950s (influences that are excluded from consideration by his limiting sociological frame of reference), distinctions will be made between the different types of group format that can be the subject of investigation so that the one to which the arguments here pertain can be identified. There are five major types:

I. The most common format consists of an ad hoc grouping of four to seven students, with no prospect for long-term interaction, no prior knowledge of, or relations with, one another, and only their assigned task to act as a group goal. Because these groups are usually assembled in the laboratory to enable the observation of interaction, their tasks tend to be designed to elicit a full range of interactive behaviours (i.e., Bales' use of 'human relations' problems to produce 'fully-fledged' interactions). Such groups therefore have in effect two tasks, the undisclosed 'interaction task' and the assigned vehicle for this; subjects' performance on the goal interior to the latter is of only marginal interest to the experimenter.

II. This type is only differentiated from the first in that there are specific additional experimental manipulations that are introduced (like the incorporation of a 'stooge') in order to induce

particular behaviours.

III. Here collectivities are given the opportunity to develop into groups over a period of time or as a result of specific manipulations; but the exigencies of 'time treasure and troth' mean that this variation is rarely used.

IV. The fourth type of group distinguished here refers to those that have a life-history of some kind before they are brought into the laboratory environment; such groups therefore are 'developed' to some degree before they encounter the experimenter - they are not created by him.

V. Finally, there are groups that can be generically referred to as T-groups. They have some of the characteristics of types I and II, but their significant differences are, firstly, that the investigator becomes a 'Trainer' and includes himself in his group as a participant observer; and, secondly, the group's task concerns the investigation of its own internal processes.

The type I group format is that which is of interest here, and the one primarily adopted by Bales and others (cf., Bales and Hare 1965) for use in association with his Interaction Process Analysis, (although the type II could also be introduced to provide the opportunity for recording group profiles before and after some specific experimental manipulation). The success or failure of creating these groups in the laboratory was invariably seen in terms of the interaction of subjects with aspects of the situation that they were brought into contact with (e.g. the task, instructions or other subjects). Without consideration for the implications of the

pre-emergent experimenters artifactoral influence to be reviewed below (that suggest the relevance of a more psychological view of laboratory group formative processes and their consequences), such assumptions produce at least a sociologist's conception of a group - a face-to-face interaction system.

The type III and IV group formats, on the other hand, might be expected to be predominately associated with a psychological perspective, for they contain an implicit recognition of the need for laboratory groups to be more fully developed entities. The type V format describes those groups where the experimenter has shed his pre-emergent role and joined his group as a 'Trainer'; it was in this format that the significance of the experimenter's role as a leader figure first became apparent.

The type I group does not of course have the kind of sympathetic environment or purpose (as exists in type V) to allow any 'observer' or 'leader' related concerns that might be present to be manifest. Due to the overlying basis for the temporary arrangement between group subjects and their experimenter (in terms of experimenter being the undisputed authority with the subjects subordinate to him), subjects must discuss what they are told to discuss, and other topics or concerns like their feelings about their relation to him, are implicitly discouraged from being openly expressed - this does not though mean that such preoccupations do not exist , as for example Katz (1950) discovered.

It may be that this is a 'catch 22' situation from which the experimenter who wishes to investigate subjects' reactions to this experimentally controlled relationship cannot escape; unless methods

can be formulated for gaining access to a more 'covert' level of group process where any such issues must lie in some form. But the first and most important step in tackling the problems associated with inferring covert processes is to investigate the evidence there is to suggest their existence before an appropriate theoretical framework can be deduced within which identification and classification can proceed.

The first general observation that must be made about the review of the artifact research below is then, that it will be guided by a fundamental concern with its implications for a type I group situation; any observations in the literature that suggest or support the proposition that there is a covert dimension of experimental process largely concerned with the experimenter will therefore also necessarily be of special interest.

The use of the term 'artifact' below might in general terms be misleading for it implies 'artificiality' - a sense that is in fact inappropriate here. Laboratory research has, though, often been criticised in just these terms (e.g., Cicourel 1964, Argyris 1968, Harre 1979) where its equivalent to non-laboratory situations is questioned. Such concerns with external validity have reflected the general assumption that relative to other research methods, the experiment's weakness is in this area. However, much of the work to be discussed below questions what is usually considered the greatest strength of the laboratory medium - the control it enables over the confounding influence of extraneous variables. For the effect of this process of control can be to create another set of underlying influences; and the identification and investigation of these is

the domain of internal validity (7).

Broadly speaking, then. the 'artifact research' refers to a body of work (e.g., Rosenthal and Rosnow 1969, Rosenthal and Rosnow 1975) that has focused upon ways in which the laboratory situation is in fact far more 'real' (i.e. 'equivalent') than has been generally assumed. For the significance of many of the 'artifacts' that have been identified is best understood in terms of their constituting components of a 'real' social situation that includes the experimenter. An 'artifact' is then an extraneous variable that might constitute (or conjoin to reinforce) the residual 'man made' influences of the experimenter, either upon his subjects or within the relationship they share in the experimental process.

This perspective, although concerned primarily with single subject experiments, has a self-evident relevance to the proposition that the subject-group is a unique instance of experimental artifact. For instead of the investigation of how behavioural research constitutes a social situation that includes the experimenter (and produces artifacts), the issue becomes the quality and extent of the experimenter's participation in a new social unit, the existence of which he is directly responsible for. This research then provides a perspective on the 'pre-emergent' role of the experimenter - one that assumes a critical posture toward the methdological convenience of believing that the experimenter is 'detached' (in social or

(7) i.e. experimental group boundary closure not only exercises control over the range of stimuli accessible to subjects, but also over the group's membership boundaries. If, therefore, one member should dislike one or all of his chosen accomplices, withdrawal or antagonistic behaviours might be encouraged as the only alternative to quitting the group.

methodological terms) from the object of his investigations.

Merely to consider the experimenter under these circumstances as an extraneous variable is, then, a crucial advance; but as implied above there are other potentially extraneous variables that contribute to the interaction that constitutes his experiment with the single or group-subject and reinforce (or lessen) his influence. The review below will therefore consider experimental artifacts under three headings: (1) Subject variables, (2) Situation variables, and (3) Experimenter variables.

(1) Subject variables. It is usually some aspect of subjects' behaviour that is the dependent variable in a study. Their individual characteristics, expectations and motivations will, of course, have a bearing upon their participation in the experiment and its social character (i.e. their relationship with the experimenter).

(2) Situation variables. It is in the laboratory situation that subjects encounter and interact with the experimenter (and each other in group experiments). This situation is normally assumed to constitute or include the independent variable of a study in the form of instructions, the assigned task or the overall design of the controlled environment.

(3) Experimenter variables. More usually in small group research the experimenter would be considered one of the 'givens' in the situation, but here extraneous subject or situation variables are defined as artifacts through the nature of their relationship with or origins in the experimenter.

3.1 SUBJECT VARIABLES

3.1.1 The Volunteer Student Sample

(a) The student bias in sampling

Problems encountered by researchers with recruiting subjects outside the university environment have led to a situation where the majority of findings in behavioural research are based upon an extremely unrepresentative sample of the general population - students. For example, in his examination of the subjects used in all the studies published in two major American journals over a two-year period, Smart (1966) found that only 0.6 per cent were drawn from the general adult population. While 16 years later in a review of 1970s research drawn from four major social psychological journals, Higbee, Millard and Folkham (1982) still found fully 70 per cent opting for experimentation and the college student. Students are of course an unrepresentative sample of the general population in a number of ways, like for example their social class and levels of intelligence, but this is also true in terms of less obvious factors like their probable familiarity with, or understanding of experimental methods.

(b) The self-selecting volunteer sample

Moreover, even within a student sample a random selection does not tend to operate. For although subjects can be recruited on a compulsory basis (perhaps as part of a course requirement), many 'volunteer' and are therefore self-selecting, for 'volunteering' is

not a random event (cf., Rosenthal and Rosnow 1975) . For example, in a summary of studies relating to the special characteristics of volunteers, Rosenthal and Rosnow (1969) listed the most confident statements that could be made: they found a better education, higher intelligence, more need 'for approval' and less authoritarianism than with non-volunteers.

(c) Reasons for volunteering as a variable

Further, a subject's reasons for volunteering might also be an important variable. Orne (1962), Riecken (1962) and Rosenthal and Rosnow (1969) independently suggested a consensus on three broad volunteer motivations: 'gain' (either financial or in terms of course credits), 'interest/curiosity', and a desire to 'contribute to science'. Jackson and Pollard's (1966) study broadly concurred with these suggestions when they found among their subjects 50 per cent volunteering out of 'interest', 21 per cent for 'gain' and only 7 per cent to 'contribute to science'.

(d) The influence of subject variables on task performance

Although the problem has as yet only received limited attention in the research (i.e. Rosenthal and Rosnow 1969, Hood and Back 1967), it seems reasonable to suppose that aforementioned variables like motives for attendance, or differing volunteer characteristics might have some influence over subjects' performances on experimental tasks. For example, the volunteer-student characteristics discussed above might simply constitute a configuration of traits that make this kind of subject particularly well equipped to deal with certain types of experimental task; thus students might perhaps find the

human relations tasks used in type I groups an all too familiar counterpart to the seminar.

The kind of bias that such variables introduce may, though, be more pervasive than issues of external validity (e.g., volunteers or students achieving better task outcomes than the general population). More subtle questions might be raised about the internal validity of instruments developed and used in such a subject environment. For example, Bales' (1951) understanding of interaction in terms of a problem-solving frame of reference would tend to be confirmed by a subject sample of students who might be expected to work through the phases of the problem-solving cycle he proposed more readily and consistently than those with less 'analytically' trained thought processes.

3.1.2 Volunteer Compliance and Experimental Control

(a) Volunteer compliance

But perhaps the most important underlying feature of an act of 'volunteering' is the implicit agreement it entails to comply with an experimenter's (usually unknown) purposes. Indeed, Rosenthal and Rosnow (1966) found that volunteers were more susceptible to persuasive communications from the experimenter than 'non-volunteers'. The subject in fact agrees to place himself for a time under the 'control' of the experimenter. Clearly he knows that he can always withdraw (as some do) before, or during, the experiment; although this option can be made more difficult by any external institutional relationship between subject and the

experimenter. But once the subject is participating, the extent of his compliance or obedience to an experimenter's wishes has surprised researchers (8). Orne (1962) tested just such a dimension when he attempted to plumb the depths of boredom and/or discomfort to which subjects would be prepared to go at his behest - and was forced to capitulate before the subjects! In addition to long suffering toil and the infliction of pain on others,(9) subjects have also been found willing to undergo the risk of serious personal injury while under experimental instructions (Orne and Evans 1965).

(b) Compliance as a function of controlled experimentation

One available explanation for this kind of behaviour is that subjects assume the experimenter is in complete control of the situation in such a way as to prohibit anything harmful 'really' occurring. This kind of assumption is encouraged by the fact that it is more than likely that student subjects would be fully aware of the principles and methodology of 'controlled' experimentation. It is paradoxical that an associated (but in a way contrary) effect of student subjects' understanding and acceptance of this experimental 'control' is how they are also aware that it is often exercised for manipulation and misrepresentation (cf., Gross and Fleming 1982). In an experimental environment, therefore, suspicion and caution are the bedfellows of security and dependence.

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(8) It was the realisation of the existence of essentially the same 'compliant' tendencies that encouraged early acceptance of the notion that it was possible to 'create' small groups in the laboratory (cf., p.28 above)

(9) Milgram's (1963) experiments reinterpreted (i.e., Boutilier et al. 1980) were perhaps the most dramatic demonstrations of compliance.

(c) An historical perspective on experimental controls

The tendency for subjects to be viewed as mechanical objects to be manipulated, measured and controlled - an experimenter to subject relation more characteristic of M.Buber's 'I-it' than 'person to person relation' - has, though, not always been characteristic of experimental methodology (cf., Boring 1954 regarding the history of experimental control). The subjects used, for example, in Tichener's or Wundt's laboratories in the late nineteenth and early part of this century were usually psychologists themselves, who would undergo extensive training as observers for the task of introspection. Not all were accredited with the ability to act as subject-observer for it was generally held that there was a disposition for psychological research, although the required characteristics were never specified. This position relaxed somewhat and by 1912 Tichener considered it possible to train "... any normal person coming to the task with goodwill and appreciation ...". But the decline of satisfaction with the introspective method, and the concomitant rise of functionalism and behaviourism, turned the attention of investigators like J.B.Watson and R.F.Bales to the 'untrained naive' subject.

One element in the older experimenter to subject relationship though returned to favour in the phenomenological Zeitgeist of the 1960's (i.e., Greenberg 1967, Kelman 1967 and Journard 1968) - that subjects could be restored to their rightful place as 'active' participants in the experimental process. Role-playing and mutual self-disclosure became popular methods.

The standard tenets of the experimental method would though, of course, strongly disagree with such proposals. For although positive use is made of subjects as active sentient beings - the subject as subject - this practice in one sense involves an even greater intrusion by experimenters in their experiments - through their increased interaction with subjects. This increase reduces the distance between the experimenter and subject and in doing so also leads to a loosening of the 'controlled' relationship - and of experimental controls.

However, those who suggested more open contact between the experimenter and his subjects, did so in the light of research findings which suggested that, even when the experimenter does attempt to control his contact with subjects, he still constitutes an unintended source of influence on their behaviour (i.e. Rosenberg 1965). What these researchers hoped to achieve was an elimination of the root cause of suspicion among subjects and the exposure of the experimenter's influence so that it could be identified and understood. But this increased contact and openness between experimenter and his subjects is not possible in every kind of experiment. In this thesis, for example, an attempt is made to account for the influence of the experimenter when experimental controls are operating in their more usual fashion, but upon subjects conceived as 'active'. This 'influence' has been conceptualised in a number of ways that differ from that which is actually intended by the experimenter (the successful manipulation of independent variables), and it owes something to both sides of the experimenter to subject interaction implied. The emphasis in this section is upon the subjects' input to this relation.

3.1.3 The 'Covert-Deferent' Dimension to Subject Compliance

(a) Qualifications to compliance

A large part of this contribution arises out of the suspicion and caution tied up in subjects apparent compliance; they are simply not as 'naive' as many behaviourists would like to imagine. Argyris (1968) has remarked, for example, that subjects come into the laboratory "fully expecting to be deceived" (cf., also Gross and Fleming 1982). Such attitudes do not necessarily imply that subjects are somehow neurotically defensive; McGuire (1967) suggested that they are rather "... coterminious with the awareness variable ". Subjects are in this case then, 'active' interpreting beings and compliance must not be mistaken for a capitulation of the desire to discover the 'real' meaning of the situation that faces them. With the exception of knowledge regarding the experiment's 'true' purposes that subjects might be privy to by virtue of their own expertise, or perhaps campus rumour, the only available source of information regarding what it is that is 'really' going on, is whatever they can infer from what the experimenter does or does not do or say - their compliance is perhaps not therefore unconditional.

(b) Deference to unintentional aspects of experimenter performance

One way of conceptualising this implied qualification within subjects co-operation is to propose a 'deferential' dimension to their 'compliance' - a 'deference' to the experimenter which must not be confused with a state of compliance with him. The need for this distinction arises out of consideration of the subject as an active sentient, rather than passive being. For the meaning of

deference intended is to 'refer to for information', not necessarily 'to submit to'. Deference and compliance are then, two different perspectives on the same overlying dimension of the experimenter to subject relationship; and the distinction ultimately rests upon the consequences of the behaviour pattern in each case. When totally compliant, the subject accepts without question the instruction set given by the experimenter; his performance can therefore be said to be on the whole determined by the independent variable - the information that the experimenter intended to impart. On the other hand, deference delineates that part of a subject's behaviour that is a function of his attendance to information, cues or general aspects of the experimenter presence or performance that he most probably did not even know he was communicating.

(c) Deference to experimenter as 'audience'

Rosenberg's (1965) (and Silverman 1977b) approach to the problem of these extraneous experimenter influences introduces the link to another crucial dimension of deference - deference to the experimenter as 'audience'. For subjects are not only expecting the 'true' purposes of the experiment to be concealed, but they are also fully aware that they are being observed and evaluated in some way by the experimenter. Rosenberg coined the term 'evaluation apprehension' to describe:

> "... an anxiety toned concern ... (of the subject) ... that he win a positive evaluation from the experimenter, or at least that he provides no grounds for a negative one." (Rosenberg 1969)

Another reason, then, for subjects' deference to the experimenter for information is that only possession of an accurate, true

definition of the situation will enable them to organise an appropriate, favourable self-presentation to the experimenter - and reduce the threat of evaluation.

Riecken (1962) began his formulation from the same underlying premise as Rosenberg - that subjects are especially concerned in the laboratory to put "... their best foot forward ..." - a perspective heavily influenced the 'self-representational dynamics' implicit in Goffman's (1959) dramaturgical metaphor for human behaviour. However he dealt more explicitly with how subjects might attempt to achieve this, and what aspects of the situation make their efforts more or less difficult; in other words, how subjects decide what virtues are relevant and what faults must be concealed. Riecken looked at features of the experiment as a social situation and at what he saw as a 'process of negotiation' between the subjects and the experimenter whereby the former arrives at a working definition of the situation. The subject was seen as entering the laboratory with broad, vague expectations that become progressively more explicit as the experience proceeds, with this definition open to on-going re-evaluations as the process of the experiment continued. Riecken saw the subject as having to:

> "... adopt a peculiar posture. He must be (or appear to be) cooperative in order to find out the meaning of his own actions, as these are given meaning by the experimenter's interpretations ...". (1962)

(d) Solution of subject's 'deutero-problem' as a goal of deference

He suggested that the subject in fact has a 'deutero problem' in addition to the assigned experimental task problem, which he defined by its three inter-related aims: attainment of whatever personal

reward was sought from the experience, the divination of the experimenter's true purposes, and the presentation of a favourable self. He explains the subject's dilemma:

> "... like a stranger at a ceremonial ... the subject comes to know what is going on, only in so far as he participates in the action, and does as he is told ... He can only have partial knowledge of the effect of his action until the whole situation is played out ...". (1962)

Clearly, Riecken also felt that there was another dimension to subjects' apparent compliance. For in his terms this 'compliance' was merely the means to another end - solution of their deutero-problem. But he did not, though, describe in detail the kinds of information or cues to which subjects defer to solve their deutero-problem, or indeed where they might occur.

(e) Sources of information for the solution of the deutero-problem

Rosenberg (1969), on the other hand, stressed the early stages of the encounter between the experimenter and his subjects where the grounds for the confirmation or non confirmation of their early suspicious about having to expose themselves to evaluation might become apparent. And this would naturally point to the ways in which the experimenter goes about presenting the task, instructions or experimental design to subjects as variables influencing evaluation apprehension. Orne (1962) was though more specifically concerned with these issues and therefore outlined more alternatives; he referred to the 'demand characteristics' of the experiment:

> "... the rumours or campus scuttlebutt about the research, the information conveyed in the original solicitation, the person of the experimenter, and the setting of the laboratory, as well as all explicit and implicit communication during the experiment proper."

(f) The covert medium of deference

However, the medium by which subjects pick up on these cues, or why they respond to them at all, has remained an essentially mysterious process; although the fact that these events do occur has been more than adequately demonstrated in the research. For example, Gustafson and Orne (1965) have manipulated specific demand characteristics to show their effect upon subjects' behaviour; and many researchers (i.e. McGuigan 1963, Saranson 1965, Rosenthal 1966) have demonstrated how interactional experimenter variables (like the experimenter's biosocial characteristics) have also a proven influence.(9b). But on the whole researchers have been less than expansive in discussing the mechanisms by which the demand characteristics are transmitted in the interaction process; it is light shed on this problem that reveals the final important feature of the deferent dimension of the experimenter to subject relationship. Rosenberg (1969) for example, referred to "... the secret side of the transaction ..." and Orne, in addition to his reference above to 'implicit communication', stated:

> "... it appears that subtler cues from which the subject can draw covert or even unconscious inference may be still more powerful." (1962)

There is, it seems in the literature, at least the implication that the existence of the deutero-problem and the medium of its solution (deference to the experimenter and his design) are in some sense a covert dimension of the experimental process.

(9b) Rosenthal (1967) has proposed three categories of experimenter effects: bio-social, psycho-social and situational. However, McGuigan (1963) and Bouchard and Hare (1970) have shown how experimenter effects sometimes do not lead to artifactual results, and Chapman, Chapman and Brelje (1969) have shown how they can be problematic when they interact with treatment conditions.

There is then an 'active', 'deferent' and covert dimension of the subject to experimenter relationship concerned with the solution of the subject's deutero-problem, which exists in addition to the self-evident, overt, passive, compliant dimension that is concerned with the solution of the experimental task.

3.1.4 An Alternative Perspective on the Deferent Dimension

(a) Involvement with extraneous variables and involvement generality/permanency

Wiggins (1971) too emphasised the importance of an 'active' dimension of subjects' behaviour and how this can question the internal validity of laboratory experimentation. But in the sense of focusing on the potential variability this suggests regarding subjects' involvement with experimental tasks. He outlined three 'involvement' variables which are generally ignored: involvement with extraneous variables, the generality of involvement, and the permanency of involvement. Thus, for example, in a type I group subjects might be more involved in the deutero-problem (an extraneous variable) than their assigned discussion topic; or they might become more or less involved with the group itself over time. In addition, the scope (or generality) of their involvement with an independent variable might not be balanced or appropriate for subjects might more become involved in the problem than the group interaction it was supposed to elicit (or vice versa).

(b) Problems with operationalising the involvement concept

The tendency amongst experimenters to avoid these considerations has

though not only been encouraged by the notorious difficulties of operationalising the concept 'involvement'. For there are two demonstrable psychological tendencies that have supported the experimenter's expectation of a satisfactory level of compliance in subjects (i.e. involvement with the independent variable). Firstly, the long-since recognised tendency for subjects to accept the authority of the experimenter. And, secondly, the need, demonstrated by Sherif (1935), that subjects have for a frame of reference through which they can orientate themselves (that varies with the degree of structure in the stimulus situation). Clearly, in the novel and uncertain experimental situation this need is satisfied by the acceptance of the structure and direction that the experimenter provides in the form of the task or instructions.

But these findings have largely been interpreted from the point of view of the perspective that assumes 'naive' subjects. In the light of the phenomenological implications of the 'active' dimension of subjects' behaviour discussed above, and with allowances therefore made for variable involvement, a new meaning can be found for these psychological tendencies. For instead of justifying an approach that considers any subject performance successfully elicited by instructions, as having a uniform or acceptable degree of involvement (i.e. compliance taken at 'face value'), an explanation can be offered as to why it is that subjects often appear to be compliant with experimenters' independent variables when research has begun to suggest that their preoccupations might also lie elsewhere.

For the task and instructions that it is generally assumed are

compliantly accepted by subjects can be more or less satisfying to their need for Sherif's 'frame of reference'; and an active sentient subject is capable of understanding the difference. For these and other aspects of the situation embody intrinsic qualities that can aggravate or alleviate the extent of ambiguity and uncertainty in the laboratory. Furthermore, there may be unforeseen consequences of the authority/subordinate relation between the experimenter and his subjects which, far from ensuring involvement in the independent variable, can actually decrease it. Indeed, as Riecken (1962) remarked, there is a sense in which at certain times, 'task compliance' is more accurately a means to an end - with 'the end', strictly speaking, unrelated to task fulfilment.

3.2 SITUATION VARIABLES

3.2.1 Introduction

(a) The serviceability of task sets to subjects' deutero-problems

Of all the elements present in the laboratory situation, more attention has been directed at the experimental task and instructions than any other feature. But the interest has invariably been in their intrinsic characteristics (i.e. motor/mental, simple/complex), and their success or failure as independent variables manageable to experimenters. The same preoccupation with manipulation and control that distracted experimenters from the fact that subjects do not suspend their own needs and personal goals on entering the laboratory, has also perhaps masked the implications of

subjects having to realise these within the framework of their assigned task activity. For by adopting an 'active' view of subjects, these compulsory task and instruction sets can ultimately be approached in terms of being more or less serviceable to subjects as vehicles for the satisfaction of their own needs and personal goals.

3.2.2 The Context and Nature of Experimental Tasks and Subject Involvement

(a) A typology of task sets

McGrath and Kravitz (1982) have proposed a typology of tasks used in small group research. They suggested four major types which each included two sub-categories; tasks where subjects are asked:

I To Generate	III To Resolve
(a) plans	(a) cognitive conflict
(b) creative ideas	(b) interest conflict
II To Choose	IV To Execute
(a) interest tasks	(a) contests
(b) decision-making	(b) physical tasks

The discussion below refers in the main to the 'choosing tasks' of the second type (which McGraith and Kravitz note are by far the most common): 'interest tasks' where there is a fairly clear-cut right or wrong solution, and the kind of decision-making tasks that Bales (1951) employed. The 'creative ideas' tasks of the first type will, however, be significantly involved in the later argument.

(b) Situational features that encourage low involvement

Factors pertaining to subjects themselves have already been suggested to account for their involvement with extraneous variables (i.e. their deutero-problem) and clearly involvement here implies, if not necessitates, subjects lesser involvement with the experimenter's intended communication - the independent variable. But before moving on to consider how subjects extraneous involvements might be more or less easily resolved given the quality of task and instruction sets, features intrinsic to the laboratory situation that can encourage low involvement with the interior goals of task or instruction sets per se, must be touched upon. For example, Riecken (1962) recognised that the experimental experience is:

> "... spatially and temporarily set apart from everyday life ...".

Once again, the concern here is not directly with external validity or the lack of 'reality' this feature implies; rather the bearing it has upon the 'meaning and relevance' to subjects of assigned activities in this context. For with the exception of any external relations that might exist between the subjects and the experimenter (or the latter's department), the experimental experience is removed and separated from the normal continuity and complexity to everyday life patterns (cf., Harre 1979). Task activity too is cut off from the profusion of social and other influences that more usually place an activity in an historical context and provides it with meaning and relevance with reference both forward and backward in time. Wiggins, for example, remarked that in these circumstances less

involvement might be expected:

> "... if the subject does not perceive the task as meaningful, the chances are that he will not become involved in the task ... or his behaviour will be a function of the particular activity." (Wiggins 1971)

One might expect broad agreement (10) amongst researchers that the goals interior to experimental tasks often have little 'meaning or relevance' to subjects (except indirectly, to gain the experimenter's approval). However, rather in the same way that there is a consensus that the observer influences the observed without such influence having yet been adequately conceptualised or operationalized, there is a dearth of studies that attempt to clarify or operationalize the concepts 'meaning and relevance'. One exception is the renowned experimentalist Schachter (1951), who found some relationship between 'task relevance' and group cohesiveness, but in the final analysis was forced to outline three different conceptualizations for 'relevance'.

(c) Vicarious involvement in problem-solving process

Moreover the human subject clearly retains some potential to become 'involved', to get drawn into abstract problems or games, perhaps deriving meaning vicariously from the problem-solving process itself, rather than the achievement of it's end purpose. An example of what this distinction can mean is perhaps what is reflected in the findings of Hoffman and Maier's 1963 observational study, concerning the ways in which groups accepted solutions to experimental problems.

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(10) e.g., Bales' (see p. 47), Sherif's (see p. 45) and Smith and White's 1983 (see p. 12) statements above.

For fully 80 per cent of these groups adopted their first task solutions (which were of a poor quality) without adequate consideration of alternatives - suggesting that although discussion proceeded, the quality of the end result was of little importance to subjects.

This potential for subjects to become involved in problem-solving processes might well be what is characteristically relied upon or tapped by experimenters in experimental manipulations (11); indeed, there might be some validity in assuming the adequacy of this kind of involvement with certain single subject experiments. However, given that with a type I group-subject there are in effect two tasks, this vicarious quality of problem-solving involvement would only relate to the assigned problem, not necessarily the 'interaction task'.

3.2.3 The Coexistence of Overt Compliance and Covert Involvements

(a) Assigned and interaction task involvement in a type III group

Some light can be shed on these problems by an early piece of research explicitly concerned with the involvement of a group of subjects , not only in the task, but also in the concomitant process of their coming together as a behavioural unit. Yablonsky (1952), although not directly concerned with uninvolved groups or extraneous involvement, did outline procedures necessary to avoid the

(11) This conclusion might seem to support the validity of Bales' problem-solving frame of reference. However, it would only be relevant to the involvement of subjects in the 'task area' of his frame of reference.

"manipulation oriented interaction" he thought was characteristic of type I groups, so as to achieve involved or 'significant' group process. The concept 'involvement' is therefore implicitly operationalised in this context; moreover, one crucial consequence of the low involvement that accrues from laboratory controls was identified.

Yablonsky utilised a 'warm up period' (first suggested by Moreno 1932) for his groups with three parallel aims - to:

> "... (1) Create a warm feeling between all interacting members ... (2) Interest and involve the group in the experimental situation ... (3) Have the experiment contribute something of personal value for all members of the group."

His procedures included attempts to: allay any fear of experimental trickery (i.e. reduce 'active suspicion'), illustrate clearly to subjects the usefulness of the research to their own life-interests (i.e. establish the relevance and meaning of the activity), and gain access to subjects "... innermost thoughts ...". In sum, they were devised to create conditions under which what he saw as significant factors in the small group system could emerge, for he felt that:

> "Oftentimes ... the analysis of how a group operates in terms of a limited area of their interaction is extended as an analysis of the group as a complete social system."

His aim was, then, to elicit from subjects 'actor-oriented' rather than 'manipulation-oriented' interaction, with the former achieved when groups were given freedom to develop their interactivity with a minimum of outside control, and the individual became:

> "... the exclusive author of his interaction in

relationship to the other ....".

Whereas the latter was the result of:

> "... specific small groups... organised in terms of performing the specific function designed by the experimenter ...".

To achieve these ends, subjects were enlisted in the tradition of Tichener and Wundt as 'co-researchers'. But in addition to reducing the 'controlled' relation between the experimenter and his subjects, this strategy aimed to provide a method for gaining access to an 'internal' view of group process. For Yablonsky was also attempting to narrow the gap he saw between the observer's external perception of group inter-activity and group members personal (internal) interpretation of the same process. A complete view of a group was then thought to include both manifest (overt) and latent (covert) levels. The former referred to the subjects' description of the topical content of interaction that they were engaged in, and the latter to the subjects' record of the unexpressed thoughts they had during the same period.

Significantly, Yablonsky attributed the lack of agreement or dissonance he found between individual subjects' manifest and thought levels (and also between different interactors thought levels), to the extent to which subjects were involved in their task. Thus, 'actor-oriented' involvement was not only thought of as necessary to encourage significant group processes to occur, but also to reduce the extent to which these processes remained latent. For example, in interpreting the results from one group Yablonsky stated:

> "... possibly due to the nature of the subject being discussed and its importance for both of the interactors, there was a high level of mutuality and reciprocity on all levels."

Despite his efforts to encourage 'actor oriented' interaction with a "... minimum degree of outside control ...", Yablonsky found considerable disagreement between individuals' manifest and latent levels (with 53 per cent of the subjects), and interactants latent levels (with 73 per cent of the subjects). Clearly, some residual 'controlling' effects persisted even in a type III group that, in Yablonsky's terms, reduced the involvement of subjects and thus encouraged a general lack of synchronicity found between overt and covert levels.

(b) Overt task compliance, covert involvements and experimental control

Paradoxically then , covert dimensions of group process (12) may be encouraged (through 'active suspicion') by the very same 'controlled' relation between the experimenter and the subjects that ensures compliant task activity. For 'manipulation oriented' interaction not only reflects limited involvement with the agenda of control, it has also been shown to stimulate subjects' need to defer to extraneous variables in order to seek an accurate definition of their situation. However, overt and covert preoccupation need not be mutually exclusive; the paradox can be resolved by demonstrating how subjects, although giving every appearance of being involved to some

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(12) The overt and covert dimensions discussed here conjoin with the 'passive-compliant' (experimental task activity) and 'active-deferent' (the deutero-problem) dimensions to a subject's behaviour discussed in the last section (cf., p. 69)

degree with the experimental task, can entertain 'parallel' or somehow associated covert preoccupations. This will be attempted below not only in terms of how covert concerns can be alleviated, but also 'expressed' through a particular kind of overt task activity.

(c) The frustration of the deutero-problem in type I groups

The 'experimental' definition of the situation, imposed by the experimenter, to which subjects acquiesce in the action of volunteering, of course, demands that certain thoughts and concerns remain latent. But another crucial implication of the 'rules' of this 'game' is that information from the experimenter (regarding the true purposes of the experiment) will be controlled. In a situation where the mutual concealment and the control of spontaneous expression are the order of the day by prior implicit agreement, it is hardly surprising that concerns which might quickly become manifest in everyday life situations remain covert - subjects are in fact invited:

> "... to behave under specified conditions but revealing neither what the experimenter regards as the right answer, nor even the criteria by which right answers will be judged ... the experimenter typically withholds information, and the subject knows he is doing so." (Riecken 1962)

In some forms of experiment there may in fact be demand characteristics available to 'inform' subjects. For example, if they are administered a questionnaire, and are then told to engage in some activity before being presented with another instrument, many must be aware that some change between the two measurements is expected.

But the type I group is a context that betrays particularly few clues to it's members about the experimenter's true purposes; for characteristically a task or discussion topic is presented by him with no further contact until the debriefing - subjects' only clue might be that a cooperative performance is expected.

3.2.4 The Alleviation of Deutero-Problems in Type I Groups

(a) The task-ability and self-quality task sets

In such a situation one of the few ways in which subjects can alleviate or express difficulties associated with their deutero-problem involves their approach to the experimental task - the remaining 'representative' of the experimenter. For a large proportion of available information is contained in the task and instructions, their manner of presentation, and any relevant antecedent events. Riecken (1962) has made a crucial distinction between two different kinds of task in terms of the quality of cues or hints they provide to subjects in the solution of their deutero-problem - 'task-ability' sets and 'self-quality' sets.

The former involved working on some "skill, ability or capacity to perform"; with this kind of task there was no upper limit to the amount of skill that subjects 'ought' to display, and "... the positively valued end of the ability continuum ..." could be easily discerned by them in most cases. Subjects could therefore do no more than their best with this kind of task, and the only scope for misrepresentation lay in under achievement (i.e. hiding a skill); here then they have only partial voluntary control over performance.

The self-quality set, on the other hand, was seen as primarily concerned with eliciting more generalised opinions, values or beliefs from subjects. Instead of there being fairly clear, 'good and bad' end points along a dimension of performance, an optimal or desirable performance on such a task would lie somewhere between the two (it is, for example, possible to be too friendly or too unfriendly with the appropriate response lying somewhere in between these extremes). Unlike the 'task-ability' sets then with this kind of task subjects can never be sure how 'extreme' a behaviour, or indeed which end of any behavioural dimension, might be considered by the experimenter, a maximally worthy performance.

With a self-quality task, therefore, subjects have within broad limits some 'control' over their 'presentations'. It is this feature, coupled with a lack of demand characteristics available in this kind of task, that Riecken felt encouraged a situation of maximum 'negotiation' between the experimenter and the subject. For a wide range of behavioural choice possibilities (13) and limited information on which to choose between them (to achieve a performance favourable to the experimenter) must increase deference to him as the other available information source.

(b) The self-quality set and the 'interaction task'

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(13) McFeat (1974) also remarked in his comparison of Bales' experimental groups with natural-state groups that in the former there is a range of behavioural possibilities (not necessarily present in the latter):

> ".. the choice is to whether or not a person will act at all .. choice as to the other person toward whom he chooses to act .. and choice which involves the quality of that action."

Interestingly, the 'interaction task' of a type I laboratory group constitutes just such a self-quality set. For although subjects have some control over the range of their performance, they cannot be sure what aspect of their interaction with one another is the object of interest - they cannot therefore be certain of what exactly a 'good' performance might be in these terms. The Thematic Apperception Test is another example that is significant for it is more obvious here how experimenters characteristically deem it necessary to disguise the true meaning of subjects' assigned activity as a task-ability 'test' of imagination. This strategy perhaps not only serves to ensure 'naive' subjects - for if they were told the experiment's true purpose (or nothing at all) the experimenter's problem might just as easily be a lack of response as it might be misrepresentation. The need for disguise suggests that experimenters are aware that subjects might in some sense find a self-quality task something that they would rather avoid.

(c) Subject avoidance of self-quality sets

The 'control' that subjects have over behavioural choice possibilities with the self-quality set might not then represent the preferred state that it sounds; and reasons why this might be so are not hard to find. In the main they are concerned with the fact that such freedom of choice as there is goes hand in hand (given a lack of available demand characteristics) with uncertainty and ambiguity over what the 'right' choices are. And the combination of subjects' concern to earn a positive evaluation by the experimenter with the commitment of self involved in the public expression of the stuff of self-quality tasks - opinions, values and beliefs - might well be

expected to make the need for appropriate choices paramount.

And yet there are clearly circumstances where subjects would be quite unable to be sure of the appropriateness of their performances on a self-quality item. Insufficient consideration of the phenomenological implications of their 'active' potential and the fact that the 'threat' inherent in being evaluated according to unknown criteria in an ambiguous and uncertain situation (14) is perhaps underestimated have both contributed to a general failure to consider how subjects might cope with such circumstances. Herman and Schild (1961) for example however while discussing the 'stranger-group', outline important consequences of this feature that is central to type I groups (both due to the novelty of the experience and the fact that group members are invariably strangers to one another):

> "Firstly, the immediate psychological result of being in a new situation is lack of security. Ignorance of the potentialities inherent in the situation, of the means to reach a goal, and of the probable outcomes of an intended action causes insecurity".

The term 'anxiety' (which might include notions of " .. apprehension and worry ..") as Hudson et al. (1965) note, is more usually employed to characterize the human response to " .. strange or unfamiliar .." phenomena. But whatever the name given to the emotional state:

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(14) Indeed prior to Rosenberg's proposition that evaluation apprehension might be a common feature of subjects' laboratory experience, researchers such as Lanzetta et al., (1954) were manipulating experimenters' evaluation of subject performance in order to operationalize a notion of 'threat' or 'anxiety-evoking situations'.

> ".. increase in anxiety is the primary concommitant of threat and .. anxiety will accentuate security operations in an attempt to terminate or diminish the anxiety. The latter postulate has been frequently stated by learning and personality theorists." (Lanzetta et al., 1954)

Many human techniques or strategies for reducing the anxiety that arises from uncertainty, ambiguity, instability or insecurity have been explored that range from humour through " .. deference to authority .." to reliance on structured patterns of behaviour (cf., Hudson et al. 1965). It is the latter example that at least in the first instance represents the closest parallel to an interesting strategy that subjects might well adopt in type I laboratory groups in order to deal with the threat inherent in self-quality task performance under the circumstances described.

(d) A strategy of avoidance

For in the type I situation there are , of course, in effect two 'tasks' facing the group - social interaction and the discussion problem. Given that the latter has 'task-ability' characteristics (and Riecken concurs that this is the case with, for example, a 'human relations' problem) these qualities of the task could conceivably be emphasised by subjects in their performance at the expense of the self-quality features of the interaction task. The subject need only, as it were, make one choice - an 'ability continuum' that enjoys some degree of general approbation - he can then perform to the goal he has defined for himself.

Clearly, the co-operation or interactive aspect of the task cannot be avoided altogether; but subjects' performances under certain circumstances might reflect attempts to neutralise the uncertainty

and unpredictability intrinsic to their situation through a concentration upon task or intellective aspects of interaction rather than interpersonal issues. For not only is evaluation by the experimenter in terms of task-ability activity less threatening (because less public commitment of self is called for), but, as will be seen, the unpredictability inherent in interaction with strangers is also dealt with.

(e) Overt task compliance as a means to alleviate deutero-problems

Behaviours that could be explained in these terms have in fact been observed by a small number of researchers associated with Bales. Borgatta (1963), for example, while looking at the amount of social responsibility placed upon individuals in groups for what they say and do (i.e. public commitment of self) as an important interpersonal variable, found that early in his meetings there was a predominance of one particular kind of task activity ("Gives Information") and he felt that:

> "... this might be a reflection of a requirement for setting an objective base for communication in this abstract situation. Presumably, objective facts are neutral, and thus are a desirable type of behaviour in the unstructured experimental situation involved."

Further, Olmstead (1954) found that the 'task ability' he observed in his groups (that could have been mistaken for the successful engagement of his independent variable), was in fact being used as a 'vehicle' or 'medium' for the solution of 'other' problems. In his terms (those of the structural functionalists, i.e., Bales, Parsons and Shils 1953) the task constituted his group's 'external' problem, and issues arising from the relations among group members, the

'internal problems' (or interaction task). In attempting to create experimentally, groups with 'Gemeinschaftlich' and 'Gesellschaftlich' characteristics, he found unexpected behaviour developing in the former. Consistent with the idea that a self-quality task emphasis might be expected to encourage tension amongst subjects, Olmstead (1954) found his groups initially approaching their problems in a:

> "... cautious, hesitant and somewhat nervous way ...".

And while they were more convivial and disagreed less than the Gesellschaftlich groups this was thought to be more a result of their having to following instructions than a:

> "... free expression of satisfaction with themselves as a group ..."(ibid.)

Further, Olmstead also found that groups of strangers who were in effect forced into being harmonious and co-operative:

> " .. focussing their attention on a target that was outside the group, thereby relieving self-consciousness about whether or not they were being sufficiently harmonious, and providing them with the opportunity of acting as they felt they were supposed to act .." (ibid.)

The 'outside' problem was of course the task, which subjects were found to pursue 'assiduously', at least as far as 'analysis and interpretation' were concerned, while baulking at moving onto the potentially more disruptive social emotional problems of 'decision' and 'control'. In other words, in these groups the interior goal of the task per se was not being dealt with - there was intense discussion, but no positive action being taken.

Significantly, Olmstead did not interpret this behaviour as committed, but unsuccessful task interaction, chosing rather to see it as a function of 'anxiety over process' - interaction had become an end in itself and not just a means to external ends:

> "... anyone making a contribution to the process, whether it solves the group's external task or not, is at least helping to solve the internal problem, since after all its better that something be said than that communication break down." (Olmstead 1954)

Thus:

> "... while a group is presumably devoting itself to a scientific analysis of an objective phenomenum ... it may actually be dealing successfully (or unsuccessfully to be sure) with internal problems of integration, of sentiments and leadership." (ibid.)

Although Olmstead had emphasised the interactive (i.e. self-quality) aspect of the task in the Gemeinschaftlich group, this feature is, of course, always present in any type I group to some degree. Therefore, although he was not strictly speaking concerned with an evaluative threat to subjects, he clearly demonstrated how a task-ability emphasis in group behaviour could be adopted by subjects as a solution to two covert problems: the satisfaction of an experimental authority (neutralisation of 'anxiety over evaluation') and the neutralisation of 'anxiety over process'.

There are, then, features intrinsic to experimental tasks that can be 'actively' interpreted (15) and presented to the experimenter by subjects in much the same way as occurs in reverse; though for

(15) The manipulation involved in subjects' performance presentation in task ability rather than self-quality terms suggests that subjects are in fact seeking a situation where they have less control (in Riecken's terms) over their behaviour.

subjects it is in the light of manipulation, not in its service. Such strategies might seem too specialised a response to suggest a significant hidden bias in group studies. However, this thesis will attempt to show that they may in fact represent one aspect of a much more general and perhaps universal set of group behaviours related to the experimenter. Before moving on to discuss ways in which the experimenter's involvement in the experimental interaction might be understood, those characteristics intrinsic to the situation that reinforce the influence or threat that the experimenter constitutes as 'evaluator', must be detailed.

3.2.5 Situational Features that Reinforce Experimenters as Evaluators

(a) The physical environment

For example, there are physical features of laboratories like the one-way mirror which acts as a glaring reminder that unknown persons, making unknown judgements, lie behind it. In addition, remote video cameras and microphones reinforce subjects awareness that they are under observation - particularly if devices move periodically in order to track or monitor group process. Indeed, all the paraphenalia of observation are accentuated by the claustrophobic environment caused by the exclusion of extraneous stimuli. This unusual physical simplicity of the laboratory as compared to the complex environments of social situations in everyday life has also been cited by Harre (1979) as a cause of a threatening state of ambiguity and uncertainty. For he maintained that the varied perceptual and symbolic stimuli which usually

inhabit differentiated situations, direct interpretative procedures and the choice of rule systems by actors:

> "... the simplified environment of the social psychological experiment leads inevitably to an unresolved ambiguity of interpretation. Actors simply do not know which rule meaning system to draw upon in acting. Every one of their actions is fraught with a kind of uncertainty." (Harre 1979)

(b) The unseen audience

From the more general point of view, the effects of 'being under observation' were researched by Wapner and Alper (1952) . Here, the effect of an 'audience' on individuals' behaviour was investigated with 'personality oriented' and 'neutral choice' instructional sets. It was found that the unseen audience condition (as opposed to 'seen' and 'none') yielded the longest decision times; Wapner and Alper therefore concluded:

> ".. . an audience who cannot be seen but is 'out there' watching and listening to the choices being made is indeed more threatening to self status ... (need to be thought well of by others) ... than an audience whose composition is known."

There was also inconclusive evidence that under these circumstances 'personality oriented' materials yielded longer decision times than the 'task' or 'neutrality' oriented items. And once again this was interpreted in the light of the threat to self-status posed by the materials used, given the audience. Similarity between the characteristics of personality and neutral-oriented tasks, and self-quality and task-ability sets respectively, therefore suggests some support for the proposition that task-ability sets are a less threatening activity to engage in whilst under observation.

3.3 EXPERIMENTER VARIABLES

3.3.1 Introduction

(a) Experimenters' Influence Through Subject and Situation Variables

The extraneous influence of the experimenter has been indirectly dealt with above in terms of subjects' contribution to experimenter to subject relations and the situation the experimenter creates. In 3.1 the hidden bias that an experimenter's choice of subject-sample introduces and how this sample's expectations and perceptions contribute to a covert deferent dimension of overt compliant relations with the experimenter were both discussed. In 3.2 factors inherent in the laboratory situation (and associated materials, i.e. task and instruction sets) that (a) might negatively influence subjects involvement in them (as a complex constituting a type I group's independent variable), (b) encourage a discrepancy between their overt and covert preoccupations, and (c) reinforce the evaluative threat of experimenter were detailed.

3.3.2 Experimenters' Performances and Defensiveness in Groups

(a) Six categories of behaviour that encourage defensiveness

A more direct investigation of the experimenters' influence can also be approached in a number of ways. For example, a surprisingly appropriate model for key features of experimenters' normal experimental practices has been unwittingly provided by Gibb (1965) in his proposal of six categories of behaviour which he found to

encourage 'defensiveness' in groups. Firstly, as might be expected, behaviour which appeared evaluative was included. Secondly, any implication of control "... to change an attitude, to influence behaviour, or to restrict a field of activity ..." was identified. Also remarkably apt for the experimenter to subject relation was the recognition that any communicator perceived as engaging in a stratagem involving "... ambiguous and multiple motivation ... would induce defensiveness in the receiver. Fourthly, the manifestation of neutrality in speech, or a "... clinical, detached, person-as-object-of-study attitude" was thought to encourage defensive climates. The fifth category referred to attitude of superiority when a communicator indicates that he does not wish to enter into a "... shared problem solving relationship, that he probably does not desire feedback ...". And, finally, the well known effects of dogmatism or 'certainty' were included.

It could be argued that these categories effectively summarise the significant dimensions of experimenters' characteristic posture to subjects in the presentation of his instructions. On agreeing to take part in the experiment, the subject agrees to accept the 'superiority' and 'certainty' of the experimenter's instructions; moreover, these instructions are clearly an attempt to 'restrict the field of activity', or 'control'. They are presented in a detached. 'neutral' fashion, and are almost certainly perceived as a 'stratagem' (or at least suspected as such) and subjects also know that they will have to enact them while 'under evaluation'.

3.3.3 The Experimenter's Influence on His Group

(a) Experimenter as special evaluating 'other' in a social situation

Alternatively, in rather the same way that the 'threat' in Wapner and Alper's study above was conceptualised as a generalised 'audience' rather than some significant evaluating figure, Rosenberg's concept of subject apprehension (that arises out of experimenter specific evaluation) might also be understood to be simply an exaggerated form of the uncertainty inherent in the more general process of 'social evaluation' described by Bales:

> " .. all human beings presumably evaluate, to some extent, their own, and other person's behaviour, and attempt to control or change it." (1970)

In these terms, the evaluation 'threat' posed by the experimenter might then be seen as a kind of hybrid social process accentuated in significance through his role as psychologist (i.e. perceived as possessing of special skills in interpreting behaviour) and the blatant observational purpose of the situation. From this perspective, the experimenter is simply party to social situation as 'another', though perhaps special, evaluator (cf., Riecken 1962).

Indeed, the investigation of the experimenter's influence on his group-subject can not proceed very far without considering him as a somehow 'special evaluating other' in a social situation - or, more specifically, in a social unit that he has brought into being. Thus, for example, Rosenthal (1969) recognised that in addition to the methodological implications of his research on 'experimenter expectancy' (how an experimenter's 'expectancies' regarding his hypothesis are communicated to subjects), an intriguing light was also shed upon interpersonal relationships more generally, for he

noted how:

> "... people can engage in effective, unprogrammed and unintended communication with one another." (1969)

Here, he was referring to cues the experimenter conveys to subjects. But elsewhere Rosenthal was at least aware of the possibility that subjects must also be involved in such a process, for although concerned with the ways in which the subjects' confirmation or non confirmation of an experimenter's hypothesis might influence him in turn, he concluded that:

> "... the experimenter-subject communication system is a complex of intertwining feedback loops." (1966)

Rosenthal (1969). too, saw the wider implications of the research on artifact, and spoke of the need for:

> "Some larger more integrative theory of the experimental transaction process ... to contribute to a richer understanding of the role of <u>self-representational dynamics</u> in non-experimental interaction situations."

(b) Experimenters' integration into a social situation

It is a short step to Shultz's conclusion that the experimenter and subject constitute a unit:

> "... the process of observation becomes an interaction with both sides contributing to the observational transaction. There is no longer an independent fact and independent observer, but rather an interaction and integration of the two in an observation." (1969)

From this perspective, then, the experimenter's or observer's influence can be understood in terms of him being in some sense a part of the interaction system that he was ostensibly only observing

in a detached scientific fashion. Clearly, he could not be involved in quite the same sense as subjects engaged in continuous face-to-face interaction; for his equivalent participation only occurs in a type I group for a short period at the beginning and then again at the end of the experiment. And yet the compliant relation established with each subject individually during the process of their enlistment, precedes (and follows on after) that which subjects succeed or fail to develop between themselves - subjects enter the experiment as complete strangers to each other, but not so vis-a-vis the experimenter.

A systematic examination of the sense in which the experimenter might be included within the interaction system he observes is a complex question that leads directly into the next chapter. However, what is already clear is that relations with his subject-group have been considered real enough on the one hand to promote the research on artifact, while on the other a sufficiently strained and artificial relation from the point of view of small group analysis to encourage experimenters to emerge from behind the one-way mirror to join their groups as leaders/trainers. As suggested in the introduction to this thesis, it is Mills (1967) that provides a point of articulation between these two perspectives by recognising that the laboratory group is a unique instance of experimental artifact - and it is the role that the experimenter plays in his group's formation that holds the key:

> "... quite precisely in forming the group, he gives it form; he creates the character of his experimental subject ... the act of creating ones experimental subject may be peculiar to the group situation ...". (Mills 1967)

It has already been seen in Chapter Two (see the discussion in 'A Mixed Marriage') how a sociological perspective tends to be explicit in its exclusion of this area of group life. However, a further examination of sociological and psychological (or more specifically psycho-analytic) group concepts for any sense in which they might accommodate the 'inclusion' or involvement of the experimenter in his laboratory group, reveals that the latter perspective primarily deals with a level of group process intimately concerned with the formative area of group life. Moreover, this is not only a level that seems to demand the inclusion of the experimenter's influence, but one where the elements can be organised systematically.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE EXPERIMENTER AS GROUP MEMBER

SUMMARY

The chapter reviews sociological and psychological group concepts for a theoretical framework that might encompass the inclusion of the experimenter in his group. Problems with his inclusion in terms of the group's interactive independence are explored and overcome with reference to an overlying system context. It is noted that the choice of this context is influenced by the significance perceived in his executive role and the analytical utility of the context, by the level of group process focused upon. The experimenter and his group are identified as a single system with behavioural and primordial subsystems of process. The latter subsystem is reviewed in the work of Freud, Redl and Bion to yield an appropriate range of concepts and categories to justify the experimenter's inclusion in his laboratory group as a leader-figure and support further analysis.

General Introduction

In the same way that there is no unambiguous point along the continuum from "... a loose mass to a compact unit ..." (Hare 1962) where a collection of individuals 'becomes' a group, there is equally none along a continuum 'observer-to-leader' where the researcher becomes interdependent with the object of his study. He may begin by observing a natural-state group already in existence, then wishing for greater control become an experimenter by forming his own; finally, he may come out from behind the one-way mirror to join a group as its leader. At the 'observing only' end of this continuum it seems clear that he is not a group member, while at the other extreme he certainly is. It is the interim stage where an experimenter creates his own group, and then 'steps back' for the sake of objectivity, that his role is uncertain.

The adequacy of the proposition that an experimenter's influence over his subject-group might be understood in terms of his being a prominent member of it must then be evaluated from the point of view of small group theory; for its utility will depend heavily upon the group concept chosen, the criteria for group membership employed and the analytical purposes of his 'inclusion'.

It would be a relatively simple matter to select or design a definition of group membership that would uncontroversially permit the experimenter's theoretical 'inclusion'. However, such a strategy would hardly encourage the emergence of any significant new insights - the criteria might be so easily satisfied that little or nothing is said about the group, the experimenter, or, more importantly, the relations between them. A more useful enterprise is to test the

proposition against a range of group conceptualisations (from the 'sociological' to the 'psychological') in order to gain a clearer idea of the extent to which, or the ways in which, the experimenter might be said to be interdependent with his group.

For the analytical purpose of the experimenter's 'inclusion' is to facilitate exploring the possibility of identifying and then appropriately interpreting those aspects of group members' behaviour that are a function of their controlled relation with him. In other words, if interaction in the type I group is approached as a complex symbolic score with multiple meaning-referents, then one particular 'line' of this score is of interest - that which is observer, experimenter or perhaps even leader-relevant. As will become apparent below, observations of this nature cannot properly proceed without an interpretative frame of reference within which they might be understood; and the proposition that the experimenter is in some sense a prominent member of his own group suggests where such a framework might be found.

4.1 SOCIOLOGICAL MEMBERSHIP

4.1.1 Experimenters Inclusion into the Sociological Group Concept

(a) Inclusion into face-to-face systems

From the point of view of those group criteria discussed in Chapter Two that demand face-to-face interactive interdependence, it is not immediately apparent how experimenters might be 'included'. Clearly,

they engage in face-to-face interaction with groups at their initial and terminating phases, with their role in the interim period even comparable to that of a 'silent' group member. Indeed, Smith (1957) has shown how a group member behaving in this way does have a special influence upon a group by increasing the atmosphere of uncertainty. However, such grounds for inclusion are not entirely satisfactory. For during the main phase of a type I group's life, 'invisible' experimenters cannot be a part of interactive exchanges in quite the same way as visible but silent group members - they cannot, for example, react on any of Birdwhistell's (1973) 'multiple channels of communication', which exist in addition to a simple linguistic level (i.e. Kinesic channels).

(b) Need for 'consistency' in act-to-act sequences

More specifically, where the group is conceived as a system of interaction, reactions are seen as essential to ensure the integrity of that system, for when persons interact and communicate, they try:

> "... to make their activity 'add up to' or 'refer to' something they want to achieve or keep in common." (Slater and Bales 1956)

Acts must therefore have a 'connectedness' or 'consistency' that interactants are aware they have in common:

> "... consistency cannot be maintained over any long period unless actions are acknowledged by reactions, and unless actions and reactions somehow hang together in relation to some concept held in common. This is a fourth type of constriction of behaviour systems; namely that one-way communication is typically not enough." (ibid.)

(c) 'Consistency' in terms of a wider system context

In a functionalist's view, then, actions are only part of an inter-related system in so far as they have a relevance for, that is an effect upon, a 'common concept'. But this emphasis upon the need for connectedness in act-to-act sequences arises to a large degree out of the exigencies Bales had to address in scoring a continuous flow of interaction process. Shifting perspective to the 'self-representational dynamics' (see above, p.66) implicit in the dramaturgical metaphor, suggests a level of analysis that does not require immediate reaction. For here the consistency of a 'performance' can be understood in terms of a wider context that the group is embedded in; one that involves group members working toward more general, distant goals and through longer time spans.

For example, a political interviewee on television is constrained to maintain a degree of consistency in his responses in terms of the 'here and now' questions addressed to him; at one level his behaviour can therefore be understood within the immediate context of this system of interaction constituted by him and his interrogator. And yet the violence that can commonly be observed being visited upon the immediate context of questions addressed in such situations , demonstrates that his acts also constitute a performance with a consistency at another level (16) - best

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(16) There may in fact be consistencies at many levels - multiple meanings, each targeted at a particular audience. Indeed, the political art can to some extent be defined by the ability to target a variety of audiences at the same time without resorting to a degree of performance 'neutrality' (a very similar presentation to the 'task-ability' emphasis discussed above) that would in effect constitute the presentation of no recognisable position at all! One thing is though certain: were the politician to constrict the consistency of his performance to the demands and needs of the interrogator, he would be unable to realize his own goals.

understood with reference to the vast electoral audience he is invariably deferring to.

4.1.2 Problems with the Overlying System Context

(a) Qualifications for application to the laboratory

The analogy, though, is not true to the situation of the subject -group in a laboratory without some qualification; although differences are perhaps in degree only, and simply serve to reduce the conspicuity of the relevance of acts in this context to a wider 'experimenter-audience'. Firstly, in small groups (rather than dyads) it is less easy to manipulate reactions in such a way as to disregard the immediate context while retaining deference to a wider audience - generalised group dynamics, and the increased complexity of interaction see to this. Secondly, it could be argued that the experimenter is not as significant (as an evaluating audience) to subjects, as the millions in the electorate are to the politician. And, last but by no means of least importance, subjects perhaps have a less coherent, recognisable message to communicate.

(b) The need for an interpretative frame with the overlying system context

For the conspicuity of a politician deferring to the wider audience is considerably enhanced to any observer given the likely prior knowledge that he <u>is</u> a politician of a particular persuasion. In other words, observers are often fully cognisant of the 'frame' of the message before its delivery.

In the laboratory group however, the relevance of subjects' communications to a wider context might be extremely hard to infer if little or nothing is known about the quality of expressions expected (or the nature of the experimenter to subject relation)

(c) Bales' recognition of the laboratory's overlying context

The artifact research alone offers few clues as to the possible parameters of an analytical framework within which an observer might interpret or recognise the meaning referents of such acts; therefore before moving on to consider a confederation of concepts that can satisfy this need, it is interesting to note how Bales might have one day approached the problem had he not changed his experimenter's role to that of Trainer. For once again with customary thoroughness he did recognise the existence of the system context of interest here - the subjects' 'electorate':

> "... group members are ... first and last 'subjects' vis a vis the 'experimenter' and second or in between, they are members of the group that he asks them to form. Part of their behaviour vis a vis each other is best understood by reference to this overlying system-context." (Parsons, Bales and Shils 1953)

The relationship between this overlying and his own interactive system was, though, not described in any great detail beyond being recognised as "... extremely complex and subtle ...". Briefly, Bales' micro system was seen as not simply a reflection of the macrocosm but as a constituent part of it. However he did note that:

> "The content of symbols interchanged or (presented) in the overt communication process can be analysed in terms of its reference to any one or all of these systems." (1953)

(d) Limitations to Bales' accommodation of observer-related acts

Indeed, Bales (1953) even suggests how the specific problem of the observer's relation to the group might be handled by:

> "... including observation procedures specifically designed for content analysis of those aspects of behaviour which appear to be most directly a function of the relations of the subject-group to the experimenter."

It can be inferred from these statements that even though Bales was aware that observer-related acts could be accommodated within a social systems perspective by analytically extending the boundary of the laboratory group, he was in all probability also aware that his own problem-solving frame of reference might not be appropriate for the analysis of acts with these particular overlying system referents. In any case (perhaps because of the limitations of his frame of analysis), Bales considered the experimenter-observer as an 'outside', marginal influence - strictly speaking, physical absence precluded his inclusion into Bales' 'in-group'.(17)

4.1.3 Criteria to Determine Choice of System Context

(a) Artifactoral and sociological factors

The decision as to whether to focus upon the extended rather than

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(17) However, Bales did make a tantalising allowance for the experimenter's "symbolic presence":

> "An interaction recorded as 1 - X ... (the notation for the observer) ... is identified as some interaction by the given actor addressed to or directed toward some other person not physically present in the in-group but only recalled, or symbolically represented." (1951)

the limited system context must ultimately depend upon the extent of influence or involvement that it is assumed the experimenter has in his group. The previous chapter detailed a number of reasons from the perspective of the artifact research why such an assumption might be prudent (e.g. his social psychological significance as 'special evaluator', the target he represents for subjects' deference, together with their dependence upon him implied in the need for this process). However, Mills (1967), unconstrained by the operational exigencies of an observational instrument and a problem-solving frame of reference for one particular level of group process, was able to take a broader view (over a number of different levels) and find persuasive 'sociological' reasons for insisting that the experimenter and his laboratory group constitute a single system equivalent to Bales' 'overlying' system.

(b) Experimenters' 'executive' functions

For by 1967 Mills must have been fully aware of the problematic issue of experimenter-observers' 'detached objective' posture reflected both in the existence of the artifact research and the fact that 'emergent' experimenters were adjusting this posture. His special insight was that this methodological stance encouraged two 'illusions', the first of which was that the experimenter was 'outside' his laboratory group, when sociologically speaking he clearly functions within it. He was unequivocal that the experimenter's unavoidably intrusive role vis-a-vis the group he creates and controls, usurps sufficient 'executive' functions from the notion of an autonomous natural-state group, to justify his inclusion in the group system; it is he who performs the roles of:

> "... creator, goalsetter, programmer, lawmaker, paymaster and judge ...". (Mills 1967)

In the laboratory it is the experimenter who:

> "... admits, excludes... who assembles and dismisses ... who announces the purpose, sets the agenda, prescribes the rules, shifts direction, shields against outside influences and so on ...". (ibid.)

The second illusion followed as a direct consequence of the first, for if the experimenter and his group constitute a single system in which functions are divided, then it follows that the subsystem of subjects is only a phantom of its potential self. Such a group cannot realise its developmental potential without the independence and autonomy to control its own executive functions (cf., C.I Barnard 1959, for a description of 'executive functions') ; in short, as Moore (1963) remarked, it is the experimenter who is the principal source of change in these groups.

(c) Executive functions and Bales' level of group process

But given the analytical purposes for including the experimenter detailed above, a 'frame' of reference within which the influence of his executive role (in the overlying system context) might be interpreted is still wanting. Bales' interactive criteria might, for example, be satisfied in an abstract fashion by taking the complete laboratory episode into consideration and denoting the delivery of instructions as the 'initiating act', the group task performance or reaction to them as the 'medial act' and the debriefing (as the experimenter's reaction to the group performance) as the terminal act - but clearly this unit of analysis is far too broad to be of any practical utility. Bales' frame of reference is then

inappropriate, but does he provide a clue to an approach in his reference to experimenters' symbolic presence? (cf. p. 102, [17]).

(d) The 'behavioural' and 'primordial' subsystems of group process

These limitations of Bales' analytical frame of reference were recognised in Mills' analysis, for here Bales' behavioural interactive system was identified as one of two levels of process on which ephemeral groups of strangers initially participate - the 'behavioural' and the 'primordial' - the elements of which could be organised into 'subsystems' with their own features and principles of organisation. In short, Mills implied that the homology necessary for the meaningful transfer of theoretical models between these subsystems was not present, that they each have their own dynamics. The dynamics of Bales' interactive behavioural subsystem are a tendency toward order and predictability, whereas the 'primordial' subsystem that is the subject of the next section is concerned with the psychodynamics of emotional and motivational processes - it is in this subsystem of group process that the experimenter occupies a centrifugal role and constitutes a potential source of change.

These two subsystems are clearly inter-related to some degree: motives influence behaviour, and the behaviour of others influences how we feel. However, without the kind of homologous relationship between subsystems that, for example, Bales and Parsons were striving for between their micro and macro systems respectively in "Working Papers in the Theory of Action", such connections must remain obscure within the confines of the aims of this thesis. Indeed, this may be the price paid for an eclectic and yet systematic approach to small groups.

4.2 PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTUALISATIONS

4.2.1 Introduction

(a) Focus on a different system of group process

The 'psychological' perspective was last discussed in Chapter Two in terms of its tendency to be explicit in considering groups' aetiology. And although it is in this area of group life that the experimenter first significantly participates, understanding the level of group process (the primordial subsystem) where this involvement occurs necessitates narrowing the focus of attention onto the psycho-analytic perspective. Bales' analytical framework. of course, avoided the problems of observational inference necessarily encountered in trying to interpret this level of process by not attempting to take account of the intent of actors or covert emotional processes between group members. But a clinical research environment and a tradition of interest in emotional and motivational processes makes the psycho-analytic view well suited to such a task, not least because unlike a mainstream psychological approach (cf., p. 4 [2]), from this perspective the elements of the primordial level of process can be grouped into 'configurations' systematically; Mills described these as:

> "... configurations of those conscious and unconscious unstructured and emotional elements and processes occurring within and among persons which affect what the aggregate of members can or cannot do, say, believe and think ...". (1967)

In deference to a less sociologically aware audience, Mills also

suggested a metaphor (to remove any hint of 'the group mind fallacy') that is an instructive introduction to a key feature in psycho-analytic models of the primordial subsystem. He compared instinctual and emotional process in individuals to filings distributed at random over a surface, and events or phenomena that influence these to 'vectors' of magnetic current. Thus when a particular vector is passed over a surface field, filings can be observed to arrange themselves into recognisable patterns without there being any change in their individual characteristics. Mills described a number of such 'vectors' that included how an outside observer could change the emotional state of group members, making them feel vulnerable so that they seek, perhaps unconsciously, "to incorporate or expel him", or indeed how "presence through conscription" in a laboratory group:

> "... is a vector in as much as it organizes both feelings of deference toward the experimenter and a sense of detachment among members ...". (1967)

4.2.2 Freud's perspective on groups

(a) Necessary integration with later psycho-analytic perspectives

The experimenter can, then, be a vector - it is in the sense of being a centrifugal figure in constellations of group emotion that he might be included in the psycho-analytic group model. For the defining feature of the perspective of Freud (1921), Redl (1941) and Bion (1961) was their attempt to identify some order in the complex of group emotion in terms of the role a central or focal figure plays in the formation or character of group phenomena. Therefore,

prior to an attempt to integrate these psycho-analytic perspectives into a frame or reference in order to realise their explanatory potential within the aims of this thesis, certain basic features of each approach will be outlined.

(b) The historical context of Freud's group theory

Scheidlinger remarked (1952) that Freud's outline of a group's aetiology might only be 'literally true' in the case of a mob or a crowd; indeed, Freud's use of the term 'masse' (which more accurately means crowd rather than small group) seems to support this idea. However, Freud was addressing himself to other major group dynamicists of the day (i.e. Le Bon) who were mostly preoccupied with the idea of a 'group mind' exhibited by mobs or crowds, and was in fact attempting to relocate the origins of such ties to the family group:

> "It seems difficult to attribute to the factor of number a significance so great as to make it capable by itself of arousing in our mental life a new instinct ... the social instinct may not be a primitive one ... and it may be possible to discover the beginnings or its development in a narrower circle, such as that of the family." (Freud 1921)

With reference back to the two principle hypotheses of Cooley (1909) it can be seen that Freud was in essential agreement with these. Moreover, the germination of his ideas on groups in "Totem and Taboo" (1912-13) occurred only a few years after the publication of Cooley's work. Freud might, then, lay a surprising claim to having been a pioneer of <u>small</u> group dynamics in so far as he was one of the first to stress its particular significance. Indeed, there was a great deal of implicit sociology in "Group Psychology and the

Analysis of the Ego"; like, for example, his assumption that there is a 'potential' in any collection of people to form a group via 'analclitic' object-ties (where an association is made between objects or persons and some significant figure from earlier family life; see Brown 1959).(18)

(c) The 'continuum' of Freud's group types

But although he noted differences between the temporary and permanent, natural and artificial, and primitive and organized group types, Freud's particular interest was in the distinction between groups with a leader and those without - or more accurately, the lack of distinction. It is here that his most significant contribution is to be found, which can be illustrated with reference to the 'continuum' implicit in his approach to groups, with 'stable organized' groups at one pole and 'primitive ephemeral' groups at the other.

The 'primitive' end of this continuum is summarised in Freud's metaphorical description of the hypothetical social structure of the 'primal horde'; the essential features of which were that its patriarchal leader was all-powerful and utterly narcissistic, while the band of 'sons' shared an impotence and a dependence upon him. Such a group existed only to serve the needs and wishes of its leader, its members having no opportunity to develop their own individuality. They feared, revered, hated and were attracted to, the leader in as much as they all wished, but never dared, to usurp

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(18) Although Freud recognised the importance of the family as the seed ground for re-occurring forms of social structure, it was left to Scheidlinger (1952) to develop this theme more fully.

his position, and 'become' him. This then, was a model of 'autocratic' rule with the leader assuming the role of an 'inner authority' for group members, and their ties to him constituting the group's basic cohesive forces; behaviour here was then characterised by submission, compliance and 'naked dependence'.

At the opposite pole of the continuum were groups whose principal features concurred with those McDougall (1920) outlined for groups with a higher level of organization: elements of continuity, the awareness of the group's purposes by its members, a code determining relations among members, and finally, a structure provided for the differentiation of functions. Freud felt that this kind of group would not experience the same regressive tendencies, intensification of emotions, unquestioning submission, loss of personal identity and the manifestation of magical and symbolic processes substituted for rational thought and action found in the primal horde. For in the organized group only a 'part' of the participant's superego would be given up so there would therefore be less dependence, and a greater expression of individuality. Significantly, these reduced ties to the leader might also be compensated for by the sharing of a common ideal among the group members, with 'faith' in the leader at least partly replaced by 'faith' in institutions:

> "We should consider whether groups with leaders may not be the more primitive and complete, whether in the others an idea, an abstraction, may not be substituted for the leader, and whether a common tendency, as wish in which a number of people can have a share, may not in the same way serve as a substitute. This abstraction might be more or less completely embodied in the figure of what we might call a secondary leader." (1921)

(d) The 'original' and 'perpetual' leader-figure

In effect, Freud suggested that even 'organised' groups have a leader-figure albeit as a 'shadow' of his 'former' self (in the primal horde). By looking again at the myth of the primal horde discussed above (cf., p. 17 - 19) the underlying structural continuity can be revealed. For the continuum from the 'ephemeral' to the 'organised' kind of group corresponds to the hypothetical process of development from 'patriarchy' to 'fraternity'. This process of 'development' is concerned with the eventual revolt of the deprived sons against the narcissistic leader of the horde and his monopoly of the capacity for independent will and thought. The sons banded together to kill the father and via this conspiracy ".. the individual emerges from group psychology ..". However, the power vacuum left by the patriarch's removal presented the sons with the problem of how to cope with their newly 'released', and now competing egos. With no single son standing out from the others in the way the father had done, a stalemate arose. In Freud's view it was out of the search for the solution to this stalemate that 'society' was born. Only by coming to an arrangement - a 'social contract' - could the brothers resolve the situation. Each renounced his claim to inherit the patriarch's role in return for the equal restraint of the others. In effect, therefore, a 'new' individuality and a 'new' group came into existence with an organization designed to cope with the needs and drives of many rather than the narcissistic desires of one individual.

Holmes (1967) adopted this model to explain certain processes in the university seminar and in doing so usefully identified the two

key explanatory features of Freud's hypothesis - "... which retain their potency regardless of whether the primal horde even in fact existed ...". Firstly, that "... power is anterior to and indeed the begeter of morality ..."; and, secondly, that the most 'primitive' kind of group is that which is polarized around an authority figure whose 'shadow' remains even after he has been 'overthrown':

> "... he returned first as the totem animal, and later as a god ... because despite the hatred of the sons he was still needed by them ... it was out of the collusion of those who hoped to regain their lost father, and who relied upon one another for the atonement of the guilt that they could not disavow, that a group was born ...". (Holmes 1967)

For Freud (1922), Holmes (1967) and Brown (1959, 1966) there is then a fundamental imbalance in all groups in that they need: "... the perpetuation of an authority, that each one, as an individual secretly resents ...". (19) (Holmes 1967)

The notion that the shadow of the old patriarchy, as it were, re-occurs in the primordial subsystem and co-exists with the social achievements of the 'brothers', opens up a much wider range of possibilities regarding the explanatory power of Freud's model. For while examples of the kind of naked narcissism attributed to the primal horde might be rare, groups with a degree of social organisation at one level, and a configuration of underlying group emotions related to a leader-figure at another, might be more common. In the light of the discussion so far in this thesis and the issues raised regarding the centrality of the experimenter in the

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(19) It is this 'residue' of the primal horde that has in effect been repeatedly identified in type III groups.

life of the laboratory group, certain aspects of Freud's model are simply too appropriate to ignore. For it provides the grounding of a theoretical framework within which the covert preoccupations of a group that has as its creator and focus of interest an undisputed authority figure might be understood. However, evaluating the special significance of the dynamic features of this model must, though, be deferred in favour of first introducing the work of Redl (1942) and then Bion (1961) that is especially relevant to these features.

4.2.3 Redl's Group Theory

(a) Defining leader types

Redl (1942), for example, re-affirmed Freud's basic proposition regarding groups' aetiology, but considered many more situations where one person might evoke group formation. He therefore substituted the notion of a 'central person' for the 'leader' - a more generic concept that encompassed ten different roles. Redl restricted the 'leader' role to one particular set of circumstances in an attempt to control a term which he felt was subject to tremendous variations of meaning. Indeed, the notion of 'including' the experimenter as in some sense the 'leader' of his type I group suffers from similar problems. For just as an insubstantial definition of groups could be chosen to ensure the theoretical feasibility of an experimenter's inclusion, definitions of the term 'leader' could conceivably be stretched to accommodate almost any proposition regarding his relation to a group. If the experimenter does play some kind of significant role in relation to the creation

of his laboratory group, then Redl offers an expanded range of possible types or relations from which to choose.

(b) Redl's three leader-group relationships

The ten types were elaborated from three basic kinds of relationship between group members and the central person. The first of these was that which comes nearest to Freud's formula, while the others derived from developments in his work that came after "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego", of which Redl notes two in particular: his clearer distinctions between the 'ego ideal' and the 'superego', and between 'love drives' and 'aggressive drives'. The three basic relations on the basis of which group members find a similarity or commonality and therefore develop group emotions toward one another are, then:

1. Where the central person is an object of identification on the basis of the group members' love or fear of him.

2. Where the central person is an object of the group members' 'love' or 'aggressive' drives

3. Where the central person acts as an 'ego support' for the group members.

In the first category, the 'leader' type was the model to be admired with group members placing him in their 'ego-ideal'. Secondly, on the basis of Freud's later distinction between the 'ego-ideal' and the 'superego', Redl defined the 'Patriarchal Sovereign' type as the central person whose approval group members seek (as opposed to the 'leader' whom they want to be like) - for identification occurs where the conscience or standards of conduct of the parental figures

become institutionalized. Finally, identification with the 'tyrant' type occurred on the basis of fear of the central person as an aggressor. In the second category, the central person was either an object of aggressive, or love drives. Whereas the 'organiser', 'seducer', 'hero', 'bad influence' and 'good example' focal persons of the last category, referred to situations where they are used by the group members as a means of resolving their own internal conflicts.

(c) Additional observations

In addition to his typology, Redl made two cautionary qualifications, the significance of which will become apparent below. Firstly, although his theory seemed to imply that it was the central person who was responsible for the formation of the group, he also in fact stressed how the readiness and flexibility of group members themselves was just as important - the central person could, as it were, be 'enrolled' by the group. And, secondly, he recognised that there could be some distance between:

> "... the actual underlying constellation ... (of group emotion) ... and the surface manifestation of overt group verbage and group behaviours.". (Redl 1942)

(d) The major exclusion from Redl's view

However, ways in which burgeoning configurations of group emotion might develop once a group has formed was an area of interest explicitly excluded from Redl's analysis. For he made a distinction between 'constituent' and 'secondary' group emotion; with the former referring to emotional events between potential group members

occurring under the pressures of group formation, and the latter (which he excluded from consideration) referring to those that develop from this basis.

4.2.4 Bion's Group Theory

(a) Constituent and secondary group emotion

It was the complimentary (and like Bales') paradigmitic (e.g., Robinson 1985) work of Bion(1961) that deals with these and other important issues: constituent and secondary group emotion, their covert quality and the often passive and changing roles of focal persons. Like Freud and Redl, Bion (1961) addressed himself primarily to the problem of finding some coherence in the complex of group emotion and yet he also managed to reconcile his ideas in this area with the organizational side of group life. And although he was not specifically interested in groups' aetiology (with his analysis directed more at secondary group emotion), his concepts were also discussed in these terms.

(b) Critiques of Bion

Bion's work has been criticised on a number of counts with some justification (i.e. Scheidlinger 1960 and Sherwood 1964) but these criticisms seem to centre around two recurring issues. Firstly, that Bion presents little if any evidence for his theoretical propositions and secondly, his concepts often seem vague, ambiguous and even contradictory. However, his work must be understood in its proper context, for the former critique is one often levelled at theoretical propositions arising out of clinical experience, which

present no immediate formalised means of verification and yet invariably prove usable and meaningful to practitioners in the field. Similar qualifications apply in the case of the second criticism, for concepts developed partly on an intuitive basis often display an incompleteness or logical inconsistency while remaining extremely valuable in practice; moreover, there have been lucid explanations of these concepts (e.g. Rioch 1970). Indeed, the criticisms of Bion's work are far outweighted by his followers at the Tavistock (e.g., Rice 1965, Turquet 1974) and others (e.g., Grinberg 1981) who have turned to his concepts to make some sense of the complex of group emotion, and found them appropriate - even the two critical reviewers mentioned above admit to their practical utility.

(c) In defense of conceptual ambiguity

Indeed it may well be that it is this conceptual ambiguity that has enabled so many researchers to find a place for Bion's concepts in their work; for they almost seem to demand some form of reinterpretation or reformulation and there are many that have capitalised upon this feature (e.g., Stock and Thelen 1958, Slater 1966, Carter 1974, Levine 1974, Kets de Vries and Miller 1984). Bion himself shows the way:

> " .. these three states of mind have resemblances to each other that would lead me to suppose that they may not be fundamental phenomena, but rather expressions of, or reactions against some state more worthy of being regarded as primary." (1961)

(d) Configurations of group emotion and work

The 'states of mind' referred to by Bion are perhaps the most significant proportion of his work - his conceptualisation of the Basic Assumption (abbreviated henceforthas "BA"). In the course of running therapy groups he had observed that they frequently appeared to be permeated by quite sharply defined emotional states. Certain patterns of 'group culture' emerged with a character defined by a particular method of functioning, social structure and emotional complexion in stark contrast to the co-operative, voluntary and rationing problem-solving 'work' activities the group had ostensibly come together for:

> "... work group activity is obstructed, diverted and on occasion assisted by certain other mental activities that have in common the attribute of powerful emotional drives. These activities, at first sight chaotic, are given a certain cohesion if it is assumed that they spring from basic assumptions common to all the group." (Bion 1961)

BAs were, then, recurrent configurations of group emotion to which group members contributed in an involuntary and unconscious fashion; they represented a categorisation of the powerful, unconscious emotional issues that underpinned the group's rational and conscious 'work'. They lent coherence to chaotic emotional aspects of group process by viewing it "as if" members were acting upon some common assumption about the purpose or aim of the group. Golembiewski (1962), for example, referred to the BAs as the 'hidden' or 'unannounced' agenda, or goals of groups - recurrent themes that were complimentary (or antagonistic) to the group goal operating on the overt conscious level. While Shambaugh (1985) discussed them in terms of their characteristics as 'shared fantasies There were three mutually exclusive categories:

1. Dependency.

2. Pairing.

3. Fight/Flight.

(e) The three Basic Assumptions (BAs)

1. Dependency

In this BA a group acted 'as if' it had met in order to be nurtured, supported and directed by some leader-figure upon whom it was utterly dependent. Group members experienced both the pleasures and protection of security; and the inadequacy, guilt and frustration that arose from their dependent 'childish' posture and their desires for independence. Between each other, participants had only immature and undeveloped relations, while expressions of feeling directed to the leader were common - there was then an imbalance in the network of communications. When the leader failed to respond to these overtures, either another was chosen from the group, or reliance upon the leader was replaced by reference to a 'bible' that was made of the group's own history and tradition. More generally, a loss of critical faculties, compliance and passivity were the hallmarks of members' behaviour. Various models have been suggested that characterise the underlying assumptions of this relationship between group members and the 'target' of dependency. Bion himself proposed the doctor-patient, Sherwood (1964) the priest-suppliant, while Grinberg et al. (1975) suggested the professor-pupil; the 'experimenter-subject' relationship might usefully be added to this list.

2. Pairing

Bion observed that when two members of a group (of the same or opposite sex) became involved in conversation (to the exclusion of the others), the rest of the group made the unconscious assumption that there was an especially strong emotional commitment manifest - to the extent of there being a 'sexual' purpose behind the relationship. However, the remainder of the group did not react adversely to their exclusion, rather a particularly strong atmosphere of 'Messianic hope' was engendered. The belief seemed to be that whatever the group's current problems, something or someone in the future would resolve them. This atmosphere of hope was then, as it were, addressed to an 'unborn saviour' - the potential offspring of the pair. Although Bion's explanation of the primitive and unconscious origins and dynamics behind this BA appear rather abstract, the actual configuration he described has a more accessible meaning. The 'Pairing' basic assumption engenders in the group the 'hope' for other pairs and the development of more intimate, meaningful interpersonal relations between members.

3. Fight-Flight

In this final configuration,

> "... the basic assumption is that people come together as a group, for the purposes of preserving the group ... my second point is that this group seems to know only two techniques for self-preservation, fight or flight ...". (Bion 1961)

Here there was no concern by group members to make the group worth preserving, the assumption was rather that there was an 'enemy' that had to be attacked or avoided. The threat this enemy represented

could in Bion's therapeutic groups be either the therapist, his interpretations or the psychological problems that participants were hoping to deal with. More generally though this emotional configuration could have as its target almost any manifestation of an enemy or threat. The complex of emotion and motives in such a group included fear, anger, hate and aggression.

(f) Features common to the Basic Assumptions

The feature common to all three BAs that is of special significance to this thesis was that (consistent with the psycho-analytic basis of the theory) at the centre of each structural configuration was a leader-figure:

> "... all basic assumptions include the existence of a leader ... the leader need not be identified with any individual in the group, it need not be a person at all, but may be identified with an idea or inanimate object." (ibid.)

Clearly, Bion also accounted for the same kind of 'secondary' leadership as Freud, although he only discussed in detail the form it took in the dependency and pairing BAs, which he saw as similar in the sense that:

> "... the dependent group appeals to the authority of the past leader, it becomes very close to the Pairing group which appeals to the future leader." (ibid.)

But Bion did allude to the possibility of a symbolic fight/flight leader in citing the example of how an army (his notion of a 'classic' fight/flight group), fleeing in panic following the death of its leader, could still be said to be following him:

"... he is followed even when dead, for his death is an act of leadership ...". (ibid.)

Moreover, like Redl, Bion felt that the leader-figures of his BAs did not only emerge by virtue of their strengths alone; they could also be drafted by the group to fulfil a role the particular qualities of which were dictated by the needs of the active BA grouping. In other words, they were seen as more passive participants in the process of becoming leader; indeed, they might even be ignored by the group when their behaviour or characteristics fell outside the limits set by the prevalent BA.

4.2.5 The Experimenter's Psychological Group Membership

(a) The psycho-analytic model and the laboratory group

In detailing these psycho-analytic approaches to groups and their analysis of the role a focal person can play in configurations of group emotion, a digression has to some extent been necessary from the question concerning the validity and pertinence of the notion of 'including' the experimenter in his laboratory group; this question can now be re-addressed.

To suggest the explanatory relevance of the basic Freudian model to certain features of the type I laboratory group might not be as extraordinary as it seems. For the defining characteristic of subjects' relationship with their experimenter in this context is, as detailed above, their ambivalent acceptance of his authority and monopolistic control - volunteer subjects are aware that they are assembled to serve the experimenter's 'narcissistic' wishes alone.

Indeed, the very existence of the group is attributable to the fact that each subject has first made a commitment to the experimenter on an individual basis, not to the others as a group; the basic cohesive force that underlies its formation and continuance therefore consists of these ties with the experimenter.

Clearly, Mills (1967) recognised the significance of an experimenter's control of his group's executive functions in similar terms, for in discussing an ideal process of development in groups as movement between two poles of emotional relations - the 'narcissistic and the generative', he remarked that:

> "... Freud's description of the Primal Horde approximates a 'group' near the narcissistic pole ... if we may attribute an underlying basic assumption to such a group it is that it exists to fulfil the narcissistic needs and wishes of the chief ...". (Mills 1967)

And further that:

> "... the sociologist who disassociates himself from the group except in so far as he uses it to collect data, is operating (as far as his relations to the group are concerned) near the narcissistic pole ...". (ibid.)

(b) Reformulating the membership issue

If the experimenter does indeed operate near the 'narcissistic' pole vis-a-vis his group, then the issue regarding the quality of his 'inclusion' possible has undergone a subtle but crucial transformation. This is not only in the sense that from this perspective the experimenter would be included in a different level of group process from, for example, Bales' interaction system, but also because he might not simply be associated with the

'configurations of group emotion' that constitute this level, but 'responsible for', or even 'enrolled by' them. In other words, the full range of the psycho-analytic perspective suggests both an 'active' and 'passive' dimension to the 'inclusion' of the experimenter at the level of group emotion.

Moreover, there is a greater emphasis upon the experimenter being considered in some sense a leader-figure, rather than just a member of his group - and leaders are not necessarily members, as Freud's description of the primal horde implies. For although in this formula the leader represented the basis of group members' identification with one another, it does appear that he was seen as 'outside' or distinct from the horde of sons; his total narcissism and monopolistic control precluded their formation into an autonomous unit and:

> "... consistency would lead us to assume that his ego had few libidinal ties ...". (Freud 1921)

However, leader-figures can be members if reference is made, for example, to the 'post-revolutionary' model rather than the primal horde. For here, 'originally' distinct individual and group psychologies merged into co-existence and the new leader that eventually emerged did so from within the group as a 'shadow' of the father's lost authority.

CHAPTER FIVE: EXPERIMENTERS' CHANGING INFLUENCE IN GROUPS

SUMMARY

The chapter explores the implications of dynamic features in the psycho-analytic group model for its utility to the interpretation of covert leader-related process in a type I group. The relationship between Bion's and Freud's theories is investigated. A consensus amongst theories of group development is identified that corresponds to a sequential analysis of Bion's Basic Assumptions. Dissent to this consensus is reviewed in terms of certain behavioural strategies characteristic of constituent group process. The potential influence of a covert leader-related emotional configuration upon a type I group's overt work is demonstrated through a re-interpretation of these behaviours in constituent group process. Finally, it is shown how Bion's three categories of emotional configuration in conjunction with associated leader-figures drawn from Redl's typology provide an interpretive framework for constituent and secondary emotional process as it relates to the experimenter in a type I group.

General Introduction

To suggest the relevance of the basic Freudian model to an understanding of the kind of role that an experimenter might play in type I groups is only the first step in utilizing the psycho-analytic perspective for the investigation of his involvement or influence in the primordial subsystem - the analytical purposes of the proposition demand consideration beyond Freud's basic principles, incorporating Redl's (1942) and Bion's (1961) work. For it is the various configurations of group emotion associated with a potential range of centrifugal roles suggested for the experimenter by the overall psycho-analytic perspective that will constitute the complete picture of his extraneous influence upon a type I group. Any manifestation of group members' participation in these configurations will determine the kind of centrifugal role that the experimenter is occupying.

Freud's model of the original primal horde was in fact strictly speaking a vector that precluded group formation because there was a:

> "... rigid structure of primordial roles ...not a lack of structure, but a lack of capabilities ...". (Mills 1967)

The explanatory relevance of this limiting vector became apparent in the previous chapter through a concentration of attention upon features of the type I group that would correspond to 'constituent' processes. This was an emphasis that followed on naturally from the proposition that a guarantee of 'boundary closure' provided in the laboratory had distracted attention away from the component dynamics

of this event - most especially the centrifugal role that the experimenter plays in this process. But the other reason for this continuing focus of attention paradoxically demands consideration of 'secondary' configurations - those configurations that later in group life might reflect or be associated with experimenter roles other than the 'narcissistic'.

For if the experimenter's involvement in the constituent process of his laboratory group does indeed mirror in some way the 'narcissistic' leader-figure, then the associated process of 'group revolt' must also be considered in this context, and this raises a number of questions. For what parallel might there be in the type I group for such a process? How might it occur without violation of the most elementary experimental controls? Or is it an inherent characteristic of these groups (as Mills seemed to be suggesting) that their potential is 'truncated' without the possibility of development beyond a certain point? And, if so, what and where is this point?

Examples of open 'insurrection' in type I groups are clearly wanting in the literature, and inconsistent with the overt compliance of subjects that defines their very participation. Without access to a covert level of process (where the answers to such questions must lie) the primary objective must therefore be, in the first instance, to reconcile the notion that experimenters are involved in constituent laboratory group process, with the relevant research. Though, given the exploratory nature of the arguments here and their as yet unrealized goal of gaining access to the covert level, there is no way of knowing, prior to the realisation of this goal in

observation, whether any process approximating the 'revolt' actually occurs - in the final analysis, therefore, some allowance will have to be made for it in any conceptual framework.

Another approach might be to refer to Redl's (1942) expanded typology of central persons which offers a much wider range of 'alternative' constituent vectors, that do not perhaps contain the implicit seeds of their own destruction (or, more specifically, transformation) as is the case with Freud's model. But this perspective as an alternative or supplement to Freud's is insufficient; for neither deals explicitly with 'secondary' configurations - or those that are the result of an expectation that constituent configurations might change or develop over time to encompass other issues or concerns. Moreover, the descriptive and explanatory emphasis in their work is not upon the kinds of behaviour or relations that might be expected from (and between) group members, given the leader-centred group structure they outline - the sort of material necessary for the nuts and bolts of a category system.

For with the aim here being to categorise those aspects of subjects' behaviour that are a function of their relations with an experimenter throughout the life span of a type I group, changes in the quality of configurations of group emotion and/or the associated role occupied by the experimenter, must at least be anticipated. Indeed, given the 'passive' flavour of an experimenter's psychological 'inclusion' suggested by both Redl (1942) and Bion (1961), such changes need not be a function of the central person's behaviour; they might well be the result of developing relations

between group members themselves. For the crucial role played by a central person in instigating a group might change or fade into insignificance once its members discover another basis for commonality or interdependence.

As intimated above, it is Bion's (1961) analysis that provides an outline of a dynamic, all-inclusive set of universal emotional configurations (with leader-figures central to them) that can serve as the basis for a system of categories. For by concentrating upon the content of the BAs (in both theoretical and behavioural terms) rather than their leader-figures' role in them, or relationship to them, the emphasis in Bion's work is appropriate to the need to observe group behaviour as a reflection of its relations with leader-figures.

But in order to see how the BAs represent what is in effect a dynamic process of constituent and secondary group emotion, and relate to Freud's and the appropriate central persons in Redl's analysis, requires first an examination of the relationship between Bion's and Freud's work. An attempt can then be made to weld together the different emphases that exist in the work of Freud (1921), Redl (1942) and Bion (1961) into a unified and universal perspective to re-constitute a conceptual framework within which experimenter-relevant aspects of behaviour in a type I group might be understood - a framework that finds some rapprochement with the conclusions in Chapter Three.

5.1 FREUD AND BION

5.1.1 Theoretical Differences

(a) Common ground

A general observation Freud made about the primal horde and primitive ephemeral groups was that there would be:

> "The dwindling of the conscious individual personality ... the predominance of the affective side of the mind, and of unconscious psychical life, the tendency to the immediate carrying out of intentions as they emerge ...". (Freud 1921)

Thus behaviour reflecting this configuration would display 'regressive' characteristics; it is this feature that provides the most basic link to Bion's BAs. But although a shared psycho-analytic perspective and a primary interest in covert unconscious and instinctual processes yield in themselves considerable common ground, there are important differences between the two that must be clarified. Bion was in agreement with Freud that there is:

> "... ample evidence that the family group provides the basic pattern for all groups." (Bion 1961)

(b) Klein's influence on Bion

However, he felt that a full understanding of groups required not only consideration of the working through of stresses related to these family patterns but also the:

> "... still more primitive anxieties of part-object relationships ...". (ibid.)

It was these primitive anxieties and their associated mechanisms as described by Melanie Klein (1946) that Bion believed tallied well with the emotional states that he found expressed in the BAs and constituted the ultimate source of group behaviour; and yet he saw his approach to groups as:

> " .. not so much at variance with Freud's views as supplementary to them .." (1961)

(c) Leader's relations to groups

Bion's view of a leader's role in his configurations was also a development of Freud's perspective; the BAs were said to "include the existence of a leader", rather than him being the 'requisite for' them. For Freud in the family group, compliance to parents (or more generally relations between an unorganised ephemeral group and its leader) constituted a 're-awakening' of the 'archaic heritage' of the son's relations to the father in the primal horde, and therefore the re-enactment of a relationship based upon 'suggestion or hypnosis'. Bion, on the other hand, consciously avoided the meanings 'that already adhere to these terms' and adopted instead the concept of 'valency' to denote a more neutral capacity of individuals for instantaneous combination with others in a BA. He accounted for this difference by noting how Freud's view of identification was almost entirely a process of introjection by the ego; whereas he saw the leader as "a creature of the BA " like any other member.

> "... identification of the individual with the leader depends not only upon introjection alone, but on a simultaneous process or projective identification". (ibid.)

As suggested above, Bion's explanation of what his BAs 'are' is on occasion contradictory and ambiguous, although they do seem in some sense to be 'group defensive reactions' to some state that has its origins in the family group:

> "... basic assumptions emerge as formations secondary to an extremely early primal scene worked out on a level of part objects, and associated with psychotic anxiety and mechanisms of splitting and projective identification such as Melanie Klein has described." (ibid.)

His emphasis was, then, upon processes deeper and more primitive than those that concerned Freud in the family group, bringing to light different mechanisms which had the effect of making the leader-figure a more 'passive' party in his relations with the group. In Freud's model the leader-figure wielded his power and authority, while for Bion, the group, as it were, demanded that this authority be exercised whether the leader wished or not (a situation almost indistinguishable from the imbalance Freud was proposing for groups that follow on from the primal horde). Moreover, Bion's analysis stressed that the leader-figure must in any case be in an appropriate role or have the right qualities to be included by the group - the group then 'chooses' someone with the potential to satisfy their needs.

Further, comparison of the ambivalent structure of group emotion centred around an institutional authority-figure in the dependency BA and in the 'original' primal horde reveals only a slight difference in perspective. Like Bion's dependency BA (cf., p. 120), a configuration of group emotion in the primal horde was structured around deference to, and dependence upon an authority figure

suffused with ambivalent feelings: hatred and attraction, the desire for independence and yet the fear of retaliation, dependence and yet feelings of deprivation, reverence and yet resentment. Between group members themselves Freud was less clear what kind of relations might pertain; he simply remarked that the sons were effectively 'cast out'. But Mills' (1967) interpretation that the sons "... through mistrust avoid one another ..." and his use of a group with this profile to describe the relation between a "detached observer" and his experimental group in terms of " .. deference to the leader and detachment amongst the membership .." is also a similar situation to the 'immature and underdeveloped' relations found in Bion's dependency group.

5.1.2 Appreciation of Correspondences

(a) Dynamic features of Freud's and Bion's theories

A fuller appreciation of correspondence here, and of the relevance of the fight/flight and pairing BAs to other phases (and ultimately leader-figures) along the continuum of group development implied in Freud's myth, can only be properly revealed by examining Bion's concepts in more dynamic terms. For Freud's model of the decreasing centrality of a leader-figure (and increasing concern of the group with its own internal relations) can be understood in terms of a developmental sequence of BAs; it is in this sense that Bion's work is truly supplementary to Freud's - the BAs 'signpost' the historical myth of the primal horde. And it is of course primarily in the study of type V groups (where a leader-figure is present) that it has been possible to observe overt expressions of the

'revolutionary' process of group development implied in Freud's myth (e.g., Slater 1966, cf., above p.8).

(b) Group phases and behavioural categories

However, although the 'decreasing centrality of the leader' model represents one particular emphasis amongst a plethora of developmental studies dealing with many different kinds of groups (including the 'leaderless' variety), this perspective (and a sequential analysis of the BAs) have been incorporated within apparently successful attempts to identify a consensus amongst these studies - a universal model.

But an investigation of this consensus yields more than the aforementioned associations; for there is a relationship between attempts to isolate the smallest number of dimensions necessary to describe important variations in interpersonal behaviour, and the investigation of major phases of change in group life, from which this thesis can profit. For these phases are in one sense 'molar' summaries (taken at particular points in the group life) of the most frequently endorsed dimensions of behaviour. And although phases are often identified by the frequency of particular categories (cf., Hare 1973), this process can perhaps to some extent be reversed. For theories of group development not derived from the frequency distribution of observational categories nevertheless have something to say (in 'molar' terms) about the basic dimensions required to describe group behaviour.

5.2 THEORIES OF GROUP DEVELOPMENT

5.2.1 Summary Reviews of the Literature

(a) Theoretical consensus

Given the large number of studies on group development, there has in some respects been a surprising measure of agreement between them that is reflected in Tuckman's (1965), Hare's (1973) and Shambaugh's (1978) summary reviews of the literature. Tuckman's approach was to seek a consensus amongst studies drawn from heterogeneous groups; Shambaugh on the other hand attempted a synthesis of the three overlapping model types that have emerged - the 'recurring phase', the 'sequential phase' and 'decreasing centrality of leader'. While Hare's particular interest was in the observational category systems associated with the major theories.

(b) Tuckman's summary of heterogeneous group theories

Tuckman's paper serves as a useful starting point for two reasons. Firstly, because the developmental sequence that he proposed is perhaps the most widely accepted universal model (cf., Shambaugh 1985); indeed, Cissna (1984) concluded that if the fifth 'separation' stage that was added by Tuckman and Jensen's (1977) review of the original model is discarded (as is appropriate for "... brief laboratory problem-solving groups ...") then Tuckman's model is:

> "... an appropriate point of departure for further research ...". (Cissna 1984)

And, secondly, because his synthesis demonstrated clearly how studies which are apparently dealing with quite different kinds of groups still find common ground. For example, the opening phase of group life that he identified as 'testing and dependence' was shown to be consistent with both dependency suggested by Bion (1961), and orientation found by Bales and Strodbeck (1951); for these two concerns are not as disimilar as they might appear, as Tuckman (1965) suggests:

> " ..coincident to discovering the boundaries of the situation by testing, one relates to the Therapist, Trainer, or some powerful group member, or existing norms and structures in a dependent way. One looks to this person, persons or standards for guidance and support in this new and unstructured situation .."

In this view, then, dependency was just one characteristic way that group members could cope with a period of testing; while Bales and Strodbeck's perspective was more generalised, based upon the assumption that the laboratory group was essentially leaderless - persons, structures, or norms to which subjects might refer in a dependent fashion had yet to be sought or found. Tuckman's second phase outlined the emergence of intra-group conflict between members (including the leader) as an expression of the differentiation of self from the growing group structure. While in the third phase, harmony and group cohesion pertained, with members accepting each other's individuality and the group demands before finally developing the functional role relatedness which permits effective task pursuit.

(c) The Oedipal paradigm

Tuckman referred to his phases as "forming, storming, norming, and

performing", and compared the process to the development of the individual - dependency upon authority, through adolescent rebelliousness, to increased socialisation and finally maturity. Establishing a correspondence between phylogenic and ontogenic process in this way has also been attempted by other researchers, particularly those of a psycho-analytic persuasion who have, for example, sought evidence for a correspondence to the Oedipal paradigm in the process of group evolution, (e.g., Gibbard, Hartmann and Mann 1974).

Bennis and Shepherd's (1956) paper was one such study that was among the first to suggest a developmental distinction between authority and peer concerns in the group by analysing group members' changing relations to a leader-figure, and as recently as 1984 (Rugel and Meyer) have had their findings confirmed in a factor analysis. Their first phase was, again, seen as being concerned with resolution of dependency-counterdependency issues which culminated in an attack or challenge to the group leader. While the next phase was characterised by increased intimacy and solidarity in the group. Although the emphasis was upon the issue of authority-relations, the process outlined is very similar to Tuckman's analysis - and the living face of Freud's mythic model.

(d) Sequential analysis of the BAs and overall consensus

Indeed, Hare's review (1973) showed how many of the studies which came after the publication of Tuckman's paper were also in essential agreement with his basic propositions, given that some allowance is made for the different emphases of particular interests. For example Dunphy's (1966) study:

"... following the patterns suggested by Tuckman, with more explicit emphasis on problems the group faces at its termination." (Hare 1973)

There was, then, some measure of agreement at a high level of generalisation that groups move from the initial experience of uncertainty, testing and dependence, through a period of conflict and aggression, to intimacy, solidarity and productiveness (or maturity). As suggested above, this consensus can also be extended to include a sequential analysis of Bion's BA emotional configurations - if one discontinuity is resolved. Namely, that the implicit assumption behind Tuckman's (1965) and Bennis and Shepherd's (1956) models was that group life could be described by a relatively ordered progression of sequential phases culminating in a state of maturity. However this assumption is by no means universal. Both Bion (1961) and Bales and Stodbeck (1951), for example, preferred what Shambaugh calls a 'recurring phase model'; thus Bion stressed the continual swing back and forth between his BAs in combination with the 'work' of the group.

However, Shambaugh (1978) also pointed to a degree of overlap that exists between the sequential phase, recurring phase and leader-centred models of development, such that Bion's (and Bales') work both betray a sense of a progressive development in their descriptions of characteristic sequences of recurrent phases. In Bion's case, this took the form of the work aspect of his groups becoming increasingly dominant and integrated with emotionality in a complimentary rather than antagonistic way. Thus although Bion did not subscribe to the inevitability and linearity of a sequential phase model, a progressive oscillating sequence of change can be

discerned in his work:

> "In the first stage, the group members are dependent upon the leader. Next they begin to attack him (fight) followed by scapegoating a rival leader (flight) from the group. Next they pass through the stage of pairing and finally develop into a work group with relatively little emotionality." (Hare 1973)

This sequence of BAs corresponds closely to the consensus represented by Tuckman's phases and its identification opens the way to an understanding of group members changing relations with a leader-figure in terms of BAs. Moreover, the emotional preoccupations of these phases also, of course, mirror the critical stages in Freud's group revolt.

5.2.2 Dissension to the Consensus

(a) The significance of Slater and Shutz's reinterpretation

Unfortunately, the elegance of this consensus is upset by Lacoursiere (1980) Slater (1966) and Shutz (1958). The latter two authors proferred a subtle re-interpretation of the BAs and where in group life they are to be found; fight/flight was placed before dependency in their theories of group development, although both agreed that pairing was the final phase. This issue is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, if a consensus regarding the most important dimensions needed to describe group behaviour in 'molar' (or phasic) terms is to have any utility in the identification of the most likely basic dimensions of the posited member-to-leader (subject to experimenter) relationship throughout group life, then it must in fact <u>be</u> a consensus: a challenge posed by a theorist as

important as for example, Slater in this context must be resolved. Secondly, the issue concerns which BA is to be understood as the constituent configuration, and which are to be in effect 'secondary' (or more generally how the BAs are to be associated with each phase of group life and ultimately each dimension of member-to-leader relations). Finally, as will become apparent below, an investigation of the issue leads directly into the question of what particular configurations of behaviour might be subsumed under each BA - or, more specifically, how certain overt behaviours of subjects in type I groups can be understood in terms of Bion's BAs.

(b) The BAs and the group revolt

For example, if the first phase of group life is taken to be dependency, then counter-dependent behaviours would be understood as a manifestation of only the seeds of a revolt, still 'contained', and perhaps expressed in the negative aspect of ambivalent feelings toward the leader. The full-blown, open insurrection of the next phase would be understood as fight/flight behaviour with the leader as the 'enemy'. However, if dependency issues are assumed to be the second phase of group life, then they would coincide with the period leading up to and including the group revolt; and counter-dependent behaviours would therefore represent the full-blown revolt. Fight/flight in this case might have a different target from the leader, as 'enemy' of the group.

(c) Slater's view

Both Slater (1966) and Shutz (1958) are similar in their understanding of what the meaning of fight/flight is and where it is

likely to be found in group life. But a more detailed investigation will be made of Slater's (1966) work, for he has conducted perhaps the most detailed and wide-ranging analysis of the notion of the 'group revolt'. He was attempting to investigate parallels in the developmental phases of consciousness (based on a model derived from Piaget) and its correlates at the psychological, social psychological and group levels with a view to constructing a 'paradigm of cultural evolution' - a process of the substitution of conscious bonds for unconscious ones (or cultural for instinctive bonds).

Slater capitalised upon Bion's (1961) suggestions that the BAs might not be fundamental phenomena, but rather expressions of or reactions against "... some state more worthy of being regarded as primary ..." (Bion 1961) by proposing that they represented defensive mechanisms appropriate for:

> "... maintaining individual and group boundaries under conditions of constant flux ... produced on the one hand by increasing emotional involvement while on the other by increasing secularity, consciousness, differentiation and separateness ...". (Slater 1966)

From this perspective, fight/flight was then understood as a method of differentiating self (through contradiction or distance respectively) when there was a blurring of the boundaries between self and the group. This process was seen as appropriate to a group's incipient phase, for here a group might be perceived by its members as an 'undifferentiated mass' that threatened to 'sweep them away' or 'engulf' them, with mutual re-inforcement of unconscious fantasies seducing all into moving toward an increasing feeling of loss of individuality. Pairing, at the other pole of Slater's

continuum, was seen as an appropriate mechanism for restoring balance at a point where there was maximum secular differentiation between individuals and therefore the need to re-affirm a degree of emotional commitment and intimacy.

Finally, dependency was understood as an intermediate stage where the ambiguous but prominent position of the authority figure provided a focus for group members to share a fantasy that " .. gradually seduces them into sharing a reality .." (i.e., conscious ties). This shared feeling could also serve to rescue the group from the threat of submergence in the "undifferentiated mass".

(d) Qualifications to Slater's view

Notwithstanding this analysis, it is quite clear that Slater saw the incorporation of fight/flight into his theory as the greatest obstacle to its overall integration. He recognised the absurdity of expecting adults in groups to be unable (like a child) to distinguish between themselves and their social environment (thus needing distance or contradiction) - members of groups clearly 'know' that they are separate from one another. He therefore suggested that a fight/flight stage might not be observable because of the "... polite civilised veneer ..." which is characteristically colouring interaction between strangers at this point in group life:

> ".. as the group continues .. more layers of the personality are engaged in the group .. customary cultural techniques of interpersonal asepsis fall away, and deeper feelings nudge consciousness. But at the same time self-identity and intragroup differentiation are increasing, so at the point where these most primitive fears about the group might become visible they are already in a state of decay." (Slater 1966)

Slater proposed that it was in fact the characteristic long periods of 'uneasy silence' in nascent groups that:

> "... facilitate a definition of the group on the level of unconscious unity, and arouses the fear that unconscious fantasies may be shared." (ibid.)

It was therefore these silences that represented the real 'threat' of being 'engulfed' to the group; but the kind of corrective response that Slater observed groups characteristically making to them can, as will be argued below, be interpreted as other than fight/flight behaviour:

> "The first discussion was prefaced by a silence of several minutes, and much subsequent behaviour seems to have been influenced by a desire never to repeat the experience ... <u>assiduous task interaction</u> in the early stages tends to fend off this anxiety in most groups." (ibid.)

For through recognition of the close connection between the issue of group envelopment and that of dependency upon a leader (in the sense that the leader constitutes nascent group members' only 'solid bond'), Slater offered a clue to be followed up below, that suggested how this 'assiduous task activity' might be understood as an expression of dependency rather than fight/flight. Moreover, the fact that he revised his intention to place fight/flight as a first phase is further confirmed by a qualification added to Hare's (1973) review of his theory, where he stated that fight/flight would only in fact precede dependency in:

> "... a totally independent society ... in a group ... in society like ours, fight/flight is more a matter of fantasy than behaviour". (Hare, 1973)

5.1.3 Behavioural Strategies in a Group's First Phase

(a) Introduction

On closer inspection, therefore, Slater's uneasy proposition does not represent a substantive threat to the consensus sought above. However, further investigation of the issues raised in his attempts to reconcile his re-interpretation of the BAs with the kinds of behaviour that had been observed in the opening phase of group life leads directly into consideration of how the overt behaviours of subjects in a type I group context can begin to be understood in terms of Bion's BAs; bringing into light significant parallels with insights derived from the discussion in Chapter Three above.

For, as intimated above, the kinds of issues that are discussed in the literature as peculiar to groups' (in general) opening phase, or 'nascent' groups, or a group's 'constituent' process, or groups of 'strangers', might be expected to have a particular relevance to the type I group; where 'group life' in its entirety is both ephemeral and artifactoral. The complex 'meaning' of, and characteristic responses of groups to 'silences' are no exception.

(b) 'Goblet' issues

Thus, Shutz in addition to emphasising, like Slater, the process of group members trying to establish themselves as individuals, described another peculiar quality of nascent groups' early interaction, the prevalence of 'goblet issues':

> "Goblet issues in themselves are of minor importance to the group members, but function as vehicles for getting to know people ... each group finds its own within the framework of its aim ... rules of procedure is common in formal groups (*) .". (Shutz 1958)

But goblet issues can also serve as one of the 'techniques of interpersonal asepsis' (cf., p. 143) Slater observed; for they not only provide a 'commonality' and 'vehicle' for social exchange, but also permit (if necessary) the suspension of involvement in, or commitment to interaction around it. Strangers can be kept at arms length during the testing and sizing up characteristic of early stages of contact - and it is the neutrality or lack of intrinsic significance in goblet issues per se that allows this to be achieved; hostility or intimacy can be avoided and relations can be kept on a predictable and neutral level.

(c) Goblet issues and related strategies

Furthermore, the generation of discussion around goblet issues is also, of course, perhaps the most commonly adopted solution to uneasy silences (20); conversely therefore, the prevalence of this kind of interaction in a group to some extent indicates a latent 'potential' for silences to occur.

Goblet issues, then, serve a function in stranger-to-stranger interaction that is indistinguishable from that fulfilled by Slater's 'assiduous task activity' (cf., p. 144) - indeed they might be expressed through undue concern with the 'rules of procedure'

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(20) Especially in a situation like a type I group where there are external controls operating which preclude the possibility of physical removal from the situation.

Shutz suggests above (cf., 146, *). Taking an overview of what these strategies, variously described, might be trying to achieve, ultimately reveals that they may all be a function of a much broader class of group behaviour.

(d) Interactive silences in nascent groups

Reasons for a high incidence of periods of uneasy silence in the constituent process of nascent groups are complex and varied, ranging from stranger's caution or embarrassment through boredom or lack of involvement. However, what is especially interesting is groups' intolerance of silences and their characteristic reactions to them. Slater goes further than most in considering both the meaning of, and responses to, this phenomena, but does not tell the whole story. Bruneau (1973), on the other hand, in a paper exclusively devoted to an analysis of the forms and functions of silence, although in partial agreement with Slater, presents a fuller picture. He suggested two key features that seem to summarise well its 'significance'. Firstly, how it creates an ambiguous and uncertain void in interpersonal relationships in the sense that it not only promotes "movement towards interpersonal closeness", but if silences are too long, relationships can become "strained, uncertain and perhaps threatened beyond repair" (Bruneau 1973). In other words, silence can imply both 'togetherness' and/or failure in interpersonal relations. And, secondly, how:

> "... silence is the language of all strong passions, love, anger, surprise, fear ...". (Bruneau 1973)

(e) Exigencies of group responses to silence

Slater's view that group members' corrective response to silences is an attempt to differentiate self (through fight/flight) was based upon the idea that silence implied only an increasing sense of unconscious unity or togetherness - and resultant 'assiduous task activity' was understood in these terms. However, with the benefit of Bruneau's more detailed observations it can be seen that if this strategy is to be an appropriate response then it needs to satisfy more complex, apparently contradictory demands, i.e.,

(1) Restoring the equilibrium upset by any implied failure in interpersonal relations through the provision of a 'solid bond' that nevertheless re-defines the basis of any implied surfeit of 'togetherness'.

(2) Neutralising any implied sense of strong passion, both generally and specifically, in terms of aggression or withdrawal (which would reinforce a sense of failure) and intimacy (which would reinforce a sense of togetherness).

Fight/flight would not seem an appropriate behaviour to achieve these ends; however, the latent functions of interaction around 'goblet issues' discussed above suggest that it might. Moreover, if this consensual fixation on a neutral vehicle for activity (as opposed to inactivity) could be shown to be a function of the dependency BA, then the substance of the 'solid bond' provided would be broadened in the sense that it would include (or be an expression of) groups' constituent relationship with a leader-figure. (21)

However, ways in which the goblet issue itself, the task that is assiduously pursued and the dependency BA might be related, must first be shown.

Olmstead's (1954) observations discussed above illustrate the first connection; for he recognised in a laboratory group setting that what appeared to be assiduous task activity could in fact be motivated more by the need to avoid a complete communication breakdown (i.e. silence). Both he and Borgatta (1963) saw that concentrating upon the neutral, objective and predictable (i.e. 'task-ability' or 'goblet') features of a task made it a suitable vehicle for the solution of problems other than the goals interior to the task itself. Thus, when subjects adopt a task-ability emphasis in order to avoid the problems associated with self-quality features, they might also be fashioning a goblet issue out of available material (e.g. " .. within the framework of their aim .."; cf., p. 146 *) - in other words their experimental task.

(f) An overview of behavioural strategies

An overview of such 'strategies' seems to suggest that certain forms of work or task activity can be adopted in nascent groups in order to exercise 'control' in some sense over 'emotionality' or, more generally, 'social-emotional' concerns; but there are at least two possible perspectives on this overview. The first is provided by Bales in his discussion of the relationship between task and social emotional areas of group life, by suggesting there might be:

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(21) This is the real basis of their commonality (at least with a type I group) to which commonsense dictates the prevalence of silences must be related in the first place.

> "... the institutionalisation of a certain indifference, impartiality, impersonality or emotional neutrality ...in the performance of certain roles." (Bales 1951)

These 'roles' might then be adopted when demands were made upon actors in certain encounters, to avoid becoming embroiled in social and emotional concerns (e.g., doctors and judges). In this view, then, a tendency toward potentially disruptive emotionality is controlled to enable more efficient adaption to the task (i.e. in the service of task goals).

However, in the observations cited above, the situation seems to be one where emotional neutrality is sought for its own sake and work is fashioned as a vehicle for these ends. The effect of the behaviour in both cases is the same, but the dynamics behind it are conceived quite differently. Moreover, given that Bales saw groups as moving toward a state of greater formality he would have expected his impartiality roles to appear toward the end of group life where some degree of commitment to the task might have developed, not at the beginning where it would mean less to participants (and therefore be more appropriate as a conversational vehicle to achieve a degree of interpersonal asepsis). Indeed, it is the occurrence of these behaviours early in a group's life that lends them their significance, for it is here that its 'commonality' is uncertain.

The second perspective can be introduced through an observation of Watson and Potter (1962) who focused in their study upon the commonality or medium of an interactive 'episode' in a way more consistent with the view taken here. For they conceptualised it as a 'conversational resource' - a vehicle that can be manipulated or

'fashioned' by actors for a variety of purposes; those suggested are significant:

> "Communication proceeds at many levels both overt and covert ... sometimes a topic of conversation is chosen not so much for its intrinsic interest, as for its adaptability in the service of covert processes of communication." (Watson and Potter 1962)

5.4 WORK AND THE BAs IN A TYPE I GROUP

5.4.1 Constituent Emotionality Underlying Work Strategies

(a) Introduction

The alternative perspective on these behaviours is provided by Bion in his description of the relationship between the BAs and 'work'. For this is an approach consistent with a need to focus upon how work might be influenced or 'coloured' by the underlying emotionality in groups; it is a view that reconciles a dissatisfaction with the assumption that all work is 'equivalent' in terms of its social-emotional significance.

(b) Dependency and Work

More specifically, a closer look at dependency reveals an emotional configuration that can influence the overt work of a nascent group in such a way as to produce the kind of strategies described above. This is apparent in Bion's (1961) description of typical constituent processes in his groups. For in the same way that Slater (1966) spoke of participants in nascent groups having access to "...

cultural definitions of the situation that render it familiar and harmless ..." and obscure fight/flight behaviour, Bion observed how patients in his groups:

> "... arrived with a preconception that serves well as a foundation for a structure intended to help the group to keep its behaviour at a sophisticated (work) level ... that the group consists of doctor and patients." (Bion 1961)

Bion (like Slater) saw this preconception or definition of the situation as concealing a more basic process - though not fight/flight. For the kind of agenda, rules of procedure and general structure usually provided in formal groups was absent in his own - and his patients expected him to provide it. Because he frustrated this expectation and encouraged a situation where the groups' internal structure was in effect a tabula rasa (by adopting a passive, non-directive posture), his group set out "... to make good his omissions ..." and they had a "... structure already to hand ..." based on the preconceptions above.

It was the intensity with which he found his groups pursuing this approach to their work that suggested to him that their behaviour might reflect much more than simply a desire to achieve their conscious aims - Bion, too, recognised that there could be more than "... a passion for efficiency ..." at stake in assiduous task activity. However, he went further than the proposition that this kind of work functions to keep regressive group tendencies at bay (i.e. Bales' approach). For his understanding of the relationship between work and BA activity was such that the latter was always expected to be associated with the former; work always had a particular flavour derived from being in combination with one of the

BAs. Consistent with this approach, Bion suggested that in the group's opening phase:

> "... the doctor-patient foundation for a sophisticated structure soon shows its inadequacy and one reason for this is that it is only a thin disguise for a dependent group." (Bion 1961)

It was not, therefore, simply work that was guarding against the intrusion of regressive BA activity, but work in association with dependency that was guarding against the intrusion of fight/flight or pairing, (with either perhaps also in association with work).

> "The group often structures itself as a dependent group in order to avoid the emotional experiences peculiar to the pairing of fight/flight groups ... the dependent group lends itself very well to this ... the symbiotic relationship between the group and myself ... serves to protect members ... from experiencing certain aspects of group life for which they do not feel prepared." (ibid.) (22)

(c) Dependency and an overview of behavioural strategies

An overview of the strategies described above suggested that nascent group members 'assiduously' pursue group work in order to exercise control in some sense over areas of emotionality implied in 'silence'. An underlying definition of the situation synonymous with dependent assumptions about the doctor-patient relationship (or indeed any other of the leader-follower relations; cf., p.120) would satisfy this criteria by producing the most neutral work (23)

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(22) These comments suggest like Slater that dependency upon a leader can represent a 'solid bond' in nascent groups.

(23) In the sense that it is neither too aggressive or withdrawn (i.e., fight-flight-work) or too intimate (i.e., pairing-work); it acts as a 'protection against these BAs.

(perhaps through attempts to define non-existent rules of procedure, cf., p. 146 *). A group 'fills' the silence, potential in the 'tabula rasa' it confronts, with work (from within .." the framework of their aim ..." , cf., also p. 146 *), the intensity and yet neutrality of which betrays that it is conjured up by dependent assumptions, as the doppelganger of the 'solid bond' that the leader (unsuccessfully) refuses to provide, or be. Dependency is not a 'cultural technique of interpersonal asepsis' or a 'civilised veneer', but it may be that cultural mechanisms are confused or infused with instinctual ones.

5.4.2 Dependency and Work in a Type I Group

(a) Introduction

Moreover, these arguments regarding groups' characteristic constituent process need not be restricted to the context of Bion's therapy groups. For in a type I group, preconceptions subjects bring to the laboratory about the 'experimenter to subject' relationship that serve as the foundation for their overt compliance to experimental tasks (the sophisticated structure in this context) may also be a thin disguise for a dependent group.

(b) Problems with Bion's perspective in type I groups

There are, however, certain problems that must be resolved before this perspective can be brought to bear in full on the type I group. Firstly, in Bion's description of how early group work he encountered was underpinned by dependency, there was the implication that were it not for the fact that he frustrated his group's

expectations by providing no structure or agenda, the existence of the covert BA might not become apparent - for group members would not need to busy themselves with attempts to replace it.

Although this situation is clearly more acute with the dependency BA, Shambaugh for example, has suggested that all three of the BAs might constitute in some sense a reaction to an "... unstructured ... chaotic ..." group situation, for he interpreted them as:

> "... shared fantasies .... homologues of some of mankinds most powerful myths ...(that have) ... the critical function of modelling ongoing social and psychological processes of the small group ...". (Shambaugh 1985)

And he further proposed that reference was made to these "... controlling images ..." because man:

> "... has no genetically programmed way of dealing with group life ... the shared fantasies of the basic group are so critical ... they are ways of grasping a chaotic situation ...". (ibid.)

The question therefore arises as to what an equivalent missing structure might be in a type I group. The obvious candidate is the experimental task and instructions; for there is an expectation or 'preconception' on the part of subjects that the experimenter provide direction, instructions, agenda, rules of procedure or a vehicle for interaction. But it would clearly be very difficult for an experimenter to be 'non-directive' in these terms - to purposively assemble a group and then do nothing! There may even be a sense in which the fulfilment of subjects' dependent expectations by the experimenter is an inescapable consequence of the provision of instructions and assignment of tasks (or at least certain types

of task or instructions). For if dependency underpinned work in a type I group, its influence would be far from inappropriate to the aims of normal experimental practice. Indeed, in so far as this BA is expected to be expressed in subjects' unquestioning compliance with an experimenter's instructions and manipulation, it would reinforce the methodological perspective that views the ideal subject as a passive object to be manipulated at will. Further, it may even be that the possibility of this relationship, so desirable to many experimenters, is in some sense contingent upon the existence of an underlying, dependent configuration of group emotion.

Secondly, bringing this perspective to the type I group immediately suggests the experimenter as the initial target for any expectation of guidance (as the institutional authority figure appropriate to this situation). However, the experimenter, unlike Bion in the therapeutic context, removes himself (at least physically) from the group, having provided it with its task and instructions. And although a dependency group can be understood to 'turn to' a framework of this kind (should it satisfy the demands of dependency) as a replacement 'bible' for the leader, can an experimenter under these circumstances still be understood to be the leader-figure central to dependency?

(c) Task sets as experimenter's representative

Both these problems are informed by Herbert and Trist (1953), who observed and documented just such a process; for they encountered a situation where an absent group member was found to represent a challenge to a 'present' leader of a group. In this case, the

present leader was not satisfying the demands of the group that he lead a dependency BA. Therefore a paper (the 'abstraction' or 'idea') which had been sent to the group by the absent member was used as a reference point or 'bible' by another present member (who was effectively acting on the absent member's 'champion') to challenge the present leader. Indeed, Herbert and Trist also noted how the very features which might have been expected to make the absent leader such an unlikely candidate for this position, in reality, reinforced her role:

> "... absent, yet present in her paper, silent yet speaking through another member of the group. There were the attributes which made it the easier to endow her with an omnipresent magical and compelling omnipotence. It is this quality that constitutes her valency for the dependency BA." (Herbert and Trist 1953)

A similar situation might then prevail in the laboratory with the experimenter becoming an 'absent' group leader whose task and instructions - or, more specifically, particular aspects of these - become his symbolic representative that continues to direct the group through, as it were, 'the rule of law'. Like the therapist's leadership style, the quality of the task and instructions given by an experimenter to a type I group, may have a capacity to either satisfy or frustrate a dependency BA. Further, on the basis of this proposition it may be possible to formulate a method for the unavoidable provision of task or instruction sets that nevertheless 'deprive' subjects of a structure or agenda - thus recreating to some extent the 'tabula rasa' in which Bion's BAs first emerged.

(d) Self-quality task as non-directive leader

For the distinction between 'task-ability' and 'self-quality' task and instructions sets discussed at length in Chapter Three, was largely based upon differences in the extent to which each offered subjects control over their 'behavioural choice possibilities' - or, conversely, differences in the quality of structure or direction given by the experimenter in each case. It was further argued that a pro-active task-ability emphasis by subjects removed a sense of directive ambiguity, and created for them a more formal and explicit framework of expectations within which they could perform. For with the self-quality task there would always be a paupacity of implicit direction or information provided by the experimenter to guide an 'appropriate' (in terms of the experimenter's evaluation) performance. In short, a task-ability set might tend to 'satisfy' the demands of a dependency BA more than a self-quality set.

Alternatively, if a self-quality task were administered to a type I group (in such a way as to exaggerate the 'behavioural choice possibilities' inherent in it), then a 'task-ability' emphasis by subjects in overt interaction might prove to be synomymous with the expression of a dependency BA (and 'assiduous task activity'). A relationship is therefore established between the quite specialised behavioural strategy defined as a task-ability emphasis, and 'dependent work', providing rudimentary criteria for distinguishing between different sets of experimental materials on the basis of their plasticity in the service of a dependency BA.

5.4.3 Fight/Flight Pairing and Work in a Type I Group

(a) Developmental potential of a type I group

The question that is still unanswered, though, is how long an experimenter (or his 'equivalent') remains the target of a dependency BA, or (from the perspective of the artifact research), how long an experimenter as evaluator/observer continues to influence his group in this way. Therefore the focus of attention must now turn to considering what might be expected to occur in a type I group should either of the other BAs come into association with, or begin to influence work. For it cannot be assumed that the experimenter will always be cast in the role of provider and director by his subjects (that there will necessarily always be a high valency for dependency) - especially if the agenda provided is not refractory material in the service of this BA. For given the correspondence established above between a sequential analysis of BAs, the consensus on a universal model of group development, and the developmental process implicit in Freud's description of the revolt in the primal horde, it is necessary to address the question of whether type I groups remain 'truncated' in these developmental terms.

(b) The leader-figures of fight/flight and pairing

More specifically, the final step in achieving a unified theoretical framework can be taken by considering what the 'target focus' of the other two BAs might be. For the experimenter or his materials cannot be an 'influence' in a pairing or fight/flight group unless he represents the centrifugal leader-figure in these cases as well. Is

his influence in these terms restricted to his involvement in a dependency BA? In short, it is unclear whether, if the acting BA of a group changes to fight/flight or pairing, the experimenter remains the target focus (i.e. with the only corresponding change occurring in the quality of emotionality directed at him), or whether his 'influence' ceases because these feelings are directed at another leader-figure.

(c) Pridham's View

Further support for the ideas expressed above regarding the possible 'targets' of dependent assumptions in a type I setting, and also an indication of how similar processes might be at work with pairing and fight/flight, is to be found in a paper by Pridham (1974). For she utilised BA theory in an observational study of what were, in effect, type I groups, similar in many respects to those in this study (i.e. mixed sex, face-to-face groups of strangers, assembled with no leader to do discursive work). Her paper was concerned with outlining a categorisation system for what she called 'acts of turning':

> "... an act of turning is defined as the act of an individual who turns to a group structure (i.e. central or complimentary person, group tradition or norm) to instrument his intention to locomote the group to act upon some assumption about its purpose for having met." (Pridham 1974)

However, Pridham apparently misunderstood the relationship between work and BA activity as one of mutual exclusivity, rather than Bion's intended view of constant conjunction. Therefore, 'acts of turning' were seen as attempts by group members to resolve stress arising in a BA grouping because it was failing to pursue work. The

reason for this interpretation of Bion is unclear, for it was not necessary to the aims of the study - stress could also be understood to arise as result of work being in association with one particular BA as opposed to another.

Moreover, this feature of Pridham's approach presents no hinderance to an appreciation of the significance of other aspects of her work to this thesis. For Pridham's 'acts of turning' can also be seen more simply as 'expressions of' or 'contributions to' the BA to which her groups were being 'locomoted' (regardless of the acts' underlying causation). Approached from this perspective, the 'agencies' to which 'acts turned' can reveal something about the target focus appropriate to each BA. Indeed, Pridham's paper was in effect testing the efficacy of the proposition that the agencies she postulated as appropriate to locomote the group toward their associated BAs were in fact those used in such cases - and her hypotheses were confirmed.

5.4.4 Final Integration of Perspectives

(a) Redl, Bion and Freud

The human agencies to which Pridham referred for the targets appropriate to each BA were drawn from Redl's typology of central persons; this choice therefore provides the final missing link in an overall psycho-analytic perspective that incorporates Redl's perspective with that of Freud and Bion. Redl's analysis provides description of the 'target' leader-figures central to each of Bion's universal set of group emotional configurations that signpost the

developmental process implicit in Freud's myth of the primal horde.

(b) Redl's leader-figures centrifugal to the BAs

Thus, with the fundamental character of the dependency group being the shared conviction that the purpose of the meeting was for participants to be directed and made secure by a 'nurturant' leader, Redl's 'Patriarchal Sovereign' is clearly the appropriate human agency to which acts could turn. However, in the case of fight/flight the position is more ambiguous, for the target focus of this BA was an 'enemy' or 'threat'; and Bion appears to have suggested on the one hand that the dependency leader became the 'enemy', while on the other that the leader of the fight/flight group was someone who:

> "... mobilises the group to attack someone, or alternatively leads ... (the group) ... in flight." (Bion 1961)

A leader figure had then to be identified who mobilised the group to act out fight/flight (against some threat), and yet was also the target focus (the threat itself). This apparent contradiction is in fact reconciled in Redl's description of the 'Tyrant'. For with this central person the group comes together with a shared emotionality on the basis of their fear of this leader as aggressor. In one sense, therefore, he constitutes a threat, yet through his actions as a tyrant he leads the group in the belief that there is a threat.

The target focus of pairing was defined by Bion as the hope for an "unborn saviour", made possible by a focus upon intimate pair relationships in the group. The assumption was that at some time in the future there would be a leader that would solve all the group's

problems. There was then a sense of the benevolent omnipotence of the dependency leader, but this pairing leader was clearly not chosen on the basis of his tenure of institutional authority. He was rather the offspring of an intimate interest in interpersonal relations in the group; moreover, this leader should 'never be realised' - the emphasis was upon the means to create a new leader rather than his existence per se . Pridham's choice of a human agency for this BA was Redl's "Love object", for this central person although the target of positive friendly feelings, was not understood as a leader in the usual sense of the term.

(c) Inanimate agencies

Pridham was though, also concerned with inanimate agencies, through having taken account of Bion's notion that each BA included "... the existence of a leader ..." as a ".. person ... idea ... or inanimate object ...". She therefore outlined three kinds of "traditions, laws and customs", and three kinds of "norms" which could act as the central person's equivalent in each BA:

> "There are times when a member of an adult problem solving group is observed to turn to another member, or refer to a group norm or tradition as if thereby to move the group to operate in some specific way. When such acts are observed it may be that the group is not having 'scientific' goal directed behaviours toward solution of a problem. Instead the group is acting out some emotionally laden unexamined assumption." (Pridham 1974)

Clearly, she also felt that certain forms of task activity were in fact a function of an underlying BA - and this need not only be dependency.

(d) Mann's analysis of principal leader-figures and associated emotionality

Some of Pridham's assumptions are further born out by the most explicit investigation of the member-to-leader relations that first came to light in type V groups. Reference to Mann's (1967) crucial analysis has been deferred not only because of the limitations to its relevance posed by the context of his research, but also because the significance of his conclusions to the aims of this thesis can only be seen subsequent to an independent demonstration of the potential relevance of Bion's BA theory to the analysis of the experimenter to subject relationship in a type I group.

Mann's investigation was exclusively concerned with the categorisation of member-to-leader acts or expressions in a type V group. His categories initially constituted sixteen dimensions, eight of which covered group members' affective responses to the leader, three of which dealt with authority relations, while the final five described how group members felt about themselves in relation to the leader. This system as it stands might almost fulfil the requirements of this study. However, the fine distinctions which would have needed to be made between content categories in order to maximise its use would have been far too exacting in a type I situation where the leader-figure is not present and the group task is 'antagonistic' to these purposes. The task of simply locating components of acts which might be relevant to the experimenter would be demanding enough without having to make sophisticated judgements as to their precise meaning.

Indeed, even though the task of Mann's t-groups (the investigation of it's own internal processes) was such that the manifest leader-relevant material was more varied and frequent than might be expected from a type I group situation, he clearly felt that there was still a certain amount of redundancy in his category system. For he subjected the frequency distribution of category scores to a factor analysis to see if a smaller number of underlying dimensions could be used to describe member to leader behaviour. As a result of this analysis, six factors were identified, complete with the behaviours found at the positive and negative poles of each.

Hare (1973) recognised that the first four, most significant of these factors, bore a close resemblance to Bion's categories of dependency, pairing, fight/flight and work.

> "... after beginning with Bales' twelve categories and amplifying them with four more interpersonal categories ... Mann finds that four themes are sufficient to account for most of the process of group development. These themes are quite similar to those proposed by Bion." (Hare 1973)

Not only did the 'relations with a leader' denoted by each factor specify target figures in all essentials the same as those chosen above as appropriate to each BA from Redl's typology, but Mann's theory of group development stripped to essentials, and described in terms of these four factors and their associated themes of nuturance, control, sexuality and competence, corresponds to the consensus outlined extensively above, and represented in Tuckman's (1965) model - as Hare (1973) also recognised, i.e.

	THEME	PRIMARY ASSOCIATED FACTOR
1st Phase	Nuturance (Dependency)	Relations with leader as authority figure (i.e. Patriachal Sovereign)
2nd Phase	Control (Fight/Flight)	Relations with leader as manipulator (i.e. Tyrant)
3rd Phase	Sexuality (Pairing)	Relations with leader as audience (i.e. Love Object)
4th Phase	Competence (Integrated Work)	Relations with leader as analyst

The relationship of Mann's four main factors to Bion's categories therefore clearly reinforces Dunphy's (1966) interpretation of the relevance of the BAs to the comprehensive analysis of group members' changing relations with a leader figure. Moreover, the fact that Mann's factor analysis revealed dimensions that appear in the essentials the same as Bion's BA categories, suggests that it might be relevant in situations other than the type V group, given that Bion's theory was not intended to be hidebound to therapy groups - it did have universalistic aspirations, i.e...,

> "... This does not mean that I consider my descriptions apply only to sick groups. On the contrary, I very much doubt if any real therapy could result unless these psychotic patterns were laid bare no matter what the group ...". (Bion 1961)

5.5 A SUMMARY VIEW

The introductory proposition that the 'significance' of experimenters in the emotional life and organization of laboratory groups that became apparent when their role changed from observer and manipulator to participant-observer and leader-manipulator, was in fact only a rediscovery of an extraneous, covert influence they always had, demanded further investigation in two broad areas:

(1) A review of the emergence of the small group concept, in order to trace the origins of the failure there has been to consider the explanatory relevance of leader-centred models of group structure to the situation that pertains between an experimenter and his type I group.

(2) A review of the 'artifact research' for a perspective on the extraneous influence of experimenters on their subjects or subject-groups, while 'still' in the detached, 'pre-emergent' role of normal experimental practice.

In the first case, it was determined that advances toward a sociology of small groups (the extrapolation of a 'fraternal' structure) had been achieved at the expense of consideration for the 'patriarchal' group structure (representative of a psychological perspective) that had underwritten it. At two turning points (one 'theoretical', the other 'operational') in the emergence of the small group concept, 'the patriarchal begat the fraternal'. In other words, events paralleled a process described in Freud's supra-historical archetype - the myth of the primal horde, where

patriarchy is the 'original' form that persists as a 'shadow' in all groups.

For example, at the 'operational' turning point (when small group research shifted almost wholesale into the laboratory), the fact that the guaranteed, artificial 'boundary closure' of controlled experimentation coincided so conveniently with the sociologists' analytical circumscription of the small group as a face-to-face system, enabled experimenters to ignore an 'overlying system context' that included the methodological and theoretical implications of their own involvement in laboratory groups' aetiology. The patriarchal structure of the relationship between the experimenter and subject-groups created in controlled experimentation underwrote the operational feasibility of sociologists' analytical framework.

The second major area of investigation concerned with experimenter's controlling artifactoral influence over subjects began with recognition of the "catch 22" inherent in it; and the proposition that this problem could only be resolved with reference to a covert level of process. By first examining the nature of volunteer subjects' tautological co-operation with experimenters' control (that constitutes the fulcrum of this catch 22), a suspicious, covert 'qualification' or dimension to their compliance was identified in their 'deference to' general aspects of experimenters' performance for 'information' to aid resolution of their 'deutero-problem'. However, few references were found in the literature as to the form this information might take, what its content might be, and how it is inferred by subjects in the

experiment itself. But by turning to examine what in effect constitutes not only the experimenters' 'representative' but also the 'substance' of subjects' overt interaction in experiments - the task and instructions sets - and adopting Riecken's self-quality/task-ability distinction between them, it was found that subjects might also alleviate and express difficulties associated with their deutero-problem by adopting a particular quality of task interaction (the 'task-ability emphasis').

Finally, serious consideration of the experimenter as an intervening variable in the experimental process ultimately led to the realisation that the significance of his 'influence' could best be understood in terms of him being included in some sense as a part of the group. Moreover, his control of groups' executive functions and, most especially, the significance of the creative role he plays in its constituent process suggested that he be included in a centrifugal role rather that simply as a group member. This proposition therefore pointed irresistably to the explanatory relevance of leader-centred theories of group structure.

How then is this psycho-analytic perspective reconciled with those earlier propositions that arose out of investigating the experimenter's influence from the point of view of subject and situation variables? Although there is no obvious isomorphic relation between each set of concepts, both are ultimately concerned with resolving the "catch 22", by providing a conceptual framework to question the dynamics behind the overt behaviour of type I groups that is pre-determined by experimenters as a certain type of task activity, and anticipated by them as a function of the

'successful' manipulation of independent variables. Thus the covert deferent/overt compliance distinction achieved separation between the influence on subjects' overt behaviour of their extraneous involvement with the deutero-problem (a significant part of which is concerned directly or indirectly with the experimenter), and the independent variable - the experimenters' intended influence. While the notion of a constant conjunction between work and the BAs located the experimenters' extraneous influence upon a group's work in specific, covert configurations of group emotion, in the sense that these focused upon him as a 'leader-figure'.

Moreover, these diverse perspectives converged in making use of the self-quality/task ability distinction to point to the potential for extraneous experimenter-related influences behind the same quality of seemingly 'compliant' task behaviour. The artifact perspective achieved this by showing how these different task sets might be more or less serviceable to the covert concerns of the deferent dimension of the subjects' compliance, and thus how a 'task-ability emphasis' could reflect its expression or alleviation. While the same behavioural strategy was found to be equally relevant to the satisfaction of the demands of an underlying dependency BA.

The latter perspective clearly suggests that the former might be taken a stage further through the definition in much more specific terms of the social psychological context and quality of experimenters' extraneous influence. Subjects' responses to this influence (or interactions with it) that could be seen as somewhat specialised behavioural strategies unique to the laboratory situation might then be understood as examples of a much more

general and universal set of behaviours related to leader-figures, and inter-related within a unified theory of small groups.

For example, one crucial consequence of a pro-active task-ability emphasis by subjects noted in Chapter Three was that there was a sense in which it also suggested a preference for less control over behavioural choice-possibilities (cf., p. 81-82, [13]). This observation that might appear to co-exist somewhat uneasily with the notion that subjects are actively attempting to control their presentations to the experimenter, is not, of course, hard to understand if such behaviour is rather seen from the point of view of it reflecting the influence of an underlying dependency BA. One might speculate that Olmstead's awareness of this possibility is implied in his comments on a 'task-ability emphasis':

> "... While a group is devoting itself to a scientific analysis of an objective phenomenum ... it may actually be dealing with internal problems of integration, sentiments and leadership ...". (Olmstead, 1954)

Indeed, in rather the same way, the contradictory quality that lies at the heart of subjects' compliance in experiments (cf., p. 61, 'suspicion and caution are the bedfellows of security and dependence') is more easily accommodated by BA theory, for it is particularly resonant of the kind of ambivalent feelings intrinsic to the emotional configurations in, for example, a dependency BA.

Furthermore, those unanswered questions concerning the kind of 'information' subjects defer to and how they get access to it in an experiment (that preceded analysis of their alternative manipulation sets) can be superceded by the psycho-analytic perspective. For the

issue is redefined in Bion's descriptions of what are in effect a complex series of "... intertwining feedback loops ..." (Rosenthal 1966) of influence involved in the relationship between group and leader in a BA mentality. Once again, comments of researchers (like Rosenthal's here) left as markers at the boundaries of the research on artifact to point to unexplored issues, frequently seem to support this proposition. For example, Orne while discussing the 'information' to which subjects defer suggested that:

> "... It appears that subtler cues from which subjects can draw covert or even unconscious inference may be still more powerful". (Orne 1962)

To what extent, though, are cultural mechanisms being confused or infused with instinctual ones? The temptation to strive toward the kind of theoretical elegance that would be achieved if an isomorphic relationship was established between the covert deferent dimension of the group-subject to experimenter relationship and the covert BA dimension of group to leader relations must, for now, be resisted. For the artifact perspective was instrumental in this thesis only in so far as it suggests various covert potentialities in the group-subject to experimenter relationship; but the 'dramaturgical' metaphor must give way to the 'primordial' in order for the investigation of extraneous experimenter-influences to proceed beyond the limitations of theory.

CHAPTER SIX: PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS

SUMMARY

The chapter describes the first phase in the investigation of the covert dimension of the type I group-subject to experimenter-leader relationship in terms of Bion's conceptual framework. The 'Group Fantasy Story' task (GFS) is introduced as a method of eliciting interactive material appropriate to this end. Projective instrumentation and technique are reviewed. The self-quality and non-directive features of the GFS are reviewed. The conceptual framework for the interpretation of GFS material is reiterated. The format recruitment and procedures of the groups in the pilot study are outlined. The performance of the GFS task and Bion's interpretative framework are discussed in anticipation of the presentation of the complete system of categories used in the main study.

General Introduction

The theoretical considerations above have, then, moved irresistibly toward the proposition that a potentially dynamic, covert dimension of the group-subject to experimenter relationship that constitutes an extraneous, artifactoral influence upon subjects in the type I group can be understood in terms of Bion's all-inclusive set of emotional configurations. The three BAs provide the foundation of an interpretative framework within which disparate, chaotic elements of leader-related group process might be meaningfully categorised.

For having considered the unique artifactoral implications of experimenters' involvement in the constituent process of laboratory groups (a phase that is crucial due to the defining quality of their transience), it was found that it closely paralleled Freud's specification of patriarchal group structure. Moreover, Bion's 'corresponding' dependency BA was shown to be an emotional configuration most appropriate (from both experimenters' and subjects' point of view) to the concerns of normal laboratory practice - even to the extent that under certain circumstances it might constitute an underlying configuration somehow necessary for experimenters' successful manipulation of independent variables. But given this special relevance, the question arises as to the necessity of the fight/flight and pairing categories to an effective analysis of experimenter-related laboratory group behaviour.

It could be argued that the "catch 22" inherent in this investigation that directs it toward a covert level of process and thus necessitates an interpretative framework like Bion's BA theory, also questions the relevance of dynamic features of this theory. For

the BAs are all-inclusive categories in the sense that they represent critical points in a complex cycle of group development. In short, Mills' paradox that experimenters' control "creates the potential" for a laboratory group but "takes away its means of becoming one", implies that these groups are not in some way able to move through these phases. Does the characteristic constituent configuration of laboratory groups preclude group 'formation' (i.e. as is the case with the primal horde model)? With the experimenter the institutional authority figure at the heart of a constituent dependency BA, can subjects be expected to challenge or rebel against this authority in order to realise some notion of potential group autonomy? For this is a course of action hardly credible overtly, given their original compliance to join the experiment.

Slater's observations about the 'primitive' processes he was concerned with analysing in the group revolt, re-affirm that it too (i.e., 'secondary' configurations) can be located at a covert level in obscure, elusive and symbolic forms, for even in a type V group format it is rarely seen 'naked':

> "... only shades and echoes of humourous associations to phenomena that are deadly serious and fearfully real in situations where masking is less developed. We see revolt but it is gamelike and ritualistic, we see religion but it is metaphorical and facetious, the cannibalism is symbolic and the sexuality is verbal ...". (Slater 1966)

Mann (1967), too, in the context of his study dealt with this kind of material and further specified the interpretative problem involved by recognising that group members establish symbolic equivalents for themselves and the targets of their feelings. He therefore found it necessary to make:

> "... valid connections between the subject and object of the content on the manifest level, and feelings of the member toward the leader at a more covert level of meaning and awareness ...". (Mann 1967)

Given that these kinds of interpretative problems in gaining access to leader-relevant material in a type V group format would be expected to be accentuated in a group with no leader continuously present perhaps the most significant challenge posed to the investigation here therefore concerned facilitating the kinds of 'connections' Mann referred to, in a type I group context.

Consequently, it was considered prudent to organize a pilot study in order to test the efficacy of the two key elements in the overall investigative strategy that was designed to overcome these problems.

(1) The first element was concerned with the provision of a medium or vehicle (i.e., task) for laboratory group interaction that would be fertile ground for the kind of manifest symbolic material from which 'connections' to a more covert level of meaning and awareness could be made. The pilot therefore tested the efficacy of the 'Group Fantasy Story' (GFS) task that was developed to fulfil this and other requirements.

(2) The second element was concerned with the provision of an appropriate framework to enable the identification and interpretation of covert experimenter-relevant elements from within the manifest interactive material elicited by the Group Fantasy Story task. The pilot was therefore also an opportunity to make a broad determination of the suitability of Bion's three BA categories to these ends.

6.1 THE GROUP TASK AND INTERPRETATIVE FRAMEWORK

6.1.1 Projective Instrumentation

(a) The 'Group Fantasy Story' task

The 'Group Fantasy Story' task (GFS) engaged groups in collectively making up a story on a theme of their own choice, with the requirement that it be as 'imaginative' as possible (cf., APPENDIX I). The most important general feature of this task was that, given its equivalence to Murray's Thematic Apperception Test (excepting the absence of picture cards), it constituted a projective test, and as such was expected to elicit the kind of interactive material of interest here. For the feature of projective tests that is distinctive and crucial is their sensitivity to covert and unconscious processes:

> "... the capacity of these devices to intercept the private, covert, latent unconscious components of the individual personality, distinguishes them from most other psychological instruments." (Lindzey 1961)

(b) The assumptions of projective techniques

The basic assumption that lies behind such a test is that when a subject is presented with an ambiguous and structureless stimulus permitting variable responses, those that result will reflect his or her characteristic response patterns and tendencies. However, in addition, Lindzey (1961) catalogued a series of factors and conditions that can also influence a subject's test responses as intervening or extraneous variables - these 'artifactoral' and group

influences are, though, not necessarily extraneous to this investigation. For example, he suggested (as well as their enduring dispositions) that subjects' defences, significant social groups to which they have belonged or even their definitions of the situation, could influence responses. Given that the BA behaviour the GFS was aiming to lay bare can be seen as both an interpretation of present group influences (as well as the influence of a history of participation in 'significant' groups) and as 'defensive' mechanisms (e.g., Slater 1966), the 'extraneous' influences that Lindzey catalogued also have some relevance to the interests of this thesis. Indeed, this is particularly true of subjects' 'definition of the situation' for factors that were understood to influence it were:

> "... the relationship between the examiner and his subject ... the physical setting in which the test is administered ... the test relevant past experience of the subject ... procedural factors such as the instructions accompanying the administration of the test ...". (Lindzey 1961)

Because of the range of factors capable of influencing subjects' test responses, one might anticipate some difficulty in identifying the correct determinants of any given element. For example, when is a response shaped by enduring and when by temporary dispositions? A detailed solution to this kind of persistent problem in projective testing is beyond the scope of this thesis. In any case, such an enterprise is not necessary here, for the kinds of responses (interpreted as expressions of BA configurations) that GFS was designed to elicit can, in the context of this investigation, be understood to be reflecting a complex of influences close to the kinds of determinants discussed.

(c) Projective instruments for groups

Lindsey's comments, and projective testing in general, have in the main applied to the individual subject; however, there have been a number of studies that have used variations on the TAT instrument with groups in order to gain access to 'covert' areas of group life (e.g., Henry and Guetzkow 1951, Horowitz and Cartwright 1953, Mills 1964a). These studies offer useful insights and although they ultimately suffered from the lack of a comprehensive theoretical framework within which to organise and interpret the mass of contradictory and confusing symbolic material elicited, they did demonstrate the effectiveness of their instruments in producing it. Henry and Guetzkow (1951), for example, confirmed that such instruments:

> "... permit and encourage expression of non rational feelings elements in group process."

Further, Horowitz and Cartwright (1953) outlined an important assumption underlying the use of these kinds of instruments with groups; namely, that just as they reveal an individual's personality characteristics so too, group properties can be elicited. For the basic assumptions that serve in this investigation as the backbone of a theoretical framework are, of course, group constructs of 'non rational' feeling elements; although Stock and Thelen (1958) observed that:

> "... detectable affect may be expressed by the individual in his verbalisations to the group, and the quality of emotionality in the group as a whole must ultimately have its source in such expressions ...".

The observation that individual acts can serve as a 'barometer' of the group culture is important to the proposed methods of this thesis because, as Horowitz and Cartwright (1953) noted, when a TAT story is a group product, the analysis of end stories alone is insufficient in so far as they would tend to reflect each individual's idiosyncratic summary based on his or her own preferences or perceptions. The categorisation of on-going interaction process, on the other hand, takes full advantage of the fact that the exigencies of communicative consistency, clarity and interpersonal decision and control in the group context demand the more overt communication of members' thoughts and feelings. The investigation here was then concerned with categorising individual acts as the quantitative and qualitative expression of group constructs (and ultimately with establishing some equivalence between these expressions of basic assumptions and experimenter-relevant acts).

An even more direct relationship can, though, be suggested between the interactive material elicited by the GFS and the interpretative framework of this investigation, for as Lindzey (1961) remarked:

> "... most projective techniques ... evoke fantasy responses from the subject ... even though the responses themselves may be closely linked to realistic situations the subject is encouraged to respond without concern for the sanctions of the real world, to respond imaginatively ...".

The GFS is then more fundamentally a 'fantasy inducing' instrument, and as suggested above (cf.,p. 155), there is a perspective that has been taken on the BAs that views them as 'shared fantasies' (i.e., Shambaugh 1985 or Kets de Vries and Miller 1984). Indeed the

notion of fantasy has itself tended to be used in a number of different ways; it can, for example, be more or less unconscious and can refer to intra-psychic or group phenomena.

The fantasy elicited by the GFS is one of a variety of forms of creative or imaginative thought, the world of daydreams, fiction, fairy-tales and jokes, etc., which although containing elements of unconscious fantasy, is to some extent conscious - it does not necessarily derive its sole importance from unconscious infantile conflict. Those traces of unconscious process relevant to a strict interpretation of Bion's concepts would ultimately be understood in terms of this kind of reductive, Kleinian explanation (cf., p. 133). However, Shambaugh (1985), drawing on the work of Schorer (1968), argued that the shared fantasies of the BAs were "controlling images" that organized experience and activated behaviour; he was more concerned to show how they are " homologues of some of mankinds most powerful myths " that can operate anywhere in a hierarchy of 'sacred symbolisms', than seek a psycho-dynamic explanation for them - his approach was in a sense more 'sociological'.

A reductive, psycho-analytic explanation of the BAs is therefore not necessarily a prerequisite for their utility in identifying or 'organizing' those 'chaotic' elements in individual expressions in a group context that reflect a more or less unconscious but shared fantasy of the group as a whole, and of a leader-figure's centrifugal role therein. Indeed, it is to draw attention to this latter feature of the BAs that in the discussion above Bion's work has been related to the more general psycho-analytic perspective on groups - for this is perhaps its major contribution in the context

of the aims of this thesis.

(d) Projective techniques and fantasy

One thing is, however, clear about fantasy observed in a group context: it may have intra-psychic unconscious origins, but, as suggested above, the repression possible in an autistic context is soon undone in interpersonal communication to reveal more conscious group-related themes that may only survive because they fulfil some need in the group's functioning. Bales (1970) made a useful contribution to an understanding of such processes in the analysis of what he called 'fantasy chains'.

'Fantasy chains' were identified as occasions when some image or topic of conversation seemed to 'catch on' and draw upon the participation of group members with unexpected rapidity. A heightened sense of excitement, increased competition to contribute and a new sense of involvement in the topic were all common signs of such a process. These often brief explosive episodes were understood to arise when some symbol was presented which had (often quite different) unconscious meanings for each, or some of the group members. Each participant attempted to 'control' the symbol presented, in rather the same way that they might attempt to control their own unconscious fantasies - and the chain took off as this individual control failed in a group context.

Further, like Horowitz and Cartwright (1953) , Bales remarked on the special advantages in a group situation that encourage the emergence of fantasy material an individual in an autistic context might not reveal:

> "... the forces toward expression are strong and reinforced, whereas the defences of the members are uncoordinated and hence weakened. Since individual members defend themselves psychologically in different ways and express different aspects of the same themes, they circumvent and undo each other's defences." (Bales 1970)

Given such processes, the 'take off' of Bales' fantasy chains was only 'shut down' or suppressed when a significant consensus of members agreed on the 'threatening' nature of the fantasy material.

(e) Multiple motivation in fantasy

Bales also noted that group fantasies, like dreams, were multiply motivated. He pointed to the psychological overlap between three 'symbolic and emotional domains': the manifest content of the fantasy, its here and now relevance and its relevance to past, (particularly childhood) experience. The interpretative task therefore common to Bales, Horowitz and Cartwright and this thesis is the translation of the manifest content of group fantasy (via 'allusive clues') into its 'here and now' significance and finally perhaps relating these elements back to unconscious infantile associations. This final step was not, though, the concern of Horowitz and Cartwright and is only dealt with in this thesis implicitly by virtue of the fact that the interpretative framework adopted has its origins in an appreciation of the Kleinian analysis (1946) of infantile part-object relationships.

(f) The interpretation of psycho-dramatic fantasy

To successfully complete this interpretive 'translation', Bales suggested that it was the 'psycho-dramatic' elements in fantasies

which had to be understood; these he identified as:

> "... elements ... which present an image of a person or some kind of being that has personal qualities, behaving in a certain way toward a certain situation or some other personage ...". (Bales 1970)

Focus upon these elements is an interpretative strategy in all essentials the same as that proposed by Murray (1943) for the Thematic Apperception Test; where there is the initial identification of a 'hero' figure in stories followed by an analysis of his needs and the 'press' or environmental forces acting upon him. Moreover, this approach was also adopted by Horowitz and Cartwright (1953) who broke their data down into the 'simplest meaningful sentences' consisting of a subject and predicate (or referent and characterisation), with the subject referring to:

> "... a person behaving as an individual, a subgroup member, or a group member, or to the group as a whole, a part of the group or some item in the environment ...". (Horowitz and Cartwright 1953)

Clearly, there is a slightly different emphasis with each author, but a consensus can be seen in the identification of a central personality followed by an interpretation of environmental forces acting upon him (including, of course, significant relationships) and his needs or reactive behaviour. The 'here and now' group situation about which Bales was hoping to learn from his analysis of these 'psycho-dramatic' elements in fantasy consisted of:

> "... the interacting group ... their relations to each other, the problem of the group, the hidden attitudes, the dislikes, fears, jealousies, envies, loves, despairs, confusions, and anxieties ...". (Bales 1970)

(g) The 'here and now' significance of fantasy

Bales offered three principles to explain why the psycho-drama of group fantasy reflects such extensive realms of real group life: selection, elaboration and chain reaction. He began by pointing out that not all elements in fantasy chains are necessarily relevant to the 'here and now'; for these chains are made up of the 'original facts', 'elaborations' on these, and then 'accidents of combination'. It is only the selection of original facts and the way in which they are elaborated that can be understood in motivational terms. However, the additional factor he stressed was 'chain reaction'; with the accelerating quality of involvement and excitement reflected in a chain of associations, suggesting its underlying significance. Indeed, Bales clearly felt that it was often 'here and now' relevance in the manifest context of a symbol that set the chain in motion:

> "The chain of fantasy starts to build, usually, because the manifest topic of conversation somehow mirrors or sets into resonant vibrations the problems of the group here and now. The topic threatens to run away because it is in fact being used to express motives relevant to the here and now." (ibid.)

The principles of selection and elaboration have a clear relevance in determining the 'here and now' significance of the psycho-drama elicited by the GFS; however, the position regarding the quality of 'spontaneous combustion' is less certain. For there is an 'escapist' flavour inherent in the notion of fantasy chains that introduces a potential for confusion in the assimilation of Bales' insights into the analysis to be conducted here. In his analysis, fantasy was included in the social-emotional area of the categorisation scheme

(under 'Dramatizes') where acts were understood as a release from tensions created while pursuing activities subsumed under the task area. A fantasy chain was therefore a spontaneous digression from the assigned group activity that is sparked off from some conversational element in this activity that embodies unintended 'resonances'; whereas in this thesis the production of fantasy from scratch constituted the purpose itself. The degree to which this instruction might change the quality and function, or perhaps diminish the 'here and now' significance of the resultant fantasy material, was an issue with interesting implications and one that was also explored in the pilot study.

6.1.2 Self-Quality Features of the GFS Task

(a) The 'threat' of self-quality GFS tasks

But the 'here and now' significance that, at the point where a chain of associations has gone 'too far', is apparently recognized by groups as threatening and therefore controlled and suppressed, is not the only sense in which fantasy (or its public production) might be potentially 'threatening'. For the second crucial feature of the GFS is that it constituted a 'self-quality' task as defined by Riecken (1962); moreover, the usual practice of 'disguising' it in task-ability terms as a 'test' of imagination (that suggests how it may have been found to cause difficulty or discomfort in its true form) was not adopted here.

In the discussion above (cf., p. 81 - 82) , it was shown how the control subjects have over their 'behavioural choice-possibilities'

with self-quality tasks (24) is perhaps not a preferential option to them given that it goes hand in hand with ambiguity and uncertainty over what the 'right' choices might be (in terms of winning a positive evaluation from the observer). For example, how 'imaginative' should fantasy be before story elements begin to suggest unacceptable extremes of emotion (either to the observer or the rest of the group)? In a nascent, laboratory group of strangers under evaluation, the 'commitment of self' involved in the public expression of the stuff of self-quality tasks might well be expected to promote wary and uncertain behaviour.

(b) Strategies for resolving threat

It was also suggested that subjects had at least two options available to them for resolving this dilemma. The first involved deference to the experimenter for guidance, direction, or even clues as to the appropriate parameters for performances; but when the opportunities for this deference were not available a second option was identified; subjects might adopt a 'strategy' of emphasising the task-ability features of their task at the expense of its self-quality characteristics. Leaving in abeyance the interpersonal or indeed expressive consequences of such behaviour, one of its most interesting features was that it seemed to indicate subjects opting for less control over their 'choice possibilities' - or, conversely, seeking or assuming more control from the experimenter.

(c) The GFS task as a 'non-directive' representative of experimenter

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(24) Such a task therefore has the distinctive feature of 'multi-dimensionality' (Lindzey 1961).

When it later came to examining the implications of a dependent BA acting in association with the work of a laboratory group as a constituent configuration of group emotion, the full potential significance of the self-quality/task-ability distinction in these terms became evident. For it provided criteria to distinguish between different sets of experimental materials on the basis of their plasticity in the service of a dependent BA - the basis of an approach for making the task of a laboratory group the 'non-directive' equivalent (as the experimenter's 'representative') of the type V group leader, while yet resembling a normal experimental task. For if Bion's (1961) propositions were correct, the frustration of early dependent assumptions should encourage attempts by group members to replace the task structure that they assumed should be present (i.e., a task-ability emphasis), thereby sowing the seed ground for group revolt (frustrated dependency) and encouraging group development through other BA phases.

(d) Administration of the GFS task

Finally, the format of the instruction sheet and the way in which it was introduced was also specifically designed to enhance the proposed self-quality (or 'non-directive') qualities of the GFS; as was the decision not to use group-related TAT cards around which subjects could structure their story. For it was felt that by giving the group what amounted to the one blank TAT card, one more potential source of reference, guidance and direction was removed - the picture cards themselves.

(e) Summary of GFS features tested in pilot

In theory, therefore, the GFS task reconciled a number of seemingly contradictory demands: the need for a group activity or purpose that would encourage the emergence of interactive material accessible to an analysis of covert, perhaps unconscious group processes - while simultaneously confronting the group with a self-quality 'tabula rasa' that deprives them of any structure or agenda.

Prior to its adoption for the main study, therefore, the GFS task was scrutinised in the pilot for its performance in a number of areas:

(1) Its general efficacy as a projective 'fantasy inducing' instrument

(2) Its ability to generate material that reflects group properties

(3) Its ability to create a self-quality tabula rasa

Moreover, two further issues related to the interpretation of interactive material elicited in the GFS were also investigated:

(4) Whether the analysis of what was referred to above (cf., p. 183 - 184) as the 'psycho-dramatic' elements of group stories enabled the translation of their manifest content into their 'here and now' significances.

(5) Given that fantasy was 'on demand' with the GFS, whether fantasy chaining occurred and if it did whether its here and now significance was attenuated due to the fact that it was on demand.

However any test of the efficacy of the GFS could not take place in isolation from the interpretive framework within which it's results might be given meaning. Therefore the second inter-related element in the investigative strategy that was tested in the pilot study involved the relevance of the framework of concepts chosen in this thesis for the identification and interpretation of experimenter-relevant acts.

6.1.3 The interpretative Framework

(a) Analysis in the pilot study

In the first instance, the assessment made in the pilot study of the explanatory relevance of Bion's conceptual framework only referred to his three basic categories of emotional configuration in the broadest terms. The interactive elements and episodes that over the course of group life contributed to and ultimately added up to the group fantasy stories, were first examined with a view to identifying the 'psycho-dramatic' themes. An assessment was then made as to whether the relationship between the central personalities of these themes and the environmental forces (including significant others) acting upon them, could be understood in terms of Bion's three all-inclusive configurations of group emotion: dependency, fight-flight and pairing (cf., p. 120 - 122).

(b) Category summaries

(1) Dependency

In this configuration, behaviour suggests the underlying assumption that there is a patriarchal (also sovereign, guardian, etc.)

leader-figure, upon whom there is a complete dependence. There is the suggestion of reliance upon or reference to this figure (or his equivalent) and the expectation of direction and support in return.

(2) Fight/Flight

In this configuration, behaviour suggests the underlying assumption that there is an enemy or threat that must be avoided or attacked. There is the suggestion of hate or fear and an over-riding need for self-preservation.

(3) Pairing

In this configuration, behaviour suggests the underlying assumption that the product of intimate interpersonal relations will solve any problem. There is the suggestion of hopeful expectation and aspiration towards an unborn messiah or unrealized utopian ideal.

6.2 THE PILOT STUDY

6.2.1 Laboratory Group Procedures

(a) Group format

The basic format of the groups that were assembled for the pilot (and main) study followed principles well established when the focus of an experimenter's concern is the observation, for whatever reason, of social interaction in small laboratory groups (i.e., Bales' groups); and was distinguished from other variants above as the type I.

Thus, to control for known tendencies toward subgroup formation outside these parameters, it was determined that the size of the groups should be kept between four and seven members (although in both the pilot and main series four-person groups were invariably the norm). There was no prospect for long-term interaction, no common goal (other than that given by the experimenter) , and subjects had no prior knowledge of, or relations with one another. Considerable care was taken with regard to this last feature not only to control for the effects of prior interpersonal relationships, but also to ensure that subjects' compliant relationship with the experimenter preceded any relations that they might establish between each other during the course of the group meeting.(25)

(b) Recruitment

The recruitment of subjects into these groups was conducted through the placement of notices in halls of residence and on departmental notice boards throughout the university asking for volunteers who would be "... prepared to give up an hour of their time to take part in a simple experiment ..." in return for a modest financial inducement. Over a period of some months this method yielded 56 names and addresses (both domicile and departmental); through failure to respond to follow-up communications, this total was reduced to 36.

From this pool, volunteers were then randomly assigned to groups in

(25) Meeting in 'stranger-groups' (c.f. Herman and Schild 1961) also reinforced the general uncertainty and unpredictability of the situation.

respect of age and sex; although to reduce as far as was possible the likelihood of members of the same group having prior knowledge of each other, assignments were selectively heterogeneous with regard to domicile and department. In all, it was possible to make preliminary arrangements for six groups, each comprising five recruits (with the remaining six volunteers excluded for a variety of logistical reasons).

(c) Instructions and group activity

Having arrived at the pre-arranged times, each subject was shown into the social psychology laboratory, seated around a circular table, and asked to wait for the remaining participants. The procedings were recorded using the laboratory's remote video and sound facilities from the moment of the second subject's arrival. When at least four subjects had assembled, the experimenter returned and told the subject-group that they were required to read the GFS instruction sheet which would contain all the information they needed to continue with the experiment, and that he would return again in 30 minutes.

In this manner, the interactions of four suitable groups were obtained; with two groups having to be excluded because a failure of volunteers to turn up for the experiment and a failure in the controls for prior interpersonal relationships. Transcripts of verbal and relevant kinesic behaviour were made of these groups, and it was these, in conjunction with the replay facilities of the video record, that constituted the data to be analysed.

6.3 FINDINGS

6.3.1 General Features of the GFS Test

(a) The self-quality 'tabula rasa'

As anticipated, an assessment of the performance of the GFS task made in isolation from the interpretative framework within which group responses to it could be given meaning, was only possible to some degree with respect to two of the issues listed above (cf., p. 189) for scrutiny. In the first instance, therefore, the pilot groups' general responses to the GFS and some of the theoretical implications of these responses will be addressed.

It very quickly became apparent that the GFS (and the manner in which it was administered) was successful in creating a 'structural tabula rasa' in the groups; for example, in group I this quality of the task was exlicitly recognised by subjects:

> S2: I've just noticed here it says to construct a story that could be used ...
>
> S2: Yea ... (dejected).
>
> S1: ... so there's nothing concrete there ...

Moreover, at least in part because of this lack of a structure and agenda, it quickly became obvious that the GFS task was surprisingly difficult for laboratory groups to effectively carry out. The production of a complex, highly imaginative story might have been beyond the capabilities of some subjects, but the kind of interactive paralysis and high levels of tension that were often

observed seemed to suggest something other than an intellectual or communicative problem - even the selection of simple story themes was beyond some groups.

One possible explanation for this behaviour might be that something like the kind of 'control' or 'suppression' Bales observed being exercised by groups (when a sufficient consensus that associations have 'gone too far' and become threatening, finally halts a fantasy chain) was cautiously maintained with regard to the fantasy demanded by the GFS task. For although individuals' psychological defences can easily be circumvented and undone in a group context, some 'control' might be possible when the spark (26) required to set off a chain is 'on demand', and therefore unlikely to arrive suddenly and unexpectedly from the random flow of task interaction, taking subjects unawares and eliciting from them unconscious associations before they have a chance to resist the group dynamics of the chain. It may be therefore that there is an awareness at some level amongst subjects of the potential threat of here and now significance in fantasy, and that it is the self-conscious generation of basic symbolic material that makes the GFS problematic.

An alternative, or related explanation might be that subjects' caution and unease was due to the self-quality nature of the GFS. For implicit within subjects' concern that their contributions to the fantasy story be 'imaginative' to an 'appropriate' degree (in terms of the experimenter's evaluation) is perhaps a more popular

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(26) A manifest conversational element that sets into 'resonant vibration' here and now group problems.

awareness (27) of the potential that symbolic material has for revealing 'undesirable' or repressed wishes, tendencies or attitudes. Almost by definition, highly imaginative fantasy would be expected to be characterised by extremes of one sort or another, and yet subjects were clearly concerned (inappropriately in terms of their assigned task goals) to contain their stories such that they did not appear too violent, romantic or bizarre, etc.

(b) Theoretical implications of GFS task performance

It is interesting to briefly consider one implication of the fact that discomfort, tension and strain appeared to be intrinsic to the 'commitment of self' (cf., p. 83 and 85) involved in the public expression of the stuff of self-quality tasks (rather than a function of the 'wear and tear' of completing it as a task). For in Bales' (1951 and 1970) analyses, fantasy is not the only category included in his 'social emotional' area that involves self-quality expression - the other behaviours here have the same quality.

A question therefore arises as to whether behaviours that Bales included in his social-emotional area are understood best as a release from pressures arising out of assigned work - at least in a type I group context. Might not his theoretical framework more meaningfully be turned on its head, such that certain task behaviours are recognised as a method of escape, or release from tensions inherent in the public expression of the self-quality

(27) The profound effect on popular consciousness that Freud's (1900) "Interpretation of Dreams" achieved was either responsible for this idea or an expression of it (cf., Gergen 1973).

characteristics in social-emotional behaviour (28). Although some involvement in interpersonal exchange in groups is inevitable and joking, fantasy, intimacy or hostility can always spontaneously break through, it may be that there are familiar and persistent characteristics of laboratory groups that can be understood in these terms. For example, the embarrassment, tension and silence following the collapse of fantasy chains (when self-quality expression is seen to have 'gone too far'). subjects' willingness to engage certain types of task (or perhaps 'compliance' more generally) - and discomfort with others, or perhaps tendencies toward emotional or interpersonal neutrality (i.e. suppressing extreme hostility or intimacy).

(c) Group fantasy chains in the GFS

In the discussion above, Bales' (1970) perspective was enlisted to provide insights into characteristics unique to group fantasy that would supplement a view of the GFS as a projective test. In addition to confirming general principles for interpreting fantasy material and the advantages inherent in group situations for its emergence, Bales' main contribution was to point to the special 'here and now'

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(28) This kind of reversal was at least implied in Olmstead's observations documented above (cf., p. 85 - 87) although such a far-reaching theoretical re-evaluation is beyond the scope of this thesis. Here, a general overview of these work strategies above (cf. , p. 149) first suggested that they might be understood in terms of subjects' exercising 'control' over certain forms of emotionality. Later (cf., p. 151 - 154) in more specific terms, it was proposed that this kind of 'assiduous work' might in reality be associated with an underlying Dependency BA, and reflect attempts by groups to 'make good the omission' of the experimenter/ leader that is inherent in his leaving a 'self-quality tabula rasa' as his 'representative' (i.e. the task he assigns).

significance of material leading up to and including fantasy chains.

Interestingly, even with the 'control' described above in evidence, fantasy chains were in fact found nested within the main story. Group members could still, it seemed, be taken by surprise, or carried away by associations, although these occurrences appeared to be more a function of random chance than a release or escape from work. Moreover, even with the functions of fantasy having changed, the group dynamics of 'chain reaction' still seemed to lend additional weight to the significance of emerging material. However, there should be no implied devaluation of the remaining story elements, for in line with the more general principles of projective analysis, selection and elaboration still took place with these.

Indeed, in some groups there appeared to be a point (or series of points) in the interaction process where there was a coincidence of these three factors - the 'crystallization point'. This occurred when groups (often quite suddenly) reached agreement about the topic, frame of reference, or starting point of their story; a consensus over selection was achieved and elaboration began with a sense of spontaneous excitement characteristic of the beginning of a fantasy chain. However, the development of stories from here was not always successful; indeed, more often than not it was the way in which they collapsed that gave these processes the flavour of fantasy chains.

(d) Further general observations

Moreover, observations made regarding difficulties that groups encountered in reaching the crystallization point, highlighted the

availability of another type of clue to the proposed analysis. For this process involved groups not only in selecting story elements for elaboration, but also in rejecting certain individual contributions. And although (as Bales noted) individual contributions that are passed over can inform about the individual concerned, groups' reaction to these contributions often revealed much about the 'here and now' significance of both the material rejected and replacement proposals. In other words, control or suppression proved to be an informative and revealing as selection and elaboration. For on occasions subgroups or particular individuals were observed resisting a consensus, by persistently (and often unsuccessfully) proposing a highly imaginative, and therefore 'appropriate' (in terms of the assigned task) topic that was truly resonant with 'here and now' significances.

Two things were therefore clear about the general performance of the GFS. Firstly, the manifest reluctance and tension pilot groups displayed in fulfilling its demands suggested not only that a 'self-quality tabula rasa' had indeed been promoted, but also that there might be an awareness in the group of the potential for 'here and now' significances in the interactive material demanded. Secondly, groups' reluctance or difficulty was often overcome at the 'crystallization point' in a psycho-dramatically significant process that resembled fantasy chaining. As suggested above, however, the 'resonances' or 'here and now' significances of the symbolic material elicited by the GFS could only properly be judged within the interpretative framework of Bion's BA concepts. More specifically, the GFS's efficacy as a projective instrument capable of generating material that reflects group properties through an

appropriate analysis of psycho-dramatic elements, is best demonstrated in the context of the discussion to follow regarding the explanatory relevance of these concepts.

6.3.2 The interpretative Framework and GFS Material

(a) Symbolic representation of the group and experimenter

With the simple unit of analysis of an act or series of acts where emotionality expressed was uniform, the tapes and transcripts of the pilot groups revealed a quantity of surprisingly pertinent psycho-dramatic material that was fully comprehensible and coherent in terms of Bion's three sets of subject-group to experimenter-leader relationships encapsulated in the BA configurations. For example, in Group I:

> S1: How about taking some sort of story like King Arthur and the Knights of the Round Table and making it into a Monty Python sketch ...?

An archetypal 'Patriarchal Sovereign' and the 'here and now' significance of his associated group being "of the Round Table" (n.b. the subject-group were seated at a round table) can be clearly seen in this proposal. Moreover, the suggestion that this leader-figure and his group are somehow symbolic representations of the experimenter and the subject-group was reinforced by the fact that the speaker was also expressing a mocking attitude toward this relationship; for this attitude reflected the mood of the entire group toward their experience in the laboratory. This statement was therefore an expression of the 'frustrated' BA of dependency.

(b) The 'crystallization point' in Group I

Significantly, the group continued in this mocking vein with mention of various failed leader-figures (i.e. "Neville Chamberlain coming back from Munich" or "President Carter") as if they were in need of direction, until a 'crystallization point' was reached:

(A) S1: Well, what about murder in the social psychology lab ...? That's quite a simple thriller topic ... we can have a beginning ... I think it's got to be quite specific really ...

S2: Mmm ... well ... (looks up at one-way mirror).

S3: Yes!

S1: We came ..!

S3: Murder's nice!

S1: We came to do a test in the psychology lab ... no-one knew anyone else ...

S3: Of course! ... we could all be here to meet mass murderers.

ALL LAUGH (TENSION RELEASE)

S3: That's a good one! ... when the half hour is up ... they study our reactions ...

(B) S1: We want to murder this character who brought us here ... how do we go on from there ...? He's watching us on television listening to us with the microphones and everything so that's why we've got to be very secretive ...

S2: What's the motive?

S1: Murder the bloke whose running the show.

S2: What for?

S1: Because he brought us here (LAUGHS).

S3: I think he's got more motive ...

S4: ... exploitation!

S5: We could crack under the strain couldn't we?

S3: The thing is that he's got more motive than us ... he's sitting there with mirrors ... he can study us quite happily and that's his motive . .. what HAPPENS to people ...

S1: ... (CUTS IN) ... its the object of murdering him ... he knows that we are going to murder him.

S2: Mmm ...

S1: But we have got to do it somehow without him knowing.

S4: I tell you what, we all get under the table then he can't take pictures of us ...

ALL LAUGH (TENSION RELEASE)

S1: We'll all go over and stand in the corner ...

ALL LAUGH

S4: It's the children in us coming out to defy him, isn't it?

S1: Yes ... mmm ... (LOOKS POINTEDLY AT REMOTE CAMERAS).

(c) General implications of findings

In the light of remarks made above concerning the earlier emotional tone of the group, this series of exchanges seemed to represent the psycho-dramatic evolution of latent dissatisfied feelings about the experimenter-leader (or, more particularly, his/her equivalent's non-directive role), into expressions operating at a much more literal level of symbolic representation. A number of important points regarding the performance of the GFS, Bion's interpretative framework and the final design and methodology of the system of categories can be illustrated through a closer scrutiny of this example.

Firstly, a certain continuity could be observed in both group and individual performances that seemed to suggest that problematically obscure single acts were understood best when interpreted within the context of the GFS taken as a whole. For example, S1, who earlier in this group's life had made mocking allusions to patriarchy, throughout the GFS test in a more or less overt fashion could be seen expressing his disappointed dependent assumptions. The implication was therefore that the use of contextual information with reference both forward and backward in time) would be indispensable in the categorisation process.

Secondly, it was quite clear that the interactive material of interest to this thesis was being presented to the experimenter at qualitatively different levels of symbolic representation. And this observation had implications for both the methodology of interpretation and the readiness of groups at a given time to allow (consciously or unconsciously) exposure of the 'here and now'

significance of fantasy material. For example, in the first example both the experimenter and the group are symbolised by personalities in the GFS, whereas in the longer episode above, the group (and intermittantly the experimenter) enter into the story as their 'real' selves - the group in effect appear to identify themselves with their own unconscious representations.

Thirdly, this GFS episode (and those that followed) in Group I were a remarkably 'naked' symbolic representation of that developmental process which was modelled in the myth of the primal horde as the 'group revolt'. As such it suggested that the GFS was indeed eliciting appropriate material (i.e. expressions concerning issues of leadership, its overthrowal and even, in this case, its relationship to experimental artifact and control), and that this could be categorised in terms of Bion's (1961) BA concepts.

The precise categorisation of individual or group acts was not the declared intention of the pilot study, and although the sample episode from group I should serve as a vivid illustration of the general points raised above without such an analysis, some examples of the categories of particular episodes and acts taken from it will illustrate these ponts more fully.

(d) Dependency and fight-flight expressions

In accordance with the discussion in Chapter five (in particular n.b. p. 141) feelings and behaviours coincident with the 'group revolt' would be expected to fall into the categories of fight-flight and dependency.

Thus the episode quoted from group I begins (A) with the introduction of a violent aggressive theme by S2 that elicits a reaction from S1 that confirms the 'here and now' significance of the topic and the sense that the experimenter's witnessing it constitutes a threat; this sense of threat is eventually made explicit by S3 (i.e. it is the experimenter who is the 'mass murderer') before a bout of tension-releasing laughter from the whole group adds further confirmation of the theme's relevance to feelings in the group. This exchange therefore reflected an emotional configuration of fight/flight, with individual contributions that were more or less complete; for example, only S3's final statement clearly outlined that it was the group that was under the threat of murder!

In the following exchange (B), S1 begins by 'turning the tables' on this plot and raising the stakes of the 'here and now' significance of the GFS, by suggesting that it is rather the group that want to murder the experimenter - a thinly disguised symbolic representation of a 'group revolt'! The rest of the group clearly back off from the 'resonances' of this suggestion by questioning whether it is they or the experimenter who has 'more motive'. The issues of 'exploitation' and the 'strain' that the group feel they are under are both mentioned before an uneasy resolution appears to be achieved when S4 're-frames' the naked aggression of the plot by implying that it is simply a matter of childish defiance. This overall exchange therefore reflects competing fight/flight and dependency basic assumptions. S2 and S3 are clearly more concerned with the experimenter as a 'threat, whereas S1, with some support from S4 (and to some extent S5) are clearly concerned with reversing this

threat by proposing the secret murder of the "... bloke who is running the show ...". Finally, it is interesting to note that S1's penultimate suggestion that the cameras could be avoided by everyone "... standing in the corner ..." not only suggests his persistent attempts to make the revolt feasible (by maintaining secrecy), but it also sets off an associative chord with S4 who makes explicit the allusion to childish defiance - the perfect encapsulation of dissatisfied or frustrated dependency.

Still closer scrutiny of individual acts in this episode revealed one final important point concerned with the use of the basic assumption categories. Namely, that it might be possible, and indeed desirable, to make further distinctions between acts falling into each basic assumption category. For example, S4's remark that the group should escape from view "under the table" is clearly an expression of flight rather than fight. And, further, many of S1's statements discussed above (e.g., "We want to murder the bloke who brought us here ...") are more comprehensible as acts of dependency if some account is taken for the fact that this emotional configuration can include counter-dependent feelings.

(e) The 'group revolt' in group II

The remaining three groups of the pilot study also produced to a variable degree significant GFS material. Further examples drawn from group II can, though, serve to reinforce some of the more important points made above: for in this group the GFS also seemed to reflect a process resembling the group revolt although it was at a much higher level of symbolic representation and its essentials were far less concentrated in time. For this reason, those acts

given as examples were drawn in sequence from quantities of other less vivid behaviours and expressions for the sake of brevity and explanatory clarity.

The crystallization point of group II occurred with the introduction of a "Brave New World" theme, with the idea of one group of people "... totally cut off ..." from another, more civilised, group. The 'isolated' 'backward' group were in fact 'Indians' and as the GFS began to develop a series of contributions seemed to confirm the growing suspicion that the material did indeed have a 'here and now' significance:

(A) S2: That's right, you can have people not paying attention to them because they're absolutely ... backward ...

And then a few moments later:

(B) S3: You can have students disguised as Indians if you like.

And further:

(C) S2: OK, so we've got a reservation that's completely cut off ... and they're plotting to invade the new world as it were ... they're curious about the new world ...

Then in discussing how this invasion would take place:

(D) S3: We can have lots of mistakes with the dynamite like blowing their way into the sheriff's office or something like that which is next door ...

As if in response to the increasingly obvious 'here and now' significance of the GFS, the group at this point appeared to back

off from where the story had been leading, lose the fragile consensus that had been developing; cigarettes were lit and there were two long silences before:

(E) S2: It's certainly now developing political undertones ...

S1: Yea, yea, yea! (SMILING AND GLANCING AT THE ONE-WAY MIRROR)

S2: That a society might be based on money ... what chance do they have ...?

(f) Dependency and pairing expressions

These and other statements reinforced the impression that the 'isolated' 'cut off' and 'backward' group were a representation of the present group (n.b. 'B') and that the GFS theme was the vehicle for the expression of dependent complaining (n.b. 'A'). Furthermore, revolutionary intent could be seen in (C) that was attenuated in an interesting way - it was tempting to speculate that there was an unconscious suggestion that 'revolt' in the experimental context might be better represented as perhaps undue "curiosity." about the experimenter and his purposes. The impression that the experimenter was being represented by the 'civilised' group was also reinforced in (D) - a much more violent attack on an authority figure "next door". Finally, the 'here and now' significance of the developing thrust of the GFS appeared to be dramatically confirmed by the group's reaction to its own production (E). The "political undertones" mentioned by S2 were related to the issue of authority relations with the experimenter by S1's knowing and insinuating response; before with resignation, S2 seemed to suggest that the

present group was (i.e. a " society based on money" as indeed this group was!) in a hopeless situation.

Rather in the same way that group I, immediately following the first episode discussed above (cf., p. 201 - 202) entered into a protracted and fascinating discussion about how they as a group were to deal with the " dead body " of the murdered experimenter (29);group II, having approached and (also in a similar way to group I) then seemingly backed off from a symbolic attack on authority, proceeded to discuss what exactly was being 'stolen' in their attack:

> S1: ... it could be something taking them further ... sort of political undertones ... they could steal something that is essential to the civilisation ... the group living outside the reservation ... something they can't live without ...

The first suggestion that arose was a "... power station ..." before "... test tube sperm ...", then "... necessary part of the next generation ..." was put forward and entertained as a possibility:

> S2: But would the people who live in the world really care about it that much ... would they care if there weren't going to be any future generations ...?
>
> S1 Yea .. yea but thats not the point of it .... the whole point would be that the Indians would be stealing it to stop the Brave New World as such spreading any further ... so that they have a chance to ...

---

(29) The "dead body" was never specifically identified as the experimenter and therefore there was a lingering ambiguity as to whether the "corpse in their midst" was not in fact rather the symbolic representation of the experimenter's failure to satisfy their dependent assumptions.

S2: (CUTS IN) ... you assume that they want to stop it ... but they might want to emulate it or become equal to it ...

The metaphor of the group stealing the 'power' of the experimenter was subtly transformed into stealing the potential for future "equal" generations. The exchange therefore moved, almost imperceptably, beyond a concern with the means of revolt into its consequences for the "backward" group. In effect, it was suggested that the group might gain access to "equality" by seizing control of the reproductive process wherein lay the hope for future generations: a concern with the issue of pairing was then clearly evident.

It can be seen from these examples (28b) that although the GFS was clearly eliciting appropriate interactive material that was comprehensible in terms of Bion's interpretative framework, a much more sophisticated set of categories and methodological practices would be required to systematically unravel the complex symbolic representations of relations between the subject-group and the experimenter-leader of interest to this thesis. The pilot study yielded extremely promising results in terms of its aims (as set out above, cf., p. 176 & 189) ; however, prior to detailing the aims and format of the main study that would further explore these influences and relations, as a continuation from the discussion above, the observational instrument to be used for the identification and interpretation of these variables will be outlined.

(28b) In the third group of the pilot study one subject who had been displaying signs of discomfort actually quit the group meeting, thus rendering the results from this group unusable - although his actions were perhaps a remakrable example of Flight. In the fourth group the fantasy story was prohibitively obscure, given that the complete system of categories had yet to be developed.

CHAPTER SEVEN: THE SYSTEM OF CATEGORIES

SUMMARY

The chapter outlines the complete system of categories developed from the experience gained with the basic categories in the pilot study. The first co-ordinate for acts coded is described in the six content categories arrived at by splitting each BA into individual acts of 'moving toward' and 'moving away'. Detailed definitions for each category are also provided. The second co-ordinate is described in the four 'levels' of inference made in the coding of acts. Detailed examples and further sub-categories for each level are also provided. Finally, the unit of analysis and the way in which contextual information is used in the investigation are described.

General Introduction

The foregoing and final analysis conducted upon groups engaged in the GFS task was based upon a number of assumptions which as well as being implicit in the arguments above were in many cases also specified by Mann (1967) in his investigation of group member-to-leader relations. Indeed, those outlined below draw heavily upon his work, while being adjusted where appropriate to the context of this study. The first and most general represents the basic premise of a psycho-analytic perspective on small groups:

> (1) In all groups, there is a largely covert level of emotional process, that can only be fully understood with reference to a leader-figure or his equivalent.

The second assumption is concerned with the implications of the first, when coupled with insights from the 'artifact' perspective and applied to a type I group situation - the experimenter-observer becomes a potential 'leader-figure'. It is the first of those necessary for an analysis of this covert level of emotional process to proceed:

> (2) The subject-group to experimenter-leader relationship, that arises out of the aetiological artifact intrinsic to laboratory groups, is always influencing subjects feelings and behaviour to some extent. Subjects' relations with the experimenter will never completely determine their behaviour, but these feelings are a component of the total set of determinants of any public act in a laboratory group.

Mann's (1967) equivalent assumption was derived from an observation he made regarding the problematic nature of attempting to categorise largely covert needs and feelings. Namely, that when group member A expresses his feelings toward group member B, there is a vicarious, but simultaneous expression of feeling to all other group members. His conclusion, that any act therefore has a relevance to a number of 'targets' and can be analysed in terms of its 'message' to each, was shared by the investigation here - the focus of which was on the target experimenter (as a leader-figure). The only 'line' or 'part' in the total 'score' of interaction process in groups that was abstracted therefore concerned feelings expressed in a variety of ways by group members about their relations to the experimenter-leader.

Once again, because of the predominantly covert nature of this 'line', assumptions needed to be made regarding the various manifestations of such expressions and behaviour, and the dynamics behind it:

> (3) Persons can express their feelings symbolically as well as directly, unconsciously as well as consciously.

In anticipation of the fact that in a type I group context, expression in this area would constitute the major portion of experimenter-leader relevant material available for analysis (relative to more overt expression), and that interpretative access to it would be even more limited than was the case in Mann's type V groups; the fourth assumption was concerned with the efforts detailed in the preceding section to "amplify these incipient

responses" (Weik 1968):

> (4) The GFS task will elicit from groups more symbolic material that would arise by chance if they were otherwise engaged; which will be sensitive to the covert experimenter-leader relevant 'line' of the interaction score.

The last two assumptions deal less with the existence of the expressive, fantasy material of interest to this thesis and more with the means to understand it. For with subject-group members capable of establishing symbolic equivalents for themselves and the targets of their feelings, the major interpretative task becomes the translation of the flow of manifest content (which might be totally devoid of references to the experimenter or even the actors themselves) into a running record of the subject-group's feelings toward the experimenter-leader. The kind of analysis necessary to complete such a task is, of course, fraught with problems of inference. However, the concentration of effort in this investigation upon making a comprehensive record of group meetings (taking full advantage of the remote video/sound facilities in the laboratory, and freeze-frame and slow replay functions available on playback) was in the light of the fifth assumption that is also shared with Mann (1967):

> (5) Although it is generally held that the reliability of a scoring system tends to decrease the further it moves toward the analysis of inner feelings and needs, this problem can be attenuated if great depth is associated with decreased speed of scoring.

The final assumption was also related to these issues, but in a much more specific and crucial sense. For the translation of the covert meaning in overt acts needs an appropriate theoretical framework within which a scorer can recognize, understand and conceptualise the mass of confusing and contradictory material that confronts him. This is, of course, the deductive method pursued by Bales (1951), or what was called by Weik a "rational approach strategy" (1968).

> (6) The subject-group to experimenter-leader relationship reflected in the experimenter-relevant line of the interaction score can be recognised and understood in terms of the three-dimensional theoretical framework provided by BA theory.

The continuous record of the experimenter-relevant line of subjects' interaction score made in this investigation was therefore conceptualised in terms of the three sets of subject-group to experimenter-leader relationships encapsulated in Bion's BAs. Consequently, the first set of co-ordinates in the system of categories developed here owes something to Stock and Thelen's (1958) adaption of Bion's concepts into an observational instrument. However, methodological principles incorporated in Mann's (1967) analysis were also invaluable with regard to a second set of co-ordinates; not least because his original sixteen categories of group member-to-leader behaviour proved to be reducible to three essential dimensions that closely resemble the BAs. Each author's contribution can, though, also be seen in the four interdependent, and to a large extent simultaneous judgements that were necessary in scoring acts.

(1) Identifying the quality of emotionality (i.e. the prevailing BA relationship) expressed in any act.

(2) Identifying, if necessary, the originator and/or target of the expression in symbolic material.

(3) Determining whether the act(or) was 'moving toward' or 'moving away from' the prevailing BA.

(4) Coding on one of four 'levels', the degree of inference employed in this scoring process.

Stock and Thelen's (1958) and Bion's (1961) work informed the first and third judgements, while principles outlined by Mann (1967) were especially useful with regard to the second and fourth. The interdependence of perspectives can, though, be seen in the way in which the critical problem of identifying experimenter-relevant acts in the first instance, was often dealt with. For with a large percentage of these necessarily interpreted via symbolic equivalents in the GFS, an inferential minefield of ambiguities, contradictions and psychological defences invariably had to be negotiated before the target (and sometimes originator) of an act could be determined. But by first identifying the overall quality of emotionality in an expression, the identity of its originator and target often followed via a proper understanding of such an act in terms of it expressing a BA relationship. A dependent act, for example, clearly implies, or indeed necessitates, someone's dependency upon someone or something. Equally, this process could be reversed when, for example, the unambiguous identity of both originator and target in the symbolic material informed the choice of prevailing BA relationship.

Before considering in more detail these and other primarily methodological issues that arise out of coding practices in general (and those more specific to the second set of co-ordinates for scoring acts), the framework of basic content categories developed for the first coding co-ordinates will be outlined.

7.1 THE CONTENT CATEGORIES

7.1.1 Sub-categories to the BAs

(a) Introduction

The content categories devised represent predetermined categories of meaning, the frequencies of which constituted the data to be analysed. The acts or units in terms of which behaviour in groups was observed were therefore not units of behaviour as such, rather 'pigeon holes' into which the observer attempted to fit behaviour. The three super-ordinate categories or 'boxes' into which disparate, chaotic elements of group emotion were sorted correspond to Bion's BA constructs, and constituted the foundation of the system of analysis. However, findings in the pilot study, reference to the operational definitions of categories in Stock and Thelen's (1958) observational systems, and the implications of correspondences between Mann's revealed dimensions of member-to-leader relations and Bion's propositions, suggested the possibility of making a further distinction between acts once sorted into any basic category.

(b) Fight and flight behaviours

For, as stated above, Stock and Thelen (1958) recognised that although the BAs appear more appropriate for describing 'molar' behaviours of the group, individual acts in groups could be understood an expressions of, or contributions to a BA configuration:

> "... the quality of emotionality in the group as a whole must ultimately have its source in such expression."

This focus upon individual expressions led these authors to the conclusion that one BA at least - fight/flight - should, from the point of view of the observational system, be split into two sub-categories; for with this configuration dominant, it was found that some individuals were predisposed to 'fight', while others would 'fly'. Moreover, this adjustment suggested an examination of the other two BAs to see if there were grounds for the adoption of a similar strategy in their case.

(c) Dependency and counter-dependency behaviours

The dependency BA in particular seemed to warrant closer examination; for in Bion's original description it was clear that compliance, submission and the need for security were held in 'indissoluble combination' with feelings of 'dissatisfaction, resentment, guilt and discomfort' at being in this emotional state. The existence of these elements seemed to promote the idea of splitting dependency along the lines suggested by Stock and Thelen - the necessity to make a distinction between dependency and 'counter-dependency'. This lead was followed because any expression

of a need to move away from or resist a state of reliance must be based upon the implicit assumption that such a relation exists in the first place; only indifference to, or independence from a dimension would signify non-involvement.

The other important point about counter-dependent feelings is that they constitute the seed-ground of the group 'revolt'. For although fight/flight represents behaviours appropriate to the time when the group see their leader as an enemy, the origins of their turning against him in this way lie in their unsatisfied dependent demands. Thus, Slater (1966), in his detailed analysis of the group revolt, described how it is the trauma created by a leader's non-directive posture that leaves them feeling deprived and abandoned, for the group is fundamentally ambivalent about the freedom thrust upon them. Indeed, he goes on to suggest that this problem is a central dilemma in life generally: "What should we be doing? ... What is the meaning or purpose?" The decay of the 'religious' fantasies characteristic of dependency therefore begins when the reality of a non-directive leader confronts the myth of his 'nurturance'. Before the group finally reject his 'omnipresence' by turning him into their 'enemy' there is, then, an interim stage where he is still accepted as all powerful, but he is also seen as withholding that which they demand. In other words, this is a phase of what Mann (1967) and others have called 'dependent complaining'.

Therefore in this investigation when group members indicated an involvement with the issues of authority relations by questioning the power of the experimenter-leader or rebelling against it, the behaviour was coded as 'rebellion' rather than 'loyalty'. Moreover,

this distinction reflected the 'moving toward' and 'moving away' represented not only in the distinction between fight and flight already made above, but also in the two poles of Mann's associated dimensions (cf., p. 165 - 166) - "relations with the leader as authority" and "relations with the leader as manipulator" (for dependency and fight/flight respectively).

(d) Pairing and counter-pairing behaviours

The internal logical consistency of the category system seemed to demand that a similar distinction be made between pairing and 'counter-pairing'. Initially, however, from a purely theoretical point of view, no firm justification could be found for making it, not least because the distinction between 'fight' and 'counter-pairing' seemed a little strained. However, in part due to the practice of first identifying the relevant BA before determining whether an actor was 'moving towards' or 'moving away', it became apparent in the pilot study that there were acts that ran counter to positive issues of pairing which could not be satisfactorily explained as 'fight'. The pairing BA was also therefore split into 'active' and 'neutral' which corresponded to the two poles of moving toward and moving away from the issue of pairing.

(e) Problematic distinctions between sub-categories

As the more precise definitions below reveal, there were in practice distinctions between certain content sub-categories that were potentially problematic; for example, between 'fight' and 'rebellion', 'loyalty' and 'active' pairing, or between 'neutral' pairing and 'fight'. However, the guiding principle that attenuated

such difficulties was once again to first identify the prevailing BA before coding whether the act was moving towards or away from it. The presentation and organization of the detailed content category definitions and examples reflects this operational necessity.

For descriptions of the three configurations of emotionality that must be identified in the first instance - the BAs - are presented in the broadest terms (before outlining in more detail definitions and examples of the sub-categories): the 'covert agenda' that makes sense of potentially chaotic emotionality, the broad emotional tone of this agenda (in Bion's terms), the way in which it is acted out, the type of leader-figure or symbolic equivalent that is the target of these expressions and finally examples of the relationship models found in the GFS

Once again, with regard to these co-ordinates, the debt owed to Stock and Thelen's (1958) observational scheme should be re-emphasised. For by providing extended operational definitions for their categories, they gave indispensable aid in decoding the specific individual behaviours appropriate to each BA. However, unlike Stock and Thelen, there was no attempt to categorise the overt work component in acts, or understand its relation to the underlying BA; only the covert level of emotionality and its relevance to the experimenter as a leader-figure that was of interest.

7.1.2 Category Definitions

E = experimenter

S = subject

(a) The dependency BA

I. DEPENDENCY - relations with the E as authority/protector

The Covert Agenda (BA): the group members act as if they had met in order to be nurtured, supported and directed

Emotional Tone : guilt, depression.

Means to Satisfaction : reliance upon, or reference to:

(1) the 'rule of man'
(2) the 'rule of law' for direction or meaning

E-equivalent Targets : institutional authority/guide/power 'inside' or 'outside' the group as:

(1) patriarch, deity, sovereign, guardian, director, etc.
(2) procedures, traditions, instructions, rules, standards, routines, structures in whatever form that derive from, represent, or are symbolically related to the authority-figure.

Relationship Types : king/subjects, teacher/pupils, doctor/patient, priest/suppliant.

(b) 'Loyal' and 'Rebellious' behaviours

I. (i) LOYALTY (L) - moving towards dependency

Behaviours/expressions reflecting S to E relations:

passivity, inadequacy, caution, awe, respect, compliance, lack of self-reliance/confidence, childlike responses, undue concern with/awareness of E/E-equivalent, seeking approval of E, seeking/demanding agendas, direction, etc.

GFS themes/issues mirroring E to S relations:

deification, dependence, devotion, duty, fate, obligation, subordination, allegiance, responsibility.

I. (ii) REBELLION (R) - moving away from dependency

Behaviours/expressions reflecting S to E relations:

denial, resentment, frustration/dissatisfaction with existing authority, depression/grumbling/ complaints relating to being overlooked, neglected, starved, ignored.

GFS themes/issues mirroring S to E relations:

revolt, mutiny, insubordination, striking, treason, defection, espionage, heresy, irreverence, reformation, derogation, abandonment, isolation, searching.

(c) The fight/flight BA

II. FIGHT/FLIGHT - relations with the E as manipulator/threat

The Covert Agenda (BA):	Group members act as if they had met for the purpose of self-preservation/protection in the face of a real or imagined threat
Emotional Tone :	anger, hate, fear
Means to Satisfaction :	attack or withdrawal as the only response to a real or imagined threat.
E-equivalent Targets:	a danger/threat outside the group; protection is sought from the enemy that the leader-figure has come to represent as menace, manipulator, malevolent influence, experimenter, tyrant, etc.
Relationship Types :	guard/prisoner, svengali/innocent, master/slave, antagonist/victim.

(d) 'Fighting' and 'Withdrawing' behaviours

II. (i) FIGHT (F) - moving toward fight-flight

Behaviours/expressions reflecting S to E relations:

general or specific hostility/aggression, belligerence, rebuking, punishing, retaliating, blocking, dividing, resisting, scapegoating, threatening, mocking, ridiculing, warning.

GFS themes/issues mirroring S to E relations:

warfare, fighting, sieges, portents, murder, killing, malevolent spirits, hatred, invasion, takeover.

II. (ii) WITHDRAWAL (W) - moving away from fight-flight

Behaviours/expressions reflecting S to E relations:

extreme/inappropriate emotionality, humour, daydreaming, red herrings, changing the subject, excess 'busy work', disorganisation under stress, general tension release, over generalisation/ intellectualisation, concern with trivia.

GFS themes/issues mirroring S to E relations:

avoidance, escape, hiding, fleeing, giving-away, retreating, ridicule, extreme fantasy.

(e) The Pairing BA

III. PAIRING - relations with E as friend/equal

The Covert Agenda (BA)	group members act as if they had met in the hopeful expectation that the product of intimate interpersonal relations will solve any problem.
Emotional Tone	: messianic hope, friendliness
Means to Satisfaction	: the creation of, or aspiration towards an 'unborn' messiah or an 'unrealised' utopian ideal through intimacy in pairs.
E-equivalent Targets	: because neither negative feelings or the issue of authority is involved the E-equivalent becomes a friendly equal (n.b. consistent with the notion that the leader be 'unborn', an equal group member is no longer a leader; i.e., a peer, lover, confidant, colleague.
Relationship Types	: brotherhood, betrothal, communal.

(f) 'Active' and 'Neutral' behaviours

III. (i) ACTIVE (A) - moving toward pairing

Behaviours/expressions reflecting S to E relations:

commitment to or satisfaction with group experience, responsiveness, informality, supportiveness, warmth, furthering relations with the E, collusive side remarks, sharing, sociability, sympathy, co-operation, moderation, re-assurance, self or group appreciation.

GFS themes/issues mirroring S to E relations:

Utopia, unborn saviours, resurrection, alliances, intimate sexual relations, unions, pacification, etc.

III. (ii) NEUTRAL (N) - moving away from pairing

Behaviours/expressions reflecting S to E relations:

social/emotional neutrality, lack of interest in sociability, denial of intimacy, resistance to co-operation.

GFS themes/issues mirroring S to E relations:

homosexuality, androgeny, hermaphrodites, asexuality.

7.2 THE LEVELS OF INFERENCE

7.2.1 Adapting Mann's System

(a) Introduction

The aspect of Mann's (1967) analysis that was drawn upon most heavily in this thesis was his notion of making explicit the inferential 'reach' necessary to code the content category of acts. Following this lead, the scorer therefore first coded the appropriate content category and then defined a second co-ordinate for acts that specified the degree of inference (on one of four 'levels') necessary to make this judgement. Alternatively, this second co-ordinate could be understood to refer to the extent to which or the way in which the instigator of an act and its target were represented symbolically in the GFS, or interaction; thereby specifying a distinct level of decoding that the scorer attempted, when matching the manifest and latent content of acts.

However, Mann's system needed to be adapted in the light of the significant differences (in terms of assigned activity and the group's access to their leader) between his type V groups and the type I group format of interest to this thesis. Furthermore, in order to be even more explicit about the way in which acts were assigned to levels, sub-categories for each level were adapted; these sub-categories appeared in the categorisation of any act as prefixes.

(b) Level One - definitions and examples

LEVEL ONE: Where the E is referred to openly and directly.

Although not frequently used, this level covered acts of some importance. For in Mann's system, acts placed here required the least inference by the scorer:

> "... the member clearly identifies himself as the possessor of the feeling being expressed, and the leader as the object of the feeling." (Mann 1967)

With the substitution of 'the E' for 'the leader', this definition was found to be quite sufficient for the purposes of this thesis without any further elaboration.

(c) Level Two - definitions and examples

LEVEL TWO: Where the E to S relation is inferred from reference Ss make to aspects of the situation they face:

(i) NT = there is no specific target (generalised expressions of feeling) or the target is the group 'as a whole', or the situation.

(ii) GM = the target of expression is another specific group member.

(iii) IP = emotionality discernible in general procedural approach to task/instructions.

(iv) IE = emotionality discernible in expressions made regarding task/instruments.

This level, then, referred to acts where the E was no longer the manifest target of an expression; here, too, the core meaning of the co-ordinate was in all essentials the same as Mann's. For although the speaker identifies himself, the inference necessary by the scorer was that the E-leader was represented by some 'equivalent'

within the group. In Mann's system, three types of symbolic targets were identified for acts at this level - the general situation, the group as a whole, or some specific group member. In the latter two cases, the scorer was understood to be inferring that the group or the individual were serving as objects upon which the speaker displaced his feelings about the leader. But in all three cases, the assumption was not made that the speaker did not feel what he expressed about these specific targets, merely that feelings were multiply determined and an important part of this complex was the leader.

The first sub-category (NT) of Level Two here retained Mann's assumption about generalised expressions of feeling. Namely, that if subjects felt perhaps angry, lost in or threatened by the general situation, then not only was the experimenter-leader an important element in that situation, but here he was wholly and directly responsible for it. In the case of these acts, then, it was inferred that one source of the speaker's general feelings were his feelings about the experimenter. Also included as a valid target here was the group as a whole.

The second sub-category (GM) referred to acts directed at another group member, following Mann's assumption that there were displacement processes at work. However, in addition, a person acting in the group as the experimenter's equivalent might be understood as a secondary leader in the sense outlined above by Freud and Bion. One might suspect these kinds of processes at work when, for example, a particular group member was repeatedly the target in this way.

The remaining two sub-categories were concerned with the ways in which group members approached their instructions and the GFS task when these were understood to be the symbolic equivalent or 'representative' of the experimenter-leader in the group, and made up a major proportion of the acts at this level. In the context of this thesis, the symbolism was then understood within the adopted frame of reference where actual leaders of BA configurations might be replaced or represented by:

> "... a person ... idea ... or inanimate object." (Bion 1961)

Or from Freud's perspective:

> "... an idea, an abstraction ... a common tendency, a wish in which a number of people can have a share ... a secondary leader ...". (1921)

The first of these two sub-categories (IP) was, then, concerned with occasions when subjects displayed a particular quality of emotionality in their general procedural approach to the GFS task. The most readily identifiable example of this behaviour was that discussed at some length above, where an expression of dependency was manifest in a subject's constant reference to the 'letter' of the experimenter's assigned 'law' for guidance and direction - the conspicuity of such acts was, of course, enhanced by the fact that, in real terms, the GFS task and instructions offered none. The second sub-category (IE) referred to occasions when subjects directly expressed some feeling about the group task or experimenter's instructions.

(d) Level Three - definitions and examples

LEVEL THREE: Where the E to S relation is inferred from Ss expressed feelings regarding some theme/character/aspect of the GFS.

(i) FT = feelings expressed vis-a-vis theme/character/aspect of story.

(ii) FOT = feelings expressed vis-a-vis a specific group member's suggested theme/character/aspect.

(iii) IT = identification of self/group with story theme/character/aspect.

The third level of inference for Mann was essentially the same as Level Two, except that the symbolic, target objects were 'outside' the group. Once again, the core meaning was retained, but in the context of the investigation here these 'outside' objects were characters, themes or aspects in the GFS.

The first sub-category (FT) included acts where a subject expressed some feeling about a particular character, situation or general theme in the GFS, which often came in the form of suggestions or contributions to the story that betrayed an underlying assumption or feeling. The second sub-category (FOT) was similar to the first except that it dealt with one member's essentially reactive feelings vis-a-vis another's contribution to the GFS.

The third sub-category (ID) was particularly interesting, for it was concerned with occasions where subjects momentarily appeared to identify themselves or the group as a whole with a character or situation in the story - it was as if the individual or the group were suddenly projected into the story. These acts were easily identified by virtue of the fact that the speaker characteristically

dropped use of the third person in his narration and lapsed into the first person. Such acts were placed on Level Three because subjects were understood to be expressing their feelings about the situation using the story content as the vehicle.

(e) Level Four - Definitions and examples

LEVEL FOUR: Where the E to S relation is inferred from the selection, elaboration and quality of GFS themes/issues.

(i) REG = both E and S-group present in symbolic equivalents.

(ii) RE = only E present in expressed BA relation.

(iii) RG = only S-group present in expressed BA relation.

(iv) BA = generalised expression of a BA atmosphere

This level, broadly speaking, concurred with Mann's equivalent, for it dealt with acts where both the speaker and target of expressions were symbolized by some equivalent inside or outside the group. Moreover, the kind of inference that was necessary to match the speaker and experimenter-leader with appropriate characters in the GFS was indistinguishable from that made in a projective analysis of psycho-drama. Indeed, the only real difference (taking Murray's TAT procedures as a point of reference) lay in the fact that one particular aspect of the 'press' understood to be acting upon the 'hero' was of interest - the experimenter as leader-figure.

The first of the four sub-categories (REG) dealt with acts where the symbolic equivalents for both the speaker (or his group) and experimenter were present in the manifest content. However, although in suggestions or additions to the group story subjects often only

included the symbolic equivalent of the experimenter (RE), or themselves (RG), it was often possible to establish the relevance of such statements to a BA relationship by determining the existence and identity of the 'other party', with reference to the meaning of the act, taken in the context of the group story as a whole. The remaining sub-category (BA) was concerned with acts where neither of the two parties were represented by their symbolic equivalents; however, in these instances also, a theme or issue in the story relevant to an underlying BA was nevertheless often identifiable, given appropriate reference to the continuity of the story as a whole or the core meaning of the BA. Clearly, the use of 'contextual information' was, on such occasions, a necessary practice. However, before discussing the implications of this strategy, two other issues concerning coding practices associated with these particular co-ordinates must first be outlined.

(f) Coding practices

1. There were occasions where an act could be interpreted on more than one level simulataneously; the clearest examples of this was when a contribution to a story theme identifying at Level Four also constituted a joke at Level Two (indeed, it is in the nature of jokes that they often operate on different levels of meaning at the same time) - when this occurred the higher (more overt) of the two levels took precedence.

2. It became apparent that the symbolic equivalents of the experimenter and/or the subject-group at Level Four sometimes shifted backwards and forwards - the 'hero' could represent the subject-group one minute and the experimenter the next.

Clarification here depended upon keeping in mind the fact that it was the relations between the two that mattered, and the continuity of the acting BA that constituted this relation often enabled the appropriate identification of 'who was who'. It is interesting to speculate however that these shifts in identity might well mark a point where the group begins to incorporate or 'fuse' the leader-figure into the group mentality.

3. Examples are given of general coding practices for both the first and second coordinates in APPENDIX II.

7.3 THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS

7.3.1 Unit Equivalence

(a) Unit definition

With the relative significance of the three major dimensions of the experimenter to subject relationship in groups measured in terms of the frequency with which acts were coded into the corresponding categories, the principle of 'unit equivalence' was clearly the ideal to which to aspire. The unit of analysis adopted here was any act, or series of acts, within which expressed feelings were found to be uniform. Either an actor 'yielded the floor' to another group member, or a change in the quality of feelings expressed indicated the end of one 'act', and the beginning of another. With this unit, between 100 and 150 acts relevant to the subject to experimenter relationship were scored in each half hour period. It is interesting

to note that Mann himself found his scoring system averaging 200 acts per hour, with a similar unit of analysis. In practice, this unit invariably constituted a simple sentence of modest length, with both 'referent and characterisation' in the sense that Horowitz and Cartwright (1953) used the term. However, at one extreme a whole series of sentences elaborating one theme could be taken together, while at the other a nervous glance at the one-way mirror could also constitute an act.

(b) 'Strong' and 'weak' Units

The range implied in the relative 'weight' of these examples might appear to belie the ideal of the unit equivalence; indeed, the intransigence of this problem is reflected in its almost universal avoidance by researchers attempting to categorize behaviour. Exceptions are, though, to be found in the work of Borgatta (1962) and Stock and Thelen (1958) who incorporated 'weightings' in their codings for 'strong' and 'weak' expressions; but this approach also has its problems. For what are the criteria to be for such distinctions - their interactive effect, their length? And even if these difficulties could be overcome then how can such units be manipulated statistically - does one outburst of 'strong' laughter 'equal' two sentences of 'weak' speech? The inevitably arbitrary nature of these kinds of judgements would seem to be little improvement on the much simpler assumption that in the long run 'weak' expressions balance out 'strong' ones.

(c) 'Weighting' practices

However, experience gained with the pilot groups suggested that it

would be prudent to make two adjustments to this general rule. The first arose out of the fact that given the coding practice of first identifying the prevailing BA expressed by an act, there were occasions where it was not in fact possible, having achieved this, to make the further distinction between whether this act was 'moving toward' or 'moving away' from the BA. In these cases, therefore, one half of a unit was assigned to both the sub-categories of the BA in question. This procedure was adopted in order to retain the impact of such an act upon the complete profile of each BA, while not skewing the relative balance between sub-categories.

The second adjustment concerned the scoring of significant pauses or silences in the flow of interaction process. Because of their frequency, it became apparent that scoring these behaviours as group (i.e. four units) 'withdrawal' or 'loyalty' (i.e. passivity), skewed the overall profiles dramatically toward fight/flight or dependency. Therefore, two units were scored on these occasions to represent the minimum number of persons needed to constitute a 'group' response; in effect eliminating the speaker prior to the pause, and the group member who breaks it.

7.4 CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION IN CODING

7.4.1 The Interactive Context of Meaning in the GFS

(a) Contextual information and unit equivalence

Regarding the question of how much contextual information the

observer should refer to before assigning behaviours to their appropriate categories, this thesis again concurred with Mann's (1967) and Stock and Thelen's (1958) general approach. The former insisted that subjects' expressions must make sense in terms of their prior behaviour, while the latter more explicitly stated that the use of context was necessary with a behavioural rating system based upon Bion's BAs:

> "... a great deal of judgement is required on the part of the observer because each category comprises a constellation of behaviours and because any particular behaviour may at different times belong in different categories depending upon context, tone of voice ..." (Stock and Thelen 1958)

It has, though been suggested by, for example, Weik (1968) that the use of context as an aid to coding is methodologically speaking, unsound practise, because each judgement by the scorer would tend to be based upon varying degrees of contextual information, thereby threatening the ideal of 'unit equivalence' between acts coded. However, given the aims and method of investigation here, the achievement of this ideal would necessitate ignoring the crucial fact that meaning (at the overt and more covert levels of the GFS) is constructed and therefore only recognisable <u>in an interactive context</u> .

(b) The manifest interactive context

At the manifest level of discourse, the use of context was unavoidable because of the basic nature of the GFS task. Unless this task were to become a 'memory game' where every addition to the story needed to be prefaced by a reiteration of what had gone before, acts had to assume or implicitly incorporate meaning from

earlier contributions; acts were invariably 'elaborations' upon some already accepted 'original fact'. For example, when in group I of the pilot S1 suggested "murder the bloke who's running the show", it was necessary to take into consideration earlier remarks which were also part of the story and interactive context of the statement for it to be comprehensible that "the bloke" was the "character who brought us here " and the "show " was the experiment itself.

(c) The constancy of interactive context utilized

The context to which reference was made in this investigation was, then, a 'constant' within any given group in the sense that each individual act coded was more or less a contribution to, and therefore a constituent part of that group's fantasy story taken as a whole. Rather like the acts that Bales (1951) coded were understood to have a problem-solving relevance to his social system taken as a whole, acts coded here had relevance to the meaning of the whole GFS. However incomplete or imperfect, the group stories (or 'end products) were in reality twisting threads of meaning running through the interaction of each group. Moreover, every act might have a significance in the context of the group fantasy taken as a whole system of meaning, regardless of whether it was supportive, contrary or even just reactive to what had gone before, because of the unique fertility of group fantasy as an environment for unconscious associative processes.

(d) The covert interactive context

With the GFS task there was, therefore, also a covert system of meaning running through the groups. Rossel (1983), another

collaborator of Bales, who was particularly concerned with demonstrating the interactive and contextual properties of meaning through an analysis of fantasy in small groups referred to this system:

> "... by tracing the associative process through which members play with each others images, one may discover a rich layer of meaning that is hidden beneath the manifest discourse. The associative process involved in the play of imagery gives one access to a richly elaborated code that lies much closer to the primary process and unconscious feelings than the manifest discourse." (Rossel 1983)

The 'code' used in this investigation to ascribe coherence and comprehensibility to the confusion of associative processes operating within the covert system of meaning was, of course, the three-dimensional, analytical framework provided by the BAs. In the same way that the interactive stream of individual contributions made up each manifest group fantasy story, those elements that were teased out of the covert system of meaning weaving in and out of this stream, were identified as contributions to the prevalent group BA.

Because it was the centrifugal role that a leader-figure plays in these expressions of BAs that was of particular interest to this investigation, as stated above, a persistently problematic aspect of the categorisation process was the unravelling of the real life identities of the speaker and target of expressions from their symbolic representations in the GFS. It quickly became apparent in the pilot study that the manifest content of the GFS did not always reflect the relationship between the subject-group and experimenter in a direct, isomorphic fashion - the refraction and displacement of

the symbolic mirror image often varied.

(e) The 'Identifier' and its use

One contextual device used in this investigation as a 'marker' or 'stepping stone' to navigate through the associative processes of the covert system of meaning was called the 'identifier' (cf., APPENDIX II). This was a statement or expression characterised by the fact that it layed bare the latent meaning of prior or subsequent acts (in terms of their 'here and now' significance) - indeed, often a whole sequence. The most dramatic examples of this were 'identifers' that confirmed the latent here and now identity of a character in the story. But it was the strong reaction from the group to these statements (i.e. embarrassed silences or tension-releasing laughter) that often confirmed how they were making potentially threatening unconscious associations conscious (cf., p. 199)

For example, in group IV of the pilot there was a story that dealt with a 'rapist' and his 'victim' (and the events surrounding the latter being 'picked up' by the former). Although it was clear that this theme incorporated a relationship between someone 'threatened' and a 'threat', it had been difficult to determine which was the symbolic representation of the subject-group and which the experimenter. However, the ambiguity was resolved with reference to an identifer which came relatively late in group life.

> "... They put him in this room with four other people who were captured, and sit them around a table to observe them."

With 'him' being the victim and 'they' the rapists here, it became

clear that it was the subject-group that was the victim of some outside threatening force. The often surprising 'sweep' of identifiers is also illustrated in this example by the fact that the individual victim was not only identified, but transformed into a 'group' victim.

Finally, it is interesting to note that the propensity for making the kinds of statements which laid bare the meaning of unconscious symbolism appeared to be characteristic of a particular kind of individual. For not only did it always seem to be the same subject in any group that provided 'identifiers', but these subjects were invariably those who, in objective terms, engaged the GFS task most effectively and without inhibition. As intimated above, the groups in question rarely condoned these highly imaginative participants (or their suggestions), who consequently often found themselves (most inappropriately in terms of the groups' assigned task goal) cast in a deviant role. Indeed, it was in this way that 'suppression and control' could be most informative to the interpretative task (cf., p. 199) for, ironically, it only served to highlight the 'here and now' significance of story themes. The use of these kinds of highly imaginative offerings as identifiers was, moreover, consistent with Bales' observation:

> "Responses ... that deviate from an subject's typical behaviour are also those that seem non-logical and bizarre are often the most significant." (Bales 1970)

CHAPTER EIGHT: THE MAIN INVESTIGATION

SUMMARY

The chapter describes the way in which the experimenter's 'role' or 'identity' is manipulated in a series of type I groups engaged in the GFS task in order to determine whether associated changes in subject-group behaviour might be measured by the observational instrument detailed in the previous chapter. Procedures for the recruitment, instruction and management of subjects are described in terms of the organizing principles underlying three experimenter-identities: the 'patriarchal sovereign', the 'tyrant', and the 'love-object'. Finally, a computer-assisted method of coding the subject-groups' interaction is outlined.

General Introduction

Having developed a complete system of categories and associated methods for the purpose of identifying and interpreting the covert experimenter/observer-relevant 'line' of a type I group's interaction 'score', the next stage appropriate to the investigation was to attempt to manipulate the experimenter's 'identity' (more specifically, the contribution he makes to his relations with laboratory groups) as an independent variable, and make use of the observational instrument to measure the quality of any associated changes in group behaviour. In the main study, therefore, the category system in effect constituted a set of hypotheses about the major, underlying experimenter/leader-relevant dimensions of group process in a type I group and the scores recorded therein, the dependent variable (30).

The 'manufacture' of three 'E-conditions' might also be seen in a similar light to Bales' (1951) use of 'fully-fledged' discussion agendas to elicit a complete range of group problem-solving behaviours and so optimise the use of his category system. For there

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(30) It was not, however, possible to include a 'control' group in the investigation, at least in the normal sense of the term. For with the experimenter's role in bringing together groups and furnishing them with an activity as the independent variable, there was, of course, no way in which it was possible to organise a 'control' group unaffected by the influence of an instigating agent of some kind - or influenced only by some experimental role for the experimenter considered a 'norm'. For, in agreement with Mills (1967), laboratory groups were considered to be 'unique instances of experimental artifact' in a very real sense 'created' by the experimenter. However, as will be seen below, the first of the E-identities (condition E1) was in fact itself a reflection of an experimenter's performance and involvement in experimental procedure usually considered the 'norm'.

was some justification in assuming that further to the introduction of the GFS task, the manipulation of the experimenter's role and performance vis-a-vis his groups, such that the three 'E-conditions' mirrored the three leader-types (identified above from Redl's typology, cf., p. 162) associated with each BA, might encourage these configurations in turn. And, given the uncertainty reiterated above (cf., p. 174 - 175) about the potential of laboratory groups to develop beyond dependent relations with their experimenter, thus amplify the more specific 'incipient responses' (Weik 1968) of pairing and fight/flight behaviour. From the first point of contact with subjects, therefore, experimenters' identities for the three experimental conditions were designed to correspond to the qualities of the 'Patriarchal Sovereign' (E1), 'Tyrant' (E2) and 'Love-Object' (E3).

However, there is a problem with this perspective. For looked at from the point of view of Bion's contribution to the theoretical framework that underpins the observational instrument, there is a sense in which the centrifugal leader-figures are seen as 'passive' participants in the process of their 'inclusion' into BAs. It is as if these configurations arise at random by unspecified means before manipulating someone whose 'personality renders him particularly susceptible' into playing an appropriate part in the fantasy - the leader is 'chosen' by groups to satisfy the demands of the prevailing BA. Any attempt to encourage particular configurations of constituent group emotion might then be at the mercy of 'unconscious group whims'

However, the other side of the coin is the sense in which Bion

suggested that his leader-figures needed to be a distinctive personality type to avoid being:

> "... ignored by the group when their behaviour or characteristics fell outside the limits set by the prevalent BA ...". (Bion 1961)

For any BA's target leader-figure to be included, therefore, he should be in an 'appropriate role' and have the 'right qualities' - in other words, the potential to satisfy the group's needs should be in evidence; it was this potential that was encouraged here: i.e., a benevolent authority for dependency, someone whose demands on the group 'afforded the opportunity for flight or aggression' in the case of fight-flight, and someone to 'save the group from feelings of hatred and destructiveness' for pairing.

Further, any sense of lingering contradiction in Bion's position can be attenuated by referring back to the essential difference between Freud's and Redl's view of the leader's 'active' role in group life, and Bion's redevelopment of these themes. For Freud's notion of the leader as someone from whose personality the group derives its qualities, arose from his view of identification as almost entirely a process of introjection of the ego; whereas Bion envisaged the identification of an individual with a leader as:

> "... depending not on introjection alone, but upon the simultaneous process of projective identification." (Bion 1961)

It was the Kleinian (1946) influence upon Bion's work that led him to view these processes as occurring simultaneously, such that the leader is understood to be in a sense both 'active' and 'passive'. Ultimately, however, resolution of the question regarding the extent

to which the leader figure is 'included' by the group mentality rather than being the active central focus of constituent processes would only come from observing how successful manipulating the experimenter-identities proved to be.

In addition to these theoretical difficulties, there were also, however, those more practical that were associated with the task of creating the three different E-conditions. It was the solution to one of the more pressing of these that had an important and positive influence on the design of the main study. For if experimental procedures (i.e. administration of task and instructions) were to be kept as close as possible to those normally associated with type I laboratory groups, then there could only be limited period of face-to-face contact between the experimenter and his subjects, where such conditions might be created. It was reference back to the principle central to this thesis that leader-figures have a crucial part to play in constituent group process that suggested where a solution to this problem might lie. For recruitment procedures enacted by experimenters are, of course, an important part of constituent laboratory group process. The way in which subjects were recruited to the group series here was therefore carefully designed and controlled.

8.1 SUBJECT RECRUITMENT

8.1.1 Recruiting Procedures

(a) Limitations on recruitment

It had quickly become apparent while organising the pilot study that the recruitment of sufficient numbers of naive subjects (i.e., outside the Department of Social Sciences) to conduct a statistically viable series of group experiments by the usual method of 'appealing to' or 'paying for' volunteers, would not be possible. Straightforward naive volunteers proved to be an extinct breed, resources were insufficient to enable a credible financial inducement to be offered to the large numbers needed for group experiments, and conscription was undesirable as an alternative due to the implications such a procedure would have for the ensuing experimenter to subject relationship. A novel and ultimately successful approach was therefore formulated.

(b) Selection of sample

A complete list of the undergraduate and postgraduate population was obtained from the university mainframe computer, along with their domiciles and departments of study. From each of the twenty university departments, fifteen names were then randomly selected (and sorted into three groups of five to correspond to the three E-conditions). The decision to disperse selection evenly between departments in this way was taken not only to encourage heterogeneity in the sample, but also to reduce as much as possible the likelihood of both those finally taking part having prior knowledge of one another, and those canvassed becoming aware of others similarly chosen (and perhaps 'comparing notes'). It proved necessary to arrange three such recruitment series over a twelve month period with a total of 867 persons canvassed.

(c) Recruitment by experimenter-identities

By utilising the word processing facility of the mainframe computer, it was possible to send a 'personalised', 'original' letter to every potential subject appealing to them on the basis of their having been selected and as one of a small number of people with suitable qualities for the study (cf. APPENDIX III a, b and c). The principles underlying the recruitment process were therefore similar to the sales technique that utilizes specialised mailing lists to 'target' buyers. In terms of those 'reasons for volunteering' discussed above (cf., p. 59) that have been most frequently identified, the motives it was hoped could be tapped were: 'curiosity/interest' and the 'desire to help/contribute to science'.

Further, the three groups of five students selected from every university department, having been assigned to the three E-conditions, were sent qualitatively different letters designed to reflect the three experimenter-identities ('E-identities') As detailed below in the outline of the principles behind the E1, E2 and E3 conditions, these 'identities' were manipulated in the letters through the use of key phrases, 'symbols' and 'tone' of appeal, although the underlying format was the same in all cases. Upon receipt of a favourable reply, a follow-up letter congruent in style with the appropriate E-identity was sent to complete the arrangements for attendance; this was the only other contact between the experimenter and recruits before the experiment itself.

(d) Assigning recruits to groups

The principles underlying the assignment to group meetings of those finally agreeing to take part followed those adopted in the pilot study (c.f., p. 191 - 193) thus, for example, assignments were random with regard to age and sex but selectively heterogeneous with regard to recruits' domicile and department. Furthermore, having found during the pilot that recruits' agreement to participate was by no means a guarantee that they would appear at the specified times, six recruits were assigned to each group meeting in the expectation that at least two might fail to appear; this assumption proved to be by no means pessimistic; indeed, on occasion it was unduly optimistic.

8.2 PROCEDURAL PRINCIPLES

8.2.1 Laboratory Procedures

(a) The laboratory and the video-record

The venue for the type I group meetings in the main study was once again a social psychology laboratory equipped with a one-way viewing screen, microphones for sound recording, and two remote control video cameras. As in the pilot, the emphasis was placed upon producing as elaborate and detailed a record of these groups engaged for 30 minutes in the GFS task as possible, making full use of the remote cameras, sound and vision mixing facilities, for concentration here would permit greater depth of analysis later,

given the unlimited potential for replay of both sight and sound.

As intimated above, the procedural principles underpinning the way in which the experimental conditions E1, E2 and E3 were conducted, were a continuation of those that informed the three E-identities introduced during recruitment. On arrival, therefore, subjects assigned to each E-condition group were met, directed toward their seats in the laboratory, introduced to the GFS task and instructed by three different E-identities.

(b) The Experimenter as 'Patriarchal Sovereign'

E1: 'The Patriarchal Sovereign' (authority/protector)

Based on Redl's description, this leader-type needed to be an institutional, but benevolent authority figure; 'stern but mild in manner', representing order and discipline and yet providing security and direction for the group who were expected to trust him and seek his approval. He needed to stand for 'good and thorough work' and leave no doubt in the minds of his group what he expected from their performance. In terms of Leary's (1957) dimensions of interpersonal relations, he should be dominant in terms of authority relations, but friendly in terms of affective relations. In line with these requirements, a senior lecturer in the Department of Social Sciences was chosen to play the role, and instructed accordingly.

Condition E1 was therefore introduced in the recruitment letters by the inclusion of items such as those canvassed being addressed by surname and first name, his identity as 'senior lecturer', a departmental letterhead, the appeal being made on behalf of the

department ("we"), and no pre-emptory tone (c.f. APPENDIX III a). Given the discussion above (cf.,p.174) regarding the ways in which the dependency BA associated with this leader-type might be expected to be a configuration of group emotion 'compliant' to the means and ends of normal experimental practice, the way in which E1 managed and instructed his groups was unremarkable. It simply followed established procedures in managing a type I group - the maintenance of experimental controls, while simultaneously attempting to put subjects at their ease. Thus, having introduced the instruction sheet in the normal way, E1 would attempt to allay any sense of suspicion or fear amongst subjects by offering to answer queries. At this juncture, however, the only procedure followed by E1 which it might be argued deviated from standard practice with a type I group was introduced. For if any queries arose, he was instructed to, in effect refer subjects back to their instructions; it was important that he give every appearance of being supportive and helpful, while in reality leaving his group with the GFS 'tabula rasa'. In sum, the keynotes of experimenter's performance were an underlying sense of institutional authority, coupled with a supportive, friendly but essentially non-directive attitude.

(c) The experimenter as 'Tyrant'

E2: 'The Tyrant' (manipulator/threat)

This manipulating and thus threatening authority-figure, in terms of Redl's (1942) description, needed to be a representative of 'capricious' order and discipline, his notion of which was 'compulsive and unrealistic'. With a sadistic edge to his manipulations, he would be expected to employ a "noisy machinery of

special tricks, rules and revenge techniques". In terms of Leary's (1957) dimensions, he would be dominant in terms of authority relations but unfriendly in terms of affective relations. In short, E2 represented, as it were, the 'dark side' of E1 - the 'worst case' of subjects' expectations of experimenters, inducing suspicion and anxiety amongst them with regard to his motives and intentions. This role was played by someone purporting to be the assistant to a psychiatrist 'Doctor Creed', who remained invisible behind the one-way mirror.

E2 was therefore introduced into the recruitment letters through, for example, his identity as psychiatrist, the lack of first name in the form of address, the use of pre-emptory phrases (i.e. "... return this letter to me NO LATER THAN ...) and the individual (i.e. as 'Doctor') use of departmental authority (c.f. APPENDIX III b).

The 'Doctor's Assistant' was dressed formally, and emphasised the fact that Doctor Creed was behind the one-way mirror 'observing' and 'evaluating'. In line with Wapner and Alper's (1952) research findings (cf., p. 89), the fact that E2 remained an 'unseen evaluator' was expected to increase the sense of threat that he represented. 'Capricious order and discipline' were introduced through subjects being told on arrival exactly where they had to sit, and that they should not under any circumstances move because of the cameras. Indeed, in suitably sombre tones, the paraphenalia of observation was made quite explicit (i.e. the 'noisy machinery of tricks'). Further, the pre-emptory tone of address was used throughout the administration of instructions and there was no attempt to explain the task or place subjects at their ease.

(d) The experimenter as 'Love-Object'

E3: 'The Love-Object' (equal/friend)

Also based around Redl's description, E3 needed to be an equal to the group - its informal and helpful friend - with the associated BA configuration expected to develop on the basis of the group's liking of him. E3 differed from E1 in so far as there was a denial of any sense of implicit authority in his performance. In terms of Leary's dimensions, he was then neutral with regard to authority relations, but friendly in terms of affective relations. E3 was played by the author, appealing for help to finish his postgraduate work.

Recruitment by E3 was characterised by the informality of the appeal. For example, there was no departmental heading on the letters, subjects were addressed by first name only, there was no pre-emptory tone, and the letter was signed with a first and surname (cf., APPENDIX III c).

Groups were then approached by E3 as if they were co-researchers. Further, E3 made an effort to distance himself from any sense of formality or authority implicit in the situation through adopting a slightly 'mocking', apologetic attitude to the necessities of experimental practice. On arrival subjects were introduced to one another and E3 (who was dressed informally) on a first name basis. There was a maximum effort to reduce suspicion and mistrust, and appear helpful and understanding on the basis of common fate.

(e) Reinforcing subject expectations

If the substantive differences between the three E-identities

expressed in these procedures appear marginal, this is only because each E-condition represented an attempt to reinforce one particular and significant aspect of a complex of expectations subjects in all probability bring to psychology experiments (see above, Chapter Three). It was hoped, therefore, that the recruitment letters would enlist subjects who would later arrive at the laboratory with particular, nascent sets of expectations ready to be confirmed by their ensuing interactions with experimenters.

For example, volunteer student subjects' understanding of the principles and methodology of controlled experimentation, and their preconceptions about the experimenter to subject relationship (cf., p.61) can, depending upon factors like an experimenter's personality, institutional status and preferred methodology, be influenced in one of two directions - toward confirmation that their experimenter is either an 'E1' or an 'E2' type. For their expectations that they will be controlled and directed is not only capable of reinforcing a sense of security and compliant dependence, but also suspicion and caution - subjects are fully aware that this control can be, and indeed is frequently, exercised for the purposes of manipulation and misrepresentation. It is in this sense, for example, that E2 represents the 'dark side' of E1 and is a confirmation of subjects' 'worst fears'.

Having been instructed by one of the three experimenter identities outlined above, the subject-groups were left alone without intervention to engage the GFS task. After a time period of 30 minutes had elapsed, and regardless of how far the groups had progressed, the experimenter returned to stop the discussion. At

this stage the group members were asked to complete a brief questionnaire (cf., APPENDIX IV) and without conferring to write a brief description or summary of the group's fantasy story.

8.2.2 Debriefing

(a) The questionnaire

The questionnaire was designed to do two things. Firstly, by asking subjects to explain their reasons for agreeing to participate, it was hoped that something might be learned about the modus operandi of the system of recruitment, and possibly even the effectiveness of the E-identities as expressed in this system. Secondly, by asking subjects whether they previously knew anybody in their groups, a final check was instituted upon the efforts that had been made to ensure that group members were strangers one to another.

(b) Individual summaries of the GFS

As stated above, it was not individual summaries of the GFS that were the subject of the analysis conducted in this investigation. However, it was thought that these individual summaries might provide a useful additional perspective on the group fantasy stories. For example, if in the production of a GFS, a persistent intra-group schism occurred in the preferred central personality or perhaps the development of a story theme, then this might be reflected in divergent individual summaries in a much less equivocal way than might be possible if trying to judge which theme gains the 'upper hand' from the observation of the complexities of

interaction. For example, in the pilot individuals had been observed on occasion to stubbornly persist in the elaboration of a theme or aspect of the GFS that was perhaps disapproved of by the rest of the group; if the proponent was forceful enough then he might be left to follow his elaboration before the group returned to where they had left off. On such occasions it remained unclear whether the 'deviant' elaboration had been accepted as part of the GFS by omission. Although lacking support in the overt interaction process, this kind of 'deviant elaboration' might be registered by more group members than its original proponent as part of the GFS in the individual summaries. Interest in these kinds of elaborations came from the recognition that they often had a particularly vivid 'here and now' relevance (cf., p. 241).

8.3 CODING PROCEDURES

8.3.1 Exigencies of Coding Practice

(a) Computer-assisted coding

Having engaged twelve groups by the methods outlined above, transcripts of verbal and relevant kinesic behaviour were made of their half-hour interactions from the video-tape recordings. In the first instance, it was these transcripts that served as the medium for coding, although each profile was later checked against the original recording to take full account of the complete audio-visual dimension in the categorisation of acts. Furthermore, in the light of the practical complexity of achieving relatively swift coding

with a total of 72 'pigeon holes' (including all the sub-categories for the four levels of inference and three main BA categories) and the necessary irregularities in coding procedure detailed above (cf., p. 236) a method of computer-assisted coding was designed. This program, (cf., APPENDIX V) written for a Sinclair QL micro-computer in "SUPERBasic" (a variation on the Basic language), enabled a letter 'tag' (that corresponded to the appropriate level of inference and content category) for any unit act to be input via a keyboard and a score automatically assigned to a running total in the appropriate 'pigeon hole'.

(b) Reliability

Given the prototypical nature of the observational instrument, the exploratory intent of the research and the limitations in terms of 'time, treasure and troth' imposed by its context, it was not possible to enlist and train a number of scorers to enable a comprehensive assessment of the reliability of the scoring system. Moreover, the alternative or supplemental strategy to inter-scorer reliability adopted by Mann (1967) of comparing one scorer's profiles on the same meeting after a three-year lapse was also prohibitive for the same reasons; although the method of computer-assisted coding adopted made it possible for transcripts to be repeatedly scored over a three-month period. Further, in order to control for any bias that might arise from "Experimenter Expectancy" (Rosenthal and Rosnow 1969), the scorer was unaware while coding any transcript which E-condition the group had experienced.

CHAPTER NINE: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

General Introduction

It is invariably the case that the categorisation of the interaction process in groups with an instrument that is all-inclusive at its chosen level of analysis, yeilds a wealth of quantative data that may be analysed in a large number of different ways. The investigation here is no exception, indeed the potential variability in approaches to the raw data was considerably increased by the decision to code the level of inference as well as the content category. Although not vulnerable to a common criticism (e.g., Weik 1968, Fisher et al., 1979) of category systems that their utility is often restricted to the context of their designers particular interest, investigators like Bales (1951) who have developed all-purpose systems often, at least initially, apply them in quite limited ways as if content to leave unexplored avenues of analysis to others who can take advantage of early developmental work. This may at least in part be because all-inclusive systems of categories like the one introduced here, invariably constitute in themselves a set of hypotheses about the main structure and dimensions of a particular area of group life.

This kind of emphasis in research upon the initial development and testing of a prototypical system of categories that is underpinned by a closely related and comprehensive theory of a particular area in small group life, is characteristic of this thesis. Further, of all the potential avenues of exploration open to the analysis of data rising from use of the instrument, considerations of 'time, treasure and troth' restricted the interest here to the identification and interpretation of a more or less covert level of

process in a type I laboratory group that is related to its experimenter (as a 'leader-figure'). Thus the primary purpose was to determine whether any associated changes in the prevailing emotional configuration of the subject-groups might be measured by the system of categories and methods.

In one sense therefore the manipulation of the E-conditions constituted a 'test' of the internal validity of the set of hypotheses contained in the system of categories. However, any failure to detect significant differences in the expected distribution of the BA scores between groups associated with different E-conditions, would not necessarily indicate a failure to identify that level of process associated with the experimenter, only some aspect of its interpretation. The origins of this kind of failure in interpretation might for example be located in an understatement or mistake in reproducing one or all of the leader-figures associated with each BA , or in a failure to translate one or more of the set of hypotheses contained in the BAs into a workable system of categories.

The analysis and interpretation of the distribution of content category scores was therefore the main concern of this chapter. Data arising from recruitment, the questionnaire and coding the levels of inference are though also presented in so far as results from the former two areas might have a bearing upon the effectiveness of the E-conditions and the latter on the coding of the content categories. For even a limited interpretation of some of the implications of this data suggests improvements for the design of the investigation, and fruitful avenues for future research.

9.1 RESULTS

9.1.1 Recruitment

(a) General characteristics

It was originally intended to recruit sufficient numbers of subjects to enable five groups of at least four persons to be engaged by each E-identity. Having estimated (on the basis of experience gained in the pilot) that six subjects should be invited to each meeting in expectation of at least four turning up, in all ninety subjects evenly distributed between each E-condition (as operated in the recruiting letters) were then originally required.

It can be seen from the recruitment returns (cf., FIG 1) that it was necessary to run three separate recruitment series of letters in order to obtain a sufficient sample because the response rates (in the first and second series) were not evenly distributed between each E-condition; indeed even with the large numbers of those canvassed it only ultimately proved possible to engage four groups comprising four persons for each condition.

Given that no financial inducement or institutional conscription was employed, the average rate of 'letters returned' (i.e., agreement to participate) for all conditions of 16%, was satisfactory in the light of the quality of the sample recruited (i.e., its heterogeneity). However it can be seen that there was a high percentage of 'wastage' (65%) between initial 'recruitment' and subjects actually taking part. This was in part due to the fact that

recruits for each E-condition could not be mixed in the same group, discontinuity in subject availability, failure to participate as agreed, but perhaps most importantly the high priority that was placed upon ensuring that subjects were strangers to one another in any given group. The fact that only 5% of those canvassed actually took part in the groups illustrates clearly the logistical disincentives to group research (cf., Mcgrath and Kravitz 1982), if their format and composition must be tightly controlled.

(b) Recruitment returns

RESPONSES TO RECRUITMENT LETTERS (FIG.1)

	No of individuals sent letter appeals	No. of positive responses	% of positive responses
Recruiting identity E1 "PATRIARCHAL SOVEREIGN"			
Recruitment series 1	96	14	14.5
Recruitment series 2	99	9	9.1
Recruitment series 3	90	23	23.5
TOTAL	285	46	16.1
Recruiting identity E2 "TYRANT"			
Recruitment series 1	98	20	20.4
Recruitment series 2	98	10	10.2
Recruitment series 3	90	23	25.5
TOTAL	286	53	18.5
Recruiting identity E3 "LOVE OBJECT"			
Recruitment series 1	94	5	5.3
Recruitment series 2	106	12	11.3
Recruitment series 3	96	23	23.9
TOTAL	296	40	13.5

9.1.2 Distribution of Coding Through Levels of Inference

(a) General characteristics

The inclusion of this coordinate in the system of categories was, in the first instance, for the purposes of making as explicit as possible the quality and degree of inferences being made in the coding of content categories (cf., APPENDIX IV). In these terms, the distribution throughout the various levels was perhaps remarkably even, suggesting that none was redundant (cf., FIG. 2). In FIG. 2 the acts scored at each level of inference (irrespective of BA dimension) over the four groups in each E-condition are presented as a percentage of the total number of acts scored throughout (the four groups of each E-condition).

It can also be seen that a relatively high percentage of acts were coded in particular subcategories of levels in all conditions. Emotionality was for example quite readily discernible in the general procedural approach to the task (2ip). This is an interesting finding because acts of this kind might be understood as occasions where the covert process being scored could be seen to break through and exert an influence upon the more overt organizational features of group life. Indeed this is more generally true of the quite high percentage of acts found overall at level two. Further, the consistently high proportion of generalised expressions of feeling (2nt) and feelings expressed regarding some theme, character or aspect of the GFS (3ft) were perhaps an unremarkable representation of the kind of generalised expression found in many other group contexts. Finally, at the fourth symbolic

level, there were nearly twice as many acts containing a symbolic representation of the group (4rg) than a symbolic representation of the experimenter (4re). Again this is perhaps not a surprising result for the subject-group might be expected to be more concerned with its own "here and now" situation relative to the experimenter, than the experimenter's role relative to itself; moreover, acts where the symbolic representation of both the experimenter and the group existed to confirm the relationship were consistently found.

(b) Percentage distribution

DISTRIBUTION OF % SCORES THROUGH LEVELS OF INFERENCE (FIG.2)

LEVELS	CONDITION E1 GROUPS	CONDITION E2 GROUPS	CONDITION E3 GROUPS
1	4	2	3
2(nt)	12	13	13
2(gm)	5	7	8
2(ip)	14	7	7
2(ie)	5	4	5
3(ft)	10	12	8
3(fot)	5	7	7
3(id)	13	4	1
4(reg)	9	16	12
4(re)	4	7	15
4(rg)	13	16	14
4(ba)	5	5	8

9.1.3 Distribution of Content Category Scores

(a) General characteristics

The average number of acts coded from the groups in condition E1 (34.6% of all acts scored) was 137, from the groups in condition E2 (36.8% of all acts scored) was 146, and from the groups in condition E3 (28.6% of all acts scored) was 113 for the half hour period. Given the complexity of group interaction these kinds of rates for the identification of experimenter-relevant acts might appear modest, however in statistical terms they represent an average of one act somehow relevant to the experimenter every 13 seconds for the E1 condition, one every 12 seconds for the E2 condition, and one every 16 seconds for the E3 condition. These acts did not of course tend to be so evenly distributed through the groups' interaction, but this form of presentation for the data illustrates that the kind of influence that was being measured was not marginal.

It is also apparent from this data that there was some variation in the total number of (scoreable) experimenter-related acts in each condition, particularly between the E1 and E2 condition groups and the E3 condition groups. Moreover, when the total number of acts scored in each main BA category (irrespective of E-condition) are examined, a similar (given the anticipated association between E-identities or conditions and prevailing BAs) pattern emerges with 43.6% of all acts scored being acts of dependency, 39.9% of all acts scored being acts of fight-flight and 16.4% of all acts being acts of pairing. Variation between the total number of scoreable acts can however be traced back to individual groups, and this creates

something of a dilemma regarding the ways in which the overall distribution of content category scores might be presented and statistically manipulated. For the question arises as to whether the meaningful interpretation of the data would be assisted or misled by attempting to control for the differences in the total number of scoreable acts between individual groups, by presenting their BA profiles as percentages of the total number of acts in the relevant group.

The assumption underlying such a procedure would be that an individual group's high score in any BA category would only be meaningful in relation to correspondingly low scores in the other two categories (for that group). For example (cf., FIG. 3a), in condition E1 group IV's dependency score of 65 appears to be low in relation to the dependency scores of groups I, II and III of that condition, but it in fact represents a high score in relation to the fight/flight and pairing scores of group IV. In other words with this approach the assumption is that it would be reasonable to anticipate an inverse correlation between the score of the "prevailing" BA category and the scores on the other two dimensions of any given group. However BA theory (as propounded by Bion and later reinterpretations of his work) does not suggest that this kind of relationship between BAs should necessarily pertain. Indeed because the contexts in which Bion's concepts have been utilized have been primarily therapeutic, training or theoretical, the issue has barely arisen in the literature. Although as the analysis and interpretation of results will reveal, the implications that developmental interpretations of the BAs have for the relationship between them have an important bearing on this question.

In the final analysis the issue must centre upon what the working definition of a "prevailing" BA in any group should be; either a high score relative to the other BA scores within the relevant group, or a high score relative to some hypothetical 'norm' determined for that category across a number of groups; clearly though due to the exploratory nature of this investigation there is no way of knowing what this norm might be. Prior to the analysis and interpretation of results therefore, the distribution of acts through the individual categories is presented below both as raw scores on FIG. 3a, and as percentages of the total number of acts in each group in FIG. 3b.

Certain characteristics of the profiles in FIG. 3a and FIG.3b are immediately apparent. Firstly, overall and within the main categories there were invariably more acts of "moving toward" than "moving away from" the BAs; although this imbalance was to some extent redressed in the case of BA scores in groups from E-conditions associated with those particular categories. And secondly, the percentage of both active and neutral pairing acts was clearly low. More importantly however, it can be seen that the distribution of mean scores in the main BA categories is in the expected direction for each E-condition. The group profiles gave every indication of confirming some kind of relationship between the three 'constituent' E-identities and the relative frequency of associated BA behaviour recorded in their groups; broadly speaking the 'Patriarchal Sovereign' was associated with the highest dependency scores, the 'Tyrant' with the highest fight/flight scores and the 'Love-Object' with the highest pairing scores.

(b) Group profiles of content category raw scores

RAW SCORES FOR CONTENT CATEGORIES (FIG.3a)

	L	(DEPENDENCY)	R	F	(FIGHT-FLIGHT)	W	A	(PAIRING)	N
E1 Condition									
Group I	47.5	(71)	23.5	52.0	(61)	9.0	8.0	(10)	2.0
Group II	59.5	(80)	20.5	25.5	(34)	8.5	13.0	(22)	9.0
Group III	60.5	(83)	22.5	38.5	(53)	14.5	20.5	(23)	2.5
Group IV	47.0	(65)	18.0	32.5	(36)	3.5	10.0	(11)	1.0
$\bar{X}$	54	(75)	21	37	(46)	9	13	(16)	4
E2 Condition									
Group I	36.5	(45)	8.5	42.5	(68)	25.5	15.5	(20)	4.5
Group II	38.0	(48)	10.0	45.5	(63)	17.5	21.0	(21)	3.0
Group III	51.5	(79)	27.5	43.5	(64)	20.5	7.0	(7)	0
Group IV	53.5	(58)	4.5	60.0	(83)	23.0	17.0	(25)	8.0
$\bar{X}$	45	(57)	13	48	(69)	22	15	(19)	4
E3 Condition									
Group I	59.0	(72)	13.0	18.5	(37)	18.5	16.5	(21)	4.5
Group II	30.5	(36)	5.5	22.0	(29)	7.0	40.0	(45)	5.0
Group III	19.0	(28)	9.0	52.0	(69)	17.0	6.0	(7)	1.0
Group IV	22.5	(27)	4.5	26.0	(36)	10.0	28.0	(46)	18.0
$\bar{X}$	33	(41)	8	30	(43)	13	23	(30)	7

(c) Group profiles of content category scores as a percentage of total number of acts in each group

'PERCENTAGE' SCORES FOR CONTENT CATEGORIES (FIG.3b)

	L(DEPENDENCY)R			F(FIGHT-FLIGHT)W			A(PAIRING)N		
E1 Condition									
Group I	33	(49)	16	6	(43)	37	6	(07)	1
Group II	43	(58)	15	6	(25)	19	9	(16)	7
Group III	37	(52)	14	9	(33)	24	12	(14)	1
Group IV	41	(57)	16	3	(32)	29	9	(10)	1
$\bar{X}$	38	(54)	15	6	(33)	27	9	(12)	2
E2 Condition									
Group I	27	(33)	6	19	(51)	32	12	(15)	3
Group II	28	(35)	7	13	(47)	34	15	(17)	2
Group III	34	(52)	18	14	(43)	29	5	(5)	0
Group IV	32	(35)	3	14	(50)	36	10	(15)	5
$\bar{X}$	30	(39)	8	15	(48)	33	10	(13)	2
E3 Condition									
Group I	45	(55)	10	14	(28)	14	13	(16)	3
Group II	28	(33)	5	6	(26)	20	36	(40)	4
Group III	18	(27)	9	16	(66)	50	6	(7)	1
Group IV	21	(25)	4	9	(33)	24	26	(42)	16
$\bar{X}$	28	(35)	7	11	(38)	27	20	(27)	6

9.1.4 Responses to the Questionnaire

(a) Reasons for volunteering

Analysis of subjects reasons for volunteering revealed three main, and two marginal factors that appeared alone or in combination:

1. 'Interest/curiosity': 66% of all subjects who took part, mentioned this factor, making it by far the most significant overall and for each experimenter condition. Reasons could range from a generalised interest in psychological research through to a more specific curiosity regarding this particular series of group meetings (and for example why they were selected).

2. 'Friendly help': 35% of all subjects who took part mentioned this factor although 71% of these subjects were from the E3 condition. This factor was distinguished from the next to be outlined because the overriding reason appeared to be a sympathy with the problems that can be encountered with recruitment. Subjects often had direct or indirect experience of these problems and felt it was only fair to 'help out' - they were doing what they would expect others to do for them in a spirit of 'cameraderie'.

3. 'Dutiful help': 12% of subjects mentioned this factor although 66% of these were from the E2 condition. This factor was distinguished from (2) above because there was more concern with a sense of 'duty' or a wish to 'contribute to science'

4. 'Whim/fun': only 6% of all subjects mentioned this marginal factor, although subjects with these motives might be found to be disruptive to the experimenters' purposes.

5. 'Social': only 4% of all subjects mentioned this second marginal factor; expressing an interest in 'meeting people', a motive which might also have a bearing on their approach to the group meetings

72% of subjects gave only one of the above reasons for volunteering; however all but one of those who had mixed motives came (equally) from the E2 and E3 conditions. Finally it was found some failures were identified in controlling for subjects' prior knowledge of one another, and a number of groups were discounted for this reason.

9.2 ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

9.2.1 Recruitment

The uneven distribution that was found in response rates from each recruitment condition although necessitating three series of letter appeals, was perhaps a significant finding in itself. For it seemed to suggest that the E-identities as expressed in the letters were perceived differently by those canvassed, at least to the extent that their willingness to respond varied. Furthermore the distribution of these returns was in a direction that might at first glance seem unexpected. Broadly speaking the most authoritarian and least friendly appeal form the 'Tyrant' yielded the best response, followed by the friendly authoritarian 'Patriarchal Sovereign', with the 'Love-Object' by far the least successful recruiting identity.

It may be that these findings can be explained by the fact that in so far as the letters were completely unsolicited and unexpected,

the 'starkest' manifestation of authority justified its intrusion best; and it was easier for those canvassed to dismiss as less 'important' or 'serious' an appeal from a friendly equal. Data from the questionnaire was through only marginally supportive of this interpretation. 'Interest/curiosity' remained the predominate reason for volunteering in conditions E1 and E2 and ran a close second to 'Friendly duty' in E3; however 'Dutiful help' was best represented as a motive in condition E2 (although only 25% of these subjects mentioned it). 'Interest/curiosity' was therefore always a powerful motive even though there was marginal evidence that recruits to the E2 condition were responding in some sense to authority. It is though in the least successful recruiting identity that the clearest picture emerges, for fully 75% of these subjects appeared to have responded directly to the egalitarian friendly tone of the appeal - the attempt to express the E3 identity in the recruitment letters appeared to be successful, although there is little doubt that this identity was a failure in terms of the numbers it recruited.

One other characteristic of the recruitment returns was though less satisfactory; for the levelling out of the disparity in response rates through the second series toward equality in the third, perhaps represented confirmation of a problem that it had been suspected might arise, although given the difficulties encountered with obtaining sufficient numbers of subjects, it proved to be unavoidable. Namely, that as more and more letters were dispatched, the probability inevitably increased that comparisons might be made between different E-identity letters by those canvassed, with the likely consequence that, in view of the common elements in their format, less difference might be perceived in their source. Given

that the influence upon subjects of the E-identities as expressed in the letters relative to the influence of the E-identities in person, was uncertain, it was however difficult to make any objective assessment of the effect that this problem might have had upon the findings; although it may be significant that three of the four groups in condition E3 were made up of subjects drawn from the third series where this problem was clearly the most acute. (30b)

9.2.2 The Levels of Inference

While coding the complete system of categories, the intuition grew that this coordinate represented more than simply a method of making explicit the 'inferential reach' attempted in coding the content category coordinate, for the level of inference also of course referred to the extent which or the way in which the instigator of an expression symbolically represented himself/herself and the experimenter. Within the groups themselves therefore the level of inference coded by the observer to some extent corresponded to more or less conscious awareness on the part of those listening (or indeed the speaker himself), of the 'here and now' significance of GFS themes or characterizations. Although it was not always the case that a high degree of symbolic representation was less readily 'recognizable' to group members, it became clear while coding the groups that an investigation of the relationship between degrees of symbolic expression or communication and more overt interaction processes might constitute a fruitful avenue for future research. In

(30b) It should also be noted that the three recruiting identities may have attracted unique groups of subjects that were not necessarily congruent with the experimenter-identities as formulated. For example, the fact that the E2 identity ostensibly came from outside the University might have differentiated it significantly from the other two.

APPENDIX II (c & d) the explanatory notes on the coding of the episode taken from group I condition E2 are couched in these terms as a further illustration of the point.

Given the stated priorities of the investigation here though, a comprehensive account of any relationship between overt process and levels of symbolic communication must be deferred. However what can be readily seen from the relationship between the distribution of the levels of inference and the distribution of content category scores (without reference to some other observational instrument for coding overt process), is a reflection of groups' awareness of different levels of symbolic representation.

For example, 73% of all acts of 'moving away' - those that expressed the negative aspect of each BA relationship - were located at levels three and four, confirming the expectation that negative expression of feeling toward the experimenter (while perceived in any of his leader-figure roles) would take place predominately at a level where it would constitute less of a 'challenge' or contradiction to the agreed overlying status quo of experimental control. Moreover where the E-identity itself was perceived negatively in condition E2, a higher proportion of acts relative to the E1 and E3 conditions were also found at symbolic levels suggesting that it was preferable for subjects to shift even the recognition of the experimenter as manipulative, threatening leader-figure into the symbolic domain.

Paradoxically a high proportion of expression contributing to a Pairing BA was also found at the highest symbolic level; but this finding can perhaps also be explained in terms of the inhibitory effect of the overlying situation, that would mitigate against the

overt development of a friendly egalitarian social milieu with total strangers in a transient laboratory experience.

9.2.3 Content Category Scores

(a) Dependent and independent variables

In order to investigate further the relationship suggested in the data between the three constituent experimenter identities and the relative frequency of associated BA scores recorded in their groups, it was decided to first conduct an analysis of variance on this data to see if differences between the mean scores for BA categories under each experimenter-condition were statistically significant. With E-conditions 1, 2, and 3 constituting the independent variable, and the frequency of recorded acts in the main BA categories of dependency, fight-flight and pairing representing the three separate dependent variables, the means of the four group scores in each of the categories of dependent variable for the three experimenter conditions were obtained from both raw scores and percentage scores (% of total number of acts in each group).

(b) The means for main BA categories in each E-condition

RAW SCORE MEANS.

	CONDITION E1	CONDITION E2	CONDITION E3
Dependency scores (groups I - IV)	74.75	57.50	40.75
Fight-flight scores (groups I - IV)	46.00	69.50	42.75
Pairing scores (groups I - IV)	16.50	18.20	29.75

PERCENTAGE SCORE MEANS

	CONDITION E1	CONDITION E2	CONDITION E3
Dependency scores (groups I - IV)	54.76	39.25	34.95
Fight-flight scores (groups I - IV)	33.36	47.62	38.35
Pairing scores (groups I - IV)	11.88	13.14	26.50

(c) Analysis of variance

Further, the results of the analysis of variance on the dependency, fight-flight and pairing scores between the three experimenter conditions were as follows:

RAW SCORES (FIG.4a)

Dependency	ss	df	Est. Var	F
Total	4576.67	11		
Between	2312.17	2	1156.085	
Within	2264.50	9	251.611	4.594

Fight-flight	ss	df	Est. Var	F
Total	3436.25	11		
Between	1704.50	2	852.25	
Within	1731.75	9	192.416	4.429

Pairing	ss	df	Est. Var	F
Total	1838.25	11		
Between	396.50	2	198.25	
Within	1441.75	9	160.194	1.237

PERCENTAGE SCORES (FIG.4b)

Dependency	ss	df	Est. Var	F
Total	1757.80	11		
Between	869.19	2	434.59	
Within	888.61	9	98.73	4.40

Fight-flight	ss	df	Est. Var	F
Total	1677.35	11		
Between	416.70	2	208.35	
Within	1260.65	9	140.07	1.48

Pairing	ss	df	Est. Var	F
Total	1630.60	11		
Between	525.28	2	262.64	
Within	1105.32	9	122.81	2.13

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VALUES OF F AND LEVELS OF SIGNIFICANCE (FIG.4c)

	Raw Scores	Level of Sig.	% Scores	Level of Sig.
Dependency .... F =	4.594	(.05)	4.40	(.05)
Fight-flight .. F =	4.429	(.05)	1.48	-
Pairing ..... F =	1.237	-	2.13	-

It can be seen from the summary table that a significant degree of variance was only found in the raw dependency and fight-flight scores and in the percentage dependency scores between the three E-conditions, although all the findings were in the anticipated direction. Clearly there was a problem with the pairing dimension overall, and some unexplained discrepancy occurring between the use of raw and percentage scores in this statistical context. However this overall analysis of variance was of only limited interpretive utility because it in effect tested for variation in BA scores between E1, E2 and E3 conditions, and although variation was for example anticipated between the dependency scores in E1 and dependency scores in E2 and E3, there was no reason to expect variation between the dependency scores in E2 and E3. Therefore in order to investigate further both the areas of significant variance found (and those areas where there was none), a t-test was used to make comparisons of the specific means of all BA scores in all E-conditions to determine exactly where significant differences (for a one-tailed test) lay.

(d) Comparison of specific means (t-test)

COMPARISON OF SPECIFIC MEANS (FIG.5)

	Raw Scores (t=)	level of Sig.	% Scores (t=)	level of Sig.
Dependency Scores:				
Difference between condition E1 and E2 means	1.710	(.10)	2.605	(.025)
Difference between condition E1 and E3 means	2.580	(.025)	2.336	(.05)
Difference between condition E2 and E3 means	1.070	-	.447	-
Fight-flight scores:				
Difference between condition E2 and E1 means	2.069	(.05)	3.050	(.025)
Difference between condition E2 and E3 means	2.300	(.05)	.821	-
Difference between condition E1 and E3 means	.253	-	.470	-
Pairing scores:				
Difference between condition E3 and E1 means	.894	-	1.384	-
Difference between condition E3 and E2 means	1.129	-	1.235	-
Difference between condition E2 and E1 means	.400	-	.305	-

Given that the relationships of interest to this thesis were those between each E-identity and the frequency of BA acts associated with it, these results are encouraging. For if such relationships existed, then significant differences would be expected between: the mean of E1 dependency scores and those from the E2 and E3 conditions, the mean of E2 fight/flight scores and those from the E1 and E3 conditions and finally the mean of E3 pairing scores and those from the E1 and E2 conditions. On the other hand there was no reason to anticipate any significant difference in the dependency score means between the E2 and E3 conditions, the fight/flight score means between the E1 and the E3 conditions and the pairing score means between the E1 and the E2 conditions.

Firstly, with regard to the latter differences, the results of the t-test detailed above show that in these areas where no significant differences were expected, none were found in either the raw or percentage scores. Leaving briefly in abeyance explanations for the apparent failure overall to find any significant difference in the pairing scores between the pertinent E-conditions; it can also be seen that the issue regarding the interpretive potential of raw scores as against percentage scores that arose prior to the analysis of variance, was illuminated to some degree through the comparison of specific means. The differences in the means of percentage scores on the dependent and fight-flight dimensions between the relevant E-conditions achieved marginally better levels of significance than the differences in the means of raw scores, except for the failure there was to find any significant difference in the percentage means of fight/flight scores between the E2 and the E3 condition. The raw score means on the other hand did not register this failure,

although only a modest level of significance was achieved for the difference in the dependency score means between E1 and E2. Overall therefore given the exploratory nature of this investigation and the relatively small sample of groups, there was perhaps little to choose between raw and percentage profiles in terms of their interpretive value; reference to both would therefore seem appropriate.

(e) Variation in individual group profiles

However, the interpretation of this data is considerably enhanced by a more detailed look at the individual group profiles in FIG. 3a and FIG. 3b. For here the probable cause of the failure to find any significant difference in the percentage score means of fight/flight between E2 and E3, and the modest level of significance found for the difference in the raw score means for dependency between E1 and E2 can readily be identified in the confounding influence of two particular group profiles. With regard to the former case it can be seen that quite out of character with the other groups in this condition, E3 group III produced the highest fight/flight score of any group in any condition (and a coresspondingly low pairing score). And with regard to the latter case group III in condition E2 'inappropriately' registered the third highest dependency score of any group in any condition (that was within four unit acts of the highest dependency score recorded).

Clearly the modest level of significance found in the difference between the raw dependency score means of E1 and E2, is much less of a problem to the expectations of the investigation than the complete failure to find any significant difference in the percentage

fight-flight score means between the E2 and the E3 conditions, and the pairing score means between the E3 and the other two conditions (for both raw and percentage scores). This is not least the case because in the group that was the probable cause of the former finding (group III in condition E2) the unexpectedly high dependency score was accompanied by a fight-flight score that was also high and therefore appropriate to that E2 condition (a situation that is reflected in the reasonable level of significance achieved in the same comparison made from the percentage profiles).

Therefore prior to dealing with the question of how it is that the distribution of either raw or percentage content category scores in individual groups might come to deviate from that which was anticipated for their relevant E-condition, it is important to illustrate the vulnerability of the overall results to these deviations that was caused by the relatively small sample of groups that it was possible to recruit. It was found for example that the confounding influence of the extraordinarily high fight-flight score in group III condition E3 was not restricted to the difference in the fight/flight percentage score means between conditions E2 and E3; for the hypothetical effects of shifting twenty fight/flight acts into the pairing category (to produce a profile that still reflects a very high fight/flight score and a relatively low pairing score) were quite dramatic. Under these circumstances, not only would the difference in the percentage fight-flight score means have achieved a significance at the .05 level, but so too would the difference in raw pairing score means between E3 and E2 (.1) and E3 and E1 (.05), and the difference in the percentage pairing score means between E3 and E2 (.005) and E3 and E1 (.0005).

(f) Evidence for and against a failure in the E3 condition

It would seem therefore that although the results of the statistical analysis were all in the expected direction, the failures that there were to confirm some kind of relationship between constituent experimenter identities and the frequency of acts recorded in their associated BA categories, can all be accounted for with reference to one particular group profile - group III in condition E3. With nothing unequivocal in this group's history that might account for it's extraordinary profile the first consideration is that it represented a failure to effectively manipulate the E3 condition (a proposition supported by the profile of group I in this condition that seemed to reflect a prevailing dependency BA, in the same way that group III reflected a prevailing fight/flight BA).

However the data available that might shed some light on this explanation is contradictory. On the one hand, the levelling out of the response rates to the recruiting letters toward the third series suggested how such a failure to manipulate the E3 condition might have occurred. For as stated above (cf., p.274) three out of the four groups in this condition were drawn from the third series. If therefore the recruiting procedures did indeed have an important part to play in the constituent process of the groups, there may have been a failure in these terms with some or all of the 'third series subjects' assigned to the E3 condition because prior to their group meetings they had compared their letters with others canvassed from the E2 or E3 conditions, and perhaps guessed their common origin (given the common elements that it was necessary to keep between letters). Alternatively, these subjects were much more

likely than subjects from the earlier recruiting series to have come into contact with those who had already taken part in the meetings, giving them the opportunity once again to doubt the veracity of the E3 identity. On the other hand, the analysis of the reasons E3 subjects gave for volunteering (cf., p. 271) indicated (much more clearly than with the other conditions) that the manipulation of the experimenter's recruiting identity in their case was successful.

These interpretations of the recruiting data are though of course far too impressionistic to enable any firm conclusion to be reached; to this end much more sophisticated methods would need to be developed for cross-checking the efficacy of each E-condition, and determining the extent to which those canvassed were in fact aware of the other two recruiting identities. However the significant differences that were found in the dependency and fight-flight score means between the E3 condition and the other two conditions would seem to indicate that it was qualitatively different in some sense, suggesting that on balance a straightforward failure in the manipulation of the E3 condition may not have been the problem. It may be that this condition was rather one, that for a number of reasons , was particularly 'vulnerable' to the forces underlying a second explanation.

(g) The random uncontrollable quality of unconscious 'group whims'

This explanation is closely related to an issue touched upon above (cf., p.245 - 246) that concerns the extent to which leader-figures can in fact take any 'active' constituent role they choose in group process - as opposed to being 'passively' included into the prevailing basic assumption. In short group I and group II in

condition E2 may for example have been instances of an experimenter condition 'at the mercy of unconscious group whims' that persisted in including the experimenter as 'manipulator and threat' or 'benevolent authority-figure' despite his performance as a 'friendly equal'. Indeed reference again to FIG. 3a and FIG. 3b reveals that there were groups in other conditions that may have been subject to the same kind of process; the profile of group III in condition E2 appears to reflect a prevailing dependency BA, while the profile of group I in condition displayed a near equivalence of dependency and fight-flight scores - the very existence of these latter instances from conditions other than the E3 condition also of course suggests that the underlying problem was not simply it's efficacy alone. However effective the manipulation of the E-identities, there might therefore be no guarantee that these will be 'accepted' by the group in question to encourage the associated BA activity to prevail - the uncertain and unpredictable nature of these emotional configurations might mitigate against the kinds of causal relationships that were sought in this investigation.

It is true to say that it was more important to the main thrust of this thesis that identifying and interpreting experimenter-related acts in a laboratory context be achieved than the confirmation of a relationship between representations of theoretical notions of leader-types (that were in all probability more or less imperfect) and the frequency of associated BA behaviours. However the existence of the latter relationships does of course to some extent confirm the internal consistency of the theoretical framework that underlies the ability to identify and interpret experimenter-related acts in the first place. Therefore prior to suggesting how this internal

consistency may, paradoxically, be actually confirmed by the most significant unanticipated result of the investigation (i.e., the failure to find significant differences in the raw and percentage pairing scores between the relevant conditions), more must be said about the possible reasons for deviations in the profiles of individual groups away from the kind of frequency distribution that appeared to be the norm for their condition. To justify unanticipated results purely on the basis of the peculiarly random quality of unconscious group whims - a process the underlying mechanisms of which remain unexplained in the relevant literature - is not entirely satisfactory.

(h) 'Mismatching' in individual preferences for BAs

One of the more concrete ways in which the kind of 'uncertainty' or 'unpredictability' in emotional configurations discussed above could be introduced might also then be because of a 'mismatch' between individual 'valencies' or preferences for BAs. For example, as suggested above (cf., p. 241) it was not uncommon to find one particular individual making persistent attempts to introduce a clearly defined quality of emotionality that often proved to be an 'identifier' in GFS themes, and was resisted by part or all of the rest of the group; such instances could have one of two outcomes. Either these contributions caused a bias in the distribution of acts through the group profile <u>away</u> from what seemed to be the prevailing and 'appropriate' BA of the group as a whole, or these expressions were for some reason unsuccessful in locomoting a group <u>toward</u> a BA that was appropriate to the E-condition.

In the former case the problem might again have it's source in the

recruitment procedures, for this situation could arise if there had been a failure in the manipulation of the relevant E-identity recruiting letter with only perhaps one member of the group. Clearly in so far as the introduction of the E-identities to subjects in the recruitment process was indeed an important part of the manipulation of the conditions, the quality and size of the subject sample for this investigation was again crucial. It cannot be emphasised too strongly that access to a larger sample of 'naive' subjects would have gone a long way toward removing the possibility of any confounding influence from the cross-fertilization of information in different recruiting letters between those canvassed, or from campus rumour or scuttlebutt. Perhaps more importantly, as the discussion above suggests , within a larger sample of groups the effects on the mean scores of E-conditions of the occassional group where the leader-figure was perhaps at the mercy of 'unconscious whims' (for whatever reason) would have been less marked.

In the latter case, where an individual's expressions <u>were</u> perhaps surprisingly appropriate to the E-condition he was in, and yet were met with resistance from the rest of the group, the question arises as to how this individual might, paradoxically, be a cause of his groups' movement away from the 'appropriate' BA he was expressing. The answer would seem to lie in the defining characteristic of the kinds of acts that are being referred to - the stark clarity with which they 'resounded' with 'here and now' significance that the rest of the group shrank from encouraging. Indeed on these occasions it was not so much that the group was pressing for an alternative BA, more that they appeared to be inhibited from making meaningful contributions to the GFS by the overlying situation. The

raison d'etre of the investigation was of course to circumvent this inhibition, however as implied in the coding of the levels of inference, there was more or less awareness at some level of consciousness within the groups of the 'here and now' significance of symbolic acts - in other words their relevance to the experimenter. An individual could therefore, perhaps quite early in the meeting set into 'resonant vibration' issues surrounding his group's relations with their experimenter to such an extent that a kind of self-conscious paralysis occurred (cf., p. 194 - 197) that seemed to forestall or confuse development of the appropriate leader-relevant themes in the GFS.

However like the random quality of unconscious group whims, the incidence of individuals who displayed a singular propensity for making these kinds of 'risky' contributions to the GFS could not be related directly to any obvious failure in the E-conditions. Ultimately therefore their subtle influence upon group profiles could also only be attenuated within a larger sample of groups. But the issue raised by the observed reactions of groups to their resonant contributions had a much wider significance to the investigation as a whole. For these reactions demonstrated that however successful the GFS proved to be in 'teasing out' elements in group process relevant to a centrifugal symbolic leader-figure, there were still repeated instances of a self-conscious awareness in some sense within the groups of the overlying situation and of the 'here and now' significance of these elements to it. Indeed from the observers point of view it was the surfacing of this awareness that often confirmed the significance of material. For example this process can be seen working within one statement (C) or in a

group's reaction to a statement (D) in the episode quoted from group II condition E1 to be found in APPENDIX II (a).

(i) Summary

In conclusion therefore, access to a more or less covert level of laboratory group process that is related to the experimenter as a 'symbolic leader-figure' was achieved in the investigation. And given that the frequency distribution of BA acts in each E-condition was in the direction that was anticipated (if there was indeed a relationship between the each E-identity and its 'associated' BA behaviours), the system of categories and associated methods used were to some extent shown to be sensitive to the changes in leadership type manipulated in the E-conditions, although this sensitivity was only statistically significant in certain cases.

With regard to the group profiles of raw scores, significant differences were found between the mean of E2 fight/flight scores and those from the E1 and E3 conditions, and between the mean of E1 dependency scores and those from the E2 and E3 conditions - although the difference in the mean dependency scores of the E1 and E2 conditions achieved only a modest level of significance. This latter shortcoming was though corrected when the same analysis was conducted on the group profiles of 'percentage' scores, for this measure in effect allowed for the fact that the high dependency score in group III condition E2 (that was clearly a major cause of the modest level of significance achieved) was in fact accompanied by a high fight/flight score. The 'percentage' measure also produced significant differences between the means of dependency scores in the E1 and the E3 conditions and between the means of fight/flight

scores in the E2 and E1 conditions; however no significant difference was found between the means of E2 and E3 condition fight/flight scores.

As suggested above, this latter failing was potentially the most disruptive result to the aims of this thesis of those detailed so far; not least because the extraordinary group profile (group III condition E3) that could account for it, in all probability also had a major bearing upon the failure to find any significant difference between the mean of E3 pairing scores and those in the E1 and E2 conditions. However, the ease with which it proved possible to account for this and other unanticipated results with reference to individual group profiles illustrates clearly that a degree of caution should properly be exercised in the interpretation of data derived from such a small sample of groups.

Nevertheless if (as the underlying theory suggests) those individual group profiles (i.e., Group III from condition E2 and Groups I and III from condition E3) that did not reflect a frequency distribution of BA behaviours appropriate to their E-condition, were the result of a peculiarly random quality inherent in the formation of BA configurations, then two observations are possible. Firstly that in a larger sample of groups the effects on the mean scores of each condition of the occasional group where the leader-figure was somehow 'at the mercy of unconscious group whims', would have been less marked (or alternatively there would have been more opportunities to investigate this process). And secondly, the E3 condition, as suggested above, appeared to be especially 'vulnerable' to these random forces.

This interpretation is preferred to consideration of an outright failure of the E3 condition for two reasons. Firstly, on balance the ancilliary data available to inform an assessment of the success achieved in manipulating the E3 condition (however imperfect) did not point to there having been such a failure. For example as suggested above, the explanations subjects gave for volunteering for the E3 condition (c.f., p. 271) were in fact a more unequivocal confirmation of its successful manipulation than was the case with the E1 and E2 conditions; and further, the significant differences found in the dependency and fight/flight score means between the E3 and the other two conditions strongly suggested that it was qualitatively different from them in some respect.

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, there are theoretical reasons to suggest why the E3 condition might, in the context of this investigation, have been particularly 'vulnerable' to unconscious dependency or fight/flight 'whims' (or conversely why pairing issues were somehow under-represented). These reasons relate back to an issue touched upon above in the discussion concerning the relative merits of raw or percentage measures of the frequency distribution of acts. For as suggested there, the only relationship between BAs within a group that is implied in Bion's work is <u>developmental</u> . A re-examination of certain assumptions that were necessary to this investigation's attempt to test the set of hypotheses regarding dimensions of group life (that underpinned the category system), will reveal the significance of this relationship to the issue of E3 condition's 'success' or 'failure'.

For testing the internal consistency of the theoretical framework by

manipulating the E-identity (to see if the resultant prevailing BA was appropriately associated with it), in fact necessitated the implicit assumption that in an 'idealized' or 'hypothetical' control group (i.e., one where there was no amplification of implicit BA responses via the introduction of the influence of a particular leader-figure's style), there would be, in any given time-frame or in any given group, an equal likelihood that any of the three BA configurations prevail.

This assumption although essentially based upon the perspective elaborated in Chapter five (cf., p. 136 - 140) where Shambaugh (1978) noted a progressive oscillating sequence of change in Bion's model of group development, necessarily leaned more toward Bion's original 'recurring phasic' model than a strictly linear interpretation. For even though it was accepted that there was a gradual linear sequence discernible in the constant shifting back and forth between BAs, it had to be assumed that this sequence was not so marked that limiting the time-frame of groups would decrease the likelihood that issues relevant to the later (i.e., pairing) phases of linear development would be equally represented - or even more extreme, that the appearance of issues relevant to later phases was in some way actually contingent on the prior resolution of those earlier.

It may be that the results obtained in this investigation suggest that a linear sequence of development was in fact more marked than had been supposed, therefore making the assumption inappropriate - at least in a group with a finite life-span. For example, the finding that 43.6 % of all acts scored in the investigation were

acts of dependency, 39.9 % were acts of fight-flight and only 16.4 % were acts of pairing, suggests that the half-hour life-span of the groups might not have been sufficient to allow pairing an equivalent chance to emerge. Indeed there is no way of knowing how long group-life would need to be extended before a hypothetical point is reached where the assumption of approximate frequency equivalence would be appropriate.

Thus, the predominance of pairing issues that the E3 condition was attempting to encourage, might theoretically speaking, have represented a zenith of developmental achievement - an intimate egalitarian spirit within a group that had already worked through the process (albeit in a recurring phasic sense) of resolving the dependency issue by 'symbolically' or otherwise 'overthrowing' its leader-figure in the 'group revolt' - and there may have been both a 'time-frame' and indeed a 'contextual-frame' necessary for this process to have occurred, that could not be satisfied in a transient laboratory group of strangers - even one manipulated by an E3 identity.

The contextual-frame is also relevant to this issue because it may be that however effective the E3 condition, the perception of the experimenter by the subject-groups as an equal partner in the utopian, intimate exploration of interpersonal relations is, even in fantasy, too marginal. The basic group format, certain elements in the recruitment letters, and the entire overlying laboratory environment (complete with the paraphenalia of observation) necessarily remained fixed for all E-conditions. Therefore manipulating the E3 identity might only have had the effect of

attenuating to some extent the influence of those other E-identities that were more consistent with subject expectations and this overlying environment - rather than actually encouraging the acceptance of the experimenter as a 'friendly equal'. Indeed the frequency distribution of the total number of experimenter-relevant acts through the E-conditions would also seem to support this interpretation; for the highest percentage (36.8 %) was recorded in the most intrusive E2 condition, while the lowest (28.6 %) percentage were coded in the E3 condition groups.

9.3 DISCUSSION

9.3.1 A Perspective on Experimental Artifact

It has been suggested by Silverman (1977) that Pages' (1975) survey of 250 research psychologists reveals limitations in the impact that the artifact research has actually had upon experimental practice; for in this survey fully 92% of those questionned thought that it's findings should be taken seriously and yet 67% said that it had influenced their research practices minimally or not at all. Moreover this kind of attitude is reflected in the literature, for example Jones' (1985) major review of developments in social psychology like many others (e.g., Boutilier et al., 1980), suggests that the artifact research precipitated a 'crisis' of confidence in psychological experimentation, and yet he also felt that this had been "... basically self-corrective .."

Certainly many of the issues raised by this body of work could be

dealt with by relatively straightforward changes in research practices. For example, problems with Orne's (1962) 'demand characteristics', or Rosenthal's (1964) 'unconscious experimenter bias' could be attenuated simply by keeping experimenters blind to the experimental condition of the subject being run; similarly Rosenthal and Rosnow's (1969) observations concerning the introduction of bias through specialised subject samples could be dealt with by a change in recruiting practices. In short, the de facto impact of the artifact research has been 'minimal' or 'self corrective' in the sense that many of its criticisms of the experimental method have been answered simply through the introduction of more sophisticated experimental controls.

Alternatively, the more wide-ranging critique of laboratory experimentation that was to some extent influenced by the artifact research of the 1960's (i.e., Gergen 1973, 1982; Harre 1972 Harre and Secord 1977) questioned the basic validity of experimentation in social research and proposed alternative methods. For example Harre's approach involved a variety of observational techniques used together with a 'negotiation' over explanations between investigators and subjects. In rather the same way that this method might be seen as an attempt to bring out into the open the kind of hidden negotiation between experimenter and subjects that Riecken (1962) referred to, there were also attempts to deal with problems associated with deception in research through disclosure and the introduction of role playing (i.e., Zimbardo 1972); although in the latter case the essential character of the experiment was retained.

It may be that the impact of the artifact research has only been

'limited' because the seemingly inescapeable consquence of accepting its more profound implications (rather than making the kinds of minor adjustments to experimental methods described above) is to seriously question the external validity of laboratory experimentation. For these implications, as Boutilier et al., (1980) have remarked, suggest that the 'psychological uniqueness' of the experimenter-subject relationship imposes limits on the generalizability of subjects' responses; moreover it would seem to be the most 'real' social relationship in the experimental situation. Research psychologists have clearly not been prepared to go this far and have remained commited to the experiment as a series of articles in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin in the late 1970's have suggested; there has been a lack of both applied research (i.e., Rickman 1976) and attempts at extra-laboratory generalization (i.e., Lowe 1976). By the same token psychologists have clearly not been prepared to cross the interdiciplinary divide to embrace alternative strategies for research like the ethnomethodological approach of Harre.

This thesis has attempted to follow a previously uncharted course which represents the only real way out of this dilemma of having to either 'abandon' the experiment, or ignore the deeper implications of the artifact research. For it proposes a theoretical framework within which the 'psychological uniqueness' of the experimenter-subject relationship might itself be understood, and develops an all-inclusive set of observational categories and associated methods based upon it, that make it possible to measure the extraneous influence of this relationship throughout the course of a laboratory experiment. Instead of opting for partial or

imperfect control of the experimenter variable, the investigation here has attempted to monitor it continuously so that it becomes a known quality and quantity.

For example, perhaps the most immediate and general conclusion possible from an examination of the distrubution of experimenter-related acts coded is that although the E3 condition failed to elicit a significant difference in the number of pairing acts compared to the other conditions, on average there were 22% fewer experimenter-related acts of all kinds recorded than in the E2 condition and 18% fewer than the E1 condition. As suggested above therefore, however unsuccessful the E3 identity may have been from the point of view of recruiting subjects, the relaxed, informal, open and friendly atmosphere it engendered in the laboratory clearly reduced the extraneous influence of the experimenter variable on or in groups. as compared to the E1 and E2 identities; even the introduction of just the sense that the subjects were enlisted as 'co-researchers' was sufficient to reduce their preoccupation with the experimenter. This finding therefore has direct implications for the way in which subjects should be instructed and introduced to each other in future research that is concerned to reduce the influence of the experimenter variable (i.e., achieve only partial control). However, drawing conclusions from the total number of experimenter-related acts in groups is only scratching the surface of the instruments potential.

Much of this potential lies in the fact that there were no particularly specialised pre-requisite conditions or controls necessary for applying the system of categories, except of course

the use of the GFS task in the groups; however this task may not be as restricting as in might first appear. For with reference to Mcgraith's (1982) typology (cf., p. 72) it can be seen that although it is a type I (b) task that calls for the 'generation of creative ideas', a significant part of its achievement involves the same intra-group processes as are elicited by the II (b) type, the kind of 'choosing' that takes place in decision-making groups. In so far as it is a discursive task with a goal that must be achieved cooperatively, the GFS therefore elicits a full range of interactive behaviours and small group phemomena; it would for example be suitable for 'ad hoc' groups coded by Bales (1951) instrument.

This means that the experimenter-relevant part of the complex 'score' of small group interaction can be coded continuously and simultaneously with other parts of that score. For the view taken here is that social relationships within the laboratory are as 'real' as any other (albeit in an incipient state), but that the doubts about their external validity have arisen because no methods have been developed for monitoring the experimenters place in or extraneous influence upon these relationships, given that the experimenter-subject relationship preceeds them - indeed created the potential for them to exist in the first place. The theoretical framework underpinning the categories developed here incorporated these latter, crucial factors, and the complete instrument provides a method of continuous measurement and interpretation to enable the potential for a wide variety of intra-group processes (at any point in group life) to be related to different kinds of experimenter-relevant process - or the experimenter to subject relationship.

For example, as intimated above, the episode quoted from group I condition E2 in APPENDIX 3(b&c) provides a glimpse of how aggressive themes related to the experimenter could be seen breaking through into some level of consciousness within the group in a way that seemed to encourage schism and tension. This finding is broadly consistent with those from Horwitz and Cartwright's (1953) early use of projective techniques to explore latent group process, where a relationship was discerned between hostility expressed in the group and hostility in the group stories. Similarly it is not hard to see that patterns or rates of participation in groups, networks or strategies of verbal communication, role differentitation (like for example Bales' distinction between task and social emotional leaders) or affiliations, might equally be influenced by a more or less covert experimenter-relevant process. Indeed with a system of observational categories, the influence that the experimenter variable might have on almost any aspect of discursive, laboratory group life could be investigated.

At least initially, the main limitation of the theoretical framework and instrument as a tool for the investigation of experimental artifact would seem to be that they are based upon group concepts, and therefore only perhaps applicable to groups. However not the least of the implications of this thesis is that laboratory groups may not only be unique instances of experimental artifact, but they may offer a unique opportunity for the investigation of its more profound implications. For the results detailed above were sufficiently encouraging to confirm that the experimenter does indeed play an important role, at least as a 'benevolent authority' or 'threatening manipulator' in the constituent process of his

groups. Further that the 'influence' of these roles if felt by subjects at some level of consciousness and detectable by an observer throughout group life.

This is not to suggest that the covert subsystem of group process relevant to a leader-figure identified in this thesis is necessarily synonymous with group process that is related to the experimenter as an 'artifactorial influence'. However all the elements that conspire to make the experimenter's presence significant as for example evaluating audience, institutional authority, object of curiousity, threat or even nuisance, have a place within the BAs in so far as they represent configurations of feelings toward significant centrifugal figures. In other words the BAs can be expressed in groups without experimenters, and by the same token with single subject experiments there may be 'artifact' without BAs ; but in the laboratory groups the elements of experimenters' artifactoral influence come together, find meaning and can be organized into distinct configurations of emotionality.

This may be a case of what Bion called:

> "...the erroneous impression that a thing must necessarily commence at the moment when its existence becomes demonstrable." (1961)

For he clearly felt that the BAs, that are used here to lend coherence to the artifactoral influences of the experimenter to subject-group relationships, only needed a group context in order to become manifest:

> "...no individual, however isolated in time and space can be regarded as outside a group or lacking in active manifestations of group psychology, although

conditions do not exist which would make it possible to demonstrate it." (1961)

With the system of categories underpinned by a theoretical framework based upon Bion's concepts, there may therefore be some sense in which the level of group process identified is also relevant to the experimenter to single-subject artifactoral relationship, although it may not be so readily identified in this context.

The second important implication of the fact that experimental artifact is understood in terms of the BAs, is that the wide range of group situations to which the instrument might be applied, can be extended beyond the laboratory. For what are experimenter-related acts in this investigation, would in a different group context be related to some other symbolic leader-figure. Indeed confirming the existence of the covert agenda of the BAs in the laboratory only lends further support to the universalistic aspirations Bion had for his concepts (cf., p.166). Therefore doubts about the external validity of the findings from laboratory groups can to some extent be reassessed in the knowledge that the extraneous artifactoral influence introduced by the deeper implications of the experimenter to subject-group relationship, may be one example of much more widespread, even universal, group phenomena. Thus, laboratory groups engaged in the GFS task could be compared with the findings from studies like for example Kets de Vries and Miller's (1984) unstructured observations of larger scale groupings with a history. For here a categorisation of 'shared group fantasies' based upon Bion's concepts was developed in terms of how they exerted influence upon organizational decision-making, structure and strategy.

As a map of the unknown territory of experimental artifact, Bion's interpretative frame of reference was not without its drawbacks. These invariably centred around the inherent ambiguity and imprecision of the BA concepts - a problem also registered by others who have attempted to operationalize them (cf., p.117). In short, even with detailed category definitions and the provision of the levels of inference, some potential undoubtably remains for disagreement in the interpretation of E-relevant acts. But there is a sense in which some ambiguity or flexibility in the concepts underlying a prototypical and pragmatic observational instrument primarily concerned with the interpretation of verbal interaction, is necessary or at least unavoidable to some degree.

For even with the powerful and precise mathematical modelling tools of the natural sciences - the semanticist Korzybski's (1958) potent slogan pertains - "the map is not the territory". More significantly however there is a price that has to be paid as the definition of a system of conceptual abstraction moves toward this kind of rigour. Namely that as precision increases the flexibility of the model suffers. For example, the language of mathematics has reached a point where barely any relationship remains between it's symbols and human sensory experience. Moving too far in this direction is clearly inappropriate for a system of concepts that are to be of any practical use in ongoing observation. It could be argued therefore that the ambiguities inherent in Bion's 'map' are synonymous with a certain flexibility that allows it to accommodate the undulating contours of the verbal 'territory' of this investigation (cf., p.118)

In short it must be accepted that there is a degree of ambiguity and uncertainty inherent in the interactive territory mapped in the exploration here; the verbal (or indeed kinesic) communication and understanding of feelings is to some extent haphazard, not only in its interpretation but also in its design or intent. Language is an imperfect vehicle for expressing the imperfectly articulated complex of human emotionality - but it is , unavoidably, the major currency of the human sciences and there is a sense in which in this investigation shades of meaning in it's interpretation (in the GFS) somehow matched or mirrored the uncertainty of this material's motivational origins (cf., p. 178)

Clearly, the perspective on experimental artifact elaborated here does not, strictly speaking, aspire to being deterministic. However, in this sense it is a perspective shared with, for example, Quantum physicists who arrived at the realisation of the inseparability of the observer and the observed in research via their ultimate rejection of a classical deterministic view of the behaviour of sub-atomic particles:

> "Nothing is more important to the quantum principle than this, that it destroys the concept of the world as 'sitting out there' with the observer safely separated from it by a .. slab of glass ... one has to cross out that old word observer and put in its place the new word 'participator' (Wheeler 1973)

For it was found that the Newtonian, mechanistic concept of the reality of matter would not accomodate the sub-atomic world where matter could not be said to exist, but rather showed 'tendencies to exist', where atomic events could not be said to occur at definite times and in definite ways but only showed 'tendencies to occur'.

These 'tendencies' were of course expressed mathematically in terms of probabilities, but they were not probabilities of 'things' - rather probabilities of interconnections:

> " .. nature does not show us any isolated 'building blocks' but rather appears as a complicated web of relations between various parts of the whole. These relations always include the observer in an essential way .. The Cartesian partition between the I and the world cannot be made with atomic matter .. we can never speak about nature without, at the same time, speaking about ourselves .." (Capra 1983)

Such concerns bear an uncanny resemblance to those discussed in this thesis for the realms of social psychology, where an attempt has been made to account for experimental artifact, by identifying one line of an inextricably interwoven score of group interaction - the 'primordial' subsystem of group process, which although only one of the many subsystems that make up the group system as a whole, to some extent contains those elements that 'speak about human nature [at least in a small group context] as it relates to ourselves' - as experimenters or observers.

9.3.2 Implications For Social Psychology

Because the emphasis in this thesis was upon the initial development and testing of a prototypical system of categories and associated methods, the important bearing that the perspective taken and the findings made, have upon a wide range of social psychological research, can only at this stage be stated in quite general terms. However the investigation of the more specific implications (for past research) of having identified and interpreted a covert subsystem of group process relevant to the experimenter that (as

intimated above) is possible due to the instrument's ability to be used in combination with other measures and in a variety of circumstances, defines it's significant potential (for future research).

In general terms therefore, the significant insights of Mills (1967) that informed crucial aspects of the perspective taken here, were confirmed. Members of incipient groups in the first instance at least, relate to one another (perhaps primarily) on the 'primordial' as well as the 'behavioural' levels. Patterns of behaviour were the specific concern of Bales (1951) instrument, but because of it's predominately covert nature, the primordial level has rarely been the subject of investigation - least of all with an observational instrument. Clearly the way in which overt actions are organized must be heavily influenced by configurations of feelings and emotional responses - so without access to the latter any understanding of the former remains incomplete.

With the system of categories and associated methods detailed above significant inroads have been made into the primordial subsystem of the laboratory group, thus clearing the way for the detailed investigation of its relationship to, and and influence upon other subsystems (the only restriction being that the groups in questions would have to be engaged in the GFS task). For example, with coherence given to the primordial subsystem of process here by a psycho-analytic frame of reference, one way in which the experimenter as a 'leader-figure' might participate as the principal agent of birth, change and death in the complete laboratory system can be seen. Moreover focus upon the primordial subsystem acts as a

'psychological' counterbalance to the 'sociological' emphasis in Bales' analysis of the behavioural subsystem. With the dynamic interrelationship of the two subsystems creating a major dimension of the character of the incipient, complete laboratory group system, a truly social psychological perspective is achieved.

As suggested above, at least two experimenter to group-subject 'relationships' that represent important configurations of emotionality (or in Mills terms 'vectors') in an all-inclusive dynamic model of the primordial subsystem, have been identified and monitored throughout group life. The complete, dynamic quality of these constructs can be seen by comparing them to the 'good', 'prideful' and 'perverse' subject-to-experimenter roles that for example, Silverman (1977) outlined. For not only do the BA 'relationships' take the experimenter's participation into account, but unlike Silverman's 'static' subject role constructs, they are dynamically interrelated configurations of these and other artifactoral subject-to-experimenter feeling elements.

Moreover, as also discussed above, the failure to find confirmation of the third 'pairing' relationship in the E3 condition groups did not necessarily question the integrity of the all-inclusive model, it might simply have been the result of underestimating the dynamic features of the model in terms of the provision of a time-frame and a contextual-frame. Pairing expressions and themes <u>were</u> identified in the groups studied, but for them to have achieved prominance in the distribution of acts might have required a longer time-frame for the developmental process (that would include a group revolt), to be worked through at some symbolic level. Further, introducing the

'friendly egalitarian' E3 identity as a centrifugal figure in the constituent process of a laboratory group of strangers might simply have been too much of a contradiction in terms with the overlying situational context.

The experimenter-identities associated with the dependency (E1) and fight/flight (E2) BA relationships, were of course far from exceptional or extraordinary as investigative or observational roles; indeed E1's identity-performance was designed to replicate what would be considered 'normal' experimental practise. Therefore to find evidence of elements in group behaviour clearly associated with these identities suggests how broad a spectrum of social psychological research on (at least in the first instance) laboratory groups, might need to take account of such 'extraneous' influences. The widely accepted but wholly inadequate conventional wisdom of experimental practise in the human sciences that subjects' involvement with the experimenter or observer diminishes significantly during the course of their laboratory experience must give way to the new wisdom that Quantum physics was forced to come to terms with:

> "What we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to our method of questionning .." (Heisenberg 1963)

APPENDIX I

(a) The Group Fantasy Story task

INSTRUCTIONS

Acting collectively as a group, make up a story that is as imaginative as possible; it might for example be the basis for a book, short story, film or play etc., centred around some main theme or protagonist.

You will not require any means of documenting your story as the tape recording will serve this purpose. You have half an hour in which to finish.

APPENDIX II

(a) Condition E1 - Group II - Episode

The GFS up to this excerpt (which came right at the end of the group) had been concerned with choosing the main protagonist. '2.45' (reflecting the actual time of day) was finally agreed upon. Various attributes of this character were then discussed (i.e. his sexuality/asexuality and microscopic/normal size) before it was agreed that he is somehow transported, or finds himself in the past.

3(ft)R	S1	It's a really boring story.	
		(Group laughs)	
3(ft)L	S3	What story?	
3(ft)A	S4	Quick ... send it off to Mills and Boon!	
	S1	(Laughs)	
		(Pause)	
4(rg)L	S3	What's he going to do then?	
		(Pause)	
*	S1	He arrives on the Wednesday (laughs) ...	(A)
	S3	... They didn't have days of the week ...	
*4(reg)R	S1	... No they didn't have Gods so they can't call it Wednesday ...	(B)
		(Pause)	
*1L/R	S1	He's in this situation ... there's other people ... lots of other people another society totally different from anything we know (laughs) ... interpret that how you may! ... mind you if the people are humanoid they probably do human things like fight and make	(C)

		societies and things, don't they? ...	
	S4	Not necessarily ...	
	S2	They may only have human form might they? ...	
4(rg)L	S4	... They might be totally depressed ...	
4(rg)R	S2	... They may not have the human psychology as it were ...	
4(ba)W	S1	(Acts out someone knowingly writing something down - the Experimenter)	(D)
2x3(fot)W		(Group laughs) ... (Pause)	
4(rg)R	S1	That's true ... so they look like humans and behave similarly to humans but have different cultural ideals ...	
	S2	Yea.	
	S3	Mmm.	
2(ip)L	S3	We've still only got a situation and a hero ... still no story.	
	S1	(Laughs)	
4(reg)R	S4	What's he going to try to do ... is he going to try to sort out ... stop the cycle occurring again? ...	
	S2	Yea ...	
	S4	... Once he realises.	
4(reg)F/W	S2	... There must be some sort of crisis that's going to happen that he's got to prevent ...	
*3(id)F/W	S1	Haven't we all!	(E)
		(Group laughs)	
	S4	So he's got to (a) realise it hasn't he? ...	
	S2	No, he realises ...	
	S4	... and after that decide upon a course of action.	
	S2	Mmm.	
	S4	So what is going to be in his way and what course of action is he going to stand on ...	

4(re)R	S2	That's why there's got to be some sort of anti-hero really, hasn't there? ...	
3(fot)R	S1	I agree.	
	S2	Yea.	
*4(re)R	S3	Anti-hero could be the cycle ...	(F)
3(fot)R	S1	Yes, exactly ... I was just going to say ... great minds ...	
4(rg)R ..	S2	Yea ... Yea, but he's still got to actually physically stop something.	
.	S1	Mmm.	
..	S2	... Hasn't he? ... Is it going to be a crisis that's happening? ...	
4(reg)R	S1	Or SEES the situation fully and not stop it ... that's just as a deliberate action, isn't it? ...	(G)
..	S3	Yea, he knows that if he stops the situation and he knows that he's in the future ...	
.	S2	Yea ...	
4(rg)F ..	S3	... And if he stops the situation he's not going to exist in the future, is he? ...	
	S1	Or is he ...?	
	S2	I don't know!	
		(S1 and S2 laugh)	
	S1	Asimov rules ...	
..	S3	It depends whether he enjoys the situation he's in better than the one he's just come from.	
.	S1	Well, would he be able to go back anyway? ... I mean he might never get biorhythms again ... his batteries might run out on his watch (laughs) ... and he won't know.	
4(reg)L/R.	S3	Depends whether he's going to be selfish enough to want to stay and keep the situation as it is ... stop the cycle ... (looks up at the E).	
4(reg)L/R	S1	Well, if you stop the cycle there won't be any future to go back to anyway ...	

	.		
	..	S3	And therefore would he have come back anyway? ...
4(reg)R		S4	But there would ... but he just wouldn't live in it cos if you stop the cycle the world isn't just going to go BANG ... it's just going to carry on.
	..	S1	Well, it would though cos if there's a crisis
	.		and he doesn't stop it or ... if there was a
	.		crisis like total destruction of all life ...
3(ft)L	.		start again with a few chemicals and DNA ...
	.		and here we go again (laughs and looks at
	.		experimenter)
	.		
	.		(pause)
	.		
	..	S1	That's what happened last time ... (laughs).
			(Pause)
*3(id)L	..	S3	We're lacking in material on which to (H)
	.		build ourselves ... got nothing to stimulate
	.		our minds.
	.		
	.	S1	No.
	.		
	..	S3	No reference points ...
	..	S1	Well, they don't want a story do they ... they
	.		just want to see how we interact as a group
1R	.		(laughs) ... record that!
	.		
2x2(nt)W	.		(Group laughs)
	.		
	..	S1	Well ... interact ... interact!
	.		
	.	S3	Yea.
	.		
	..	S1	... be collective!
2x2(nt)W			(Long pause)
		S3	So what have we got then ... humanoid person whose gone back in time.
		S1	We've got a hero ... we've got a situation ... we've got a crisis and a cycle ... That's not bad for a story is it ...? It's a basis of a story ...
		S3	It's just a case of filling in the gaps.
2(ip)R		S1	Why fill them in ... (I)

		(General agreement)
1R	S1	... Leave it to the reader's imagination ...
..	S4	Yea!
2x3(ft)R.		(All laugh in general satisfied agreement and excitement)
2(ip)R ..	S4	Give him a three page book ... this happens... this happens ... what happens you decide ... you can probably sell that to the yanks for millions actually ...
..	S2	Write a page on every hundreth page ... and leave the rest blank ... and fill your own in ... yea!
1R .	S1	Use your imagination!
2(ie)R ..	S2	Stick this in the front (indicates the instruction sheet).
2x2(nt)W		(All laugh)
	S4	Sell it to the yanks and be millionaires next year.
		(S2 and S4 laugh)
3(ft)R	S1	No, you'd have to spread rumours that it was banned first ... and then put it on the market (laughs) ...
	S4	That's true.
4(re)R	S1	... Fight a law court and then put it on the market.
	S3	That would work.
3(ft)R ..	S2	It's been censored ...
.	S1	(Laughs and agrees) ... for another $1000 we will supply you ...
..	S2	... The uncensored version ...

(b) Condition E1 - Group II - Explanatory Notes

The meaning of category pre-fixes are as detailed in Chapter seven

"*" = an identifier

The central personality and the situation in which it finds itself represents Group II itself (n.b. its name '2.45' = the real time, and 'A' below). The 'revolt' that takes place occurs in the symbolic denial of the validity of the experience or situation which the experimenter is responsible for.

(A) The main protagonist arrives on the same day as Group II.

(B) This is a remarkable example of the 'here and now' significance of certain unconscious associations; for Wednesday has been identified as 'Woden's' day; moreover, Woden was known as the God of 'eloquence' and 'poetic inspiration'. This act is then a denial of the 'God of the day' - a day that calls for eloquence and inspiration; it is a denial of the experimenter and his demands!

(C) The first part of S1's statement suggests that the group experience bears no relation to real life - the experimenter is then directly challenged before S1's tone changes to a more conciliatory emphasis. Level one is coded because it is the highest level in evidence, and the content is coded as loyalty and rebellion because the second half of the statement as

it were 'takes a step back' from the defiance evident in the first half by suggesting that the group nevertheless involves normal processes like fighting and 'making societies'. These decisions on the level and the content category are based upon the coding procedures outlined above (cf., p. 203 & 236)

(D) S1's acting out here confirms the 'here and now' significance of S2's prior statement and is in turn reacted to by the rest of the group.

(E) This identifer associates the problems that the group have been having with their task (especially in the light of the fact that their time is running out) with the 'crisis' they are discussing.

(F) Linking this identifier up with the other 'markers' through the associative process noted above (and in particular 'E') confirms the inference that the 'crisis' represents the problems that the group are having with the task in its life 'cycle' - and it is this as the representative of the experimenter that they are 'rebelling' against.

(G) In effect this statement is saying that 'seeing' the reality of the (laboratory) situation is the same as actually 'stopping it' - in other words, 'seeing through' the situation that the experimenter has created is the same as confounding his purpose; the statement in itself therefore actually describes a symbolic form

for a 'revolt' in the laboratory.

(H) An extremely powerful example of an identifier, where this 'slip' directly identifies the group with the protagonists group.

(I) This act is the first in a series that seem to move the revolt to a higher more 'overt' level.

(c) Condition E2 - Group I - episode

The GFS up to this excerpt concerned an invading group of 'aliens' living hidden away in the world whose discovery causes great 'political divisions'. Discussion centred around what these beings were and it was agreed that the 'blobs' were highly developed and did not need 'eyes and ears', relying instead on their advanced technologies. The issue of whether they constituted a threat or themselves felt threatened was also underlying the discussion.

4(re)L	S2	It's going to be a bit hard not to let them take over, isn't it? (nervous laugh).
	S1	Oh no, perhaps we could persuade them to leave quietly at night ... perhaps they disturb ... perhaps they're peaceful people ... perhaps loving people that have tried not to interfere with us but want ... upon discovery have thought that their life there had been threatened and that this is the only reason that they're sort of ... a threat to humanity ... immediately you discover that's an alien you think of a threat anyway, you don't know ...
4(re)A		
	S2	... discovered ... (laughs).

3(ft)F/W	S1	... well, I suppose it's umm ... not like ... it's like learning or not knowing what Russia's really thinking about America ... I mean it's ... we're building up a feeling ... a paranoia between the two sides ... (nervous laugh) ... do you not think?	
		(Pause)	
	S2	What do you think?	
2(nt)W	S3	I don't know really ...	
3(ft)F	S2	I'd rather have a war ...	
4(ba)W)	S4	Well, just say they want to get to another planet away from earth cos all the humans have destroyed the earth ... and they want to go to another planet? ...	
..	S1	Do you mean that they can see the folly of our ways ...	
.	S4	Yea ...	
3(id)L ..	S1	... and they can see what we're doing to each other.	(A)
	S4	Yea, and they've decided that together they can live on the moon ... somewhere a suitable distance away from humans ...	
	S1	What are they doing on the earth in the first place?	
	S2	Well, they would have done that ... that excuse anyway ... if they want to go somewhere else ...	
		(Pause)	
4(reg)L	S1	Well, perhaps they're learning from our mistakes ... see where we go wrong in order to be able to develop themselves ... and adapt their lifestyles to another planet ...	(B)
		(Pause)	
	S2	Right, OK, so we've discovered these people and so what happens? ...	
..	S1	And they think that we're a threat to them ...	
.	S2	Why ...	
4(reg)F/W.	S1	... and in turn start ... why? Because	(C)

		they don't want to be discovered basically.	
2(gm)F	S2	They say Hi down there! (laughs) ... we've just discovered you ... and they say they're a threat ...	
	S1	Yea!	
2(gm)F	S4	Well, if they're so advanced why didn't they search the planet before to find us ...?	
	S1	What do you mean?	
	S4	Suppose they were so advanced they wouldn't want to stay in one place, would they? They'd see what was around them ...	
4(reg)L	S3	Yea ... maybe they were here before us though and they've been here all along and they've just been watching us sort of develop ...	(D)
3(fot)W	S1	That's VERY imaginative (laughs) ... that's an idea they've been existing ...	
	S3	... they're treating us ...	
	S1	for thousands and thousands of years ...	
		(Pause)	
*3(id)F	S3	They've been sitting with video cameras ... watching us and recording us ...	(E)
2x3(fot)W		(Group laughs nervously)	
3(id)F	S1	Yes, with one-way mirrors (laughs).	
	S3	Yea! (laughs with S1).	
3(fot)W	S2	Right, OK (nervous laugh). We still discover them ...	(F)
		(Pause)	
4(reg)F/W	S1	... which they didn't want in the first place so they find us a threat, yea? ... (laughs) ... then they kill every human being that comes ...	
2(gm)F	S2	Who would they kill if they're so peaceful ... I mean ... I don't think they'd be able to be so peaceful.	
4(rg)F	S1	Perhaps we're going to be the aggressors.	

	S3	Yea ... loss of innocence ...	
4(rg)F	S1	Suggest that we are initially ... baddies.	
	S3	Yea ...	
	S2	Yea, OK.	
3(ft)W)	S1	That's the bit that we can't explain ourselves ... we've only got ten minutes left and er ...	(G)
2x2(nt)W		(Signs of tension in the group)	
	S2	... Nothing's happened! (laughs)	
		(Pause)	
..	S1	And there's a great plan and all the nations throw up their arms and say good gracious what have we here and try and ... come ...	
4(re)F .	S2	Blow them up ...	
2(gm)A ..	S1	... come together ... yes and umm ...	(H)
	S2	Here you are actually coming together ...	
4(reg)F	S1	... To try and understand exactly what's happening and to develop a sort of umm ... war strategy to get rid of these alien beings.	
	S2	But would they though?	
	S1	Yes.	
	S2	I mean they've just discovered them and they try to get rid of them ... perhaps they wouldn't ... I don't know.	

(d) Condition E2 - Group I - Explanatory Notes

This GFS is similar to many where there are two separated or different groups, with one perhaps more 'advanced' or 'developed' than the other. Prior to this excerpt there had been identifiers which suggested that the 'world' represented the group and the 'aliens' the experimenter(s). Confirmation of the identity of the 'aliens' at (E) therefore linked up with earlier less explicit

'markers' in the associative process (like those mentioned above, i.e. the aliens not needing "eyes and ears"). With two clear identities and the discussion of relations between them less ambiguous than in E1 Group II, the emphasis in the notes below will be upon how the level of inference (or the more or less conscious awareness in the group of the 'here and now' significance of the GFS themes) might be related to interpersonal relations and affiliations within the group.

(A) This suggestion is the beginning of a theme that is persistently developed by S1 throughout the episode which eventually leads to (E).

(B) The theme continues to develop with resistance from S2 becoming more obvious.

(C) After this development of the theme by S1, resistance from S2 becomes more overt and scathing ... changing the subject turns to sarcasm and S4 joins S2 in arguing against it.

(D) At this point S3 steps in to support S1 and in the 'knowing' tones he employs, seems to take the developing metaphor a significant stage further. S1's reaction suggests that at this point she may have become aware of the 'here and now' significance of her own theme.

(E) The developing metaphor is made quite explicit.

(F) S2 makes another attempt to change the subject, and fails as S1 and S2 go on to decide that the group will

be the aggressors even though the 'discovery' of the aliens represents a threat to them.

(G) S1 appears to back off from the aggressive conclusion to which her theme had led - this may be because of the schism and tension it has caused within the present group.

(H) In this statement S1 turns the emphasis in her theme to achieving a unified front in her attack on the aliens - to S2's surprise!

(e) Condition E3 - Group II - Episode

Up to this excerpt, the GFS described the 'sky opening' and a 'rainbow' character arriving to announce 'I come as a friend'. He changes campus into a 'wonderful place to live', brings people 'back to life' and promotes 'world peace, helping to pull things together'. Finally, he catches hayfever, sneezes and explodes!

	S4	And then you could tie that in with like umm ... the rain again like have the beginning of time ...	
3(ft)A		(Group laughs sympathetically)	
4(ba)A	S4	... Noah's ark ...	(A)
4(ba)A	S2	He could explode and a huge cloud of gas would go up into the air and then these little seeds sort of falling ... fluttering down to the ground and they fall into the earth and little ...	
3(fot)A	S3	... start to grow ...	

		(All laugh sympathetically)	(B)
	S2	... trees start sprouting and little rainbow trees ...	
3(ft)A	S4	Ahhhh ... (exaggerated sympathy)	
	S3	Oh yes ...	
2x2(nt)W		(More sympathetic laughter than an extended pause)	
4(re)N	S1	Oh well, that's got rid of him ...	
		(All laugh)	
4(ba)A	S1	Oh why don't we say at the end ... but his successor is due to come to earth in er ... so many years ... or he's got a family wherever he comes from, he's got some sons and daughters and a wife so they'll carry on his good deeds ...	(C)
	S2	But how will people find out about ...	
	S1	... But he'll be immune to hayfever cos they'll take the injections ...	
		(All laugh) ... (Pause)	
	S1	... we really can't have an 'it', he's got to be someone ...	
3(fot)W	S3	Meanwhile we've got all these trees growing up with rainbows on them ...	(D)
	S1	Well, just ... ehh .. oh no.	
		(Long pause)	
	S1	How did you get the idea originally?	
	S2	Which idea?	
2(ip)L	S3	We must not question these things. (Laughs)	(E)
	S2	Well, the energy was just generated electrically so he could have nothing to do with those rainbows on the trees to use it for energy.	
4(re)A	S3	Mmm ... I suppose they could ... It could be his gift to the earth ...	(F)
	S4	Yea ...	

4(ba)A	S1	Yea, an everlasting supply of it ...
	S2	Mmm ...
	S4	Yea.
	S3	Yea ... perhaps they could harvest the little rainbows and plant them and make massive rainbows ...
	S1	(Laughs)
	S3	Yea ...
	S1	And that generates electrical power.
	S3	Mmm ... or something.
4(ba)A	S2	Also it makes people live forever ... they can pick little rainbows and suck them ... as little bits of rock ...

(f) Condition E3 - Group II - Explanatory Notes

The religious undertones surrounding the rainbow character combined with the complete lack of any sense of authority and perhaps, most importantly, the emotional tone of the group, all pointed to an underlying basic assumption of pairing.

(A) This statement introduces the notion of resurrection and a new beginning following the death of the main character.

(B) The laughter in this group had a distinctly 'sympathetic' tone; the theme was dealt with in a rather exaggerated fashion, and yet the emotional tone of the group remained lighthearted in a friendly sense.

(C) This statement demonstrates the sense in which the

resurrected embodiment of the rainbow character is projected into the future.

(D) This statement shows S3 (and by omission the rest of the group) completely ignoring S1's appeal to name the character. Indeed, it can be seen that S1 represents the only intermittantly dissenting voice in the prevailing basic assumption.

(E) In this statement S3 reintroduces the mysterious religious element to their story after it had been secularised by S1 from (C) - however, here there is a sense of authority implied, that may relate to the nature of the GFS task itself.

(F) With the reintroduction of the religious theme, it can be seen from this point just how much agreement there is in this group.

APPENDIX III

(a) The Condition E1 recruitment letter

Departmental Heading

Dear [first name + surname]

In order to complete the final part of a larger research project, a series of small group experiments are being organized by the Department of Social Science. The research is concerned with the functionning of discussion groups within a university educational system.

For the project to be properly concluded, we require a small number of people who would be willing to participate in these discussion groups. You have been chosen as one of only a small number of students who are suitable for the research in terms of age, sex, place of origin and educational history. As there are only a limited number of people suitable, it would be very helpful to us if you could participate. We will only require one hour of your time in the week ending [.....]

If you would be willing to take part, please complete the section below and return this letter to me or the departmental secretary.

Yours sincerely

D. Mack (Senior Lecturer)

.....

Please indicate the times that you would be most likely to be available on the following days:

dates	a.m	p.m

(b) The condition E2 recruitment letter

Dr Creed
Dept. Psychiatry
Manchester Royal Infirmary
c/o Dept. Social Science
(Departmental Heading)

Dear [surname]

In order to complete the final part of a larger research project, I am organising a series of small group experiments in conjunction with the Department of Social Science. The investigation is concerned with the internal functionning of face to face groups within a university educational system.

For the research to be completed I require a small number of subjects to participate in these experimental groups. You have been selected as one of a small number of students who are suitable for the investigation; our terms of reference include age, sex, educational background etc. As there are a limited number of students who could be selected, it would clearly be helpful to me if you could participate. One hour of your time will be required on a specified day in the week ending [.....]

If you are able to participate, complete the section below and return this letter to me c/o the Department of Social Science NO LATER THAN [.....]

Yours sincerely

Dr Creed

.....

Indicate the times that you would be most likely to be available on the following days:

dates	a.m	p.m

(c) The condition E3 recruitment letter

No Heading

Dear [first name]

In order to finish my contribution to a larger research project, for which I hope to be awarded my Phd, I am having to run a few final experiments which will take the form of simple discussion groups - I am trying to look into their workings within a university educational system.

For my work to be finished in time, I need a small number of people who might be willing to help out by coming along and taking part. I am writing to you personally, as you are one of only a few students who are right for the project in terms of their age sex etc. For these reasons it would obviously be enormously helpful to me if you could come along. I will only be asking for about an hour of your time in the week ending [.....]

If you are willing to help out, please fill in the section below and return this letter to me (c/o the dept. of social science).

I hope that you will bw able to come along,

Richard Scott

.....

Please indicate the times that you would be most likely to be available on the following days:

dates	a.m	p.m

APPENDIX IV

(a) The Debriefing Questionnaire

NAME: [.....]

Could you briefly explain your reasons for agreeing to take part in this experiment; please think carefully before replying:

Were any of the other members of the group known to you before this meeting? If they were please state who, and indicate how well you knew them:

Without conferring, and in your own words, please summarise your group story:

APPENDIX V

(a) The letter-tags

It can be seen from the 'conversion' chart below that the 'letter-tags' to be input for the computer consisted of two parts, the first always corresponding to the level of inference, and the final letter notation in each case corresponding to the content category.

It is also apparent that the first part of the tag that corresponded to the level of inference, for the sake of brevity, differed from those abbreviations used in the explanations of these coordinates in Chapter Seven. With regard to the final notation (i.e., "l", "d", "r" etc.) of each tag, it can be seen that there was a literal coresspondence with the first letter of each content category. Those tags bracketed in the conversion chart however, represent the notation for those acts where it was not possible to determine whether the behaviour or expression was 'moving toward' or 'moving away from' the BA; therefore in accordance with those 'weighting' practices detailed in Chapter Seven (c.f., p. 235 - 236), when these tags were input, half of a unit was assigned to both the sub-categories of the relevant main BA.

Finally, the notation "tot" produced a read out of the group profile being scored.

(b) The conversion chart

CONTENT CATEGORIES

		L(DEPENDENCY)R			F(FIGHT-FLIGHT)W			A(PAIRING)N		
L	1	1l	(1d)	1r	1f	(1ff)	1w	1a	(1p)	1n
E										
V										
E	2(nt)	2l	(2d)	2r	2f	(2ff)	2w	2a	(2p)	2n
L	2(gm)	2gl	(2gd)	2gr	2gf	(2gff)	2gw	2ga	(2gp)	2gn
	2(ip)	2pl	(2pd)	2pr	2pf	(2pff)	2pw	2pa	(2pp)	2pn
O	2(ie)	2tl	(2td)	2tr	2tf	(2tff)	2tw	2ta	(2tp)	2tn
F										
I	3(ft)	3l	(3d)	3r	3f	(3ff)	3w	3a	(3p)	3n
N	3(fot)	3ol	(3od)	3or	3of	(3of)	3ow	3oa	(3op)	3on
F	3(id)	3il	(3id)	3ir	3if	(3iff)	3iw	3ia	(3ip)	3in
E										
R										
E	4(reg)	4l	(4d)	4r	4f	(4ff)	4w	4a	(4p)	4n
N	4(re)	4xl	(4xd)	4xr	4xf	(4xff)	4xw	4xa	(4xp)	4xn
C	4(rg)	4gl	(4gd)	4gr	4gf	(4gff)	4gw	4ga	(4gp)	4gn
E	4(ba)	4bl	(4bd)	4br	4bf	(4bff)	4bw	4ba	(4bp)	4bn

(c) The program in "SUPERBasic"

```
100 CLEAR
110 DIM loy (12), reb (12), fig (12), wit (12), act (12), neu (12)
120 create_cats
130 num_cats
190 DEFine PROCedure create_cats
200  FOR cat = 1 TO 12
210   READ loy (cat), reb (cat), fig (cat), wit (cat), act (cat),
    neu (cat)
220 END FOR cat
230 END DEFine
260 DEFine PROCedure num_cats
270  REPeat scoring
280   INPUT score$
290 IF score$ = "1l" THEN LET loy(1) = loy(1)+2 : PRINT loy(1)
300 IF score$ = "1r" THEN LET reb(1) = reb(1)+2 : PRINT reb(1)
310 IF score$ = "1f" THEN LET fig(1) = fig(1)+2 : PRINT fig(1)
320 IF score$ = "1w" THEN LET wit(1) = wit(1)+2 : PRINT wit(1)
330 IF score$ = "1a" THEN LET act(1) = act(1)+2 : PRINT act(1)
340 IF score$ = "1n" THEN LET neu(1) = neu(1)+2 : PRINT neu(1)
341 IF score$ = "1d" THEN LET loy(1) = loy(1)+1 : reb(1) = reb(1)+1:
    PRINT loy(1), reb(1)
342 IF score$ = "1ff" THEN LET wit(1) = wit(1)+1 : fig(1) =
    fig(1)+1 : PRINT wit(1), fig(1)
343 IF score$ = "1p" THEN LET act(1) = act(1)+1 : neu(1) = neu(1)+1
    : PRINT act(1), neu(1)
470 IF score$ = "2l" THEN LET loy(2) = loy(2)+2 : PRINT loy(2)
480 IF score$ = "2r" THEN LET reb(2) = reb(2)+2 : PRINT reb(2)
490 IF score$ = "2f" THEN LET fig(2) = fig(2)+2 : PRINT fig(2)
500 IF score$ = "2w" THEN LET wit(2) = wit(2)+2 : PRINT wit(2)
510 IF score$ = "2a" THEN LET act(2) = act(2)+2 : PRINT act(2)
520 IF score$ = "2n" THEN LET neu(2) = neu(2)+2 : PRINT neu(2)
521 IF score$ = "2d" THEN LET loy(2) = loy(2)+1 : reb(2) = reb(2)+1
    : PRINT loy(2), reb(2)
522 IF score$ = "2ff" THEN LET wit(2) = wit(2)+1 : fig(2) = fig(2)+1
    : PRINT wit(2), fig(2)
523 IF score$ = "2p" THEN LET act(2) = act(2)+1 : neu(2) = neu(2)+1
    : PRINT act(2), neu(2)
530 IF score$ = "2gl" THEN LET loy(3) = loy(3)+2 : PRINT loy(3)
540 IF score$ = "2gr" THEN LET reb(3) = reb(3)+2 : PRINT reb(3)
550 IF score$ = "2gf" THEN LET fig(3) = fig(3)+2 : PRINT fig(3)
560 IF score$ = "2gw" THEN LET wit(3) = wit(3)+2 : PRINT wit(3)
570 IF score$ = "2ga" THEN LET act(3) = act(3)+2 : PRINT act(3)
580 IF score$ = "2gn" THEN LET neu(3) = neu(3)+2 : PRINT neu(3)
581 IF score$ = "2gd" THEN LET loy(3) = loy(3)+1 : reb(3) = reb(3)+1
    : PRINT loy(3), reb(3)
582 IF score$ = "2gff" THEN LET wit(3) = wit(3)+1 : fig(3) =
    fig(3)+1 : PRINT wit(3), fig(3)
583 IF score$ = "2gp" THEN LET act(3) = act(3)+1 : neu(3) = neu(3)+1
    : PRINT act(3), neu(3)
590 IF score$ = "2pl" THEN LET loy(4) = loy(4)+2 : PRINT loy(4)
600 IF score$ = "2pr" THEN LET reb(4) = reb(4)+2 : PRINT reb(4)
610 IF score$ = "2pf" THEN LET fig(4) = fig(4)+2 : PRINT fig(4)
620 IF score$ = "2pw" THEN LET wit(4) = wit(4)+2 : PRINT wit(4)
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630 IF score$ = "2pa" THEN LET act(4) = act(4)+2 : PRINT act(4)
640 IF score$ = "2pn" THEN LET neu(4) = neu(4)+2 : PRINT neu(4)
641 IF score$ = "2pd" THEN LET loy(4) = loy(4)+1 : reb(4) = reb(4)+1
    : PRINT loy(4), reb(4)
642 IF score$ = "2pff" THEN LET wit(4) = wit(4)+1 : fig(4) =
    fig(4)+1 : PRINT wit(4), fig(4)
643 IF score$ = "2pp" THEN LET act(4) = act(4)+1 : neu(4) = neu(4)+1
    : PRINT act(4), neu(4)
650 IF score$ = "2tl" THEN LET loy(5) = loy(5)+2 : PRINT loy(5)
660 IF score$ = "2tr" THEN LET reb(5) = reb(5)+2 : PRINT reb(5)
670 IF score$ = "2tf" THEN LET fig(5) = fig(5)+2 : PRINT fig(5)
680 IF score$ = "2tw" THEN LET wit(5) = wit(5)+2 : PRINT wit(5)
690 IF score$ = "2ta" THEN LET act(5) = act(5)+2 : PRINT act(5)
700 IF score$ = "2tn" THEN LET neu(5) = neu(5)+2 : PRINT neu(5)
701 IF score$ = "2td" THEN LET loy(5) = loy(5)+1 : reb(5) = reb(5)+1
    : PRINT loy(5), reb(5)
702 IF score$ = "2tff" THEN LET wit(5) = wit(5)+1 : fig(5) =
    fig(5)+1 : PRINT wit(5), fig(5)
703 IF score$ = "2tp" THEN LET act(5) = act(5)+1 : neu(5) = neu(5)+1
    : PRINT act(5), neu(5)
710 IF score$ = "3l" THEN LET loy(6) = loy(6)+2 : PRINT loy(6)
720 IF score$ = "3r" THEN LET reb(6) = reb(6)+2 : PRINT reb(6)
730 IF score$ = "3f" THEN LET fig(6) = fig(6)+2 : PRINT fig(6)
740 IF score$ = "3w" THEN LET wit(6) = wit(6)+2 : PRINT wit(6)
750 IF score$ = "3a" THEN LET act(6) = act(6)+2 : PRINT act(6)
760 IF score$ = "3n" THEN LET neu(6) = neu(6)+2 : PRINT neu(6)
761 IF score$ = "3d" THEN LET LOY(6) = LOY(6)+1 : REB(6) = REB(6)+1
    : PRINT loy(6), reb(6)
762 IF score$ = "3ff" THEN LET wit(6) = wit(6)+1 : fig(6) = fig(6)+1
    : PRINT wit(6), fig(6)
763 IF score$ = "3p" THEN LET act(6) = act(6)+1 : neu(6) = neu(6)+1
    : PRINT act(6), wit(6)
770 IF score$ = "3ol" THEN LET loy(7) = loy(7)+2 : PRINT loy(7)
780 IF score$ = "3or" THEN LET reb(7) = reb(7)+2 : PRINT reb(7)
790 IF score$ = "3of" THEN LET fig(7) = fig(7)+2 : PRINT fig(7)
800 IF score$ = "3ow" THEN LET wit(7) = wit(7)+2 : PRINT wit(7)
810 IF score$ = "3oa" THEN LET act(7) = act(7)+2 : PRINT act(7)
820 IF score$ = "3on" THEN LET neu(7) = neu(7)+2 : PRINT neu(7)
821 IF score$ = "3od" THEN LET loy(7) = loy(7)+1 : reb(7) = reb(7)+1
    : PRINT loy(7), reb(7)
822 IF score$ = "3off" THEN LET wit(7) = wit(7)+1 : fig(7) =
    fig(7)+1 : PRINT wit(7), fig(7)
823 IF score$ = "3op" THEN LET act(7) = act(7)+1 : neu(7) = neu(7)+1
    : PRINT act(7), neu(7)
830 IF score$ = "3il" THEN LET loy(8) = loy(8)+2 : PRINT loy(8)
840 IF score$ = "3ir" THEN LET reb(8) = reb(8)+2 : PRINT reb(8)
850 IF score$ = "3if" THEN LET fig(8) = fig(8)+2 : PRINT fig(8)
860 IF score$ = "3iw" THEN LET wit(8) = wit(8)+2 : PRINT wit(8)
870 IF score$ = "3ia" THEN LET act(8) = act(8)+2 : PRINT act(8)
880 IF score$ = "3in" THEN LET neu(8) = neu(8)+2 : PRINT neu(8)
881 IF score$ = "3id" THEN LET loy(8) = loy(8)+1 : reb(8) = reb(8)+1
    : PRINT loy(8), reb(8)
882 IF score$ = "3iff" THEN LET wit(8) = wit(8)+1 : fig(8) =
    fig(8)+1 : PRINT wit(8), fig(8)
883 IF score$ = "3ip" THEN LET act(8) = act(8)+1 : neu(8) = neu(8)+1
    : PRINT act(8), neu(8)
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890 IF score$ = "4l" THEN LET loy(9) = loy(9)+2 : PRINT loy(9)
900 IF score$ = "4r" THEN LET reb(9) = reb(9)+2 : PRINT reb(9)
910 IF score$ = "4f" THEN LET fig(9) = fig(9)+2 : PRINT fig(9)
920 IF score$ = "4w" THEN LET wit(9) = wit(9)+2 : PRINT wit(9)
930 IF score$ = "4a" THEN LET act(9) = act(9)+2 : PRINT act(9)
940 IF score$ = "4n" THEN LET neu(9) = neu(9)+2 : PRINT neu(9)
941 IF score$ = "4d" THEN LET loy(9) = loy(9)+1 : reb(9) = reb(9)+1
    : PRINT loy(9), reb(9)
942 IF score$ = "4ff" THEN LET wit(9) = wit(9)+1 : fig(9) = fig(9)+1
    : PRINT wit(9), fig(9)
943 IF score$ = "4p" THEN LET act(9) = act(9)+1 : neu(9) = neu(9)+1
    : PRINT act(9), neu(9)
950 IF score$ = "4xl" THEN LET loy(10) = loy(10)+2 : PRINT loy(10)
960 IF score$ = "4xr" THEN LET reb(10) = reb(10)+2 : PRINT reb(10)
970 IF score$ = "4xf" THEN LET fig(10) = fig(10)+2 : PRINT fig(10)
980 IF score$ = "4xw" THEN LET wit(10) = wit(10)+2 : PRINT wit(10)
990 IF score$ = "4xa" THEN LET act(10) = act(10)+2 : PRINT act(10)
1000 IF score$ = "4xn" THEN LET neu(10) = neu(10)+2 : PRINT neu(10)
1001 IF score$ = "4xd" THEN LET  loy(10)  =  loy(10)+1  :  reb(10) =
     reb(10)+1 : PRINT loy(10), reb(10)
1002 IF score$ = "4xff" THEN LET wit(10) =  wit(10)+1  :  fig(10)  =
     fig(10)+1 : PRINT wit(10), fig(19)
1003 IF score$ = "4xp" THEN LET act(10)  =  act(10)+1  :  neu(10)  =
     neu(10)+1 : PRINT act(10), neu(10)
1010 IF score$ = "4gl" THEN LET loy(11) = loy(11)+2 : PRINT loy(11)
1020 IF score$ = "4gr" THEN LET reb(11) = reb(11)+2 : PRINT reb(11)
1030 IF score$ = "4gf" THEN LET fig(11) = fig(11)+2 : PRINT fig(11)
1040 IF score$ = "4gw" THEN LET wit(11) = wit(11)+2 : PRINT wit(11)
1050 IF score$ = "4ga" THEN LET act(11) = act(11)+2 : PRINT act(11)
1060 IF score$ = "4gn" THEN LET neu(11) = neu(11)+2 : PRINT neu(11)
1061 IF score$ = "4gd" THEN LET loy(11)  =  loy(11)+1  :  reb(11)  =
     reb(11)+1 : PRINT loy(11), reb(11)
1062 IF score$ = "4gff" THEN LET wit(11) =  wit(11)+1  :  fig(11)  =
     fig(11)+1 : PRINT wit(11), fig(11)
1063 IF score$ = "4gp" THEN LET act(11)  =  act(11)+1  :  neu(11)  =
     neu(11)+1 : PRINT act(11), neu(11)
1070 IF score$ = "4bl" THEN LET loy(12) = loy(12)+2 : PRINT loy(12)
1080 IF score$ = "4br" THEN LET reb(12) = reb(12)+2 : PRINT reb(12)
1090 IF score$ = "4bf" THEN LET fig(12) = fig(12)+2 : PRINT fig(12)
1100 IF score$ = "4bw" THEN LET wit(12) = wit(12)+2 : PRINT wit(12)
1110 IF score$ = "4ba" THEN LET act(12) = act(12)+2 : PRINT act(12)
1120 IF score$ = "4bn" THEN LET neu(12) = neu(12)+2 : PRINT neu(12)
1121 IF score$ = "4bd" THEN LET loy(12)  =  loy(12)+1  :  reb(12)  =
reb(12)+1 : PRINT loy(12), reb(12)
1122 IF score$ = "4bff" THEN LET wit(12) =  wit(12)+1  :  fig(12)  =
fig(12)+1 : PRINT wit(12), fig(12)
1123 IF score$ = "4bp" THEN LET act(12)  =  act(12)+1  :  neu(12)  =
neu(12)+1 : PRINT act(12), neu(12)
1130 IF score$ = "tot" THEN FOR cat = 1  to  12  :  PRINT  !  cat  !
loy(cat), cat ! reb(cat), , cat ! wit(cat), cat ! fig(cat) , , cat !
cat(cat), cat ! neu(cat)
1150 END FOR cat
1160 END PREeat scoring
1170 END DEFine
1280 DATA 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
1290 DATA 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
```

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1300 DATA 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
1310 DATA 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
1320 DATA 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
1340 DATA 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
1350 DATA 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
1360 DATA 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
1370 DATA 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
1380 DATA 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
1390 DATA 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
```

APPENDIX VI

LEVEL OF INFERENCE		BASIC ASSUMPTION	MOVING TOWARD OR MOVING AWAY FROM			
LEVEL 1	Overt reference made to experimenter (E)	DEPENDENCY FIGHT/FLIGHT PAIRING	loyalty fight active	(L) (F) (A)	or rebellion or withdraw or neutral	(R) (W) (N)
LEVEL 2	(NT) Reference to situation with no specific target	DEPENDENCY FIGHT/FLIGHT PAIRING	loyalty fight active	(L) (F) (A)	or rebellion or withdraw or neutral	(R) (W) (N)
	(GM) Expression toward specific group member	DEPENDENCY FIGHT/FLIGHT PAIRING	loyalty fight active	(L) (F) (A)	or rebellion or withdraw or neutral	(R) (W) (N)
	(IP) Emotionality discernable in procedural approach to task	DEPENDENCY FIGHT/FLIGHT PAIRING	loyalty fight active	(L) (F) (A)	or rebellion or withdraw or neutral	(R) (W) (N)
	(IE) Expression toward task/materials	DEPENDENCY FIGHT/FLIGHT PAIRING	loyalty fight active	(L) (F) (A)	or rebellion or withdraw or neutral	(R) (W) (N)
LEVEL 3	(FT) Expression toward theme/character/ aspect of GFS	DEPENDENCY FIGHT/FLIGHT PAIRING	loyalty fight active	(L) (F) (A)	or rebellion or withdraw or neutral	(R) (W) (N)
	(FOT) Expression toward group member's suggested theme/ character/aspect of GFS	DEPENDENCY FIGHT/FLIGHT PAIRING	loyalty fight active	(L) (F) (A)	or rebellion or withdraw or neutral	(R) (W) (N)
	(IT) Identification of self/group with character/aspect of GFS	DEPENDENCY FIGHT/FLIGHT PAIRING	loyalty fight active	(L) (F) (A)	or rebellion or withdraw or neutral	(R) (W) (N)

	(REG) Both E and S-Group present in symbolic equivalents in GFS	DEPENDENCY FIGHT/FLIGHT PAIRING	loyalty fight active	(L) or (F) or (A) or	rebellion withdraw neutral	(R) (W) (N)
	(RE) Only E present as symbolic equivalent in GFS	DEPENDENCY FIGHT/FLIGHT PAIRING	loyalty fight active	(L) or (F) or (A) or	rebellion withdraw neutral	(R) (W) (N)
LEVEL 4	(RG) Only S-group present as symbolic equivalent in GFS	DEPENDENCY FIGHT/FLIGHT PAIRING	loyalty fight active	(L) or (F) or (A) or	rebellion withdraw neutral	(R) (W) (N)
	(BA) Generalised expression of BA atmosphere	DEPENDENCY FIGHT/FLIGHT PAIRING	loyalty fight active	(L) or (F) or (A) or	rebellion withdraw neutral	(R) (W) (N)

APPENDIX VII

The Distribution of the Sexes through the Experimenter-Conditions

	Male Subjects	Female Subjects	Total
Experimenter-Condition E1:	9	7	16
Experimenter-Condition E2:	10	6	16
Experimenter-Condition E3:	8	8	16

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