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THE POLITICS OF LEISURE AND LEISURE
POLICY IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT.

by

Ian P. Henry

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award
of Doctor of Philosophy of the Loughborough University of Technology, 27
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The Politics of Leisure and Leisure Policy in Local Government

Synopsis

The period since 1974, when major reorganisation led to the development of new local government structures in most parts of England and Wales, has seen the growing politicisation of local government activities, and the emergence of leisure policy as a significant concern for local authorities. This thesis examines the implications of party politics at the local level for leisure policy by reviewing expenditure on leisure by all English local authorities, and by undertaking a case study of the development of leisure policy in a Metropolitan District.

The analysis of leisure expenditure seeks to identify whether significant differences exist in the net revenue investment on leisure services by local authorities controlled by different party groups and with different histories of political control. Regression analysis is the principal technique employed for this purpose.

The case study of a Metropolitan District involves analysis of qualitative data derived from interviews conducted with a sample of councillors and officers drawn from a range of committees and departments of the local authority. In addition an analysis is also undertaken of one area of leisure policy making, that of grant aid to voluntary organisations, identifying policy 'outcomes' and comparing them with the expressed intentions of those involved in the decision-making process, and with formal statements of council policy.

The findings of the statistical analysis suggest significant differences in the relationship between indicators of leisure need and net revenue investment in leisure services for Labour and Conservative controlled Metropolitan Districts. However the case study highlights the fact that, in at least one Metropolitan District, intra-party differences on leisure policy may, in some instances, be as significant as those between parties, while the analysis of leisure spending for all authorities indicates relatively little difference in the response to

indicators of local need between authorities of different political hues in Non-metropolitan Districts and Counties. The qualitative case study material also highlights the importance of understanding the values, structure and relative influence of member and officer groups if one is to explain the emergence of specific leisure policies at particular times.

The difficulties experienced by local government in the last decade have brought pressure for further change in local government structures and policy practices. The final chapter therefore reviews the implications for leisure policy of alternative models of local government and seeks to explain the consonance or dissonance between particular policy orientations identified in the empirical analysis and these models which constitute alternative futures for local government.

Acknowledgements

To express with sincerity the debts of gratitude one owes in the clichéd context of formal acknowledgement is perhaps one of the more difficult tasks which this thesis sets. Yet I am thankful for the opportunity to express publicly the gratitude I will acknowledge, or have acknowledged, privately to the many individuals who have contributed to the research reported in this thesis.

My first debt is to Dr. Sue Glyptis whose critical judgement, conscientiousness, and unfailing good humour have proved a constant source of support and encouragement throughout the research. Both personally and professionally I regard myself as fortunate to have had the benefit of her expertise and sensitive direction as a research supervisor.

The research reported here was undertaken while I was a member of the Leisure Studies staff within the Community Studies Department of Ilkley College, and subsequently the Applied and Community Studies Department of Bradford and Ilkley Community College. In these contexts I have benefited from the intensity and quality of academic debate both within the Department(s) and more particularly within the Leisure Studies staff group. While I wish to acknowledge my gratitude to all those colleagues who have fostered a positive environment for research, I would like to place on record my particular thanks to Peter Bramham and Les Haywood, who may after five years have tired of discussion of my own particular research interests and problems but who have had the good grace never to have shown it. I have great respect for both the quality of their advice and the invariably modest manner in which it was delivered.

Much of the empirical analysis draws on interviews given by councillors, officers, or members of voluntary organisations. In some cases these interviews took place over two visits and took a number of hours. Without the willingness of interviewees to cooperate, with little immediate reward, this research would have been impossible. It is my hope that this research will contribute to an improved understanding of the leisure policy process, and that the policy community will therefore ultimately benefit in some way.

However the sacrifices of time and effort on the part of the interviewees were made without thought of reward and I am grateful to them.

I also wish to acknowledge the support of my employers, Ilkley College and subsequently Bradford and Ilkley Community College for this research in the form of payment of registration fees and release from teaching duties to complete the writing up of this thesis.

Finally, and most significantly, I wish to thank my family for the support and encouragement they have provided. It has become less than fashionable (for good reason) to thank one's spouse for unpaid additional domestic labour. However it is obvious that part-time research undertaken largely alongside a full-time job means that some sacrifices have to be made. I wish to acknowledge that most of those sacrifices have not been mine. In addition to her unflagging enthusiasm my wife, Carol, has relieved me of all but the enjoyable features of child care and domestic responsibilities for the best part of five years. I hope to be able to redress this imbalance. To our children, Alasdair and James, we owe our sense of perspective. The former was conceived at the same time as the research project, the arrival of the latter preempted the beginning of empirical investigation. They have together conspired to remind us that in many respects such research is unimportant.

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**PART 1: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS
OF POLITICS AND POLICY IN LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LEISURE SERVICES**

Chapter 1: The Politics of Leisure and Leisure Policy: a brief overview

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the leisure studies literature of the 1970's which dealt with leisure in the public sector, is the absence of substantive analysis of the political dimension of leisure policy (e.g. Travis 1979; Blackie et al. 1979). If anything this is even more marked in the material relating to leisure policy in local government (e.g. Dower et. al. 1979; Lewes and Mennell 1976; Veal 1979). However, in the politically charged atmosphere of the 1980's, it would be difficult to focus on any aspect of public policy without giving full consideration to the role and influence of inter and intra-party politics. The domination of national politics in the 1980's by an ideologically inspired leadership in the Conservative Party, and its attempts to control public expenditure, have been key factors in the politicisation of the national scene. Much of the energy of the Conservative administration has been concentrated in attempts to control local government expenditure, with the introduction of spending penalties (in the Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980), and rate-capping (in the Local Government Finance Act 1982) reflecting increasing tension between local authorities and central government. Since public sector leisure services are predominantly funded by local government, they have inevitably been drawn into the political arena. However, it is not simply that leisure has become politicised because leisure services have been subject to financial cuts. Cultural policy and cultural activities have been used to promote political goals, for example by the G.L.C. in its Fare's Fair programme and other campaigns (Bianchini 1987), in the Labour Party's use of Red Wedge, a group of performers who aim to cultivate the youth vote, and in the socialist inspired 'Rock Against Racism' campaign. In contemporary Britain, leisure as an issue, and specifically public sector leisure services are on the political agenda, even though this may be seen as a matter of regret by some politicians.

1.2 DEFINING KEY TERMS: 'POLITICS', 'POLICY', AND 'LEISURE'.

In order to clarify the nature of the approach to be adopted in this thesis some preliminary points should be made about the interpretation and extension of key terms employed in the analysis, specifically 'politics', 'policy' and 'leisure'. The study focuses specifically on 'the politics of government and the consequences for leisure policy', rather than on 'the politics of society and the consequences for leisure policy' (though clearly there is considerable overlap between these approaches). This is not to deny that political activity, the exercise of cooperation and control in the distribution of resources (Leftwich 1983), takes place in areas of social life other than government (e.g. sexual politics, the politics of the family, organisational politics etc.) but rather defines the starting point for this analysis and an element in the rationale for the areas investigated.

The concept of policy employed in this study follows the injunction of Goldsmith (1980) that it should "include all actions of governments, not just stated intentions as well as an understanding of why governments sometimes choose to do nothing about a particular question" (p.22). Analysis of public policy which deals solely with the policy statements or intentions of politicians or officials will fail to address a number of important questions relating to, for example, the unintended consequences of policies adopted, the policies rejected, the process of selection of policy options for consideration, and the related question of 'non-decisions'.

Lowi (1972) outlines four types or categories of public policy; distributive policies - benefitting all or most citizens indiscriminately; redistributive policies - generally favouring a segment of the population at the cost of other segments; constituent policies - which define procedures in a democratic society such as election laws; and finally, regulative policies - controlling the behaviour of members of the community. Leisure policies take predominantly one of three forms. They may be intended to be distributive, as for example in the funding of sports to foster morale through national success, or redistributive, in leisure provision aimed at particular groups or geographical areas, such as leisure for the unemployed. Finally, they may be regulative, in

for instance, the banning of the use of recreational drugs. Local government leisure policy, however, tends to be involved primarily with redistributive and distributive policies, and analysis will be concentrated predominantly on the construction (or failure to construct) these kinds of policy. This is not to say that regulative policies are not developed within the local state, but simply reflects the focus of this study which is not on policing, planning or other regulative frameworks that generally fall outwith the boundaries of local government leisure services.

Following in the recent tradition of policy analysis, this thesis ranges over the disciplinary boundaries of mainstream politics, sociology, and economics. A number of typologies of policy analysis have emerged over the last decade attempting to conceptualise the wider range of studies which policy analysis should incorporate (cf. Hogwood and Gunn 1981; Breton 1977). Perhaps the most influential of these has been that of Gordon, Lewis and Young (1977) who employed the five-fold typology illustrated in figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1 Typology of Approaches to Policy Analysis (after Gordon, Lewis and Young 1977)

Analysis for Policy =====			Analysis of Policy	
Policy Advocacy	Information for Policy	Policy Monitoring and Evaluation	Analysis of Policy Determination	Analysis of Policy Content

Although the description of categories of analysis as falling along a continuum is somewhat misleading, the characterisation of a range of approaches to analysis serves to illustrate the different foci which might be adopted in any given study. The distinction between analysis *for* policy, and analysis *of* policy, is not necessarily substantive in that many policy studies incorporate both forms of analysis. Nevertheless the distinction represents a useful heuristic device, and highlights the point which has been made elsewhere (Henry 1984 d) that since most leisure policy analysis is funded by policy-

making bodies such as the leisure quangos, research effort has invariably been concentrated in the area of analysis for policy.

The primary concerns of this study are, however, with 'analysis of policy content' and 'analysis of policy determination' in local government leisure services. Issues which are typical of the former include for example, clarifying the relationship between policy goals and political or professional values, identifying the consequences of organisational context for the content of leisure policies, or establishing the interests served by different types of leisure policy. The 'analysis of policy determination' encompasses a different but related set of issues, such as, identification of how policy statements are (or are not) translated into policy outcomes, investigation of the way interests are fostered or suppressed in the policy process, or identification of the individuals or groups which exert most influence in the policy process. Such approaches to policy analysis generated knowledge of the policy process (rather than applying knowledge in the process) but the insights gained from these approaches will have practical implications for those responsible for policy development.

In summary then, the analysis of leisure policy developed in this study draws on a broad characterisation of policy as the actions of government. The study focuses predominantly on redistributive and distributive policies, and is concerned principally with the analysis of the content of such policies, and the way in which those policies are determined in local government settings.

One final definitional point should be made about the meanings of the term 'leisure' to be employed in this context. The literature abounds with attempts to define the essential features of leisure (cf. Kaplan 1975; Murphy 1981; Neulinger 1974; Parker 1971; Roberts 1978; Shivers 1981) which invariably report the difficulty of providing definitions that incorporate all that is 'leisure' while excluding all that is not. Leisure is defined in terms of 'residual time', or of its 'function' (typically in opposition to work), in terms of its 'content' (leisure activities), or as an 'ideal state of mind'. Many of these authors follow the approach of Kaplan in adopting a composite definition

which incorporates aspects of the time / function / content / state of mind approaches.

Leisure ... consists of relatively self determined activity / experience that falls into one's economically free-time roles, that is seen as leisure by participants, that is psychologically pleasant in anticipation or recollection, that potentially covers the whole range of commitment and intensity, that contains characteristic norms and constraints, and that provides opportunities for recreation, personal growth, and service to others.

(Kaplan 1975: p. 26)

Clearly virtually no application of the term leisure incorporates all elements of this definition, and therefore the constituent elements of the definition cannot be said to constitute *necessary conditions* for the application of the term leisure. However such elements can be regarded as *sufficient conditions* for the application of the term. We can explain this more clearly by reference to the philosophy of language, and specifically to Wittgenstein's theory of meaning.

Wittgenstein (1970) points out that definitions are rarely coextensive with their objects, that is the definition of a term cannot necessarily be substituted for its object on all (or even most) occasions. This point may be illustrated if we think of a definition even for a simple physical object such as a 'curtain' and then attempt to replace the term with the derived definition in all occurrences, e.g. 'shower curtain', 'iron curtain' etc. The problem is usually compounded when the term to be defined represents an 'intangible', rather than a physical object. There may be exceptions to this rule, for instance defining a bachelor as 'an unmarried man', but it is rare for the meaning of a term be captured in a single inclusive definition. This state of affairs leaves us with something of a conundrum. If we cannot capture the meaning of a term in a single inclusive definition, how can we communicate meaningfully? In response to this problem Wittgenstein argues that the use of a term is like a rope with overlapping fibres (or interrelated meanings). No single fibre runs through the rope as a whole; a cross-section of the rope at

any two given points may well reveal completely distinct sets of fibres which are only connected by intermediate strands. However we are still able to identify the two distinct cross-sections as part of the same rope by reference to those intermediate strands. He uses another analogy, that of 'family resemblance' to make the point. Members of a family may share similarly distinctive features e.g. the hair line, the shape of the nose and other facial and physical features. We recognise any two individuals as members of a particular family by their possession of such family traits, despite the fact that they may not share any single given family feature (one may have the distinctive family hairline and eyes close together, the other the family nose and protruding ears). The point is that we are able to classify individuals as members of the same family, even though they may not share the same features of that family. Thus it is with our recognition of the meanings of terms. Most terms will convey slightly different meanings in different contexts, drawing in different ways on the 'family' of nuances, or characteristics for which it stands.

There are perhaps three major implications of this explanation of the nature of meaning for our use of the term leisure in the context of this study. The first is a recognition that leisure policy will imply slightly different emphases in different contexts, and that we should therefore specify the family of applications of the term we wish to adopt. Thus leisure policy may be associated with policies for free time, for passive or active recreations (in sport, the arts, popular culture, or informal recreation), or with policies aimed at compensating for the alienation of work (or of unemployment), or at fostering personal fulfilment through non-work activities. The second implication is that there may well be overlap with the application of other terms such as 'education' or 'education policy' in certain contexts, but our definitions should not seek to exclude all that is not leisure. It is quite legitimate for individuals to be members of more than one family. Finally it should be recognised that different theoretical positions imply emphasis on different family features of the same term. Thus structural marxist explanations emphasise the key feature of leisure as its function in providing relief from the alienation of work or non-work, while conservative theorists, arguing for the separation of cultural life from the material concerns of

existence, stress the notion of leisure as non-utilitarian activity, or as a state of mind. Such treatments of the concept of leisure must inevitably be partial.

1.3 ANALYSING LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEISURE POLICY: THE STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

There are four parts or stages to the analysis represented in this study. Part one introduces the framework to be employed in the analysis of local government leisure policy and consists of the first two chapters. This introductory chapter, in addition to clarifying key terms and concepts seeks to locate the analysis within the literature relating to the politics of leisure, and to identify the some theoretical premises of the study by reference to explanations of the nature of the local state. Chapter two deals with generic methodological issues which recur throughout the study, and seeks to explain the interrelationship between the quantitative and qualitative analyses adopted in different facets of the empirical research.

Part two consists of a single chapter which focuses on the ideological context of leisure policy, in order to clarify the nature of the relationship between the sets of values which represent the dominant ideologies of contemporary British politics, and leisure policy goals.

Part three of this study contains the analysis of empirical research into the dynamics of local government leisure policy-making. The first chapter in the section develops an analysis of local government leisure expenditure, and seeks to identify whether significant differences exist in the net revenue investment on leisure services by local authorities controlled by different party groups and with different histories of political control. Regression analysis is the principal technique employed for this purpose. Chapters five and six develop a case study of a Metropolitan District involving analysis of qualitative data derived from interviews with a sample of councillors and officers drawn from a range of committees and departments of the local authority. In addition, the final chapter in this section focuses on one specific area of leisure policy-making, that of grant aid to voluntary organisations, identifying policy

'outcomes' and comparing them with the expressed intentions of those involved in the decision-making process, and with formal statements of council policy.

The difficulties experienced by local government in the last decade have brought pressure for further change in structures and practices, not simply for leisure services but for local government as a whole. The final section, therefore, reviews the implications for leisure policy of alternative models of local government.

1.4 THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE STUDY TO THE 'POLITICS OF LEISURE' LITERATURE.

There is a great deal of leisure studies material which has implications for political practice, and similarly much material in the field of politics has consequences for leisure policy. Many of these contributions to the literature will be reviewed or drawn upon in ensuing chapters. However, this section will be primarily concerned with the relationship of the present study to literature which explicitly addresses issues in the politics of government and leisure policy. The framework adopted for this purpose is illustrated in figure 1.2, and employs four main headings, political philosophy, structures, process and outcomes. Studies of leisure politics and policy will frequently range across these headings, however the headings are intended to indicate the primary (rather than the exclusive) focus of the material discussed.

Figure 1.2 The Politics of Leisure

<u>POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY</u>	<u>POLITICAL STRUCTURE</u>	<u>POLITICAL PROCESS</u>	<u>POLITICAL OUTCOMES</u>
<i>Discussion of values / ideologies underpinning leisure goals.</i>	<i>Normative accounts of government structures & their operation in the leisure field.</i>	<i>Empirical/analytical accounts of the formal structure in operation.</i>	<i>Analysis of leisure policy outcomes in different political contexts.</i>

(a) Political Philosophy and Leisure Policy

There are two major types of contribution to the literature which fall under this heading. The first relates to material which promotes particular policy programmes based on favoured political values, and which usually takes the form of party political manifestos and party policy documents, or policy programmes advocated by individual commentators adopting a particular value stance. The second type of contribution involves the analysis of the relationship between political values and policy goals. In other words, the first type of contribution derives from the field of political practice, the second from the field of political analysis.

The interest of political parties in leisure policy has been spasmodic, and has related, perhaps disproportionately, to the arts (viz Central Office of Information 1975; Conservative Political Centre 1962, 1978; Elsom 1978; Labour Party 1975, 1977, 1986; Liberal Party 1981, 1986; Office of Arts and Libraries 1980; Social Democratic Party 1986; Thomas 1967; Treasury 1958; Wesker 1960 a & b). The thrust of most of the party policy statements in the post-war period up to the late 1960's is broadly consensual. For example the Labour Party policy document *Leisure for Living* was able to claim that

the principle that public money ought to be spent in encouraging the arts, and in providing for many kinds of recreation is *universally accepted*.

(Labour Party 1959: p. 7; my emphasis)

Furthermore, the notion of the 'insulation' of leisure from the political sphere, an argument most commonly associated with traditional Conservatism, is also evident in the Labour Party document in its outright rejection of a Ministry for Sport, and its contention that "public support for the arts should not be an issue for party politics" (p.4).

There are, nevertheless, certain nuances which distinguish particular party political stances, even during this period of policy consensus. Amery provides an example of Tory paternalism in a post war election manifesto.

Last but not least, in any scheme of social policy comes the problem of the right opportunities for leisure. To guide and elevate the pleasure of the people, to enrich their lives, as well as to increase their livelihood, is surely not outside the duties of an enlightened state.

(Amery 1945: p. 20)

This paternalistic note is echoed in the Conservative policy document *The Challenge of Leisure*.

it is the state's clear duty to encourage the true leisure of the subject, as it has for long been its duty to ensure his liberty for leisure. For leisure, wrongly used, especially by young people, constitutes a real threat to society

(Kerr et al. 1959: pp. 7/8)

The growing concern of the Labour Party to ensure access to the arts (DES 1965), to the countryside (DOE 1966) and to recreation generally (DOE 1975) is paralleled by the Conservative concern with the costs of failing to provide such access.

Quite suddenly, all around the world, governments are at work on policies to reshape the environment and to put new life into the arts. Their enthusiasm has behind it a compelling thrust. It arises from the experience common to them all of awkward, discontented individuals and minorities within their societies, who are showing themselves bored, sulking, frustrated or angry at the unexpected inhumanities of the technological revolution. And these governments are trying, for the sake of social harmony, to do what we said we would do in our election manifesto, to raise the quality of life.

(Eccles 1970: p. 5)

Such concerns may mean emphasis both on particular target groups (rather than sport for all) and on particular activities, as the then Shadow Minister for Sport, Hector Monro argued.

There has recently been an upsurge of interest in physical combat sports. The spread of judo, wrestling and fencing is helping to channel the energy and frustration which often cause teenage delinquency in our larger towns and cities. I am convinced that much of the problem of soccer hooliganism could be alleviated if, through schools, youth clubs and football clubs themselves, we can encourage bored and aggressive youngsters to take up sport.

(Monro 1974: p. 1)

By the second half of the decade, Conservative policy documents and advisers had shifted their emphasis from state intervention to private patronage, business sponsorship and voluntary effort (Monro 1977, Brough 1978, Selsdon Group 1978). Meanwhile discontent with aspects of state intervention in the leisure field was also evident in the Labour Party (Labour Party 1978, 1986), and among its supporters (TUC 1977, 1980; Whannel 1983) and among Liberals (Liberal Party 1981). However this concern took the form of advocating, not the rejection of state intervention, but its reshaping to facilitate participation and to ensure the relevance of service provision to those seen as most in need.

The relationship between leisure policy and political philosophy is the subject matter of chapter 3, which develops earlier discussions in Henry (1984 a, b, c) and Bramham and Henry (1985). However, analysis of political philosophy (rather than its practical application in policy advocacy) is relatively underdeveloped in the leisure studies field. Hargreaves (1985) locates an explanation of shifts in leisure policy within the context of hegemonic struggle, with new policy orientations reflecting the emergent dominance of 'authoritarian populism' (popular support for a strongly centralist, libertarian, nationalistic politics) over the mild reformism of post-war 'social democracy'. Butterfield (1984) also discusses the implications of New Right politics for leisure policy, while Tomlinson (1984) reviews the Labour Party's 1983 election manifesto, seeking to identify the main features of Labour's leisure policy programme. The sparsity of British literature on leisure is in part explained by Hoberman (1984) in his wide ranging discussion

of ideologies of sport in a variety of political systems. Hoberman draws most of his examples relating to liberal democracies from continental Europe, arguing that in the United States and Great Britain the ideology of sport as apolitical is so strong that it has resulted in relatively little discussion of sport and political values. The current politicisation of government and social and economic policy seems likely to foster discussion of ideological issues in a range of policy areas including sport and leisure.

(b) Political Structures: Normative Accounts of the State Framework for Leisure Policy

Until relatively recently one of the difficulties associated with conducting research in the politics of leisure has been the generally hazy picture of the complex formal system of governmental responsibilities for leisure which was available to researchers. This problem has in part been overcome by the Sports Council / E.S.R.C. studies by Blackie et al. (1979) and Travis (1979) which set out to trace the history and structure of governmental responsibilities for leisure. These studies share, however, a limiting feature in that they adopt a predominantly managerialist perspective, focusing on 'technical', 'rational' managerial solutions to identified problems within the system of provision. One of the principal shortcomings of such a perspective is that interests which may be incompatible with those of the policy maker tend to be discounted.

The lodging of responsibility for public sector leisure services with local government was a function of the traditional view of leisure and indeed local administration as largely outside the political sphere. Similarly the establishment of the quasi-autonomous Sports and Arts Councils reflected the view of leisure as apolitical, to be dealt with by government at arm's length. The emergence of comprehensive leisure services departments in local government in the 1970's was a function of the economies of scale anticipated from large organisational units at local level (Bains 1972, Redcliffe-Maud 1969). Such units, it was argued, would by dint of their size, resources and responsibilities, attract better qualified staff, be able to address large-scale

problems (especially in the inner city), and would adopt a more policy-oriented (rather than ad hoc) approach to service provision. Recent critiques in particular by the New Right but also by other groups have led to a questioning of the wisdom of this rationale for the structure of governmental responsibilities. Both leisure quangos and local government have been subject to attack as too costly to be supported by Britain's ailing economy (Bacon and Eltis 1978), as dominated by budget maximising bureaucrats (Holland 1982), and as failing to represent working class interests (Whannel 1983). Discussion of these critiques is taken up in chapter 3.

Concern about the effects of an increasingly hostile environment on local government prompted the local authority associations to commission a review of the future of local government by the Institute of Local Government Studies at Birmingham University in 1985. This has resulted in a series of studies reviewing different service areas in local government and those for leisure services are summarised in Bennington and White (1986). A discussion of alternative strategies and structures for local government and their consequences for leisure services provides the subject matter for the final chapter of this study.

(c) Political Process: analysis of the political framework in operation.

Detailed empirical studies of the political process in action are remarkably rare in the leisure field. This is in part attributable to the difficulty of gaining access to data which allows the researcher to go beyond mere description of the formal organisational structure and responsibilities. Hutchinson (1982) in his insightful account *The Politics of the Arts Council*, provides an exception. This analysis of how key individuals and interest groups influence the policy direction of a national organisation was made possible only by Hutchinson's privileged access to information as an employee of that organisation. By contrast, Hargreaves's (1984) explanation of policy development in the Sports Council does not constitute an insider account. It draws on an analysis of the make-up of the Council over time (illustrating the lack of representation for working class or black people, women or those

reflecting the interests of non-élite sportsmen and women) and argues that the role of Sports Council policy is one of legitimization, reproducing competitive individualism, achievement orientation, national identity and other salient values in 'Thatcherite Britain'.

Most of the public funds spent on leisure in Britain are disbursed by local government and yet only three detailed case studies of local government in action in the leisure field exist. The earliest of these, by Lewes and Mennell (1976), was already dated by the late 1970's since it investigates local government prior to the major reorganisation of 1974, and was undertaken at a time of considerable inter-party political consensus and during a period of planned expansion of public sector spending. A later study by Dower et al (1981) was a product of research undertaken in a London Borough in the period 1977-9. Even since this period the public sector financial squeeze has taken far greater effect, with the consequently increasing difficulty of dealing with political (resource allocation) leisure issues. In both these case studies it is argued that party politics played little part in the shaping of leisure policy. The study by Coalter et al (1986) however, sought to highlight any such differences by reviewing policy in three local authorities, one Labour controlled, one 'Independent' controlled, and the third a Conservative administration. This study employs interview data primarily to illustrate different political and professional attitudes to leisure policy, rather than to evaluate how such policy might be affected by these ideological differences. Interviews were undertaken predominantly with officers in key positions and with front bench politicians, so that the full range of political perspectives on leisure policy was not sought.

The case study of local government policy-making within a metropolitan district described in chapters four and five seeks to clarify the process by which leisure policy is mediated by politicians and professionals. The fieldwork for this study was undertaken in the period 1983-1985, and therefore covers a period of intensification of the squeeze on local government expenditures. Given this context, the problems of the process of deciding spending priorities were particularly acute, and served to some extent to highlight inter and intra-party political differences.

Whitsun's (1984) advocacy of the alignment of leisure professionals with dispossessed consumers of public sector services is unusual in that it explores links between leisure issues and analysis of struggles relating to collective consumption, and because it recognises the pivotal role of professionals in the leisure policy process. Another paper, an analysis of the development of community recreation (and community policing) policy, promotes the argument that 'policy fashions' may be shaped by professional networks, but that implementation at grass roots level may be a stronger influence on actual policy outputs (Henry and Bramham 1986). However, with the exception of Coalter's discussion of different concepts of professionalism and value sets among local government professionals, little empirical work has focused on the professional's role in leisure policy.

(d) Political Outcomes

While considerable research effort has been made to evaluate some leisure policy outcomes, with the plethora of user surveys and other forms of monitoring and evaluation which have been undertaken, there is a significant gap in the literature in terms of the identification of party political differences in policy outputs. There are a number of output studies relating to local government policy areas other than leisure, and some which deal in passing, with aspects of leisure services such as parks and libraries (viz Sharpe and Newton 1984; Boaden 1971), though these relate to local government prior to reorganisation. One British study which does focus on local government policy outputs in sport and recreation by Gratton (1984) does not attempt to evaluate differences between authorities of differing political complexions. Chapter four of this study therefore seeks to remedy this omission in evaluating the evidence for the existence of significant differences in the spending patterns of local authorities controlled by the two major parties.

1.5 LEISURE, THE LOCAL STATE AND SOCIAL THEORY

While the preceding discussion of the politics of leisure indicates the range

of the material in this field, it does not consider the theoretical context of the research. The major theoretical developments in understanding the nature of local policy-making, and of the local and national state, have taken place in the mainstream urban politics literature, though clearly there are important implications for analysis of local authority leisure policy. It is important therefore that the empirical work which follows should be located in relation to these developments.

The development of explanations of the local state has been accelerated in recent years by the fiscal crises of western economies, and the pressures experienced by local governments particularly since the middle 1970's. The received wisdom of local government as a neutral vehicle for local administration (which still features, though with less emphasis, in some texts for administrators cf. Lloyd 1985) was underpinned by the assumptions of democratic pluralism. These included the notion of free competition between interest groups across a range of issues, with local political parties representing shifting alliances of such interest groups in the political process. The classic statement of local pluralism is Dahl's (1961) analysis of politics in New Haven which examines a range of issues or decisions, and describes how no single interest group is able to dominate all such decisions. Although not all groups have equal access to resources, the nature of the local political process means that where an issue is sufficiently important to a group greater efforts may be made to lobby decision-makers and mobilise public opinion so that the desired outcome may be achieved by pressure politics. The principal role of the local state then in such an explanation, is one of ensuring that interest groups have a forum for expressing their preferences. State intervention in the form of social provision is restricted to those instances where a consensus exists supporting such intervention. These instances are likely to be rare and the democratic pluralist argument therefore implies a minimalist approach to state intervention in general and leisure provision specifically.

This analysis is consistent with Roberts' (1978) account of leisure participation as reflecting a fragmented pattern of 'taste publics'. The state

should, he argues, therefore avoid positive involvement in leisure provision, limiting itself to generating the conditions under which individuals and groups may meet their own needs. However where a consensus supporting state involvement does exist (perhaps for example in promotion of national fitness or conservation of art forms) or where the market operates inefficiently, the state may step in. Nevertheless, such state involvement is insulated from the competition of interest groups by employing 'neutral', 'technical' experts often in quangos, such as the Arts and Sports Councils, to make decisions about the precise nature of resource allocation.

A number of difficulties with the premises of the pluralist argument have seriously undermined this explanation. It is by no means clear for example that local political parties are responsive to local pressures. As Dunleavy (1980) has illustrated, the majority of local politicians represent 'safe' council seats, and, as Newton (1976) points out, voting patterns in local elections tend to reflect the popularity of the national parties rather than be influenced by local events. Local politicians are largely, therefore, insulated against local opinion and may not be 'penalised' for ignoring local pressure groups. Furthermore, the pluralist explanation of local policy ignores the pivotal role played by 'urban managers' (Pahl 1977) or local state bureaucrats in the setting of the policy agenda. Decision making and non-decision making occurs within the bureaucratic structures of public sector bodies which are even more insulated from public opinion than local politicians. Thus, as Bachrach and Baratz (1970) have illustrated, local bureaucrats are able to influence significantly the local political agenda, filtering out undesired policy options, and defining 'responsible' interest groups, and as such they are crucial gate-keepers, controlling access to public services. Pahl's analysis largely draws on examples from the field of housing and has been employed in the analysis of urban planning, but the establishment of the new, large leisure services departments since 1974, and the professionalisation of leisure services has given leisure professionals greater access to resources, the opportunity to influence corporate planning, and has helped to develop a degree of autonomy in defining leisure needs. Such a situation invites analysis of leisure officers' influence on resource allocation decisions.

Marxist critiques of the pluralist and urban managerialist explanations of the local state point to their failure to locate the activities of interest groups and urban managers in the context of the structural demands of capitalism. Perhaps the most influential marxist account of this type, was developed by Castells (1976), who explains the crisis of the local state as a consequence of its contradictory functions, meeting the long term needs of capital while responding to working class demands (expressed through urban movements) for increased social expenditure. In seeking to sustain an increasing rate of profit, capital has traditionally socialised the costs of reproduction of labour power, with education, health, housing and even leisure provision becoming responsibilities of the state. However, as the rate of profit falls, capital seeks to reduce costs by pressing for lower taxation, while working class demands for social expenditure increase. Thus the costs of 'collective consumption' exceed revenues, and this basic contradiction of capitalism manifests itself in the form of struggles around consumption issues, many of which directly involve local government.

This type of explanation of the welfare state (and of the role of the local state) has significant implications for leisure policy. If collective consumption is to be cut back, one might expect leisure to be one of the first service areas to suffer since resistance to cuts seems likely to be keenest in more 'basic' service areas such as health, housing, and education. However as social expenditure is reduced, social expenses may accrue with the need to secure public order in the face of resistance to cuts. Such social expenses may take the form of policing, vandalism repair, or even 'preventative recreation'. Opposition to the cuts may foster new alliances, for instance between local state professionals and client groups (viz Whitsun 1984), generating urban movements.

There are a number of problems with the structural analysis of Castells and other functionalist marxist accounts of the local state (e.g. Cockburn 1977). Perhaps the two most important of these are the *circularity* implied in such functionalist explanations, and the '*problem of specificity*'. Any forms of state intervention which might appear to benefit working class interests, such as the development of welfare services, are explained in the marxist account as

representing, in the final analysis, the interests of capital by buying off working class opposition to capital accumulation. However, such an argument will not allow of any realistic example of the state acting against the interests of capital. The conclusions of such marxist analysis are therefore built into the premises which underpin any empirical work in this field. The tautological nature of the argument and the impossibility of describing a state of affairs in which the state acts against the interests of capital serve, therefore, to devalue the marxist account. However even if the circularity of this argument is ignored, the functionalist account explains state activity only by reference to general principles, such as the need to reproduce labour power, and fails to explain how and why particular policies arise at particular points in time. Yet such explanation of detail must be a criterion of the adequacy of social theory, and in this sense also the marxist explanation is inadequate.

The shortcomings of structural marxist analysis of the local state as an undifferentiated element in a functional whole, has led Saunders (1984) to develop the 'dual state thesis'. The local tier of government is regarded in this thesis as performing different and often conflicting functions to those of central government. According to this account the allocation of responsibilities for various functions to different tiers of government represents the way in which the state manages to accommodate such conflicts. Saunders describes four key tensions in government activity, the need for centralized control of the economy, and for self determination on the part of communities; the maintenance of production, and the management of social consumption; the need for rational planning and the requirement of democratic accountability; the need to maintain profit while meeting needs. In each case the first item in each pair is the responsibility of central government while the second is undertaken by local government. Thus Saunders describes the operation of local government as essentially pluralist and concerned with consumption issues while central government is essentially corporatist in the way that it operates and is predominantly concerned with production.

Not only does Saunders wish to argue that the local state should be differentiated from the central state in its operation, he also argues that consumption issues should not be seen as a function of class membership.

Class is not the be all and end all of politics and people's class interests, determined by their location in the social division of labour, do not exhaust the range of their material interests. On some issues - incomes policies, unemployment, trades union reform and so on - they will act as members of a particular class, but on others they will act according to their sectoral interests as determined by their particular mode of consuming the service in question. At the local level, where government activity is addressed primarily to provision of consumption, most political mobilisation will occur around such sectoral as opposed to class cleavages.

(Saunders 1984: pp. 32-3)

There are problems for this explanation of the operation of the local state. It should be noted for example, that some production issues (e.g. highways) are the responsibility of local government, while control of some consumption services is spread across more than one tier (e.g. the National Health Service). However, the separation of production and consumption functions between different tiers of government might perhaps be regarded as an organising tendency which will admit of some exceptions. A potentially more serious objection is produced by Dunleavy (1984) who argues that, if the operation of local government were indeed best characterised as pluralist, one would expect to find a great variation in the level, quality, and variety of consumption policies across local authorities. However, what is striking about such consumption policies is their uniformity in apparently disparate settings.

Policy determination in local authorities does not respond in any simple way to local political inputs. Rather policy over very large areas seems dominated by professionally promoted 'fashions' which are nationally produced and adapted with little variation from one local authority to another.

(Dunleavy 1984: pp. 78-9)

Thus for Dunleavy, the major difficulty with the dual state thesis is its failure to acknowledge the pivotal role of the public sector professional in influencing policy.

A major feature of the appeal of the dual-state thesis is that it eschews description of the state as a monolith, seeking to capture the differential operation of the state machinery at different levels of government without collapsing into atheoretical, anecdotal accounts. It should be said in defense of Saunders' argument that he promotes a thesis, rather than a theory. The significance of this distinction is that the thesis invites disconfirmation or support from empirical investigation rather than simply 'explaining' the phenomenon in question. Dunleavy's major objection to the thesis, the characterisation of local policy-making as professionally dominated, is a potentially serious problem, but it also is open to evaluation in the light of empirical studies. Thus the dual state thesis offers a useful organising framework for considering the analysis of local government leisure policy. Each of the four dimensions of the dual state thesis along which the local and the central state are differentiated highlights strategic issues for research into local government leisure policy.

(a) *The Organisational Dimension:* the key tension here is between the need for centralised direction and for local self determination. A strategic concern, therefore, for leisure policy research is establishing the extent to which leisure policy is subject to non-local influences such as central government 'advice' or restrictions?

(b) *The Functional Dimension:* the functional division between central and local government is such that the former is allocated responsibility for production while the latter is predominantly responsible for consumption services. Here the strategic concern for leisure policy research is one of clarifying whether there are important exceptions to this functional division in respect of leisure production and consumption.

(c) *The Political Dimension:* the key political tension identified by the dual state thesis is between the corporate mode of decision making at the national level and the competitive politics of the local state - rational planning requires the incorporation or exclusion of conflicting parties while democratic accountability implies open access to participation in the political process. The primary issue for analysis of leisure policy is the question of whether the politics of local government leisure policy can be accurately characterised as pluralist?

(d) *The Ideological Dimension:* the key tension here is between central government's function in promoting conditions for the accumulation of profit, and local government's role in meeting local 'needs'. The major concern for leisure policy analysis is one of establishing whether the local politics of leisure are concerned solely with the meeting of needs, while the politics of leisure in the central state are concerned predominantly with providing an appropriate infrastructure for capital accumulation.

Thus although the primary emphasis of this study is on investigation of the political dimension of leisure and local government, the dual state thesis serves to underline that political questions cannot be considered in isolation from other dimensions of local government, specifically the organisational, functional and ideological dimensions of the local state. The review of the empirical investigation of local government in section three of this study, therefore, considers the implications of the research findings in the context of the dual state thesis as a whole, rather than simply for its characterisation of local politics.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1.

' The term 'cultural policy' is used in the literature with two principal meanings. One is broadly synonymous with 'policy for the arts', the other has a wider connotation of 'leisure policy'. The preference of the G.L.C. for the term 'cultural policy' over 'leisure policy' is respected here. This usage is a reflection of the influence of the sociology of culture on socialist thought about leisure (cf. Tomkins 1983). Williams (1981) provides an analysis of the meanings attributed to the term culture and their significance for social theory.

Chapter 2: Research Strategy and Methods

2.1 INTRODUCTION: IDENTIFICATION OF KEY ISSUES AND RESEARCH METHODS

In considering the literature relating to local government politics and leisure policy, it has been argued that politics at the local level, over the last decade, has exhibited a greater degree of party political influence than had hitherto been the case. This is evidenced, for example, by the diminishing numbers of independent councillors, the radicalisation of Labour dominated urban authorities such as Liverpool, South Yorkshire and Lambeth, and by the attempts of some Conservative local authorities to reduce the role of the local state through programmes of privatisation. At the same time as party political influences have grown, and the polarisation of party political stances has become accentuated, public sector leisure services have begun to establish their importance as an area of policy development. The recognition of the importance of leisure as a service area has been fuelled in part by (occasionally simplistic) notions of the relationship between profound industrial and urban problems and the leisure 'needs' of urban populations. Indeed such problems have even given rise to fundamental questions about the future form and role of local government in this country. The research which is central to this study is therefore intended to investigate the emerging relationship between local government politics and leisure policy.

More specifically the study seeks to address a number of key issues which are summarised in the following questions;

- (1) What types of leisure policy goals may be seen as (logically) consistent with the major political ideologies' or values of the political parties in English local government? How do the policy goals so identified relate to the leisure policy statements of the major parties?

(2) To what extent and in what ways does party political control of a local authority determine (or mediate) the leisure policies of that authority, and the resources which it allocates to leisure services?

(3) What factors other than party politics might be influential in determining local authority leisure policy and resource decisions? What is the relative importance of such additional factors vis à vis party politics in determining such outcomes? In what ways might these factors interact with political variables?

(4) In what ways do the rationales for leisure policy differ between local politicians of different parties? Are their rationales consistent with their ideological affiliations? In what ways do these rationales differ from those offered by professional local government officers?

(5) How do local government politicians explain the process of initiation, formulation and implementation of leisure policy? What are the key factors in determining policy outcomes as perceived by politicians? Are these accounts consistent across parties? Are these accounts consistent with those put forward by professional officers?

(6) What is the relationship between policy intentions and outcomes for leisure policies?

(7) What directions might local authority leisure policy be expected to take in the future given the pressures for change currently experienced by local government?

? The methods adopted in this study to generate answers to these core questions fall into ⁵four categories.

(A) In addressing the issues raised under (1) above, the first of these 'methods' simply involves a review of the literature on political values to construct a set of coherent, ideal-typical ideologies in order to 'deduce' the nature of leisure policies which would be consistent with such sets of

political values. An analysis of leisure policy statements and prescriptions of the major parties is also undertaken in order to evaluate whether these are consistent with the ideological positions normally associated with these parties.

(B) A statistical analysis of leisure expenditure patterns in English local authorities is undertaken in order to review the statistical association between measures of revenue expenditure on leisure services and political variables, demographic variables, and measures of available resources. This approach allows comparison of local authority expenditures but not of leisure policies per se.

(C) A case study of local government leisure policy in a Metropolitan District is undertaken. This involves detailed depth interviews with a stratified sample of members (n=45) and a small sample of local government officers in key positions (n=14). The interviews focus on issues highlighted in (4) and (5) above.

(D) An analysis of grant aid to local voluntary leisure organisations, in the metropolitan district selected, is undertaken in order to identify the relationship between policy intentions and policy outcomes. This approach involved conducting a relatively large number of structured interviews (n=192) with successful and unsuccessful applicants for grant aid (for the period 1981-4) to ascertain whether the characteristics of successful and unsuccessful applicants were consistent with the criteria for grant aid adopted by the local authority.

(E) Finally, five ideal typical models of local government are constructed as a vehicle for discussion of projected change in local government, and of the consequences of such change for public sector leisure services.

2.2 RATIONALE FOR SELECTION OF METHODS

Detailed accounts of individual methods, their application, and the limitations of the data generated are provided in the ensuing chapters which deal with the separate aspects of the research. Nevertheless there are a number of strategic concerns, about the nature of the project as a whole and some of the assumptions which underpin it, which will be addressed here.

In view of the lack of existing material on the politics of leisure in general and the relationship between political values and leisure policy in particular, the adoption of ideal types of the major ideologies is useful for the purposes of clarification. The use of such ideal typical accounts of ideologies and the leisure policies consistent with them, is methodologically defensible in the sense that they are employed not as oversimplified representations of the complex nature of individuals' value sets, but rather are used to highlight the complex (and occasionally inconsistent) nature of the political values and policy advocacy of real actors. Similarly ideal types of future local government forms are constructed in the final chapter of the study, not as predictions, but as a vehicle for discussion of the consequences for leisure services of the influences on policy identified in the empirical research.

The mix of qualitative and quantitative empirical methods adopted in this study reflects a recognition of some of the strengths and weaknesses of the individual approaches applied in isolation. In particular the use of both qualitative case study material and statistical output analysis generates related but independent insights into the processes by which leisure policies are determined and the pattern of policies so derived.

Case studies of policy-making in individual local authorities run the risk of producing unique, non-comparable accounts of policy determination, which are so immersed in the specifics of one authority that valid inter-authority generalisations cannot be made. By contrast, statistical output studies, despite their theoretical immaturity, specifically aim to establish inter-authority generalisations about the determinants of variations in local policy. Unfortunately these generalisations cannot readily be compared

with the results of case studies, since these research designs focus on different phenomena.

(Hoggart 1983: p. 57)

What is being attempted here should not, therefore, be construed as a form of methodological triangulation in Denzin's (1978) sense, since one method, the qualitative case study approach, attempts to identify actors' explanations, values and perceptions relating to the leisure policy process (in a single authority) while the other method, output analysis, attempts to identify (though not to explain) statistical associations between relevant variables. In essence then, the case study and statistical analysis address different key issues in the research schema.

2.2.1 THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO METHODS SELECTED

The explanation of the relationship between politics and local authority leisure policy which is developed in this study represents a species of 'middle range' theory (Merton 1967). This does not imply a set of open ended hypotheses, uninformed by fundamental concerns of epistemology and theoretical adequacy. Rather it is a recognition that although the selection of particular research methods is premised on logically prior theoretical and epistemological assumptions, these assumptions are not themselves directly evaluated in the context of the empirical analysis undertaken. The way in which such research methods draw upon prior assumptions is illustrated in the hierarchy of issues in table 2.1.

Although therefore it would not be appropriate to embark upon a fully articulated analysis of the major theoretical traditions, and their roots within the philosophies of knowledge, action and language, it is nevertheless important to identify the major theoretical assumptions on which decisions about method in this study are based. It should be noted therefore that the ensuing discussion is premised upon a realist epistemology, that is the explanations developed aim to 'reveal social reality' rather than simply to provide a useful way of summarising

TABLE 2.1: QUESTIONS OF THEORETICAL ADEQUACY, VALIDITY OF RESEARCH METHODS, DATA RELIABILITY AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ISSUES OF ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY

<u>Level of Analysis</u>	<u>Key Issues</u>
Ontological / Epistemological Concerns	What is the nature of social reality? What is the status of knowledge of social phenomena?
Adequacy of Theory	Is the theory employed consistent with an appropriate set of ontological and epistemological assumptions? What are the values on which the theoretical perspective is implicitly or explicitly premised? Is the theory internally consistent? Is the theory honest (or is there an attempt to mislead)? Is the theory 'testable'? What are the implications of the knowledge gained for power relations between social groups (is the theory emancipatory)?
Validity of Method	Are the methods selected consistent with the theoretical arguments and ontological / epistemological assumptions? Do the methods selected generate data of the order intended? Are the methods optimal to the situation under analysis?
Reliability of Data	Were the methods selected appropriately adapted to the situation? Were the methods stringently applied? Do the results obtained reflect the nature of the phenomenon under analysis? (What factors might count as corrupting the data?)

the 'particulars' which go to make up the social world (Johnson et al. 1984). This is complemented by an assumption that social life exists within a set of structures which are both the context of (and give meaning to) and are the product of, social action. These premises combine to define a core task of this study as one of generating explanations which will identify the structures which produce, and are produced by, the local government leisure policy process.

The empirical research which provides the focus of this study, investigates the nature and development of a specific set of identified social practices or 'regularised, acts', that is those which constitute the construction of leisure policy in local government. Assumptions, therefore, relating to the nature of social practices will prescribe the parameters for selection of methods of investigation since, as Denzin argues;

Each theory demands and produces a special view of the research act.

(Denzin 1978: p. 6)

As a precursor to any discussion in detail of the methods adopted, some clarification of the conceptualisation of 'social practice' which informs the choice of method in this study is required. In the same way as Denzin locates his own research procedures in a particular theoretical tradition, symbolic interaction, so this study will draw upon the theoretical framework of structuration (Giddens 1979) in highlighting the following specific characteristics of social practices which are germane to decisions about selection of methods.

- (i) Social practices cannot be explained solely by reference to the intentions of actors.

Social practices, or regularised acts, are subject to 'rules' (in the sense traditionally employed by Wittgenstein 1970, and Winch 1958), or to 'tacit knowledge' (Garfinkel 1967). That is to say that in the context of any given social practice there is an implied set of appropriate behaviours from which a participant in that social practice will draw. It is important

to note that the notion of rule-governed behaviour employed here does not infer the existence of a set of formal articulated rules (in the sense for example of the rules of a game - whether they be codified or not) but rather 'rule' is meant to infer shared knowledge of how to proceed (and how not to proceed) under certain conditions. Thus it may be the case that someone involved in a particular practice is not able to say what the rules are. It is sufficient for them to be said to know the rule if they know how to proceed in the situation governed by that rule (Wittgenstein 1970).

Wittgenstein, Winch, Searle (1969) and Giddens (1979) together constitute a tradition in a range of theoretical fields which has adopted language as a paradigm example of a set of social practices. Language is characterised in this tradition, not simply as a means of communication, but rather as a set of 'regularised acts' in itself. To understand these acts we need to refer to the rules which apply to them and it is impossible to explain the significance of any given speech act simply by reference to the intentions of the speaker. Words and expressions are given their meaning by their context within a language, with its own semantic rules and grammatical structure. However, it is not possible to explain the significance of what an individual is saying simply by reference to the structure of the language without consideration of the intentions of the speaker. The rules of the language (semantics and grammar) determine what will count as a meaningful utterance without determining what is to be said. The speaker therefore draws upon, reproduces, and perhaps modifies (by innovative use of the language) the structure of the language itself in ordinary usage. Research which aims to generate insights into the nature of social practices therefore will be required to identify both the rules which govern those practices and the intentions and understandings of the actors involved.

(ii) Actors' understanding of the rules governing social practices can be said to operate at the level of either practical or discursive knowledge.

The knowledge and understanding of the rules governing social action may involve simply knowing how to act appropriately, what Giddens terms 'practical knowledge'. However actors are also often able to discuss their reasons for acting in a particular way in terms of the rules which apply in a given situation. In doing so they exhibit 'discursive knowledge' of the rules governing that social practice.

The set of research instruments employed should normally therefore seek to identify knowledge of the rules governing social practices along each of these dimensions. Thus in the case study for example, councillors are asked to supply information about specific policy decisions taken in their party group, and also more generally about the procedures adopted by the group for decision-making. This is intended to provide the opportunity to gain insights into what counts as appropriate behaviour in such settings either through respondents' descriptions of how people actually proceeded or through their discursive knowledge of what the tacit rules are which apply in such situations.

(iii) Social practices may incorporate certain regularly produced but unintended consequences.

The literature on bureaucracies and bureaucratic dysfunctions illustrates ways in which unintended consequences (such as goal displacement, lack of responsiveness, lack of performance incentives: cf. Haynes 1980) result from the setting up of rules and procedures designed to ensure accountability and efficiency. Such dysfunctions are among the set of unintended consequences of the social practices embedded in 'bureaucracy'. It is clear therefore that any research investigation which aims to identify the salient features of a social practice should consider such unintended (and often unperceived) effects. For this reason it will be important to employ methods other than those which focus solely on the perceptions and

knowledge of the actors involved. Thus in this study statistical analyses of leisure policy outputs complement the interview material generated as one potential means of identifying some unintended consequences of policy decisions.

(iv) Unacknowledged conditions of action may significantly affect the nature of social practices.

In the same way as effects of social practices may be opaque to the actors involved, so the conditions which give rise to such practices may be similarly obscure to those concerned. Principal among these 'unacknowledged conditions of action' are, Giddens (1979: pp. 116,7) argues, the unconscious motives of individuals. Giddens points out that there are times when we are motivated to act for reasons which we are unable to specify (as is the case for example with young children). Thus, politicians may be motivated to act in ways which ensure their political survival, but which are inconsistent with the political values they espouse. Such unconscious motives may therefore form an important element in any explanation of political behaviour.

In order to develop this line of argument some clarification is required of the nature of the relationship between 'wants', 'interests' and 'motives'. Although only individuals may be said to have wants, explanations of group behaviour may draw upon notions of 'objective interests'. The distinction between wants and interests is summarised by Giddens in the following way;

Wants (or wanting) are the 'basis' of interests: to say that A has an interest in a given course of action, occurrence or state of affairs, is to say that the course of action etc. facilitates the possibility of A achieving his or her wants. To be aware of one's interests, therefore, is more than to be aware of a want or wants; it is to know how one can set about trying to realise them.

(Giddens 1979: p. 189)

Although wants are subjective, and only individuals can be said to have interests, it does make sense to talk of objective interests since

actors have interests by virtue of their membership of particular groups, communities, classes etc. A person shares certain interests in common with others (given also the assumption of common wants), for example by virtue of being a member of the working class; there are conflicts of interest between capitalists and workers which are integral to capitalist production.

(Giddens 1979: p. 189)

However, as we have noted Giddens goes on to argue that not only may actors be unaware of their interests (in the sense that they are aware of situations or means by which to realise their wants) but also that actors may not be conscious of their motives in particular situations. He stops short of referring to 'unconscious wants' and does not explicitly define 'motives', the nearest formulation being;

I shall use 'motivation' to refer to the wants which prompt action.

(Giddens 1976: p. 85)

This represents an important difficulty with this element of Giddens' argument. What is posited here is the existence of 'hidden' phenomena (i.e. unconscious motives and unperceived interests) which might be dismissed as merely convenient heuristic fictions in the same way as Giddens himself wishes to dismiss the Althusserian appeal to 'real', unperceived structures. He appears to be sensitive to this potential criticism for he argues that,

we must avoid a reductive theory of consciousness: that is, one which, in emphasising the role of the unconscious, is able to grasp the reflexive features of action, only as a pale cast of unconscious processes which really determine them.

(Giddens 1979: p. 58)

Unconscious motives may therefore be hypothesised but their existence, some might claim, cannot be demonstrated by any *empirical* reference. The testability of theoretical claims (in the limited sense articulated by Saunders [1983; pp. 344-6] for example) is identified as a criterion of theoretical adequacy (see table 2.1). In this case however we may argue that our claims relating to hypothesised unconscious motives may in principle be open to test in one of two ways. The first is through the actor's post hoc analysis of his / her own motives 'I did not think about it at the time but I must have opted for that course of action because ...'. The second form of empirical validation is to compare the actions of the actor said to be influenced by unconscious motives, with those of an actor exhibiting similar patterns of activity but who is able to clarify and identify his / her motives. Clearly for example in the case of a child who has a limited vocabulary, we would wish to argue that apparently purposeful behaviour (e.g. stretching out for a toy or for food) does have just such a purpose, and we would tend to validate such claims by pointing to other such instances of behaviour where the actor did account for his / her actions by reference to just such motives. Such claims seem reasonable and this type of validation of claims about unconscious motives is likely to be accepted in practice. Indeed just such a process of validation is implied in the way we evaluate the reasonableness of explanations of motives given in evidence in a court of law. This is not to say that in court or in social analysis, further evidence will not be required, since the criterion or 'test' described here constitutes a necessary but not a sufficient condition of the attribution of unconscious motives.

The relationship between wants, interests and motives articulated here carries significant implications for the investigation of social action at the *individual* level since it implies that in addition to empirical observation and reference to the individual's explanation of his / her own behaviour there is a requirement of inductive, abstract analysis of unconscious motives which may serve to explain the nature of the action in question. Similarly in investigating the nature of *social practices* (regularised actions) it will also be necessary to look beyond empirical observation and actors' accounts, to the abstract, inductive analysis of the

interests of actors which derive from their membership of groups (as politicians, professionals, client groups). Thus for example a consideration of models of the state, and the accounts of interests of relevant groups of actors constituent of such models, performs a crucial role in explaining the phenomenon of leisure policy formulation and implementation.

Finally, it is worth noting that the rationale for policy analysis, whether it be 'analysis of policy' or 'analysis for policy' will be (in part at least) that such analysis should inform our understanding of the policy process. The attempt to identify unintended consequences and the unacknowledged conditions of action should therefore be construed as reformist, in Bett's terms, in that it aims "to help people make sense of their own circumstances and realise their own goals" .. by trying to .. "draw a wider scope of social life into a widening circle of discursive knowledge and human agency" (Betts 1986: p. 49)

(v) The conceptualisation of Power as Relation rather than Property, and the Relationship of Power to Social Structure

In reviewing the methods employed in an empirical analysis of leisure policy formulation and implementation the concept of power will be a central concern. The questions of who exercises power in the initiation of policy, in influencing policy outcomes and in setting policy agendas, for example, are key issues in the study. It is important therefore to clarify how power has been conceptualised in the study and how it has been operationalised in empirical contexts.

In his seminal review of concepts of power, Stephen Lukes (1974) identifies the three principal ways in which power has been treated in the literature, and characterises these as the three 'dimensions' of power. The first dimension is evident in the pluralist writings of Dahl (1961) and others who, in local government contexts, locate power by focusing on decisions across a range of issues to establish who is influencing policy. This

approach, in the Weberian tradition, views power as the ability of an actor or group to 'realise their own will even against the opposition of others'.

The second dimension of power, for Lukes, is exemplified in the work of Bachrach and Baratz (1970) who focus not simply on struggles around particular issues, but also on the logically prior concern of how policy issues find their way onto the policy agenda (and how many do not) - the exercise of power in 'non-decisions'. In particular politicians, professionals and others may act as gatekeepers to the formal agenda of local authority policy debate, and thereby exclude issues of relevance to the needs of particular groups. As with Lukes' first dimension, this notion of power is voluntaristic in the sense that it locates power at the level of individual action (whether this be in making decisions or in agenda control) rather than deriving an explanation of power as the product of the social structures within which it is exercised.

The third dimension of power which Lukes goes on to identify, in contrast reflects not the exercise of individual or collective will, but rather invokes the notion of 'interests' arguing that an individual or group can be said to have power (irrespective of its actions) when it is able to secure economic, political or social outcomes which are consistent with its 'real' interests. Structural marxist theorists, such as Althusser (1969) and Poulantzas (1973) have argued that individuals in a capitalist society are unlikely to be aware of their 'real' interests, a state of affairs which is explained by reference to the effects of ideology generating 'false consciousness', and therefore are unable to struggle to realise those interests. Power is conceptualised in this tradition as a function of the systemic needs of capital. 'Culturalist' marxist accounts, however, focus upon classes and class fractions which do in theory have the ability to break down ideological barriers, to recognise their own interests, and have the power to act to realise those interests. Nevertheless, in practice this may rarely happen. As Gramsci (1971) argues, so complete is the political and economic hegemony of the dominant group in capitalist society, that workers will only come to appreciate their real interests under conditions of overt struggle with capital. Lukes draws on this argument to promote the

view that the insistence on identifying power in the context of individual and/or group behaviour is unduly limiting.

The trouble seems to be that both Bachrach and Baratz and the pluralists suppose that because power, as they conceptualise it, only shows up in cases of actual conflict, it follows that actual conflict is necessary to power. But this is to ignore the point that the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict arising in the first place.

(Lukes 1974: p. 23)

There is however a fundamental difficulty with this marxist concept of power. This is particularly evident in the structural marxists, such as Althusser and the early Castells (1976), whose writings imply a tautologous position. In this literature power is referred to in terms of the ability of dominant groups to meet their own needs (interests) through the operation of the social / political / economic system of capitalism. An action or an element of the system, is, however, characterised as operating in the interests of the dominant group if it reinforces the dominant position (power) of that group. Power in other words is defined in terms of interests and interests in terms of power. This circularity of argument is illustrated if we consider the classic difficulty for Marxist theory of explaining the advances made by working people in terms of state provision of welfare in advanced industrial economies. Such policies are normally explained as the result of capital "buying off" potential working-class resistance. However this line of argument implies that no state policies in a capitalist system can ever be said to be in the interests of working people since they will always be in the long run interests of capital, ensuring as they do the compliance of workers. As Saunders (1984) points out, however, taking this argument to its logical extreme, no state policy will ever count as being in the interests of labour except a policy by which such a capitalist state overthrew itself. In practical terms (though not strictly in terms of formal logic) this theory does not therefore allow 'testability' since it will admit of no counterexample other than the rather spurious case cited.

The conceptualisation of power as uniquely a function of structural factors without reference to individual wants, needs, or action is one which is rejected in this study. Indeed, as Giddens argues, there would seem to be no logical connection between power and interests. Lukes' formulation of the third dimension of power as the ability of an actor or party to influence another in a manner contrary to that other's interests, presumes that power may not be used for example to influence people to act in their own interests, or to act in ways neutral to their interests.

Mennell (1979), drawing on Lukes' analysis of power, has attempted to draw parallels between the three dimensions of political / economic power and three dimensions of cultural need. The first category of cultural need identified as the equivalent of Lukes' first dimension of power is what Mennell terms 'administrative cultural democracy'. The cultural democracy approach involves identifying what people want (rather than what experts say they 'need') and ensuring that such experiences are made available either by publicly provided facilities and services or through the voluntary or commercial sectors. Such an approach is essentially what Roberts (1978) refers to in his description of socio-cultural pluralism. Mennell is able to cite examples of this approach in practice from a number of EEC countries, drawn from an earlier comparative policy study (Mennell 1976)

The second dimension of cultural need identified is what Mennell terms 'animation'. Here, however, the parallel with Lukes becomes more problematic than he acknowledges. In discussing the shortcomings of the first dimension of cultural need, Mennell points out that pluralism presupposes that cultural needs will be expressed either through participation or through the articulation of requests for provision. Socio-cultural animation however is aimed at identifying needs which are not expressed (principally because certain groups are unable to articulate their wants) and with stimulating demand among such groups.

Animateurs may not seem so different from traditional attempts to popularise the arts, except that animateurs try particularly to involve

people actively, not just as spectators, and in trying to find out what appeals most to people, modify their activities accordingly, whether or not that conforms to prior cultural standards.

(Mennell 1979: p. 25)

This characterisation of cultural policy glosses over a tension in cultural democracy concerning the role of the professional. Professionals can be a positive factor in promoting pluralism, or they can operate as a barrier, reflecting their own values or preferences through their control of access to the policy agenda. Power in defining and meeting cultural needs at this second level is therefore seen *either* in professionals acting as facilitators (animateurs) helping people to recognise their interests (i.e. to discover ways of realising their wants) *or* in professionals controlling the policy agenda, promoting policies consistent with their own values. While the former is evidenced in the socio-cultural animation movement, the latter is illustrated in, for example, Robert Hutchinson's (1982) account of the development of Arts Council policy, which represents a form of professionally determined analysis of need, and may well result in some form of policy for the 'democratisation of culture'.

The third 'dimension of cultural need' specified by Mennell employs the concept of 'real need' identified by the theorists of the Frankfurt school. Here the parallel with Lukes is clearly drawn. In the same way as Althusser, Poulantzas and Gramsci argue that we are normally unable to perceive our real political and economic interests, so critical theorists such as Marcuse, Adorno and Horkheimer contend that capitalist societies engender in their members false needs, which are evident in mass culture with its commodity fetishism, and its cultural forms which are crassly repetitive and unoriginal (e.g. soap operas) and often degenerate (e.g. video nasties). The critical theorists do not reject all bourgeois cultural forms and indeed Adorno, as Mennell points out, maintained a form of personal cultural elitism. What is being promoted here is the notion of a form of cultural elitism which is not a reflection of professional values, but rather is a function of the 'real interests' of society (as identified by critical theorists).

However the advocacy of elite cultural forms which meet 'real cultural needs' suffers from a difficulty which is analogous to that identified earlier in relation to the claims for 'real' political and economic interests. Although some criticisms of mass culture may be admissible, the implied and sometimes explicit claims of superiority for other cultural forms have not been supported. Roberts (1978) promotes a cogent argument against such claims for the high arts. He cites Wright's (1975) argument that all aesthetic judgements are culturally relative, and goes on to point out that even if aesthetic judgements were not culturally relative, the case for the superiority of certain art forms would have to be evaluated, and that such a case has not been satisfactorily constructed;

it is unnecessary to insist that objective aesthetic judgements were possible in principle, the fact would remain that we have no objective evidence whatsoever, in the ordinary meaning of the term, proving that high culture is especially effective in promoting well-being. Critics of popular culture offer only opinions ... No one has yet offered convincing evidence that the quality of experience at symphony concerts is superior to that obtained at pop festivals.

(Roberts 1978: p.56)

This argument highlights the central difficulty for critical theorists (and structural marxists) in relation to their claims about false needs and interests. Both have manifestly failed to demonstrate how it is that they as intellectuals are able to break through the 'ideological blind' of capitalism to identify such needs and interests, while the rest of the population remain cultural and economic 'dupes'. The empirical research reported in this study therefore rejects the notion of real needs or interests as a basis of the analysis of power in the policy process, in favour of focussing on needs as defined by those actors who are involved in the process (professionals and public).

Table 2.2 The Relationship between Concepts of Power and the Defining of 'Cultural Needs'

	LUKES DIMENSIONS OF POWER	GIDDENS' EXPLANATION OF POWER & DOMINATION	MENNELL'S DEFINITION OF CULTURAL NEED
LEVEL 1	Power exercised in decision-making.	Power as transformative capacity.	The ability of the individual or group to define own cultural needs; socio-cultural pluralism / administrative cultural democracy.
LEVEL 2	Power exercised in the mobilisation of bias, unquestioned practices, and non-decision making.	Power exercised in controlling access to resources required for transformative capacity	(i) Socio-cultural animation; professionals facilitate the recognition of ways of realising wants - facilitating cultural democracy. (ii) Professionals control policy agenda - administrative democratisation of culture.
LEVEL 3	Power as a function of the ability of one group to influence another to act contrary to its own ('real') interests	Domination; resources required for transformative capacity unavailable to some groups because of their structural location.	People's perception of their cultural needs shaped by capitalism (false consciousness). 'Real cultural needs can be identified by 'critical reasoning'

Table 2.2 illustrates the nature of the relationship between Lukes' explanation of the three dimensions of power and an amended version of Mennell's account of cultural needs. It also highlights the nature of the relationship of these two accounts to the explanation of power in the account of structuration offered by Giddens (1976, 1979). Giddens wishes to distinguish two related but different types of application of the concept of power which are intended to fuse agency and structure, voluntarism and determinacy.

power in the sense of the transformative capacity of human agency is the capability of the actor to intervene in a series of events so as to alter their course; as such it is the 'can' which mediates between intentions or wants and the actual realization of the outcomes sought

after. 'Power' in the narrower, relational sense is a property of interaction, and may be defined as the capability to secure outcomes where the realization of those outcomes depends upon the agency of another. It is in this sense that we can have power over others: this is power as domination.

(Giddens 1979: p. 111)

A corollary of this line of argument is that power cannot be seen as a property, something which individuals or groups possess.

It is mistaken to treat power as itself a resource as many theorists of power do. Resources are the media through which power is exercised and structures of domination reproduced.

(Giddens 1979: p. 91)

Giddens' major objection to the Lukes analysis derives from the latter's treatment of agency and structure as a dichotomous relationship.

he [Lukes] talks of 'where structural determinism ends and power begins' and is unable satisfactorily to deal with structure as implicated in power relations and power relations in structure.

(Giddens 1979: p. 91)

If, as Lukes appears to argue, the power of groups is to be seen as their freedom from social structure, then structure is being explained as a set of constraints. However, Giddens contends that to characterise social structure as constraining is mistaken, since social action is only made possible by the social structures within which it takes place. Structures are the necessary conditions of social action.

This point is illustrated by reference to language as a species of social action. The semantic and grammatical structures of language do not constrain our ability to speak, but rather make our utterances meaningful. Furthermore the structures of language do not exist independently of our speech which reproduces and modifies as well as draws upon such structures.

Structures provide the resources which actors draw upon in their social interaction, and therefore in the exercise of power. To locate this discussion within the context of the empirical concerns of this research, let us consider the example of local government professionals. Under certain circumstances, it is claimed, local government professionals have the power to influence policy decisions. This is a function of their position within political, organisational and social structures, which provides them with access to resources within the policy arena, such as access to communication channels with politicians, fellow professionals and significant groups within the community, access to detailed information on procedures and budgets and access to skills (through training) in writing and presentation of reports. It is in the deployment of such resources that professionals exercise power.

The practical implications for the current research of the structurationalist explanation of power principally relate to the need to explain power by reference both to the intentions and motives of the actor and by reference to the actor's location within social structures and his/her resultant access to resources which can be employed to realise his/her intended outcomes.

The discussion of key characteristics of social practices is intended to illustrate the relationship between research methods and theoretical assumptions. Of necessity this has been selective, the criterion of inclusion being the centrality of the theoretical assumptions considered to the selection of research methods. The citing of aspects of the structuration argument however, should not be taken to signify acceptance of Giddens' theoretical project in toto (indeed there are fundamental and unresolved difficulties with his argument²) nor should it be taken to infer the irrelevance of other aspects of the structuration argument which are not cited here. Nevertheless it is the case that these five strategic issues are indicative of, and central to the relationship between theoretical considerations and the selection and management of research methods.

2.2.2 THE SELECTION OF RESEARCH METHODS: VALIDITY ISSUES

Questions of the validity of method and reliability of data are separated here (analytically if not substantively) in the following manner: questions of methodological validity are concerned with whether a particular research method can, in principle, generate appropriate and reliable data; while questions of reliability of data are concerned with whether or not a 'valid' method once selected and applied has, in practice, generated sufficiently reliable and appropriate data in the context of the specific application under scrutiny. The validity question is treated here as a strategic issue, while questions of the reliability of data are the subject of commentary in those chapters which report the results of individual elements of the study.

The selection of the two major research approaches, the case study and the statistical output analysis, is premised upon considerations rehearsed in the earlier sections of this chapter, particularly in relation to the concern to identify both the intended and the unintended consequences of policy. However assessment of the specific methods adopted in both these approaches are considered below.

With reference to the case study, perhaps the first validity issue to consider is that of selection of the particular case for analysis. The decision to focus on a single local authority rather than on a small number of local authorities to allow comparison, was taken on the basis of the research effort required, and the resources available. The field work was conducted over a 27 month period. As Ball (1981) points out case study work is oriented to 'discovery' rather than 'verification' and therefore requires particular sensitivity in data collection (since it is by definition not clear initially what one is looking for in the data). In this case the wide range of categories of subject to be interviewed and the rewards anticipated in concentrating effort on one case, outweighed the anticipated benefits of a comparative approach.

The selection of the particular local authority to be the subject of the case study was made on the basis of a number of criteria. It was anticipated that a metropolitan district would provide a more interesting focus than other

categories of local authority, principally because of its larger budget and wider range of services, and the complexity of policy issues which occur at this level of local government. The authority finally selected was chosen in part for the pragmatic reasons of geography and access - essential given the part time nature of the data collection. However three further criteria informed the selection. The authority concerned was of interest in terms of leisure policy, because of the major problems it was experiencing with local unemployment (15% of the workforce unemployed in 1982) and because of the diversity of ethnic backgrounds among the population (8.3% estimated population in 1982 of Pakistan / Bangladesh and other New Commonwealth origin). It was anticipated that this would allow the research to focus on leisure policy responses to unemployment and to the multi-cultural needs of the district. The authority was also chosen because it encompassed inner city, suburban and semi-rural communities. The resolution of tensions and priorities within and between communities with different needs was therefore a further consideration in the study. Finally the political history of the District was highly significant given the primary focus of the study on the politics of leisure. The District selected came into being as a local authority in 1974, following local government reorganisation. Since 1974 it has experienced periods of Conservative overall majority control (1974-80), of Labour overall majority control (1980-1982) and of a hung council with Conservative minority control (1982-5). Such a pattern of party political control seemed likely to have generated policy debates, and political differences within and between the political parties represented on the council in a manner which would not have seemed likely in an authority with a history of single party control.

The options open in terms of methods to be employed within the case study range along a continuum from those based on researcher initiated categories of analysis (e.g. structured interviewing techniques) through semi and unstructured (or non-directed) interviewing, to those based on 'respondent initiated' categories of analysis (e.g. participant observation). As exploratory research aimed at uncovering the rationales for leisure policy employed by politicians and officers, and the 'rules and resources' used in constructing leisure policy, participant observation would have been consonant with the aim of identifying categories of experience as ordered by the actors themselves. However this option was rejected partly because of pragmatic considerations and partly

because of difficulties relating to research ethics. The practical problems were those of participating regularly in the work of the local authority which was the subject of the study. Access to some groups was simply not possible. For example the meetings of the party political groups which discussed the agendas of committees prior to committee meetings were closed to all but councillors and coopted members. (Green 1981 provides one of the few first hand accounts of the work of party groups in a study of Newcastle, but he gained access as politician rather than a researcher.) Where access was possible the researcher could not schedule other commitments to allow regular participation. The researcher did have access to a working group within the authority which was initially brought together to consider policy in relation to central government grant aid to local voluntary and statutory leisure organisations but which subsequently went on to provide a forum for consideration of wider leisure policy issues. However the invitation to join this group predated and was entirely separate from the research study reported here, and therefore to use this opportunity to collect data for the research clearly required the permission of those participating in the group (politicians, officers and representatives of the voluntary sector and a leisure quango). It was felt that to request the opportunity to conduct a participant observation study might both inhibit the group in its work, and perhaps also set up some resistance to probing in subsequent interviews which would be needed to supplement the material from the participant observation study. For these reasons it was decided not to employ material gained in the researcher's work with this group (although insights gained here clearly informed other aspects of the study indirectly) and as far as possible an attempt was made to separate out the roles of researcher and contributor to policy discussion.

It should also be emphasised that the adoption of interviewing as the primary research method in the case study, reflects a recognition of the strengths of this method. As Cockburn (1984) notes, there are a number of factors involved in the collection of data which make interviewing a more appropriate research tool than participant observation in certain contexts. Interviews allowed the research to focus on policy decisions which had already been taken and identified as significant by some of the individuals involved, and probing and recall generated interesting information. The interviews also allowed the use of questions

relating to the subjects' experience of situations and roles where, even with a participant observation research strategy, such roles could not be assumed by a researcher. Finally, interviews allowed access to information from a range of departments or committees, and from sporadic contexts which was essential in piecing together the policy context and process.

Denzin (1978) identifies three types of interview. The first is that of the 'schedule standardised interview', where wording and order of questions are common across interviews. The 'non-schedule standardised interview' differs in that although the 'same' questions are asked, the phrasing or wording of the questions is adapted in ways appropriate to the vocabulary and understanding of the individual respondents. Questions here share their meaning (have meaning equivalence) but not their wording or their order. Finally the 'non-standardised interview' typically employs a check list of issues to be discussed with the respondents rather than a predetermined list of questions to be asked.

A number of commentators point out that the use of schedule standardised interviews presumes a set of assumptions relating to the identical stimulation which researchers should provide for each respondent (Richardson et al., 1965; Denzin, 1978; Cockburn, 1984). These assumptions include the following;

- that respondents have a sufficiently common vocabulary such that the same question wording carries the same meaning for all;
- that an optimum and uniform wording can be found for all respondents (normally through pre-testing and piloting);
- that the context of each question is as far as possible identical, hence questions should be asked in identical order on each occasion.

In fact as Denzin points out the rules for applying schedule standardised interviews are almost invariably violated because these assumptions are naive.

These assumptions of the schedule standardised interview are largely untested articles of faith. They are ideal guidelines which are seldom in fact met in any empirical investigation.

(Denzin 1978: pp. 114,5)

The interviews conducted therefore did not employ a wholly fixed schedule. Some comparison of responses across interview subjects was clearly essential and the areas to be investigated were preselected and a schedule of questions drawn up, but this schedule was treated as a flexible base for questioning and amended where necessary. For example where respondents appeared not to understand the nature of the question, questions were reworded in terms deemed by the researcher to be more familiar to the respondent concerned. Invariably also some information was provided by respondents 'out of sequence' so that answers to questions asked early on in the schedule obviated the need to ask some of those in the later sections. Furthermore new, unanticipated and interesting areas for discussion were pursued when responses to open questions were developed. As Simmons (1981) points out, a highly structured interview schedule is inappropriate in much case study work and the researcher has to be prepared to recognise and develop interesting data on appearance.

In essence the interviewing strategy adopted is most closely related to Denzin's 'non-schedule standardised interview'. The assumptions Denzin associates with this approach are as follows;

- where the meanings are to be standardised this has to be in words familiar to the interviewee;
- no fixed sequence of questions is appropriate to all respondents, the appropriateness of a sequence will depend on the respondent's readiness and willingness to take up a topic at a given point in the interview;
- meaning equivalence can be achieved by the skilled researcher.

Though clearly some elements of each interview were 'non-standardised' in the sense that unanticipated responses were pursued, and 'non-schedule standardised'

in the sense that questions were reworded as the situation demanded, nevertheless much of the data generated was in fact prompted by questions in a common format. The interview schedules employed as the basis for interviews with politicians and officers in the study are given in appendix 2, and further commentary on the selection and use of questions is given in subsequent chapters.

Interviews, however, were not the only research tools employed in the case study. One of the issues to be considered in the analysis of leisure policy in the District was the relationship of the rationales for leisure policy articulated by politicians and professionals to the actual policy outcomes. In order to accommodate this aim (at least in a limited way) evaluation of policy outcomes in relation to grants to voluntary organisations, was undertaken. This assessment involved a statistical analysis of expenditures on such grants under various grant aid schemes sponsored by the authority for the three financial years 1981-1984. This issue specific approach to output analysis raises similar methodological issues to those raised by the output study for all English local authorities. In both cases there are important problems of data reliability which will also be considered later in the text, however both also share a problem which relates to validity of method.

Output studies are essentially positivist in approach, seeking to identify statistical relationships between socio-demographic and other 'independent' variables and local government 'outputs' (usually per capita expenditures). The major epistemological criticism levelled against such positivist approaches is that they purport to generate theoretical insights on the basis of 'neutral observation'. Claims of theory-neutral observation have of course been seriously undermined (cf. Kuhn 1970). However while claims of theory-neutrality are perhaps naive, it is important to note that the theoretical framework within which science (natural or social) operates does not *determine* what is observed. Thus the observation of social structures (in this case the structures which constitute the local government policy system) while *influenced* by theoretical premises, will nevertheless generate data which the theoretical project will have to accommodate.

The output analyses undertaken in this study are intended to identify unanticipated or unacknowledged conditions and consequences of action for those involved in the policy process. As such they move beyond the consideration of actors' own accounts to measure indices of the effects or the contexts of their actions. As such output studies identify statistical relationships between variables. The identification of such relationships and the description of their relative strengths, does not constitute 'explanation', though statistical analysis can for example involve 'causal modelling', in effect the testing of causal explanations. In seeking to employ statistical analysis the researcher is invariably involved in selecting relevant variables and excluding others. Such choices are of course informed by logically prior theorising (and by the availability of data) and the selection criteria involved may lead to the rejection of significant data. Nevertheless statistical analyses have the dual benefit of allowing the researcher to 'test' certain generalised hypotheses, and requiring her / him to explain unanticipated results.

Perhaps the key difficulty in undertaking output studies is the selection of measures of output. In both the output analyses undertaken here, the study of local government spending patterns and the local voluntary organisation grant aid policy study, the output measures employed were expenditure related. In both cases the measures represent imperfect surrogates of policy outputs. Sharpe (1981: p. 26) for example illustrates that radical policy change can take place at local authority level without necessarily involving significant change in the aggregate level of local authority expenditure. Pinch (1985) also points out that levels of expenditure may be a poor indicator of the quality of provision and may for example simply reflect variations in local costs. Nevertheless despite such weaknesses the output analysis does complement the case study approach in supporting some wider ranging, though less detailed, explanation of the distribution of resources in the field of local government leisure policy.

The output approach has many shortcomings, but if it lacks the detailed precision and the certainty of the one-off study, it does enable us to look at the broad canvas and make statistically valid generalizations about the local government system as a whole. Both research modes are after all inextricably linked, in the sense that, as one wag has noted, the plural of anecdote is data.

(Newton and Sharpe 1984: p. 2)

CHAPTER 2 - NOTES

¹ For a discussion of the use of the term ideology in this study see chapter 3, pages 56 - 57.

² Johnson et al. (1984, pp. 212-214), for example, highlight difficulties associated with Giddens' justification of a realist epistemology, which have important implications for his theoretical project as a whole.

**PART 2: POLITICAL VALUES AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC SECTOR LEISURE
SERVICES**

Chapter 3: Political Ideology and Leisure Policy

3.1. INTRODUCTION

The relationship between political values and leisure policy has received scant attention in the leisure studies literature until relatively recently (viz. Bramham and Henry 1985; Coalter 1986; Hargreaves 1984, 1985; and Henry 1984 a,b,c). Furthermore the significance of leisure as a political issue has also been neglected, though there are signs that the legitimacy of political pronouncements on leisure is now admitted, at least by Labour politicians (Kinnock 1987) though other parties remain more diffident about government involvement in leisure'. However, if politics is concerned with the allocation of scarce resources, then clearly leisure is a political issue, even if only in terms of governmental decisions about the aims, level, and appropriateness of investment in leisure from the public purse. Such decisions are at least in part a function of value judgements about the appropriateness of particular leisure forms, and the role and function of the state in social life, that is they are a function of political ideology.

The term 'ideology' is treated in this study as consistent with Hugman's formulation.

ideology is to be seen as the systematic expression of socially rooted ideas, which are experienced by historical individuals as members of classes or groups, which arise within the structural conditions of such classes or groups and which provide a social framework or world view as a basis for action.

(Hugman 1983: p.87)

This treatment of ideology rejects the structural marxist distinction between 'real' and 'phenomenal' conceptions of the social world. Such marxist explanations are treated as an element in a particular (radical) ideology, rather than as exempt from ideological influence. Similarly Mannheim's (1936) distinction between

ideology (which supports the status quo) and utopian programmes of ideas (which promote social change) is regarded as misleading, since both emancipatory and conservative ideas are partisan and therefore ideological. The second point to emphasise is that although ideal types of ideologies are constructed in this chapter, this does not signify acceptance of an idealist conception of such systems of ideas. Ideologies, political or professional, are shaped by (and can shape) the social practices within which they are embedded. They cannot therefore be regarded as independent of those practices. Finally, although this definition stresses coherence, the systematic nature of ideologies, it should be noted that not all members of a social or political class or group will give conscious expression to all features of an ideology, which may be regarded as a 'family' set of ideas or values².

The aims of this chapter are, therefore, first, to clarify the relationships between particular value sets or political ideologies and leisure policy, and, secondly, to evaluate the influence of ideological thinking on the policy practices of central government. It thus provides a context for the analysis of local authority leisure policy which follows in ensuing chapters³.

The absence of a developed body of literature on political ideology and leisure policy is reflected in the approach adopted here. The key ideologies of contemporary British politics are outlined, those of the New Right (liberalism), 'traditional conservatism', and socialism. Commentary is focused on their historical development in post war Britain, their core values and their implications for social policy and the role of the state. Subsequently a set of leisure policies is identified or constructed which is consistent with each of the ideological positions identified. Finally, the relationship of post war central government leisure policy and political ideology is considered.

Two preliminary points should however be emphasised. The first is that although for ease of reference the terms 'left' and 'right' may be used in the discussion of political values, this should not be seen as an unqualified acceptance of this common metaphor employed in political commentary. The relationships between political ideologies are multi-faceted, and cannot be accommodated on a single, simple, unidimensional continuum in the manner advocated by some political

theorists (e.g. Lipset 1960). The second issue relates to the terminology employed. The terms 'liberalism' and 'social democracy' are employed rather differently by writers in different traditions. In the context of this chapter they are employed to define, in the case of 'liberalism' the family of values or propositions associated with the New Right, and in the case of 'social democracy' to define the area of ideological and policy compromise which characterised the period from the immediate post war years to the mid-seventies. As a consequence, social democracy is not treated as an ideological position in its own right but rather as a compromise between competing ideologies. Furthermore, the labels 'liberal' and 'social democratic' should not be seen as synonymous with values espoused within the Liberal or Social Democratic parties.

3.2 LIBERALISM - THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE NEW RIGHT

Contemporary liberalism draws on the intellectual tradition represented in the moral philosophy of Locke and the political economy of Adam Smith. From Locke is derived the notion of society as a set of rational, self interested individuals who have fundamental, universal rights to life, property and freedom, and who consent to be governed (making a 'contract' with the state), with a minimum of rules, applicable to all, to guarantee those universal rights. Individuals have no special rights (e.g. to work, to education, to leisure) and the state therefore has no role to play in making such provision. Smith, writing in the same epistemological and moral tradition, sees the free market as the vehicle for allowing individuals to maximise their own self interest, and the role of the state is therefore simply one of ensuring the stability of free markets.

The political philosophies included under the New Right banner in contemporary society vary principally in their advocacy of a role for the state. Anarcho-libertarians, such as Rothbard (1978) conclude that if the natural rights of the individual are to be respected, there is no role for the state to play, and that even policing, administration of justice and national defence should be provided by private enterprise (Green 1987). Nozick, however, while accepting the premises of the anarchist argument, concludes that a minimalist state will be required to guarantee individual rights by "protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement

of contracts, and so on" (Nozick 1974: p. ix). Nevertheless all other public benefits and disbenefits, will be dealt with by the private sector. However such radical New Right thinking is not generally evident in the dominant New Right group within the Parliamentary Conservative Party. This group, in forming its political philosophy, has drawn predominantly on arguments consistent with the economics of Milton Friedman and the 'conservative liberalism' of Friedrich Hayek. Both Friedman (1962) and Hayek (1946, 1976) acknowledge that there is some scope for government intervention in addition to that of maintaining public order for individuals to pursue their private concerns, but such scope is still severely limited. In order to understand the nature of policy change under the Thatcher administration it will be necessary to familiarise ourselves with the major arguments concerning state involvement in social and economic life which are rehearsed by mainstream writers in the New Right tradition.

Monetarism, the economic philosophy espoused by both the Thatcher and Reagan administrations, reflects a reaction to the failure of state intervention in the 1960's and 1970's to deal with the major problems of western economies, unemployment and inflation. The root cause of these two features, monetarists argue, is the tinkering with the economy for which successive post-war governments (of both parties) have been responsible. Monetarists point out that money has been pumped into the economy principally on two pretexts, either to protect uncompetitive industry, or to provide for the disbursement of benefits from the public purse. In both cases this leads inevitably to higher rates of inflation, since industrial subsidy or social benefits are funded ultimately through taxation or the printing of money. The latter devalues currency and thus induces inflation directly, the former raises price levels by imposing greater tax burdens on producers and thereby fuels inflation indirectly. Monetarists, therefore, argue that the only way of making industry competitive is to control inflation and to allow the market to 'kill off' those areas of industry which are incapable of competing successfully. This accelerates unemployment but unemployment is seen as inevitable in the long run given the failure to control inflation.

What recent British governments have tried to do is to keep unemployment below the natural rate, and to do so they have had to accelerate the rate of

inflation - from 3.9% in 1964 to 16% in 1974, according to official statistics ... the higher the rate of inflation, the more widespread is likely to be the government interference in the market. In effect such interference is equivalent to increasing the amounts of frictions and obstacles in the labour market, and therefore does tend to create a higher level of unemployment Given the way in which the political and economic structure will adapt itself to the rate of inflation, if you continue to let inflation accelerate you are going to have higher unemployment either way. So you only have a choice about which way you want unemployment to come. Do you want it to come while you are getting sicker, or do you want it to come while you are getting better?

(Friedman 1976: quoted in Jordan 1982)

The opposition of the New Right to state intervention in the economy is not based solely on the claim that it is inefficient. State intervention is also regarded as unjust. Subsidy for failing industries is seen as penalising, through taxation, those industries which are competitive. Similarly, state intervention in terms of subsidised or free social provision is seen as undermining the self reliance of the individual, and creating artificially high demand for such provision. Furthermore, the liberals argue, it is erroneous to suggest that the state can act in the public interest in promoting either industrial subsidy or increased social provision. The state cannot act in the public interest (except in very limited circumstances) firstly because many of the interests of members of a society are incompatible, and therefore there is a problem in principle of defining 'the common good' or 'the public interest'; and secondly, even were there no problem in principle, there would still be the practical problem of calculating accurately what collective interests are, in any complex social structure. As a consequence of this argument, Hayek (1976) suggests that the expression 'social justice', which is based on the notion of recognised and sanctioned collective interests, is dangerously misleading and should be expunged from the language.

The key values espoused by the New Right are therefore 'freedom' of the individual to pursue his or her interests, and 'individual responsibility' for one's own well being. For mainstream liberal theorists such as Hayek and Friedman, these values imply a reduced role for the state in the economy and in social provision rather

than no role at all, and this, as we shall see, has particular consequences both for the function and form of local government and for the state's role in leisure provision.

3.3 CONSERVATISM

Perhaps the key characteristic of conservatism is its resistance to recipes for social change based on utopian ideals, whether these be socialist or liberal in origin. Many of the key arguments of modern conservatism derive from the political philosophy of Hobbes and Burke. For example, the former argues in *Leviathan* (Hobbes 1968) that loyalty to the monarch under all circumstances is essential because the overthrow of the monarchy may lead to unforeseen anarchy and chaos. Burke, in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (Burke 1969) refines this argument, suggesting that the present set of institutional arrangements represent the lessons of history, and that tradition should therefore be respected in its own right and not simply for fear of change.

It is from the sub-title of *Sybil*, Disraeli's novel which deals with the need to preserve social unity in the industrialising and urbanising society of nineteenth century England, that we gain the term 'one nation conservatism'. The concerns of Disraeli's political novels, fear of social instability and the responsibilities of the state and of the individual in sustaining social cohesion are key themes in the writings of twentieth century commentators, such as Gilmour (1970), Macmillan (1938), Oakeshott (1976), Pym (1984), and Scruton (1980).

It has been argued that conservatism is not an ideology per se but rather an intuition (Goodwin 1982) or simply a reactionary response to any ideology of change. However Scruton's (1980) account of *The Meaning of Conservatism* represents an attempt to develop a systematic explanation of the relationship between the values inherent in the conservative position and the actions (or inaction) which the conservative advocates. In opposition to the core values of liberalism, those of freedom and individual responsibility, Scruton promotes the values of tradition, allegiance and authority as the key to social stability.

For the conservative, hierarchies in society are inevitable, they represent the results of historical and present day struggles, with the more able generally achieving positions of advantage. However hierarchies are not simply inevitable features of society, they are also desirable in that they allow the most able to gain positions of authority in our society. Authority, nevertheless, brings with it a responsibility for those less fortunate. Those who are brought up to wield authority, and those who achieve positions of authority through their own efforts, must act responsibly and caringly if they are to engender allegiance in others. In the eighteenth century this took the idealised form of a 'caring squirearchy', in the nineteenth century it was evidenced in the responsible and benign industrialist providing for the needs of his work force. In the twentieth century, for some conservatives (though notably not Roger Scruton) allegiance is engendered by mild Keynesian policies of social reform.

For Scruton the function of government is to preserve civil order, and to bind individuals into the traditional networks of the family the community and the nation. The state should not be used to achieve other ends of providing welfare, promoting individual freedom or controlling the economy. For Pym (1984), Gilmour (1978) and members of the Tory Reform Group, however, the ends may be the same but the means differ. Gilmour, for example, promotes a Keynesian approach and is willing to accept the modest collectivism, corporatism and élite management of the economy which were a characteristic feature of the Conservative governments of MacMillan and Heath. He opposes the monetarist policies of the New Right on the grounds that they foster divisiveness in society.

if people are not to be seduced by other attractions they must at least feel loyalty to the state. This loyalty will not be deep unless they gain from the state protection and other benefits. Complete economic freedom is not, therefore, an insurance of political freedom. Economic liberalism because of its starkness and its failure to create a sense of community is likely to repel people from the rest of liberalism.

(Gilmour 1978: p. 118)

Such support for moderate state intervention has not endeared 'one nation conservatives' to the Party leadership, and Tory 'wets' have therefore tended to be excluded from positions within the Cabinet in the Thatcher governments.

3.4 SOCIALISM

The core values espoused in the writings of the socialist movement in Britain are those of equality, freedom and fellowship (or collective responsibility). There are perhaps two principal differences which encapsulate the contrast between socialism and the liberal tradition. The first relates to the liberal argument that inequalities in society are inevitable and that therefore the socialist aim of ridding society of such inequalities is both unachievable and, in its methods, undesirable since any such attempt will inevitably cut across the freedom of individuals to pursue their own interests. For socialists however, freedom of the individual is impossible without equality of access to the resources through which the individual may pursue his or her own interests. Secondly, while liberalism argues that the notion of the public interest or public good is severely limited in its application (and applies largely to issues such as law and order which guarantee conditions for the individual to pursue those interests through the market) the notion of collective interests is central to socialist thinking. Thus, whereas the dominant role in the allocation of welfare, for liberals and conservatives is played by the market, socialists see private enterprise as generating and satisfying demand without necessarily meeting the needs of individuals, communities or classes. Collective action is therefore regarded by socialists as a necessary corrective to the inequalities generated and perpetuated in capitalism.

The nature of the collective action to be undertaken by socialists, however, has traditionally been the subject of debates and divisions in the Labour Party. There are two principal interrelated themes evident in the tensions within British socialism. The first concerns the desirability of the strategy of 'public ownership and control of the means of production, distribution and exchange', the debate between 'fundamentalists' and 'revisionists' and their present day equivalents (viz. Greenleaf 1983) and is linked to the traditional marxist

adherence to the principle of economic determinism. The second such dimension relates to the role of the state in achievement of socialist goals, specifically whether such goals can be pursued through the state apparatus or whether that apparatus is itself a contributory factor in the inequalities which socialism seeks to counter.

The first of these themes is exemplified in the writings of Cole (1976) who makes the distinction between 'utopian socialism' and 'scientific socialism' (or 'scientific Marxism'). The former offers a vision of a socialist society based on mutual cooperation, equality and social justice, to be achieved by incremental reductions of inequalities in a mixed economy. The latter grows out of a traditional Marxist, class based analysis of social inequalities which results in the politics of class and class struggle. Both of these ideal typical brands of socialism share egalitarian goals and an opposition to the free market economics of the right, yet both are founded on very different analyses of society and the economy and both offer very different political programmes for the achievement of socialism. If these are regarded as the major traditional positions in post war British Labour politics, a third position has been identified as emerging more recently in the politics of the New Left.

The 'lineage' of utopian socialism can be traced through the early Fabians, the revisionist strategy of Crosland (1956), to the politics of the 'breakaway' Social Democrats (Owen 1981; Williams 1981). It rejects the class based analysis of traditional socialism and its programme of large scale public ownership to be achieved by mobilisation of trades union support, and opts instead for achievement of goals through parliamentary action. Redistribution of wealth and income and the reduction of inequalities in health, education and welfare are to be achieved in a mixed economy through legislative control of capital. The Labour Party (1983), the Trades Union Congress (1979, 1981a, 1981b) and leading Labour politicians (cf. Hattersley 1987) in their advocacy of 'market socialism' and Keynesian economic strategies, have implied a continuing faith in limited state intervention and the restoration of growth as prerequisite to the extension of social benefits.

The tradition of scientific socialism encompasses a range of explanations of society and the state which are consonant with the economic determinism of structural marxist accounts of society and the state. According to such accounts, for any reform to provide real benefits for working class groups it must involve the socialisation of capital, either through struggle in the workplace (in the syndicalist tradition) or through the nationalisation of industries (which may take one of many forms). The lineage of scientific socialism can be traced through the 'fundamentalist' supporters of clause 4 in the Labour Party constitutional debates of the 1950's (those who opposed the removal of the clause which was seen by some as committing the Party to the dismantling of capitalism), and through the development in the 1960's and early 1970's of radical critiques of Labour Governments' compromise with capital (cf. Miliband 1973). However, the emergence of the New Urban Left (Gyford 1983) in the 1970's and 1980's, represents a break on the part of many radicals with the economic determinism of traditional marxist accounts.

The loose coalition of interest groups and movements within the Labour Party, which Gyford identifies, has its roots in initiatives such as the Community Development Projects, the student politics of 1968, the women's movement, black organisations, protest groups, opposition to public service cuts, and the radicalisation of public sector professions (Boddy and Fudge 1984). In these groups reform is sought on social as well as economic issues through political struggle. The New Urban Left are characterised as seeking to promote socialist policies at local level as a reaction to the frustration with the failure of post war Labour governments to achieve socialist goals, and as a resistance to the Thatcherite reductions in state spending of the Conservative administration. The critique of the local state on which the Urban Left draws, is derived from the radical analyses of local government of writers such as Bennington (1976) and Cockburn (1977) and the political commentary of Gramsci (1971) whose concept of hegemony, domination by consent through intellectual and moral leadership, is employed to explain the separation of political activity from the economic sphere, and to justify attempts at political reform through the local state. The New Urban Left is seen as seeking to undermine the hegemonic domination of capitalist ideas by providing concrete examples of effective socialism at local level. It is at local level that the state apparatus can be most easily controlled and moulded for

socialist purposes because at local level the state can be made more directly accountable to its working class electorate, through the Labour Party rank and file. Examples of the influence of New Urban Left policies in action can be seen in some Labour controlled London Boroughs and Metropolitan Districts, such as Brent, Haringey and Sheffield, and in the work of the now defunct Greater London Council.

Both traditional marxist inspired analysis and that of the New Left have been severely critical of post war Labour governments and their failure to achieve socialist goals. The shortcomings of Labour governments with their utopian socialist ideological predispositions is seen as the result of their failure to recognise that the state remains an instrument of bourgeois domination and that concessions from the dominant class cannot therefore be obtained simply through legislation. Corporatist management of the economy in the sixties and seventies, had drawn trades unions into the management of a capitalist economy in crisis resulting in the control of wage levels but achieving no socialist advance. Links between the state and the establishment reveal a network of common interests (Miliband 1973) both the state and the establishment are anti-socialist (Benn 1979), and therefore compromise with existing industrial and political structures is doomed to failure. In the circumstances of the seventies, with the British economy in decline, its currency under pressure, and the aftermath of the energy crisis, utopian socialism was seen as no longer viable. This was underlined by the acceptance by the Labour Government of the terms of an International Monetary Fund loan which meant the imposition of spending limits and the cutting of social programmes. For radical socialist theorists and political activists, such as Jordan (1982) and Benn (1982), this sounded the death knell of revisionist policies. With the failure of economic growth Marxist theorists awaited the attack on working class standards of living and on the welfare state, and socialist groups sought to resist that attack predominantly through the mechanism of local government opposition to central government policy.

3.5 THE CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES FOR LEISURE POLICY

In this section, a set of leisure policies will be identified which are consistent

with each of the ideologies outlined. The purpose here is to provide a link between the discussion of what the major ideological positions represent and an explanation of the historical development of post war leisure policy, which will form the focus for the final section of the chapter. There is no suggestion here that ideology or even party political programmes are the major determinants of policy development. Rather the emphasis of the section is on demonstrating that there are consequences for leisure policy of holding to particular ideological positions, and that the notion that leisure is somehow beyond the concerns of politics is in itself an ideological position.

In the discussion of liberal ideology we made the distinction between the anarchistic liberalism of Rothbard and the minimalism of Nozick on the one hand, and on the other, the more mainstream political philosophies represented in the economics of Friedman and the 'conservative liberalism' of Hayek. Clearly, since the former leaves little or no room for state intervention, the consequences for public leisure policy of this brand of liberalism are severely limited. However Friedman does not wish to adopt the radically minimalist position and in *Capitalism and Freedom* sets out a statement of the criteria which justify the limited state intervention which he advocates. There are three types of argument which can be used to justify state intervention. The first is that the state should perform the role of impartial arbiter, ensuring (e.g. through the maintenance of a police force, the prevention of market monopolies) that individuals are able to pursue their own interests through the operation of the free market. The second type of situation in which state intervention is justified is when the free market works imperfectly. For example it may be the case that some industries can only operate profitably where a monopoly exists. Where such 'natural' monopolies exist the state should regulate them to prevent abuse. A similar market imperfection occurs where it is impractical or impossible to charge those who benefit from a service in the case of public or merit goods or where externalities occur. Friedman illustrates this aspect of his argument with an example drawn from the field of leisure services.

For the city park, it is extremely difficult to identify those people who benefit from it and charge them for the benefits they receive. If there is a

park in the middle of the city the houses on all sides get the benefit of the green space and people who walk through it or by it also benefit. To maintain toll collections at the gate or to impose annual charges per window would be very difficult.

(Friedman 1962: p. 20)

The final criterion employed by Friedman to justify state involvement is that of paternalism. However he is reluctant to employ this argument beyond very limited circumstances. For example while he accepts that, in the case of the mentally ill (who cannot identify or pursue their own interests), the state has a legitimate role to play, in the case of provision of education for children he is prepared to consider this as a responsibility of the family rather than of the state.

Such a limited view of the role of the state would seem to indicate a marked reduction in government activity in the leisure field. Indeed the rhetoric of some Conservative politicians illustrates their wish to see such a reduction. In a Commons debate for example on a motion recommending the formation of a unifying Ministry of Leisure with wide ranging responsibilities, John Page, the Conservative spokesperson, indicated the government's total opposition to state expansion of this kind.

The idea of a new Cabinet Minister and a Department of Leisure is totally unacceptable.... I believe that the Prime Minister would have nothing to do with a motion such as this. She believes in letting in the icy, gusty, lusty, thrusty winds of reality and competition to blow away the sleep from people's eyes and the cobwebs from the machinery of our industrial life.

(Official Report, Commons 24/1/80: col. 815)

Similarly Phillip Holland M.P., in a series of books and pamphlets published by the Conservative Party attacking quangos (Holland 1979; 1981; 1982), has recommended the abolition of a range of such organisations with responsibilities for leisure, and has also advocated that the activities of the Arts and Sports Councils be restricted.

In the field of arts provision the influence of the New Right is evidenced in a number of statements advocating a policy shift away from heavy reliance on public subsidy (Brough 1978, Selsdon Group 1978, Amis 1979). Of these Kingsley Amis's paper to a fringe meeting of the 1979 Conservative Conference is, in many ways, the most radical. Amis's attack is directed evenly against proposals for Conservative Party policy (in *The Arts, the Way Forward*, Conservative Party 1979) and proposals for Labour Party arts policy (represented in *The Arts and the People: Labour's policy towards the arts*, Labour Party 1977).

I've said nothing so far about the Conservative document about arts policy ... the first sentence goes "any government, whatever its political hue, should take some steps to encourage the arts". No. The arts ... have their own momentum and must be allowed to pursue it unmolested by encouragement as much as by censorship.

(Amis 1979: p.9)

This type of statement might be seen as consistent with traditional 'one nation' conservative views, but Amis goes on to identify classic liberal objections to state subsidy. His objections are based on the claim that such subsidy encourages the wasteful use of resources, particularly on experimental, avant-garde projects which are valueless (in aesthetic and market terms). Aesthetic value and monetary value are equated here insofar as Amis wishes to argue that, if a work has value, it is unnecessary for the state to step in with subsidy (though it should be said that he does allow of some exceptions). By encouraging art through public subsidy, particularly experimental art of little or no value, the state, Amis argues, is damaging the cause of excellence in the arts. Liberalism can therefore be said to espouse a form of 'cultural democracy', allowing people to define and meet their own cultural wants and needs through the market place, in opposition to the 'democratisation of culture', a policy of educating the masses to appreciate superior art forms. This relatively minimalist liberal approach is not one which has characterised Conservative Party policy, though some features of liberal thinking are evidenced in more recent policy developments. This is a theme to which we shall return.

The consequences for leisure policy of 'one nation conservatism' are perhaps more complex than those associated with liberalism. There are however clear implications in the field of arts policy where conservative values of authority, allegiance and tradition are consistent with the promotion and protection of the high arts, the cultural trappings of tradition and social structure. Thus 'democratisation of culture' might logically be expected to be the policy line promoted by the 'traditional conservative', advocating the protection of the nation's 'cultural heritage' and the education of the population to appreciate that heritage.

Scruton provides an interesting illustration of a conservative view on the role of leisure in social life. Leisure in general, and sport in particular, he argues, are autonomous institutions with intrinsic goals which are to be valued for their own sake, "the truly satisfying activities are often those with no purpose" (1980: p.142). Thus if the state uses sport and leisure for extrinsic purposes such as the curbing of delinquent behaviour among the young, it is likely to corrupt the very nature of these phenomena. Ironically, sport, when entered into for its own sake does have positive benefits for the community. Traditional team games in particular, Scruton argues, instil positive social values.

The pursuit symbolises the social values which are inspired by it - loyalty, courage, competition, endurance. Here then is a simple and spontaneous institution, which in pursuing its internal purposes generates a consciousness of social ends Every activity which allows men to value an activity for its own sake will also provide them with a paradigm through which to understand the ends of life.

(Scruton 1980: pp. 143,155)

Such values promote social solidarity and resist the instability inherent in the pursuit of the utopian ideals of left and right.

Scruton's analysis draws on the same intellectual tradition as that of European conservative commentators on leisure, Huizinga (1938), Pieper (1946) and Caillois (1961). Like Scruton, these writers reject the materialist arguments of the marxist tradition and identify the separateness of leisure and play from the

serious elements of economic, political and social life, as one of the primary defining features of these phenomena. Indeed, for Huizinga and Caillois, the treatment of sport as a serious pursuit, with its attendant professionalism and pressure to improve performance, for example by the use of drugs or other forms of cheating, is an indicator of degeneracy in our society. Leisure in such circumstances is no longer seen as autonomous, and becomes corrupted. The state therefore, apart from providing an infrastructure within which autonomous institutions such as leisure will flourish, should not actively involve itself in provision of leisure opportunities to further its own ends. Such an approach would be self defeating, destroying the very phenomenon it wished to employ.

The role of the state is guardian and foster parent. It cannot invade the institutions of leisure without perverting them to its own uses and losing sight in the process of what those uses are.

(Scruton 1980: p.168)

The conservative prescription, therefore casts the state in an enabling role which avoids the directive approach associated with state socialism. However, unlike the minimalist liberal prescription, it is consistent with the sort of indirect funding that is operated in the 'arm's length' approach to support for the arts and sport through quasi-autonomous bodies, such as the Arts and Sports Councils.

In contrast to both liberal and conservative implications for leisure policy socialist interest in leisure is likely to reflect a central concern with achieving equality through collective action. However the place of leisure in the policy priorities of the socialist will depend to a great extent on the type of socialism with which one is dealing. We have identified three branches of socialist political thought, each of which will have consequences for leisure policy - traditional (structural) marxism, with its emphasis on the primacy of economic issues; the Marxist inspired analysis of the New Urban Left, centred on the Gramscian concept of hegemony; and revisionist or utopian socialism, which rejects an analysis based on class and advocates piecemeal reform financed out of economic growth in a mixed economy.

Since traditional Marxist accounts have premised the achievement of equality in areas of social policy (including leisure) on fundamental economic reform, concern with leisure on the part of this branch of socialist thought is likely to be limited and perhaps to be seen as misdirected since primacy must be given to economic questions⁴. The role of competitive sport is viewed critically by structural marxists in that it encapsulates and reinforces the values of capitalism through its structure of apparently meritocratic, goal oriented activity, involving division of labour, specialism and most importantly winning and losing (Gruneau 1975). Lefebvre (1971) argues that sport is a 'cultural illusion', serving no other purpose than to act as a compensatory stratagem in industrialised societies, while Brohm (1978) also argues that, in its present form, sport simply performs an ideological function and predicts that,

Sport is alienating. It will disappear in a universal communist society.

(Brohm 1978: p.52)

Indeed for a short period in post-revolutionary Russia, attempts were made to ban sporting activities because of their bourgeois nature (Riordan 1978). Nevertheless, most state socialist countries were later keen to promote state involvement in sport for military, political and social reasons, a strategy equally condemned by Brohm (1978: pp. 79 - 87), whose critique of sport finds echoes in the work of other western Marxists such as Marcuse (1964) and Lefebvre (1967) who describe the emergence of the modern individual respectively as 'a happy robot' and as 'le cybernathrope', a robotic type with an affinity for sport and other non-utilitarian pleasures.

The role of art in structural marxist analysis one would also expect to be analogous to that for sport. However even Althusser himself wishes to accord some freedom from materialist forces for art, arguing that art has the potential to reflect and highlight the contradictions of capitalism. Such a move on his part however undermines the nature of his holistic, functionalist explanation. How artists are able to break through "ideology" to uncover the nature of real social relations is as difficult to explain as the ability of intellectuals to gain such insights. In ideal typical terms therefore the role of leisure forms for traditional, structural marxist accounts should be seen as ideological.

While the function of sport, the arts and leisure for the structural marxist tradition may be 'ideological', its function for the New Urban Left has been 'hegemonic'. The thinking which underlies this position involves a rejection of both the base - superstructure distinction of 'vulgar marxism', and cultural idealism which treats the material and the cultural as entirely independent spheres. The approach to cultural policy of the New Urban Left draws on the notion of the 'relative independence' of the material and the intellectual, a position reflected in the work of critical theorists of the Frankfurt school. Art was regarded by Frankfurt School theorists as a potentially powerful consciousness raising tool, though only if it is not deployed overtly for political ends. David Held illustrates this point in reviewing the work of Adorno.

Adorno always insisted that art loses its significance if it tries to create specific political or didactic effects; art should compel rather than demand a change in attitude. ... The truth value of art resides in its capacity to create awareness of, and thematize, social contradictions and antinomies.

(Held 1980: pp. 82-3, 84)

Of course, ^{for the Frankfurt School,} art can also perform an ideological function by presenting a vision of spurious harmony, but such art is valueless.

One area of leisure policy, for example, which has interested some radicals is that of community arts and its potential role in developing working class consciousness and thus its usefulness in stimulating political action. The corollary of espousal of community arts, for some theorists, is that high arts are rejected as irrelevant to the experiences and interests of working class people (Braden 1977, Clark 1980). In opposition to the commentators of the Frankfurt School who argue for the emancipatory potential of some works of high art, the role of the high arts in the critique of Braden and Clark is seen largely as a matter of status conferral, through, for example the acquisition of 'cultural competence' or 'cultural capital' (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977).

However such an approach to the high arts is not necessarily associated with the New Left. The Greater London Council, which presents perhaps the archetype of New Left cultural politics promoted both access to traditional art forms and radical

arts initiatives. Nevertheless, although access to the high arts was retained by the G.L.C. as a policy goal, there was a concern on the part of Tony Banks (the former G.L.C. Chair of the Arts and Recreation Committee) in particular, to move away from traditional definitions of culture as a site of individual excellence towards a definition focussed on collective experience, popular culture (including sport) and the media.

The G.L.C.'s cultural policy involved three major policy strands (Bianchini 1987). The first was simply to use cultural events to promote a positive image of the authority itself. Events such as the Thamesday Festival, the South Bank Weekend and the London Marathon had little or no overt political content but Tony Banks has indicated they provided a vehicle "to project the GLC's image as a progressive, caring, socialist council" (quoted in Bianchini 1987: p. 105). The second strand of cultural policy involved the use of cultural activity as a vehicle for promoting other policies, whether these be campaigns against racism, for jobs or for the survival of the G.L.C. itself. Banks explains this with reference particularly to the arts.

"In all GLC policies there was an ingredient which involved the arts..... We could use the arts, in a way, to explain and have a better understanding of the other policies. We could, in other words, use the arts as a medium for a political message."

(Quoted in Bianchini 1987: p.105)

Particular emphasis was also placed not simply on addressing inequalities in provision for black communities, women, and gay and lesbian groups, but in the use of cultural activities to promote political awareness of the nature of disadvantage experienced by those groups.

Finally, the third strand of the G.L.C.'s cultural policy involved intervention in the market for cultural activities, to provide some protection for new, small scale organisations competing in a market which has been dominated by large scale, often multi-national, capital. This policy strand owes much to the analysis of Nicholas Garnham who has argued that the key to fostering new cultural producers lies not in continuing subsidy of those who cannot compete in

the market place, but in the shaping of the market place to allow new, small scale, independent record producers, publishers, film and video companies etc. to establish a presence in the market without having to operate through (and provide profits for) the major distributors. By banding the activities of new cultural producers together under the umbrella of a large public body such as the G.L.C. or the Greater London Enterprise Board, economies of scale and strength of size can be achieved so that market opportunities can be used creatively.

the cultural market as it has developed in the last 150 years as a substitute for patronage in all its forms, cannot be read either as a destruction of high culture by vulgar commercialism or as a suppression of authentic working class culture, but should be read as a complex, hegemonic dialectic of liberation and control it needs to be said that the only alternative to the market which we have constructed, with the partial exception of broadcasting, has tended either simply to subsidize the existing tastes and habits of the better off or to create a new form of public culture which has no popular audience; cultural workers create for the only audience they know, namely the cultural bureaucrats who pay the bill and upon whom they become psychologically dependent even when reviling them.

(Garnham 1987: p. 34)

Garnham identifies the major problem to be tackled in a policy for the cultural industries as that of the concentration which has been experienced in the distribution of cultural products (the channels of access to audiences, within the film, print and music media). Large scale, multi-national concerns dictate the terms on which cultural products are to be distributed, and though they ultimately rely on small scale producers (independent film companies, freelance journalists, writers, actors etc.) it is these small scale producers that meet the costs of cultural research and development, with consistently high labour turnover and generally low profitability. Thus, Garnham argues, a socialist policy which will promote greater diversity of cultural products available in the market, will allow the consumer to shape cultural products, but will alleviate the exploitation of producers. Such a policy requires the provision of an infrastructure through which small independent producers can distribute their cultural products. The G.L.E.B. (n.d.) publication, *Altered Images: Towards a Strategy for London's Cultural*

Industries, provides some illustration of how Garnham's recommendations have influenced policy.

With the demise of the G.L.C., this exemplar of cultural politics is no longer available to us. However other Labour controlled authorities, like Sheffield, have begun to look towards the development of similar strategies for the cultural industries, and to rethink the role of cultural policy in local politics.

The key difference between the cultural or leisure policy associated with the New Urban Left, and that of 'revisionist' or 'utopian' socialism is that while the former is used for overt political purposes to challenge the hegemonic dominance of capital and its economic dominance of the cultural industries, the leisure policies of the latter are rather more concerned with reducing inequalities in leisure opportunities. Concomitant with that aim is an improvement in the responsiveness and accountability of organisations providing and controlling leisure to the wishes of the workforce, consumers and the electorate. Although leisure is not to be used as a political tool, the promotion of leisure opportunities is seen by 'utopian' socialists as a political issue, and provision of leisure opportunities should not, therefore, rest in the hands of the professional groups of self interested technocrats or be left to market forces.

Some 'socialist' arts policy documents (Labour Party 1977, 1986; TUC 1977) and the sports policy recommendations of Whannel (1983) and the T.U.C. (1980) have focused on the need to democratise the system of control of arts and sports provision. The general formula promoted for democratising the Arts and Sports Councils, for example and other sporting organisations, is one of providing representation on such controlling bodies for worker interests (through unions and / or professional associations), users of the service, elected representatives and professional administrators.

Despite a common ambivalence among socialists concerning the role of the state, there are those who advocate a greater state involvement in the leisure field arguing that this is a prerequisite for redressing existing inequalities. Dennis Howell for example has regularly raised the issue of reinforcing and unifying government control, advocating the formation of a new ministry of leisure and

cultural affairs. He has had some support in Labour ranks. James Callaghan M.P. (not the former Prime Minister) for example introduced a private member's bill in 1980 advocating a similar move. However, the fact that this was a private member's bill and not a party motion, and the level of attendance at the debate on the motion, might be taken as an indication of the low priority accorded by the Parliamentary Labour Party to leisure policy generally and this issue specifically. Nevertheless the formation of a new ministry has subsequently been adopted as a policy goal for a future Labour government (Kinnock 1987).

Gary Whannel articulates the fears of many socialists in respect of state intervention, in relation to sport.

In the case of sport, proposals must avoid the danger of control by a faceless state. The idea should be to give power to those who work in and use the sports centres, recreation grounds and swimming baths, football clubs and so on.

(Whannel 1983: p. 102)

This fear of the corporate state is related to Liberal Party commitment to community politics, and is a primary bond in the Alliance, as well as being a concern of free marketeers. What is different about the socialist concern is the nature of the solutions proposed.

Whannel promotes three further principles (in addition to that of democratic control of resources) which he argues should underpin a socialist sports policy. These are

- (a) an egalitarian intention; genuine sport for all, with positive discrimination to counter existing attitudes and structures;
- (b) adequate funding and facilities to make sport for all feasible;
- (c) social ownership of stadiums, sports centres, recreation land and subsidiary leisure industries.

The first two of these are broadly supported in the T.U.C. (1980) pamphlet *Sport and Recreation*.

The Labour Party and T.U.C. policy documents on the arts adopt a less radical approach than that associated with the New Left. These documents support the view that it is important for the public sector to sustain the high arts and that there is a need to educate popular taste to understand and appreciate such art forms. Nevertheless the documents also advocate a greater emphasis on popular art forms and community arts. In contrast to the unitary view of cultural need associated with traditional conservatism, what is being presented here is a form of cultural pluralism, arguing that the range of tastes to be supported should be as wide as possible, with an attendant emphasis on widening access. This form of cultural pluralism represents an attempt to meet the cultural wants of a range of interest groups which are not met by the market, but falls short of the use of cultural policy to mount a hegemonic challenge.

'Utopian' socialism does, however, have something to say not only about the kinds of art but also about the kinds of leisure forms which it is appropriate to foster through subsidy. Whannel argues that the public sector should discriminate positively in favour of activities which have relatively higher rates of participation among disadvantaged groups (such as women and ethnic minorities), and in particular the state should subsidise those activities which are cheap and accessible with demonstrable appeal. These are, Whannel claims, important parameters which should guide policy thinking if such policies are to be successful in achieving egalitarian goals. In addition Whannel also sees certain sports and types of contest as alien to socialist ideals. Specifically, he questions the morality of boxing, the martial arts, hunting and fishing. (In this sense his commentary has something in common with the New Left concerns about the role of sport in promoting particular political values.) Following Brohm, he sees international competition (though not all forms of sporting competition) in a negative light.

National sport has proved a highly successful element of bourgeois ideology. It creates a largely artificial sense of national belongingness, an imaginary coherence. It masks social divisions and antagonisms, offering a unity which

we all too easily fall in with ... It helps to circulate unreal expectations of our own merit and derogatory stereotypes of everybody else.

(Whannel 1983: p. 105)

Despite some differences about strategy, provision through state patronage or devolution of power to community groups, 'utopian' socialism is concerned to promote equality of opportunity and rejects leisure activities which are inconsistent with the notion of collective responsibility for the welfare of the community. This implies a very different policy prescription from those derived from liberalism and conservatism, and yet leisure policy- goals pursued by central governments over the last three decades have tended to be remarkably similar despite the erosion of political consensus in the 1970's. The final section of this chapter therefore attempts to identify and explain the nature of continuity and change in central government leisure policy.

Tables 3.1a and 3.1b summarise the nature of the argument concerning the relationship between political ideologies and leisure policy developed in the current section. It should be noted that what have been described in this account are ideal types. The distinctions between for example utopian socialism and social democracy may in some instances be difficult to sustain, and individual authors may be drawn upon in different ways to support the arguments underpinning different ideological positions. Individual cases will always depart from ideal types in some way but the types themselves provide a benchmark against which to measure the direction and degree of that departure.

3.6 THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEISURE POLICY IN POST WAR BRITAIN: THE CONSTRUCTION AND EROSION OF SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC CONSENSUS.

The emergence of leisure as an appropriate and significant area of state intervention is marked by a series of political pamphlets, White Papers and government reports in the 1960's and early 1970's, culminating in the development of departments, in the newly reorganised local government system, with comprehensive responsibility for the provision of leisure services. As such

TABLE 3.1 POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND CULTURAL POLICY

POLITICAL LABEL	TRADITIONAL CONSERVATISM	LIBERALISM / NEW RIGHT	LABOURISM / UTOPIAN SOCIALISM	NEW URBAN LEFT	STRUCTURAL MARXISM / SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM
CULTURAL POLICY	Democratisation of CultureCultural	Democracy.....	Provision to Facilitate Class Expression	Provision promotes False Consciousness
KEY CONCEPTS	Tradition and Social Solidarity	Individual Freedom	Equality	Hegemony	Ideology
CULTURAL VALUES	Elitism / Cultural Idealism	Free Market Pluralism	Mixed Market Pluralism	Socialism through a Modified Market	Economic Determinism
ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING ARTS POLICY ANALYSIS	<p>1. National unity preserved by conserving our national heritage</p> <p>2. Our cultural heritage consists of high arts evolved via tradition.</p> <p>3. Aesthetically superior art forms can be identified.</p> <p>4. Art as an autonomous institution is perverted if used for other purposes.</p>	<p>1. Freedom of individual to choose cultural artefacts through market.</p> <p>2. State intervention distorts supply and demand, economic wastage.</p> <p>3. Avoid state paternalism dilution of individual freedom and artistic expression</p> <p>4. State subsidy fosters poor taste: aesthetic judgement no different from market judgements.</p>	<p>1. No single cultural form inherently superior to any other.</p> <p>2. Inequalities deny individuals and groups cultural opportunities and resources.</p> <p>3. Role of the state to support uneconomic forms & protect minority tastes: education of people re cultural possibilities.</p>	<p>1. Arts policy can be highly visible means of demonstrating socialist ethos as caring & progressive.</p> <p>2. Art can be a medium for challenging hegemony.</p> <p>3. Cultural industries source of exploitation of labour. State can unify small scale cultural producers to give them power in market to combat stranglehold of multinationals on distribution.</p>	<p>1. Function of cultural forms is ideological, legitimating position / values of dominant group.</p> <p>2. Art cannot raise working class consciousness, because it is shaped by dominant group.</p> <p>3. Real cultural needs of working class people only if economy changes form.</p>
ARTS POLICY GOALS	Promote traditional high arts: educate people to appreciate them,	Allow market rather than state to judge people's cultural wants.	Promote those art forms unable to survive in market: educate people to appreciate high arts: promote access.	Promote arts with potential for raising consciousness. Control the market rather than circumvent it, allowing consumers wider choice by combatting oligopolies.	None - cultural policy secondary to economic policy.
PROPOSERS OR THEORISTS DRAWN UPON.	Scruton, Leavis	Amis, Brough, Selsdon Group, Friedman.	Raymond Williams, William Morris	Sue Braden, Gramsci, Adorno, Nicholas Garnham	Althusser, Bourdieu

TABLE 3.2 POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND SPORTS POLICY

POLITICAL LABEL	TRADITIONAL CONSERVATISM	LIBERALISM / NEW RIGHT	LABOURISM / UTOPIAN SOCIALISM	NEW URBAN LEFT	STRUCTURAL MARXISM / SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM
CULTURAL POLICY	Democratisation of Culture	Cultural	Democracy.....	Provision to Facilitate Class Expression	Provision promotes False Consciousness
KEY CONCEPTS	Tradition and Social Solidarity	Individual Freedom	Equality	Hegemony	Ideology
CULTURAL VALUES	Elitism	Free Market Pluralism	Mixed Market Pluralism	Socialism through a Modified Market	Economic Determinism
ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING SPORTS POLICY ANALYSIS	<p>1. Sport promotes positive social values e.g. courage, endurance, cooperation, competitiveness</p> <p>2. Sport is corrupted if used for political purposes by the state or for other purposes by the individual (e.g. body building linked to narcissism)</p> <p>3. Sport and leisure are separate from material elements of life.</p>	<p>1. Individual free to choose leisure forms through market. State only acts where market imperfections occur e.g. neighbourhood effects, externalities.</p> <p>2. Leisure forms / sports experiences which are 'valuable', are those people will pay for.</p>	<p>1. No sports / leisure forms can be said to be superior.</p> <p>2. Reduction of inequalities of access a major goal.</p> <p>3. Some sports uneconomic but contribute to individual / group well-being, and therefore should be supported.</p>	<p>1. Sport can be employed as a tool for promoting a positive image of socialism, or for other political purposes e.g. sanctions against racist regimes.</p> <p>2. Sport can be used for promoting positive self-image for disadvantaged groups, and challenging dominant views of such groups.</p> <p>3. Non-socialist sport forms (e.g. boxing, hunting) to be challenged.</p>	<p>1. Sport forms reflect and reinforce dominant values</p> <p>2. Play and spontaneous fun lost in institutionalised sport forms.</p> <p>3. Sport will wither in a socialist society</p>
SPORTS POLICY	Promote sport but at arm's length via independent sports bodies.	Market forces dictate sports provision. State involvement limited to instrumental uses of sport e.g. in inner city.	State supports uneconomic leisure forms where affordable, to maximise range of opportunities for all by subsidy..	Sports selected for state support are those which heighten social awareness (of self or other disadvantaged individuals / or groups) or promote positive image of political organisation.	None
PROponents OR THEORISTS DRAWN UPON	Scruton, Huizinga, Pieper	Friedman, Phillip Holland Ken Roberts	Whannel	Clarke & Critcher	Brohm, Lefebvre, Adorno

it represents perhaps the final item in the construction of a welfare apparatus in post-war Britain. However, ironically, it emerged at a time when the economic position of the country and attendant political pressures began to threaten to reshape the nature of state welfare provision. Leisure, as 'the icing on the welfare cake', might have been expected to be most threatened by attempts to roll back the state. However it will be argued that, although local government is subject to financial stringency, and pressures for reductions in spending are being experienced, such reductions are not consistently applied to all areas of leisure expenditure. Indeed, the role of the Urban Programme and Sports Council funding has meant that for some facets of the service, growth in leisure spending is being experienced. What has occurred is not a wholesale reduction of state spending but a 'restructuring of the welfare state' (Gough 1979).

It is important to underline the similarity in policy stance of the two major political parties in respect of public sector leisure provision. Both the Labour Government after 1975, and the Conservative administration since 1979, have sought to reduce local government expenditure while both have also increased funding through the Urban Programme and the Sports Council. The difference between these governments is that while the Wilson / Callaghan administration promoted the spending squeeze as a reluctant concession to the economic situation, the Conservative government has embraced the task of controlling public expenditure as a central feature of their political programme. Nevertheless, the rationale behind increased funding of public recreation through the Urban Programme and the Sports Council reflects a view common to both governments that 'externalities' can be achieved through leisure spending in the inner city.

The key features of post-war government in Britain until the mid-1970's had been management of the economy based on Keynesian principles, the initiation and expansion of welfare provision funded from the increasing revenues derived from economic growth, and the incorporation of labour and capital with government in 'rational' social and economic planning. The nature of this 'social democratic' compromise between competing ideologies is well documented in the literature, and dominated policy thinking in both parties (Drucker 1983, Hall and Jacques 1983, Loney et al. 1983). Consensus, compromise politics it seemed was both possible

and desirable since the interests of the constituencies of both the major parties could be satisfied, with for business, a profitable private sector, economic growth and a strong currency, and for the working class an expanding network of welfare rights and services.

Leisure policy was seen by both parties as enhancing the quality of life for participants. Both promoted expansionist policies for leisure as early as the 1959 election (Conservative Party 1959, Labour Party 1959) and both expressed support for the establishment of a Sports Council following the recommendations of the Wolfenden Report (1960). The Labour Government finally established the Sports Council in 1965, and produced two White Papers, *A Policy for the Arts: the first steps* (D.E.S. 1965) and *Leisure in the Countryside* (D.O.E. 1966), the former signalling a significant increase in financial support for the arts, the latter resulting in the establishment of the Countryside Commission. Although these policy initiatives were taken by a Labour government, not only did the Heath administration (1970-4) not attempt to rescind such arrangements, it continued to find increasing levels of finance for all three major leisure quangos (the Arts Council, the Countryside Commission, and the Sports Council). These were just part of a redesigned network of organisations which were intended to reshape and invigorate British politics. Traditional political structures were recast with the appearance of new quangos, the recasting of social services, the health service, and local government, which incorporated leisure as a unified policy area in most localities for the first time. Leisure policy and leisure departments were a logical extension of state welfare and economic planning.

Consensual politics and social democratic values however, were subject to challenge in the deteriorating economic situation of the 1970's. The turbulent circumstances of that period, with the flotation of major currencies in 1971, British membership of the E.E.C., and the explosive growth of oil prices in 1974, together with Britain's outdated industrial structure, combined to generate 'stagflation', a combination of factors, unemployment and inflation, which Keynesian theory had regarded as mutually incompatible. The Keynesian economic approach, therefore, with its emphasis on state spending to stimulate demand, and the social welfare institutions which such state spending supported, were soon under pressure, exposing the nature of the contradictory ideological positions

which had been subsumed within the pragmatic approach to social and economic policy which social democracy represented.

The rise of the New Right in the Conservative Party in the 1970's and the capturing of the Tory leadership by Margaret Thatcher fuelled the liberal critique of social democratic practices and institutions. Centralised planning through the unwieldy mechanics of the corporate state was seen as a major factor in Britain's failure to respond effectively to the volatile economic environment of the seventies. If the economy was to be regenerated taxation burdens and government intervention generally would have to be reduced in order to allow the flexibility of the free market to facilitate adaptation and change to meet new market opportunities. The social democratic model of state policy was to be replaced by the minimalism of a Thatcherite administration which regarded social democratic policies of universal welfare services and redistributive taxation as a form of 'creeping socialism'.

The polarisation which was evident in the Conservative Party was evident also in the Labour Party. Marxist critiques of the failure of post war Labour administrations to achieve real socialist gains, to redistribute wealth and welfare, explained this failure as a function of the compromise with capital which the corporate arrangements of social democracy entailed. Such arrangements had failed to gain real concessions from capital and had even failed to avoid industrial conflict. Socialist economic strategies were sought by the left to combat deindustrialization, which meant control of the export of capital and the import of goods. However, it was not simply a dissatisfaction with economic strategy which marked the disenchantment of the left in the Labour Party. The institutions of the welfare state such as the health service, the education service and other local government services, were seen to have been ineffective in meeting the needs of those members of the community who were most disadvantaged. Large scale bureaucracies, staffed by white collar professionals, generated alienated clients receiving poor levels of service and having little opportunity to influence the decisions which affected them. Socialists looked to the development of alternative means of providing social services and advocated the abandonment of large scale social welfare organisations, in favour of smaller, client-centred units. Meanwhile Labour also began to lose some of its

traditional class based support, as sectoral cleavages, especially in the housing market began to appear (Dunleavy 1980). Home owners employed in the private sector, it seemed, were more likely to be influenced by the critique of the New Right with its vision of the welfare state as undermining the principles of self help, the family and hard work.

Attacks on the achievements of social democracy were not limited to Marxist or free market liberal thinkers. The S.D.P. / Liberal Alliance certainly maintained support for a mixed economy "not as a reluctant compromise, or as a temporary expedient but as the best way of reconciling human needs and capabilities" (Williams 1981: p. 4) but nevertheless recognised limitations in the centralised planning that social democratic practice had adopted. Sharing many of the arguments of the liberal right, the Alliance with its stress on community politics and popular participation has developed a critique of the large scale governmental units and quangos which are insulated from public influence (Owen 1981). Decentralization and devolution of powers to regions and communities therefore, are key features of the Alliance programme aimed at alleviating unresponsiveness of state bureaucracies, alienation on the part of individuals and communities, and at promoting the concept of 'active citizenship' (Plant 1983).

The social democratic welfare state was also under attack by feminists who regarded the notion of 'welfarism' as grounded in the separation of public and private spheres. The framework of welfare services was built on differential treatment and role expectations of men and women and therefore served to reinforce the inequalities of the sexual division of labour. Moreover when welfare services were withdrawn to be replaced by 'community care' the consequence was seen to be that women were left with the burden of substituting for state provision.

With the welfare policies of the post war period under attack from all sides, one might have expected leisure, as the newest addition to the portfolio of welfare services, to be the service area most threatened by the economic difficulties of the 1970's and 1980's, and the general loss of faith in welfare practices. However leisure provides an interesting example of the changing face of the

welfare system in the current decade. Leisure policy has not simply been expunged from the political agenda of the public sector. As Gough (1979) has pointed out, what has occurred is not the dismantling of the welfare state but rather its restructuring in particular ways. This shift has been characterised as the supplanting of the hegemony of social democracy, with its emphasis on rights of citizenship and increasing provision to combat social inequalities, by that of 'authoritarian populism' (Hall and Jacques 1983, Hargreaves 1985) which emphasises the use of a reduced state welfare expenditure to promote social order, and foster self reliance on the part of the individual the family and community groups.

The 1975 White Paper *Sport and Recreation* reflects the beginnings of this restructuring of state expenditure on leisure because it rehearses both the traditional social democratic rationale for leisure provision (i.e. that such services reflect 'one of the community's everyday needs') and also the pragmatic promotion of leisure services on the basis of the externalities which will accrue. This tension between leisure as an end and leisure as a means (i.e. of social control) is reflected also in the White Paper *Policy for the Inner cities* which promotes the provision of leisure services in areas of deprivation as a means of off-setting expenditure on policing, and vandalism. The introduction of such pragmatic forms of justification coincides with the introduction by the Labour administration of public spending limits, which marked the end of the expansion of welfare services.

The Commons debates of 1977 and 1980 provide evidence of the similarity of thinking in both major parties with Labour and Conservative spokespersons alluding to the savings to be made in respect of inner city costs through investment in leisure. However firm evidence to support the contention that such externalities do accrue is lacking (Bramham, Haywood, Henry 1982), yet government (e.g. in the 1975 and 1977 White Papers), government departments (Department of Environment 1977) and politicians (Scarman 1981) have continued to make such assertions. As a result, governments of both political persuasions have tended since the mid- 1970's to fund recreation in similar ways. The 1976 White Paper *The Government's Expenditure Plans* outlines Labour's proposals to reduce local government revenue expenditure on 'other environmental services'

(which includes recreation) from £971.9 million in 1975-6 to £845 million in 1978-9 at 1975 prices. The second of the Thatcher government's expenditure White Papers (Treasury 1981) outlined similar reductions (see table 3.3). This is the last of the expenditure White Papers to give a detailed breakdown of recreation expenditure and demonstrates both the success of the Labour government in containing recreation spending by local government and the Conservative government's intentions of sustaining that trend. However it also demonstrates the exponential growth of the Urban Programme (from £12 million in 1975-6 to £203 million in 1981-2) which has become an important source of public sector investment in leisure services. The total investment in leisure through the Urban Programme is difficult to quantify though some indication is provided in recent White Papers. In 1985-6 approximately 20% of expenditure on Partnership Authorities (£13 million) and 18% of expenditure on Programme Authorities (£10.9 million) was spent on recreation projects (Treasury 1987), while in 1984-5 £84 million was spent on 'social projects' including 495 community centres and buildings with 204,000 visits by users per week, 4,380 sport and recreation projects with 364,000 visits by users per week and 460 health projects with 86,000 visits by users per week (Treasury 1986). Although the increase in Urban Programme leisure spending does not compensate in financial terms for the anticipated reduction in local government expenditure on leisure services, nevertheless it does represent a substantial investment. Despite subtle differences in the way the Urban Programme is administered under the Conservative régime, with greater emphasis on capital rather than revenue projects and on economic and environmental rather than social projects, it seems clear that public sector investment in leisure is not subject to cuts in all types of service. Particular kinds of leisure service, those which are appropriate for particular groups within the inner city are continuing to attract government funding.

There is a further striking resemblance in approach between the Labour and Conservative governments of the seventies and eighties, and that is in their willingness to provide additional funds for the Sports Council, and to ' earmark' those funds (despite the Sports Council's quasi-autonomous status) for schemes to combat urban deprivation. In 1978, the Labour government, in addition to an increase in grant aid to the Council made a further £1.8 million available in

mid-financial year for the schemes aimed at the urban deprived. Subsequent Conservative White Papers on expenditure announcing the level of grant aid for the Sports Council have frequently stressed how funds should be used. The 1986 White Paper for example points out that;

Provision for 1986/7 has been increased from Cmnd. 9428 by £6 million to be devoted principally to support provision of facilities in the inner city areas.

(Treasury 1986: p. 167)

The White Paper for the following year highlights a willingness on the part of government to make use of resources from other programmes to foster its recreation policy aims.

In responding to Government priorities, the (Sports) Council is increasing its expenditure in the inner cities and other stress areas from 20% of grant-in-aid to 30% (some £11 million) in 1986/7. It is seeking with success to attract private sponsorship for its campaigns (e.g. to boost mass participation) and for sports generally. ... Schemes to encourage an increase in participation have been further developed including the broadening of the Action Sport Programme (linked with the MSC's Community Programme) - this will provide for 1100 sports leaders to work with disadvantaged groups particularly in the inner city.

(Treasury 1987: p. 175)

The restructuring of government support for sport and recreation has parallels also in arts funding. Shortly before the Conservatives gained power in 1979, the Chairman of the Arts Council wrote to Mrs. Thatcher asking for some reassurance that the arts would not be subject to reductions in government subsidy and specifically that the Arts Council should not have its grant reduced. Mrs. Thatcher replied in a letter to the Chairman that, when elected, the new Conservative administration would not be looking to achieve "candle end" economies by cutting spending on the arts which was relatively insignificant in terms of the overall public sector bill. However, the incoming government did reduce the Arts Council grant by £1.114 million with virtually immediate effect

(viz. Baldry 1981: p. 32), intending that the deficit be met by increases in private sponsorship. However, just as community recreation initiatives in the inner city benefited from increased urban programme funding, so community arts projects (particularly for the more volatile elements in the inner city) were more likely to receive funding from such sources.

The process which was begun by the Labour administration of the mid-seventies with reluctant cuts, culminates not in the wholesale dismantling of the welfare state but in its restructuring. The nature of that restructuring is perhaps best captured by O'Connor's (1973) typology of state expenditures. O'Connor argues that all state expenditures fall into one of three primary categories. These are

- social investment: expenditure to raise productivity, e.g. investment in a transport network;
- social consumption: expenditure to lower the costs of reproducing labour power, e.g. housing, education, leisure;
- social expenses: expenditure to maintain social integration, e.g. policing.

These categories are not of course discrete. Education, for example, is both an area of social consumption expenditure and of social investment, since an educated workforce will be more productive. However the categories are intended to illustrate the dominant functions which public expenditures fulfil. The shift in government spending towards community recreation and community arts in the inner city represents a shift in the function of leisure spending away from 'social consumption' and towards 'social expenses', with leisure being seen as having the potential to be employed as a form of 'soft' policing. The rationale for growth in community recreation schemes is increasingly being couched in terms of externalities, rather than simply in terms of alleviating recreational disadvantage. The consequence of this form of justification is therefore that the emphasis in provision is placed on groups which are perceived as volatile and troublesome, typically young, male, unemployed, often black, inner city residents, while other equally disadvantaged groups are relatively neglected (e.g. elderly

people, 'housebound' mothers, single parents, the handicapped) because provision for such groups cannot be justified by reference to similar financial benefits.

There are other types of benefits, in addition to those associated with social order, claimed for public sector leisure investment, and which are also being used to justify increased spending. These are economic and employment benefits which are seen to accrue from investment in tourism (Fenn 1985), and more broadly in the cultural industries (Greater London Enterprise Board n.d.). With traditional manufacturing industries in decline, the service sector experiencing growth, and leisure in particular being an area of increasing profitability for the private sector (Roberts 1986), local authorities have looked to this sector as a means of attracting jobs and income into their areas. Such investment strategies for the cultural industries and for tourism development are qualitatively different from the traditional local authority investment in a tourism infrastructure of parks, piers, theatres etc. Here the emphasis is on shared investment with the private sector, or on grants to attract private capital.

Finally it should not be assumed that any reduction on net leisure expenditure in the public sector reflects a reduction in public sector leisure spending of the same order. As Elcock (1986) has noted, cuts in the trading services of local government can be accommodated least painfully, in some instances, by increased revenue generation. This in itself may act as a factor in the restructuring of public sector leisure provision, or a restructuring of the market such provision serves (Henry 1985).

The great irony in the post war history of the development of leisure services is that at the very moment at which this final welfare service area was being recognised as a 'right of citizenship', in for example the recommendation (of the House of Lords Select Committee on Sport and Leisure) that local authorities be given the statutory obligation to provide such services, the social democratic foundation on which those rights were constructed had begun to crumble. The rationale for public sector provision in the late 1980's is not simply a less ambitious form of that which obtained during more expansionist times but is qualitatively different. The social democratic strands in the leisure policy of

central government such as the concern to tackle recreation disadvantage, to 'plug the gaps' in provision in the commercial and voluntary sectors in order to foster cultural democracy or 'recreation for all' (the slogan advocated by the House of Lords Select Committee, 1973), have given way to the pragmatic cost-benefit analysis of policies based largely on financial savings in other areas. This then is the backdrop against which local government leisure policies are being developed.

TABLE 3.3: PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON RECREATION AND THE ARTS 1975 - 1982*

ARTS & LIBRARIES						RECREATION-LOCAL GOVT.			LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES	URBAN PROGRAMME
	Central Govt.		Local Govt.		Total	Capital	Current	Total	Total	
	Capital	Current	Capital	Current						
1975/76	12	107	31	230	380	-	-	-	2836	12
1976/77	19	118	20	227	384	121	329	450	2516	14
1977/78	9	126	14	226	375	95	338	433	2510	21
1978/79	16	128	12	234	389	97	343	440	2526	75
1979/80	10	143	16	234	404	72	373	445	2510	101
1980/81	7	148	14	212	381	82	349	431	2304	121
1981/82	7	139	13	199	358	-	-	-	2105	203

* The figures provided are from the last public expenditure White Paper to provide a detailed breakdown of local government expenditure on sport and recreation and the arts (Treasury 1981, pp. 86, 194-5). Figures quoted are at constant (1980) prices.

Chapter 3 - Notes

¹ The Labour Leader, Neil Kinnock, for example in a recent speech in Cardiff argued that leisure policy should be regarded as a significant political issue, commenting, "politics of any kind that do not have a cultural programme and policies for leisure provision that is accessible to and affordable by all are a barren prospect." (quoted in *The Leisure Manager* March 1987). The former Chairman of the G.L.C.'s Arts and Recreation Committee, Tony Banks, made a similar point, rather less reverently, specifically in relation to the arts in an interview reported in the Guardian, "I dislike the British hypocrisy of saying that the arts don't have anything to do with politics. I believe the idea of the government being at arm's length from the arts is absolute crap" (*Guardian* 25 January 1983, p. 9). Evidence of Conservative opposition to this line of argument is available in for example the Parliamentary debates and minutes of the Commons Committee sittings which have dealt with leisure and the arts. For example the Conservative M.P. Patrick Cormack commented at the meeting of 8 March 1982 of the House of Commons Select Committee on Education, Science and the Arts during the examination of Tony Banks, "Here in the House of Commons we tend to pride ourselves that this is one of those areas - perhaps the only major area - of national life where we have succeeded in keeping party politics out ... Is it not possible to keep politics out of the arts in London? And if not, why not?" (quoted in Bianchini 1987: p. 104).

² The concept of family resemblance, discussed in chapter 1, is of relevance in this context. Hence a 'family' of philosophies identified under the banner of (say) the New Right, will contain related but not necessarily identical features.

³ This chapter draws on earlier published material (Henry 1984 a,b,c; and Bramham and Henry 1985) in both the structure adopted and some of the arguments developed. The chapter extends, however, both the framework of ideal types employed in the earlier articles and the analysis of central government leisure policy which is developed.

⁴ Although it has been argued here that structural marxism 'explains' the form and function of culture in terms simply of the base - superstructure metaphor, it should be pointed out that even Althusser allows art some relative autonomy (Althusser 1969). However, given the epistemological premises of Althusser's argument it is by no means clear how art (or indeed social theory) can penetrate 'ideology' to reveal the contradictions of capitalism. The strength of Althusser's theoretical project is its comprehensive (if circular) functionalist account of social phenomena. Once exceptions are made (for art or social theory to be exempt from economic determinism) the explanation loses much of its power, and justification of other exceptions becomes possible. For this reason, in the ideal typical account of the structural marxist explanation of the form and function of leisure which is developed here, culture is described in terms which are consistent with the principle of economic determinism and its base-superstructure analogy.

**PART 3: LEISURE POLICY-MAKING IN LOCAL
GOVERNMENT**

Chapter 4 Analysing Local Government Leisure Expenditure

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Despite the relatively high profile, and ideological significance, of the leisure 'quangos' (the Sports and Arts Councils, and the Countryside Commission) in government policy pronouncements, any analysis of public sector expenditure on leisure will be primarily concerned with the activities of local government as the area of government primarily responsible for planning, funding and delivering leisure services. It is estimated that in excess of £1,000 million net, was spent by local government in 1985/6 (C.I.P.F.A. 1986) on leisure and recreation services, more than five times the combined expenditure of the leisure quangos'.

In the last chapter the argument was promoted that, in terms of national politics, there was a concern, common to both the Labour and Conservative governments since the mid-seventies, to employ leisure as a 'tool of social engineering' in particular to combat the effects of urban deprivation on the young and thereby to reduce the potential for delinquency and social disorder. The political consensus of the post-war period may have given way to the more clearly ideological politics of the seventies and eighties, but in the prominence given to the use of leisure (and particularly sports) provision for such social policy purposes, leisure constitutes one area at least in which ideological differences have been diluted. However, as we have noted, the primary responsibility for public sector leisure services relates to local rather than central government, and given the discretionary powers which permit, but do not oblige, local government to make leisure service provision, leisure services is one of the policy areas which is perhaps least likely to be influenced directly by the intervention of central government in terms of the kinds of service provided. Conversely as a non-mandatory service area it might be expected to be more likely to be at risk from cuts resulting from cash limits imposed on local spending.

Radicalism has emerged in British politics in the seventies and eighties, and in the Labour Party this has perhaps been most evident in *local* rather than national politics. Some examples of such radicalism have enjoyed a relatively high profile, leading in some few instances to expulsion of 'Militants' by the National Executive of the Labour Party, and disqualification in the courts of Labour councillors from Lambeth and Liverpool. Bassett (1984) explains the growth of local radicalism as a function of the frustration of rank and file members of the Labour movement with the parliamentary Labour Party and its failure to achieve socialist policy change in the Labour governments of the sixties and seventies. By contrast, radicalism in the Conservative Party has been rather more evident in national politics with the emergence of the New Right, the forging of 'Thatcherism' and, for example, the replacements of Tory moderates in the Cabinet - the so-called 'culling of the wets' - which took place in the 1979-83 administration. Indeed the introduction of rate-capping and related legislation, policy initiatives associated with the New Right, provoked opposition from local authorities of all political persuasions. Some local authorities such as Wandsworth and Southend, which have pursued privatisation policies might be said to reflect New Right thinking, but in general terms Conservatism at the local level would seem to have been relatively less enthusiastic in promoting radical change. Given, then the discretionary nature of local leisure provision, the lack of central government requirements or standards of service, and the evidence of growing local radicalism in the Labour Party, it is at local level that one would anticipate evidence of political differences in approach to leisure policy to be most acute. This chapter seeks to evaluate evidence for this argument by analysing the policy outputs of local authorities.

4.2. STATISTICAL ANALYSES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT POLICY 'OUTPUTS'.

Analyses of the policy outputs for British local government services have grown in number and scope since the beginning of the seventies. These include, for example, studies relating to education (Alt 1971, Boaden 1971, Danziger 1978) housing (Alt 1971, Nicholson and Topham 1971, Danziger 1978) aspects of personal social services (Boaden 1971, Alt 1971, Davies et al 1971), libraries (Boaden 1971), roads (Nicholson and Topham 1975) and sport and recreation (Gratton 1984). In addition Sharpe and Newton (1984) review outputs for all of these

service areas (though in the case of sport they limit themselves to expenditure on baths and parks). In the context of the concerns of the research reported here these studies have two major limitations. The first is that (with the exception of Gratton's study) all relate to local government expenditures prior to local government reorganisation. Only the Gratton study and that of Sharpe and Newton focus on leisure expenditure. The former, however, does not attempt to distinguish the influence of political variables on sporting expenditure, while the latter deals predominantly with the spending of County Boroughs prior to their disappearance in 1974. Given the politicisation of local government since 1974, and the growing significance of leisure services since that date, these studies are of limited relevance for the purposes of this review.

Many output studies have been at least partially concerned to isolate the influence of political variables on policy outcomes generally. Fried (1975) for example reviews some fifty studies from a variety of countries but concludes that,

The results of these studies show that almost any political variable can at some time be regularly related to urban policy outputs However these findings also suggest that political variables have less direct and independent impact than socio-economic variables. In many, probably most cases, some socio-economic variable has been found more useful in explaining the variance in outputs than any political variable.

(Fried 1975; p. 337)

However, some more recent studies relating to local political systems in Norway (Hansen 1981), Denmark (Skovsgaard 1981), and Belgium (Aiken and Depre 1981) indicate that local socialist control is associated with increased local spending on consumption services, suggesting that political differences may be more significant in the late 1970's and early 1980's than was hitherto the case, in some European nations. Furthermore, studies of policy outputs in the English context have suggested that political variables may be more important in 'determining' policy outcomes in this country, than may be the case for political systems (such as that of local government in the United States) which generally manifest less of an adversarial style in local politics (Pinch 1985).

However, support for the argument that political factors are important determinants of policy outputs in the English context is not universal. Nicholson and Topham (1971, 1975) for example argue that local housing and road conditions were more important in determining policy outputs for these service areas than the local political environment, while Oliver and Stanyer (1969) stress the marginality of local political influence on the local authority budget, a high proportion of which is 'committed' because of historical decisions. Nevertheless, the greater proportion of these studies report significant associations between one or more political variables and policy outputs. Alt (1971) for example cites Labour Party control as significant in explaining per capita expenditure on housing, education and children's welfare services, while Boaden (1971) concludes that party control is a significant factor in explaining output measures for a range of services, with a similar conclusion being reached by Sharpe and Newton (1984). These studies tend to suggest that there is a positive association between Labour control of local authorities and their spending on 'redistributive' services.

Notwithstanding these findings, the methods employed in output analyses have been subject to criticism on a number of grounds. Such criticism tends to fall into one or more of three categories, relating to the limitations in principle of quantitative studies of policy outputs, the structural position of local government in the policy system, or deficiencies in the way this method of analysis has been applied in practice.

(a) Limitations of quantitative approaches to the study of policy outputs:

One of the major difficulties of statistical analyses of policy outputs is the identification of appropriate operational measures of policy outputs. Perhaps the most frequently employed is that of per capita expenditure on a given service. However, high levels of expenditure on a given service area may simply reflect higher local costs, or other local factors and are not necessarily related to the quantity or quality of policy outputs. Indeed there may be other measures (e.g. the number of professionals employed in the service area, the area of indoor sports space available per hour) which might be more appropriate than financial indicators as measures of policy output for many elements of leisure policy. However, this would not obviate

the difficulty that such quantitative indicators cannot be said to reflect the *quality* of policy outputs.

Sharpe (1981) also notes that political policy differences which are fundamental may well not be represented in changes in the level of expenditure for a service. Redirection of spending rather than the changes in overall levels of expenditure may indicate significant policy change. Furthermore as Danziger (1978) demonstrates one of the most powerful determinants of expenditure levels may be the previous year's spending since much expenditure is committed by previous policy decisions.

(b) The Position of Local Government in the Structure of Public Policy:

Adversarial politics in local government might be said to be a marginal phenomenon, in that local government spending is controlled more closely than ever by the economic policy requirements of central government since the advent of spending limits and rate-capping. Furthermore if, as Downs' (1957) suggests, politicians attempt to 'buy votes' by increasing spending on services, regardless of party affiliation, inter-party differences may well be unimportant.

(c) Deficiencies in the Application of Statistical Methods in Output

Analysis: As critics of systems theory have pointed out, socio-economic variables employed as indicators of 'need' cannot be said to 'cause' or 'determine' variations in expenditure by local authorities, though they may be statistically associated with such variations. However output studies have paid little attention to the linkage between variations in socio-demographic variables and expenditure patterns (Hansen 1981). There is a need therefore to clarify the nature of the the link between 'needs' and expenditure outcomes if output studies are to provide more than a description of correlated data.

A number of statistical problems have been noted in respect of output studies which employ regression or partial correlation techniques to separate out the statistical influence of political variables on policy

outcomes. One of the crucial problems encountered in output studies in the attempt to isolate the influence of a single variable or a set of variables is that of 'collinearity'. In the context of the concerns of this chapter the problem is one of differentiating the effects of political variables from those of indicators of need (e.g. levels of unemployment) or of resources (e.g. rate base) when those areas of highest unemployment and low rate base are almost invariably in urban, often inner city locations, under Labour Party control. The problem is one of deciding whether high spending in these areas is a function of the recognition of needs, or of high levels of block grant, or of the political values of local decision makers.

Further criticisms have referred to the failure of particular output studies to comment on whether data employed meet the requirements of the statistical techniques adopted in analysis.

Most studies have used multiple partial correlations or multiple regression models but there is little recognition in these studies of the numerous statistical assumptions which must be satisfied in order to obtain reliable results.

(Pinch 1985: p. 74)

Pinch also goes on to point out that some studies which quote relatively low r^2 values do not consider the variance which is left unexplained by the analysis, which in some cases is a more significant factor than that which is explained.

Some response to the kinds of criticism raised here is necessary. In undertaking the analysis of leisure policy this chapter employs regression analysis. However the shortcomings of output analysis are not ignored. In complementing the statistical analysis of this chapter with further qualitative case study material in ensuing chapters, there is a recognition that financial output measures are not necessarily sensitive indicators of policy outputs. Nevertheless the use of such dependent variables does permit legitimate generalisation about patterns of leisure expenditure. The use of relatively insensitive output measures is the

price to be paid for generalisable results. Moreover, although political differences are not *necessarily* reflected in expenditure levels, they are perhaps more likely to be reflected in expenditure levels in the current political climate, given the ideological commitment of the New Right to reduction of public expenditure. It should also be noted that the political climate has changed considerably since Downs developed his explanation of political behaviour. Some contemporary Conservatives might, for example, be said to be 'buying votes', not by increasing expenditure on services but by reducing individual tax and rates bills.

The notion of local authorities as mere agents of central government is one which underestimates the level of discretion local governments enjoy, and their ingenuity in evading central government control (Newton and Karran 1985). Even if central government can be said to be the major influence in determining overall levels of expenditure for individual authorities, the level of spending in particular service areas is less likely to be 'controlled', particularly where such services are not mandatory.

Finally, in addressing some of the statistical deficiencies of output studies the method adopted in this chapter will follow Hansen (1981) who deals with the problem of collinearity of political and other variables, and with the problem of the failure to articulate the links between needs and output in the following way. Hansen argues that 'needs' variables should not be seen as determining policy outputs but rather as the criteria on which politicians base their decisions about what constitutes an appropriate level of funding, or an appropriate set of policy goals.

How, then, are we to interpret the relationships between socio-economic variables and political factors? Rather than regarding socio-economic factors as causes of the decisions it seems more reasonable to regard them as decision-making criteria upon which public authorities may act. It is important to notice the difference between a causal factor and a decision-making criterion. While a causal factor is automatically related to the effect variables, the relationship between a decision-making criterion and the decision has to be established by the decision-making body. In other

words the decision makers select the criterion upon which the decision is going to be based, and this selection process will be determined by the political values of the decision-makers.

(Hansen 1981: p.31).


Hansen argues therefore that by evaluating how 'needs' variables are transformed into expenditure decisions in Conservative controlled authorities, and comparing them with the way in which 'needs' variables are transformed into expenditure decisions in Labour controlled authorities, a picture can be built up of the influence of political factors on expenditure decisions. Thus separate regression equations are obtained for Labour controlled authorities, for Conservative controlled authorities and for all authorities, and the regression coefficients and intercepts compared. If one hypothesises that, for example, Labour controlled authorities are likely to be more responsive to levels of unemployment than Conservative controlled authorities in terms of the amounts they are willing to spend per head on leisure services, one would expect to find the regression slopes of the relative dimensions indicated in figure 4.1, with steeper slopes illustrating greater sensitivity on the part of the dependent variable to changes in the independent variable. The model employed here obviates the need to enter correlated political and needs data in the same regression equation, since it employs simple regression analysis. Furthermore it provides a more rational, if idealised, explanation of the role of socio-economic variables in the policy decision-making process.

4.3 METHODOLOGY


Three categories of local authority are treated in the the statistical analysis of local government leisure expenditure - Metropolitan Districts, Non-metropolitan Districts and Non-metropolitan Counties. In each case separate simple regression equations are obtained - for all the local authorities in the category; for those which are Labour controlled; and for those which are Conservative controlled. The unstandardised regression coefficients and the slopes obtained for all three regression equations within a given category are

FIGURE 4.1: ANTICIPATED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SLOPES AND INTERCEPTS OF REGRESSION EQUATIONS FOR LABOUR CONTROLLED, CONSERVATIVE CONTROLLED, AND ALL LOCAL AUTHORITIES.

(A) For Per Capita Expenditure on Leisure Services, Sport, Cultural Services and Personal Social Services



(B) For Income-cost Ratios for Sport, and Cultural Services



then compared to establish whether the anticipated relationship is that which obtains.

The variables employed in the analysis are listed in table 4.1. The dependent variables, measures of policy output, are financial measures drawn from the local government revenue expenditure estimates for the year 1982-3 published by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy. Data on financial outturn were not available for this analysis. However, estimates are likely to be a more accurate reflection of the policy intentions of the party in power than the actual financial outturn, particularly when a party assumes power in May and inherits the financial decisions of its predecessor. Changing expenditure plans in mid-financial year is a difficult manoeuvre, and policy intentions may therefore be less clearly reflected in actual expenditure than in budgeted estimates for the following year. Revenue rather than capital estimates are employed because capital estimates vary from year to year in a way which clearly will not allow an accurate assessment in any given year of the relative commitment of an authority to spending in the leisure area. Finally, analysis is restricted to a single year because of the lack of consistency in accounting practices across time.

The dependent variables employed were those of net per capita expenditure on sport and recreation, on cultural services, and on all leisure services, on personal social services (for the purposes of comparison with another service area) and income-cost ratios for sport and recreation, and for cultural services. The use of income-cost ratios as dependent variables reflects the expectation that, in Conservative controlled authorities, greater emphasis will be given to the (partial) recovery of costs by revenue generating services.

The independent variables entered into the regression equations fall into four categories, those of 'indicators of need', 'indicators of social disorganisation', 'indicators of available resources' and 'political indicators'. In the discussion of political ideologies and their relationship to leisure policy in the last chapter, the point was made that a 'dual rationale' for public sector leisure services was evident in the policy literature. The White Paper ²*Sport and Recreation* (D.O.E. 1975) illustrates this point when it argues that recreation

TABLE 4.1: VARIABLES EMPLOYED IN THE REGRESSION ANALYSIS

(A) INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	<u>Indicators of Leisure Need</u>	<u>Indicators of 'Social Disorganisation</u>	<u>Indicators of Need for Personal Social Services</u>
% Economically active males seeking work (unemployment)	*	*	*
% population aged 16 - 24		*	
% households with no access to car	*		
% households lacking or share bathroom	*		*
% households > 1 person per room	*		*
% heads of household born in New Commonwealth or Pakistan	*	*	*
% heads of household in social classes IV or V	*		*
% one parent families		*	*
% pensionable age			*
% aged 0 - 4			*
Incidents of 'Criminal Damage' per 1,000 population		*	

Composite measures of 'Leisure Need', 'Social Disorganisation', and 'Personal Social Services Need' are constructed by summarising the Z scores for the variables asterisked.

Indicators of Locally Available Resources

'Block grant and other non-local income per head', 'product of a ip. rate', and 'population size'.

Indicators of Political History and Disposition

'% Labour Councillors 1981/2', and 'political history index'.

(B) DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Per capita expenditure on leisure services²

Per capita expenditure on sport and recreation²

Per capita expenditure on cultural services

Per capita expenditure on personal social services³

Income-cost ratio for sport and recreation²

Income cost ratio for cultural services

¹ Metropolitan Districts only

² District authorities only

³ Non-metropolitan Counties and Metropolitan Districts only.

should be seen not only as a right of citizenship (Coalter et al.1986), "one of the community's everyday needs", but also as a means of combatting social disorganisation, the alienation (particularly of the urban young) which manifests itself in high levels of vandalism and sporadic bouts of social disorder. This distinction between 'needs' and 'indicators of social disorganisation' is operationalised in the statistical analysis by the inclusion of both categories of variables (see table 4.1).

The concept of 'need' as it is applied here relates to the criteria of 'need' employed by the policy makers. The criteria adopted by the Sports Council in identifying areas of special need (to benefit from the grant aid scheme of the same name) are employed here - i.e. unemployment rate, housing density, car ownership, housing lacking amenities, concentration of heads of household born in the New Commonwealth or Pakistan and those in social classes IV and V. Clearly some of these indicators are also indicators of 'social disorganisation'. Much of the concern shown by policy makers with high levels of unemployment and with concentrations of black minorities might be seen as a function of the potential for social disorder among the urban disadvantaged. These two independent variables are therefore treated as indicators of both 'need' and 'social disorganisation'. Other indicators of disorganisation are those of concentration of young people, of one parent families, and incidents of criminal damage per thousand population. Finally composite measures of 'leisure need' and 'social disorganisation' (as well as 'personal social services need') are developed by summing the 'z scores' for the constituent variables.

Three variables are employed as indicators of available resources, the product of a lp. rate per head, the per capita size of block grant, and the size of population. The last of these is included to reflect the economies or diseconomies of scale which may result from serving larger populations.

Finally two political variables are entered in the regression equations for the category 'all authorities'. These are the proportion of Labour councillors, and 'political history index'. The proportion of Conservative councillors was not included as a political variable since this figure was often difficult to gauge. Returns to the *Municipal Year Book* for example occasionally declared councillors

to be 'Independents' one year and 'Conservatives' or 'Independent Conservatives' the next.

The variable 'political history index' was constructed to reflect the effects of political control over a period of years for any given authority. Financial estimates are made up in a way which is inevitably related to the expenditure of the previous year. Thus even if political control of a local authority was an important influence on per capita expenditure on leisure *in the long run*, this would not necessarily be reflected in measures of political disposition at any given point in time. Thus the index was constructed by taking 1974-5 as the base year, the first year of existence for most English local authorities, and for this and every subsequent year in which the Labour Party controlled the council, adding a score of one to the index for that authority. For every year of Conservative control a score of one was subtracted from the index and for every year of a hung council or Liberal or Independent control, a score of nought was added to the index. The possible scores of local authorities therefore ranged from minus eight for those authorities under Conservative control for all eight years, to one of plus eight for those authorities under continuous Labour control for the the same period. Measurement of the cumulative effect of party control is something which has been neglected in other analyses of service provision and inclusion of the index as an independent variable is therefore intended to provide an indication of the effect of political control over time on service expenditure.

Before going on to discuss the results of the regression analysis, some preliminary remarks should be made about the sources and reliability of the data employed. Financial information relating to local authority expenditure is drawn from the publications of the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (C.I.P.F.A. 1982a, 1982b, 1982c), while demographic data are drawn from the reports of the 1981 census (O.P.C.S. 1982). Information relating to the political composition of local authorities for the period was obtained from *The Municipal Year Book* for each of the years 1975 to 1982. Details of rates of vandalism, or 'criminal damage'² were drawn from information supplied to the author by individual Chief Constables of the English Police Authorities. A relatively full inventory of these crime statistics could only be obtained for

the Metropolitan Districts and London Boroughs, and this variable was therefore excluded from the analysis of Non-metropolitan Districts and Counties.

In the case of both C.I.P.F.A. estimates and criminal statistics, some caution should be exercised in employing this data since both may be subject to variations in accounting procedures and other factors militating against comparison. It should, for example, be noted that police authority boundaries (and divisional boundaries) are not always strictly contiguous with local authority boundaries. Furthermore, C.I.P.F.A. estimates for leisure and recreation exclude expenditure which may appear in the education budget or under other committee heads. For this reason analysis of Non-metropolitan Counties' expenditure is restricted to expenditure on cultural services, on personal social services, and on the income-cost ratio for cultural services. Stabler (1985) also notes a range of further problems for comparability of local authority accounts including variation in accounting methods (e.g. dealing with the allocation of administrative overheads or recharges from other departments) and the treatment of taxes and subsidies (e.g. treatment of V.A.T. for trading services). It seems likely that these influences on the data set are random, and that therefore the net effect will be to make the coefficients of determination obtained (which are in effect measures of non-random distribution of the data) underestimates of the explained variance. They are unlikely therefore, if random, to affect systematically the relative proportions of variance explained, or the slopes and intercepts for Labour, Conservative and All Authorities.

Regression analysis is employed here with the populations of Metropolitan Districts (N=68), of Non-metropolitan Counties (N=39) and virtually the population of Non-metropolitan Districts (n=291, data for seven districts being unavailable). The regression technique is in this case a descriptive rather than an inferential tool and the major concern in this type of application is therefore to ensure that the linear equations obtained are accurate summaries of the relationships between variables. Where non-linear relationships were suspected transformations were undertaken to ascertain whether an improved linear fit could be obtained³.

4.4 REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF LOCAL AUTHORITY LEISURE EXPENDITURE: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

In order to structure the discussion of the major findings for this analysis seven hypotheses have been formulated indicating some expected outcomes. These are as follows;

- I Indicators of 'need' and 'social disorganisation' will explain greater variance in the case of per capita expenditure on leisure services, and on sport and recreation, than on cultural services.
- II Dependent variables will be more sensitive to increases in 'indicators of need' in the case of Labour controlled authorities than in the case of Conservative controlled authorities.
- III The differences between Conservative and Labour controlled authorities in coefficients of regression and intercepts will be greatest in the case of Metropolitan Districts.
- IV In the case of Conservative controlled authorities more variance in dependent variables relating to leisure services and to sport and recreation will be explained by 'indicators of social disorganisation' than by 'indicators of need'.
- V Per capita expenditure on cultural services will be more sensitive than expenditure on sport and recreation to increases in population size for District authorities.
- VI The income-cost ratios for sport and recreation will be more clearly influenced by levels of 'need' and 'social disorganisation' than income-cost ratios for cultural services (with sensitivity to 'need' and 'social disorganisation' variables being indicated by a negative regression slope).

- VII Differences between Conservative and Labour controlled authorities will be more evident in the case of the dependent variable 'income-cost ratio for sport and recreation' than for 'income-cost ratio for cultural services'.

The most substantial element which goes to make up expenditure on leisure services is that of expenditure on sport and recreation. Expenditure on cultural services predominantly finances what might be termed the 'high' arts - theatre, museum and art gallery subsidy (viz. C.I.P.F.A. 1982). Cultural expenditure is therefore less likely to be regarded as a tool of social policy and to be sensitive to increases in need or social disorganisation. Two of the above hypotheses (the first and sixth) reflect the argument that, while sports policy is seen to have direct and positive consequences for certain target groups, particularly the young urban disadvantaged, cultural services are less likely to be perceived as having an impact on those groups.

The second and seventh hypotheses reflect both the concern of Conservative controlled authorities to comply with central government spending limits, and the antipathy of New Right and traditional Conservative ideology to the recognition of leisure 'need' to be serviced by the public sector. These factors are seen as rendering them less likely than their Labour controlled counterparts to respond to perceived increases in 'need' by greater investment in sport and leisure. The third hypothesis suggests that political differences will be most acute in the Metropolitan Districts since the major areas of political contention at local level have been urban areas subject to significant inner city problems. The fourth hypothesis suggests that for Conservative authorities at least, increasing levels of social disorganisation are more likely to influence expenditure on leisure services than increases in 'need'. Finally, cultural provision may often be centralised in major cultural venues in a way which is less likely to be the case for sport and recreation, and this would seem likely to be reflected in the data. This proposition is operationalised (though somewhat crudely) in the fifth hypothesis.

The results of the analysis are summarised in tables 4.2.1 to 4.4.3 at the end of the chapter. The following commentary draws on the detail from those tables.

METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS

(a) Dependent variable - per capita expenditure on leisure services (see table 4.2.1).

For this dependent variable, unstandardised regression coefficients are generally greater in the case of Labour controlled authorities for both 'indicators of need' and of 'social disorganisation', the only exception being that of the independent variable unemployment, where slopes are relatively similar. However intercepts are higher in the case of Labour controlled authorities for four of the eleven needs / social disorganisation variables - unemployment, ethnicity, housing density, and the composite variable 'leisure needs'. (It should be noted that the relative size of the intercept, particularly where the difference is small, is a less crucial factor in comparison of the regression equations than the steepness of slope.) The general pattern in respect of needs variables is broadly as anticipated therefore, with expenditure rates increasing more substantially in Labour controlled authorities with increases in need variables. However, expenditure rates on leisure services are also more sensitive to increases in social disorganisation than is the case with Conservative controlled authorities, and the overall level of variance explained by indicators of social disorganisation is higher for Labour authorities than that explained by needs variables.

Individual independent variables of particular importance in explaining variance in levels of expenditure on leisure services are 'incidents of criminal damage', which alone "explains" 70% of the variance for Labour controlled authorities, 17% for Conservative and 44% for all Metropolitan Districts; 'proportion of the population aged 16-24' - 46% in Labour controlled authorities, 21% in Conservative and 38% in all Metropolitan Districts; 'lack of access to a car' - 51% in Labour controlled authorities, 32% in Conservative and 42% in all Metropolitan Districts; the composite variable 'leisure need' - 39% in Labour controlled authorities, 37% in Conservative and 38% in all Metropolitan

Districts; and the composite variable 'social disorganisation' - 53% in Labour controlled authorities, 32% in Conservative and 37% in all Metropolitan Districts.

Independent variables relating to locally available resources produce relatively low r^2 values. It should also be noted that the 'political history index' explains greater variance (20%) than 'the proportion of Labour councillors' (11%).

(b) Per capita expenditure on sport and recreation (see table 4.2.2).

A similar pattern emerges for this dependent variable, which is not surprising since expenditure on sport and recreation constitutes the major element in all leisure expenditure. For all 'needs' and 'social disorganisation' variables, the slopes are greater in respect of Labour controlled authorities, with intercepts also being lower except for the independent variables 'unemployment', 'households lacking amenities', and the composite variables 'leisure need' and 'social disorganisation'.

Individual variables explaining greatest variance in sport and recreation expenditure are also similar to those for all leisure, with 'incidents of criminal damage' - 58% in Labour controlled authorities, 18% in Conservative and 38% in all Metropolitan Districts; 'lack of access to a car' - 48% in Labour controlled authorities, 23% in Conservative, and 41% in all Metropolitan Districts; and the composite variables 'leisure need' - 38% in Labour controlled authorities, 25% in Conservative, and 37% in all Metropolitan Districts; and 'social disorganisation' - 44% in Labour controlled authorities, 21% in Conservative, and 31% in all Metropolitan Districts.

Resource variables are once again unimportant in terms of explained variance, while the independent variable 'political history index' generates an r^2 value of .20.

(c) Per capita expenditure on cultural services (see table 4.2.3).

In contrast to the findings for the first two dependent variables, indicators of need and of social 'disorganisation' are relatively unimportant in terms of explained variance. Indeed for some of these independent variables a negative slope is obtained e.g. the unstandardised regression coefficients 'B' for 'unemployment' (B = -.01 Labour; B = -.09 Conservative).

Conversely, however, resource variables are more important in explaining variance. 'The product of a 1p. rate' is strongly positively related to the dependent variable (standardised regression coefficient β = .66 Labour; β = .45 Conservative), while 'block grant per head of population' is negatively related to spending on cultural services in Conservative controlled authorities (β = -.60). The variable 'product of a 1p. rate' is a crude measure of local affluence, while block grant is related to deprivation (since it is a fiscal means of equalising available resources). Population size is important (β = .57) and the composite variable 'resources' explains 35% of variance in the case of Labour controlled authorities.

(d) Income-cost ratio for sport and recreation services (see table 4.2.4).

The expected direction of the slope for regressions of all the income-cost ratio dependent variables with 'needs' and 'social disorganisation' independent variables is negative, since as 'need' or 'social disorganisation' increases, one would expect a lesser emphasis on revenue generation. Similarly, the expected relationship between intercepts for Labour controlled and Conservative authorities is reversed, so that Labour authorities (if they are more sensitive to needs) are seen as likely to have higher intercepts (and steeper negative slopes) than their Conservative counterparts. With the exception of two regression equations, slopes are negative for these independent variables, the exceptions being 'unemployment' (Conservative B = +.006) and 'proportion of heads of households in social classes IV and V' (Conservative B = +.001). Apart from these two exceptions, slopes are generally negative but they are steeper in the case of Conservative authorities, though the differences are marginal for most independent variables.

The proportion of variance explained by individual independent variables is generally poor with only five regression equations out of forty six providing significant⁴ regression coefficients, none relating to Labour controlled authorities. Of the significant r^2 values, the strongest is that for 'incidents of criminal damage' where explained variance in the case of Conservative authorities is 46%, and all Metropolitan Districts 13%.

The lack of well defined political differences for this dependent variable is signified in the low standardised regression coefficients for the two political variables which for all Metropolitan Districts were as follows - 'proportion Labour councillors' $\beta = -.06$; 'political history index' $\beta = -.16$. 'Indicators of locally available resources' explain little variance in this instance.

(e) Income-cost ratio for cultural services (see table 4.2.5).

Slopes for this dependent variable are predominantly negative, the exceptions being 'proportion of the population aged 16-24' (Labour controlled authorities $\beta = +.002$; Conservative $\beta = +.01$), 'proportion of one parent households' (Labour controlled authorities $\beta = +.002$; Conservative $\beta = +.02$) and 'incidents of criminal damage' (Labour $\beta = +.003$). However, political differences are marginal and resource variables explain little of the variance.

(f) Per capita expenditure on personal social services (see table 4.2.6).

The indicators of need for this dependent variable differ from those applied for the leisure related dependent variables. They include for example 'the proportion of the population aged less than four' or 'of pensionable age' (see table 4.1). However, the relationship between 'need' and per capita expenditure on personal social services is less marked than that between 'need' and per capita expenditure on leisure services or on sport and recreation. Only one of the independent variables, 'unemployment' provides significant regression coefficients for Labour, Conservative, and all Metropolitan Districts, explaining 20% of variance in Labour controlled authorities, 54% in Conservative authorities, and

43% in all Metropolitan Districts. Indeed some needs variables are negatively related to expenditure levels, namely those of 'proportion of population of pensionable age' (Labour controlled authorities $B = -1.6$; Conservative $B = -1.8$; all Metropolitan Districts $B = -2.4$), 'housing density' (Labour controlled authorities $B = -4.99$; Conservative -2.07 ; all Metropolitan Districts $B = -1.41$), 'proportion of one parent households' (Labour controlled authorities $B = -3.93$), and the composite variables 'leisure needs' (Labour $B = -1.62$) and 'social disorganisation' (Labour $B = -2.78$).

In terms of the relative slopes and intercepts for regression equations for Conservative and Labour authorities with needs and social disorganisation variables, the unstandardised regression coefficients are generally greater, and intercepts lower for the Conservative authorities, contrary to expectation. Furthermore, political variables in regressions for all Metropolitan Districts explain only 12% (proportion of Labour councillors) and 7% (political history index) of variance for this dependent variable.

The composite variable 'resources' explains 35% of the variance for all Metropolitan Districts, and 25% for Labour controlled authorities, though this seems to be in part a function of the relationship between expenditure and population size.

NON-METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS

(a) Per capita expenditure on leisure services (see table 4.3.1).

Comparison of the regression coefficients for Labour and Conservative controlled authorities reveals a significant departure from the expected relationship, with the slope of the regression line being steeper for Labour authorities for only three of the ten independent variables which are categorised as indicators of need and social disorganisation, while the intercept is lower in only two cases. Indeed, for Labour controlled authorities, per capita expenditure on leisure services is positively related to 'product of lp. rate' ($\beta = .41$), while the regression coefficients with the independent variable 'block grant and other non-

local income' for Conservative ($\beta = .55$) and for all Non-metropolitan Districts ($\beta = .36$) are significant.

Although 'the proportion of Labour councillors' explains 26% of the variance for all Non-metropolitan Districts, the composite variable 'leisure needs' is significant only for Conservative controlled ($\beta = .52$) and for all Non-metropolitan Districts ($\beta = .53$). The composite variable 'social disorganisation' generates significant regression coefficients for all three types of Non-metropolitan District (Labour controlled authorities $\beta = .42$; Conservative $\beta = .37$; all Non-metropolitan Districts $\beta = .53$). The differences between Conservative and Labour controlled authorities would seem to be not simply weaker than those for Metropolitan Districts, but rather of a different order

(b) Per capita expenditure on sport and recreation (see table 4.3.2).

Although the proportion of Labour councillors explains 30% of the variance in this dependent variable, differences between Labour and Conservative authorities are again not those anticipated. For nine of the ten independent variables in the 'needs' and 'social disorganisation' categories, the slope of the regression line is steeper and the intercept lower for Conservative authorities. The regression coefficients for the Conservative authorities in the case of the composite variables 'leisure needs' ($\beta = .37$) and 'social disorganisation' ($\beta = .35$) are significantly greater than those for their Labour counterparts. These independent variables explain 23% and 24% of the variance in the dependent variable for all Non-metropolitan Districts.

(c) Per capita expenditure on cultural services (see table 4.3.3)

Once again 'proportion of Labour councillors' is positively related to the dependent variable ($\beta = .35$). However for only one of the ten independent variables of 'need' or 'social disorganisation' is the regression coefficient greater for Labour authorities or the intercept smaller. Indeed for five of those independent variables the slope for Labour authorities is negative, including

those for the composite variables 'leisure needs' ($\beta = -.07$) and 'social disorganisation' ($\beta = -.07$).

Resource variables (including population size) are relatively unimportant, though once again for Labour authorities spending is positively related to 'product of 1p. rate', suggesting that more affluent Labour controlled authorities spent more on cultural services.

(d) Income-cost ratio for sport and recreation (see table 4.3.4).

For only one of nine indicators of need or social disorganisation is the slope for Labour authorities lower than that for Conservative controlled councils, though in most cases the regression coefficients are very similar. Variance explained is generally low, but if anything the dependent variable seems to be more sensitive to increased levels of need and social disorganisation for Conservative authorities.

(e) Income-cost ratio for cultural services (see table 4.3.5)

For none of the nine independent 'needs' or 'social disorganisation' variables does the regression coefficient for Conservative authorities exceed that obtained for Labour authorities. This suggests that income-cost ratios fall in proportion to increases in need / social disorganisation more substantially in Conservative authorities. Indeed for five of these independent variables the regression coefficient for Labour authorities is positive, indicating that as these indicators of 'need' / 'social disorganisation' increase, so the ratio of income generated to costs of the service increases.

However, perhaps the most significant feature of the results of regression equations for this dependent variable is the low level of variance explained. In no case is the r^2 value obtained in double figures.

NON-METROPOLITAN COUNTIES

(a) Per capita expenditure on cultural services (see table 4.4.1).

There is a negative relationship between some indicators of need / social disorganisation and the dependent variable for both Labour authorities - 'households lacking amenities' ($\beta = -.65$), 'proportion of one parent households' ($\beta = -.07$), and the composite variable 'leisure needs' ($\beta = -.09$); and for Conservative authorities - 'proportion of the population aged 16-24' ($\beta = -.02$), 'housing density' ($\beta = -.23$), 'proportion of heads of household born in the New Commonwealth or Pakistan' ($\beta = -.53$), 'proportion of one parent households' ($\beta = -.14$) and the composite variable 'social disorganisation' ($\beta = -.08$). The two political variables 'political history index' and 'proportion of Labour councillors' explain only 2% and 1% of the variance in cultural expenditure respectively, and the political influence on this dependent variable would therefore appear to be minimal.

The major feature of the data is once again the lack of explained variance. Where reasonably high regression coefficients are obtained they relate to indicators of need or social disorganisation with a negative sign, suggesting that to some degree cultural expenditure was higher for less disadvantaged counties, though it may be the case that the figures for counties as a whole mask to some degree concentration of expenditure in disadvantaged populations.

(b) Income-cost ratio for cultural services (see table 4.4.2)

In this instance the political variables 'proportion of Labour councillors' ($\beta = .32$) and 'political history index' ($\beta = .13$) are mildly positively associated with the dependent variable. This is also reflected in the relatively high, positive standardised regression coefficients for Labour authority regressions with indicators of need and social disorganisation - 'unemployment' ($\beta = .79$), 'proportion of population aged 16-24' ($\beta = .75$), 'households with no access to a car' ($\beta = .50$), 'housing density' ($\beta = .51$), 'proportion of one parent households' ($\beta = .53$), 'proportion of heads of household in social classes IV and V' ($\beta =$

.67), 'leisure need' ($\beta = .52$), 'social disorganisation' ($\beta = .64$). It would seem that the higher levels of need or social disorganisation in Labour controlled authorities are, the greater the income-cost ratio. This may reflect greater efforts to finance 'marketable' services from user fees to off-set the costs of more basic social provision.

(c) Per capita expenditure on personal social services (see table 4.4.3).

For the nine independent variables which are indicators of social disorganisation or of needs, five have slopes for Labour authorities which are, as anticipated, greater than those for their Conservative counterparts, though in only one case is the intercept smaller for the Labour authorities.

Resource variables explain little variance, though the 'proportion of Labour councillors' does explain approximately one quarter of the variance in the dependent variable ($\beta = .49$). However the regression coefficient for the composite variable 'personal social services needs' is lower in the case of Labour authorities ($\beta = .16$) than either Conservative authorities ($\beta = .47$) or all Non-metropolitan Counties ($\beta = .55$), while in the case of the composite variable 'social disorganisation' the rank order is different (Labour $\beta = .47$; Conservative $\beta = .08$; all Non-metropolitan Counties $\beta = .50$). Political differences are evident in the data, though they are not consistent across the range of independent variables employed in the regression equations.

4.5 CONCLUSIONS

It is worth emphasising a number of key points which emerge from the regression analysis reported in this chapter. There is clear evidence that levels of expenditure on sport and recreation, and on leisure services, are more closely related to indicators of 'need' and 'social disorganisation' than is the case for cultural expenditure (or indeed, in the case of Metropolitan Districts, for expenditure on personal social services). Thus the analysis supports the first of the hypotheses outlined earlier in the chapter.

There is also support for the argument (hypothesis III) that in explaining expenditure on sport and recreation, and on leisure, party political differences between Labour and Conservative controlled authorities will be greater in the case of Metropolitan Districts than in Non-metropolitan Districts. The differences between Labour and Conservative controlled authorities are, for Metropolitan Districts, of the order anticipated, with the dependent variables of sport and recreation, and leisure spending, being more 'sensitive' to changes in 'need' or 'social disorganisation'. However this contrast is not apparent in the data for Non-metropolitan Districts. Although in the case of Non-metropolitan Districts expenditure on sport and recreation and leisure services are generally sensitive to changes in need and social disorganisation, such sensitivity is *not* more evident in the case of Labour controlled authorities. This finding may reflect the fact that adversarial party politics is largely a feature of Metropolitan local government. The analysis therefore only provides qualified support for the claim (hypothesis II) that steeper regression coefficients would be obtained in the case of Labour authorities for the regressions involving independent 'needs' and 'social disorganisation' variables with the dependent variables of per capita expenditure on sport and recreation and on leisure services. This hypothesis is confirmed only in relation to the regression equations for Metropolitan Districts.

In the preceding chapter it was pointed out that the notion of 'leisure needs', to be met by the public sector, is inconsistent with the political values of both the New Right and traditional Conservatism. Furthermore, although there was a shared concern between successive Labour and Conservative governments with leisure and social order, the concern to recognise and meet leisure needs was a feature of the Labour Government's White Paper *Sport and Recreation* which had not been taken up in policy pronouncements by Conservative politicians. However the analysis indicates that variables which are indicators of social disorganisation are not consistently better predictors than 'needs' variables of expenditure on sport and recreation, or on leisure, for Conservative authorities. There was no evidence therefore to support the fourth hypothesis. In fact, in the case of Non-metropolitan Districts, Conservative authorities were slightly *more* responsive to changes in needs variables in terms of sport and leisure expenditures than their Labour counterparts.

Political differences in respect of sport and recreation income-cost ratios are not clearly defined. If anything, this dependent variable seems to be marginally more sensitive to increases in 'need' or 'social disorganisation' in the case of Conservative controlled authorities, and hypothesis VII is therefore not supported by the data. This type of analysis cannot clarify whether any relationship between income-cost ratios and 'need' or 'social disorganisation' variables is the result of political decisions to raise revenue from charges in less deprived communities, or is simply a function of market potential, with revenue being less available in deprived communities. Notwithstanding this reservation, there are generally negative relationships evident between indicators of 'need' and 'social disorganisation' on the one hand, and 'income-cost ratios for sport and recreation' on the other. These negative relationships are generally not as strong as the positive relationships of per capita expenditure on sport and recreation or leisure with these independent variables, but are clearly stronger than those between the 'need' and 'social disorganisation' variables and the income-cost ratios for cultural services, supporting hypothesis VI.

Separating out the effects of the resource variables 'product of a 1p. rate' and 'block grant and other non-local income per head' is difficult, since these are related (negatively and positively respectively) to 'need' and 'social disorganisation' variables. However it should be noted that where relationships between these two resource variables and the dependent variables do occur, they are generally weaker than the relationships between some of the 'need' and 'social disorganisation' variables with the dependent variable.

Finally, it had been anticipated that per capita expenditure on cultural services would be related to population size in the case of the district authorities (hypothesis V). There is a mild positive relationship in all cases - for the Metropolitan Districts, Labour controlled $\beta = .57$, Conservative $\beta = .35$, all Metropolitan Districts $\beta = .26$; for the Non-metropolitan Districts, Labour controlled $\beta = .08$, Conservative $\beta = .35$, all Non-metropolitan Districts $\beta = .28$. Cultural services expenditure presents an appropriate variable for analysis employing concepts drawn from 'central place theory' (Newton 1981) since cultural centres, particularly those serving large conurbations, might be expected to

exhibit higher levels of per capita expenditure on such services. Similarly, one might expect amenity maintenance expenditure to be higher in seaside resorts, spas, and other traditional tourist destinations. Newton's analysis, however, was undertaken employing pre-1974 local government boundaries, which allowed a greater disaggregation of the data (with more and smaller local government units) and also the use of existing classifications of County Boroughs. Although this approach to expenditure analysis is attractive in principle, the newer, larger, local government constituencies present considerable practical difficulties for its application.

The regression analysis reported in this chapter generates a set of generalisable conclusions about the covariates of leisure expenditures, and points to the role of party politics in Metropolitan authorities in influencing expenditure levels. A more sensitive, qualitative analysis is essential if the nature of policy differences between the major political parties at local level is to be clarified. The following three chapters will therefore be concerned to evaluate the role of politics and other factors in determining policy outcomes for one particular Metropolitan District.

Chapter 4: Analysing Local Government Leisure Expenditure

TABLE 4.2.1: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (UNSTANDARDISED) 'R', R² AND CONSTANTS FOR SIMPLE BIVARIATE REGRESSION EQUATIONS:

METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS	DEPENDENT VARIABLE = TOTAL PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE ON LEISURE SERVICES					
	LABOUR (N=41)	CONSERVATIVE (N=22)	ALL (N=69)	LABOUR (N=41)	CONSERVATIVE (N=22)	ALL (N=69)
<u>§ Economically Active Seeking Work</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.46	.48	.68	.007	.007	.005
'r' ('r ² ') =	.14 (.02)	.27 (.07)	.25 (.06)*	.20 (.04)	.22 (.05)	.14 (.02)
Constant 'A' =	16.09	12.15	12.92	18.46	42.04	17.29
<u>§ Aged 16-74</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	4.94	1.36	4.06	.025		.05
'r' ('r ² ') =	.68 (.46)***	.46 (.21)*	.62 (.38)*	.13 (.02)	Non-linear	.27 (.07)*
Constant 'A' =	-53.3	-40.1	-40.6	15.64		9.86
<u>§ Households with no Car</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.91	.25	.57	-.00001	.0002	-.00001
'r' ('r ² ') =	.72 (.51)***	.57 (.32)**	.65 (.42)***	.17 (.03)	.28 (.08)	.11 (.01)
Constant 'A' =	-25.0	6.1	-7.0	24.0	10.9	21.5
<u>§ Hhlds share / no bath</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	1.92	.63	1.77			.13
'r' ('r ² ') =	.61 (.37)***	.46 (.21)*	.60 (.36)***			.34 (.11)**
Constant 'A' =	7.56	12.94	12.38			12.33
<u>§ Hhlds > 1 Person per Room</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	2.44	1.24	3.05			6.08
'r' ('r ² ') =	.49 (.23)***	.53 (.28)**	.61 (.38)***			.45 (.20)***
Constant 'A' =	7.97	3.66	5.08			18.9
<u>§ Heads of Hhld from New Commonwealth or Pakistan</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.56	.44	.65	1.73	.65	1.34
'r' ('r ² ') =	.40 (.16)**	.46 (.21)*	.42 (.17)***	.63 (.39)***	.61 (.37)**	.62 (.38)***
Constant 'A' =	16.9	12.9	15.1	18.29	17.71	19.17
<u>§ 1 Parent Households</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	41.06	14.47		2.36	.93	1.81
'r' ('r ² ') =	.69 (.47)***	.30 (.09)	Non-linear	.72 (.53)***	.57 (.32)**	.61 (.37)***
Constant 'A' =	-4.75	7.79		19.98	16.62	19.60
<u>§ Heads of Household in Social Classes IV & V</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	1.22	.73	.79	-.14	-.10	.37
'r' ('r ² ') =	.40 (.16)**	.52 (.27)*	.37 (.14)**	.03 (.001)	.03 (.001)	.10 (.01)
Constant 'A' =	-2.27	5.99	6.05	-21.40	15.20	19.55
<u>Incidents of Criminal Damage per 1000 Popn.</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	11.6	.41	1.31			
'r' ('r ² ') =	.84 (.70)***	.42 (.17)**	.66 (.44)***			
Constant 'A' =	8.71	11.59	8.97			

*** significant at the 0.001 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; * significant at the 0.05 level

TABLE 4.2.2: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (UNSTANDARDISED) 'R', R² AND CONSTANTS FOR SIMPLE BIVARIATE REGRESSION EQUATIONS:

METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = NET PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE ON SPORT AND ACTIVE RECREATION

	LABOUR (N=41)	CONSERVATIVE (N=22)	ALL (N=69)	LABOUR (N=41)	CONSERVATIVE (N=22)	ALL (N=69)
<u>% Economically Active Seeking Work</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.49	.30	.56*	.0014	.0013	.0015
'r' ('r ² ') =	.19 (.04)	.21 (.04)	.29 (.08)	.06 (.003)	.05 (.003)	.06 (.003)
Constant 'A' =	9.45	8.73	8.20	14.30	10.23	13.01
<u>% Aged 16-24</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	3.17	.79	2.62	.02	-.02	.03
'r' ('r ² ') =	.58 (.34)***	.33 (.11)	.55 (.30)***	.17 (.03)	.28 (.08)	.28 (.08)*
Constant 'A' =	-32.89	-.51	-25.06	9.29	14.47	6.44
<u>% Households with no Car</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.65	.17	.41	-.00001	.00001	-.00001
'r' ('r ² ') =	.69 (.48)***	.48 (.23)**	.64 (.41)***	.24 (.06)	.09 (.01)	.15 (.02)
Constant 'A' =	-18.50	4.40	-5.21	17.81	9.60	15.57
<u>% Hhlds share / no bath</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	1.12	.388	1.06			1.01
'r' ('r ² ') =	.47 (.22)**	.36 (.13)	.50 (.25)***			.36 (.13)**
Constant 'A' =	10.44	9.24	9.35			8.13
<u>% Hhlds > 1 Person per Room</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	1.64	.82	1.68			43.67
'r' ('r ² ') =	.49 (.24)**	.44 (.19)*	.53 (.29)***			.45 (.20)***
Constant 'A' =	583	7.67	3.31			13.21
<u>% Heads of Hhld from New Commonwealth or Pakistan</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.39	.32	.44	.93	.43	.77
'r' ('r ² ') =	.37 (.14)*	.42 (.17)*	.39 (.15)*	.61 (.38)***	.50 (.25)*	.61 (.37)***
Constant 'A' =	-11.91	8.92	10.63	12.75	6.00	13.28
<u>% 1 Parent Households</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	2.56	.33	-. -	1.61	.56	1.18
'r' ('r ² ') =	.57 (.33)***	.09 (.01)	Non-linear	.67 (.44)***	.45 (.21)	.55 (.31)***
Constant 'A' =	-1.33	9.01		14.20	11.50	13.80
<u>Incidents of Criminal Damage per 1000 Popp.</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	1.09	.28	.87	-.31	-.35	.18
'r' ('r ² ') =	.76 (.59)***	.38 (.18)*	.62 (.38)***	.10 (.01)	.14 (.02)	.06 (.004)
Constant 'A' =	6.59	8.11	6.73	15.2	10.07	13.7
<u>% Heads of Household in Social Classes IV & V</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	1.11	.43	.63			
'r' ('r ² ') =	.48 (.23)***	.38 (.14)	.41 (.17)***			
Constant 'A' =	-6.42	5.27	2.82			

*** significant at the 0.001 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; * significant at the 0.05 level

TABLE 4.2.3: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (UNSTANDARDISED) 'R', R² AND CONSTANTS FOR SIMPLE BIVARIATE REGRESSION EQUATIONS:

METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS	DEPENDENT VARIABLE = NET PER CAPITA REVENUE EXPENDITURE ON CULTURAL SERVICES					
	LABOUR (N=41)	CONSERVATIVE (N=22)	ALL (N=69)	LABOUR (N=41)	CONSERVATIVE (N=22)	ALL (N=69)
<u>§ Economically Active Seeking Work</u>				<u>Product of 1p Rate</u>		
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.01	-.09	.003	.003	.005	.003
'r' ('r ² ') =	.02 (.0005)	.14 (.02)	.007 (.00)	.66 (.44)***	.45 (.20)*	.35 (.12)**
Constant 'A' =	1.64	1.82	1.54	.24	-.73	.53
<u>§ Aged 16-24</u>				<u>Block Grant and Other Non-local Income</u>		
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.0922	.14	.25	-.002	-.12	.003
'r' ('r ² ') =	.09 (.01)	.12 (.02)	.20 (.04)	.06 (.003)	.60 (.35)**	.19 (.03)
Constant 'A' =	.14	6.34	2.76	1.29	9.00	3.52
<u>§ Households with no Car</u>				<u>Population Size</u>		
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.02	-.04	.02	.000	.000	.000
'r' ('r ² ') =	.11 (.01)	.20 (.04)	.14 (.02)	.57 (.33)***	.35 (.12)	.26 (.01)
Constant 'A' =	.53	2.61	.44	.26	-.70	.73
<u>§ Hhlds share / no bath</u>				<u>§ Labour Councillors</u>		
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.082	-.807	.16			-.004
'r' ('r ² ') =	.19 (.04)	.17 (.03)	.29 (.08)*			.05 (.002)
Constant 'A' =	.19	1.54	.932			1.79
<u>§ Hhlds > 1 Person per Room</u>				<u>Political History Index</u>		
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.024	-.	.164			.016
'r' ('r ² ') =	.03 (.001)	Non-linear	.17 (.03)			.06 (.004)
Constant 'A' =	1.41	-.	.81			1.52
<u>§ Heads of Hhld from New Commonwealth or Pakistan</u>				<u>Composite Variable 'Leisure Need'</u>		
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.039	-.014	.05	.05	-.05	.07
'r' ('r ² ') =	.21 (.04)	.04 (.002)	.17 (.03)	.14 (.02)	.12 (.02)	.18 (.03)
Constant 'A' =	1.23	1.30	1.20	1.45	1.03	1.58
<u>§ 1 Parent Households</u>				<u>Composite Variable 'Social Disorganisation'</u>		
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.13	.12	-.	.04	-.11	.08
'r' ('r ² ') =	.16 (.03)	.07 (.005)	Non-linear	.09 (.01)	.17 (.03)	.15 (.02)
Constant 'A' =	.69	.57	-.	1.45	1.27	1.62
<u>§ Heads of Household in Social Classes IV & V</u>				<u>Composite Variable 'Resources'</u>		
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.015	.03	-.005	.31	.2313	.16
'r' ('r ² ') =	.04 (.001)	.06 (.003)	.013 (.0002)	.60 (.35)***	.17 (.03)	.26 (.07)
Constant 'A' =	1.81	.81	1.67	1.24	1.62	1.55
<u>Incidents of Criminal Damage per 1000 Popp.</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.01	-.17	.03			
'r' ('r ² ') =	.04 (.002)	.41 (.17)	.08 (.01)			
Constant 'A' =	1.4	3.0	1.38			

*** significant at the 0.001 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; * significant at the 0.05 level

TABLE 4.2.4: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (UNSTANDARDISED) 'B', R² AND CONSTANTS FOR SIMPLE BIVARIATE REGRESSION EQUATIONS:

METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS		DEPENDENT VARIABLE = SPORT & RECREATION SERVICES: INCOME - COST RATIO					
	LABOUR (N=41)	CONSERVATIVE (N=22)	ALL (N=69)		LABOUR (N=41)	CONSERVATIVE (N=22)	ALL (N=69)
<u>% Economically Active Seeking Work</u>							
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.004	.006	-.004	<u>Product of 1p Rate</u>			
'r' ('r ² ') =	.10 (.01)	.12 (.01)	.12 (.01)		-.0005	-.0011	-.0007
Constant 'A' =	.32	.26	.31		.11 (.01)	.14 (.02)	.15 (.02)
					.29	.34	.30
<u>% Aged 16-24</u>							
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.013	-.019	-.017	<u>Block Grant and Other Non-local Income</u>			
'r' ('r ² ') =	.14 (.02)	.25 (.06)	.21 (.04)		.0002	-.0002	-.0001
Constant 'A' =	.47	.57	.53		.10 (.01)	.09 (.007)	.06 (.003)
					.22	.33	.30
<u>% Households with no car</u>							
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.002	-.005	-.003	<u>Population Size</u>			
'r' ('r ² ') =	.16 (.02)	.44 (.19)	.30 (.09)**		-.	-.	-.
Constant 'A' =	.40	.48	.42	 Non-linear		
<u>% Hhlds share / no bath</u>							
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.004	-.018	-.010	<u>% Labour Councillors</u>			
'r' ('r ² ') =	.11 (.01)	.53 (.28)*	.28 (.08)*				-.0003
Constant 'A' =	.29	.36	.31				.06 (.003)
							.29
<u>% Hhlds > 1 Person per Room</u>							
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.003	-.022	-.012	<u>Political History Index</u>			
'r' ('r ² ') =	.08 (.006)	.37 (.13)	.20 (.04)				-.0027
Constant 'A' =	.29	.38	.33				.16 (.03)
							.28
<u>% Heads of Hhld from New Commonwealth or Pakistan</u>							
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.001	-.008	-.002	<u>Composite Variable 'Leisure Need'</u>			
'r' ('r ² ') =	.07 (.005)	.33 (.11)	.11 (.01)		-.004	-.010	-.006
Constant 'A' =	.28	.34	.29		.10 (.01)	.37 (.13)	.23 (.06)
					.28	.26	.27
<u>% 1 Parent Households</u>							
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.006	-.012	-.	<u>Composite Variable 'Social Disorganisation'</u>			
'r' ('r ² ') =	.08 (.01)	.10 (.01)	Non-linear ...		-.007	-.017	-.007
Constant 'A' =	30.6	35.8	-.		.17 (.03)	.44 (.19)	.20 (.04)
					.28	.27	.27
<u>% Heads of Household in Social Classes IV & V</u>							
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.002	.001	-.002	<u>Composite Variable 'Resources'</u>			
'r' ('r ² ') =	.04 (.0002)	.02 (.0001)	.08 (.007)		.001	.01	-.002
Constant 'A' =	.30	.28	.31		.02 (.001)	.17 (.02)	.05 (.002)
					.27	.32	.29
<u>Incidents of Criminal Damage per 1000 Popn</u>							
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.007	-.02	-.008				
'r' ('r ² ') =	.29 (.08)	.68 (.46)**	.35 (.13)**				
Constant 'A' =	.33	.44	.34				

*** significant at the 0.001 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; * significant at the 0.05 level

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TABLE 4.2.5: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (UNSTANDARDISED) 'R', R² AND CONSTANTS FOR SIMPLE BIVARIATE REGRESSION EQUATIONS:

METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS			DEPENDENT VARIABLE = CULTURAL SERVICES - INCOME - COST RATIO			
	LABOUR (N=41)	CONSERVATIVE (N=22)	ALL (N=69)	LABOUR (N=41)	CONSERVATIVE (N=22)	ALL (N=69)
<u>% Economically Active Seeking Work</u>						
Unstdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.02	-.01	-.01	.00002	.0003	.00004
'r' ('r ² ') =	.29 (.08)	.12 (.01)	.23 (.05)	.03 (.001)	.17 (.002)	.06 (.003)
Constant 'A' =	.44	.35	.37	.22	.16	.22
<u>% Aged 16-24</u>						
Unstdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.002	.01	-.006	-.001	-.0004	-.001
'r' ('r ² ') =	.01 (.0001)	.06 (.004)	.05 (.002)	.24 (.05)	.05 (.003)	.20 (.04)*
Constant 'A' =	.21	.13	.33	.42	.35	.41
<u>% Households with no Car</u>						
Unstdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.002	-.006	-.007	-.	-.	-.
'r' ('r ² ') =	.08 (.01)	.11 (.01)	.27 (.06) Non-linear		
Constant 'A' =	.35	.26	.57			
<u>% Hhlds share / no bath</u>						
Unstdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.006	-.01	.003			-.002
'r' ('r ² ') =	.08 (.01)	.10 (.01)	.05 (.003)			.26 (.07)
Constant 'A' =	.29	.29	.24			.36
<u>% Hhlds > 1 Person per Room</u>						
Unstdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.01	-.001	.00001			-.004
'r' ('r ² ') =	.08 (.01)	.04 (.002)	.00 (.00)			.15 (.02)
Constant 'A' =	.30	.25	.23			.25
<u>% Heads of Hhld from New Commonwealth or Pakistan</u>						
Unstdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.001	-.	.001	-.008	-.005	-.008
'r' ('r ² ') =	.03 (.001)	Non-linear	.02 (.001)	.16 (.03)	.09 (.01)	.19 (.03)
Constant 'A' =	.28	-.	.22	.25	.25	.24
<u>% 1 Parent Households</u>						
Unstdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.002	.02	-.	-.001	-.01	.01
'r' ('r ² ') =	.01 (.0002)	.08 (.01)	Non-linear	.02 (.0003)	.11 (.01)	.17 (.03)
Constant 'A' =	.22	.16	.22	.23	.29	.25
<u>% Heads of Household in Social Classes IV & V</u>						
Unstdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.02	-.001	-.01	-.007	.007	-.006
'r' ('r ² ') =	.33 (.11)	.02 (.0003)	.21 (.04)	.09 (.01)	.06 (.004)	.08 (.007)
Constant 'A' =	.60	.29	.40	.24	.27	.24
<u>Incidents of Criminal Damage per 1000 Popn.</u>						
Unstdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.003	-.016	-.002			
'r' ('r ² ') =	.09 (.01)	.28 (.08)	.04 (.002)			
Constant 'A' =	.20	.44	.26			
<u>Product of In. Rate</u>						
<u>Block Grant and Other Non-local Income</u>						
<u>Population Size</u>						
<u>% Labour Councillors</u>						
<u>Political History Index</u>						
<u>Composite Variable 'Leisure Need'</u>						
<u>Composite Variable 'Social Disorganisation'</u>						
<u>Composite Variable 'Resources'</u>						

*** significant at the 0.001 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; * significant at the 0.05 level

TABLE 4.2.6: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (UNSTANDARDISED) 'B', R² AND CONSTANTS FOR SIMPLE BIVARIATE REGRESSION EQUATIONS.

	METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS			DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE ON PERSONAL SOCIAL SERVICES		
	LABOUR (N=41)	CONSERVATIVE (N=22)	ALL (N=69)	LABOUR (N=41)	CONSERVATIVE (N=22)	ALL (N=69)
<u>1 Economically Active Seeking Work</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	3.2	4.4	3.8	.0051	-.03	.006
'r' ('r ² ') =	.45 (.20)***	.74 (.54)***	.66 (.43)***	.07 (.005)	.31 (.09)	.07 (.006)
Constant 'A' =	-2.3	-16.0	-10.02	-31.12	27.55	25.2
<u>1 Pensionable Age</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-1.6	-1.8	-2.4	-.022	-.012	.07
'r' ('r ² ') =	.13 (.02)	.23 (.05)	.20 (.04)	.05 (.003)	.04 (.001)	.18 (.03)
Constant 'A' =	60.9	46.5	69.5	38.2	16.5	13.9
<u>1 Households with no car</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.07	.18	.57	.0000	.0007	.0006
'r' ('r ² ') =	.03 (.001)	.12 (.01)	.30 (.09)*	.41 (.17)**	.27 (.07)	.44 (.19)***
Constant 'A' =	29.9	14.5	19.2	19.3	14.1	11.0
<u>1 Aged 0-4</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-1.4	5.5	8.8			.30
'r' ('r ² ') =	.04 (.002)	.22 (.05)	.26 (.07)*			.35 (.12)
Constant 'A' =	-24.6	-16.8	-24.4			11.4
<u>1 Holds > 1 Person per Room</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-4.99	-2.07	-1.41			.77
'r' ('r ² ') =	.40 (.16)**	.26 (.07)	.12 (.02)			.26 (.07)*
Constant 'A' =	59.3	22.3	34.6			26.3
<u>1 Heads of Household in Social Classes IV & V</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.29	2.43	2.14	-1.62	.69	1.32
'r' ('r ² ') =	.04 (.002)	.49 (.24)**	.46 (.21)***	.22 (.03)	.13 (.02)	.23 (.05)
Constant 'A' =	27.8	-17.1	-9.14	35.6	16.4	28.0
<u>1 Parent Households</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-3.93	3.36	-.	-2.78	.09	-.4
'r' ('r ² ') =	.32 (.1)**	.21 (.04)	Non-linear	.45 (.20)***	.02 (.0003)	.07 (.0005)
Constant 'A' =	58.3	-3.4	-.	32.2	11.32	25.16
<u>Composite Variable 'Resources'</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	4.0	2.95	4.59			
'r' ('r ² ') =	.50 (.25)***	.28 (.08)	.59 (.35)***			
Constant 'A' =	29.6	19.8	27.5			
<u>1 Labour Councillors</u>						
<u>Block Grant and Other Non-local Income</u>						
<u>Population Size</u>						
<u>Political History Index</u>						
<u>Composite Variable 'Personal Soc S. Needs'</u>						
<u>Composite Variable 'Social Disorganisation'</u>						

*** significant at the 0.001 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; * significant at the 0.05 level

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TABLE 4.9.1: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (UNSTANDARDISED) 'R', R² AND CONSTANTS FOR SIMPLE BIVARIATE REGRESSION EQUATIONS.

NON-METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS						
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE ON LEISURE SERVICES						
	LABOUR (n=55)	CONSERVATIVE (n=148)	ALL (n=291)	LABOUR (n=55)	CONSERVATIVE (n=148)	ALL (n=291)
<u>% Economically Active Seeking Work</u>						
Unstdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.30	1.59	1.11	.09	-.01	-.01
'r' ('r ² ') =	.14 (.02)	.43 (.18)***	.41 (.17)***	.41 (.17)***		
Constant 'A' =	15.7	.97	3.6	7.19	-.01	-.01
<u>% Aged 16-24</u>						
Unstdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	3.31	-.13	1.94	-.01	.05	.02
'r' ('r ² ') =	.50 (.25)***	.02 (.0004)	.34 (.12)***	.10 (.01)	.55 (.30)***	.36 (.13)***
Constant 'A' =	-29.2	12.5	-14.3	20.55	.84	5.53
<u>% Households with no Car</u>						
Unstdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.05	.63	.55	.00	.000	.000
'r' ('r ² ') =	.05 (.002)	.69 (.48)***	.61 (.38)***	.17 (.03)	.25 (.06)*	.34 (.11)***
Constant 'A' =	16.7	-7.72	-5.9	16.2	5.2	5.5
<u>% Hhlds share / no bath</u>						
Unstdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.43	3.02	1.05			.17
'r' ('r ² ') =	.07 (.005)	.52 (.27)***	.17 (.03)††			.51 (.26)***
Constant 'A' =	19.7	3.2	8.8			7.3
<u>% Hhlds > 1 Person per Room</u>						
Unstdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	1.7	3.2	4.3			.30
'r' ('r ² ') =	.19 (.04)	.26 (.07)††	.44 (.19)			.24 (.06)***
Constant 'A' =	12.9	4.0	1.1			12.5
<u>% Heads of Hhld from New Commonwealth or Pakistan</u>						
Unstdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	1.12	.62	1.25	.46	1.10	.99
'r' ('r ² ') =	.46 (.21)***	.15 (.02)	.35 (.12)***	.25 (.06)	.52 (.27)***	.53 (.28)***
Constant 'A' =	15.9	9.7	9.3	16.7	17.4	11.6
<u>% Parent Households</u>						
Unstdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.17	.73	.63	.98	1.38	1.62
'r' ('r ² ') =	.09 (.008)	.31 (.10)††	.25 (.06)***	.42 (.17)††	.37 (.14)***	.53 (.28)***
Constant 'A' =	16.7	2.9	4.5	16.4	11.5	11.5
<u>% Heads of Household in Social Classes IV & V</u>						
Unstdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.27	.15	.57	-.01	-.01	-.01
'r' ('r ² ') =	.11 (.01)	.06 (.003)	.26 (.007)***	Non-linear		
Constant 'A' =	13.6	8.9	3.0	-.01	-.01	-.01
<u>Composite Variable 'Leisure Need'</u>						
<u>Composite Variable 'Social Disorganisation'</u>						
<u>Composite Variable 'Resources'</u>						

*** significant at the 0.001 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; * significant at the 0.05 level

TABLE 4.3.2: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (UNSTANDARDISED) 'B', R² AND CONSTANTS FOR SIMPLE BIVARIATE REGRESSION EQUATIONS:

NON-METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS						
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE ON SPORT & RECREATION						
	LABOUR (n=55)	CONSERVATIVE (n=148)	ALL (n=291)	LABOUR (n=55)	CONSERVATIVE (n=148)	ALL (n=291)
<u>1 Economically Active Seeking Work</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.26	.62	.67	.03	---	---
'r' ('r ² ') =	.20 (.04)	.28 (.08)***	.41 (.17)***	.23 (.05) Non-linear....	---
Constant 'A' =	9.1	2.6	2.3	8.0	---	---
<u>Product of 1p Rate</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	1.1	.24	1.2	.001	.017	.014
'r' ('r ² ') =	.29 (.08)*	.07 (.004)	.36 (.13)***	.04 (.002)	.34 (.12)***	.35 (.12)***
Constant 'A' =	-4.3	3.3	-9.3	11.2	2.8	3.6
<u>1 Aged 16-74</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.07	.22	.28	---	.000	.000
'r' ('r ² ') =	.11 (.01)	.41 (.17)***	.53 (.28)***	Non-linear	.15 (.02)	.26 (.06)***
Constant 'A' =	8.9	.000	-1.81	---	4.39	4.38
<u>1 Households with no Car</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	---	---	---	---	---	---
'r' ('r ² ') =	---	---	---	---	---	---
Constant 'A' =	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>1 Whlds share / no bath</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	---	---	---	---	---	---
'r' ('r ² ') =	---	---	---	---	---	---
Constant 'A' =	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>1 Whlds > 1 Person per Room</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	---	---	---	---	---	---
'r' ('r ² ') =	---	---	---	---	---	---
Constant 'A' =	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>1 Heads of Whld from New Commonwealth or Pakistan</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	---	---	---	---	---	---
'r' ('r ² ') =	---	---	---	---	---	---
Constant 'A' =	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>1 Parent Households</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	---	---	---	---	---	---
'r' ('r ² ') =	---	---	---	---	---	---
Constant 'A' =	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>1 Heads of Household in Social Classes IV & V</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	---	---	---	---	---	---
'r' ('r ² ') =	---	---	---	---	---	---
Constant 'A' =	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>1 Labour Councillors</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	---	---	---	---	---	---
'r' ('r ² ') =	---	---	---	---	---	---
Constant 'A' =	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>Political History Index</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	---	---	---	---	---	---
'r' ('r ² ') =	---	---	---	---	---	---
Constant 'A' =	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>Composite Variable 'Leisure Need'</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	---	---	---	---	---	---
'r' ('r ² ') =	---	---	---	---	---	---
Constant 'A' =	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>Composite Variable 'Social Disorganisation'</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	---	---	---	---	---	---
'r' ('r ² ') =	---	---	---	---	---	---
Constant 'A' =	---	---	---	---	---	---
<u>Composite Variable 'Resources'</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	---	---	---	---	---	---
'r' ('r ² ') =	---	---	---	---	---	---
Constant 'A' =	---	---	---	---	---	---

*** significant at the 0.001 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; * significant at the 0.05 level

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TABLE 4.2.3: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (UNSTANDARDISED) 'R', R² AND CONSTANTS FOR SIMPLE BIVARIATE REGRESSION EQUATIONS-

NON-METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS

DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE ON CULTURAL SERVICES

	LABOUR (n=55)	CONSERVATIVE (n=148)	ALL (n=291)	LABOUR (n=55)	CONSERVATIVE (n=148)	ALL (n=291)
	<u>% Economically Active Seeking Work</u>			<u>Product of 1p Rate</u>		
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.15	1.07	.53	.11	-.01	-.01
'r' ('r ² ') =	.05 (.03)	.39 (.15)***	.23 (.05)***	.37 (.14)	Non-linear	Non-linear
Constant 'A' =	8.9	-3.7	-.49	-6.2	-.01	-.01
	<u>% Aged 16-24</u>			<u>Block Grant and Other Non-local Income</u>		
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	4.1	.06	1.4	-.02	.02	.01
'r' ('r ² ') =	.47 (.22)***	.01 (.002)	.29 (.09)***	.28 (.08)	.37 (.14)***	.09 (.01)
Constant 'A' =	-51.6	2.2	-15.4	14.1	-2.0	1.9
	<u>% Households with no Car</u>			<u>Population Size</u>		
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.12	.37	.27	.000	.000	.000
'r' ('r ² ') =	.09 (.01)	.55 (.31)***	.36 (.13)***	.08 (.007)	.24 (.06)**	.23 (.05)***
Constant 'A' =	12.4	-8.01	-5.32	5.78	-1.15	-.142
	<u>% Hhlds share / no bath</u>			<u>% Labour Councillors</u>		
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.98	1.98	.55			.10
'r' ('r ² ') =	.12 (.02)	.47 (.22)***	.11 (.01)			.35 (.12)***
Constant 'A' =	9.7	-2.1	1.8			.82
	<u>% Hhlds > 1 Person per Room</u>			<u>Political History Index</u>		
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-1.3	2.8	1.9			.24
'r' ('r ² ') =	.11 (.01)	.31 (.10)***	.23 (.05)			.18 (.03)**
Constant 'A' =	11.5	-3.1	-1.4			3.8
	<u>% Heads of Hhld from New Commonwealth or Pakistan</u>			<u>Composite Variable 'Leisure Need'</u>		
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.43	.56	.64	-.16	.81	.48
'r' ('r ² ') =	.13 (.02)	.19 (.03)*	.21 (.04)***	.07 (.01)	.52 (.27)***	.31 (.10)***
Constant 'A' =	6.3	1.9	2.1	8.1	4.1	3.3
	<u>% 1 Parent Households</u>			<u>Composite Variable 'Social Disorganisation'</u>		
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-1.4	-.64	-.79	-.20	.07	.24
'r' ('r ² ') =	.56 (.32)***	.37 (.14)***	.38 (.14)***	.07 (.004)	.02 (.001)	.13 (.02)
Constant 'A' =	23.4	10.0	12.2	7.8	3.0	3.2
	<u>% Heads of Household in Social Classes IV & V</u>			<u>Composite Variable 'Resources'</u>		
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.40	.43	.32	-.01	-.01	-.01
'r' ('r ² ') =	.12 (.01)	.22 (.05)**	.17 (.03)**	Non-linear	Non-linear	Non-linear
Constant 'A' =	14.9	-2.7	-1.4	-.01	-.01	-.01

*** significant at the 0.001 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; * significant at the 0.05 level

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TABLE 4.3.4: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (UNSTANDARDISED) 'R', R² AND CONSTANTS FOR SIMPLE BIVARIATE REGRESSION EQUATIONS:

NON-METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS					
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = INCOME - COST RATIO- SPORT & RECREATION					
LABOUR (n=55)	CONSERVATIVE (n=148)	ALL (n=291)	LABOUR (n=55)	CONSERVATIVE (n=149)	ALL (n=291)
<u>% Economically Active Seeking Work</u>			<u>Product of In Rate</u>		
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.001	-.02	-.014	.001	-.
'r' ('r ² ') =	.03 (.001)	.23 (.05)**	.23 (.05)***	.19 (.03)	Non-linear
Constant 'A' =	.30	.57	.49	.23	-.
<u>% Aged 16-74</u>			<u>Block Grant and Other Non-local Income</u>		
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.006	.012	-.007	-.000	-.001
'r' ('r ² ') =	.06 (.004)	.08 (.006)	.06 (.003)	.17 (.03)	.34 (.11)***
Constant 'A' =	.22	.29	.49	.36	.52
<u>% Households with no Car</u>			<u>Population Size</u>		
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.004	-.007	-.007	-.000	-.000
'r' ('r ² ') =	.23 (.05)	.32 (.10)***	.34 (.12)***	.16 (.03)	.07 (.004)
Constant 'A' =	.46	.65	.61	.35	.41
<u>% Hhlds share / no bath</u>			<u>% Labour Councillors</u>		
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.03	-.04	-.03		-.002
'r' ('r ² ') =	.33 (.11)*	.27 (.07)***	.21 (.04)***		.22 (.05)***
Constant 'A' =	.38	.54	.47		.44
<u>% Hhlds > 1 Person per Room</u>			<u>Political History Index</u>		
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.04	-.058	-.064		-.01
'r' ('r ² ') =	.27 (.07)	.20 (.04)*	.30 (.09)***		.30 (.09)***
Constant 'A' =	.44	.57	.55		.37
<u>% Heads of Hhld from New Commonwealth or Pakistan</u>			<u>Composite Variable 'Leisure Need'</u>		
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.	-.	-.	-.001	-.02
'r' ('r ² ') =	Non-linear			.19 (.04)	.30 (.09)***
Constant 'A' =	-.	-.	-.	.34	.42
<u>% 1 Parent Households</u>			<u>Composite Variable 'Social Disorganisation'</u>		
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.001	-.007	-.005	.001	-.01
'r' ('r ² ') =	.05 (.002)	.12 (.01)	.09 (.009)	.04 (.001)	.12 (.02)
Constant 'A' =	.30	.52	.45	.31	.44
<u>% Heads of Household in Social Classes IV & V</u>			<u>Composite Variable 'Resources'</u>		
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.001	-.011	-.014	-.	-.
'r' ('r ² ') =	.01 (.0002)	.19 (.03)*	.29 (.08)***	Non-linear	
Constant 'A' =	.32	.60	.60	-.	-.

*** significant at the 0.001 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; * significant at the 0.05 level

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TABLE 4.9.5: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (UNSTANDARDISED), 'R', R² AND CONSTANTS FOR SIMPLE BIVARIATE REGRESSION EQUATIONS:

NON-METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS

DEPENDENT VARIABLE = INCOME - COST RATIO: CULTURAL SERVICES

	LABOUR (n=55)	CONSERVATIVE (n=148)	ALL (n=291)	LABOUR (n=55)	CONSERVATIVE (n=148)	ALL (n=291)
<u>% Economically Active Seeking Work</u>			<u>Product of In. Rate</u>			
Unstdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.006	-.012	-.008	.001	-.001	-.001
'r' ('r ² ') =	.10 (.01)	.05 (.003)	.07 (.005)	.15 (.02)	Non-linear	Non-linear
Constant 'A' =	.20	.50	.43	.14	-.001	-.001
<u>% Aged 16-24</u>			<u>Block Grant and Other Non-local Income</u>			
Unstdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.03	-.04	-.03	-.000	-.001	-.001
'r' ('r ² ') =	.15 (.02)	.11 (.01)	.10 (.01)	.13 (.02)	.14 (.02)	.17 (.03)*
Constant 'A' =	-.16	.99	.71	.33	.58	.51
<u>% Households with no Car</u>			<u>Population Size</u>			
Unstdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.005	-.006	-.003	-.000	-.000	-.000
'r' ('r ² ') =	.16 (.02)	.10 (.01)	.06 (.004)	non-linear	.11 (.01)	.05 (.02)
Constant 'A' =	.07	.60	.46	-.001	.57	.41
<u>% Hhlds share / no bath</u>			<u>% Labour Councillors</u>			
Unstdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.002	-.012	.001			-.002
'r' ('r ² ') =	.01 (.000)	.04 (.001)	.005 (.000)			.17 (.03)*
Constant 'A' =	.27	.45	.37			.45
<u>% Hhlds > 1 Person per Room</u>			<u>Political History Index</u>			
Unstdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.009	-.066	-.063			-.013
'r' ('r ² ') =	.04 (.001)	.10 (.01)	.15 (.02)			.18 (.03)*
Constant 'A' =	.29	.57	.54			.34
<u>% Heads of Hhld from New Commonwealth or Pakistan</u>			<u>Composite Variable 'Leisure Need'</u>			
Unstdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.001	-.001	-.001	.006	-.016	-.009
'r' ('r ² ') =	Non-linear	Non-linear	Non-linear	.13 (.02)	.13 (.02)	.11 (.01)
Constant 'A' =	-.001	-.001	-.001	.23	.41	.38
<u>% 1 Parent Households</u>			<u>Composite Variable 'Social Disorganisation'</u>			
Unstdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.003	-.006	-.001	.01	-.03	-.01
'r' ('r ² ') =	.06 (.001)	.05 (.002)	.01 (.000)	.16 (.03)	.13 (.02)	.08 (.006)
Constant 'A' =	.29	.49	.39	.23	.42	.38
<u>% Heads of Household in Social Classes IV & V</u>			<u>Composite Variable 'Resources'</u>			
Unstdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.005	-.026	-.02	-.001	-.001	-.001
'r' ('r ² ') =	.07 (.005)	.17 (.03)	.18 (.03)*	Non-linear	Non-linear	Non-linear
Constant 'A' =	.35	.77	.64	-.001	-.001	-.001

*** significant at the 0.001 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; * significant at the 0.05 level

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TABLE 4.4.1: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (UNSTANDARDISED) 'B', R² AND CONSTANTS FOR SIMPLE BIVARIATE REGRESSION EQUATIONS:

NON-METROPOLITAN COUNTIES

DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE ON CULTURAL SERVICES

	LABOUR (N=8)	CONSERVATIVE (N=20)	ALL (N=39)	LABOUR (N=8)	CONSERVATIVE (N=20)	ALL (N=39)
<u>% Economically Active Seeking Work</u>			<u>Product of 1p Rate</u>			
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.001	.225	.101	-.001	-.000	-.000
'r' ('r ² ') =	.004 (.000)	.35 (.12)	.24 (.06)	.26 (.07)	.26 (.07)	.26 (.07)
Constant 'A' =	1.69	.033	.88	2.14	1.9	2.1
<u>% Aged 16-24</u>			<u>Block Grant and Other Non-local Income</u>			
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.13	-.02	-.07	.005	.011	.007
'r' ('r ² ') =	.15 (.02)	.02 (.0005)	.06 (.004)	.14 (.02)	.41 (.17)	.31 (.10)
Constant 'A' =	-.17	1.77	2.52	.62	-.35	.35
<u>% Households with no Car</u>			<u>Population Size</u>			
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.05	.03	.04	-.000	-.000	-.000
'r' ('r ² ') =	.31 (.10)	.16 (.02)	.25 (.06)	.30 (.09)	.11 (.01)	.16 (.02)
Constant 'A' =	-.37	.48	.35	2.1.18	1.71	1.96
<u>% Hhlds share / no bath</u>			<u>% Labour Councillors</u>			
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.49	.27	.07			.01
'r' ('r ² ') =	.65 (.43)	.22 (.05)	.06 (.004)			.10 (.01)
Constant 'A' =	2.9	.75	1.4			1.5
<u>% Hhlds > 1 Person per Room</u>			<u>Political History Index</u>			
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.22	-.82	.06			.02
'r' ('r ² ') =	.15 (.02)	.23 (.05)	.04 (.001)			.17 (.02)
Constant 'A' =	.99	3.3	1.5			1.8
<u>% Heads of Hhld from New Commonwealth or Pakistan</u>			<u>Composite Variable 'Leisure Need'</u>			
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.06	-.52	.02	-.02	.09	.07
'r' ('r ² ') =	.10 (.01)	.53 (.28)*	.03 (.001)	.09 (.01)	.23 (.05)	.26 (.07)
Constant 'A' =	1.6	2.5	1.6	1.8	1.7	1.6
<u>% Parent Households</u>			<u>Composite Variable 'Social Disorganisation'</u>			
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.05	-.36	.10	.009	-.045	.02
'r' ('r ² ') =	.07 (.004)	.14 (.02)	.09 (.01)	.04 (.002)	.08 (.006)	.12 (.01)
Constant 'A' =	1.97	3.11	1.18	1.68	1.44	1.62
<u>% Heads of Household in Social Classes IV & V</u>			<u>Composite Variable 'Resources'</u>			
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.01	.14	.11	-.04	-.02	-.02
'r' ('r ² ') =	.03 (.001)	.39 (.15)	.29 (.08)	.08 (.006)	.05 (.003)	.05 (.007)
Constant 'A' =	1.5	-.54	-.01	1.74	1.5	1.6

*** significant at the 0.001 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; * significant at the 0.05 level

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TABLE 4.4.2: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (UNSTANDARDISED) 'B', R² AND CONSTANTS FOR SIMPLE BIVARIATE REGRESSION EQUATIONS.

NON-METROPOLITAN COUNTIES

DEPENDENT VARIABLE = INCOME - COST RATIO - CULTURAL SERVICES

	LABOUR (N=8)	CONSERVATIVE (N=20)	ALL (N=39)	LABOUR (N=8)	CONSERVATIVE (N=20)	ALL (N=39)
<u>% Economically Active Seeking Work</u>			<u>Product of 1p Rate</u>			
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.02	.004	.01	-.000	.000	.000
'r' ('r ² ') =	.79 (.62)*	.04 (.001)	.24 (.06)	.26 (.07)	.13 (.02)	.09 (.009)
Constant 'A' =	.009	.093	.030	.221	.083	.101
<u>% Aged 16-24</u>			<u>Block Grant and Other Non-local Income</u>			
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.070	.026	.037	.000	.000	.000
'r' ('r ² ') =	.75 (.56)*	.17 (.03)	.30 (.09)	.06 (.004)	.07 (.005)	.17 (.03)
Constant 'A' =	-.163	.163	.001	.245	.050	.071
<u>% Households with no Car</u>			<u>Population Size</u>			
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.008	-.002	.004	-.000	.000	.000
'r' ('r ² ') =	.50 (.25)	.05 (.002)	.20 (.04)	.41 (.17)	.21 (.05)	.20 (.04)
Constant 'A' =	-.16	.16	.001	.25	.05	.07
<u>% Hhlds share / no bath</u>			<u>% Labour Councillors</u>			
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.03	-.03	-.04			.002
'r' ('r ² ') =	.33 (.11)	.15 (.02)	.28 (.08)			.32 (.10)*
Constant 'A' =	.24	.19	.23			.06
<u>% Hhlds > 1 Person per Room</u>			<u>Political History Index</u>			
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.08	-.04	.03			.003
'r' ('r ² ') =	.51 (.26)	.08 (.01)	.15 (.02)			.13 (.02)
Constant 'A' =	-.06	.21	.04			-.13
<u>% Heads of Hhld from New Commonwealth or Pakistan</u>			<u>Composite Variable 'Leisure Need'</u>			
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.03	-.04	-.01	.011	-.003	.005
'r' ('r ² ') =	.48 (.32)	.26 (.07)	.12 (.02)	.52 (.27)	.06 (.003)	.15 (.02)
Constant 'A' =	.22	.19	.14	.13	.11	.12
<u>% 1 Parent Households</u>			<u>Composite Variable 'Social Disorganisation'</u>			
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.04	-.04	.03	.01	.000	.01
'r' ('r ² ') =	.53 (.28)	.11 (.01)	.21 (.04)	.64 (.41)	.003 (.000)	.24 (.06)
Constant 'A' =	-.04	.31	.01	.15	.12	.12
<u>% Heads of Household in Social Classes IV & V</u>			<u>Composite Variable 'Resources'</u>			
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.02	.01	.01	-.03	.01	.01
'r' ('r ² ') =	.67 (.44)	.18 (.03)	.33 (.10)	.48 (.23)	.19 (.04)	.19 (.04)
Constant 'A' =	-.26	-.02	-.10	.20	.12	.12

*** significant at the 0.001 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; * significant at the 0.05 level

TABLE 4.4.3: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (UNSTANDARDISED) 'R', R² AND CONSTANTS FOR SIMPLE BIVARIATE REGRESSION EQUATIONS:

NON-METROPOLITAN COUNTIES

DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE ON PERSONAL SOCIAL SERVICES

	LABOUR (N=8)	CONSERVATIVE (N=20)	ALL (N=39)	LABOUR (N=8)	CONSERVATIVE (N=20)	ALL (N=39)
<u>1 Economically Active Seeking Work</u>			<u>Product of Ip. Rate</u>			
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.16	1.18	.94	.005	-.001	.001
'r' ('r ² ') =	.08 (.01)	.33 (.11)	.32 (.10)*	.25 (.06)	.12 (.02)	.05 (.002)
Constant 'A' =	36.5	22.5	25.5	33.0	31.2	31.9
<u>1 Pensionable Age</u>			<u>Block Grant and Other Non-local Income</u>			
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.787	.458	-.009	.043	-.02	.03
'r' ('r ² ') =	.34 (.11)	.34 (.12)	.01 (.000)	.19 (.04)	.12 (.01)	.20 (.04)
Constant 'A' =	24.3	21.4	32.7	28.5	33.0	26.7
<u>1 Households with no Car</u>			<u>Population Size</u>			
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.21	.34	.53	-.000	-.000	.000
'r' ('r ² ') =	.17 (.03)	.28 (.08)	.48 (.23)**	.007(.000)	.21 (.04)	.06 (.003)
Constant 'A' =	29.4	19.9	15.2	38.2	32.5	31.7
<u>1 Aged 0-4</u>			<u>1 Labour Councilors</u>			
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	-.44	-1.3	1.2			.17
'r' ('r ² ') =	.02 (.001)	.16 (.02)	.10 (.01)			.49 (.24)**
Constant 'A' =	40.7	37.8	25.3			26.9
<u>1 Wholds > 1 Person per Room</u>			<u>Political History Index</u>			
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.19	4.8	5.8			.41
'r' ('r ² ') =	.02 (.000)	.24 (.06)	.50 (.25)**			.27 (.07)
Constant 'A' =	37.4	19.5	17.6			34.3
<u>1 Heads of Household in Social Classes IV & V</u>			<u>Composite Variable 'Personal Soc S. Needs'</u>			
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.15	.08	.85	.28	.99	1.14
'r' ('r ² ') =	.05 (.002)	.04 (.002)	.33 (.11)	.16 (.02)	.47 (.22)*	.55 (.30)***
Constant 'A' =	35.5	28.8	19.5	37.1	31.6	32.5
<u>1 Parent Households</u>			<u>Composite Variable 'Social Disorganisation'</u>			
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	5.6	4.5	3.7	1.13	.26	1.25
'r' ('r ² ') =	.60 (.36)	.31 (.10)	.46 (.21)**	.47 (.22)	.09 (.01)	.50 (.25)
Constant 'A' =	9.3	9.6	15.6	35.6	20.3	32.5
<u>Composite Variable 'Resources'</u>						
Ustdsd. reg. coeff. 'B' =	.05	-.25	.70			
'r' ('r ² ') =	.01 (.000)	.10 (.01)	.19 (.04)			
Constant 'A' =	38.0	30.0	32.5			

*** significant at the 0.001 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; * significant at the 0.05 level

Chapter 4 - Notes

¹ These figures underestimate the level of investment by local authorities in leisure and recreation, since much local authority expenditure may well appear under other budget heads, particularly that of 'education'.

² Criminal damage is a category of crime reported in the annual returns for each police authority, and refers to 'damage to goods and property to a value in excess of £20'. This category incorporates acts of vandalism and wilful damage, but excludes damage caused in the process of the committing of another crime.

³ Dependent variables were inspected and where skewness of greater or less than 2 was identified transformations were undertaken in the following manner (following Sharpe and Newton 1985); where the skew was positive, the log of the variable was obtained, where negative the square of the variable. The correlation coefficient for the transformed and the untransformed variable was then obtained and where $r < .9$ the transformed variable was employed.

⁴ Significance testing is not applicable in the case of the regression equations cited in this chapter since they are descriptive equations, summarising relationships for the population as a whole. Nevertheless, they are cited as a guideline to underline the strength of relationships identified.

Chapter 5: Politicians, Local Politics and Leisure Policy

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The following three chapters report the findings from an investigation of leisure policy in a Metropolitan District, with a focus on the roles of local politicians, professionals, and the interaction of the local authority with the voluntary sector. A number of case studies dealing with policy making in local government were published in the seventies as local government became recognised as a significant area for 'respectable' research (e.g. Hampton 1970, Dearlove 1973, Newton 1976, Cockburn 1977, Saunders 1978). Clearly, however, there are limitations in terms of the contribution such analyses can make to an understanding of leisure policy in that, although they deal with the context of decision making, they are all to a greater or lesser degree 'dated', given the accelerated rate of change in local government in this country, and none of them is substantially concerned with leisure policy.

As we noted in Chapter One, there are only a limited number of studies of local government activity in the field of leisure. Lewes and Mennell's (1976) study of Exeter takes an historical perspective, documenting how decisions over an extended time period have contributed incrementally to the pattern of leisure provision in the city. The review by Travis et al. (1979) which explores the relationship between local and national government is primarily concerned to identify the range and forms of the administrative machinery of government decision-making in the field of leisure policy. In essence a managerialist conceptualisation of the policy making process is implied in this review and there is little consideration of party political issues. The *Leisure Provision and People's Needs* study also pays scant attention to party political differences in leisure policy, limiting itself to the brief observation that "policies of the two parties [Conservative and Labour] are not as strongly contrasted in the field of leisure as in some other major aspects of the Council's activity" although "differences of emphasis continually show up" (Dower et al. 1981:37). These leisure policy studies also predate central government's attempts to control local government spending and

the radicalisation of local politics in some authorities. Coalter et al. (1986), however, do provide a more recent analysis of local government which addresses the issue of party political differences in three local authorities, concluding that in these authorities leisure was "a 'depoliticised' arena, properly outside the realm of adversarial politics" (p.127). Each of the three authorities in this study, however, experienced relatively stable and prolonged control by a single party group, and as Coalter points out this may well have militated against the adoption of party political positions on leisure policy.

Far from being the ideal-typical pluralist, politically competitive local government environment, each of the areas exhibited a high degree of political stability with little danger to the domination of the ruling groups. In such circumstances there may be less of an incentive to formulate distinctive party programmes, especially on issues where a vague consensus appears to exist.

(Coalter et al 1986: p. 127)

The local authority which is the subject of the case study reported here was selected in part because of its political history with periods of control of both major parties being superseded by a hung council shortly before the research was undertaken.

Leisure services may well provide a highly appropriate area for evaluating the 'dual state thesis' description of local politics as pluralist in character. Dunleavy (1979) distinguishes four types of consumption, 'collective', quasi-collective', 'quasi-individualised' and 'individualised', by reference to four characteristics - whether the consumption is of services or commodities, whether ownership is in the public or private sector, whether access to consumption is through market (price) or non-market criteria, and whether or not such consumption is subsidised (see table 5.1). 'Pure' forms of collective consumption involve services in the public sector which may involve non-market access criteria but are unsubsidised (e.g. council housing), or involve non-market access criteria and are subsidised (e.g. education or public parks), or may involve market access to subsidised services (e.g. sports centres). Dunleavy argues that propensity for political activity will be greater in the

TABLE 5.1: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSUMPTION TYPES (DERIVED FROM DUNLEAVY (1979))

CONSUMPTION TYPE	Individualised Consumption	Quasi-individualised Consumption	Quasi-collective Consumption	Collective Consumption
COMMODITIES OR SERVICES	either	commodities	(a) services (b) services (c) services	(a) services (b) services (c) services
PUBLIC OR PRIVATE SECTOR	either	either	(a) private (b) private (c) private	(a) public (b) public (c) public
MARKET OR NON- MARKET ACCESS	market	market	(a) non-market (b) market (c) non-market	(a) non-market (b) market (c) non-market
SUBSIDY OR NO SUBSIDY	no subsidy	some subsidy	(a) no subsidy (b) some subsidy (c) subsidy	(b) no subsidy (b) subsidy (c) subsidy
TYPICAL EXAMPLES	gas, electricity services, consumer durables, privately rented housing	private home ownership (mortgage tax relief)	(a) National Trust Land (b) the arts (c) voluntary welfare agencies (e.g. WRVS)	(a) public housing (b) sports centres (c) education, health, parks
LEVEL OF POLITICIZATION	low	high	low	high

case of collective (and quasi-individualised) consumption issues. Since leisure services fall predominantly into the category of collective consumption² one might anticipate a relatively high level of political activity in opposing cuts to services in this field. However, though this may be a fertile area for evaluation of pluralist claims, it is important to note the limitations of this study. What is being presented in this chapter is not a case study seeking to explain how policy is developed in the field of leisure services but rather an analysis of local politicians' perceptions and explanations of that process and of the role of interest groups and professionals in it.

5.2. THE CASE STUDY: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

The rationale for selection of the authority for this case study has already been described in Chapter Two of this study, and comment is restricted here to considerations which relate to the reliability of data generated. The method employed for data collection was that of semi-structured interviews with a 50% sample of Council membership³. The sample was stratified to incorporate all members of the Leisure Services Sub-committee for the period, the leaders of the three party groups, and equal numbers of 'prominent' members⁴ and backbenchers of the two major parties and all five members of the minority Liberal Group. Forty five interviews were conducted in total, lasting between forty minutes and three hours each. Forty three of these interviews were taped and later transcribed while data from the remaining two were recorded through notes taken at interview⁵. Stratification was also designed to ensure that subjects were drawn from the membership of the full range of Council committees, and as far as possible that all sub-committees were represented. The Council's major committees during the research period were as follows: Management (the senior policy making committee), Development Services, Housing, Education and Social Services. The Education Committee was the major spending committee of the Council and its sub-committees included those for Leisure Services and Unemployment as well as the education service sub-committees. The officer structure for the authority followed the same pattern with the three leisure service divisions, Recreation, Libraries, and Museums and Art Galleries being located within the Directorate of Education.

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The interview schedule employed was constructed to generate data for two related sets of purposes. The first was to provide information relating to the politicians' perceptions of issues such as:

- party Group structure,
- the rationale for specific leisure policy decisions developed by the individual and rehearsed within the party Group,
- the identification of influential individuals in the initiation and development of leisure policy,
- unrepresented interests or non-decisions in the leisure field,
- assessment of leisure needs,
- the role of officers in leisure policy formulation.

Since the case study approach reflects a concern with uncovering politicians' understandings of the social practices involved in policy development, semi-structured interviews were seen as appropriate to the research task since they facilitated the identification of 'categories of experience' as ordered by the interviewee. The approach to data analysis adopted here was informed by 'grounded theory', employing a form of constant comparative method which involved the identification and testing of concepts and categories of response, through repeated comparison with the data (transcripts of interviews) and accompanying field notes (Schatzman and Strauss 1973).

The second major purpose of the interview was to generate data which would allow some limited comparison of councillors in this study with those identified in earlier case studies. Drawing therefore on earlier work, predominantly that of Hampton (1970), Dearlove (1973) and Newton (1976) a range of additional questions were asked relating to socio-demographic characteristics and 'role orientations' of councillors in the sample. Given claims about the changing nature of local politics and of local politicians it was anticipated that this data might generate some interesting comparative material. Furthermore it was intended to identify the defining characteristics of Leisure Services Sub-committee members and where possible compare them with members involved in other spheres of council policy making.

Finally, the strategy for obtaining reliable data from the interviews followed traditional research conventions for interviews of this type (Dean and Whyte 1978): in order to ensure spontaneity on the part of respondents and to minimise the risk of responses to questioning being unduly influenced by extrinsic factors, it was stressed to respondents that information given would be treated in confidence to the extent that neither the individual nor the authority would be identified in subsequent research reports. Interviewees were also informed that the interviewer had no connection with local politics and that the information would not be used for 'party political' purposes.

Copies of the interview schedules employed, and transcripts of interviews as key illustrative examples are provided in appendix 2.

5.3 THE POLITICIANS: PARTY GROUP STRUCTURES AND ROLE ORIENTATIONS

Political Party Groups which operate on councils are unlikely to be homogeneous, bound together by party membership and common interests. Within party Groups, particularly those of any size, an internal structure in terms perhaps of geographical groupings, ideological factions or even simply demographic characteristics, such as age structure, is likely to be identified by its membership. The two major party Groups of the Council in this case study were no exception to this general rule. Certain commonly held perceptions emerged in questioning in terms of the defining features of the Labour and Conservative Groups.

Both Groups had recently been influenced by a significant influx of new, young members, some of whom enjoyed considerable influence, belying the traditional notion of length of service as a prerequisite of seniority. Within the Conservative Group, for example, the Leader elected in 1983, had previously become Deputy Leader after only three years service as a councillor and had gained promotion to the position of Leader of the Group at the age of 39. The Chairman of the Education Committee (1982-4), the major spending committee of the Council, was 26 when he took up his position, having been elected to the Council at the age of 21. These two members, together with the Chairman of Social Services, another young member in his thirties, were consistently cited

by their peers in all parties as the most influential Conservative voices on policy issues. Indeed, members clearly perceived a shifting of the balance of power from the older leading members to the younger councillors. Prior to the new Leader assuming control, a number of the older Conservative members expressed regret at the failure of the old established leadership to assert itself over the more powerful younger members.

Councillor ... [the outgoing Conservative Group Leader] is a wily old bird but the young ones are very forceful. The Deputy Leader [soon to become Leader] is a bright young thing and obviously very enthusiastic. The Chairman of Social Services is obviously very influential, a young power seeking fellow, and ... is another young man, the Chairman of Education. He is very ambitious, forceful..... It's all become very political and the older ones, the ones that have been there a long time can't control them.

(Conservative Councillor F)

The division however between the older and younger members of the Conservative Group was not based solely on age. Indeed for some members, it was based significantly on political values with the incoming group representing what was seen as a more moderate influence. As one older backbench member put it "The young ones coming up, they've got the big ideas. They've not got the same ideas as some of us [older members]" (Conservative Councillor N). The new Leader however pointed out that age grouping and ideological groupings did not strictly coincide within the Group. He described his position, and that of his Group in the following terms:

There are a number of Conservatives who are actually Social Democrats in the European (the German) sense which puts you not in the S.D.P. in this country but just to the left of centre of the Conservative Party. We have a number of Conservatives, both young and old, in that position, including myself.

(Conservative Councillor E)

In view of the literature on the radicalisation of local politics, the emergence of a Tory Group dominated by a young, relatively 'moderate' leadership represents an interesting phenomenon. The influence of the

moderates was seen even before the change of leadership in the development of a race policy for the authority in partnership with the Labour Group, and more recently the attempts to resist cuts in service expenditure in some areas, discussed below. Such moderate policy stances may to some degree have been the product of the hung council, but clearly both Liberal and Labour members recognised the political difficulties of opposing a Tory Group dominated by individuals promoting moderate policies of this nature.

the Tory Group are a very liberal Group. That makes it difficult for us and the Labour Party to attack them because we've got a right wing government and our nice local friendly Tories

(Liberal Councillor E)

The Labour Group manifested some of the same characteristics as the Conservative Group with an age group split which was perceived by members as broadly related to ideological differences. The influx of young inexperienced councillors was more marked among Labour councillors, reflecting the generally poor electoral performance of the Party at all levels in the period 1979-83 when a number of the older members lost their seats and subsequently retired. Thirteen of the twenty Labour members interviewed were forty years of age or less at the time of interview, as compared with seven of the twenty Conservatives, and fourteen had six years service or less, compared with eight Conservatives (see table 5.2a). The Labour Leader was elected to that office at the age of 32, after two years service as a councillor. His election was seen by many members as part of a move towards a "more radical" (Labour Councillor F) "more left wing" (Labour Councillor J) Labour Group. One member who did not seek reelection in 1984, voiced his concern at the changing nature of the Group.

Your newer councillors, it tends to be, spouting militant views because it is the in thing I go and negotiate for a loaf and I'll take half because I know I can come back tomorrow for the other half. The left winger says "I won't leave without the whole loaf" and ends up with nothing.

(Labour Councillor C)

Like their Conservative counterparts the newer members had been striving to make a significant impact on Group policy prior to securing the leadership. A former Leader of the Labour Group described how, since 1981-2 a clutch of new Labour members, initially only about five or six in number, had operated a caucus, deciding before Group meetings how to vote collectively on particular policy issues. The struggle for power in the Labour Group was on-going with the major fixture being the annual election of Group officers. Labour Councillor J (Education spokesperson, and a prominent member of the younger group) described the growing influence of the left and the outcome of the 1982 elections in the following terms.

The left on the Group is only about 15 out of 42, though they've become very strong, and then there's a sort of middle area and then there's a sort of rightthe left captured the leadership, so to speak, but we missed the Deputy Leadership and the right got the Chairmanship of the Group. It's that sort of thing, a bit of trading. But certainly when I came on the Group there was no recognition of ability or work. It was just a matter of time served, which I resented enormously. And when I came on three and a half years ago there was a feeling that I was there on the back benches to shut up and vote.

The continuing success of the younger members in gaining control of the key positions in the Labour Group can be gauged by the membership of the Management Committee, the senior committee of the Council. The ratio of members of 45 and under, to older members was as follows in the three council years of the case study:

1982/3	Conservative 4:3	Labour 1:6
1983/4	Conservative 3:6	Labour 4:5
1984/5	Conservative 3:6	Labour 7:2

However not all Labour members saw the policy platform of the emerging Group leadership as radical.

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The younger members in the Group are seen as left wing but in reality they are in the centre of the Party or slightly to the left, and this is likely to cause problems when we come to power.

(Labour Councillor H)

Such a view was shared by the younger, prominent members of the Conservative Group. The Group Leader (Conservative Councillor E) describing them as "moderate", while the Chairman of Education (Conservative Councillor G) distinguished the "small hard core, hard left" of the Party from what he termed "the less radical, the cuddly left", in which latter category was included the Leader of the Labour Group, and the majority of the younger members.

The Liberal Group consisted of five members, all of whom were policy spokespersons on the major committees. Given its size and the fact that no committee involved more than one Liberal member, it invariably operated as a loose coalition of individuals. The Liberal Leader could only recall the Whip being applied on one occasion in her two years experience as a councillor (and on that occasion one of the Group voted against the whip).

Group discipline was more stringently applied in the major parties, particularly in the Labour Group where the whip was applied most often. Four of the Labour members interviewed claimed to have voted against the whip (these are categorised as 'rebels' in table 5.2 f) while in the Conservative Group six members had voted against and two more had abstained, including the new Leader prior to assuming his post. Although no sanctions, other than a request to explain their actions to the leadership, had been taken against the Conservative members, on at least one occasion Labour members had been expelled from the Group and had only been rehabilitated following protracted negotiations involving the National Executive of the Party. The tighter discipline of the Labour Group in part reflects the process of local authority policy development laid down by Labour Party guidelines. The District Labour Party is responsible for drawing up policies to be pursued by the Party Group on Council. The Labour Group itself is charged with deciding how best and when to implement such policies. Such a formula provides the

TABLE 5.2: DEMOGRAPHIC AND ROLE ORIENTATION DATA BROKEN DOWN BY MEMBERSHIP OF MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE (PROMINENT MEMBERS) AND BY MEMBERSHIP OF LEISURE SERVICES

(a) Age Structure

	TOTAL SAMPLE				PROMINENT MEMBERS				BACKBENCH MEMBERS				LEISURE SERVICES MEMBERS			
	Cons	Lab	Lib	All	Cons	Lab	Lib	All	Cons	Lab	Lib	All	Cons	Lab	Lib	All
21 - 30 years	3	-	1	4	2	-	-	2	1	-	1	2	-	-	1	1
31 - 40 years	4	13	-	17	1	4	-	5	3	9	-	12	1	5	-	6
41 - 50 years	1	1	1	3	-	1	-	1	1	-	1	2	-	-	-	-
51 - 60 years	6	4	3	13	3	1	1	5	3	3	2	8	3	2	-	5
>60 years	6	2	-	8	2	2	-	4	4	-	-	4	4	1	-	5

(b) Length of Service

	TOTAL SAMPLE				PROMINENT MEMBERS				BACKBENCH MEMBERS				LEISURE SERVICES MEMBERS			
	Cons	Lab	Lib	All	Cons	Lab	Lib	All	Cons	Lab	Lib	All	Cons	Lab	Lib	All
1-3 years	6	7	3	16	1	2	1	4	5	5	2	12	2	3	1	6
4-6 years	2	7	1	10	1	3	-	4	1	4	1	6	-	2	-	2
7-9 years	5	1	-	6	2	-	-	2	3	1	-	4	2	-	-	2
10-12 years	1	2	1	4	1	1	-	2	-	1	1	2	-	2	-	2
13-15 years	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	3	2	-	-	2
> 15 years	6	2	-	8	3	2	-	5	1	-	-	1	2	1	-	3

(c) Interest in General Policy or Individual Casework

	TOTAL SAMPLE				PROMINENT MEMBERS				BACKBENCH MEMBERS				LEISURE SERVICES MEMBERS			
	Cons	Lab	Lib	All	Cons	Lab	Lib	All	Cons	Lab	Lib	All	Cons	Lab	Lib	All
Policy Orientation	11	8	2	21	6	5	1	12	5	3	1	9	3	4	1	8
Mixture of the two	3	8	-	11	1	3	-	4	2	5	-	7	1	2	-	3
Individual Casework	6	4	3	13	1	-	-	1	5	4	3	12	4	2	-	6

(d) Focus of Interest

	TOTAL SAMPLE				PROMINENT MEMBERS				BACKBENCH MEMBERS				LEISURE SERVICES MEMBERS			
	Cons	Lab	Lib	All	Cons	Lab	Lib	All	Cons	Lab	Lib	All	Cons	Lab	Lib	All
District	13	12	1	26	6	7	-	13	7	5	1	13	4	6	-	10
Ward & District	2	7	-	9	1	1	-	2	1	6	-	7	-	2	-	2
Ward	5	1	4	10	1	-	1	2	4	1	3	8	4	-	1	5

TABLE 5.2 CONTINUED

(e) Political Role

	TOTAL SAMPLE				PROMINENT MEMBERS				BACKBENCH MEMBERS				LEISURE SERVICES MEMBERS			
	Cons	Lab	Lib	All	Cons	Lab	Lib	All	Cons	Lab	Lib	All	Cons	Lab	Lib	All
Trustee	15	2	2	19	7	1	-	8	8	1	2	11	4	-	1	5
Politico	3	13	1	17	1	7	-	8	2	6	1	9	2	8	-	10
Delegate	2	5	2	9	-	-	1	1	2	5	1	8	2	-	-	2

(f) Group Discipline

	TOTAL SAMPLE				PROMINENT MEMBERS				BACKBENCH MEMBERS				LEISURE SERVICES MEMBERS			
	Cons	Lab	Lib	All	Cons	Lab	Lib	All	Cons	Lab	Lib	All	Cons	Lab	Lib	All
Faithful	12	16	4	32	4	7	1	12	9	9	3	20	4	7	1	12
Abstainer	2	-	-	2	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	1
Rebel	6	4	1	11	3	1	-	4	3	3	1	7	3	1	-	4

(g) Ward Ranked by Indicators of 'Recreation Need' (Ranked from Highest Need to Lowest, 1-30)

	TOTAL SAMPLE				PROMINENT MEMBERS				BACKBENCH MEMBERS				LEISURE SERVICES MEMBERS			
	Cons	Lab	Lib	All	Cons	Lab	Lib	All	Cons	Lab	Lib	All	Cons	Lab	Lib	All
1-5	1	6	-	7	-	3	-	3	1	3	-	4	-	1	-	1
6-10	3	4	-	7	1	2	-	3	2	2	-	4	1	2	-	3
11-15	3	8	-	11	2	3	-	5	1	5	-	6	1	4	-	5
16-20	3	1	-	4	1	-	-	1	2	1	-	3	2	-	-	2
21-25	3	1	2	6	1	-	-	1	2	1	2	5	1	1	1	3
26-30	7	-	3	10	3	-	1	4	4	-	2	6	3	-	-	3

(h) Sex of Members in the Sample

	TOTAL SAMPLE				PROMINENT MEMBERS				BACKBENCH MEMBERS				LEISURE SERVICES MEMBERS			
	Cons	Lab	Lib	All	Cons	Lab	Lib	All	Cons	Lab	Lib	All	Cons	Lab	Lib	All
Male	14	20	3	37	7	8	-	15	7	12	3	22	6	6	1	15
Female	6	-	2	8	1	-	1	2	5	-	1	6	2	-	-	2

TABLE 5.2 CONTINUED

(i) Members' Occupation

	TOTAL SAMPLE				PROMINENT MEMBERS				BACKBENCH MEMBERS				LEISURE SERVICES MEMBERS			
	Cons	Lab	Lib	All	Cons	Lab	Lib	All	Cons	Lab	Lib	All	Cons	Lab	Lib	All
Professional Businessmen & Executives	2	-	-	2	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	1
Business Professions	2	-	-	2	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	1
'Liberal' Professions	-	2	1	3	-	1	-	1	-	1	1	2	-	2	1	3
Managers (private sector)	1	1	-	2	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Clerical / admin. (voluntary sector)	1	1	-	2	1	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
Clerical/ admin. (private sector)	2	1	-	3	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	3	1	-	-	1
Clerical / admin. (public sector)	2	2	-	4	2	-	-	2	-	2	-	2	-	-	-	-
Skilled manual (private sector)	-	4	1	5	-	1	-	1	-	3	1	4	-	3	-	3
Traders	1	-	2	3	-	-	1	1	1	-	1	2	-	-	-	-
Housewife	4	-	-	4	1	-	-	1	3	-	-	3	2	-	-	2
Unemployed	1	9	1	11	1	4	-	5	-	5	1	6	-	3	-	3
Retired	4	-	-	4	1	-	-	1	3	-	-	3	2	-	-	2

opportunity for friction between the District Party, the Party Group, the Ward Party and individual members.

Although Labour councillors were generally concerned to report and justify their actions to ward parties, the ward could not formally mandate its councillors, nor indeed (formally) could the Party Group if the individual felt that the Group's decision ran counter to District Party policy. This formal mechanism provides a means of insulating members, temporarily at least from pressure to oppose Group or District Party policy decisions. Nevertheless such 'insulation' may provide only temporary protection, and one member claimed to have been deselected by his own "militant dominated" ward party for failing to vote against the Group on a budget issue.

Militant Tendency at [name of the ward].... used to have meetings to decide what they wanted, and try to impose their will on councillors. They did it in the 1981 budget decision They tried it on me and because I wouldn't do what they wanted I am no longer councillor for [the ward].

(Labour Councillor K)

The Conservative Group does not have equivalent party apparatus for screening or contributing to decisions through ward and district parties and members reported very little pressure to vote in particular ways from their party machinery outside the Group. Ward party representatives might lobby members on particular issues but in those instances reported by interviewees, all except one of the Conservative councillors⁷ were able to set aside the wishes of the ward party without significant repercussions.

Perhaps the most striking feature of the demographic data obtained from the sample is that relating to occupation, and more specifically the number of unemployed Labour councillors (nine of the twenty interviewed). This contrasted sharply with the Conservative members interviewed. Only one Conservative and one Liberal in the sample were unemployed, though four Conservative members were retired. Recent literature (e.g. Elcock 1983) has highlighted the full-time nature of the councillor's role in a large authority. Unemployed councillors indicated that they were able to approach

their political role with a commitment that would be difficult to match for councillors in full time employment. Such resources of time, particularly for front bench members, might be used for adopting a more thorough-going approach to policy-making and policy supervision, and this in turn, may require the development of new types of relationship with professional officers:

I am full-time. I work sixty to seventy hours per week on Council work and normally some of this work would be done by an officer.When I set up the Policy Group the Assistant Director jumped up and down and stamped his foot.

(Conservative Councillor G)

The demands of the councillor's role may militate against participation by anyone other than those without the time commitments of full-time employment, and as one of the older prominent Conservative Councillors noted, this may already be having a significant effect on recruitment of members.

The whole business of local government has got so big, and so time consuming that we're having trouble getting the right kind of people. In fact councillors are different now. We're getting the wrong kind of people - unemployed socialists, housewives and retired people. They're the only ones with the time, not the businessman.

(Conservative Councillor S)

In his review of studies of councillors' role orientations, Gyford (1984) identifies a common theme in such studies, with new members generally displaying a tendency to focus on the problems of individuals (particularly those living in their own ward) rather than on broader policy issues; to concentrate on the needs of their own ward rather than the city or district as a whole; and a tendency to adopt the role of 'delegate' (seeking to reflect the wishes of the electorate) rather than of 'trustee' (relying on one's own conscience) or of 'politico' (seeking to balance personal judgement and the wishes of the electorate). Together with tendencies in other aspects of councillor behaviour Gyford develops an ideal typical characterisation of the role of the 'Statesman', the senior, experienced politician trusting in his /

her own judgement, focussing on policy and district wide issues, viewing officers as colleagues, adhering to party discipline and considering local politics to be largely a matter for administrative decision making rather than ideological politics. The Statesman role is contrasted with that of 'Tribune', a role adopted typically by a junior, relatively inexperienced councillor, operating as a delegate with a concern for individual casework rather than wider policy issues, adopting a watchdog role with officers, and displaying a greater tendency to rebel against party discipline by voting against the Group or abstaining. These role descriptions are not meant to represent water-tight categories of behaviour, but rather, underlying tendencies in councillor behaviour that might be identified. Though there may be some differences in role orientations across the major parties (with Labour councillors for example displaying a tendency to retain a concern for individual casework, despite seniority, viz. Hampton 1970) Gyford argues that the distinction between 'statesman' and 'tribune' holds for members of all parties, and he supports this assertion by drawing upon the case study findings he reviews.

It was clear that some backbench Conservative members in the sample defined the way they approached their job as councillor in terms which relate to the 'tribune' role. Indeed one former front bench Conservative member described his conscious reversion to something akin to the 'tribune' role having resumed a back bench position.

As a back bencher I am looking after the interests of the people I represent, the people in my ward. As a front bencher it is slightly different if you are a front bencher you have to guide overall policy through discussion, and assess where the greatest needs in the met. district are.

(Conservative Councillor A)

However there were some important departures from the pattern of role orientations which Gyford describes. The influence of new members in the party Groups is a feature has already been noted and there are other significant differences in the way that new members have approached their work. Younger new members were as likely to be policy oriented or to mix policy and

casework, and less likely to be wholly ward oriented, or to adopt the role of delegate than their longer serving back bench colleagues. This would seem to indicate that the process of socialisation of new members into the new councillor role identified for example by Dearlove (1973) did not operate in this case, and many of the new, younger members were clearly not willing to 'sit on their hands' but were anxious to influence policy. These findings perhaps become most significant when considering those areas of policy traditionally consigned to committees or sub-committees peopled by back-bench members. Changes in the way such members view their role will almost invariably be reflected in the way such committees operate and in the policies which they generate. The Leisure Services Sub-committee provides an excellent illustration of this phenomenon.

The differences between Conservative and Labour members are difficult to gauge in terms of the way in which they perceived their political role since they are confounded by factors such as age and experience. Nevertheless the Conservative members displayed a marked preference for relying ultimately on their own judgement, fifteen of the twenty describing their role as that of trustee, as opposed to two Labour members, (see table 5.2e). Thirteen of the Labour councillors interviewed described their role as that of 'politico' and five as that of delegate. Liberal Party members provided an interesting profile given their party's commitment to grass roots involvement in decision-making, delegates and trustees being equally balanced.

In general terms Labour Group members tended to be marginally more interested in policy issues (as well as, or to the exclusion of individual casework) to be less likely to focus exclusively on the concerns of their own ward (despite representing more disadvantaged wards) and to be considerably more likely to take account of the electorate's wishes in arriving at a decision on policy matters.

One final issue to consider before focussing specifically on the work of the Leisure Services Sub-committee is that of members' perceptions of the nature of political debate and policy change in the Council. Members were asked to identify ways in which local government policy had changed since the Council had become hung following the 1982 elections. There was a majority view in all

three parties that any redirection of policy had been marginal, though there were subtle differences in the way this phenomenon was explained.

Labour members were able to point to some examples of policy change, particularly in respect of financial management:

in terms of policies, things have not changed too much. You can pick up certain things like school meals charges which are going up, something which the Labour Party would want to avoid anyway. Council rents jumped up rapidly last year and also home help charges are being reintroduced for old people. You can pick out single things like that but there isn't wholesale change in the way the Council is run or its general outlook. The race relations policy has got consensus support and our economic policies, unemployment policies have got consensus support by and large.

(Labour Councillor M)

A number of Conservatives also noted the attempt by the authority to effect "tighter accounting controls" and reduce expenditure, though as one member observed, the cuts imposed by central government, rather than the policies of the local Conservative Group, had led to a subtle shift in the policy environment.

I suppose the birth of the hung council is broadly contemporary with the cuts scenario so it is a post hoc not a propter hoc situation. The Council has become attuned to a non-expansionary situation. The pain is still felt both by officers and by members but I think the philosophy of non-expansion, the philosophy of cost-effectiveness and efficiency is now a more central philosophy and is accepted.

(Conservative Councillor T)

This perceived lack of fundamental change in policy might be explained by a combination of factors - the 'moderating' influence of the hung council, the influence of officers, and the policy inclinations of influential members of the Conservative Group. The hung nature of the Council was certainly seen as a buttress against extremism by members of the Liberal Group who held the balance of power:

each party has had to water down policies because they know we won't accept extremes.

(Liberal Councillor D)

Conservative members were also aware of the tendency to policy inertia of the hung council:

We don't get any extreme views from our right wing or from Labour's left wing. They know they won't get anywhere. For instance there should have been a rent rise two years ago but the Liberals wouldn't go along with it so it has never even gone to committee because you won't win and you will only make yourself unpopular.

(Conservative Councillor B)

Similarly Labour members noted that all parties policy programmes are impeded by a hung council and therefore that "compromise is the name of the game" (Labour Councillor E).

However while Liberal members clearly favoured what they characterised as "tripartite decision-making" (Liberal Councillor D) and "increased consultation for all parties" (Liberal Councillor B), some Labour members argued that such a situation was undemocratic, since the smallest party group exercised disproportionate power over policy decisions, and was inefficient, since decisions were delayed because they invariably involved consultation throughout three party groups. Two Labour members went as far as to argue that a Tory majority would be preferable to a hung council.

Notwithstanding the difficulties of policy-making in a hung council, some members of both major parties argued that radical policy change was difficult to effect even with a council with a clear majority for one party, given the resistance to change endemic among officers:

Most officers are resistant to change. Most people in any organisation are, if they are happy. Generally the officers run the authority, because the members don't give any clear direction. It's very easily described as a ship. If the Labour Party takes control it drifts to the

left. If the Tory Party takes control it drifts to the right. If it's hung it staggers about a bit.

(Labour Councillor P)

The hung council was seen as both making the work of officers more difficult, since they had to report to three party groups, and also as increasing the opportunities for officers to influence policy since it "encouraged them to cut corners" (Conservative Councillor D) because of their frustrations with the unwieldy three party system, and diminished the ability of politicians to control their activities (cf. Blowers's 1982 account of officer member relationships in a hung council).

In addition to the nature of the hung council, and the influence of officers, a further factor which would seem to have militated against policy change is that of the similarity of policy aims in a number of areas between prominent members of the two major Groups. The Council had for example developed a policy statement on race and ethnic issues which was a bi-partisan initiative, and was seen as one of the most far-reaching policy developments in the recent history of the authority, affecting as it did all service areas. Similarly, a statement of intent, in terms of 'decentralisation and area management' was an all party policy document which, although subsequently never acted upon, still reflected some similarities in policy goals (if not in motives for pursuing those goals). A further potentially major policy development occurred during the period of the research relating to the development of an open government policy for the Council. The Conservative Group Leader, noting the similarity of approach to this issue in the Labour Group was concerned to identify it clearly as a Conservative proposal.

the open government policy, the officer who wrote it we grabbed and ran it just ahead of the Labour Party.

(Conservative Councillor E)

Two critical Labour members however, pointed to the failure of the 1980-82 Labour administration to follow a radical socialist line as a factor explaining the subsequent lack of significant policy change.

An example of resistance to budget cuts for certain services by two prominent Conservative members also serves to underline both the existence of some shared policy aims and the strength of the influential members within the Conservative Group. The Chairman of Education described how he, together with the Chairman of Social Services had constructed a plan to shelter their own service areas from budget cuts:

Education has gained some protection for the first time. I've done deals with the Chairman of Social Services to protect our two budgets to the detriment of everybody else. Last year .. by capitalisation ... I got growth in my budget. This year, pro rata, Education should have lost eighteen or nineteen million, we've actually lost £4.5 million.

(Conservative Councillor G)

This incident serves to illustrate both similarities in some policy aims, between some Labour and Conservative members, and provides a minor insight into the methods employed to achieve those aims.

5.4 THE LEISURE SERVICES SUB-COMMITTEE.

During the research period nineteen members served on the Sub-committee which had eleven places (five each for the major parties and one for the Alliance). Of these, seventeen^a were interviewed (eight Labour, eight Conservative and one Liberal).

The Conservatives who served on the Leisure Services Sub-committee were considerably older on average than other Leisure Services members, they had generally served on the Council for longer periods, but included only two councillors with Management Committee experience (as opposed to four Labour members who served on Management, three during the research period). Labour members were also more clearly oriented towards a concern for policy and the needs of the district rather than of their own wards (see table 5.2 c and d). Furthermore all adopted the 'politico' role and all but one had always followed the Party whip (table 5.2e and f).

Recruitment patterns to the the Leisure Services Sub-committee go some way toward explaining the make-up of the Sub-committee. In 1982-3, and in 1983-4 the Labour membership of the Sub-committee incorporated four relatively new members in total. As Labour Councillor 'J' pointed out it was simply a coincidence that these new members should prove to be politically able and interested in policy matters. He himself joined the Sub-committee late in 1981-2 while still a relatively new member, shortly before being promoted to the post of Spokesperson for Education, and he was joined by two further new members the following year.

The others were sort of run of the mill councillors who take a very bland view of politics. Both parties tended to put these sort of people on. They thought 'Oh, Leisure Services is something nice and easy. It just runs itself.' and it can just run itself in times of plenty ... It is a sub-committee that can get by if you just keep your libraries and parks and museums open and functioning. But you don't have any real move forward, keeping abreast of the times. Certain new members to Council last year, ... they had to be put somewhere, let them serve their time on a committee that doesn't matter. Now they ... both turn out to be highly political people, both good thinkers, and both very hard workers .. they did their homework on issues and looked into matters. I think also with the tightening of finance it begins to heighten political awareness in all areas.

(Labour Councillor J)

In addition to the Education Spokesperson, two other councillors with front bench experience, were among the Labour members of this Sub-committee across the research period, a former Leader, and a former Deputy Leader of the Group. Indeed a party official suggested that this last individual had been banished from the front bench and given the role of spokesperson on this Sub-committee as a 'punishment' following a disagreement with other influential members of the Group. This story may be apocryphal (it was not substantiated) but it does illustrate the relatively low status of the Leisure Services Sub-committee in the pecking order. Two of these three identified themselves as members of the younger left wing group of Labour councillors. Thus, despite

its status, throughout this period there was an articulate, relatively 'radical' presence among Labour members on this Sub-committee.

The two remaining Labour members were in their fifties and had worked on this sub-committee for some years. They were attracted to individual casework, rather than wider policy issues, and were the only two Labour members who focussed on both ward and district needs rather than predominantly those of the district. In this sense they were more akin to the majority of Conservative members serving on the Leisure Services Sub-committee.

The Conservative Leisure Services Sub-committee members included four councillors who had served on the Sub-committee since its introduction in a restructuring of committees in 1979. The Party's membership of Leisure Services was therefore relatively stable, in contrast to that of the Labour Party. The 'Chairman'^a of the Sub-committee for two of the three council years which fell within the study period had occupied that position (or the position of spokesperson in opposition) since the inception of the Sub-committee. The year of absence from Leisure Services was the result of her election to the mayoralty and she subsequently resumed her role as 'Chairman'. The Labour Group in fact employed three different spokespersons, one in each of the three years. For the year of the Chairman's mayoral duties, a front bench councillor was imported by the Conservative Group to take over the chairmanship of the Sub-committee. Apart from this member and the four long-serving Leisure Services Conservative members, the remaining three Conservatives who served on the Sub-committee during this period included one member who had reverted to a back bench role in 1983-4 and joined Leisure Services Sub-committee for that year and a new, elderly councillor. Both of these had predominantly ward, individual casework and 'politico' or 'delegate' orientations.

The only Conservative member who served on this sub-committee who was less than 50 years of age was Deputy Chairman in 1984-5. He had opted to accept the post not because of an interest in the policy area but rather as a means of "gaining political experience of a Deputy Chairmanship". In fact only five of the seventeen members interviewed had sought membership of the Leisure Services Sub-committee because of an interest in aspects of Leisure Services,

and of those only one, the Labour spokesperson for 1984-5 declared a primary interest in policy issues and district wide needs.

There were perhaps five discernible types of councillor¹⁰ serving on the Sub-committee (and on the Council as a whole).

(i) **'Back bench traditionalists'**:- the first group is constituted by those longer-serving back bench members (five Conservative and two Labour) some of whom have sought to serve on this committee because of their interest in a specific aspect of the Leisure Service e.g. libraries (Conservative Councillor H), swimming (Conservative Councillor J), football (Labour Councillor S). Members in this category tended not to be predominantly interested in wider policy issues or in the needs of the city, being content to limit their interests to some degree to individual casework and ward issues. They have not had, nor do they seek, promotion to the more powerful positions within their Group, and they tend to see policy decision-making (in the leisure field particularly) as a matter of common sense, in which party political debate should play little or no part.

(ii) **'Retiring prominent members'**:- this category on the Leisure Services Sub-committee included two former members of Management Committee (one Conservative and one Labour). These members had moved from the more powerful and prestigious committees to make way for other members, and had been placed in this Sub-committee, partly to stiffen party presence. The Conservative adapted to the back bench role, concentrating on ward affairs, while the Labour councillor in this category stressed that he retained his interest in broader policy concerns. For both these members Leisure Services represented a new policy area.

(iii) **'Traditionalist prominent members'**:- there was only one member of this category serving on the Sub-committee during the research period. This was the senior councillor imported to chair the committee in the absence of the normal Conservative post-holder. A major difference between this type of member and the 'new prominent' group was their view of the role of party politics in policy decision-making, 'traditional prominents'

advocating 'apolitical', 'common sense' decision-making, and tending to be suspicious of radical policy change.

Leisure services is provided in the main for people who need it. Anyone who starts playing political games is rubbish because it doesn't matter what politics you are if the need is there politics don't arise.

(Conservative Councillor L)

(iv) **'New prominent members'**:- this group incorporated younger, often relatively inexperienced members who had achieved seniority fairly early in their council careers. The Sub-committee contained three such members, all from the Labour Group. None of the three had sought a role on the Sub-committee and none served for more than two of the three years of the research period, but they nevertheless brought their interest in policy review and change and their adversarial style of politics to bear on what for them was a new service area. Members in this category both within and outside the Sub-committee made it clear that they regarded party ideology as having a legitimate role to play in all areas of council policy;

decisions on leisure services should be like decisions on any other local authority service - we should make up our minds on the basis of socialist principles, not on habit or what we've done before

(Labour Councillor P)

(v) **'Political aspirants'**:- the final category incorporates the newer, aspiring councillors (one Conservative, one Liberal, and two Labour) who for the most part had not sought to work in this field because of an interest in the policy area per se, but who because of their policy orientation, and because of their rejection of the apolitical characterisation of decision-making, were more likely to develop an interest in substantive leisure policy issues. The Liberal member fell into this category despite his commitment to ward concerns. This commitment was in fact different in kind to that of traditionalist back

bench members-since it was a reflection of his ideological commitment to 'grass roots' community politics.

The term political aspirant does not necessarily refer to the political ambitions of the individual, though, as we have seen, many young members in the major parties gained access to senior positions fairly quickly. Rather the term is intended to reflect the aspirations of members of this category for changes of policy and of the policy-making environment.

Although therefore Leisure Services had been traditionally seen as "something of a backwater committee" (Labour Councillor G) a combination of circumstances had resulted in the recruitment of some politically able, policy-oriented members to complement (and displace some of) the back bench traditionalist membership of this Sub-committee. These factors, together with the financial pressures faced by the Sub-committee, meant that policy debate was more highly charged over the period than had previously been the case.

5.5 MEMBERS' ACCOUNTS OF THE NATURE OF LEISURE POLICY

5.5.1 Descriptions of Existing Leisure Policy

Before considering specific decisions (and non-decisions) in the Leisure Services field, it is worth illustrating ways in which policy-making was characterised by members generally and also more specifically identifying the kinds of policy change members would expect or wish to see in the local authority within the medium term ("the next five to ten years").

One of the problems in trying to clarify members' perceptions of the nature of leisure policy in the authority was its fragmentary character. Even prominent members with an interest in policy experienced difficulty in identifying what existing leisure policy was, "I don't think we've got a policy on that because we don't know what people want to do" (Conservative Councillor D). The Liberal member who joined the Council and the Sub-committee in 1984 reported that this was a problem for all three parties, "I don't see anybody having a coherent policy on how they see leisure developing." (Liberal Councillor E)

The Labour spokesperson (1983-4) for Leisure Services argued that the sub-committee did not deliberate on policies but rather on individual and often small-scale issues.

I am very concerned about the performance of Leisure - the staffing and the performance of members - and since May I've been trying to change it and look at policies not detail.

(Labour Councillor F)

In similar vein, the Liberal member on the Sub-committee argued that the rationale for provision was not so much a matter of policy intentions as of "tradition";

Leisure grows by increments. We accept what exists and we add to it. We never replace existing schemes with something new.

(Liberal Councillor E)

The lack of underlying policy programme for any of the parties in respect of leisure services was related to the fact that a number of members, particularly amongst the Conservatives interviewed, saw this area of work as peripheral.

Leisure Services will always be seen as marginal, and an easy touch as far as cuts are concerned compared with the core services in Education therefore I think that Leisure Services must increase its visible efficiency.

(Conservative Councillor T)

Members argued that because it was regarded as peripheral and because it did not have powerful members defending it (in the Conservative Group of 1982-5 or the Labour Group of 1980-2) it had suffered more than a proportionate cut in revenue estimates in succeeding budgets.

It would seem that the location of the Leisure Services Sub-committee within the remit of the Education Committee and the Education Directorate, rendered it more vulnerable to cuts. The professional affiliations of the senior

officers in the Directorate of Education and the sub-committee affiliations of the senior politicians on the Education Committee, meant that these relatively powerful individuals were predominantly involved with 'mainstream' education services and that such services may therefore have been more likely to be protected from financial cuts. Within a shrinking Education Committee budget, this would be done at the expense of 'peripheral' service areas such as Leisure Services.

The Labour Group and the District Party had set up a range of working groups to advise Labour members on the work of some service committees and sub-committees. However, throughout the research period, no such shadow group existed for Leisure Services although the Education Spokesperson and the Spokesperson for Leisure Services (1982-3) declared their intention of establishing such a group. Without such policy advisory bodies they argued, it would be difficult to break out of the incrementalist policy discussions which dominated the work of the Sub-committee.

I don't think [the District] can boast an adventurous radical, highly controversial leisure policy. I mean if people think of [the District] they might think of the race relations policy. It's challenging, it's radical, it makes the news. Can you say that about leisure policy? No, you can't.

(Labour Councillor M)

Nevertheless the newer Labour members stressed the need to develop a clearer set of policies in this area. The Labour Leader made this evident in explaining his opposition to the location of responsibility for leisure services within the Education Committee's remit.

they [the Conservative and Liberal Groups] don't see leisure as that important, but then a lot of members of the Labour Group don't either, because they try and tie leisure in with the schools. You need that side I don't deny it. But there is the other side of the coin, where with the growing unemployment problem and changing lifestyles, you are never going to get the attitude shift that is necessary to bring about the improved quality of life. It is going to be a very divisive lifestyle in the

District, unless we can get the leisure side right with the economic and wealth creating side. If you can match the two then we've got progress, if we can't match the two then we've got problems.

(Labour Councillor B)

One of the factors related to the lack of clear political objectives which was perceived by members of all parties was the prominent role officers played in this area of decision-making.

the three senior officers [chief officers for Recreation, Libraries, and Arts and Museums] are obviously very influential. They are the people who write up service plans and so on, and really they are the people who are influencing what's going on. I don't really think that up to now there has been any real thought by Labour, by any of Labour people about what are the priorities and how we create improvements and so on. It has been left to officers to develop that.

(Labour Councillor Q)

All five types of Leisure Service Sub-committee member noted the strength and significance of officer influence in initiating and developing policy, though only the 'new prominents' and the 'political aspirants' regarded this as a seriously negative feature. One consequence of the influence of officers in leisure policy decision-making which was identified by younger members from both parties was a misplaced emphasis on 'prestige' facilities.

as an officer if you're building [the city theatre] you can travel all over the country, you can meet a lot of people, and when you're applying for jobs if you've been involved in building such a great thing well you're in line for a top job somewhere else. Whereas if you've been involved with some local drama group in a community project, well, people are less likely to be impressed.

(Labour Councillor Q)

This type of influence was seen as going some way to explain why there are

very few sections of society that are catered for. It seems to be white, middle class car owners who are best served.

(Labour Councillor F)

The role of officers in local government in general and in leisure policy in particular is a crucial issue. One Labour member described it in the following terms, "After the cuts, the biggest single problem is the relationship between officers and members." (Labour Councillor H). The penultimate section of this chapter maps out the contours of this problem in more detail.

The traditional lack of party policy programmes in this field has also in the past been reflected in, or reinforced by, a politically consensual approach to decision-making. Members of all three party Groups consistently cited the Leisure Services Sub-committee as having been among the least likely committees or sub-committees to generate inter-party political differences. The 'Chairman' (1982-3, 1984-5) of the sub-committee explained her approach and that of her Labour counterpart in the period before the research was conducted in the following terms.

at my very first meeting [in 1979] I said "Now I don't want any political nonsense, this isn't a political thing at all, leisure services." And it worked extraordinarily well. ... [the then Labour Spokesman] got up and said "I follow exactly No politics. Let's go straight down the middle." But unfortunately, he lost favour with his Group for not making it aggressive enough. the Leisure Services Committee was more political last year and will be this year because they've got three or four very able new left wing members.

(Conservative Councillor K)

This impression of increasing politicisation of the sub-committee's work was common to all parties;

When I first went on to Leisure Services in 1979 I thought it was more or less non-political. But in the last year, with the introduction of newly

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elected members onto the Council, Leisure Services has become much more politically motivated.

(Labour Councillor K)

Indeed one of the Labour Spokesmen on Leisure Services for the period (Labour Councillor F) declared that he had "intentionally made it more political because it was a bit like sleepy hollow".

The level and strength of inter-party policy differences need not simply be related to the subject matter with which a committee deals. Leisure is a service area as open as any other to the construction of policy programmes based on political ideology, as the discussion of ideology and leisure policy in Chapter Three illustrates. Furthermore some areas of Council activity with traditionally strongly differentiated party policy positions, such as Housing and Direct Works, were noted by politicians to be less contentious in this authority than might have been expected, because of the style of the key politicians involved who had eschewed adversarial politics. (Here again, however, the situation was changing with more stridently political appointees to those committees.) Interestingly the Chairman and a number of other Conservative members noted the impact of the new Labour members;

Sometimes the best ideas come from Labour (but they are put over badly and become controversial).

(Conservative Councillor K)

I can tell you that the Labour Party has tended to speak out more forcefully on leisure issues than the Conservative Party. ... that's largely through the new members.

(Conservative Councillor Q)

Councillor ... [a new Labour member on Leisure Services] ... who is on the opposition is going to be a powerful bloke because he is a very bright lad. His politics are just about the opposite of mine but you can't help respecting a bright man.

(Conservative Councillor F)

Interestingly, of the Conservative members interviewed only the Group Leader expressed any regret at the lack of party political debate there had been in the Sub-committee, while older back bench and prominent colleagues tended to see this apolitical approach as a positive feature.

The growing politicisation of debate in the Leisure Services Sub-committee should not be seen as a function merely of changing membership, because, with continually shrinking resources, differences in priorities would almost invariably become more obvious. Nevertheless it seems that the new members became the vehicle for the heightening of such debate.

To summarise these preliminary observations on politicians' characterisations of leisure policy, this area of Council decision-making was seen as piecemeal or haphazard, dominated by tradition, and marginal to 'mainstream' council activity. It was seen as an area of policy which was heavily influenced by officer input, and lacking political direction in terms of party policy programmes, but that as resources for council services had shrunk and demands on those resources had increased, party political divisions in the area of leisure policy had become more apparent.

5.5.2 Leisure Policy: Aspirations and Expectations.

Members were asked to identify any changes in leisure policy they might *wish* to see over the next five to ten years, for example, which types of service they might wish to see expand or contract and why. They were also asked in similar terms to identify changes in leisure policy they would *expect* to see over the same period.

Labour members, as one might expect, argued that expansion of public sector leisure services was desirable. Rather more surprising was the majority support among the Conservative members for increased provision. Not only were members recognising the growth of factors such as non-work time, but some Conservatives also argued that the Council was the most effective provider of such services.

I am quite happy for us to run these services if we can afford them because I always instinctively think we tend to do the best job.

(Conservative Councillor J)

This support for public sector provision was not however universal and some Conservative members certainly took a 'drier' line;

I don't think I would like to see the expansion of the leisure services by this Council I think it will have to come from the private sector.

(Conservative Councillor C)

Among the Conservative councillors, backbench members were more likely to oppose expansion of public sector provision 'in principle' rather than because of the lack of available funds. One member of the Leisure Services Subcommittee for example opposed spending on leisure services for the unemployed "because it doesn't add to the wealth of the community" (Conservative Councillor H), while another objected to the growing level of spending in the inner city, arguing that such provision should be centralised, and the overall level of spending in such areas reduced;

I don't think we should spend all those bitty bits of money on all those inner city places. I'm sure it isn't necessary. I think ... Sports Centre is a good idea but I don't think every pocket should have one because eventually it will be like the bowling alleys, nobody will use them.

(Conservative Councillor F)

However though both Labour and the majority of Conservative members foreshadowed increased emphasis on public sector provision, nine of the Conservative members stressed the need for the local authority to adopt a more entrepreneurial style in managing its leisure services. The commercialisation of service provision was seen not simply as a matter of requiring the user to meet an increased proportion of the real costs of the service, but would also involve the introduction of charges for services such as libraries and museums which traditionally (or by statute) are provided free of charge, together with

a greater emphasis on retail sales within establishments, and the development of partnership schemes with the commercial sector;

A useful recent innovation is the joint management venture with a commercial concern with shared profits. This accent on saving money may seem odd, but I think it's important Further steps could be taken in museums to generate more money. I know it's government policy not to charge, but we've done so little in terms of marketing. We've got good promotion but we don't make use of point-of-sale sales. We do have a tourist market and many of our tourists are falling over themselves to buy things. Leisure Services is under-selling the services to the public.

(Conservative Councillor T)

The Conservative Group Leader was clearly aware that this move towards a more stridently commercial approach, and particularly charging for traditionally free services, would be a sensitive issue with the electorate.

The rationales for growth put forward by the members of all parties invariably related to the growth of free time, either for the unemployed or for both the unemployed and those in work who would be working fewer hours. The Liberal Leisure Services member noted the difficulty of meeting the needs of those out of work, who were a legitimate target of public sector subsidy, while excluding or charging the market rate to those in work with increasing discretionary income and free time.

Subsidising services alright helps people who are unemployed, but also helps people who are not unemployed and who frankly don't need it. This I suppose is the Labour party's idea of the universalisation of provision - you get away from any stigma. That's alright if you've got enough resources and if you've got government taxing people more progressively. Where you haven't got that, those people, people like myself, are benefitting all down the line. If you give something free to someone who is unemployed and to someone who isn't, this does two things. The relative gap doesn't diminish and also you are not raising the money to give to people who need it. I haven't worked this one out yet, but certainly the

Council has got to get its pricing policy together to be able to tap the money that is there, and put it in the areas where it is needed.

(Liberal Councillor E)

An area where there was agreement between Conservative and Labour members was in the need to develop the use of educational facilities for leisure provision. Labour members supported this partly because it offered one means of developing a network of community based facilities, employing resources that were already located in most geographical communities. Conservative members tended to provide a rationale for this approach which centred on maximising efficiency and on opposing restrictive practices:

We want complete opening up of education facilities to the public we have a lot of facilities for sport and leisure which could be opened and I'd just give them [voluntary groups] a key, and if the headteacher or caretaker say it can't be done, I'd say "I'm sorry it's in your contract. You either do it or you go."

(Conservative Councillor E)

All three Labour members who served as Leisure Services Spokespersons during the research period stressed the need for fostering community recreation initiatives. The key elements of such initiatives they identified as firstly, the appeal of community recreation to groups not normally successfully attracted to public sector leisure provision, secondly localism, easily accessible services with which people within a given community can identify, and finally the opportunity for the development of community influence in service decisions.

Leisure services has to break out of its traditional approach and go out into communities responding to the needs which people express for themselves, not diagnosing their needs like a doctor. We've had some of that in promoting Asian sports and games in playschemes in certain areas, and that is a lot more successful, but we need a lot more of it.

(Labour Councillor P)

we should be thinking about what the community wants, not just in terms of helping the deprived, but also bringing communities together, because I think through leisure activities you create much more of a community spirit, and communities are able to take on board and make demands and get things going and organise things themselves in the community.

(Labour Councillor Q)

Community leisure has to be given a higher profile. There is no reason why we should have vast sports centres with three quarters of the population trailing to that when on their own doorstep they don't have anything. And I think that the playscheme idea of involving kids and parents in play (because that's what leisure is all about, play) we should be able to develop that playscheme thing and hold people's interest the whole year and not just for a few weeks.

(Labour Councillor F)

The community oriented approach was contrasted with the highly centralised, prestigious provision in the city of a major sports centre and museum, with Labour members arguing that "I think we've got our priorities wrong." (Labour Councillor Q). This theme was taken up by the Liberal Leisure Services member whose support for community recreation was linked to his support for the "Liberal ideas of local decision-making":

I would like to see facilities that are more local, run locally. Get rid of the massive sports centres, and have things you can walk down the road to.

(Liberal Councillor E)

Conservative support for community recreation was rather less strident, and appeared to be motivated as much by the concern to avoid the administration costs and overheads of large scale facilities, and making use of voluntary effort, as it was with social goals and enhancing community influence in service decisions.

The Conservative Chairman (1982-3, 1984-5) promoted the notion that local authority investment in sports provision was justified in terms of its potential for character development.

I believe that if you can develop an interest in sport then you can develop other aspects of your personality, your character confidence, resilience.

(Conservative Councillor K)

A related claim about links between sport and national identity was implied by another Conservative member (a traditionalist prominent member) who argued that more resources should be put into sports coaching for young people because "For example we are failing in this country in cricket and it is our national game." (Conservative Councillor D)

The leisure policy aspirations of the members interviewed may be summarised then in the following manner. There was little evidence of Conservative sympathy with attempts to 'roll back the local state', most Conservative members assuming that if financial conditions improved for local authorities, the pressure of demand would generate expansion in the public sector. However there was a common emphasis, particularly among Conservative 'political aspirants' and 'new prominent' members, on improved marketing of services and the development of greater entrepreneurial skills.

Among the 'new prominents' and the 'political aspirants' in the Labour Group, the major theme in policy development was the promotion of community recreation initiatives, non-standard forms of provision, with community involvement in decision-making and an emphasis on reaching disadvantaged groups. This emphasis on community recreation was also common to the Liberal Leisure Services representative, but although some younger Conservative members also argued for the development of community recreation initiatives, their emphasis was on the potential to save on the administrative diseconomies of scale of large, facility-based provision, and to develop voluntarism.

The other categories of member in both major parties, were generally supportive of expansion of existing, standard types of facilities and services in the leisure field. This would require little change in the style and presentation of service delivery. By contrast, traditional public sector management approaches, located within bureaucratic organisational structures, would be inappropriate for the policy developments promoted by younger members. Both market-oriented provision to maximise income, and community-oriented provision to foster leisure participation and involvement in decision-making, require replacement of the rigid hierarchical organisational structures by new, more fluid organisational forms, more conducive to dynamic response to the market and / or the community (cf. Haywood and Henry 1986). This would seem to be a prerequisite then of the reshaping of policy which these two categories of member require.

S.5.3 Unemployment and Leisure Policy.

The analysis of leisure policy at local authority level is complicated by the fact that responsibility for leisure services is fragmented. Further education and the Youth Service, for example, provide a range of leisure-related services. In order to review some aspects of leisure policy beyond the work of the Leisure Services Sub-committee, interviews also focussed, where possible, on the work of the Unemployment Sub-committee.

Attitudes towards the unemployed and unemployment policy suggest subtle differences in the rationales put forward for social provision, including leisure provision, for the unemployed. However the clearest inter-party differences were evident in the explanations of the causes of unemployment provided by members. These tended to fall into one or more of the following range of four categories:

- (i) 'Crisis of capitalism' explanations:- three Labour members argued that current levels of unemployment are an inevitable consequence of the structural characteristics of a capitalist economy. Monetarist policies may accelerate the growth of unemployment, but they are not to be regarded as underlying causes.

(ii) 'Central Government Economic Policy' explanations:- a majority of Labour members argued that government policy was the primary cause of unemployment, or at least the major contributing factor over which control could be exercised. Within this category are included some more specific claims, for example that such policies represent "a deliberate attempt by the Tories to tighten the noose around the neck of the trades unions" (Labour Councillor A); or that the interests of capital are paramount for the Conservative administration "which allows capital to disappear out of Britain to other parts of the world"- (Labour Councillor D).

Interestingly, two of the 'new prominent' Conservative members cited government economic policy as an important contributory factor in addition to others, "I wouldn't necessarily disagree with that policy, but it is certainly one of the factors which has increased unemployment" (Conservative Councillor O).

(iii) 'Historic underinvestment, disinvestment, and new technology':- this group of factors was consistently cited as primary causes by Conservative members and by two Labour members (back bench traditionalists);

You can put a lot of it down to the Tory government, but really, basically it's technological. The sad thing is there's no alternative.

(Labour Councillor C)

(iv) 'Trades union practices and wage costs':- the intransigence of unions and the unwillingness of individuals to accept the market rate was described as a major factor by three of the 'back bench traditionalists' in the Conservative Group;

The trouble is a lot of these youngsters don't want to work for £30 a week, they want £100 a week and there are many people who can't afford to pay that, whereas they would have them for £30. People watch TV and they see all these wonderful

places and lifestyles. It's all a fairy story. Life's not like that. I'm afraid the unemployed young need their bottoms smacking a little.

(Conservative Councillor F)

Explanations of the causes of unemployment ranged across these categories, rather than individual explanations necessarily fitting neatly into single categories. However it should be noted that there was a discernible difference in terms of such explanations promoted by members of each party. Labour members tended to promote the first two categories of explanation of the primary causes of unemployment, whereas Conservative and Liberal members placed emphasis predominantly on causes grouped together under the third category. Nevertheless the differences in explanations of the *causes* of unemployment were not necessarily matched by differences in the policy *responses* promoted.

In 1981 the Labour controlled Council had introduced an Unemployment Sub-committee, located within the area of responsibility of the Education Committee, together with an Economic Development Sub-committee, reporting directly to the Management Committee (the Council's senior policy making committee). While still under Labour control the Unemployment Sub-committee adopted a policy document advocating a three pronged approach to the problem of unemployment. This approach incorporated policies to facilitate the regeneration of the local economy, policies to encourage job and work sharing, and special provision to meet the social needs of the unemployed, their dependents and similar low income groups. This policy document had not been rescinded by the hung council, though differences in policy aspirations, between and within party Groups, emerged during interviews.

In relation to economic policy to counteract unemployment, there was support for industrial subsidy and in particular, grants to new small businesses from all parties. There was also a shared cynicism about the effectiveness of attracting industry from other parts of the country as opposed to fostering new businesses. It was seen simply as "robbing Peter to pay Paul" (Conservative Councillor J). However, as one might expect, Labour members

were more forthright in promoting growth in public spending, either in terms of resistance to cuts in services and jobs, or in terms of Keynesian reflation (this approach being consistent with the explanation of monetarism as a primary cause of the problem). Only one Labour member proposed the development of municipal enterprise as an appropriate response to the problems of the local economy.

More significant, in terms of the context of this study, is the range of responses to the social needs of the unemployed in the District. One of the major policy developments in this area was the establishment of Centres Against Unemployment (C.A.U.), supported by urban aid and local authority funding, and with support also from local trades councils. These quasi-independent organisations provided social centres, with (in some cases) sporting provision, and ran interest and leisure courses as well as providing information and training which was work-related. A second policy development involved the offering of price concessions for some Council leisure facilities and adult education courses to unemployed people (who were identified by production of their U.B.40 form, or their C.A.U. membership card). These two initiatives were specified by members as the major leisure policies of the Unemployment Sub-committee. Members' explanations of these two facets of the work of the Sub-committee highlight some important differences in attitude to the social dimension of the Unemployment Sub-committee's work.

When the Unemployment Sub-committee was established, there had been some resistance from within the Tory Group to the separation of functions of the Economic Development and the Unemployment Sub-committees. The Leader of the Conservative Group pointed out that:

The Group opposed the setting up of the Sub-committee we wanted it [together with Economic Development] in Management. The Group has got sympathy with measures to help the unemployed that create jobs. They have some sympathy with measures to combat the social consequences of unemployment. We ain't got any sympathy with money going to make political centres. We aren't I'm afraid into those centres that just give tea and sympathy where you just come in for a chat. If you come into one of those centres you've got to come in to

learn a skill, or have a chance of doing something which could lead to a job.

(Conservative Councillor E)

This concern about the nature and ends of social provision within the C.A.U.s was reiterated by a number of Conservative councillors, including 'new prominent', 'traditionalist prominent', and 'backbench traditionalist' members. Criticisms of social measures implied that the justification for leisure provision should be instrumental, a means to some further end.

The policies are largely cosmetic. We are providing ways of filling in their time, not necessarily usefully. We are supporting Centres Against Unemployment which provide games and so on but it's only filling in time.

(Conservative Councillor S)

This notion of an instrumental rationale for leisure provision, already noted earlier in the chapter in comments by a Conservative Chairman of Leisure Services, is underlined in the ambivalent attitude of one Conservative back bench traditionalist;

The unemployed cannot afford to pay for themselves, but they shouldn't be spoon fed, although you should certainly help the less able, especially the disabled. But I wouldn't help the 'lame and lazy' quite as much as the Labour. There are those that won't work.

No I think you've got to justify it [leisure provision] in as much as you've got your people who are unemployed with more time on their hands, and even those in work with a lot of leisure time, and empty hands are usually mischievous hands. You should keep them occupied.

(Conservative Councillor F)

In a similarly instrumentalist approach, reductions in pricing were supported by two of the Conservative members on the grounds of economic benefit to the

authority, rather than solely on the grounds of social benefits to the unemployed.

I voted for it [price concessions for the unemployed]. There's no point in having facilities that people can't afford to use. You've got to get some money in.

(Conservative Councillor A)

Conservative attitudes to the C.A.U.s were influenced to some degree by an episode which took place during the research. The first of the C.A.U.s was taken into mainstream local authority budgets because its period of Urban Programme funding had expired. However the local press publicised statements by a worker at the Centre and reported some activities which had been conducted at the Centre which were construed as 'political', since they were occasions of criticism of government policy. Part of the philosophy of the Centres as they were first envisaged by the then Chairman of the Unemployment Sub-committee was that the unemployed would have a degree of autonomy in the running of the Centres. However, following this episode, it was decided that the local authority, if it was to foot the bill, should also have a majority influence on the management committees of the C.A.U.s, and thereby have the opportunity to veto what might be construed as political activity.

Criticism of social provision was not universal in the Conservative Group, nor was support for such provision unqualified among Labour members, some of whom were cynical of the value of such provision (most particularly the newer, policy oriented members of the Leisure Services Sub-committee). This cynicism was based on two principal arguments. The first was the notion that the leisure needs of the unemployed are relatively insignificant in comparison with other needs, "what the unemployed really need is jobs" (Labour Councillor M). The second type of argument concerned the effectiveness of existing policies aimed at meeting the leisure needs of the unemployed. Price concessions, for example, operated only at selected facilities and only during off-peak times; as one Labour Leisure Service Spokesman noted:

they can only use the concessionary cards between 2 a.m. and 6 p.m. (sic) They can't join in with their mates who are working unless they pay the full price. Again it's even more demeaning treating them like lepers.

(Labour Councillor F)

Price concessions were also seen as providing a relatively insignificant reduction when travel costs represented the largest element of the outlay required to participate in many recreations.

Members of all three parties expressed support for job and work sharing schemes, and in addition, two members from each of the Groups argued for the development of education for leisure programmes and the reorientation away from work-centred values to help people to adjust to their new life-styles.

The picture which emerges, from this examination of member attitudes to and perceptions of, leisure policy for the unemployed, is one of subtle, though by no means universally applicable, differences between the two major party groups in terms of the rationales for unemployment policy, even if such differences are not marked in terms of the actual policies supported by the hung Council and its predecessor. The Labour Leader explained this (in partisan terms) by arguing that there was a "difference of understanding" between the two major parties, and that although "their [Conservative] priorities don't include alleviating the social consequences of unemployment" nevertheless policies adopted by the previous Labour administration had not altered significantly because,

the Tories found that they had to agree with us to disagree meant that they disagreed with trying to help people and that wasn't good for them

(Labour Councillor B)

Whether one accepts this analysis or not, the evidence culled from the interview data suggests that there are tensions in policy for the unemployed, which to some extent reflect party political differences. The three key tensions which emerge in respect of leisure policy are between;

(A) the promotion of leisure opportunities for their own sake, and the use of leisure for extrinsic purposes, such as maintaining work readiness;

(B) pricing to maximise use of facilities and up-take of services, and pricing to increase the economic return on facilities;

(C) autonomy on the part of unemployed groups (particularly in the management of Centres Against Unemployment), and the responsibility of the authority to be accountable for the disbursement of public funds.

The elements cited in each of these tensions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. It is possible for example to promote leisure opportunities both for instrumental purposes and as 'final goals' of policy. Nevertheless the rationales for policy put forward by members in this case study, suggest a tendency for Labour members (particularly the newer, younger members - 'political aspirants' and 'new prominent' members) to promote leisure opportunities as final policy goals, to seek to maximise leisure opportunities, and to be supportive of some measure of self determination for 'clients' of the service. By contrast Conservative members (particularly backbench members or the older 'prominent members') are more likely to value leisure opportunities for instrumental purposes and be rather more concerned with economic return and public accountability. However what is being described here are general tendencies, rather than water-tight categories of response or respondent.

5.5.4 Analysis of Individual Leisure Policy Decisions and 'Non-decisions'

Interviews focussed also more specifically on five policy decisions, either taken by the Leisure Services Sub-committee, or which were taken outside the Sub-committee but significantly affected leisure policy. These consisted of two capital expenditure decisions for facilities under the control of the Leisure Services Sub-committee, two recurring areas of policy decision-making, the allocation of grant aid to 'voluntary' (i.e. non-profit) organisations, and the setting of the Sub-committee's annual revenue budget,

and the adoption of the Council's race policy which had implications for all service areas. Members were asked to explain why their Group supported or opposed the policy decision, what their own position was in respect of this issue, and where possible to identify individuals influential in initiating and developing the policy.

(a) The City Theatre

The first of the decisions reviewed was taken early in 1983 and involved the allocation of capital to reconstruct and refurbish the city's old Victorian theatre. The Leisure Services Sub-committee had received a report earlier in the Council year indicating that the building was in need of major modernisation work, and the Sub-committee subsequently agreed that a feasibility study should be undertaken. The officers involved, having conducted that study, realised that the project would involve capital expenditure well in excess of the amounts normally considered by the Sub-committee, (first estimates indicating the cost would be some £8 million). The officers did not therefore report back directly to the Leisure Services Sub-committee but, with the authority of the Group leaders, took the matter to the Special Sub-committee of the Management Committee. This sub-committee consisted of seven members (three each from the two major parties and one Liberal) and had special powers to act in emergency situations. Central government had just announced the relaxation of capital spending limits towards the end of that financial year and was encouraging local authorities to bid quickly for additional resources. The need for a quick decision on capital for the theatre project was therefore seen to constitute an urgent situation. The Special Sub-committee agreed to support a proposal which included not only work on the theatre but also new and redeveloped sporting and cultural facilities on adjacent sites. Subsequently, however, considerable discontent was expressed by various members (particularly Labour members) both about how the decision was taken and about the expenditure commitment itself. This discontent was further fuelled when officers had to revise the initial estimate upwards by some £5.5 million. The scheme was later agreed by Council but reduced in scope to incorporate the work on the theatre alone.

The Conservative Group, as we have seen, operated without any formal mechanism for policy inputs from the Wards or Constituency parties, and it was therefore perhaps not surprising that Conservative members expressed less concern than their Labour counterparts about the way the initial decision was taken. The Deputy Chairman of the Leisure Services Sub-committee, however, was disconcerted by the fact he and the Chairman first heard of the project over the radio, but other Conservative members expressed little or no concern or surprise at the way the initial decision was taken.

Concern among the Labour members was, by contrast, widespread. Whereas the Conservative Deputy Chairman had been unhappy at the lack of consultation and the way he had been informed of the decision, Labour members expressed rather more fundamental worries about the powers of the Special Sub-committee. One prominent Labour member cited three large capital schemes for Leisure Services which had gone through the Special Sub-committee, rather than through Leisure Services in the recent past

If you look at Council spending over the short time of two years that I've been on Council, £15 million spent, not initiated by the Leisure Services Sub-committee at all The quorum for this Special Sub-committee is only two, so theoretically two councillors could spend millions of pounds, with the advice of top officers Management Special Sub-committee is the only committee where the decision can't be moved to a higher committee. So basically, it is an undemocratic, unaccountable small cabal of top councillors and top officers we are proposing in the Labour group that this power should be taken away.

(Labour Councillor M)

While none of the Liberal members commented on the nature of the decision-making process (even though it would seem to be of significance given the Party's commitment to community politics and maximising participation) three of the Group expressed concern that the decision had been made on costings supplied by the officers which had subsequently proved to be considerable underestimates.

They sold the scheme at £9 million, went away and did the costings and it came to £13 million was it? That was the point at which members threw their hands up in the air and said "Hang on a minute!"

(Liberal Councillor E)

Support for the scheme was solid among Conservatives. The principal reasons for supporting the scheme included the following:

(i) 'The Economic Contribution of Entertainment and Cultural Provision to Tourism':- this was the most regularly cited of reasons among the Conservative sample, with nine Conservative members providing this as part of the rationale for the expenditure. An anticipated multiplier effect goes some way to explain the Group's support of the project despite the Party's overall concern for maintaining spending limits.

The [theatre] was the obvious facility to choose because that had the greatest tourist potential. Obviously we want to do a lot to boost tourism as the only major new industry coming our way.

(Conservative Councillor I)

(ii) 'Economic Return on Investment':- three of the Conservative Group argued that the net loss on the refurbished theatre including debt charges, would be less than the cost of simply closing the facility which was a listed building.

I was convinced that we could make the [theatre] not break even ... but not lose as much as if we were going to mothball it.

(Conservative Councillor E)

(iii) 'Civic Pride and Prestige':- this was a factor noted by six of the Conservative members. Typical was the comment that "We felt that [this] was a city worthy of a great theatre for all kinds of productions." (Conservative Councillor K).

(iv) 'Cultural Heritage and the Importance of Culture':- three of the Conservative members argued that although there may be competing needs, the loss of the theatre would result in the cultural impoverishment of the District. By far the most strident of these statements came from a 'backbench traditionalist' member of the Leisure Services Sub-committee;

Theatre is terribly important in the development of civilized life. Theatre has been going for so long and I certainly think theatre is more important than people to be honest. I'd rather spend it there than in [an inner city housing estate] where it would just be frittered away.

(Conservative Councillor F) --

In contrast to the Conservatives' whole-hearted support for the project, only two of the Labour members interviewed declared themselves to be firmly in favour of the scheme. Some members of the Labour Group felt the Group had been placed in a difficult position, with the leadership having been party to the decision to support the scheme when it was originally presented to the Management Special Sub-committee. A compromise was therefore struck within the Group which agreed to support the reduced version of the scheme on the understanding that significant capital contributions were likely to be obtained from sources outside the Council.

The debate within the Labour Group was described in the following terms by one member.

Our Group was divided on this issue. There were two schools of thought. One was saying this is the wrong priority for us. There are other areas where we will need some more money. Then there was an opinion among Labour members, they used this argument of cultural heritage.

Some of us, including myself would say it is not going to reflect working class culture. ... if we were going to support it , we would

want to see one or two conditions. They should have facilities for minority groups and the poorer classes. There should be a focus of cultural life, not of the selected few, the middle classes, who are always going to benefit from things.

(Labour Councillor A)

The majority of Labour members interviewed expressed reservations about spending a large sum on cultural provision when housing and other areas of the Council's capital programme had been severely cut back, and it was also widely held that working class communities would not be able to afford to visit the theatre, and for the most part would not be interested in the theatre's cultural programme.

Three arguments were cited in support of funding by members of the Labour Group. One of the 'new prominent members' of the Leisure Services Subcommittee (who worked professionally within theatre) promoted the scheme on the basis of a mixture of 'civic pride' and 'cultural heritage' arguments.

We want [the city] to have the best. We don't want to be called philistines. We actually have a building there which is part of the cultural heritage of the city.

(Labour Councillor J)

A second Labour member noted the Group's concern not to promote the image of "a socialist 'no fun' party" (Labour Councillor G), while a third pointed out that closure of the theatre, the consequence of not carrying out the work, would have meant facing difficulties with public sector unions. Indeed the Conservative Group Leader described how at one stage "the unions were running my campaign for me" in support of the Council's decision to build.

The five Liberal members, with one exception, supported the proposal in principle, citing reasons similar to those given by Conservative members. This position was taken, according to one member, despite considerable opposition within the Party.

The analysis of the background to this policy decision serves to illustrate a number of key points. The first is that given the low level of importance accorded to leisure policy-making in the local authority, some of the most important, non-routine, policy decisions affecting leisure services may well be taken outwith that committee, and that the key 'leisure politicians' (in the sense of those whose decisions have the greatest impact on the nature of the authority's leisure services) may not in fact be members of the Sub-committee formally responsible for that service area. The second point to emerge is that underlying the apparent consensus in terms of the decision taken, there were significant differences in the rationales for support of policies in the two major political groups. Consensus in policies adopted should not be seen as necessarily signifying a consensus in relation to policy goals. A third point which is highlighted by this episode is the widespread concern among Labour members relating to the need for cultural pluralism (cultural democracy) as opposed to a policy of paternalism (democratisation of culture), or promotion of a 'unitary' cultural heritage. Finally it should be noted that despite an apparently 'democratic' framework for generating policy, the Labour leadership was drawn into a policy-making elite, making it difficult for the Group to withdraw from commitments made by the Management Special Sub-committee.

(b) The Purchase and Development of a Site for a Youth and Community Centre and a Sports Development Centre.

Analysis of the other capital investment decision investigated highlights some different but related points. At the end of the financial year preceding the research (1982/3) this site unexpectedly came onto the open market. It had previously been in use as a sports ground for a private club, and it was purchased jointly by the Leisure Services Sub-committee and the Further Education Sub-committee (which had responsibility for Youth and Community Services) with a view to development of a youth and community centre and sports facilities (including a floodlit synthetic football / hockey pitch, changing and indoor sports facilities). Although this decision went through both sub-committees in the normal way (in contrast to the route for the decision on the theatre) members reported their involvement as minimal.

Indeed, one of the difficulties of reporting on this decision was that relatively few of the backbench traditionalist members of the Leisure Services Sub-committee could recall the decision being made, despite the fact that it represented a major investment at a time of shrinking budgets.

I seem to remember that it went through on the nod because it had to be a quick decision - the site was going to be sold for housing but the deal fell through. Anyway half the money came from Youth and Community so we weren't paying the whole bill and we looked like getting money from outside, the Football Trust or the Sports Council. Councillor ... [the then Chairman] did the negotiations on it. I think it was more or less agreed all round as a good thing.

(Conservative Councillor J)

The then Chairman of the Further Education Sub-committee explained the process in the following terms:

It was done between me and the Youth and Community Officer with the City Recreation Officer and the Chairman of Leisure Services because the premises suddenly became available and we didn't have anything in that area. I persuaded my colleagues fairly easily and it wasn't very expensive.

(Conservative Councillor I)

The Chairman of the Leisure Services Sub-committee described the major influence as that of the City Recreation Officer who was able to persuade him of the merits of the decision "which I then approved" (sic).

Although none of the backbench traditionalist members took exception to their lack of involvement beyond the formal committee discussions, the lack of consultation was seen by political aspirants among the Labour members on the Sub-committee as reflecting undue officer influence in the policy process.

That's an officer scheme which got through because it fell between committees and there's still building going on up at [the site] that nobody knows about.

(Labour Councillor F)

In contrast then to the case of the city theatre, funding decisions were ostensibly made in the service sub-committees, but were seen to some extent, by senior politicians involved, simply as ratification of their approval. Such a state of affairs was seen as unexceptionable by backbench traditionalists, but as something to be opposed by new prominent members who were not simply concerned with making an input into policy, but also wished to avoid a situation in which officers could press their policy preferences through individual, powerful politicians.

(c) Construction of the Leisure Services Sub-committee Revenue Budget...

While it might be argued that the previous policy decision was untypical since it involved responding swiftly to an unforeseen opportunity, the same could not be said of the setting of the budget for Council committees. Yet here again one of the significant features of the responses of backbench traditionalists to questions about the construction of the budget for the Sub-committee was their relative lack of awareness of the process involved. Backbench members of both major parties often either professed ignorance or provided accounts of the process which conflicted with those given by leading members of their party group.

I assume that we are given a budget Mr. H. , the Finance Officer told us how much we had to pull back from our original bid obviously people who are keen to get to the top are going to be ferreting out more than me. I have no axe to grind at all. I am not power seeking. This is just little old me. It's presented to me.

(Conservative Councillor F)

We all [members of the Leisure Services Sub-committee] put in bids for what we wanted and then we were told what we could have by Management [Committee]

(Labour Councillor K)

The start of the whole process is Management Committee which decides how much Education is going to get. Then Education [sic] decide on

allocation to each of the sub-committees. I think in the cuts package this year it was split pro rata. Within that the officers for Recreation, Libraries, and Arts and Museums also split it down in percentage terms. We had a meeting with these three officers the Chairman and I [Vice-chairman] and I was personally trying to make a bigger cut in the Libraries and Recreation than in Arts and Museums.

(Conservative Councillor R)

(The last of these three quotations came from the sole Conservative 'political aspirant' on the Leisure Services Sub-committee.)

It would seem that leading members, particularly the new prominent members, in the Conservative Group who held key posts exerted a considerable influence on budgetary decisions. We have already cited the case of the Chairman of Education striking a deal with another Chairman to protect both of their budgets at the expense of other committees. This tactic might increase the global sum available to the committee, but what of decisions within committee about how such funds should be used? The same councillor suggests that, at least for the Conservative Group, the Chairman plays the dominant role in all important policy decisions.

I find two thirds of the Group will follow the Chairman (me or anyone else) just because I am Chairman. The other one third split roughly down into equal halves. One half don't agree but aren't confident enough to oppose you. The other half oppose, but providing you know your facts, you can win them round. You win whatever happens. I have never lost a policy decision in three years.

(Conservative Councillor G)

The interviews with officers cited in the following chapter indicate that some officers see the dominance of new prominent members in the Conservative Group as resulting in budgets being set in effect by powerful individual politicians.

Labour new prominent and political aspirant members expressed two major concerns in relation to the budgetary process. The first was that the process had become resource led in that the decisions taken were primarily concerned with deciding the order of cut that had to be made in order to avoid spending penalties, rather than deciding the level of spending required to meet local needs.

It has been a question of responding to Tory cuts rather than costing policy priorities.

(Labour Councillor P)

The second concern was that the budgetary process was dominated not by individual prominent Conservative members, but rather by officers especially where a committee or sub-committee did not have a history of assertive chairmanship. Members, it was argued, might decide the overall size of budgets but detail was worked out by officers, and deciding in detail how money was to be spent was seen as a means of deciding policy. As a consequence of this concern, in the last year of the research the Labour Group asked each of its 'service planning teams' (consisting of interested individuals from the District Party as well as the Labour Group on Council) to draw up detailed breakdowns of budget requirements which would subsequently be costed by officers.

(d) Policies for Grant Aid to Voluntary Sector Leisure Organisations

The Leisure Services Sub-committee operates two major grant aiding schemes, for sport and recreation organisations, and for cultural organisations. The precise nature of the criteria for allocating grant aid was relatively unclear, as will become evident from the discussion in Chapter Seven, but some comment is appropriate here to emphasise issues which emerged in the interviews with politicians.

There were particular differences in the ways the two grant aid schemes operated. Cultural grant aid took the form largely of recurring revenue grants (or financial guarantees against losses for performances) and varied

in size from up to £16,000 (for large non-profit organisations) to as little as £50. Sport and recreation grant aid however was predominantly for small scale contributions to the costs of non-recurring items, and rarely exceeded £200 for any single grant. Total grant aid under the sport and recreation programme was £6,300 in 1983/4 while for the same year cultural grant aid amounted to £44,900.

Decision-making in relation to grants for sport and recreation was described by members from all three parties, backbench traditionalists, political aspirants and new prominent members as "haphazard" (Conservative Councillor J), "unsystematic" (Labour Councillor P), "a bit of a lottery" (Labour Councillor N). Some conditions were placed on applicants whose organisations, for instance, had to be solvent and to have an unrestricted membership policy (so that in principle no member of the public was debarred from joining) and members of both major parties mentioned a willingness to help new organisations, or those serving young people. However other criteria applied tended to reflect personal preference on the part of individual members, rather than policy formally decided by the party groups. Nevertheless, such preferences did reflect differences in emphasis between Labour and Conservative councillors.

there was a certain amount of political lobbying for your patch, and obviously our Group tended to support applications from unemployed groups, from areas of few amenities, and tended to look a lot less kindly on applications from more affluent areas and for privileged kinds of recreation.

(Labour Councillor M)

The criteria I used to try to use was anything to help the unemployed, anything to assist needy institutions. I was always hesitant to give anything to golf clubs when there was an unemployed group looking to start up football.

(Labour Councillor K)

It should be noted that some Conservative members were also very willing to support some schemes for disadvantaged groups such as the unemployed, or

ethnic minorities. However, comments by Conservative members did suggest a subtle difference in *rationale* for their support of grant aid schemes, with an emphasis on rewarding 'self help', and (in relation to cultural grant aid) on the financial savings to be gained by the authority in fostering voluntary effort.

If an organisation is genuinely trying to help themselves, particularly if they are doing something for the youth or the ethnic minorities, then we take all that into account.

(Conservative Councillor J)

There's the larger [cultural] organisations we tend to support because they provide a facility which otherwise we might have to do.

(Conservative Councillor R)

However the self help argument represents something of a 'double edged sword'.

On the recreation side briefly we look to support new ventures and if it was an adult venture we would not want to support it We tend to think adults should help themselves.

(Conservative Councillor R)

If you are a well run, well organised lot you seem to have no chance of a grant.

(Conservative Councillor F)

The system for considering applications from cultural organisations for grant aid (for reasons which will be discussed more fully in the following chapters) resulted in the majority of grants going to the same organisations from one year to the next. The new prominent and political aspirant Labour members on the Leisure Services Sub-committee were unhappy both with the process of allocating grants and the pattern of grant aid which emerged. The comments of two of the members who acted as Labour Spokespersons on the Leisure Services Sub-committee over the research period illustrate this point.

Cultural grant aid is just a pot of money people apply for until it runs out. There is little knowledge of what people do with the money, whether they actually need it most come back year in year out. My proposal would be only to fund new projects or constant loss making projects which are of benefit to the community. I question whether [District X] Operatic Society is of benefit to [the district] rather than [the district] Gala. Opera rules out Asians, people with no money, one parent families. It's just tradition that the operatic societies get money.

(Labour Councillor F)

I went to an officer in the Policy Unit and asked for some information on grants and he produced a report for me analysing the grants that were made and his ... conclusion was that they were all sort of middle class dominated, the people that were getting the grants, and there was a need to decide on where you were going to put the money, how you were going to give it out and so on.

(Labour Councillor Q)

Both these spokespersons pressed for a review of grant aid procedures and criteria in the Leisure Services Sub-committee and this resulted in reports to the Sub-committee during the period of the research (see Chapter Seven). This episode is of interest in terms of differentiating the approach of the new prominent and political aspirant Labour members from the backbench traditionalists of any party. Although all members recognised the ad hoc nature of decision-making in this area of leisure policy, in general such ad hocery did not perturb backbench traditionalists who saw the decision making process largely in terms of common sense application of personal criteria. This view of policy decision-making as apolitical was anathema to the newer Labour members with their clear policy orientation and political goals, and grant aid therefore represented a target for policy development, an area of policy to be overlaid with political values.

A further major source of grant aid for voluntary sector leisure organisations which was explored in the interviews was that of the Leisure Programme Area of the Urban Programme. Under this Programme, 75% of the funding was provided by the Department of the Environment (DOE) and 25% by the local authority. In order for a voluntary organisation (or a local authority department) to be successful in its application for finance, its bid had to be given sufficient priority by the local authority to be included in a package submitted to the DOE, and to be approved by the DOE.

Decision-making in relation to the construction of the local authority's submission for urban aid operated at two principal levels. First, the Deputy Leaders of each of the party groups met with officers of the Council's Policy Unit to decide how the overall Programme was to be broken down into 'programme areas' (i.e. which service areas such as housing or leisure, and which target groups, such as the elderly, or ethnic minorities, were to be selected for funding in the Programme that year). The structure and emphasis of the Programme was then 'advertised' and bids were invited from any voluntary sector organisation or local authority department. This first stage represented a response to the guidelines issued by the DOE, indicating the emphasis which central government wished to give the Programme for that year. Over the period of the study, for example, these DOE guidelines placed a growing emphasis on economic and environmental projects, and a reduced emphasis on revenue as opposed to capital schemes.

Once the overall structure of the local authority's Programme submission was decided, a Programme Area Team was set up for each programme area consisting of officers and voluntary sector representatives. This Team drew up a strategy statement, indicating the kinds of criteria to be employed in prioritising applications, and this was approved or amended by the Deputy Leaders' Group. Finally, bids were received and provisionally prioritised by each of the Programme Area Teams, and then forwarded to a Programme Area Group (which consisted largely of the Team plus selected councillors). The introduction of member involvement at this level was designed to achieve political accountability. Once approved by the Programme Area Group, the list of priority projects was forwarded to the Deputy Leaders who might amend or accept the list before its consideration by the Council. Once approved by

Council the list of priority projects, together with a rationale was submitted to the Department of the Environment. This complex and apparently unwieldy mechanism for constructing the Urban Programme submission was designed to ensure that the overall policy strategy was decided by representatives of the political parties, and that the work of officers and voluntary sector representatives was carried out within the context of the policy framework so decided.

The Urban Programme consists of a family of grant aiding initiatives with varying emphases and funding arrangements. The particular species of the Urban Programme operating in this authority was relatively rare and placed particular emphasis on involvement and fostering of the voluntary sector. The involvement of voluntary sector representatives in the Programme Area Teams reflects this concern, and is one which might have been expected to appeal to those Liberals who espouse 'community politics', and to those 'new prominent' members and 'political aspirants' who may be concerned about the overweening influence of professionals in decision-making. However both the Liberal Leader and a number of 'political aspirant' and 'new prominent' Labour members expressed concern about the influence of officers on the shaping of the Urban Programme submission.

It's supposed to be done through the Deputy Leaders and members on the programme areas, but the way it works the Directors get what they can. They control the prioritisation exercise which is difficult to change once it's done.

(Labour Councillor N)

In terms of the specifics the councillors tend to come in very low. I gather that staff involved in the programme areas and representatives of the voluntary sector, they are the ones who determine who gets what. The less energetic councillors, they simply accept their decision unless they are lobbied. You have to be very energetic to get things changed.

(Labour Councillor H)

Furthermore some younger Labour members also expressed concern about the centralisation of responsibility for strategic decisions in the hands of the Deputy Leaders.

the Deputy Leaders with the Policy Unit have sat down and carved up a pot into certain categories. The Area Groups prioritise projects and submit them back to the Deputy Leaders. It's too centralised that. The Deputy Leaders or people making these decisions need to be more accountable.

(Labour Councillor F)

However, whereas the principle of participation by a wider number of councillors and by the voluntary sector was viewed positively by many Labour and Liberal members, it was seen as a matter for concern by some Conservative 'backbench traditionalists' and 'prominent traditionalists'.

The process [of prioritisation of bids] is shambolic - everyone puts their oar in. There is no real plan.

(Conservative Councillor A)

The concerns of some of these members was not about the lack of member involvement in the process, but rather about the unwarranted demands made of members.

The Urban Programme is very unsatisfactory. We were asked to go out and see groups. I haven't got time for that. It's an officer's job. They can get on with evaluating bids ...

(Conservative Councillor D)

The use of positive discrimination in funding was also seen by some councillors to have negative effects. As with the Leisure Services Subcommittee's grant aid scheme, three traditionalist Conservative members argued that such funding undermined self help.

It annoys me that in the outer areas we raise money through coffee mornings et cetera, but Asian groups don't believe in it. The Bangladeshi groups put in bids amounting to about one million.

(Conservative Councillor D)

Given the thrust of the Urban Programme with its emphasis on positive action for disadvantaged groups, one might have expected more enthusiasm from Labour members for the opportunities which the Programme offered since these members invariably represented the most deprived wards (see table 5.2 g). In theory at least the Urban Programme contrasted with the Leisure Services Subcommittee's grant aid schemes because political priorities were spelt out in the strategy for each of the areas, and for the Programme as a whole. This should have allowed the newer policy-oriented members the opportunity to shape the pattern of grant aid by introducing their own political values when specifying priorities in the strategy. In practice members felt the criteria suggested in the strategy "were not sufficiently tight to rule out anything officers might want to put in" (Labour Councillor T). Thus the ad hocery associated with sport and recreation and cultural grant aid schemes, was not necessarily avoided by the existence of a political strategy statement. Indeed the new Liberal member suggested that the criteria mentioned in a strategy statement would be more meaningful if they were used as the basis for a points system (in much the same way that an individual's position on a Council house waiting list is determined by a points system).

The Urban Programme was an impossible system as far as I was concerned. I would recommend a points system for allocation of grants. The political Groups should argue over the weighting, but if an ethnic minority group comes forward it should have so many points, if it comes from a voluntary group it should have so many points, if it comes from a certain area it should have so many points. Of course there should be a float of points for unforeseen criteria. The points system would do away with some of the subjectivity.

(Liberal Councillor E)

Perhaps two major points should be stressed in comparing the Urban Programme and the Leisure Services Sub-committee grant aid schemes. The first is that although the Urban Programme has an annually articulated political strategy, concern on the part of the newer Labour members about the level of influence enjoyed by officers was not significantly reduced. This suggests that it is not necessarily the case that officers shape policy only in the absence of political guidelines about policy. Even where such guidelines existed some members still regarded officers as going beyond their role. The second point to stress is that the Urban Programme contrasts with the Leisure Services Sub-committee's grant aid scheme in its mode of operation. Representatives of the voluntary sector serving on the Programme Area Teams were incorporated into decision-making, and also into service delivery (when their organisation received grant aid for that purpose) and in monitoring and evaluating the operation of the Urban Programme. This is a form of local corporatism which may prove difficult to square with the neo-pluralist account of decision-making relating to consumption issues.

(e) Race Policy, Sex Equality, and 'Non Decisions'.

The District's adoption of a Race Policy provided an interesting issue for exploration in the interviews because it represented a controversial area of policy, yet had all party support, and carried implications for all council service areas. The seriousness with which this issue was treated contrasted with that accorded to the question of sex equality, and this contrast provides a useful context for the discussion of 'non decisions'.

In July 1982 the Council had written to all its employees in a letter signed by all three Party Leaders, informing them of the Council's commitment to "positive acts of intervention to redress the consequences of past disadvantage and discrimination". These positive acts took the form of monitoring recruitment and service delivery, race awareness training for recruiters, and the production of action plans by service departments designed to combat disadvantage.

Members of all parties identified the key individuals in the development of this policy initiative as new prominent members. However although the policy had "all party support", it would seem that it had never enjoyed support from all sections of any of the political groups. One of the Labour councillors described how he and other new prominent members steered the issue through the Labour Group despite muted opposition.

There was racism in the Labour Party. Racism and sexism know no political boundaries but we got the policy through our own Group and it gathered momentum. God knows how ... [names two Conservative 'new prominents'] ... got it through the Tory Group.

(Labour Councillor P)

One of the Conservative members most closely associated with the race policy related the support for the policy in the Conservative Group to the internal structure of the Group. After describing the structure of the Labour Group he drew parallels between this and his own Group.

In our Group you've got the moderates, people like myself, and ...[names three other 'new prominents'], then you've got a whole mass of people in the middle who vary according to the issue. Then you come to the nutters [names three members], they are out on their own. The difference is on race issues. You've got agreement across parties. It is almost an age thing (with some exceptions) across all parties with the younger members supporting it and the older members agin it. (sic)

The younger members in the cuddly left, or the moderate members of the Tory Group are in the ascendancy. They get more policies through, partly because they are (this is very modest) more intelligent, more articulate, they put in more work, they are prepared to pursue issues where others won't get involved and clearly they've got more energy and drive than some of the older members. And what happens is they are more skilful, they outmanoeuvre them.

(Conservative Councillor Q)

Despite the continued commitment to the policy across the younger leading members in each of the parties, there were considerable reservations (in some cases outright opposition) expressed by traditionalists of all parties.

There is a feeling that the race relations policy has been implemented too quickly without enough consideration for its effects. There is resistance building up to that now. That's probably as much among staff as it is among members.

(Labour Councillor N)

He ... [names a leading Labour member] ... is that concerned with race issues, he has a tendency to go overboard. He does it regardless of what the consequence is. Among working class communities there's a lot of prejudice and it's difficult to tell people what we're trying to do.

(Labour Councillor C)

Race relations is a political hot potato and it is not bearing any fruit.

(Labour Councillor G)

Our Group are sick and tired of race relations.

(Conservative Councillor B)

Our race relations policy has been a disaster. The people in this area disapprove of it and it has bad publicity nationally.

(Conservative Councillor D).

I wrote to the Leader to say we were going too far and got called up in front of them. [Names two new prominent members who were present at her interview with the Leader], they were there and told me what I should do.

(Conservative Councillor N)

Indeed one forthright Conservative backbench traditionalist argued in relation to grant aid,

I'll tell you the other people who have a good chance at the moment is the coloured people because there is all this 'hoo-ha' and bending over backwards not to be racially prejudiced, well, I mean to the detriment of the good old indigenous population ... I mean .. if they don't like it here they ought to go back home ... That's not a very good ... politician is it, seeing as how we've got so many here? But I don't mind saying what I think.

(Conservative Councillor F)

Part of the problem for the new prominent leadership of the Conservative Group was that although they might be able to win battles in terms of getting the Group to formally adopt a policy, there were insufficient of them to monitor the implementation of such policies in all committees. Thus despite the Council's adoption of a multi-cultural approach to service provision, the Chairman of Leisure Services, for example, still argued for a policy of assimilation (while ironically arguing elsewhere in the interview for a policy of cultural pluralism);

The one difficulty is that there isn't enough effort made to persuade the ethnic minorities they must integrate. They belong to us, not we belong to them ... We could go over there tomorrow and stay there but we would certainly have to stick to their customs.

(Conservative Councillor K)

Thus despite the Council's formal policy statements, it should be recognised that differences of understanding, intolerance, or fear of electoral disfavour, may well militate against full support for, or implementation of, the race policy in all policy areas, among all parties.

As Bacharach and Baratz (1970) have so cogently argued, pluralist analyses of power which focus solely on actual decisions, do not consider potential policy issues which may have failed to reach a policy agenda. Bacharach and Baratz were not concerned with those issues or 'interests' which were not perceived by decision-makers but rather those of which decision-makers were aware, but which were suppressed, or not given sufficient priority to merit consideration as serious policy issues. In the context of this chapter's

concern to explore members' explanations of leisure policy development and the rationales underpinning such development, a consideration of how the interests of some groups are excluded from consideration on policy agendas is obviously important. However there are difficulties in questioning members about non-decisions. Adapting Newton's (1976) strategy, members of the Leisure Services Sub-committee were asked whether they were aware of "any matters concerning leisure which some groups or individuals (among the general public or within political parties) feel are important, but which fail to reach the agenda of the Leisure Services Sub-committee?", while non-members of the Sub-committee were asked in similar terms about wants or needs of a more general nature, without special reference to leisure or the work of the Leisure Services Sub-committee. There are potential problems with this type of attempt to uncover 'non-decisions'. Issues discarded by politicians as unimportant are less likely to be recalled during an interview of this nature and where issues have been consciously suppressed interviewees may be unwilling to reveal them. Nevertheless some observations can be made about the replies to this question (and to others) which reveal something of the way policy priorities are constructed.

The 'political aspirants' and the 'prominent members' of the Labour Group were most likely to recognise this problem of 'gaps' on policy agendas. In respect of leisure, these members were able to cite a number of examples of groups whose interests they felt were underrepresented in policy discussions, and these were women, the elderly (particularly those in institutions), young mothers, single parents, ethnic minorities, and 'unattached' individuals (i.e. those who are not members of organisations which can represent their interests). The majority of Conservative members, and particularly 'back bench traditionalists', argued that either they were unaware of any such groups or individuals, or that they probably did not exist. For example Conservative Councillor 'B' argued, "No, I don't think there are any groups like that. Anybody can get a problem aired just by contacting their ward councillor". Some younger Conservative members were sensitive to the existence of such groups but only one individual cited an example, when she noted that the Council's race policy had tended to ignore the needs of black women.

Table 5.3: Female Councillors 1982-5

During this period 114 individuals served as councillors of whom 23 were women.

	Newly Elected Female Councillors 1982-5	Outgoing Female Councillors 1982-5	Females Serving Throughout 1982-5	TOTAL FEMALE COUNCILLORS 1982-5
Labour	3	3	-	6
Conservative	4	1	10	15
Liberal	1	-	1	2

Representation of black minorities was disproportionately low on the Council (three black members out of ninety on Council, with a population of whom 8.3% were of Pakistani, Bangladeshi or New Commonwealth origin), as was the representation of women (see table 5.3). Although a sex equality working party had been set up within the authority, it had,

no real front bench membership, nor any top officer support - but then that's because there are very few female councillors who get on the front bench and women who get top officer jobs. It's chicken and egg but no-one is treating it seriously ...

(Labour Councillor P)

The impression of a lack of real impetus on sex equality issues is reinforced by comments from back bench Conservative members. One member, a former 'Chairman' (as she wished to be known) of the Sex Equality Working Party, for example took issue with the Unemployment Sub-committee in its policy of "training women to take men's jobs" and furthermore argued, "I can't believe women are equal to men. I don't believe I'm inferior to a man but I don't believe I'm the same." (Conservative Councillor C). Although Labour members (particularly 'political aspirants' and 'new prominent' members) were most vocal in their support of sex equality as a policy goal, sex bias in terms of Group membership was strongest in the Labour Group which had the lowest

proportion of women (less than 10%, see table 5.2 h) and no female councillor serving on the Management Committee.

The evidence presented here in relation to non-decisions is limited and to some extent impressionistic, as is invariably the case in attempting to identify 'gaps' in policy. Nevertheless two conclusions are worth stressing. The first is that backbench traditionalists tended not to identify, and in many cases did not acknowledge the needs of groups which were not addressed in policy debates. The Leisure Services Sub-committee has until recently been predominantly populated by this type of member, and indeed the Conservative members on the Sub-committee during the period of research were still predominantly of this type. It is therefore hardly surprising that policy in the leisure area was described as incremental and haphazard with little evidence of analysis and evaluation of the overall direction of leisure policy in the authority. The second point to emphasise is that even where issues are placed on the policy agenda, as Bacharach and Baratz acknowledge, there are a number of further barriers to overcome and politicians' commitment to action may be limited.

5.5.5 The Role of Officers in Leisure Policy

The reduction of financial resources with which to run services and the politicisation of local government in recent years have subjected local government professionals to increasing pressures. The New Right criticises professionals for maximizing budgets, seeking to enhance their own service areas at the expense of the public purse. The left sees professionals as out of touch with the needs of their clients, protecting their control of service decisions and attempting to minimise the opportunity for political influence and community involvement in such decisions. Meanwhile professionals are also experiencing the dissatisfaction of clients who see the services they use being cut back. The ideology of the local government professional as the impartial, expert adviser giving neutral technical support to politicians has been severely tested under the weight of such pressures and has been found wanting.

However, as has been noted in the discussion of individual policy decisions, members' attitudes towards the role of professionals in policy-making varied considerably depending on the category or type of member. Traditionalist prominent members and back bench traditionalists were supportive of proactive service officers who initiate, develop and implement policy under their scrutiny. Typical of the comments of this type of member were the following:

You've got to allow the government (sic) officers to run the Council really. We do conflict with them sometimes but in the end if you've got any ideas, you have to talk it over with the officers and they will tell you if it can't be done.

(Conservative Councillor H)

Officers get well paid to make policy decisions, they should get on with it.

(Conservative Councillor N)

I think officers of the Council are professional people and because they are professional people, I think, naturally their views must be taken into account. I seek their advice before coming to any decision. You have to have a good case for going against them.

(Labour Councillor K)

The comments from this group tended to suggest either that members felt officers did not go beyond their role of providing neutral advice, or that they did so but nevertheless such behaviour was justifiable.

They ignore what we say and carry on regardless ... all the time. I don't blame them ... I think they are superb in their desire to give service. I think it is the councillors who get in the way.

(Conservative Councillor D)

Some members in this category however made a distinction between traditionally professionalised areas of local government work, with high levels of technical expertise in which it would be 'difficult' for the

politician not to be guided by the expert, and those non-professional or newly professionalising areas of local government work.

To wander into the realms of higher and further education is something that is difficult for the simple layman to do Leisure does not have a professional 'aura' but it does involve activities that most people will touch on in their lives, sport, libraries, arts and museums. You feel you can have a personal input in these areas.

(Conservative Councillor 1)

The categories of councillor who were by contrast critical of the leading role of service officers in policy initiation and development were the newer 'young prominent members' and 'political aspirants' of the Council. Both these categories of member tended to be interested in policy change and were critical of what was perceived as the inherently conservative approach to policy and opposition to change of most senior officers. Younger members were also apparently less willing to accept the ideology of professionalism, which was seen as buttressing the influence of officers and reinforcing the status quo. The Labour Leader put the case in the following terms;

The problem is most officers are conservative with a small 'c' so that they tend to oppose change, often unconsciously, by not responding to policy initiatives, particularly if they are radical or difficult. They, if you like, are making policy by not doing anything.

The other thing they do is to use their professional tag to add weight to their own personal policy preferences. This is not all of them, but you've got to ... follow policy up. That way you get involved in their job, managing the service

.... It's a matter of the individual officer rather than the type of work he does. The professional bit is easier to push of course if you're in the traditional local government professions, but that probably accounts for most types of local government work these days. You'll find the newer members, particularly Labour members, are less

likely to kow tow.

(Labour Councillor B)

Among the younger members there was also an awareness that what might be presented as a neutral, technical problem, almost invariably involved political priorities. An example was cited by one member which concerned the need to spend money on security for museum exhibits so that insurance cover could be obtained. He commented "That looks like a technical decision, but of course every time you spend money you have to decide priorities" (Labour Councillor M).

Only four of the forty-five members interviewed expressed any concern about the party political leanings of officers. A Conservative member implied that one of the directorates of the council was heavily influenced by socialist officers, while a Labour member suggested that Labour policies were not pursued enthusiastically by officers partly because "There are very few officers who are socialist, and very few of them make it to the top." (Labour Councillor F). Another Labour member argued that officer-member relationships were inevitably problematic for the Labour Party, because "what officers don't realise is they are class enemies because they are professionals they have very different economic and political interests from the people the Labour Party represent." (Labour Councillor T).

The image of the officer as budget maximizer was also evident in the remarks of some members:

The local government officer is departmentally oriented, so he will put recommendations forward to members to enlarge and control his own department.

(Labour Councillor E)

The adverse effect of this on corporate planning was also highlighted; "They don't think about, or aren't concerned with, the effects on other directorates." (Conservative Councillor R).

Given the different perspective on officer-member relationships of the 'new prominent members' and the 'political aspirants', it is not surprising that their approach to working with officers was different from that traditionally adopted. There were three discernible shifts in working relationships with officers which the younger members had initiated. The first of these was the rejection of the 'hierarchical model' of communication between officers and members. This refers to the rejection of the convention that members seeking information on the work of a directorate, do so by referring to the chief officer concerned. Younger members had soon become aware that use of such channels meant that chief officers had the opportunity to 'filter' the information they received, and they therefore sought to get round this problem by establishing links with middle management.

The [chief officer] has had a policy that nobody but himself and possibly one or two others can speak to elected members ... and that's unacceptable. So after a couple of months of trying to deal with him on a personal basis, and getting nowhere, I've started getting at middle management and asking them to produce papers anonymously, which he doesn't like.

(Labour Councillor F)

The Conservative Leader noted that "this approach is becoming more and more common with both parties and has upset the senior politicians. They're as bad as the senior officers." (Conservative Councillor E).

The second area in which the younger members differ from their senior colleagues in officer relationships is in their greater use of, and support for, the Council's central Policy Unit. This support is more marked among the 'new prominent members' who generally make greater use of the Unit, and expect to be given higher priority by it when requiring work to be undertaken. The principal roles of the Unit are policy coordination across departments, acting as a 'think tank' for policy development, information retrieval, and monitoring of policy implementation. Here again Policy Unit officers are placed in a potentially difficult situation where they are seen by some members as too closely involved in the political role of policy development without the legitimization of professional expertise in a given

service area. There is also potential for tension and mistrust with fellow officers in service departments, given the Unit's responsibility for monitoring and evaluation of corporate goals.

It's the Policy Unit that's the problem because these officers are the political officers of the Council In the Policy Unit you're dealing with some fairly junior, inexperienced staff who are political officers and therefore very senior, if you see what I mean. They end up doing things the directorates wouldn't do which is why the directorates hate the Policy Unit and why some politicians feel we would be better off without it.

(Labour Councillor G)

The third initiative on the part of new members is the use of officers in party political roles. Traditionally, political impartiality has been sustained by a number of conventions. It is only fairly recently in many authorities that chief officers have begun to break with tradition, and for example attend and advise party group briefings (Gyford 1984). However the Conservative Leader argued that officers should be employed by each of the parties in more overtly political ways. He had for example asked officers to contribute to the writing of some of his political speeches, and in the final year of the research for the case study small groups of officers were established to advise each of the party groups on the development of party programmes.

5.6 CONCLUSION

Leisure policy, as a focus of analysis or an area of political practice, has generally been given a low priority. Such neglect has not been universal. Some political practitioners with reputations for charismatic leadership and radical policy development (e.g. Tony Banks of the G.L.C. or Michael Connarty, the Labour Leader Stirling's first Labour Leader) have given leisure policy a high political profile and a high priority in their respective authorities, and there is a small but growing literature in the

field of leisure policy analysis. Nevertheless understanding of the nature of leisure policy preferences in local government, and in particular of the role of political parties in policy development is relatively limited. This chapter has therefore sought to address this problem in exploring the 'assumptive worlds' of leisure politicians in a particular local authority.

It is important to note two significant limitations of this study. The first is simply to reemphasise that this is a single case study, which may generate certain hypotheses but which will not generate generalisable results. The second point is that the study focusses on individuals' explanations of, and aspirations for, local authority leisure policy, and these are not necessarily linked to policy outcomes. Other factors such as central government funding, base budgets and existing provision, the influence of interest groups or leisure professionals may prove to be more influential on outcomes than the preferences of politicians. Nevertheless, exploration of the assumptive worlds of political actors provides interesting ancillary data in the evaluation of the 'dual state thesis' or Dunleavy's argument that local government professionals dominate the construction of policy. Indeed data from this case study suggest that politicians perceive very little influence on the part of interest groups in leisure policy matters and considerable influence on the part of professionals in some contexts. However whether politicians' perceptions were in this case accurate is another question to which we shall return. Nevertheless it should be stressed that an understanding of the nature of the politicians' policy preferences is a prerequisite of addressing the question of whether such preferences significantly influence policy outcomes.

In reviewing the findings of this element of the case study it is important to distinguish between politics and party politics in leisure policy. The former is unavoidable if priorities for spending (or not spending) are to be decided. It is the nature of the latter, how such priorities may differ between parties in a local authority, which has been the primary focus of this chapter. Analysis of members' accounts of the structure and practices of local politics in the case study has highlighted the importance of the internal structure of the major party groups. Both Labour and Conservative groups have had a recent influx of younger, politically able and policy-

oriented individuals, many of whom have achieved positions of authority in their respective groups. These new members had been socialised into local politics in the late 1970's or early 1980's, a period of greater emphasis on ideology generally in British politics, and on a new, more adversarial party politics in local government in particular. It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that their approach to their role as local councillors should differ from that of their longer serving 'traditionalist' backbench colleagues.

The practise of socialising new members into the world of local government by having them 'serve their time' on the backbenches of 'uncontentious' committees resulted in the introduction onto the Leisure Services Subcommittee of policy oriented members. These members have begun to question the 'common sense' approach to analysis of policy problems, and in some cases sought to consider such issues through the prism of their political values. However the effect of such changes has not simply been one of heightening inter-party conflict. On important issues (as the adoption of the race policy illustrates) the key divisions may be between the 'new prominent' and 'political aspirant' members of all parties, on the one hand, and their more traditionalist colleagues, on the other.

The significance of inter-party differences in political values may be underestimated if one looks solely at policies adopted. As the issue of social policy for the unemployed illustrates, support for a policy from different groups may well mask fundamental differences in the rationale for such policies.

There are significant differences in the ways in which the new prominent members of the two major party groups operated within their own party's organisational frameworks. While the respect and authority traditionally accorded to the leadership in the Conservative Group gave the new members who achieved positions of responsibility considerable influence, the emphasis on the democratic machinery of policy determination in the Labour Party provided both an opportunity and a constraint for the new prominent members. As one Conservative 'new prominent' put it,

It is much more simple in the Tory Group because the Labour Group have this concept of democracy where everyone is involved in decision-making. In our Group, without being autocratic, most people will go along with the Chairman. You can get away with a lot more in our Group.

(Conservative Councillor G)

The decisions on leisure capital investment reviewed illustrate the nature of the concern on the part of Labour Party 'political aspirants' to ensure involvement in policy decision-making. Backbench traditionalists of all parties, however, expressed far less unease about the lack of consultation on such issues. Historically, the Leisure Services Sub-committee has been populated predominantly by members of this type, and it seems likely therefore that many important decisions will have been taken with scant reference to the membership of that Sub-committee.

Concern to become actively involved in policy decision-making on the part of political aspirants (particularly in the Labour Group) and new prominents (in both major groups) has also resulted in pressure to change the nature of officer-member relationships, with some newer members seeking to erode areas of professional influence and autonomy. Political conventions and social practices relating to the relationships between members and officers were seen as reinforcing the power of the professional. To place such an analysis in the context of the structurationalist explanation of power as a set of relations, officers (particularly chief officers) have traditionally operated in a structure which gave them access to the resources to influence decisions. Those resources included, for example, control of information available to members (through the convention of communicating with officers through the chief officer), 'time' to work through the detailed breakdown of policy (for example in deciding budgetary allocation), 'policy advice and clerical support' from junior and middle management, to obtain and present information for their case in developing preferred policy proposals, and continuity or experience (and legitimating professional qualifications) in their own service areas. New members have sought to cut across or reshape these structures. Many new members now have the time to pursue their policy goals if they are in effect full-time or near full-time councillors. Some of them have circumvented the traditional channels of communication,

communicating directly with middle management, and obtaining information and policy advice which might otherwise have been 'cut off' by officers higher in the hierarchy. The failure of the welfare professions to service effectively many of the most needy members of the community has undermined the effectiveness of the professionals' legitimating claims of technical expertise. Furthermore, the attempts of some of the more policy-oriented members to locate themselves at the centre of the network of resources essential to develop, implement and monitor policy is clearly leading to frictions and difficulties as both members and officers feel their way towards a new set of relationships. The developing nature of professional activity in the field of local government leisure services will therefore provide a focus for the following chapter.

Chapter 5 - Notes

- ¹ This is quoted in Saunders (1981) and attributed to an unpublished paper 'Rehabilitating Collective Consumption' Department of Politics, London School of Economics.
- ² See Henry (1985 ^a) for a discussion of the arts as collective rather than quasi-collective consumption.
- ³ The research period covered the full council year of 1983-4, and parts of 1982-3 and 1984-5. Membeship of the Council by party was as follows for those years:

	Conservative	Labour	Liberal	S.D.P.
1982-3	42	42	5	1
1983-4	43	41	5	1
1984-5	44	40	5	1

The Council has 90 elected councillors. 114 individuals filled those 90 positions in the three council years covered by the research.

- ⁴ 'Prominent members' are defined here as those who sat on the Council's primary committee, Management Committee. 'Backbench' denotes all others. This is slightly inaccurate since not all front bench members sat on the Management Committee. This definition of prominent members was recommended by the leaders of the two major party Groups as a more accurate (if still imperfect) index of influence within the Group than front bench positions.

- 5 Data of two interviews were recorded by notes taken during the interview. In one case this was at the request of the interviewee, in the second case it proved difficult to tape record because of background noise.
- 6 The terms 'left wing' and 'right wing' were not introduced by the interviewer during interviews because of the inexact and relative nature of the terms. Nevertheless interviewees often used the terms to denote ideological positions, and some of their responses are contained in quoted extracts.
- 7 One Conservative member who had played a prominent role in developing the race policy lost his seat in 1984. Labour and Conservative members (and the media) reported this loss as resulting in part from electoral reaction against the race policy and the failure of the ward party to canvass wholeheartedly for its candidate (for the same reason). Pressure from Conservative Ward Parties may therefore be less evident, and occur less often, but may nevertheless be effective.
- 8 One Labour member resigned shortly after joining the Leisure Services Sub-committee and left the district. The S.D.P. member spent a considerable amount of time out of the country during the research period. Interviews were not conducted with these two members.
- 9 This was the preferred term of the female councillor concerned.
- 10 Compare the typology employed here with that developed by Newton (1976). Newton's categories are based entirely on clusters of role orientation data. The typology used in this case study employs age / council experience as significant variables in differentiating categories of councillor because the new members in this study are different in kind (whether back bench or prominent) from the backbench and prominent members described in earlier studies such as Newton's.

- " The 'indicators of recreation need' used to rank the wards from highest in need to lowest, were those employed by the Sports Council in its regional analysis of local authority wards (Henry 1984). The index for each ward was the sum of the 'Z' scores for the ward on the following variables, percentage unemployed, percentage households without amenities, housing density, percentage heads of households born in New Commonwealth, Pakistan and Bangladesh, percentage heads of household in social class IV or V.

Chapter 6: Leisure Professionals and the Policy Process

6.1 THE ROLE OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROFESSIONAL IN EXPLANATIONS OF THE LOCAL STATE.

Explanations of the role and function of the local state provide varying accounts of the influence of local government professionals or bureaucrats in the construction of local authority policy. Traditional descriptions of the role of local officials as neutral technocrats have lost their force given empirical research findings which have highlighted the influence of officials in policy initiation, formulation and implementation (viz. Dunsire 1978 a,b) and because of the the conceptual difficulties associated with separating out policy formulation and implementation (Goldsmith 1980). The notion of officer neutrality has also been more difficult to sustain in the politically charged atmosphere of the last decade, when shrinking public sector budgets have polarised political positions and undermined the post-war consensus in which the concept of the 'neutral technocrat' flourished. In the 1980's public sector professionals have become the target of criticism from both the left and the right in British politics.

In Chapter One, a range of explanations was introduced in a discussion of models of the operation of the local state. Each of these models clearly has implications for the way in which the role of the local government professional is characterised. A form of 'naive pluralist' account of the state is for example implicit in some traditional texts designed as prescriptive manuals for service administrators (viz. LLoyd 1985). Such accounts characterise the task of the professional as ranging from providing neutral, expert advice, to simply acting as a 'conduit' for the communication and interpretation of the policy preferences of client groups to political decision makers (and subsequently implementing policy decisions in a technically efficient manner).

Structural marxist explanations of the state dismiss the notion of the neutrality of the official, but fail to articulate clearly the role of the local state or that of the state professional. This is a major shortcoming of such accounts since they fail to provide explanation at any useful level of detail of the actors and processes operating within the local state. Cockburn (1977), however, in her neo-marxist account of local government activity in Lambeth does attempt to explain the emergence of new forms of managerial practice (in particular the development of corporate management). Nevertheless, even in Cockburn's work, these new forms are ultimately to be attributed to the 'functional imperatives' of containing class struggle while sustaining the development of capital. The role of the welfare professional, or any state bureaucrat, in such accounts is one of legitimating state power and sustaining economic domination, and the significance of the activities of state officials is, therefore, ultimately predetermined by the theoretical orientations of structural marxist writers rather than grounded in critical analysis of empirical data.

As we have noted, the 'dual state thesis', in rejecting the marxist characterisation of a monolithic state apparatus, describes political activity at the local level in broadly pluralist terms. The role of the local government official is not spelt out in this form of local 'neo-pluralism' (pluralism within a wider corporatist framework). However, if we take Saunders's (1979) own account of decision-making in Croydon, the role of officials is described in terms of a mutually beneficial partnership with elected members in the local authority's mediation between central government and local interest groups. Nevertheless, as Saunders acknowledges, the relationship between officers and members in Croydon (where he conducted a study of 'community power') may well not hold for "authorities where a radical Labour group is in control" where "the bureaucracy does come to impose a strong constraint on the political actions of members" (p.225). Presumably in such cases Saunders regards local government professionals as constituting a species of interest group within the local pluralist system. However the strategic location of professionals in the decision-making process makes them at least a special case of interest group, and more plausibly might be regarded as undermining the neo-pluralist explanation.

Dunleavy (1980, 1984) in opposing the neo-pluralist account, points to the similarities and continuities in local government policy across a wide range of differing types of local authorities. He argues that if local policy systems were indeed pluralist in operation then we would expect to see a plurality of policy outcomes. However, the strength of influence of the professionals, who set policy agendas and intervene in policy debates, is such that analysis of policy problems and the range of policy solutions are remarkably similar.

There are perhaps two potential problems with Dunleavy's analysis which should be considered in this context. The first is that although the major empirical illustration of Dunleavy's case, housing, may exhibit centralised, professionally dominated policy fashions, the same may not hold for other service areas which are perhaps less professionalised and more fragmented as is the case with leisure services. The second difficulty, which has been highlighted elsewhere (Henry & Bramham 1986) is that even if policy communities exist with shared ideas and resources, policy outcomes across local authority boundaries may also reflect patterns of influence of 'junior professionals' and non-professionals whose interests will not necessarily coincide with those of their senior, policy oriented professional colleagues.

6.2 EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROFESSIONALS

In some recent major studies of local government policy making there has been a marked absence of empirical research relating to the role and influence of professionals in policy construction and outcome. This is in part a function of the difficulty of access, that is, the difficulty of penetrating the management ideology in the officer community which perpetuates clichéd notions of the respective roles of officers and members:

The relationship between politicians and local authority officers is difficult to study academically The participants are bound together by mutual interdependencies and they are loth to reveal the unclothed realities which exist behind the conventional dress. 'The politicians decide policy and we administer it', so I have been told in many interviews with senior, well qualified, officers. 'Yes, but ...' I continue; but get nothing in return except a bland smile.

(Hampton 1980: p.8)

Dearlove (1973) reached similar conclusions and omitted analysis of officer activity from his study of Kensington and Chelsea:

I would agree that their omission from this study is a major shortcoming, occasioned by a lack of research time, and my difficulty in finding a 'way in' to study their contribution to the policy process. Many of the officers were interviewed but it proved impossible to break through the cultural cliché that they were simply servants advising the all-powerful policy-making councillors whose decisions they readily implemented.

(Dearlove 1973: p.229)

Similarly Newton (1976), in his classic study of decision-making in Birmingham, having interviewed the great majority of local councillors, considers the Weberian hypothesis of the 'dictatorship of the official' with little reference to officers' own explanations of their activities, for reasons similar to those of Hampton and Dearlove.

Newton nevertheless goes on to conclude, on the basis of other evidence reviewed, that much of the literature on officer-member relations overemphasises the power of officers and underemphasises that of members who have considerable resources to draw on in opposing professional opinion. Cockburn (1977) in her case study of Lambeth, also argues that member influence on policy, particularly among leading members, is greater than that to be exercised by officer structures within the authority.

Dearlove concludes that officers are "unlikely to challenge the existing policy of the council or what they perceive to be the ideology of the senior councillors" (Dearlove 1973: p. 189) while Saunders (1978) describes the officer-member relationship which obtained in Croydon as 'symbiotic':

In that the 'political élite' needs the help, advice and information which only officers can provide, while the officers in turn are obliged to address themselves to the ideological predispositions of the élite members if their proposals are eventually to be accepted by the council. Even where policies are initiated and formulated by the officers ... they must generally reflect the the values and overall objectives of the 'political élite', and in Croydon this is reflected in the lack of any observable tension over the years between bureaucratic advice and majority group preferences.

(Saunders 1978: p. 224)

However Kensington and Chelsea, like Croydon, had had a stable Conservative majority over the period of study, and as Saunders notes traditionally Conservatism has successfully represented itself as ideologically neutral, particularly in local government (where Conservatives have in the past often stood for election as Independents). This ideological neutrality fits neatly alongside the notion of the neutrality of the professional offering 'technical', 'apolitical' advice. Furthermore, where stable political control exists, applicants for officer posts who are most likely to be attracted and appointed, are those whose values fit most closely with those of the ruling group.

Randall (1981) reaches similar conclusions in her study of housing policy decisions in three London Boroughs for the period 1964-72. Officers, she argues, were generally constrained by the broad framework of ruling party values, though their advice was not determined by those values since they did occasionally promote the interests of some groups neglected by the ruling group. Nevertheless officers were most influential when their values were congruent with those of the majority party group, particularly where there was a single, unified ruling party. However Randall also emphasises the point that although officers did not dominate the emergence of policy, or policy outcomes, they did exert considerable influence in the elaboration of policy.

The situation in this present case study differs in significant ways from the authorities which feature in the studies reviewed here. One factor is the changing context of local government. It must be stressed again that these studies largely predate the period of polarisation of politics in local government. Furthermore, in the present case study, there are tensions within as well as between the party groups, with more 'progressive' or 'radical' factions gaining control of the leadership of the two major parties. Policy goals are therefore likely to be more clearly articulated than they have been in the past in this and perhaps in other authorities. Such a situation seems more likely to highlight potential differences of interests between officer and member groups. The authority in this case study has also had a chequered history of party control, so that the argument that local authorities of a given political hue will attract particular kinds of officer does not hold here. Finally, the studies reviewed fail to account for the effects of tensions and factions within the officer body, which may, for example, generate differing and conflicting advice.

Some more recent empirical work in this field has focused specifically on the role and values of professionals in the local government policy process, and has been concerned to address the effects of the changing environment on that role. Neve (1977) in his study of chief education officers, points out that the economic situation of local government with shrinking resources is likely to enforce a more corporate style of decision-making and thus reduce the influence of individual professions in resource decisions. (The study of local authority budgetary processes reported by Elcock (1986) also highlights a tendency towards corporate control over departmental budgets.) Neve argues that the influence of professionals is mediated by factors such as the type of political issue, particularly its 'perceived saliency' or importance, and the level of local party political organization. Where issues are regarded as having high political saliency and local party political organization is more developed, the influence of professionals is likely to be reduced. However, he also follows Randall in arguing that though policy may be decided by party élites, chief officers can significantly influence the form and quality of service.

Laffin and Young (1985) argue that chief officers in local government "face a crisis of adjustment" (p.43) in learning to cope with the changing environment of

the local government officer's role. On the basis of interviews with chief officers in twelve authorities they identify three key features of the chief officer's role which reflect the kind of adaptation which officers are making in some authorities to accommodate the pressures they are experiencing. The first of these features of the officer's role is that of 'chief officer as professional adviser'. Here the adaptation taking place is a move towards becoming adviser to political groups rather than simply to the council, the committee or even the chairperson. This manifests itself in attendance of increasing numbers of chief officers at political group meetings to proffer policy advice. The role of 'chief officer as manager' is also changing with the advent of full-time, politically motivated councillors who are interested in becoming involved in day to day management issues. Indeed the strength of links between the local authority trades unions and some Labour Groups, for example, means that senior officers can sometimes come to be regarded almost as third parties in union-local authority negotiations, where they are in effect conducted between the unions and the party group. The third area of the chief officer's role which has evidenced a shift in thinking is that of 'chief officer as bureaucratic politician'.

Unlike the more traditional officers, 'bureaucratic politicians' are more willing to allow political factors and tactics to influence their involvement in the political process; are more prepared to give as much weight to those factors as to technical or professional factors; are more tolerant of role ambiguities; and believe in and relish, close involvement with politicians in developing and carrying out council policy.

(Laffin and Young 1985: p. 51)

Each of these three areas of the chief officer's role, ^amanager, professional adviser and bureaucratic politician, are reflected in the work of senior local government professionals more generally and are taken up in the interviews conducted in this case study.

Identifying the factors which explain variations in the role and influence of the local government professionals and their relationship with local politicians is a task which Hampton (1980) sets himself in constructing six models of officer member relationships. The factors influencing officer-member relationships which

he cites are; the range and size of local provision, the extent of professionalization among officers, the extent of party political organization, the extent of sensitivity to public opinion in service provision, and the degree of central government interest or influence. Of the conditions associated with the six models he outlines, those which most closely fit the circumstances of the present case study relate to that model he describes as 'pluralist partnership'.

Model A - Pluralist Partnership A high emphasis is shown for every characteristic. The model applies to several of our large conurbations. The councillors are powerful figures but the officers have to look as well to other influences in central government or in the community. Sometimes these influences from outside the authority come together in the urban programme or partnership arrangements. This model can prove difficult for senior officers, particularly as changes in party control can lead to a different emphasis in the relationship of people, party and officers.

(Hampton 1980: p. 12)

It will be interesting therefore to establish whether the data drawn from the officer interviews supports the description of the officer-member relationship anticipated in this model

6.3 THEMES AND ISSUES EXPLORED IN THE INTERVIEWS WITH LOCAL AUTHORITY OFFICERS

The nature of the empirical work on which this chapter draws is essentially exploratory. A small number of in-depth interviews was undertaken (n=14) and the sample drawn is clearly therefore not intended to be statistically representative. There are three principal reasons for the adoption of this relatively small sample. First, the dispersion of responsibility for leisure services across a wide range of departments means that the selection of a sample frame, even for a single authority, would involve a sample of unmanageable size given the constraints of time and access. The second difficulty is that of the lack of comparable material in other case studies. Relatively few recent studies of local government professionals exist, and for the most part these deal with chief officers rather than with a vertical sample drawn from within a single service area. There is also

a significant lack of empirical material dealing with the operation of local government leisure officers. Finally, given the problems of access reported by other studies, there was a pragmatic concern to avoid the expenditure of considerable research effort on what might potentially be a relatively fruitless set of interviews. In the event officers interviewed were for the most part quite willing to discuss the realities of their experience of policy development in local government. Nevertheless, the relatively small number of interviews allowed the time and opportunity for probing in interviews which generated responses of greater detail, and which therefore facilitated the development of hypotheses for future research.

In the local authority under study the major leisure divisions, that is those with primary responsibility for leisure services and reporting to the Leisure Services Sub-committee, the Recreation, Libraries, and Arts and Museums Divisions, were located within the Directorate of Education. However other sections of the local authority, both within and outside this Directorate had responsibility for aspects of leisure services. These included the sections, divisions or directorates of Unemployment Services, Economic Development, Social Services, Adult Education and Youth and Community Services. Given the exploratory nature of this element of the research it was decided that a primary focus on one of the divisions, the Recreation Division, would be complemented by interviews with the chief officer and a senior officer of the two other divisions reporting to the Leisure Services Sub-committee, and with the chief officers of two other sections with a 'secondary' responsibility for aspects of leisure services (the heads of Unemployment Services and of Economic Development). Within the Recreation Division interviews were conducted with the chief officer, with officers responsible for policy monitoring (the Head of the Research and Administration Section, and the Research Officer), officers with operational responsibility for elements of the recreation service (the Heads of Swimming Facilities Section and of Community Recreation), and officers with responsibility for facility management (managers of two of the local authority's sports centres).

The principal aims of the interviews were as follows:

- (a) to identify the policy goals advocated by interviewees, and the policy processes preferred (including specifically consideration of how leisure 'needs', 'wants' or 'interests' should be identified, and the role of politicians in policy construction);
- (b) to generate material for discussion of professionals' perceptions of their own interests and influence in the policy process and of those of other actors (politicians, other professionals, voluntary organisations or individuals);
- (c) to evaluate professionals' explanations of the development of particular policy decisions and to compare them with those of local politicians;
- (d) to identify the affiliations of officers to voluntary organisations and to professional associations in the local government field generally and the leisure services field more specifically.

Interviews were conducted employing a semi-structured interview schedule (see Appendix 3). The interviews lasted for between 50 minutes and 2½ hours. The precautions taken for ensuring the reliability of data were essentially those reported in the previous chapter, principally, that is, to assure candidates of the confidentiality of the research exercise, and to evaluate responses in terms of the plausibility of historical accounts, the reliability of the respondent, and the consistency of explanations with the accounts of others. Interviews were tape recorded and transcribed. Transcriptions of interviews, together with observational notes form the basis for the data analysis reported below. (See Appendix 3 for transcriptions and observational notes of key illustrative examples).

It should be noted that the sample selected consists entirely of male, white officers. This is a reflection of the absence of black or female officers in senior positions (or even in junior management) in the departments under study (and in most other council departments) and indicates something of the power structures and social milieu of the authority, which, in turn, is likely to influence its relationships with client groups and other organizations.

6.4 ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEW DATA

Discussion of the data culled from these interviews will be arranged under the following seven headings:

- analysis of leisure 'needs', 'wants', or 'interests',
- leisure policy expectations and 'aspirations',
- relationships with politicians in the policy process,
- officer explanations of the role of leisure quangos in local government policy making,
- professional affiliations and links with the voluntary sector,
- explanations of five sample policy decisions,
- explanations of the causes of unemployment and unemployment policy aspirations.

6.4.1 Analysis of Leisure 'Needs', 'Wants' or 'Interests'

During the interviews respondents were asked the question "How do you identify the leisure needs of the local community?". The aim of this line of enquiry was to encourage respondents to articulate what they understood by the term 'need' and how they operationalised it in the context of their own work; and to gain some insight into how the respondent went about evaluating different or competing needs. In Chapter Two, following Giddens, I adopted the argument that 'wants' were related to 'interests' in that awareness of interests represented not only awareness of wants but also of the means of meeting those wants. The term 'need' is used here to denote those 'wants' or 'interests' which are accepted in a given situation or social institution (including the political system) as social priorities. Such a use of the term need is akin to what Titmuss (1968) terms 'rights of citizenship'. As Coalter et al (1986) have pointed out such rights have been expanded in post war Britain to incorporate rights to leisure, which one government white paper went so far as to describe as "one of the community's everyday needs" (DOE 1975).

It is important to clarify the application of these central terms not only for the purposes of conceptual clarity but because their meaning carries with it some

prescriptive notions of what constitutes the legitimate role of the professional. The acceptance of the notion of 'unperceived interests' (in the sense of people being unaware of some means of realising their wants) might be said to indicate a role for the professional in both raising awareness in the community of the means of satisfying wants and of obtaining access to those means. However this approach presupposes the availability of opportunities for individuals and groups to clarify and articulate their wants; in other words to set the agenda for the work of the professional.

Interestingly when councillors were asked to indicate how they 'got to know about the needs and attitudes of the general public', they indicated a range of media for communication from the formal, such as the politician's surgery, to the informal, such as chatting to people in pubs and clubs, together with such considerations as political values. However when some of those same members, including all those serving or who had served on the Leisure Services Subcommittee, were asked to describe how they got to know about the leisure needs and attitudes of the general public, their response, was invariably that officers were the appropriate source for such information or analysis. This type of response was made by all but one of the respondents to whom the question was addressed. Even those who in other responses indicated a suspicion of, or dissatisfaction with, officer analysis of needs responded in this way. One of the Labour spokespersons for the period of the study provides a fairly typical illustration of this inconsistency. This particular individual who displayed a distrust of officer policy recommendations in general still promoted the notion of professional responsibility for defining the leisure needs and identifying the leisure attitudes of the general public:

Well, we're supposed to have officers paid to give us that information and you've got to rely on them, and we do have people who are so-called professionals

(Labour Councillor F)

This apparent adoption of professionally defined conceptions of need may be a reflection of trust in the impartial professional on the part of 'backbench

traditionalists' but for other members it is more likely to be a reflection of the absence of any well thought through manifesto for leisure policy.

Officers in responding to this question used the term 'need' without expressing concern for its problematic nature. However the way the term was applied implies a range of concepts of 'need' some of which are mutually incompatible. The range of explanations encountered in the interviews of how needs are identified is given below. Although the officers interviewed are concerned with differing aspects of the local authority's services, and may be dealing with different client groups, the range of explanations is nevertheless striking. They range from the expert diagnosis of the professional to the community development approach, with no single approach being dominant.

(1) Analysis of 'Needs' Originating with the Professional

(a) The 'Top Down' Approach.

Here needs are identified by the professional, the qualified expert. Some consideration may be given to expressed demand principally through consultation with established user groups, but the emphasis is clearly on arbitration of need by the professional. One chief officer for example claimed that his principal sources for assessment of need were as follows;

I've got senior staff who are specialists, and I also talk to colleagues in other authorities. I also have contacts in certain areas of my work for example the [city theatre] Users Association. I've also got my own personal information. I am a member of ... [names an international association for the leisure professions].

(Officer L)

(b) National Trends.

This approach was cited by a senior member of the Recreation Division who argued that his principal source of information on changing needs was his knowledge of the national leisure services scene. This approach together with 'talking to customers' provided the background for decisions about needs.

In terms of customers, potential customers, I would say, talking personally, that I get as much from just seeing what's been happening nationally, in terms of trends whether it be commercial or local authority. ... I think we've moved on now from the big research thing because it is a bit theoretical and I would say we're now into things like simply talking to people.

(Officer E)

(c) The Bottom Up Approach:

In common with the first two approaches, this involves identification of needs originating with staff. However the respondent argued that staff at the base of the organisation, those dealing directly with clients, would be most likely to be in tune with client needs. He therefore based his own assessment of need on feedback from people working at this level in service delivery.

With me it tends to be observation and talking to people but notably not customers myself. ... I go by the response you get from some managers and committed people who've got into a certain area, be it handicapped people or whatever.

(Officer D)

(d) The Investigative Approach.

In both the Libraries and the Arts and Museums Divisions, officers stressed the importance of user surveys and "opinion testing" as means of assessing whether community needs were being met.

[the chief officer] is very aware of the need to search and investigate in the public sector. That is why in our recent restructure that part of the service was beefed up. ... They have just done a study at the request of one of our librarians of what goes in [a particular branch library] and they are in the middle of doing a fairly massive piece of work for the Leisure Services Subcommittee at the moment on services to small communities. So much more of that stuff has to be done.

(Officer F)

Interestingly the emphasis on formal investigative (largely positivistic) research contrasted with the attitude apparent in the responses of the Research Officer and a former Head of the Research and Administration Sections of the Recreation Division, who argued that having made a considerable effort in the mid 1970's to collect such data from user and non-user surveys, the results of such work were now of diminishing value. Findings tended to confirm what management already 'knew' about who customers were without giving qualitative feed-back on why such usage patterns existed'.

(e) Outreach Work.

This approach moves closer to a 'client originated' analysis of need but is differentiated from community consultation in that it refers to promotion of existing services within the community rather than to originating service decisions within the community. The respondent who illustrates this approach, a facility manager, argued that to market his facility and services successfully, his staff had to go out into the community to promote them, and in so doing would gain some insight into the expressed preferences of local people.

We're starting more and more to reach out to go out and find out what people want. It has been done rather better in the smaller centres than it has here. There again the brief is different between ourselves and other centres. Where we know there is a catchment of people in a category that doesn't use the Centre, we are trying to get them in ...

(Officer J)

(ii) Corporatist Approaches to Analysis of Leisure 'Needs'

The approach adopted in the construction of the annual Urban Programme bids is essentially a corporatist strategy. Cawson (1985) differentiates corporatism from mere cooption of non-governmental organisations, by insisting that corporatist practices are those which "involve ... fusion of the processes of interest mediation (input) and policy implementation (output)" (p.127). The operation of the Urban Programme involved a strong element of corporatism in the sense that some representatives and individuals from particular organisations participated in the assessment of which bids for funding might best serve the local community, and in monitoring the work of some grant receivers, while their own organisations were also in receipt of grant aid from the Urban Programme. These organisations were then involved in both 'input' and 'output' in a way

which is analogous to other, more obvious forms of corporatism at national level.

The Urban Programme was divided up into a number of programme areas dealing with different types of policy or service. Thus in 1983-4 for example, there were eleven programme areas - unemployment, ethnic minorities, community development, economic development, environment, health care and the handicapped, the under fives, children and youth, the elderly, the homeless, and leisure. Each programme area had a team of officers, representatives from the voluntary sector and individuals or representative of organisations with specialist skills or knowledge. In the leisure programme area this team included, among others, individuals from the Sports Council, the Regional Arts Association, the local Play Association, ethnic arts and sports organisations, and the local Council for Voluntary Service. This team screened bids for grants from the voluntary and public sectors. The programme teams were regarded by the politicians as being particularly influential in the processing of grant bids since it was their responsibility to construct a list of schemes for consideration by a wider programme area group which included some members. Having screened the schemes recommended by the programme area teams the programme area groups submitted them (amended or otherwise) to the Council via the political coordinators appointed by party groups who in this case were the Deputy Leaders of the three parties.

Since many officers and voluntary sector representatives operated on both programme teams which drew up the original recommendations and programme groups which began to overlay politicians' priorities, there was considerable scope for influencing the outcomes of local prioritisation of bids. The general parameters for each programme area were set centrally before the beginning of the prioritisation process, but these were also based upon the recommendations of the programme area teams and in themselves appeared to allow considerable scope for interpretation;

Strategy statements for each programme area are produced. The problem is they are so open-ended that you can make almost any

scheme fit the strategy and it comes down to the decision about which schemes get priority.

(Officer A)

The thinking which informed this approach to deciding on local priorities was clearly that local needs, and adequate or innovative responses to those needs, would best be decided by the public and voluntary sector in partnership. However it is interesting to note how the voluntary sector representatives were selected.

In terms of selecting which voluntary sector and which local authority sector people are involved, we just issue the broad criteria that they should have interest and expertise. It's left up to the convenor who he or she would want to be involved. We write to the CRC [Community Relations Council] and CVS [Council for Voluntary Service] to give us a list of those who they think ought to be involved but it's still up to the convenor.

(Officer A)

There is clearly scope here for the kind of incorporation of pressure group interests which both Newton (1976) and Dearlove (1973) note in their studies, but the relationship goes beyond mere incorporation. The benefit for the authority might be defined in terms of policy input (the availability of informed sources in dealing with voluntary sector bidders), policy output (the provision of services by voluntary sector organisations in ways which are often difficult or impossible for the local authority), and the reduction of friction between the authority and those organisations directly affected by its decisions. The benefits for the voluntary organisations directly involved in the programme area teams and groups include the opportunity to influence significantly local authority decisions (even though clearly voluntary sector representatives were not permitted to participate in decisions concerning their own organisation). The corporatist relationship however involves also a third party, central government, which in the form of the Department of Environment and its responsible minister can accept or reject any of the constituent bids put

forward once the local authority has finalised its urban programme application.

(iii) Analysis of Need Originating with Client Groups

(a) Response to Demand

The officer responsible for the administration of grant aid in the Recreation Division argued that since the resources available for aid clearly outstripped local needs, and since there were no resources for developing an analysis of needs, one way of establishing priorities was simply to respond to demand for grant aid until resources ran out.

I think we tend to respond more to people's demands. I think it is because of the resources we've got. We'll sit and we'll wait because there is that much demand. they come knocking on the door and we'll respond to that rather than say "Look this is the policy we'll go out and push it."

(Officer B)

It is perhaps arguable whether or not this constitutes a client originated prioritisation of the response to needs. It is certainly the case that those less able to promote a grant aid application or those less aware of the availability of grant aid are likely to be disadvantaged in this approach where the professional simply responds to expressed demand.

(b) Community Consultation.

In contrast to outreach work, the approach adopted here is to seek to establish community wants, by consultation with existing community groups and to tailor provision to meet those wants. The emphasis is not on the

promotion of existing services but rather on adaptation or initiation of services to meet local needs.

Apart from [another facility manager] I am the only manager who is community oriented. Everyone else is money oriented. They think the definition of success is hitting your income targets. I don't. I mean you can't ignore them, but we have certain obligations and commitments to the people around us. The process we go through ... is that the Supervisors ... go out into the streets and talk to people, they knock on doors ... we contact groups, contact people who are in contact with groups. The only way to find out needs is to ask and the first process is to try to identify groups and individuals who have some bearing in the community and to talk to them, and with a bit of luck you can hopefully identify some needs and respond to them. But it's a difficult process.

(Officer K)

(c) Community Development.

It is perhaps unsurprising that an officer with responsibility for community recreation should be the individual within the Recreation Division who displayed most concern with establishing opportunities for community self determination in provision (cf Haywood and Henry 1986 a & b). This respondent argued that the approach was important not only in respect of improving decisions about what services to provide, but also in terms of the process itself. This type of involvement was seen as having the potential to generate strengths within the community.

I'm very interested in a sort of liaison and community development approach, going to these kinds of people, bearing in mind that kind of thing and trying to work with them in meeting their own leisure needs Some of our facilities may be very actively useful in that process but I believe we've got a wider role than that, beyond our facilities for the whole area. So if that means a Baths Supervisor

helping a group to apply for a grant to run something in a church hall then that in my view is legitimate.

(Officer I)

The officer responsible for Unemployment Services also adopted this approach to the analysis of needs for the unemployed.

Who am I to be telling the unemployed what they should be doing with their time? But what we might be able to do is to provide fieldworkers who would go out to [a council housing estate] and work with the unemployed there based on the old, traditional community development version. I mean they are a kind of 1980's version of the old CDP workers. They would work with groups who would then come to the Unemployment Sub-committee to ask for money to support their schemes.

(Officer N)

6.4.2 Leisure Policy Expectations and Aspirations

Officers were asked to identify the changes in leisure policy, if any, they wished to see in the period of the next five to ten years within the local authority. The concern here was not with obtaining 'expert' opinion, but rather with establishing officer values in the specific sense of policy preferences (cf. Walsh et al 1981), with tracing relationships between preferred and expected developments in policy among officers, and where appropriate comparing them with those of the councillors interviewed.

Immediately prior to the interview period the Recreation Division had drawn up a document outlining its goals and projections for the future. Unfortunately, this seems likely to have influenced respondents to provide a version of the collective response rather than thinking through their own position in relation to this question. Of the seven officers interviewed in the Recreation Division, five had been responsible for drawing up the document or presenting its recommendations, and it is not surprising therefore that the responses from this Division echo the

analysis and recommendations of the report. Of the four principal themes discussed below the first three feature in the Division's document. The first two of these are relatively straightforward and uncontentious policy aspirations. The third and fourth sets of issues raised are somewhat more problematic and carry particular implications for the role of the public sector leisure services officer.

(1) Increased Emphasis on Participation in Recreation Activities, Rather than Spectating

This was seen as a desirable and anticipated trend by three respondents (officers B,E,L), with the role of the recreation manager seen as both one of the development of new products and also one of promotion to extend the product lifecycle of existing services.

In the future there will be greater emphasis on participation because even with increased employment, employment will be more leisurely than in the past. There will be fewer physical demands. ... I think this is going to mean not just more people jogging or swimming but more people doing things like woodwork, basket work and creative arts.

(Officer L)

You seem to have reached a saturation point in a lot of sports, swimming, squash, that sort of thing ... but ... it depends on management of swimming facilities. The new promotions, the new schemes. ... A lot of things like swimming and parks would have contracted ... the use of parks, if we carry on doing what we do now, but I don't think we will. We will probably open city farm type projects.

(Officer B)

A corollary to this emphasis on product promotion or product development was the recognition that the traditional services would continue to fail to attract difficult target groups like the unemployed, and this in itself would be a stimulus to the development of new services.

We think the unemployed will come more to specialist things like sub-aqua, water-polo or diving than they will to ordinary swimming. So that means offering a wider range of services.

(Officer E)

A continuing concern for this and other similar target markets seems likely therefore to foster greater diversity of provision in public sector leisure services.

(ii) Increased Use of Non-specialist Community Facilities as Venues for Promoting Leisure Opportunities

This is simply the extension of existing policies such as dual use which are likely to be given special impetus by the difficulties of attracting funds for specialist provision. Three respondents (officers B,E,L) cited this as a desirable and likely emphasis for future policy:

I think one of the areas we will hopefully expand on is more extensive recreation use of community facilities outside Recreation, things like schools and colleges, because it fits in as well with a national Sports Council aim. I think we will go in for more non standard facilities, whether it's just a meeting room.

(Officer B)

(iii) Clarification of the Relationship Between Financial and Social Goals.

A number of the respondents expected the local authority to clarify its policy position in terms of the relationship between financial and social priorities (respondents D,K,J,E) which was seen as a major policy tension or confusion. However there were differences between respondents in terms of the kinds of balance desired and these were most clearly reflected in the responses given by the two facility managers included in the sample. These two individuals were selected for the sample because of the contrasting roles which their facilities played in the

hierarchy of local sports centre provision, with one being responsible for a well established facility of regional importance, the other being responsible for a small group of community sports facilities. In the former case the manager of the regional facility felt that the pressure on local authority budgets would and indeed should promote a more positive approach to commercialism on the part of public sector managers involving a greater decentralisation of decision-making to cost centre heads.

I'd like to see a more commercial policy applied to the service. We don't sell our product at an economic, marketable rate. It is still oversubscribed for those who can afford it and would pay more.... We've started making strides in that direction, banging up prices at peak periods. Part of our problem has been the British tradition of providing public recreation at rock bottom prices.

(Officer J)

His colleague, while agreeing that the pressures on local government were such that greater emphasis on commercial operation was highly likely, argued that this was not necessarily to be seen as desirable.

The area I do see expanding is for us to be a lot more commercially oriented and be much more professional so we can compete with health clubs and squash clubs and the like. I see us moving towards making more money but making more money at the expense of the social service we offer and that's sad. We're going to be under a lot of pressure to do that. We're already under a lot of pressure now which in certain ways is breaking up my philosophy of recreation provision.

(Officer K)

These concerns were echoed in the comments of the Libraries staff who pointed to the pressure on their service to obtain revenue from those services for which, by statute, the local authority was allowed to make a charge.

(iv) The Future Role and Function of Local Authority Managers

The tension between social and financial goals clearly has implications for the role which management should play in developing future services, as well as for the form such services should take. Respondents in general expressed an awareness of the changing nature of management in local government, particularly in the field of leisure services as a non-statutory, revenue generating service. A number of officers in the Recreation Division, for example stressed that the managers should be more proactive in their work, contrasting this approach with the traditional 'caretaker' style of public sector leisure management in which managers were said to adopt a wholly product oriented and reactive approach to their jobs.

We need to change some of our attitudes. We still see ourselves as caretakers rather than helping people to provide their own services. Why should sports centre staff be stuck in a centre if they are concerned with sport? It's what's happening with blacks. We know they are not coming into our places in proportions they ought to. What they are doing is going into their own facilities. What they do need is professional help in setting up their own place - getting money, applying for money, putting contractors in, hiring coaches ... Can we help them to do that themselves?

(Officer D)

But more and more we are allowed to manage. Perhaps four or five years ago managers were not managing. I'd even go so far as to say that even the managers were caretakers. There was no thought about development, programming, clientele, who they were providing for.... It was just a case of get them in, get their money, get them out again.

(Officer K)

However the role of leisure managers was seen as developing in two distinct directions, towards a more socially proactive role and towards a more financially proactive role. Managers were becoming more proactive in terms of attracting disadvantaged target groups, and adopting new approaches in order to do so. However they were also being given a greater degree of autonomy in some respects in for example being allowed to vary prices in order to either increase revenue or increase usage without losing revenue.

We have flexibility in pricing. The policy mentions maximising income, but the rider to that has been maximising usage.... We've had that for two or three years but never actually used it except at [one local sports centre] where they were funded differently and had more freedom. But now there isn't one facility indoor or outdoor that doesn't use it for promotional purposes.

(Officer E)

There was evidence also of cooperation with the commercial sector in a scheme to develop in partnership a profit-making water slide within a leisure centre, a move which in part would seem to have been inspired by fears on the part of management that the centre might be privatised.

Take the slides, my motive for putting those in was purely commercial. I responded to the sabre rattling that occurred almost two years ago .. There were threats that because the Sports Centre was costing so much ... they were going to look to sell it off. ... In response to that I set about looking for ways of significantly reducing the deficit, not with a thousand pounds here or there but with a wallop, and I saw as a possible option, the installation of a commercial attraction, water slides.

(Officer J)

The financial squeeze may well have resulted in other achievements in terms of efficiency and cost cutting.

Some of our services can break even or make money. One of the areas we've recognised is catering. We've got specialist baths managers but they weren't necessarily any good at catering if we're honest. What we've done is brought in our own catering experts. We've looked towards presenting products better, improving staff attitudes, streamlining lists of available products, but presenting them better. Takings have gone up considerably

Other areas where you can up the price for a different type of market, for example saunas, we've improved the product put in better staff, put on a

special offer, reduced the price, doubled the users and then put the price back up and people kept coming.

(Officer E)

The change in role however was potentially more revolutionary than simply the development of more market oriented practices. The Leisure Services Sub-committee, for example, was presented with a proposal that the council investigate ways of developing and marketing sporting holidays in the District, and of cooperating with a commercial company in the manufacturing of sports equipment using the name of the District for brand identity.

[the chief officer] has spent the last few weeks working almost totally on job creation. One thing is a sports bag factory, which made the banner headlines in [the local paper]. He has got somebody interested in setting up a factory in the City to sell [sports goods with the District name] rather than say Adidas. ...That received support from the Tories but less so from Labour so it was referred to Economic Development Sub-committee. What he did get support on totally was sports holidays.

(Officer D)

We can create jobs by creating work. We know that people go to the Costa del Sol. They've spent £20 million to fly folk from this region out. Why aren't we flying people in to spend money here to create jobs? People laugh when you say I'm going on holiday to [this city], but they don't laugh when you say I'm going on a riding holiday or an archery holiday. Where you go isn't always important. ... If you were advertising in Hanover that children can improve their English and learn a sport, go on a barge or whatever, they'd say, "I'd enjoy that!" It's got to be marketed. Somebody then has got to cook, somebody has got to coach and so on. And some of those economic schemes would go towards meeting social needs, because some social needs exist because people haven't got jobs.

(Officer L)

The expansion of existing roles in local government leisure management however was not restricted to those areas primarily concerned with alleviating financial

problems. There was evidence also of a concern to go beyond traditional forms of provision, and in particular to promote a range of community recreation opportunities, including the promotion of ethnic arts projects, schemes for the unemployed, community self help schemes and so on. The officer responsible for the administration of cultural grant aid for example notes how well established organisations concerned with the high arts in the city are in decline while ethnic organisations are increasingly receiving recognition from the local authority in the form of grant aid.

The contraction has come very much in the field of music organisations ... groups started about a century ago which are now going out of existence .. which I personally regret. There is much more help given towards ethnic groups. They are coming along for help with a festival, concerts that sort of thing ... five or six years ago that sort of thing didn't happen at all.

(Officer H)

Similarly the Recreation Division had set up a Community Recreation Section in recognition of the growing social needs of an industrial city in decline (although it had subsequently also effectively disbanded it by failing to replace staff who were leaving).

I feel the Community Recreation Section has tried to be far more proactive in terms of positive discrimination because that's what we were brought into the Directorate to do and we were there to encourage managers and to develop opportunities for various disadvantaged groups. So we have had a policy of positive discrimination towards ethnic minority groups, the unemployed, elderly, handicapped and housing estates. These were very much our target groups ... but to achieve that you've got to change staff attitudes and make them realise that they can work far more for their communities.

(Officer I)

These innovations in working practices are consistent with the explanations of organisational change promoted by contingency theorists (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967, Burns and Stalker 1961) in that the changes in the local authority's working

environment which has become recognizably more volatile in financial and social terms have been accompanied by the erosion of rigid bureaucratic practices. Delegation of authority to vary prices to managers, the challenging of traditional modes of officer-member communication, and cooperation with the commercial sector are examples of the response of the organisation to the difficulties it faces. For some managers this change has not gone far enough.

If I'm given £100,000 to run a pool that's what I must work within. But .. the cream on the cake for me would be, if I work to a net budget that is less than that I feel two things should happen. First some of the money should be reinvested into these facilities. But I also feel some of the money should be paid back to the council's employees, because when you look at it they're paid a pittance, pool attendants or even supervisors, for doing a very responsible job.

(Officer E)

Taken together these changes represent attempts to overcome some of the classic dysfunctions of bureaucracies - inflexible behaviour, reduced incentives for high personal achievement, displacement of goals, poor internal and external communications, and a lack of adaptive capacity. Such changes will invariably involve a reduced capacity for accountability, but this seems an inevitable corollary of allowing officers greater flexibility to respond to situations in new and often experimental ways. Typical of this changing balance between flexibility and accountability were the comments of an officer concerned with developing links with voluntary groups serving the needs of the unemployed.

I think the council in the past and some officers have had a schizophrenic attitude to the voluntary sector which was that if £100 went missing in a scheme in the voluntary sector then the scheme must be closed down and that was a great disaster; whereas every year the council gets its spending wrong, we overspend by millions and noone seems to worry about it

(Officer N)

(v) Local-Central Relations

One final issue which represented a common concern expressed in the interviews was the growing influence of central government in local affairs. This was seen as an undesirable trend likely to continue. Comments took the form of either generalised concern about the effects of government initiated funding squeezes on local choice in mainstream funding, or a more specific concern about government involvement in decisions about how money should be spent locally, particularly in the Urban Programme.

One of the effects of reduced sources for mainstream expenditure, concurrent with the availability of special funds, from sources such as the European Community and the Urban Programme, was the shrinkage in what was seen as basic provision accompanied by the expansion of funding for things which by definition were seen as marginal in some service areas. The Arts and Museums Division provided an example of this kind of thinking.

Opportunities for doing new things with 'funny money', money not included in the base budget are increasing. There is more and more use of Section 11, of Urban Programme, of MSC. We're expanding here in response to what we know to be the needs of the community. That's great while it lasts. A good example is the Oral History Project, and Community Arts which was originally Urban Aid and is now part financed by the local authority and part by the DOE. That's great, but where we have a real problem is in curation, preservation and conservation, the core service.

(Officer C)

However at least one officer noted the value of non-mainstream funding in allowing room for experiment, getting beyond routinised budgets and methods of working.

I think we have got to find other ways in the authority [than the Urban Programme] of swaying mainline services to respond to the sorts of things we are able to do in a very small way in the Urban Programme, and to be more directly in touch with the local community in one way or another; so that as the Urban Programme fizzles out (as far as new projects are concerned) we have got something in the leisure area to put in its place, some way of

being more responsive to local need and demand.

(Officer F)

6.4.3 Explanations of Officer-Member Relationships

A range of explanations of the roles of officers and members was evident in the responses of officers. As we have seen the traditional explanation of the officer-member roles characterises the officer as proffering expert, neutral, technical advice on policy options and members deciding on which of those options to adopt. Qualified versions of the traditional explanation were expounded by some officers, though with acknowledgement of the difficulties of making this work in practice. However others interviewed clearly saw the respective roles in different terms and four types of explanation are identified below.

(a) The Neo-traditional Model

Though none of the respondents actually argued for the traditional notion of officer-member relationships as such, a significant proportion of the officers interviewed regretted the growth of member influence in decision-making, and clearly resented 'unwarranted interference' with their own sphere of professional or managerial competence.

If I was a doctor and I said "You're suffering from appendicitis. You'd better go to hospital" the patient accepts it because you're a doctor or a dentist. But if you're a professional local government officer specialising in a certain field people can stand up for an hour or two hours debating whether the decision you gave was the right one.

(Officer L)

I know it's the same in virtually every local authority where you've got the butcher, the baker, the candlestick maker who are in effect making major decisions and when you've got professional people in the job with a lot of experience, a lot of knowledge, and they can perhaps be overruled ... it makes

a mockery of the whole situation.

(Officer K)

The 'objectivity' of the professional was seen by one officer as in stark contrast to the 'irrational self interest' of some politicians.

Members very rarely disagree with a professional officer on the grounds that they don't think the advice is accurate. It is usually because there is a political interest which can be served by not following that advice, which can be of advantage to them individually or collectively on a political basis

(Officer L)

One facility manager who had worked in three local authorities (a Conservative controlled borough, a Labour controlled metropolitan district, and the authority in this case study) suggested that member 'interference' with managerial decisions, day-to-day operational activity was greatest among Labour members and was particularly evident in Labour controlled authorities. He argued that the area of managerial autonomy should be widened and that impinging on managerial autonomy simply demotivated management.

When I was in [the Labour authority] it was a little bit more moderate than it is now. One of the things which encouraged me to leave .. was member interference. They might as well have not had officers paid at senior officer, principal officer level because effectively they were acting as tea boys. It was more than member involvement it was member interference. Constantly in and out of the facility, demanding to know what you were doing, what you were doing next, when you were going to implement that minute from yesterday's meeting and I found it pretty unbearable.

(Officer J)

The term 'neo-traditional' is used here because although it is recognised by respondents that roles could not be defined in the clear cut, mutually exclusive characterisations of the traditional model, there was still a dominant emphasis on the preeminence of professionally legitimated policy advice. Three of the five chief officers claimed that their policy recommendations when made to committee rarely,

If ever, are seriously questioned (though one of them felt this to be a worrying feature). Indeed one of these three chief officers described how he took great pains to ensure that his advice was heeded.

By the time I go to the committee I've been to the leader and all the important people and had them in for a chat. If I go to committee it's to get approval for something. You might put one or two things on the agenda which it doesn't matter if you lose, because it's good for discussion to take place. But to say a terrible thing a lot of the things I'm involved in are too important for democracy... by the time you've waited for people to vote you've lost twenty or thirty jobs.

(Officer M)

The neo-traditional model implies that, whether the relationship is adversarial or a form of limited partnership, professionals constitute the dominant group in the relationship. Of the relatively small sample interviewed, approximately half (respondents C,E,H,J,K,L,M) gave explanations of officer-member relationships falling within this category.

(b) Partnership Model

The notion of separate political-administrative spheres of activity was rejected by some officers who characterised their working relationship with members (or the relationship to which they aspired) as one of partnership with overlapping roles, involving members in operational decisions and officers in policy formulation.

The operation of the Urban Programme in the District had constituted one area of work which had brought together officers and members to work on a common set of problems, occasionally with overlapping tasks (such as seeking background information on grant applicants). The officer most centrally concerned with the construction of the authority's Urban Programme submission saw his relationship, particularly with senior politicians, as one of partnership in putting together a package which both reflected their political priorities and would gain approval from the Department of the Environment. Similarly, an officer from one of the

leisure divisions who had been brought in to work on the leisure area of the Programme found the experience of working more closely with members a refreshing change from the adversarial relationships of the neo-traditional model, which he had experienced in some of his regular duties. When interviewed he provided an extract from a report he had written for members for other purposes which reflected how he felt officer-member relationships had been developing and how they might change. It is worth quoting this extract at length.

"We see the present management climate of the Authority as one of the biggest obstacles to effectiveness, progress and responsiveness to change throughout the Council's work. This climate is in our view characterised by unclarity, distrust, back-biting, back-stabbing, abrasiveness, confrontation, egocentric mischief and dysfunctional games playing. If the Council embraces the principles of Area Management and a new Programme Area approach, this constitutes virtually a fresh start in the management of the authority - and therefore an unique opportunity to move to a management climate likely to bring about the best, instead of the worst, in everyone. The challenges and threats facing local government at this time are of such magnitude that such a fresh climate is surely worth striving for. To attain it would mean - for people in all parts of the Authority, but mainly for the most senior officers and Members - breaking with the habits of a lifetime. It would mean a switch, from the top downwards, to a creative, collaborative, mutually supportive, open, honest and trusting, resilient and energetic approach to each other and our work. Such a new style would in our view lead to the work of the Council being - and being seen by the outside world as - productive, progressive, risk-taking, flexible, trusted and happy. Such a climate would be free of negative conflict (as distinct from positive conflict, which is healthy) and would be conducive to facing issues productively."

The partnership approach was seen by some as not merely a means of building up good relationships but also of speeding up decision-making processes by dint of regular consultation with members which would flag potential problems in time to deal with them before they became major issues. One respondent gave the example of having been instructed to make savings, and doing so by proposing to close

facilities which were under-used and which had catchment areas overlapping with similar, better used, neighbouring facilities. This seemed to the officers involved to be the only way of making the order of saving required in the time available. However, when put to Committee, this caused considerable disquiet leading to delay in implementation.

Even the Chairman of Leisure Services was unhappy when she saw what it meant and all those hundreds of letters she was getting complaining about what was happening. Then it dawned on her how bad it was. Now I personally don't think it was all that bad. We would almost have had to do it anyway with members I don't think we get involved early enough. I think we're going to have to get that better and work more closely in the future.

(Officer G)

Within the Recreation Division the advent of 'full time' Labour members with specific interests in the recreation field had imposed a new officer-member relationship in some areas of the Division's work. One respondent felt initially that this was detrimental to the service but as relationships were established with the new politicians, he came to welcome this new departure.

Members are very much more working members than people who give up a few hours a week to rubber stamp things. That's really in the past in [this authority]..... Originally I didn't [think this was a good thing] because the problem we got was, we are individual experts - take theatre, we've got theatre experts for that. The problem with members when they first got involved, they were all experts. They all knew the answer and it was wrong. But to their credit, members, after two or three years of more involvement in day to day working, now, rather than make a decision, they ask officers and get more information.

(Officer B)

As we have already noted one feature of the neo-traditional model which was under considerable strain was the convention of member communication with officers in a department through that department's chief officer. Members, particularly newer members, expressed concern that this meant that the chief officer could effectively

control the information they received about his department. Members therefore resorted to communicating directly with middle management. This in itself caused difficulties for some officers who were being pressed by their chief officer to observe the convention and by members (particularly the more persistent, full-time members) to break with it. At least one officer flouted the convention against his chief officer's wishes, and other respondents argued that relationships with members would be more productive if the convention were to be ignored.

In all five respondents (officers A,B,F,G,I) promoted a partnership model as an appropriate prescription for officer-member roles.

(c) The Quasi-Political Relationship

One officer within the Recreation Division sought to communicate directly with the major political groups, and also indirectly through officers with 'political contacts' in order to further policy goals to which he was committed. He cited an example of action taken when the Division appeared to be "dragging its feet over the race issue".

On 'race' there were a couple of things I didn't agree with the way it was going when [the chief officer] was going to take things to the Leisure Services Sub-committee or whatever. So I would let [the officer responsible for race relations] know 'Did you know this was coming up next week. Have a look at it. It might be dodgy. He would be straight then on to [two leading politicians from the major parties] who backed him and things would be withdrawn from the agenda within minutes of the meeting starting.

(Officer D)

This form of officer-member relationship is not so much a case of officers becoming involved in the political process in advising members on policy goals but rather took the form of lobbying for specific purposes and, where required, tailoring arguments to be consistent with the values espoused by the two major groups.

You don't con members, you write a report geared to their beliefs, what you think will get the thing through, especially in our field. I mean you haven't got any strong party political support for what we do ... not like say housing.

(Officer D)

The practice of actively seeking out influential members, directly or indirectly, would seem to have caused some friction in the Division, and was opposed by the chief officer. According to the officer concerned it was eventually conceded that such contacts could not be effectively suppressed.

This type of contact between middle management and the newer 'prominent members' or 'political aspirants' was fostered by the failure of the traditional formal communication networks to fulfil the needs of policy oriented politicians and officers. However what has been described here is different in kind to the partnership model or the policy adviser and political adviser models described below, because the focus of 'discussion' is the policy goals espoused by the individual officer concerned.

I get the job of writing a report for committee - it will be somebody else's idea, but if I believe in it it will be a strong report. I will work for it, not just write the report. If that means seeing members then I will.

(Officer D)

(d) Policy Adviser to a Political Group

The officer as policy adviser to party groups has become a fairly common feature of local government in the 1980's, particularly in Metropolitan, and the larger urban Non-metropolitan Districts. The presence of chief officers at group meetings was very rare even a decade ago and is still to some unthinkable, a breach of the principle of impartiality on the part of the administration. However more recently some authorities have begun to appoint assistants to political group leaders, and at least one authority, Walsall, attempted for a period to screen the party affiliations of new appointees and invited only those with socialist sympathies to

apply for posts. A more moderate line was adopted by the authority in the case study. Leaders of the two major parties sought to acquire policy advisers by inviting existing employees to take on additional responsibilities for advising one of the two groups. Two teams of four officers were established and one officer in each team took on the role of personal assistant to the group leader (in addition to his existing duties).

One of the sample of officers interviewed had taken on the role of leading the officer group attached to the Conservative Leader.

I am PA to the Tory Leader and that is an official appointment. So I head up a team of officers drawn up from throughout the authority, a team of four, and I am .. whether you would call it personal assistant or political assistant is a moot point. For example in two weeks time I am off to spend a day at Central Office working to find what links we can make with their local government people and so on.

(Officer N)

Interestingly party affiliation was not one of the criteria considered in making this appointment. The officer concerned had also worked closely with the Labour administration when in power on the development of the District's nuclear free zone policy and had been a member of Labour's "National Nuclear Free Zones Committee". In that sense at least the appointment was not a political one.

I would rather work for a dynamic Tory than a slow Labour member, and I would rather work for a dynamic Labour member than a slow Tory. So I am really a career bureaucrat. I don't care who I work for as long as they're dynamic. There is considerable self interest for me in this because if people like [the Labour and Conservative Leaders] are not able because of their work commitments to work for council, then we'll end up with a lot of councillors who are geriatric and not dynamic.

(Officer N)

(e) The Political Adviser Role

The role of policy adviser to political groups should be differentiated from that of political adviser which sees the officer steering the political thinking and policy development of the party groups. There were no officers in this sample who fell into this category in the role they adopted. Examples are likely to occur however where there are political appointments made (formally or informally) or where officers are members of a local political party. In this case the officer is seen as a legitimate member of the political community and one with particular expertise in a given area of policy. Political appointments are rare in British local government, though the Labour Group in the G.L.C. for example did appoint an adviser to the Labour Administration on cultural policy, whose appointment was to be for the duration of Labour control of the authority. It is however rather more difficult to assess how common local party membership is among local government officers. This may well accord even greater political influence to an officer who occupies a strategically important position within the local party, especially in a Labour controlled authority, given the democratic nature of the machinery for policy discussion espoused in that party's constitutional arrangements.

It should be stressed that individual officers may well not conform to a single category of role, but may vary their behaviour according to the situation. Nevertheless, these categories of officer role (with the exception of the final category) are based on officers' explanations of the approaches they have adopted for dealing with the difficulties of establishing 'professional relationships' in a situation where traditional platitudes about the separate spheres of administrative and political responsibilities have become increasingly difficult to support. The range of officer roles discussed is itself indicative of the pressures for change within the current environment. Some officers are resisting that change, or stressing the need for greater powers for the professional if services are to deal effectively with the social, economic, and political difficulties which face them. Others recognise the power of the local government professional as part of the problem of service development which has, in many cases, failed to meet the needs of the most disadvantaged and alienated the communities it was supposed to serve.

6.4 OFFICERS' EXPLANATIONS OF FIVE POLICY DECISIONS

In order to permit some comparison with members' accounts and to establish officers' perceptions of policy decisions, respondents were asked to describe the process which was gone through in reaching a decision in each of five sample policy issues. Respondents were asked specifically about the arguments marshalled and the factors which, and individuals who, were significant in reaching decisions on these issues.

(a) The City Theatre

The decision to allocate capital for the renovation of the city theatre was significant for the substantial amount of money involved at a time of cutbacks in revenue and capital budgets, and because of the route the decision took going virtually straight to the Management Special Sub-committee, which had special executive powers to commit the Council to expenditure.

The background to the decision as described by councillors was discussed at some length in the previous chapter. However officer accounts of the process tended to complement members' by providing more information on how the issue came to reach the political agenda in the way that it did, the processes that were gone through and the officers who were influential in steering it through the pre-committee stages.

The process of submission of this proposal to the Management Special Sub-committee was a complex one and is best described as a chronological series of events. The process began with the Labour administration of 1980-2 seeking 'service reviews' from all directorates with a view to assessing future policy

developments. The chief officer and the Divisional Management Team for Recreation saw this as an opportunity to encourage members to think about growth in the leisure field, and accordingly submitted three areas for consideration as candidates for service area reviews. All three were accepted (relatively few were submitted by other Divisions) and the first area to be tackled by the Division's Research Section was that of 'entertainments'.

The major area of difficulty for the Entertainments Section was clearly the city theatre which was in danger of closure. The Research team therefore spent considerable time with the Head of the Entertainments Section talking through the problems of the building and establishing what he thought would be desirable features of a refurbished city theatre.

What other directorates did was to produce a two page report saying what the service was. They thought that was what you had to do. We saw it as an opportunity to get a hell of a lot out of it ... we saw them as an opportunity to get what we always wanted. So what we did first off was to meet [the Head of Entertainments] took a tape recorder and got him to talk about what entertainments should be like in the centre of [the city]. We encouraged him to go for the best, to not think what was practical. We had a fairly clear picture of what he thought Entertainments should be like. We used to meet him once a week without fail.

(Officer D)

Accordingly an architect was commissioned to draw up some preliminary plans which were incorporated within the the Entertainments Review which was subsequently submitted to the Education Directorate's Service Planning Team.

They were just astounded with what we came up with we used comics and engaged hostesses and things like that. We were up til two or three in the morning preparing [the presentation] and then back at seven the next day ... by that time we were all totally committed to it.

(Officer D)

The Education Service Planning Team however were unable to promote the proposals any further and the officers who prepared the review took advice on how to progress the scheme from officers outside the Education Directorate. They were advised to enlist the support of the Chief Executive in taking the scheme straight to the leaders of the political groups. The chief officer who up to this stage had simply approved the Review and had not been directly involved in its presentation, was drawn in to approach the Chief Executive with a view to putting the item on the political agenda at the highest level.

people just didn't know what to do with it. I mean you just can't come up with a proposal to spend £15 million (which it was at the time) like that.

(Officer B)

The Chief Executive arranged for a briefer, more factual presentation to be made to a Management Special Sub-committee and then advised members that they would have to decide to either spend the money or close the theatre. In this case as in others "the Chief Executive played a pivotal role" (Officer M). The small Sub-committee of prominent councillors agreed in principle to the expenditure though subsequently there was a considerable and adverse reaction on the part of both some members and some officers.

The officer opposition was perceived as originating largely from within the Education Directorate.

Then there were some things that went wrong, mainly officers who thought "What's going on here? You should have gone through proper channels through Leisure Services Sub-committee to Education Committee to Management Committee so officers started causing trouble then and they were speaking to certain politicians and it all got party political. ... They knew damn well if we'd gone through proper channels we wouldn't have got it ... That's when some of us got to work in other areas. So we were seeing [politicians] in pubs. We started to persuade them, to put our case.

(Officer D)

There are a number of points to raise with reference to the officers' accounts of this decision. The first is that the explanations of how the project was progressed are drawn predominantly from the two officers in the Research team who were centrally involved, and the two chief officers who were involved in progressing the project in the later stages. These accounts are however substantially in agreement on aspects of the case common to each of them. Where details are given in one account only, as is the case with officer D's description of social meetings with members, there is some corroborative evidence from the councillor interviews, and some supporting circumstantial evidence also.

The second point to emphasise is that officers chose different, perhaps even incompatible arguments in promoting the scheme within the two major party groups.

We've tended to go towards Tory support by emphasising the commercial support towards it ... The Labour Group were the ones who were least in favour. So I sold it to them on the idea of a people's theatre ... we spent a long time with ... the Labour Leader ... to persuade him that we weren't after this sort of posh theatre with opera and ballet in it for the upper classes ... What we've got in practice is something different. ... In practice to achieve the income targets we'll have to get in things that will sell and that's the only criterion on which the theatre will be booked. ... You can get the Royal Ballet and their loss guarantee might be £20,000 far more than a variety act, but you know that you can charge far more, £10 a ticket and fill it.

(Officer D)

This seems a clear example of attaining departmental goals by accommodating the values of politicians in the rationales rehearsed on particular occasions.

The third point to make in respect of this particular decision is that the location of Recreation within the organisational structure, that is within the Education Directorate, and the location of the Leisure Services Sub-committee which reports to the Education Committee, normally allows one professional group, education officers, to control access to resources by another professional group, leisure services officers. The concern expressed by members about the 'route' taken, with

decisions being arrived at by a small cabal of members, was paralleled by a concern on the part of education officers at the lack of opportunity for the decision to be considered within the formal committee system where there is potential for those officers to influence policy discussion. The formal organisational (departmental and committee) structures can be seen to mediate the influence of particular groups of local government professionals. Location within the formal organisational structure does not necessarily, however, dictate power, and as Child (1972) points out there may well be more than one 'dominant coalition' in operation, effecting change in any given organisation. The city theatre development might seem in many respects a project unlikely to attract influential support, given the financial climate, the subordinate organisational location of Leisure Services, the size of the bid, and the disjunction with Labour's policy priorities. Among the 'interests' of those promoting the decision would seem to be - for the Entertainments Section, the professional prestige of expansion of 'core' facilities; for the Research Section, the kudos of successful policy development; for the Economic Development Section, a reinforcement of the Section's policy of tourism promotion; for the Labour Group, avoidance of negative connotations associated with responsibility for closing down the city theatre, and being seen as the 'no fun' socialist party; for the Conservative members, the promotion of economic policy through tourism and the placation of the arts lobby within the Party. This range of interests was sufficient to deflect opposition in the Education Directorate, where officers regarded the success of this project as likely to undermine capital developments in the mainstream educational field; in the Conservative Group with its concern over public spending; and in the Labour Group with its concern for other areas of social provision. Astute use of a truncated form of the decision-making system allowed the successful coalition to make it very difficult for those representing opposing interests to act effectively since this would involve challenging party unity in the two major groups at a time when, with a hung council, such unity was at a premium.

(b) The Development of the Recreation Division's Race Action Plan

The Race Advisory Group established to oversee the implementation of the Council's policies on race, required individual directorates and divisions to establish an information base and action plan outlining how they might set about realising

Council policy in their own areas of work. At this time (1983-4) the Recreation Division's Management Team was seriously depleted with the departure of some senior managers who had not been replaced because of the need to make savings. As a result the Divisional Management Team had not met regularly and there was a feeling among officers interviewed that policy issues were being neglected in responding to the operational pressures of running a Division without three of its six senior managers. The Division was initially therefore seen as being slow to respond formally to the requirements of the Council in respect of race policy. Three of the officers interviewed remarked that there was little priority given to the exercise by the chief officer, because it was not seen as a priority by the Leisure Services Sub-committee.

There was no pressure to do anything from [the chief officer] because there was no pressure from the Leisure Services Sub-committee. All the pressure came from a group of middle tier officers.

(Officer K)

At least one respondent however felt that the Division was actually going some way towards implementing policy in this area without spending time on collecting information to demonstrate that this was the case.

My argument is that we're doing something about it anyway. We've done so much work with ethnic minority groups and ethnic minority leaders that it's going ahead. The swimming, the outdoor amenities, the grant aid, all the sports, they are working with ethnic minority groups more than any other because they are quite vociferous and we respond. Now what we don't do and we are getting hammered for it is we don't write down on bits of paper for the Race Action Group what we are doing... we will write about it after if we've got time.

(Officer B)

However this perspective was not shared by all officers in the Division, some of whom felt that this was an important area in which the Division was failing to

make progress. A Divisional Race Action Group was accordingly established which was to provide a forum for discussion of race issues and the development of an action plan.

The idea was to consult representatives from all levels of the Division, including the black employees within the Division, so that the action plan would be developed in that context, through the Division's Race Action Group. Otherwise we would have drifted along without really doing anything.

(Officer I)

Although this Group started to meet to discuss the issues, it does not appear to have operated very successfully, and failed to produce an action plan.

He included all levels of the Division including manual workers, he included all the black workers in the Division ... The problem was they were not the sort of people who could deal with council policy. The blacks on the Group never spoke. They'd never been to a meeting before or been asked to speak to people who were paid more. ... That strategy produced nothing. By that time there was pressure from members to do something. So I was asked to go along with [another officer] and after two meetings I came away and wrote the Race Action Plan from that and with consultation with other officers.

(Officer D)

As with the city theatre, a relatively small number of officers, not the most senior in the Division, were able to push the Division in the direction of setting out its own action plan. Whether or not this would actually influence the delivery of services is another question. It seems ironic that the consultation process should fail to produce any concrete policy proposals and yet one of the respondents should argue that the race action plan would not be implemented in part because of the "resistance of staff who had not been consulted" (Officer K). Also as in the case of the theatre project, communication by middle management with members was used to stimulate action on this issue.

I was going over to City Hall to the Labour rooms and speaking to [the Leader] and other Labour members about the Recreation Division and race

relations in Bradford and how I felt it ought to be going. That got a bit sticky ... but it worked in terms of race relations. The Division got off its backside and started doing things.

(Officer D)

(c) Purchase and Development of a Site for a Youth Centre and a Sports Development Centre

The opportunity for purchase of this site arose at the end of a financial year when central government had unexpectedly made capital available for 'quick spend' projects, and money was also subsequently made available by the Football Trust and the Sports Council. The decision was of interest because it involved cooperation across two committees (the Leisure Services Sub-committee and the Further Education Sub-committee) and two divisions (Recreation and Youth and Community) in the purchase and management of the site. Members of both sub-committees seemed somewhat less well informed about the project than they were about schemes which were the sole responsibility of their respective sub-committees.

Officers explained the promotion and acceptance of this policy in the following terms.

Unfortunately we are in a period of time when finance is declining and whilst ideally one should say "Here's a map of the district. We need a sports centre here, here and here, and the same with swimming pools". The reality is we're closing facilities.... So when it comes to arguing the case for some provision like this, there's got to be almost a fortuitous opportunity for someone to have success. The process is identifying the money and getting the argument through to members that the need is there. Theoretically it should be the proper planning process but in reality!

(Officer L)

That one was more opportunism than anything else. It was [the chief officer and head of section]. There had been ideas in the Outdoor Amenities Service

Plan for an outdoor facility and a Development Officer ... I think there were four reasons for the decision being taken. First they could help the [sports club]. Second they could use substantial funding from the Urban Programme and the Football Trust. Third we didn't have a synthetic surface, and the site allowed this which would accommodate heavy use and prestige events. Fourth Unemployment agreed to find some money. And finally the Youth Service agreed to share some costs.

(Officer 1)

Unlike the previous two decisions discussed there would not seem to have been a significant input in the development of policy in the formative stages of this project by the central Research Section. However the management brief for the sports development centre was written by members of the Research Section and the parameters within which the operational managers subsequently appointed would work were, to some degree, shaped by this group.

(d) Grant Aid to Voluntary Sector Leisure Organisations

The policy decisions considered in the following two sections are of a different order to the three described so far in that they involve on-going or regularised policies, dealing with allocation of grant aid and the budgetary process respectively. Among the officers interviewed were those responsible for the administration of four forms of grant aid. These consisted of three administered through the Leisure Services Sub-committee, involving grants to cultural organisations, to organisations concerned with sport and active recreation, and to organisations running children's holiday play schemes. The fourth source of grant aid included in this review was that available through the Urban Programme.

We have already noted how decisions relating to grant aid in the urban programme involved a form of corporatist arrangement with key voluntary sector organisations drawn into the decision-making process. Grant aid for sport and active recreation organisations involved a relatively small amount of money (a budget of £6,300 in 1983-4 for example) and during the last year of the research period the Leisure Services Sub-committee adopted the policy of delegation of the

decision about individual grants to the chief officer and his staff. This was seen by the officer responsible for administration of grants as preferable for a number of reasons.

It seemed all out of proportion in Sub-committee business, probably for the right reasons because they [the councillors] were very emotional about little groups in their own area. We felt members also, because of their own constituencies, you'd get one supporting his own ward and not other areas - for the right reasons. Quite often you'd get [certain] councillors filling in the application form, just about, but it was wrong for them then to be part of the forum discussing it. What I feel as officers we do is that we look at every group without any preconceived ideas. ... We treat it in black and white and apply the criteria.

(Officer B)

Despite the reservations expressed about members' objectivity, because of their close contact with organisations exemplified by their assisting with "form filling", this practice was also common among officers in dealing with applications for the Urban Programme. The same officers prioritised applicants including those they had assisted with their application without 'compromising' their objectivity. The ideology of professional technocratic neutrality is evident in these remarks.

Although the decision about individual applicants was made in this case by officers the Leisure Services Sub-committee had "agreed" the criteria which should be employed as those recommended to them in a report written by the officer responsible for administration of this grant scheme.

we will give grants based on three sets of criteria, like 'new start' clubs, like representative teams or individuals representing their area or the country even, clubs who were doing a lot of self help, raising a lot of money themselves and trying to improve their facilities.

(Officer B)

These fairly broad criteria leave considerable scope for the professional to impose his or her own set of values on decisions about which organisations should be

favoured. The officer concerned was asked why no reference had been made to priority for disadvantaged groups, and the second part of his reply illustrates the point.

I think that's because the disadvantaged are always looked upon favourably. There wasn't any need to actually have it in. I am also quite aware that I would not like to see all the grant aid going to disadvantaged groups. There are a lot of middle class cricket clubs who do a lot of their own fund raising and spend thousands of pounds ... who deserve help. Even if it's only a gesture of £100, it's worth the encouragement.

(Officer B)

The point to be made here is not that such an argument is (or is not) weak, but rather that, within the context of applying council policy, the values of professionals do have a significant influence on policy outcomes. The decision about which play schemes to grant aid was similarly one made by an officer, who traditionally had been free to determine which grant applicants would be successful (and therefore where voluntary playschemes would operate) in this case without the benefit of criteria decided by committee.

... the play scheme grant aid ... as the officer in charge of that I just make up the criteria and give them the grant. It's just my decision.

(Officer I)

Here again professional control is evident, though in both cases relatively small sums are involved.

Grant aid to cultural organisations was rather more significant in terms of the local authority's financial investment (£44,900 in 1983-4) and this remained under the direct control of the Leisure Services Sub-committee. Financial aid was given in the form either of a simple grant or in the form of a 'loss guarantee' against a particular production or a season's performances. In practice relatively few grant applicants were turned down by the Sub-committee (only two in the three council years covered by the research) and of those which were successful the vast majority were organisations which had received financial assistance the previous

year. The following chapter will explore patterns of grant aid in more detail but it is worth noting here that the pattern of cultural grant aid was reinforced by the practice of routinely inviting the applicants of the previous year to reapply by sending them application forms at the beginning of the new financial year. Much of the Sub-committee's money under this vote would therefore be committed by the beginning of the financial year, leaving little scope to introduce new applicants.

The criteria employed by the Sub-committee in deciding on grant aid applications were described by the responsible officer in the following terms.

They had to provide a balance sheet to show they were a viable organisation The Committee took the line that they would provide assistance where it was necessary for the continued existence of a voluntary organisation that was providing facilities and benefits to the community at large. They took the line that this assistance should normally be in the form of loss guarantees rather than direct grant aid support, and that an organisation should do all in its power to stand on its own two feet.

(Officer H)

The criteria to some degree militated against applications from newly formed cultural groups which could not provide the previous year's audited accounts and found it harder to demonstrate that they were 'viable'. Even when these barriers could be overcome there was the additional difficulty of competing with existing beneficiaries. If the application was received in the middle of the financial year the budget would invariably be largely committed. However despite these difficulties, the officer responsible for administering this form of grant aid argued that there was some evidence of a growing number of small grants going to ethnic cultural organisations and community arts groups. At the same time some traditional grant aid recipients were going out of existence.

In summary then, the picture that emerges of the generating and processing of grant applications from the evidence of the interviews complements the accounts of local politicians, and is one of a mixture of approaches. Professional control over the implementation of grant aid policy in respect of sport and children's play, would seem to conform to the characterisation of public sector professionals as

'gatekeepers', controlling access to relatively small scale resources. In the case of cultural grant aid, 'tradition', both in terms of organisations previously supported and the practices associated with fostering grant applications, means that competition from 'new' applicants only takes place at the margin, and any change in patterns of grant aid under this system is likely to be incremental. Finally the urban programme in the manner in which it was administered during the period of study, might most clearly be characterised as corporatist, with 'acceptable', 'establishment' voluntary sector organisations being incorporated into the process of grant allocation, and being required to undertake some of the work associated with the urban programme process. None of these systems of grant aid would appear to conform to a pluralist or neo-pluralist account of consumption politics in the local state and yet state support for leisure through grant aid, one of the 'purest' forms of collective consumption (Dunleavy 1979), is an area in which one would perhaps expect to find the clearest evidence of pluralism in operation.

(e) Establishing the Annual Revenue Budget

The budgetary process in local government has become more fraught in the period since 1976 when spending limits were first introduced. Since that period it is claimed budgets have become increasingly 'resource led' (Greenwood 1980). The resource led budgetary process involves decisions about the level of service being made on the basis of the amount of money likely to be made available, rather than the service led budgetary process, which seeks to establish what the desirable level of service should be and then sets the budget to achieve that level. There is some evidence from the officer interviews that such a change has been experienced in the authority under study. The process adopted up to the late 1970's it is claimed, was one of service planning, service led budgeting.

At one time it used to be fairly thorough. We would examine whether this or that was necessary to carry on. Were there any growth items? Find areas where savings could be made. The last few years it has been a purely administrative exercise of what savings could be made. There are guidelines given on what savings have to be made.... that is the biggest turn off to officers where you've got no potential for growth. You can't even shift

resources unless we do it ourselves and not tell anybody.

(Officer D)

Whereas corporate management in local government failed to live up to the expectations of Bains (1972) during the post-reorganisation period after 1974 (viz. Haynes 1980), the financial situation and the accompanying resource led budgetary approach would seem to have been successful in fostering central control, exercised largely by Finance Departments, over spending departments (Elcock 1986). This involvement of finance officers in the operation of service departments is seen by some service officers as an unwarranted intrusion.

I think that other officers do that [go beyond their role] more than members. The 'centralists', Personnel, Finance, they go beyond their role. They don't allow managers to manage enough. Instead of being told they have to make a lump sum saving of say, £50,000 on staff posts, they tell us what areas we are going to make it from. As far as I'm concerned that's our job. We'll say where we're going to make the savings

(Officer B)

As Dunleavy (1980) points out there is a tension between 'managerialism' on the part of financial controllers, and 'service development' on the part of those responsible for service delivery.

Greenwood (1977) predicted in the period immediately after the International Monetary Fund loan to central government, that spending limits would undermine the incrementalist pattern of local government budgetary development (Danziger 1978). However in this study, officers maintained that though the size of the service budget was being seriously affected by spending limits, its 'shape', the kind of services the money was actually being spent on, was still largely influenced by the base budget of previous years. Typical of this kind of comment was the following.

Probably the crucial element there was the setting up of the budget in 1974. That still largely dictates what we have now.

(Officer E)

The location of the leisure divisions within the Education Directorate was seen by a number of officers to impair the ability of those divisions to struggle for resources.

Our perception is that there are parts of the Education Directorate proper, which have been protected ... It is because there is a greater professionalism in the education service. Teachers in particular are good at knobbling councillors and making emotive points about children suffering ... which have some truth but are overplayed to the point of ridiculousness. There are a number of influential politicians ... who protect the colleges.

((Officer F))

The leisure divisions are seen as losing out in the processing of budgets by officer groups (prior to submission to members) at Education Directorate level. The Directorate Management Team is dominated by officers with a strong professional commitment to mainstream education service.

Within the 'education' part of Education they still operate in the way we used to operate in that they put in growth items that are accepted. They're ... still moving towards more investment in some areas. We've been totally ignored in that as a non-education Division.

((Officer D))

Nor is it the case that politicians serving on the Leisure Services Sub-committee are seen as promoting leisure interests.

Noone could really argue that the Leisure Services Sub-committee is one of the more powerful committees on the council. Even the other sub-committees are more powerful. And the people on it, particularly the Tory side are quite weak really compared with the Labour side. The Labour side are quite good, but that doesn't help.

((Officer G))

Elcock, in his interim review of a study of local authority budgeting in times of financial stringency, argues that in terms of political influence on the construction of budgets,

The most significant variable here is political marginality. If a local authority changes hands frequently, or has no party in overall control, members' influence is likely to be greater than in authorities where one party holds a majority, especially where that party has held control for a long time.

(Elcock 1986:p. 10)

Given the recent record of changing political control of the authority under study, it is to be expected that greater member influence will be experienced by officers. The evidence from member and officer interviews tends to support this contention, with members becoming involved at three critical stages. The first of these is in setting the overall parameters for the level of spending, indicating what rate rise will be acceptable given the amount of block grant to be received. The second of these is in allocation of a particular level of finance to individual committees, which in recent times has generally meant indicating the type of cut each committee would have to handle.

The politicians, they decide where the growth is going to be and where the cuts are going to take place.... then it's handed down to the Divisions and you decide what you are going to cut.

(Officer L)

The process can be contrasted with that adopted in the years immediately post-reorganisation, when department bids were submitted and members reacted to these assessments of spending requirements for each service. Member involvement here is more proactive.

The third level at which member involvement is evident is in the detailed scrutiny of individual department bids. As Elcock notes, power is often concentrated in the hands of a few members because "the others are not interested in the relatively rarified world of budgetary strategy" (Elcock 1986: p.12). In fact in this case study, this could boil down to one interested and able member having sufficient influence to carry the budget within his own Group.

In the past what used to happen is that the [budget] was worked up by the officer team and passed on to the Group for approval or whatever. But it tended to be done and dusted by the time it went to members.... All ours this year went to [the Chairman of Education] one councillor. He then presented his budget to the full Tory Group ... and over two Saturdays got his budget through. We have gone over to one councillor controlling budgets

(Officer D)

Conclusions from the Sample Policy Decisions

Before drawing any tentative conclusions on the basis of these five policy decisions, the exploratory nature of the interviews undertaken should be reemphasised. No attempt was made to provide comprehensive coverage of the officers involved in leisure policy development and implementation generally, or in the five sample decisions which were the subject of specific questions. Nevertheless some interesting data emerge which are relevant, and suggestive of hypotheses concerning issues of power and influence in leisure policy decision-making. These insider accounts of policy decisions provide insights into officer perceptions of the influences mediating policy decisions, and each of the decisions reviewed through the evidence of some of the actors involved highlights issues which are worth further exploration.

(i) The city theatre project and the race action plan for the Recreation Division demonstrate the influence of a key group of middle management officers who are seen as exerting considerable influence over policy development within the Division across a wide range of policy issues. These individuals are located physically at the Division's headquarters (whereas many staff are located in outlying leisure facilities) and are also located

strategically at the centre of the organisation, being members of the Research Section, or Divisional Management Team.

There does seem to be a core group of officers within this Division that do everything.

(Officer D)

There is a group of people in this Division who have always worked well as a group, and really we've determined different policies within the Division.

(Officer E)

The Chief Officer is very influential for two reasons. One reason is he is a good ideas man. The other reason is he's got a good senior group of officers with lots of enthusiasm and influence. These senior officers in Recreation have a lot more commitment to the job than officers in a lot of other directorates.

(Officer B)

The point was made earlier in this study that an explanation of the changes which local government is currently experiencing conforms to the explanatory framework of contingency theory, with the traditional hierarchical, bureaucratic organisational structure and processes of local government proving unsuitable to the volatile political, social and economic environments in which it is operating. However such an account neglects the explanation of the role of human agency in interpreting the environment and generating new forms of organisational response to changed circumstances. Child (1972) cites Cyert and March's (1963) concept of the 'dominant coalition' as a useful vehicle for making sense of the nature of policy influence and change in organisations. The purpose of employing this concept is primarily to distinguish those who initiate rather than respond to strategic change within organisations.

The dominant coalition concept opens up a view of organizational structures in relation to the distribution of power and the process

of strategic decision-making which these reflect ... The dominant coalition concept draws attention to the question of who is making the choice. It thus provides a useful antidote to the sociologically unsatisfactory notion that a given organizational structure can be understood in relation to the functional imperative of 'system needs' which somehow transcend the objectives of any group of organizational members.

(Child 1972: p. 14)

Child cites three caveats about the application of the concept of the dominant coalition. The first is that its members will not necessarily be formally designated as senior post holders at the top of the hierarchy. The second is that there may be circumstances in which there is more than one dominant coalition. Finally others also have power in filtering information to the dominant coalition. To these we should add a further caveat which is that membership of competing coalitions may be overlapping, in that individuals may belong to more than one coalition.

The group of officers identified does not of itself however constitute the Recreation Division's dominant coalition, since although it may be the source of some policy innovations its role is also one of developing the policy ideas of others, particularly those initiated or promoted by the chief officer. The relationship between the policy group and the chief officer thus might be said to be symbiotic, with both the policy group and the chief officer able to initiate discussion of new policy directions, but with both parties also able to make it difficult for the other to progress policy options. The chief officer may refuse to put the item on the policy agenda, while members of the policy group may, consciously or otherwise, underperform in undertaking the necessary preparatory work of research and report writing for a policy in which they have no conviction. In themselves these are not insuperable barriers. There are other ways of getting items on the political agenda than through the chief officer (as the race action plan item illustrates) just as there are also other ways open to a chief officer for having research undertaken and reports prepared. However the chances of policy developments being successfully promoted are obviously increased

where these two groups work in tandem. Their chances of success in promoting policy change of a major kind, such as the theatre project or the race action plan) are greatly enhanced when they are in tune with the thinking of the more powerful politicians.

We noted in the previous chapter that for many members, particularly back bench traditionalists, the chief officer was the primary influence on the development of policy in the Recreation Division. Our discussion of officer membership of the dominant coalition reveals this to be only partially true, with the chief officer perhaps presenting the public face of policy innovation developed primarily by the policy group. However, with the exception of those political aspirants, and new prominent Labour members on the Leisure Services Sub-committee, member involvement in leisure policy development was minimal. This was the conclusion drawn from member explanations, and it was also clearly the perception of officers in all three leisure divisions.

When you try to name members on Leisure Services Sub-committee who are influential in developing leisure policy, we don't have any except one-offs like [the Labour Spokesman].

(Officer B)

Since also for the period of the research turnover in membership of the Sub-committee for new prominent and political aspirant Labour members was relatively high, they can perhaps at best be regarded as transient members of the dominant coalition within the recreation policy field.

It is important to distinguish between the dominant coalition for the recreation field and that for the field of local authority policy per se. It would seem likely that the senior members of the Chief Officers Management Team, particularly the Chief Executive, members of the Policy Unit, and the dominant members of the Council's Management Committee would be the primary sources for membership of the dominant coalition for the organisation as a whole. However, the theatre project also illustrates how by seeking alliance through the Chief Executive with the key members of the Management

Committee (who constitute the Management Special Sub-committee) and also by 'lobbying' those members, the recreation group was able to overcome opposition from senior officers and members. The new prominent members formally established the officer role of 'policy adviser to political groups', in part, as a means of enhancing their information base and thereby their influence to counteract the traditional power of officer groups like the Chief Officers Management Team. It would seem therefore that this new type of councillor would be more responsive to policy initiatives developed outwith formal hierarchical structures, than their more traditionalist forerunners.

(ii) The comments about the race action plan by one of the operational managers (who was incidentally sympathetic to the proposals it contained) remind us that policy outcomes are not necessarily dictated by developing new policy statements, when he argued that the race action plan may well not be implemented because many of those responsible for implementation felt that the policy was being imposed on them without consultation.

(iii) Consideration of both the theatre project and the budgetary process illustrate the tensions between, and the respective strengths of some of the service professions operating within local government.

(iv) The sports development centre project illustrates the potential for policy to be shaped by those concerned with drawing up detailed operational specifications, which will for example inform the selection of personnel for management of the facility.

(v) Finally the grant aid schemes illustrate the difficulty of promoting a pluralist account of the operation of consumption policies at the local level. The relationship between the local authority and the voluntary sector varies across grant aiding schemes according to the purpose of such schemes.

6.4.5 The Role of Leisure Quangos in Local Authority Leisure Policy

Officers were asked during the interviews to what extent, and in what ways, the Sports Council, the Arts Council or their regional counterparts exerted influence on local authority leisure policy. The information obtained was once again of course, partial, not simply because of the size of sample interviewed but also because no officers were interviewed from those other organisations. Nevertheless it is interesting to note the differences reported between the nature of the relationship of the local authority leisure divisions with the regional arts and sports bodies.

In the case of the Sports Council and the Regional Council for Sport and Recreation, officers were unanimous in claiming that their influence was negligible.

I mean we read the documents and find things out, and we benefit from the things they do now and again, but I would say that the influence the national and regional Sports Council has had here is minimal.

(Officer E)

Certainly the Sports Council used to [exert influence] because at one stage it was the most informed group, better informed about leisure facilities than local authorities. But that has been changed and certainly ... the Met Districts are as well, if not better informed than the Sports Council. I think the Sports Council's role has changed. In the shire districts where there are no recreation departments they need help and I think the Sports Council officers probably spend more time now with those districts and with clubs and voluntary organisations.

(Officer L)

In terms of the effects of Sports Council policy advice or grant aid, officers argued that this did not significantly shape local policy.

In relation to the decision-making process.... I don't think we consider the Sports Council at all ... If there was anything worth referring to and it would help our case [with members] we would use it, and if we were doing

anything that attracted grant we'd apply.

(Officer K)

Of the officers interviewed only one had served formally on a committee or sub-committee of the Regional Council for Sport and Recreation.

The relationship of officers in the local authority to the Regional Arts Association was in marked contrast to that with the Regional Council for Sport and Recreation. The Arts and Museums Officer for example, apart from serving on a key grant aiding panel of the RAA, was chairman of the board of the major grant recipient of the Visual Arts Panel in the region (which lay some way outside the District) and also served on the board of another major grant recipient. Furthermore since the publication of *The Glory of the Garden* (Arts Council 1984), increasingly Arts Council grant aid to the local authority was channelled through the RAA.

They do [influence policy] if we are applying for grant aid for say an exhibition If we are looking for money they would have influence, though I don't think they'd interfere.

(Officer C)

The Arts and Museums Officer also pointed out that he knew a number of those involved in the RAA on a personal basis, and officers of the RAA obviously met local authority personnel at cultural events on a formal and informal basis. This would therefore seem to be at least one way in which professional networks are sustained among the region's professional arts administrators. The potential for the development of shared policy values to which Dunleavy (1982) points is perhaps greater therefore in the arts than in the area of sport and recreation where contact across the local authority-leisure quango line is rather more limited.

... 6.4.6 Affiliation to Professional Bodies and Professional Qualifications, and Links with Voluntary Sector Organisations

The strength of identification of individuals with their professional groups in local government may in part be serviced through their membership of professional

associations. Of the three leisure divisions professional affiliations are perhaps most straightforward in the Library service which has a single, unified professional qualification giving the status of Chartered Librarian, administered by a single professional association. As one of the officers argued,

I think libraries are different from the other leisure services in that we have a sort of commonality in that we are professional with a small 'p'. There is more in common with me and say a librarian in the United States, than there is with somebody working in City Hall, there is a sort of common thread running throughout. So you tend to think "Well, I'm here to run the library service, these members get in the way" ... but obviously they're crucial.

(Officer G)

This officer went on to qualify his remarks by arguing that members took his recommendations too unquestioningly and that he would like to adopt a closer form of partnership with members in policy development. Nevertheless the link between professional identity and influence with members in decision-making is not accidental.

The situation in arts administration is somewhat different with a range of professional organisations serving sub-specialisms in the museums and arts fields. Of the two officers interviewed from the Arts and Museums Division, one was primarily concerned with administrative tasks which (with the exception of grants administration) were not necessarily specific to the arts, and he was professionally qualified in the field of administration. The chief officer however was a professional member of the Museums Association, a committee member of the Art Galleries Association, and a fellow of the Royal College of Arts, and in addition was a graduate in the history of art. In terms of professional standing in his own field this officer was very well qualified.

In the Recreation Division however the pattern of professional affiliation was very different. Only three of the officers interviewed were current members of the Institute of Leisure and Amenity Management, though one had been a member but had allowed his membership to lapse because he could not see any worthwhile benefits

to membership. Of those three, one was also a member of the Institute of Baths and Recreation Management, one a member of the Chief Leisure Officers Association, and one a member of the Leisure Studies Association. Only two of those interviewed had undertaken any formal professional training, other than in-house short courses, in the recreation management field, one officer having gained a post-graduate degree, the other the diploma of the IBRM. Indeed one of the officers, a graduate, adopted an anti-professional stance, claiming that,

I am not a member of any professional association, I have always avoided that sort of thing.

(Officer D)

Five of the seven officers interviewed in this Division were graduates. Four interviewees had qualified as teachers (three in physical education) before gaining employment in the recreation field. Of the remaining three officers interviewed, one had begun his career in the local government recreation field immediately following his university career, while the other two had backgrounds and qualifications in the personnel management field before taking up posts in the policy and operational management areas of the Division.

Given this comparative lack of specialist professional training and the attendant 'legitimation' of specialist expertise in the recreation field, it is perhaps unsurprising that the advice of the chief recreation officer is seen as more questionable by some members. As the Libraries chief officer pointed out,

I think there has always been that sort of feeling in the Directorate that the library service is over there, let them get on with it and we go to members occasionally. It is very significant that I have very little going to the Leisure Services agenda, [the Chief Recreation Officer] has quite a lot, [the Arts and Museums Officer] very little either.

INTERVIEWER: Do members usually accept your advice or do they tend to question it?

In all fairness they do. This has worried me a little. They do seem to accept it. I've heard one of them (a Tory) say "Oh well, if [the Chief Librarian] says it's alright, it's alright", honestly! ... I think they trust me, especially on the Labour side, which I don't think they do with [the Chief Recreation Officer].

(Officer G)

In developing leisure policies it may well be the case then, that recreation (as opposed to the Library and Arts and Museums services) has a credibility problem, in that it lacks the legitimization of a traditional service and a strongly professionalised occupational identity.

In reviewing links between officers and the voluntary sector, essentially four types of relationship emerge. The first is that of *the ex officio member*, where an officer is invited to join the executive of a voluntary organisation to represent the local authority. Normally this involves chief officers and in this sample there were two such examples. The chief officer for the Arts and Museums Division represented the local authority on the board of a government-funded museum which received some financial support from the local authority, while the Chief Recreation Officer was a director of the local football league club for which the authority had also provided some financial support. Other examples beyond the chief officers existed where for example the officer responsible for community recreation served on the executive of the local Leisure Association for the Disabled, the establishment of which resulted from his initiatives.

The second type of role or relationship was that of *unofficial representative of the local authority*, where individuals had been drawn into working on the executives or committees of organisations because of their involvement with them as one of the major points of contact between the authority and the organisation. One officer who had previously worked in the Social Services Directorate and was now responsible for Unemployment Services continued to serve on the executive of the Family Services Unit, while the officer responsible for community recreation served on the executive of the local Children's Play Association. These organisations were predominantly, but not exclusively, peak voluntary organisations (that is those which represent the collective interests of other voluntary

organisations). In some instances however officers had adopted semi-official roles with smaller, first order organisations. Again, the officer responsible for community recreation provides an example, in serving on the executives of an Asian football club, and a Break Dance Group.

The third type of role adopted by officers in voluntary organisations is that of *committee member with specialist expertise*. This role was undertaken by officers in organisations which they had joined out of personal rather than predominantly professional interest, but in which they had taken on duties for which their role in the local authority rendered them particularly suitable. One sports centre manager was for example a member of his district Round Table executive and had taken on the responsibilities of Sport and Recreation Organiser. Another officer who was a qualified accountant, and who had responsibility for administering the Urban Programme, had joined a local community association and shortly afterwards become Treasurer of the association which received a considerable amount of its funding from the local authority (though not through urban aid). Of the small sample interviewed less than four individuals mentioned roles of this type.

Most officers were simply *recreational members* of the voluntary organisations to which they belonged. In some instances, this involved membership of organisations whose activities were directly related to the work interests of the individual officer. For example, the officer responsible for cultural grant aid was a member of a local music society. In other cases the organisation had been selected by the officer, because either the activity itself, or the geographical catchment of the voluntary organisation, did not allow overlap with the officer's responsibilities at work.

These then were the major forms of membership role of officers, but this is of course only one element in explaining the relationship between the local authority and the voluntary sector. The following chapter, which develops an analysis of local authority grant aid, will therefore return to this theme.

6.4.7 EXPLANATIONS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT POLICY

In the analysis of members' explanations of the causes of unemployment responses

were grouped within four categories, with explanations founded in 'the crisis of capitalism', 'central government economic policy', 'historic underinvestment, disinvestment and / or the effects of new technology', and 'trades union practices and wage costs'. In order to provide a direct point of comparison between the frameworks of explanation and understanding employed by members and some officers, officers were also asked to indicate what they saw as the major causes of unemployment in the district. With only three exceptions answers fell into the third category of explanation. Two officers in the Recreation Division mentioned government economic policy as a key factor, though none of those interviewed made any reference to accounts which see unemployment as an inevitable feature of late capitalism. Only one officer explained the high level of local unemployment in terms of problems with the nature of the workforce, as opposed to the system within which the workforce operated.

One major cause is changing markets and changing industrial patterns locally, assisted by a lack of flexibility, and understandable lack of flexibility by people on the job market.

(Officer C)

Given that Labour members' explanations fell predominantly into the first two categories cited, the sample would seem on this issue to reflect the majority, 'moderate' analyses promoted by Conservative and Liberal councillors.

Officer explanations of the role of local authority policy in addressing difficulties associated with unemployment reflected the authority's formal adoption of a threefold approach of, promoting employment opportunities, job and work sharing, and alleviation of the social and psychological effects of unemployment. There was however no consensus on the role of leisure policy within this context, either within or across divisions. Two officers argued that the provision of leisure opportunities is at best marginal, and for many wholly unrelated to their real requirements, and indeed the Unemployment Services Officer had, following the earlier experience of the authority, become opposed in principle to the establishment of centres against unemployment which provided only or predominantly leisure opportunities for the unemployed.

So our initiatives to combat the effects of unemployment initially focussed on leisure, but we're now trying to move beyond leisure to something which I see as more constructive and more concerned with getting people either on a pathway which might lead to work, or might lead to college. But we must realise that even if we get everybody onto a pathway that leads to work there aren't enough jobs. But I do think that some of our centres with leisure activities, they've become centres of despair rather than centres of activity.

(Officer N)

This officer went on to argue that it would be better for the local authority to invest in providing subsidised work opportunities than to spend money on leisure in the centres against unemployment.

If this horticultural nursery ... never becomes self financing, that won't unduly worry me. We would be willing to subsidise that permanently, and I'd rather subsidise that kind of outfit than a drop-in centre where merely (and I use the word 'merely' advisedly) merely they are playing pool and drinking cups of tea. Some of these centres have understandably become very inward looking, not attracted a wide range of unemployed people. I am not trying in any way to blame anybody for this. It was a brave attempt but they don't appear to provide people with any inspiration.

(Officer N)

Furthermore there was considerable cynicism expressed by facility managers about the effectiveness of the system of concessionary rates for unemployed people (which involved the issuing of membership cards by centres against unemployment). In contrast to the Unemployment Services Officer however, the problem was seen here, not as one of pursuing an inappropriate policy, but rather one of difficulty in implementation.

we have the CAU card system which is an absurd joke. It needs completely rejigging. ... The major problem we have with the unemployed is our image.... There are certain facilities the unemployed find it difficult to walk into, show their UB 40 or card and say "I am unemployed". ... So we've quite a job

to do in terms of eliminating the threshold problems of the unemployed. Image is a big problem.

(Officer K)

Two officers also cited the need for policy to contribute to the changing of societal values in relation to work and leisure, though they were not specific about how this might be achieved.

Where Leisure Services can contribute is in the longer term changing of people's attitudes to work and unemployment. It's not just leisure, it goes beyond into schools. Changing people's attitudes from life being justified by a job to life being justified by life and trying to get away from the view that life is worthless without a job. We need to be influencing the curriculum so that what we have to offer in the leisure services is recognised as valuable by kids.

(Officer C)

In summary then, though officers in the leisure divisions generally saw leisure services potentially playing a significant role in alleviating some of the social problems of some unemployed people they either did not specify how such contributions should be made or were simply cynical about existing policy. Furthermore, the officer with primary responsibility for services for the unemployed saw a relatively insignificant role for public sector leisure services in this sector.

There was however, one project which operated at the Sports Development Centre, and which was described as having successfully met some of the needs of the unemployed people. This was a scheme to provide football coaching skills for unemployed people. Funding to run the courses was initially made available from the EEC Social Fund, but the scheme was subsequently discontinued when this funding was no longer available.

I think people are far more likely to enjoy themselves in sport actually working as sports leaders or coaches back in their own communities with either kids, elderly or whatever. They may not get paid at all or may not get

paid very much, but its giving people the same kinds of values and experiences they got from work but it's in the field of leisure. And talking to people who've done the course and gone back to their communities or sports centre, they've found it very rewarding to feel they can contribute.

On the ... project 90% of those on the course got jobs. It did a lot for their confidence. They could go to employers and say "Look, I've not just been sitting around. ... A lot of the people on the course were Asian or West Indian. I think the Division should have said "That is an excellent course, we should take it on and fund it".

(Officer I)

Here the emphasis seems to be less on leisure than on service to the community. The conclusion would seem to be that unemployed people can enhance their self esteem through voluntary 'work', whether that be in the leisure field or in some other aspect of service to the community.

6.5 CONCLUSIONS

In the same way as local politicians within a single party group cannot be characterised as a homogeneous group, it is to be expected that groups of officers, even within a single service area or at similar levels in the formal hierarchy, will manifest important differences. Identifying the dimensions of such differences will be one important element in advancing understanding of the role of professionals in the leisure policy process. Although the data in this chapter is generated from a small sample of interviews, it nevertheless suggests some useful ways of conceptualising the nature of different forms of officer involvement in, or approaches to, leisure policy.

The first dimension along which professionals' approaches to policy development were categorised was in their approach to the identification of 'leisure needs'. The leisure services field is in the process of pursuing classic professionalization strategies² at a point in time when the concept of the 'professional' is under intense scrutiny (Goodale and Witt 1982). Members of some

liberal welfare occupations, such as community work, have rejected the label and status of 'profession' in part because they see a conflict between the traditional notion of the professional as expert and the goal of fostering community self determination (Thomas 1986). It is perhaps no coincidence that the 'client centred' or 'corporatist' analyses of needs were advanced by staff working in relatively new service areas, attempting to reach relatively difficult target groups (community recreation, Urban Programme, and unemployment services), while those working in traditional service areas (facility management and departmental administration) tended to promote concepts of need, derived from expert analysis.

The relationship of officers with members is to some extent bound up with the issue of professionalism, in that the characterisation of professionals as experts tends to cast clients and politicians in a dependent role. Those who advocated client centred or corporatist analyses of 'need' were certainly willing to accept (and in some cases enthusiastically embraced) a more proactive role on the part of politicians. Nevertheless, some of those who promoted traditional explanations of professionally defined 'need' also attached importance to the exploring of new approaches to officer-member relations.

There were important differences between officers in the way that they viewed developments in the leisure service. One direction for service development which was anticipated was *retrenchment*, perhaps with an attendant emphasis on fostering *voluntarism*, replacing public sector services where possible with self help approaches. A different but related emphasis was placed on *community development* initiatives, which advocated self help not as a response to cuts but as a positive goal in its own right. A further direction for public sector leisure services which was referred to in the interviews was that of *entrepreneurship*, which took the form not simply of off-setting subsidy on leisure services by marketing trading services more vigorously, but also meant the consideration of plans for the authority to promote economic development through leisure services, or even the manufacturing of leisure goods. These directions are not necessarily mutually incompatible, but each requires of the leisure professional a different set of skills, and some of these options are likely to be unacceptable to particular groups of politicians. This theme is developed further in the discussion of

leisure policy orientations and their relationship to local government structures in the final chapter.

A further feature highlighted in the interviews is the existence of networks of influence which operate within an organisation relatively independently of the formal, hierarchical structure. This, of course is no new phenomenon, such informal structures can be identified in virtually any complex organisation. What is significant about this feature is the *way* in which an informal group such as this exerts influence. As we have noted, the power relationships which exist between the formal leadership in the administration (the chief officer, and perhaps members of a management team) and the informal group of policy influentials are a function of the access of those parties to the resources required to exert pressure for the achievement of desired goals. The resources of the formal hierarchy consist largely of the authority vested in those in positions of responsibility, and include the ability to impose sanctions on those members of a department who do not conform to 'required standards of behaviour'. The resources of the informal group of policy influentials include access to strategic intelligence concerning the operation of the service (because they included officers with responsibility for research and information), and access to key politicians who can place pressure on the formal leaders of the administration. The resources of these two officer groups may be deployed to achieve shared goals (as in the case of the theatre project), or can be deployed antagonistically to achieve competing goals (as in the case of the race action plan). These groups are likely, however, to be most influential in achieving the adoption of particular policies when they are working in tandem and have forged alliances on that issue with either the formal political leadership (predominantly the party group leaders) or the informal political influentials (the 'political aspirants' or 'new prominent' members) of the authority. However as the following chapter emphasises, the adoption of policy statements or policy intentions should be differentiated from policy implementation and policy outcomes.

Chapter 6 - Notes

¹ The comments of officers relating to 'investigative approaches' to the analysis of leisure needs are similar to those reported in Henry and Marriott (1982) who report an analysis of leisure planning approaches adopted in a sample of English local authorities. These comments would appear to relate implicitly however to *positivist* approaches to such analysis in the context of this case study.

² Classic professionalization strategies include the establishing of a single, unified professional body (such as the Institute of Leisure and Amenity Management), the pursuit of graduate level professional certification, the defining of core skills, the distinguishing of tasks of 'conception' (of appropriate policy goals) as the preserve of the professional and of 'execution' (carrying out routine tasks as directed) as the role of the non-professional etc. There are a number of contributions in the collection edited by Goodale and Witt (1980) which discuss the problematic nature of professionalization in the leisure field.

Chapter 7: Local Authority Interaction with Voluntary Sector Organisations: Analysing the Outcomes of Grant Aid Policy

7.1 INTRODUCTION.

The focus of research activity in the case study reported in the two previous chapters has been analysis of the 'assumptive worlds' and the explanations of policy outcomes of key actors in the policy process. These concerns, though they generate interesting insights into the construction of local government leisure policy, fall short of a comprehensive analysis of the influences on policy outcomes in two critical ways. Firstly, they fail to consider the role of interest groups external to the local government organisational framework itself, and secondly they fail to consider the link between actors' values or policy intentions and the actual outcomes of the policy process. The concerns of this chapter are intended to explore the relationship between policy intentions and outcomes, and the articulation of the local authority with voluntary sector leisure organisations in a specific policy context, that of the granting of financial aid.

Following members' and officers' accounts in previous chapters of the policy process in deciding how grant aid to voluntary sector leisure organisations should be disbursed, the aims of this element of the study are to identify and classify organisations which were successful and those which were unsuccessful in applications for grant aid over the period 1981-4, and to consider whether the formal criteria for grant allocation, nominated by officers and / or members, were the best 'predictors' of policy outcomes. Some significant limitations in this approach to the study of policy outcomes and of interaction with the voluntary sector should however be noted. Grant aid represents only one area in which interaction with the voluntary sector takes place, and policy over a wide range of issues involves negotiation and perhaps cooperation with interest groups in the leisure field. The picture of interaction with the voluntary sector established here will therefore of necessity be partial, since it relates solely to patterns of

grant aid. To illustrate the point, given the real costs of providing facilities for say indoor sport, or outdoor pitches, the level of subsidy and support by the local authority for groups which make use of those facilities will often be far greater than that accorded to grant applicants who own their own, or hire facilities at commercial rates.

A second important limitation of this element of the study is that it considers only those organisations which have made contact with the authority and applied for grant aid. It fails to consider therefore the great majority of voluntary sector leisure organisations which have not sought financial assistance. The decision not to include in the study a sub-sample of non-applicants was taken on the basis of the anticipated time and research effort required to generate a sufficiently representative sample to draw some meaningful comparisons with the population of grant applicants (viz. Hoggett and Bishop's (1986) account of the difficulties of identifying a representative sample for one area alone in each of two local authorities). Thus, establishing why organisations *do not* approach the local authority for assistance, and what happens to those organisations which are in financial need and which fail to apply, are important issues for those concerned with this area of policy, but which require more extended treatment than can be given in the present study.

7.2 LEISURE, THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

While the leisure studies field has burgeoned in the last decade, relatively little research has been directed at understanding the nature and operation of voluntary organisations. Hoggett and Bishop (1986) for example, conclude that while the leisure studies literature pays scant attention to the voluntary sector, the material relating to voluntary organisations has little to say about leisure issues. There are however a number of studies of relevance to the concerns of this chapter, and these include material relating to the membership and 'representativeness' of voluntary organisations, the relationships of voluntary groups with local government, the influence of voluntary organisations on local government leisure policy, and analyses of grant aid policy.

**Chapter 7: Local Authority Interaction with Voluntary Sector Organisations:
Analysing the Outcomes of Grant Aid Policy.**

A recurring theme in the studies of voluntary organisations has been the significance of social class in relation to frequency of membership, frequency of membership of more than one voluntary organisation, and the holding of formal offices within such organisations. Such findings are consistently reported in for example Banbury in the 1950's and 1970's (Stacey 1954; Stacey et al. 1975), in London in the 1960's (Young and Wilmott 1975), in the general survey reported in Sillitoe (1969), in Swansea in the late 1970's (Hutson 1979) and in Hillingdon in the 1980's (Limb 1986). Studies of public participation in formal decision-making processes also point to lower levels of participation among lower socio-economic groups (Boaden et al. 1982). Factors explaining these phenomena are reviewed by Tomlinson (1979) who argues that 'social closure' mechanisms operate to reinforce a general tendency of individuals to form socially homogenous groups, and that key skills learned through occupational experience may provide the professional and managerial workforce with the confidence and abilities to carry out the work of office holders. He also argues that there is likely to be less need for working class groups to formalise their social networks.

Working class collectivities based on shared community in terms both of environment and interests preclude the need for formally constructed voluntary associations.

(Tomlinson 1979: p. 10)

Tomlinson also points out that survey data generally shows female membership of voluntary organisations to be significantly lower than that of their male counterparts, though "it is very likely that much corporate action by women ... has been 'hidden from history' "(p. 14). Hoggett and Bishop (1986) similarly note a tendency for women's leisure groups to operate as 'instruction classes' in a given leisure activity rather than through the formal organisational structures of the sports club or the hobby society. One might suggest reasons for this based on women's concerns about the legitimacy of spending time outside the family in a club (where the rationale may simply be one of enjoyment of the activity) as opposed to that of a formal class with an instructor (where the rationale may be one of 'improving skills' and where there is a regular, and perhaps financial commitment in terms of pre-paid fees). Furthermore Hoggett and Bishop also note the relatively low level of voluntary sector activity in inner city Leicester when

compared with the area of Kingswood on the outskirts of Bristol incorporated in their study. This may be a function of the different class and ethnic constituencies represented here and may also reflect the relative lack of access to financial and other resources in the inner city. However, regardless of the reasons for these patterns of membership relating to class, gender or other factors, the important point to emphasise in this context is that the voluntary sector should not be seen as reflecting interests evenly throughout the social structure, if only because some sections of the community are systematically underrepresented. A vibrant and active voluntary sector should not be taken to be synonymous with, or representative of, a vibrant and active community.

Relationships between voluntary organisations and local governments have received attention in a number of case studies. Dearlove (1973) for example, differentiates voluntary organisations which are seen as 'helpful' by local authority officers or members (that is those which promote acceptable demands, usually for incremental or marginal change, and adopt acceptable modes of communicating those demands) from those which are seen as 'unhelpful' groups (making unacceptable demands, and / or adopting unpalatable tactics such as mass lobbying, and picketing or disrupting meetings). The former groups are likely to be more sympathetically treated when they approach the local authority and are also more likely to be consulted by the authority on relevant matters. Newton (1976) takes this argument a stage further in constructing an 'establishment index', an operational measure of an organisation's acceptance in local government circles. (see section 7.5.2 below). He then goes on to demonstrate that in Birmingham 'well established' organisations tended to have more regular contact with their local authority over a wider range of issues than their less 'established' counterparts. This is in part due to the fact that they tend to have clearer communication channels with the local authority, and in part because they anticipate that the local authority will be reasonably well disposed towards them, and that therefore attempts at communication are worth the effort. Cousins (1979) also identifies a range of voluntary organisations at Borough level in Bromley or at regional level in Greater London which operate with varying degrees of support and integration within the local government framework, while Limb (1986) describes the establishment of council working parties in Hillingdon which involved the incorporation of pressure groups into a quasi-official relationship with the local

authority. In each of these studies the relationship between the voluntary organisation and the local authority is mediated by the channels of communication between the two, and the proximity of the organisation's goals to those of local authority policy. It is not simply the case that voluntary organisations with goals which are consonant with those of the local authority are accorded an 'approved' status, but also, once recognised as a responsible organisation, they may be loth to threaten that status by putting forward unreasonable demands.

Coalter (1987) drawing on interviews with local authority members and officers, identifies three perspectives on the role of the voluntary sector in leisure provision. These are characterised as voluntarism, 'helping those who help themselves'; 'managerialism', where local authorities seek to minimise the costs of promoting leisure opportunities by avoiding direct provision and stimulating voluntary effort; and 'service development ideologies', which may reflect a scepticism about the effectiveness of voluntary sector provision or representativeness of membership. Limb (1986) identifies the motivation of officers and members in fostering the involvement of the voluntary sector in Hillingdon as reflecting a primarily managerialist concern to minimise costs, coupled in some instances with a wish to harness the energies of (or to 'defuse') pressure groups.

The studies of local authority - voluntary sector relationships discussed here are not concerned with investigating or explaining patterns of grant aid. Even Newton's (1976) wide-ranging study of voluntary activity in Birmingham is concerned only to explain levels of 'political activity', which he defines broadly as anything from simply approaching the local authority for information, to seeking a change in local government policy. Newton highlights the significance of a number of factors, the size of the organisation, its annual income, the existence of full-time employees, and the geographical area served, as significant in explaining rates of political activity, but is not concerned either to explain 'success' in dealing with local government generally, or the specifics of the operation of grant aid systems.

The Sports Council has produced and commissioned studies of its own grant aiding schemes in operation (Roberts 1979; Sports Council 1984). However these studies

were solely concerned with analysis of successful applicants and the pattern of grants actually awarded rather than with identifying the nature of organisations which successfully applied, or with explaining the differences between successful and unsuccessful applicants. Hoggett and Bishop (1986) do focus on some effects of grants by public bodies to voluntary organisations, and though they do not undertake a systematic review, their treatment does highlight a number of key issues, not the least of which is the negative attitude they detect within some organisations towards both local authorities in general and grant aid schemes in particular.

we have witnessed examples of impoverished groups being quite dogmatic about their unwillingness to approach the council for grants. Even where no strings are attached such groups may invent them, worry about them, or simply construe any relationship with a council as a lack of autonomy.

(Hoggett and Bishop 1986: p.53)

Indeed, their concern to support the 'assertive independence' of voluntary groups leads them to argue strongly for the reduced involvement of local authorities in what they see as the 'fragile' status of 'mutual aid leisure organisations' whose essential character may be undermined by the influence of both the commercial and public sectors.

7.3 PROBLEMS OF METHODOLOGY AND RELIABILITY OF DATA.

In the context of the local authority case study, the analysis reported here focuses on grants administered through the Leisure Services Sub-committee (i.e. grant aid programmes, for 'Sport and Recreation' and for 'Cultural Activities') and the 'Leisure Programme Area' of the Urban Programme. However it should be noted that the local authority operated a wide range of grant aid schemes within six directorates in addition to the Urban Programme. Leisure organisations in the voluntary sector therefore were not limited to grants administered by the Leisure Services Sub-committee. The Directorate of Social Services for example funded certain children's play schemes. The result of limiting the study to the three grant aiding programmes in question is perhaps to underemphasise the authority's

support for voluntary groups with 'secondary' leisure aims. For example, leisure groups such as youth clubs, community associations, town twinning groups were invariably supported through other grant aid programmes.

Information on grant aid applicants was collected in two principal ways, by analysis of the detailed information supplied on application forms and by telephone interviews with the secretary or chairperson of the organisation, and / or the contact person specified on the application form. The period selected for the analysis was the three financial years 1981-4, though in the case of the Urban Programme, the Leisure Programme Area was initiated in 1982-3 and therefore data for two financial years only were available. The following response rates were achieved for each of the categories discussed: Sport and Recreation Scheme 92% (n=117), the Cultural Grants Scheme 87% (n=39) and the Urban Programme 94% (n=58). The generally high response rates (especially for 1982-4) reflect the fact that contact was made with each of the organisations relatively quickly after their submission of application forms.

Before considering the analysis of grant aid applicants in detail some preliminary points about the validity of the methods adopted and the reliability of data should be emphasised. The use of telephone interviews together with analysis of application forms, even for obtaining relatively 'hard' data about the size, structure and history of a voluntary organisation is not wholly satisfactory. Officers of each of the organisations filled in the grant application forms with the expressed purpose of obtaining grant aid so that items like membership figures, where open to interpretation, might be cited in a way likely to maximise the possibilities of success (e.g. might be 'inflated' by one sports club by say including social and non-playing members in order to demonstrate the number of potential beneficiaries, and 'deflated' by another club which gives the numbers for playing members only because they wish to emphasise their low resource base). Similarly the age of organisations in some cases proved difficult to establish, though this was more likely to be a problem for older organisations. More problematic perhaps is the difficulty of establishing whether an organisation has been in receipt of a grant over the past five years, given

that turnover in personnel on the executive committees of organisations is likely to be higher than that experienced in the public or commercial sectors.

For the purposes of grant applications voluntary organisations were asked to submit a copy of their balance sheet for the previous financial year, so that what might reasonably be assumed to be a relatively accurate picture of the annual turnover of these organisations was available. However, some organisations were newly established and by definition were unable to submit accounts. Data relating to financial turnover for these organisations was therefore sought during interviews.

Perhaps the most significant limitation of the interview / application form analysis method, was the difficulty of establishing the 'process' through which the application had gone when submitted to the Council. It was intended that the telephone interview would identify the 'route' taken by each applicant in developing and submitting their application - in particular whether the organisation had approached a local government officer (chief officer or grants officer), or a councillor (Chairman, ward councillor, member of the Leisure Services Sub-committee or Leisure Programme Area Group), the action taken by the individuals contacted and so on. However, pretesting the questionnaire made it clear that even this limited information relating to the processing of the application could not be obtained from a significant proportion of the respondents. This was in large part due to the fact that 'contact officers' in the voluntary organisations nominated on the application forms were not necessarily those who had initiated the application or conducted initial negotiations with the local authority and even where this was not the case memory recall proved a problem. This item was therefore dropped from the interview schedule for the main study. No overall picture was obtained of how representatives of the organisations explained their perceptions of local authority structures and procedures, or of their subsequent behaviour in seeking grant aid.

In conducting interviews respondents were assured of the confidentiality of their responses, and were informed that their answers would not directly influence council policy specifically in relation to their own organisation. Despite these standard precautions taken to ensure the *veracity* of responses, the *precision* of

responses, where for example membership sizes or annual turnover have been estimated, gives grounds for some concern and should therefore be treated with some caution in the analysis of responses.

7.4 GRANT AID TO LEISURE ORGANISATIONS: POLICY STATEMENTS BY THE LEISURE SERVICES SUB-COMMITTEE AND IN THE URBAN PROGRAMME

7.4.1 Sport and Recreation Grant Aid.

During the final year of the period of study the Leisure Services Sub-committee received a report from the Chief Recreation Officer outlining the conditions under which grant aid was awarded. The report (whose principal author was the officer responsible for administering the scheme of grant aid for sports and recreation organisations) provides an indication of the *necessary* conditions of grant award, and describes or categorises the types of award made, rather than outlining the criteria used to *prioritise* one application over another (i.e. the sufficient conditions). The conditions of grant aid cited were as follows;

'that the organisation is a voluntary body operating on a non profit-making basis ... that membership is open to all and no application for membership to the organisation will be refused other than on reasonable grounds e.g. there will be no discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, occupation or other opinion[and] that a statement of accounts be forwarded to the Recreation Officer on completion of the project'

(Report to the Leisure Services Sub-committee 13 March 1984)

The report goes on to categorise the types of grant aid awarded under the following three broad headings

'seed money, i.e. assistance for newly formed organisations or existing organisations creating new teams or embarking on new activities
running costs i.e. assistance with the organisation's costs recurring annually e.g. fees and transport, travel and accommodation for

representative teams [and] the replacement or upgrading of equipment or facilities

Indeed these 'criteria' are so general that it becomes difficult to identify a project which would not fall into one or more of these three categories. It should however be noted that the officer responsible for this area of grant aid pointed out that the report had not specified the priority to be given to disadvantaged groups because this was implicitly understood by both officers and members.

The amounts of grant aid disbursed under this heading amounted to £3,665 in 1981/2, £6,433 in 1982/3 and £6,300 in 1983/4. With one exception total amounts allocated did not exceed £500, the exception being a grant of £1,000 to a gymnastics club as a contribution towards the cost of participating in a non-competitive gymnastics event in Switzerland. At a meeting of the Leisure Services Sub-committee in March 1984 it was agreed that responsibility and authority for grant aid allocation under this scheme be delegated to the Chief Recreation Officer who would apply the criteria outlined in the report (and cited above).

7.4.2 Grant Aid to Cultural Organisations

Though policy statements relating to the conditions associated with grant aid to sport and recreation organisations were vague, those relating to grants to cultural organisations were even less specific. The only references to the criteria for allocating grants in Council minutes offer the following guidelines; that grants should,

follow the general principle that aid shall normally be given where it is necessary for the continued existence of an approved organisation which adds to the cultural life of the community. Special consideration shall be given to those using Council premises, but in general aid shall be given in the form of loss guarantees.

(Report to the Leisure Services Sub-committee 19 July 1977)

and at a subsequent meeting,

that the loss guarantee be judged on each organisation's full accounts and that any donations to charity in the previous years be taken into consideration.

(Report to the Leisure Services Sub-committee 2 December 1980)

The criteria cited here beg the serious questions of what constitutes "an approved organisation" or one "which adds to the cultural life of the community". The reports do not attempt to define these terms and this might lead to the inference that either the criteria were not of sufficient importance to decision makers to warrant clarification as to what precisely these terms mean, or that there was sufficient commonality of values among decision makers about what constitutes 'the cultural life of the community' as to render the need for a more detailed explanation superfluous.

Grant aid under this scheme amounted to £40,140 in 1981/2, £42,675 in 1982/3, and £44,900 in 1983/4. Traditionally the vast majority of the budget was allocated to seven organisations or groups of organisations (approximately £40,000 in 1982/3 for example). Among these seven organisations were included two, the regional arts association and a regional opera company, which were not strictly voluntary organisations, although they were, by constitution or tradition, non-profit making. These have been included in the analysis of cultural grant aid under the heading 'quasi-voluntary organisations'.

7.4.3 The Leisure Programme Area of the Urban Programme.

The situation in relation to formal policy statements about grants under the Urban Programme was somewhat different from that for the previous two categories. Preparation of annual submissions to the Department of Environment for central government finance necessitated the publishing of criteria for prioritising grant applications. The District's Urban Programme submission incorporated a separate 'Leisure Programme Area' for the first time in 1982/3 when priorities were described in the following terms;

The ... strategy looked for projects which were geared towards the spare time in people's lives. In particular it looked for:

Projects which helped to remove barriers between communities and especially those in which one part of the community works to help others.

Projects which might include multi-purpose buildings for the Arts, sports, cultural/entertainment type activities.

Projects which might be novel - e.g. an idea based on a pub or club.

Projects which will satisfy local needs but which will attract prestigious events to a neighbourhood thus elevating the status of a deprived area.

Projects linked to modern technology, for example computer hardware for fun but at the same time giving people the opportunity to learn how to programme.

(Urban Programme submission 1982/3)

Criteria which were stipulated in the following year by the local authority included all five of the above, but added two further items to those listed;

projects which ... reflect the multi-cultural nature of [the City], particularly those which help to preserve the cultural heritage of an ethnic minority ...[and] which will enable ethnic minorities to share their culture with the remainder of the multi-cultural population of this City

(Urban Programme submission 1983/4)

Although these guidelines are somewhat more specific, it should be noted that the categories themselves were seen as fairly elastic by the officer responsible for coordinating the submissions, and were not necessarily used to exclude projects which did not meet these specific criteria but which did have what were perceived as being other positive features.

In 1982/3 the Leisure Programme Area amounted to £196,400 (£159,800 in capital, £36,600 in revenue costs) of which £92,200 (£79,400 capital, £12,800 revenue) was to be allocated to the seven successful voluntary organisations, with the remainder to be spent on local authority sponsored projects. This represented approximately 5% of the total bid for new projects. In the following year, new bids in the Leisure Programme Area totalled £210,800 (£207,800 capital and £3,000 revenue) of which £151,800 (£148,800 capital and £3,000 revenue) was to be allocated to eleven voluntary organisations. The Leisure Programme Area absorbed 4.9% of the total Urban Programme bid in 1983/4. In addition some applications, which were initially considered as Leisure Programme Area bids but which were unsuccessful, were redirected to other programme areas (e.g. to 'children and youth') and a small number of these projects received funding under other programme areas. The higher proportion of voluntary sector bids in the second package, and the greatly reduced proportion of revenue costs reflect pressures from the Department of Environment to modify the nature of bids for grant aid. The size of individual grants to voluntary organisations under this area of the Programme varied from £51,000 to £600.

7.5 THE RATIONALE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The construction of the interview schedule employed in this element of the case study was influenced by three sets of factors, a review of Council policy statements with regard to the three grant aid schemes under scrutiny; a consideration of the types of explanation of the policy process put forward in the interviews by members and officers; and a review of the literature to identify factors highlighted in other studies as significant in the relationships of voluntary organisations with local government.

7.5.1 Issues Arising from Officers' and Members' Explanations of the Operation of the Three Grant Aid Schemes.

The issues emerging from discussion of the interviews with members and officers can usefully be subsumed under two main headings; concerns of policy *outcomes*; and concerns of the *decision making process*. In relation to the grants for sport

and recreation and to cultural organisations, Labour members in particular expressed concern with the lack of agreed and specified criteria for prioritising grant aid applications. 'Tradition', it was argued, had played a strong role in the development of grant aid policy in respect of cultural grants and while the officer responsible for administering cultural grant aid pointed to a growth in the number of 'community and ethnic arts' grants, the nature of the distribution of grant aid was still a matter of concern for some Labour members both in terms of the types of activity and the types of client group supported. The report by the Chief Recreation Officer to the Leisure Services Sub-committee on the subject of grants for sport and recreation had argued for a positive role for grant aid in facilitating the development of new organisations while the Chief Librarian in his report on cultural grant aid referred to grant aid supporting those forms of provision which contribute to the cultural life of the community (without necessarily defining the constituency signified by 'community'). Variables for consideration in the analysis of patterns of grant aid therefore include types of activity funded, geographical constituency of the organisation (e.g. whether it serves the District as a whole, predominantly 'disadvantaged' wards), the age of the organisation, the size of grant and purpose (i.e. the type of activity funded).

In terms of the process of grant application, and decision-making, Labour members expressed concern about the restricted awareness of the availability of grant aid which they saw as reinforcing the pattern of repeated support for particular cultural organisations and restricting the number and type of sports and recreation organisations applying for aid. This raises two related issues, how the organisation became aware of the availability of grant aid, and how its application was progressed (through contact with members and / or officers, or simply by returning the completed application forms). As has already been indicated information about the way applications were progressed was not regularly available from respondents, since contact officers often simply did not know the specifics of how their own organisation had originated its application. However information was obtained from organisations about their links with the local authority in terms of membership, specifically whether they had as members of their 'executive committee' or as honorary members, a councillor, a senior officer of the authority (defined as of principal officer or above), or their M.P., and whether the organisation was represented on any of the Council's working

parties or committees. The rationale for inclusion of these questions was to establish whether organisations with access to information about the nature of the local authority's operations would fare better than those without discernable ties with the local authority.

7.5.2 SELECTION OF VARIABLES FOR ANALYSIS

The data sought from the interviews and analyses of applications allowed categorisation of organisations applying for grant aid by the following variables, or groups of variables.

(A) CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ORGANISATION

(1) Organisational Type:

As Hoggett and Bishop (1986) note, there are difficulties with defining voluntary organisations operating in the field of leisure because members of those organisations are unlikely to see themselves as 'volunteers'. They therefore employ the term 'mutual aid organisation' to differentiate those bodies which have grown up around a common interest among their memberships for a central activity itself, from those with other primary goals. Hoggett and Bishop's study focuses exclusively on this type of organisation, however, neglecting other voluntary groups which operate in the leisure field. Other categories employed in this analysis are as follows;

community service groups, where the group is client centred, and its membership is involved in producing a service (e.g. Womens Royal Volunteer Service which provides a library service for the housebound);

community development groups, where groups may begin life as client or service centred but where the aim is to generate self reliance;

community action groups, which focus their activities on a particular cause (e.g. a pressure group conducting a campaign for the development of children's play facilities;

social groups, those with 'socio-emotional goals' (Haywood and Henry 1986) but for which recreation forms an important element in their activities (e.g. youth clubs, working men's clubs).

quasi-voluntary organisations, which operate on a not-for-profit basis with a professional staff servicing the needs of their non-professional membership and / or a wider clientele (e.g. regional opera company, community arts organisation) - these are not voluntary organisations as such but bid for resources from the same sources as voluntary organisations for funding.

Given the role of the Urban Programme in social planning one would expect to find a significant difference in the types of organisation supported by this programme of grant aid with a greater emphasis on community service, community development, community action and social organisations than would be the case for either of the other two grant aid schemes.

(11) Age of Organisation, Annual Financial Turnover, Size of Membership, number of full and part-time employees, ownership of the premises used by the organisation, second order organisations.

This set of variables indicates the 'size' of an organisation, its financial / asset base, the resources available to it, its age and whether as a second order or peak organisation it represented a number of first order organisations. Given the shared concern of councillors to support new organisations with 'seed money' under the sport and recreation grant aiding scheme, and the attempts of the Urban Programme to foster new voluntary sector initiatives one might expect to find a significant proportion of grants to new bodies. However it is also the case that those organisations with longer histories and greater resources, or those which are representative of wider interests (second order organisations) may be more effective in promoting their case for grant aid, and also more able to assimilate and control larger schemes.

However, the absence of sufficient numbers of second order organisations in the Urban Programme and Cultural Grants populations, meant that this variable was excluded from the analysis for these two data sets and incorporated only in the analysis of the Sport and Recreation Grant Scheme.

(iii) Gender of Organisation Members or Beneficiaries, Geographical Area Served by the Organisation.

The analysis seeks to differentiate those organisations which are predominantly designed to service the leisure interests of men from those which predominantly service the interests of women, and those which draw membership from or provide benefits directly to men and women. Further consideration is also given to the identifying of organisations which draw most of their membership (or serve client groups) from those wards identified by the Sports Council as falling within the worst 15% in the region in terms of indicators of 'recreation need' (viz. Henry 1984). These organisations are distinguished from those which predominantly serve other areas in the District, the District as a whole or the region.

Although one might expect clear evidence of positive action in favour of women as well as disadvantaged areas in the case of Urban Programme bids, it should be noted that with the exception of the Sport and Recreation Grant aid scheme there were insufficient numbers of organisations specifically concerned with meeting the leisure needs of women to allow meaningful analysis. However this set of variables facilitates an evaluation of the claim that the disadvantaged are considered more favourably in respect of the Leisure Services Subcommittee's grants, particularly those for sport and recreation.

(B) THE NATURE OF THE GRANT BID

(1) Activity Type:

The type of activity for which the grant aid is requested is subdivided under the following headings;

organised sport forms and physical recreation

traditional, 'high' or 'serious' art forms this terminology, though loosely defined allows the distinction to be made between art forms which are promoted for predominantly aesthetic criteria, as opposed to those which are supported primarily on the basis of the social function of the art project (community arts), are seen as of significance for a particular ethnic minority (ethnic arts), or are promoted simply as popular pastimes and hobbies, the aesthetic content of which is irrelevant.

ethnic and community arts this category includes both 'serious' (high) ethnic art and popular ethnic art forms. 'Community arts' incorporates those activities which the grant applicant categorises as 'community arts' (the concern here is with what the local authority's reaction is to applications for support of what are perceived as community arts activities). Ethnic and community arts are banded together here in part because of a pragmatic concern with the size of the category, but also because support for these art forms represents a departure from a cultural policy of support for traditional art forms, and in many instances represents the use of cultural policy as an element in social policy programmes (e.g. the fostering of community development or multiculturalism).

popular arts, crafts and hobbies and other cultural activities, including a range of production activities e.g. pop music, break dancing, model making, animal fancying, but also some consumption activities e.g. film appreciation societies.

social activities, leisure organisations and environmental groups, where the nature of the activity itself is secondary to the aim of social contact, conservation etc.

Interest here will focus on issues such as the relative levels of funding of different forms of cultural activity by the Leisure Services Subcommittee, and the mix of leisure activities supported within the Urban Programme.

(11) Disadvantaged Groups to Benefit from Grant Aid.

A concern to meet the 'recreational needs' of disadvantaged groups is evident in the Urban Programme generally, and (according to the officer responsible) in the operation of the Sport and Recreation Grants scheme. The range of groups identified in the analysis is informed by the authority's statements in the Urban Programme submissions for 1982-4, and by the recreationally disadvantaged groups identified by the Sports Council as target groups for positive action. These include, the unemployed, ethnic minorities, children and young people, the elderly, the disabled and low income groups in general. Thus it is intended to evaluate the claim that the grants system operates selectively in favour of disadvantaged groups.

(C) NATURE OF THE ORGANISATION'S PAST ACTIVITIES

(1) Political Activity

Following Newton's (1976) broad definition of political activity as incorporating the full range of contact with the local authority from merely seeking information to attempting to secure policy change, this variable seeks to distinguish those organisations which display some awareness of the working of the local authority and of the existence of communication channels with officers and/or members, from those which, for whatever reason have not established contact with the authority. The inclusion of this variable implies the hypothesis that those organisations with links with the authority and a knowledge of the authority's workings are more likely to be successful in grant aid application than those with little knowledge or experience of the local authority's world.

(11) Received Grant in the Last Five Years

Some organisations which have access to the skills associated with putting together a strong grant application, may well be successful on a number of occasions. This variable seeks to identify those organisations

which have been successful with grant applications in the recent past to establish whether or not they are more likely to be successful in the three schemes monitored in this study.

(D) INDEX OF ESTABLISHMENT AND POLITICAL SKILLS

As we have noted, a number of the studies of the relationship of local government with the voluntary sector have indicated that certain voluntary organisations may be regarded positively by a local authority, and are therefore likely to be consulted or even incorporated into its decision making processes. Newton (1976) operationalised this concept by constructing what he termed an 'establishment index'. What is described here represents a development of this index. Newton describes five constituent elements for his index, each of which contributes a score of '1' if positive or '0' if negative, such that a well established organisation will register a score of '5' while an organisation which exists with no establishment connections will register a score of '0'. The five elements were as follows;

- (i) the organisation's membership includes a Member of Parliament,
- (ii) the organisation's membership includes a Councillor,
- (iii) one or more of the organisation's membership serves as a coopted member representing the organisation on one of the Council's committees,
- (iv) one or more of the organisation's membership serves as a coopted member representing the organisation on any other public body,
- (v) the organisation has been consulted by the Council or other public body in the last twelve months.

For the purposes of this study, element (iii) has been broadened to include membership of Council working parties. Element (iv) was dropped during the pre-test stage when the questionnaire was being evaluated. This decision was taken because of the difficulty of defining what

constituted a 'public body'. If membership of 'second order' organisations was excluded, membership of public bodies proved to be negligible, while second order organisations themselves were so variable in size, scope and level of activity that many could hardly be ascribed the status of public bodies. To illustrate the point membership of the local Council for Voluntary Service might constitute access to a body which seeks to communicate with and in many cases influence local authority policy and in this sense is a very different second order organisation from the local Football Association. Elements (i) and (ii) of the Newton index were also combined, since in only three cases was a local Member of Parliament a prominent member of the organisation. However a further element was also added to the index;

(vi) the organisation included within its executive committee, or leading members a senior officer of the Council (i.e. of principal officer grade or above).

These amendments allow a maximum score on the establishment / political skills index of '4' and a minimum of '1'. The title of the index and its construction have been amended to reflect two related types of phenomenon - '*establishment*' i.e. acceptability and credibility of the organisation within local authority circles; and '*political skills*' i.e. the knowledge, resources and ability to operate effectively within the local government system. The availability of a relatively senior council officer, a professional and potentially skilled bureaucrat who understands and may be able to make effective use of formal and informal communication channels is a valuable resource. This extension of the Newton index therefore implies that operational measures of 'establishment' and 'political skills' are in practice very difficult to separate out.

(E) TRANSFORMED VARIABLES

For the purposes of statistical analysis of association between the variables which were organisational or grant application descriptors (i.e.

those in categories A to D above) and those which were indicators of policy outcome (i.e. those in category F below) it was necessary to employ ordinal forms of measurement. Where appropriate, therefore, independent variables were transformed into ordinal form by converting nominal variables into bivariate statements. The following transformations were undertaken;

<i>Original Nominal Variable</i>	<i>Transformed Ordinal Form</i>
1. Type of Organisation	1. Mutual aid organisations / others
2. Use of Premises	2 (a) Organisations with / without own premises 2 (b) Organisations hiring Council premises / others.
3. Types of Disadvantaged group served by the project for which grant aid is sought.	3 Projects serving / not serving disadvantaged groups.
4. Type of area served.	4 (a) Organisations located or predominantly serving disadvantaged wards / others. 4 (b) Organisations serving ward - city - region.
5. Sources of previous grants	5. Organisations which have / have not received grant aid in the previous five years.
6. Types of activity	6. Either ; sporting activities

supported by the project	/ others (for Urban Programme
for which grant aid sought.	and Sport and Recreation Grants) or 'high arts' / others (for Cultural Grant Aid).

In fact, the only independent variable which was nominal in measurement which was not transformed in this way was that of the 'gender' group served by the organisation. In analysis of the Urban Programme and Cultural grant Aid programme this variable had to be excluded because of the lack of organisations serving female and or male, rather than mixed populations. In the Sport and Recreation Grant Aid analysis although there were significant numbers of male (n=64) and female (n=11) organisations it did not make sense to reduce these to dichotomies (male organisations / others; and female organisations / others) since this implied a comparison of single sex organisations with opposite sex and mixed organisations grouped together, with mixed organisations (n=42).

(F) VARIABLES EMPLOYED AS INDICATORS OF 'POLICY OUTCOMES'.

The policy outcomes to be 'explained' in the analysis were operationalised in the following variables;

Organisations Applying for Sport and Recreation Grant Aid -

- (a) success or failure of organisation's grant application(s) under this scheme,
- (b) Success of application on more than one occasion (in all three schemes),
- (c) total amount of grant aid received under the Sport and Recreation Scheme 1981-4,
- (d) total amount of grant aid received under all three schemes 1981-4

Organisations Applying for Urban Aid (leisure Programme) Grant Aid-

- (a) success or failure of organisation's grant application(s) under this scheme,
- (b) Success of application on more than one occasion (in all three schemes),
- (c) total amount of grant aid received under the Urban Programme (Leisure Programme Area) Scheme 1982-4,
- (d) total amount of grant aid received under all three schemes 1981-4

Organisations Applying for Cultural Grant Aid -

- (a) Success of application on more than one occasion for cultural grant aid 1981-4
- (b) total amount of grant aid received under the Cultural Grant Aid Scheme 1981-4,
- (c) total amount of grant aid received under all three schemes 1981-4

The policy outcome indicators for the third category of grant aid, that for cultural organisations differ slightly from the other because this last group includes only three organisations which applied unsuccessfully for cultural grant aid. Instead of differentiating those organisations which were successful from those which were unsuccessful under this category of grant aid, the first of the 'policy outcome' indicators differentiates those organisations which were successful *on more than one occasion* in applying for grant aid under this scheme.

TABLE 7.1: VARIABLES EMPLOYED IN THE ANALYSIS OF GRANT AID POLICY

VARIABLES	VALUES
<u>(a) Characteristics of the Organisation</u>	
Type of Organisation	(1) Mutual aid organisation, (2) Community service organisation, (3) Community development organisation, (4) Community action group, (5) Social group, (6) Quasi-voluntary organisation.
Geographical Area Served by the Organisation	(1) Wards of high recreation need, (2) Other wards, (3) the city or Metropolitan District, (4) the region.
Age of Organisation	(1) < 2 years, (2) 2 - 5 years, (3) 6 - 10 years, (4) 11 - 25 years, (5) 26 - 50 years (6) > 50 years.
Membership Size	(1) < 10, (2) 11 - 25, (3) 26 - 50, (4) 51 - 100, (5) 101 - 200, (6) > 200.
Premises	(1) Own, (2) Hire council's, (3) Hire other.
Annual Budget (Gross Income)	(1) < £500, (2) £500 - £1500, (3) £1501 - £5000 (4) £5001 - £10000 (5) > £10000.
Full Time Employees	(0) No, (1) Yes
Second Order Organisations	(0) No, (1) Yes
Gender of groups served by the organisation.	(1) Predominantly female, (2) Predominantly male, (3) Both.
<u>(b) Nature of Grant Aid</u>	
Type of Activity for which Grant Requested.	(1) Formal sports and physical recreations, (2) 'High Arts', (3) Community and ethnic Arts, (4) Hobbies, crafts, popular cultural forms, (5) Social and environmental groups.
Disadvantaged Groups to Benefit from Grant.	(1) Ethnic groups, (2) Elderly, (3) Disabled, (4) Youth, (5) Children (< 14 years), (6) Unemployed, (7) Ethnic unemployed, (8) General low income groups.

TABLE 7.1 (CONTINUED)

<u>VARIABLES</u>	<u>VALUES</u>
<u>(c) Nature of Past Activity</u>	
Organisation 'Politically Active'	(0) No, (1) Yes
Received Other Grants in Last Five Years	(1) From Council, (2) From other sources, (3) Both
<u>(d) Index of Establishment / Political Skills</u>	
Councillor or M.P. Leading Member.	(0) No, (1) Yes
Senior Council Officer Leading Member	(0) No, (1) Yes
Member of Organisation Coopted onto Council Working Groups.	(0) No, (1) Yes
Organisation Consulted by Council	(0) No, (1) Yes
<u>POLICY OUTPUT INDICATORS</u>	
Sport and Recreation 1981-4	(1) Application for grant successful (2) Unsuccessful.
Urban Aid 1982-4	(1) Application for grant successful (2) Unsuccessful.
Cultural Grant Aid 1981-4	(1) Application for grant successful on more than one occasion (2) Unsuccessful, or succesful only once.
Total Grant Aid Received Sport and Recreation Scheme 1981-4	(0) £0 (1) < £50, (2) £50 - £100 (3) £101 - £200 (4) £201 - 500 (5) £501 - £1000 (6) £1001 - £5000 (7) £ 5001 - £10000 (8) > £10000
Total Grant Aid Received Urban Aid (Leisure) 1982-4	(0) £0 (1) < £50, (2) £50 - £100 (3) £101 - £200 (4) £201 - 500 (5) £501 - £1000 (6) £1001 - £5000 (7) £ 5001 - £10000 (8) > £10000
Total Grant Aid Received Cultural Grant Aid 1981-4	(0) £0 (1) < £50, (2) £50 - £100 (3) £101 - £200 (4) £201 - 500 (5) £501 - £1000 (6) £1001 - £5000 (7) £ 5001 - £10000 (8) > £10000
Total Grant Aid Received (under all three schemes together)	(0) £0 (1) < £50, (2) £50 - £100 (3) £101 - £200 (4) £201 - 500 (5) £501 - £1000 (6) £1001 - £5000 (7) £ 5001 - £10000 (8) > £10000

7.6 ANALYSIS OF THE DATA - STATISTICAL METHODS AND FINDINGS

Analysis of the outcomes of grant aid policy was developed in three stages.

(a) The organisation / grant application descriptors (variables in categories A to E above) are evaluated in cross tabulations to identify the strength of association or independence between each pair of such variables for each of three populations, grant applicants to the Sport and Recreation Scheme, to the Cultural Organisations Scheme and to the Urban Programme (Leisure Programme Area).

The criterion employed for evaluating the strength of association between pairs of such variables measured at the ordinal level was that of Kendall's tau_b (τ_b) or Kendall's tau_c (τ_c) as appropriate. Where τ was significant at < 0.05 there was deemed to be a significant relationship between independent variables. Although significance tests might strictly be regarded as inappropriate in this context (since the three sets of data constitute populations, or virtual populations) nevertheless they provide some indication of the strength of the association denoted by τ , giving an indication of whether or not this may constitute 'chance' relationships between variables.

The relationship between gender and other organisation / grant application descriptors was evaluated using statistics appropriate for nominal data. The lambda (λ) value derived from crosstabulations was employed to assess the strength and direction of the relationship, while χ^2 was assessed to provide an indication of the significance of the association between gender and other variables.

Summary statistics from these cross-tabulations are reported in tables 7.5 (A to C).

(b) The strength of association between each of the descriptors and each of the policy outcome variables was assessed for all three populations to identify factors which are associated with the success or failure of

organisations in their grant aid applications. The criterion employed here was once again that of r (or in the case of the relationship between gender and 'dependent', policy outcome variables for the Sport and Recreation Grants, etc).

Summary statistics from these cross-tabulations are reported in tables 7.5 (A to C).

(c) The third stage in the analysis involved evaluation of relationships between each organisation / grant application descriptor X and each policy outcome indicator Y (for which a significant r_B or r_C had been obtained) while controlling for any other independent variable which was significantly associated with both X and Y. For this purpose three way contingency tables were constructed and the resultant zero-order gamma and first order partial gamma statistic was obtained. A partial gamma which differs substantially from the first order gamma indicates that the strength of the association between a dependent and an independent variable may be due to the intermediate effect of the control variable(s). It is of course possible to control for the effects of more than one variable but the size of the data sets involved in this instance made controlling for more than one variable at a time impractical.

The results of these statistical procedures are reported in tables 7.3 (A to C).

The commentary which follows draws primarily on the extracted statistics reported in tables 7.2 (A to C), together with tables 7.3 (A to C) which provide information concerning the influence of control variables. Comparison of the values of r_B or r_C , even within the same category of grant aid is not always strictly possible (given for example that missing values may influence the size of the data set on which the statistic is based). Comparison of values between the three data sets is however likely to prove misleading. Nevertheless, comparison of the direction of the relationship and its significance provides useful clues as to similarities and differences in the structure of the three data sets.

Tables 7.2 (A to C) illustrate that in all three grant aid programmes, there are two groups of descriptors for which each variable in the group is clearly positively associated with most others and negatively associated with variables in the other group. In the first of these 'groups' the variables which are related are those of the age of the organisation, its membership size, the size of its budget, whether or not the organisation owned the premises it used, and whether or not the organisation had any full time employees. The positive relationship between these variables may be explained relatively simply. Organisations with large memberships will tend to have access to greater income (through members' fees), and may therefore be more likely to be able to afford the costs of owning their own premises or of employing one or more full time members of staff. The second group consists of organisations located in disadvantaged wards, applying for projects which were intended to serve disadvantaged groups, and using council provided facilities. Use of council facilities is most clearly related to the other two variables in this group in the case of sport and recreation organisations, and is least clearly linked with them in the case of cultural organisations where a number of organisations promoting traditional, 'high arts' make use of council premises for public performances.

(a) Sport and Recreation Grant Aid

As table 7.2(A) illustrates, where a significant τ_B or τ_C is obtained for cross tabulations of descriptor variables in the first group with the policy outcome variables, the relationship is negative. The reverse is true in terms of the statistical relationship between the three descriptors in the second group and the policy outcome indicators. However the relationship between individual pairs of variables should be considered in detail.

(i) **Age:** - Age was strongly associated with the size of the organisation ($\tau_B = .41^{**}$), with the size of budget ($\tau_B = .34^{**}$), and with ownership of premises ($\tau_C = .54^{**}$). Older organisations were also more likely to be 'mutual aid' organisations ($\tau_C = .23^{**}$) and to be seeking grants for sport and active recreation projects ($\tau_C = .20^{**}$). However, more crucially this variable is significantly related to the three policy outcome indicators

TABLE 7.2(A): SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR CROSS TABULATIONS OF VARIABLES -
SPORT AND RECREATION GRANT AID
(EXTRACTED FROM TABLES 7.4(A) & 7.5(A))

	Age	Size	Employees	Budget	Own Premises	Successful Applicant Sport & Rec. Scheme 1981-4	Size Total Sport & Rec Grants 1981-4	Size Total Leisure Grants 1981-4
Age	-,-					$r_c = -.47^{**}$	$r_b = -.27^{**}$	$r_b = -.30^{**}$
Size	$r_b = .41^{**}$	-,-				$r_c = -.24^*$	$r_c = -.08$	$r_b = -.07$
Employees	$r_c = .08$	$r_c = .31^{**}$	-,-			$r_b = .05$	$r_c = .05$	$r_c = .04$
Size of Budget	$r_b = .34^{**}$	$r_b = .47^{**}$	$r_c = .50$	-,-		$r_c = -.19^*$	$r_b = -.08$	$r_b = -.07$
Own Premises	$r_c = .54^{**}$	$r_c = .56^{**}$	$r_b = .21^{**}$	$r_c = .65^{**}$	-,-	$r_c = -.30^{**}$	$r_c = -.29^{**}$	$r_c = -.31^{**}$
Mutual Aid Org	$r_c = .23^{**}$	$r_c = -.09$	$r_b = -.13^{**}$	$r_c = -.06$	$r_b = .18^*$	$r_b = -.35^{**}$	$r_c = -.32^{**}$	$r_c = -.30$
Sporting Project	$r_c = .20^{**}$	$r_c = .01$	$r_b = -.08$	$r_c = -.06$	$r_b = .10$	$r_b = -.20^*$	$r_c = -.16^*$	$r_c = -.14^*$
Establishment / Pol. Skills Index	$r_c = .04$	$r_c = .18^*$	$r_c = .39^*$	$r_c = .21^{**}$	$r_c = -.02$	$r_c = .14$	$r_c = .11$	$r_c = .13^*$
Political Actv.	$r_c = .05$	$r_c = .25^*$	$r_b = .16^*$	$r_c = .38^{**}$	$r_b = -.002$	$r_b = .13$	$r_c = .21^*$	$r_c = .24^{**}$
Previous Grant	$r_c = .04$	$r_c = .31^*$	$r_b = .21^{**}$	$r_c = .43^{**}$	$r_b = .16$	$r_b = -.002$	$r_c = -.02$	$r_c = .02$
Disadvantaged Group	$r_c = -.52^{**}$	$r_c = -.42^{**}$	$r_b = -.08$	$r_c = -.57^{**}$	$r_b = -.55^{**}$			
Disadv. Ward Hire Council Premises	$r_c = -.37^{**}$	$r_c = -.23^{**}$	$r_b = .05$	$r_c = -.25^{**}$	$r_b = -.31^{**}$			
	$r_c = -.58^{**}$	$r_c = -.48^{**}$	$r_b = -.18^{**}$	$r_c = -.65^{**}$	$r_b = -.75^{**}$			
		Disadvantaged Groups	Disadvantaged Wards	Hire Council Premises		Successful Applicant Sport & Rec. Scheme 1981-4	Size Total Sport & Rec Grants 1981-4	Size Total Leisure Grants 1981-4
Disadvantaged Group		-,-				$r_b = .39^{**}$	$r_c = .34^{**}$	$r_c = .31^{**}$
Disadv. Ward Hire Council Premises		$r_b = .44^{**}$	-,-			$r_b = .19^*$	$r_c = .15$	$r_c = .15$
		$r_b = .60^{**}$	$r_b = .31^{**}$	-,-		$r_b = .35^{**}$	$r_c = .35^{**}$	$r_c = .31^{**}$
Mutual Aid Org		$r_b = -.32^{**}$	$r_b = -.08$	$r_b = -.14^*$				
Sporting Project		$r_b = -.19^*$	$r_b = -.11$	$r_b = -.02$				
Establishment / Pol. Skills Index		$r_c = .13$	$r_c = .11$	$r_c = .05$				
Political Actv.		$r_b = .08$	$r_b = -.14$	$r_b = -.01$				
Previous Grant		$r_b = -.01$	$r_b = .01$	$r_b = -.27^{**}$				

cited in table 7.2(A). There is a significant negative association between age and success in sport and recreation grant aid applications ($r_c = -.47^{**}$), the size of grant received under this scheme 1981-4 ($r_B = -.27^{**}$) and the size of leisure grants received under the three schemes 1981-4 ($r_B = -.30^{**}$). These findings are consistent with the Leisure Services Sub-committee's policy of 'pump priming' grants for new organisations. The zero order and first order partial gamma statistics given in table 7.3(A) indicate that gammas are not substantially reduced by the intervening effects of third variables with the exception perhaps of the variable 'use of council premises'. However even in this case the influence of age on the statistical association between use of council premises and success in grant aid application ($\gamma = .63$; partial $\gamma = .25$), between use of council premises and size of sport and recreation grant 1981-4 ($\gamma = .47$; partial $\gamma = .16$) and between use of council premises and total grant aid under each of the three schemes 1981-4 ($\gamma = .46$; partial $\gamma = .22$) indicates that age is a more significant factor than use of council premises.

(ii) **Size:-** Larger organisations tended to be more politically active ($r_c = .25^{**}$), better 'established' ($r_c = .18^*$), and be more likely to have had a grant in the previous five years ($r_c = .31^{**}$). This variable is significantly related to only one policy output variable, success of grant aid applications under the sport and recreation scheme ($r_c = -.24^*$). Nevertheless, as table 7.3(A) indicates, this relationship can be substantially explained by the intervening influence of the age of the organisation ($\gamma = .30$; partial $\gamma = .02$).

(iii) **Employees:-** The existence of one or more full time employees in the organisation was not significantly associated with any of the policy outcome variables, despite exhibiting a strong statistical association with a range of other descriptor variables which were in turn related to policy outcome indicators. Organisations with full time employees tended to be well established ($r_c = .39^{**}$), be politically active ($r_B = .16^*$) and have received grant aid in the previous five years ($r_B = .21^{**}$)

(iv) **Size of Budget:-** Organisations with larger budgets also tended to be better established ($r_c = .21^*$, be more politically active ($r_c = .38^{**}$) and be more likely to have received grant aid in the previous five years ($r_c = .43^{**}$). The strength of the association between budget size and success in grant application under the sport and recreation scheme, is substantially reduced when controlling for all other related variables, indicating a weak independent negative association between budget size and success in grant aid application.

(v) **Applications for Disadvantaged Groups:-** Organisations putting forward bids for grant aid relating to projects for disadvantaged groups, were less likely to be mutual aid organisations ($r_B = -.32^{**}$), or to be seeking grant aid for formal sports provision ($r_B = -.19^*$). However they were more likely to be successful in their application for aid ($r_B = .38^{**}$) and to receive bigger grants across the three years 1981-4 both under the sport and recreation scheme ($r_c = .34^{**}$) and under the three schemes in total ($r_c = .31^{**}$). Although the strength of the association between this variable and the policy outcome variables when controlling for age or for 'hiring council premises' is slightly reduced, there is still evidence of a clear and independent association of 'applications for disadvantaged groups' and the three policy outcome indicators cited in tables 7.2(A) and 7.3(A).

(vi) **Organisations Serving Disadvantaged Wards:-** This variable was not related as strongly either to the dependent or to other independent variables. Although there is a significant relationship with success in grant aid applications ($r_B = .19^*$) this would seem to be accounted for by the effects of organisational age ($\gamma = .39$; partial $\gamma = -.15$).

(vii) **Use of Council Premises:-** Those organisations which relied on the use of council facilities were less likely than other organisations to be mutual aid groups ($r_B = .14^*$) or to have had a grant in the previous five years ($r_B = -.27^{**}$). Although this variable was significantly related to success in grant aid applications ($r_B = .35^{**}$), to size of sport and recreation grants 1981-4 ($r_c = .35^{**}$) and size of grants from all three

programmes 1981-4 ($r_c = .31^{**}$), controlling for the effects of organisational age significantly reduced the gamma statistics in each case.

(viii) **Mutual Aid Organisations**- This variable was significantly related to the age of the organisation, and to ownership of own premises, and negatively related to organisations with full time employees, to those promoting projects for disadvantaged groups and to those using council premises. It was also significantly, negatively associated with three of the dependent variables, success of applications ($r_B = -.35^{**}$), size of total sport and recreation grants 1981-4 ($r_c = -.32^{**}$) and size of total grants for all three programmes 1981-4 ($r_c = -.30^{**}$). In each case the intervening effects of control variables indicate a substantial independent negative association between this variable and the policy outcome variables.

(ix) **Organisations Seeking Aid for Formal Sports and Physical Recreation Projects**:- These organisations were more likely to be successful in their applications for aid under the sport and recreation programme ($r_B = -.20^*$, and were likely to receive smaller amounts both from this programme ($r_c = -.16^*$) and from the three grant aid programmes combined ($r_c = -.14^*$). Controlling for other related variables did not indicate any substantial reduction in the gamma statistic. Perhaps the explanation of the importance of this variable is that groups which promote schemes with broader recreational objectives are treated more sympathetically than those promoting purely sporting developments.

(x) **Establishment / Political Skills Index**:- Those organisations which were most established tended to be bigger ($r_c = .18^*$, were more likely to have one or more full-time employees ($r_c = .39^{**}$), and to have larger budgets ($r_c = .21^*$). Furthermore established groups were more likely to be politically active ($r_c = .50^{**}$) and to have had a grant in the previous five years ($r_c = .34^{**}$). Indeed this variable was only significantly *negatively* related to mutual aid organisations. Even 'organisations promoting projects serving disadvantaged groups' were

positively related to 'establishment / political skills index' (though the r statistic was not significant $r_c = .13$). 'Establishment / political skills index' however was significantly associated with only one policy outcome variable, size of total grant aid from all three schemes 1981-4 ($r_c = .13^*$, and this relationship was minimal when controlling for the effects of 'mutual aid organisations' (zero order $\gamma = .22$: partial first order $\gamma = .02$).

(xi) **Political Activity:-** Those organisations which tended to be more politically active were larger ($r_c = .25^*$, had bigger budgets ($r_c = .38^{**}$), and were more likely to have full time employee(s) ($r_B = .16^*$. In addition politically active organisations tended to be better 'established' and were more likely to have received a grant in the previous five years ($r_B = .28^{**}$). Political activity was however significantly associated with only two of the dependent variables, size of total sport and recreation grants 1981-4 ($r_c = .21^*$), and size of total grants from all three programmes ($r_c = .24^{**}$). The strength of the association with these policy outcome indicators was however reduced when controlling for the effects of 'mutual aid organisations'.

(xii) **Organisations Receiving Grant in the Previous Five Years:-** Interestingly those organisations which had been successful in attracting grant in the recent past were not significantly more successful than other organisations in attracting grant aid from the sport and recreation scheme. This variable was significantly positively related to size, 'employees', size of budget, establishment index, and political activity but organisations which predominantly made use of council premises for their activity tended to be less likely to have received grant aid in the recent past ($r_B = -.27^{**}$).

To summarise, the findings reported here indicate that success in grant aid application, the size of grant received under the Sport and Recreation scheme 1981-4, and the size of grant received under all three schemes, reduced with the age of the organisation, budget size and ownership of premises. More 'established'

groups and those which were more politically active tended to receive larger grants, while those which were mutual aid organisations, or which were seeking grant aid to support projects solely concerned with sport and active recreation, were less likely to gain a grant or to receive larger amounts. Finally, those seeking aid for disadvantaged groups or using council premises were more likely to have been successful in attracting grant aid under this scheme and to have received larger amounts.

The picture which emerges when the effects of control variables are taken into account is rather more specific. Three variables manifest strong independent association with policy outcome variables. These are 'age', 'mutual aid organisations', and 'disadvantaged groups'. These findings are consistent with policy guidelines identified earlier. Among the policy aims of the Leisure Services Sub-committee (or rather those articulated by the officer responsible for the grant aid programme) was the intention to channel aid towards new organisations, and towards those which serve disadvantaged groups. The findings also provide evidence of a tendency to support groups which were not simply mutual aid organisations but which may be involved in, for example community service, community development, or community action. However, perhaps as interesting as these findings is the lack of importance of 'political activity' and 'establishment / political skills' in influencing grant aid outcomes when the effects of other variables are controlled for. This, as we shall see, contrasts with the findings for the next group of organisations, those applying for Urban Programme (Leisure) funding.

(b) The Urban Programme (Leisure Programme Area)

The 'policy outcome' variables employed in the analysis of the Urban Programme grant aid scheme were similar to those used for the sport and recreation grant aid analysis. They were successful grant aid application (in either 1982-3 or 1983-4), success with more than one grant application across all three schemes, size of grants received under the Urban Programme 1982-4, and the total size of grants received under all three schemes 1981-4.

**Chapter 7: Local Authority Interaction with Voluntary Sector Organisations:
Analysing the Outcomes of Grant Aid Policy.**

**TABLE 7.2(B): SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR CROSS TABULATIONS OF VARIABLES
URBAN PROGRAMME (LEISURE) GRANT AID
(EXTRACTED FROM TABLES 7.4(B) & 7.5(B))**

	Age	Size	Employees	Budget	Own Premises	Successful Applicant Urban Prog. Scheme 1981-4	Size Total Urban Prog. Grants 1981-4	Size Total Leisure Grants 1981-4
Age	-,-					$r_c = .19$	$r_b = -.08$	$r_b = -.10$
Size	$r_b = .43^{**}$	-,-				$r_c = -.18$	$r_b = .004$	$r_c = -.06$
Employees	$r_c = .03$	$r_c = .28^*$	-,-			$r_b = .19$	$r_c = .43^{**}$	$r_c = .29^{**}$
Size of Budget	$r_b = .25^{**}$	$r_b = .39^{**}$	$r_c = .55^{**}$	-,-		$r_c = .01$	$r_b = .24^{**}$	$r_b = .13$
Own Premises	$r_c = .39^{**}$	$r_c = .24$	$r_b = .29^{**}$	$r_c = .59^{**}$	-,-	$r_b = .15$	$r_c = .04$	$r_c = -.02$
Mutual Aid Org	$r_c = -.004$	$r_c = .05$	$r_b = -.19$	$r_c = -.10$	$r_b = .01$	$r_b = -.33^{**}$	$r_c = -.34^{**}$	$r_c = -.29^{**}$
Sporting Project	$r_c = .24$	$r_c = .16$	$r_b = -.17$	$r_c = -.07$	$r_b = .09$	$r_b = -.16$	$r_c = .10$	$r_c = -.06$
Establishment / Pol. Skills Index	$r_c = .05$	$r_c = .31^{**}$	$r_c = .59^{**}$	$r_c = .53^{**}$	$r_c = .26$	$r_c = .30^*$	$r_c = .43^{**}$	$r_c = .30^{**}$
Political Actv.	$r_c = -.04$	$r_c = .06$	$r_b = .42^{**}$	$r_c = .33^*$	$r_b = .13$	$r_b = .21$	$r_c = .45^{**}$	$r_c = .30^{**}$
Previous Grant	$r_c = .22$	$r_c = .28^*$	$r_b = .42^{**}$	$r_c = .42^{**}$	$r_b = .16$	$r_b = -.02$	$r_c = .30^*$	$r_c = .20$
Disadvantaged Group	$r_c = -.24^*$	$r_c = -.18$	$r_b = .21$	$r_c = -.15$	$r_b = -.28$			
Disadv. Ward	$r_c = -.31^*$	$r_c = -.22$	$r_b = -.12^*$	$r_c = -.48^{**}$	$r_b = -.27^{**}$			
Hire Council Premises	$r_c = -.30^{**}$	$r_c = -.25$	$r_b = -.12^*$	$r_c = -.48^{**}$	$r_b = -.8^{**}$			
		Disadvantaged Groups	Disadvantaged Wards	Hire Council Premises		Successful Applicant Urban Prog. Scheme 1981-4	Size Total Urban Prog. Grants 1981-4	Size Total Leisure Grants 1981-4
Disadvantaged Group		-,-				$r_b = .34^{**}$	$r_c = .30^*$	$r_c = .32^{**}$
Disadv. Ward		$r_b = .44^{**}$	-,-			$r_b = .03$	$r_c = .10$	$r_c = .09$
Hire Council Premises		$r_b = .27^{**}$	$r_b = .13$	-,-		$r_b = .13$	$r_c = -.05$	$r_c = -.01$
Mutual Aid Org		$r_b = -.21$	$r_b = -.08$	$r_b = -.13$				
Sporting Project		$r_b = .01$	$r_b = -.13$	$r_b = .12$				
Establishment / Pol. Skills Index		$r_c = -.01$	$r_c = -.24$	$r_c = -.14$				
Political Actv.		$r_b = .14$	$r_b = -.09$	$r_b = .13$				
Previous Grant		$r_b = .16$	$r_b = .06$	$r_b = -.31^*$				

(i) **Age:-** Whereas in the Sport and Recreation population, age was significantly negatively related to success in grant application and size of grant received, the τ statistics for crosstabulations between this variable and the policy outcome indicators are not significant. There is a positive relationship however between age and size ($\tau_B = .43^{**}$), budget ($\tau_B = .26^{**}$) and ownership of own premises ($\tau_c = .39^{**}$) and a negative relationship with 'organisations promoting projects for disadvantaged groups' ($\tau_c = -.24^*$), organisations serving predominantly disadvantaged wards ($\tau_c = -.31^*$) and organisations using council premises ($\tau_c = -.30$). Interestingly older organisations were not necessarily significantly more likely to have full time employees.

(ii) **Size:-** Larger organisations were more likely to have bigger budgets ($\tau_B = .39^{**}$), to have full time employees ($\tau_c = .28^*$), and own their own premises ($\tau_c = .24$). They were also more likely to be well established ($\tau_c = .31^{**}$) and have received a grant in the previous five years ($\tau_c = .28^*$). However size was not significantly related to any of the three policy outcome variables.

(iii) **Organisations with Full-time Employee(s):-** Organisations which employed full-time personnel, had bigger budgets on the whole ($\tau_c = .55^{**}$), were more likely to own their own premises ($\tau_c = .29^{**}$), tended to be politically active ($\tau_B = .42^{**}$), have received grants in the previous five years ($\tau_B = .42^{**}$) and to be better established ($\tau_c = .59^{**}$). This variable was significantly related to those of total urban programme grants 1982-4 ($\tau_c = .43^{**}$), and total grants for all three schemes ($\tau_c = .29^{**}$). The calculation of partial gammas for control variables supported the hypothesis that the relationship between this variable and the policy outcome variables was not the result of the intervening effects of the mutually associated descriptors identified. The role which can be played by employees in securing grant aid may well be more significant in the case of the urban programme because of the corporatist nature of decision making described by officers and members and identified in the preceding chapters.

(iv) **Size of Annual Budget:-** As one might expect, organisations with larger budgets were more likely to own their own premises ($\tau_c = .59^{**}$). They were also more likely to be politically active ($\tau_c = .33^{**}$), to have received grant aid in the previous five years ($\tau_c = .42^{**}$) and to be well established ($\tau_c = .53^{**}$). They were significantly more likely to have gained more than one grant from the three local authority schemes under review ($\tau_c = .26^*$), and to have received larger grants under the Urban Programme ($\tau_c = .24^{**}$). However in the case of the latter relationship the strength of association is considerably reduced when controlling for either 'employees' ($\gamma = .66$: partial $\gamma = -.08$) or 'establishment index' ($\gamma = .43$: partial $\gamma = .08$).

(v) **Organisations Owning their Own Premises:-** This variable was not significantly associated with any of the policy outcome variables, although it was positively associated with size of budget, full-time employees, and organisation's age.

(vi) **Organisations Seeking Grant Aid for Projects Serving Disadvantaged Groups:-** Given the nature of the Urban Programme it is not surprising that this variable is significantly related to three of the policy outcome variables, success in grant applications ($\tau_B = .38^{**}$), size of total urban programme grants 1982-4 ($\tau_c = .34^{**}$) and size of grants for all three schemes 1981-4 ($\tau_c = .31^{**}$). No other organisation / grant application descriptors were significantly associated with both this variable and the three policy outcome indicators, lending support to the hypothesis that there is an independent association between organisations promoting projects for disadvantaged groups with success in grant application, and with receipt of greater amounts of grant support.

(vii) **Organisations Serving Disadvantaged Wards:-** Surprisingly this variable was not significantly associated with any of the policy outcome variables, though it was clearly associated with organisations promoting projects for the disadvantaged. This may in part reflect the fact that the urban programme was not operated on an area specific basis in this District (no urban priority areas for example had been nominated). This

approach to grant allocation does in effect recognise that deprivation, though clearly concentrated in certain locations, is not necessarily limited to those areas (viz. Lawless 1979).

(viii) **Organisations Using Council Premises:-** These organisations were more likely to serve disadvantaged groups ($\tau_B = .27^{**}$), were younger ($\tau_c = -.30^{**}$), smaller ($\tau_c = -.25^*$), have smaller budgets ($\tau_c = -.48^{**}$) and no full-time employees ($\tau_B = -.27^{**}$). Nevertheless this variable was negatively related to receipt of more than one grant ($\tau_B = -.27^*$) and was not significantly related to other 'policy outcome' variables.

(ix) **Mutual Aid Organisations:-** These groups were both less politically active ($\tau_B = -.42^{**}$) and less well established ($\tau_c = -.32^{**}$) than others. They were also significantly less likely to be successful in attracting grant aid in the urban programme ($\tau_B = -.33^{**}$) and also tended to receive less money both in urban programme grants 1982-4 ($\tau_c = -.34^{**}$) and across all three schemes ($\tau_c = -.29^{**}$). However controlling for the effects of political activity substantially reduces the strength of the association in the case of all three policy outcome variables - success of applications (zero order $\gamma = -.62$: partial first order $\gamma = -.19$), size of urban programme (leisure) grant (zero order $\gamma = -.46$: partial first order $\gamma = -.15$) and size of grant from all three schemes (zero order $\gamma = -.35$: partial first order $\gamma = -.04$).

(x) **Organisations Seeking Grant Aid for Formal Sports and Physical Recreations:-** This variable was not significantly associated with either other descriptor or policy outcome variables.

(xi) **Establishment Index:-** Well established organisations tended to have larger memberships ($\tau_c = .28^*$), larger budgets ($\tau_c = .53^{**}$), be more politically active ($\tau_c = .57^{**}$) and were more likely to have full time employees ($\tau_c = .59^{**}$). Furthermore this variable was significantly associated with success in application to the urban programme ($\tau_c = .30^*$), the size of grants received from the urban programme 1982-4 ($\tau_c = .43^{**}$) and the size of grants received from all three schemes ($\tau_c =$

.30**). In the case of these last two relationships the strength of the association was reduced by controlling for 'employees'

(xii) **Political Activity:-** Politically active organisations were more likely to have full-time employees ($r_B = .42^{**}$), and tended to have larger budgets ($r_C = .33^*$) and be well established ($r_C = .57^{**}$). This variable was significantly associated with the size of total urban programme grants 1982-4 ($r_C = .45^{**}$) and size of total grants under all three schemes 1981-4 ($r_C = .36^{**}$). A review of partial gamma statistics for these last two relationships in table 7.3(B) indicates that although the effect of the control variable 'employees' is evident (in the case of size of urban programme grants, zero order $\gamma = .65$, first order partial $\gamma = .44$, and in the case of the size of grants from all three schemes, zero order $\gamma = .59$, first order partial $\gamma = .44$) nevertheless there is a clear association, independent of the effects of the control variables.

(xiii) **Organisations in Receipt of Grants in the Previous Five Years:-** These organisations tended to have larger memberships ($r_C = .28^*$), bigger budgets ($r_C = .42^{**}$), to be better 'established' ($r_C = .29^*$) and to be more likely to have full time employees ($r_B = .42^{**}$). This variable was significantly related to the total size of grants under the urban programme 1982-4 ($r_C = .30^*$) though the intervening effects of the control variables size of budget (zero order $\gamma = .43$: partial first order $\gamma = .29$), and 'establishment index' (zero order $\gamma = .41$: partial first order $\gamma = .20$) are evident in table 7.3(B).

In summary, as one might expect, given the purpose of the Urban Programme, the variable most clearly associated overall with the policy outcome variables is that of 'projects serving disadvantaged groups'. This variable is not significantly associated with any other descriptors which are themselves associated significantly with the policy outcome variables.

However the analysis also highlights the strength of associations (independent of the effects of control variables) of three other descriptors, 'organisations with

one or more full-time employees', 'political activity', and 'establishment / political skills index'. The process of the construction of the urban programme and the consideration of bids means that those organisations with resources (particularly employees) and a working knowledge of the local government system and the actors within that system, are more likely to be successful in securing grant aid. This contrasts with the findings for both other grant aid programmes.

(c) Cultural Grant Aid Scheme

The 'policy outcome' variables employed in this section of the analysis differ from those employed for the other two grant aid schemes insofar as it is not possible to use success / failure in application for cultural grant aid as a variable. All but three of the organisations whose applications were considered by the Leisure Services Sub-committee under this scheme were successful. The policy output indicators employed are therefore reduced to three in number, and are as follows 'success with more than one application for grant aid under the cultural organisations scheme 1981-4', 'size of total grant under cultural organisations scheme 1981-4', and 'size of total grant under all three leisure schemes 1981-4'.

(i) **Age:-** In contrast to the Sport and Recreation Grant Aid scheme, age is significantly, positively related to all three of the policy outcome variables - 'more than one successful application for cultural grant aid 1981-4' ($r_c = .33^*$), 'size of cultural grant aid received 1981-4' ($r_c = .22^*$) and 'size of total leisure grant received 1981-4' ($r_c = .24^*$). However, organisational age was also related to size of budget ($r_B = .35^{**}$), membership size ($r_B = .27^*$), receipt of grant in the previous five years ($r_c = .42^{**}$) and to organisations with projects serving disadvantaged groups ($r_c = -.44^{**}$). When the effects of these variables are controlled for, the level of association between age and policy outcome variables is substantially reduced.

(ii) **Membership Size:-** Large organisations tended to be better 'established' ($r_c = .32^*$), and less likely to be seeking grant aid for

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**TABLE 7.2(C): SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR CROSS TABULATIONS OF VARIABLES
CULTURAL GRANT AID
(EXTRACTED FROM TABLES 7.4(C) & 7.5(C))**

	Age	Size	Employees	Budget	Own Premises	> 1 Successful Application Cultural Orgs Scheme 1981-4	Size Total Cultural Grants 1981-4	Size Total Leisure Grants 1981
Age	-,-					$r_c = .33^*$	$r_b = .22^*$	$r_b = .24^*$
Size	$r_b = .27^*$	-,-				$r_c = .39^*$	$r_b = .16$	$r_b = .24^*$
Employees	$r_c = -.13$	$r_c = -.14$	-,-			$r_b = -.02$	$r_c = .34^{**}$	$r_c = .32^*$
Size of Budget	$r_b = .35^{**}$	$r_b = .16$	$r_c = .47^{**}$	-,-		$r_c = .47^{**}$	$r_b = .60^{**}$	$r_b = .51^{**}$
Own Premises	$r_c = -.03$	$r_c = .06$	$r_b = .59^{**}$	$r_c = .48^{**}$	-,-	$r_b = .09$	$r_c = .29^*$	$r_c = .26^*$
Mutual Aid Org	$r_c = .12$	$r_c = .08$	$r_b = -.59^{**}$	$r_c = -.30^{**}$	$r_b = -.39^{**}$	$r_b = .01$	$r_c = -.13$	$r_c = -.10$
High Arts	$r_c = .26$	$r_c = .24$	$r_b = -.41^{**}$	$r_c = .04$	$r_b = -.33^*$	$r_b = .28$	$r_c = .13$	$r_c = .01$
Establishment / Pol. Skills Index	$r_c = .05$	$r_c = .32^*$	$r_c = .17$	$r_c = .34^{**}$	$r_c = .20$	$r_c = .22$	$r_c = .40^{**}$	$r_c = .33^{**}$
Political Actv.	$r_c = -.08$	$r_c = -.04$	$r_b = .62^{**}$	$r_c = .25$	$r_b = .32^*$	$r_b = .00$	$r_c = .21$	$r_c = .17$
Previous Grant	$r_c = .42^{**}$	$r_c = .16$	$r_b = .18$	$r_c = .70^{**}$	$r_b = .10$	$r_b = .59^{**}$	$r_c = .47^{**}$	$r_c = .33^*$
Disadvantaged Group	$r_c = -.44^{**}$	$r_c = -.43^{**}$	$r_b = .16$	$r_c = -.16$	$r_b = .03$			
Disadv. Ward	$r_c = -.10$	$r_c = -.11$	$r_b = .10$	$r_c = .03$	$r_b = .17$			
Hire Council Premises	$r_c = .05$	$r_c = .00$	$r_b = -.47^{**}$	$r_c = -.37^*$	$r_b = -.67^{**}$			
		Disadvantaged Groups	Disadvantaged Wards	Hire Council Premises		> 1 Successful Application Cultural Orgs. Scheme 1981-4	Size Total Cultural Grants 1981-4	Size Total Leisure Grants 1981-
Disadvantaged Group		-,-				$r_b = -.42^{**}$	$r_c = -.11$	$r_c = -.17$
Disadv. Ward		$r_b = .32^*$	-,-			$r_b = -.08$	$r_c = .11$	$r_c = .06$
Hire Council Premises		$r_b = -.15$	$r_b = .12$	-,-		$r_b = -.15$	$r_c = -.26$	$r_c = -.19$
Mutual Aid Org		$r_b = -.41^{**}$	$r_b = -.15$	$r_b = .31^*$				
High Arts		$r_b = -.54^{**}$	$r_b = -.24$	$r_b = .36^*$				
Establishment / Pol. Skills Index		$r_c = -.06$	$r_c = .14$	$r_c = -.02$				
Political Actv.		$r_b = .32^*$	$r_b = .27$	$r_b = -.21$				
Previous Grant		$r_b = -.40^{**}$	$r_b = -.03$	$r_b = -.14$				

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projects serving disadvantaged groups ($\tau_c = -.43^{**}$). This variable is associated significantly with two policy outcome variables, 'more than one successful application for cultural grant aid 1981-4' ($\tau_c = .38^*$) and 'size of total leisure grant received 1981-4' ($\tau_B = .24^*$). In both cases however the association is significantly diminished by the effects of control variables.

- (iii) **Organisations with Full-time Employee(s):-** Organisations with employees were less likely to be mutual aid groups ($\tau_B = -.59^{**}$), or to be applying for grant aid for the 'high arts' ($\tau_B = -.41^{**}$). This reflects perhaps the existence in the population of a number of amateur drama and classical music groups (with no employees), together with some organisations such as community development groups (with employees) for whom cultural activity is not their sole or even primary concern. Organisations with employees were also more likely to be politically active ($\tau_B = .62^{**}$). This variable is associated significantly with two 'policy outcome' variables, those being 'size of cultural grant aid received 1981-4' ($\tau_c = .34^{**}$) and 'size of total leisure grant received 1981-4' ($\tau_c = .32^*$). In both cases controlling for the effects of budget size substantially reduces the strength of the association (the partial first order γ in both cases falling to .14 from .80 and .77 respectively).

(iv) **Size of Budget:-** Organisations with larger budgets tended to be older ($\tau_B = .35^{**}$), were more likely to own their own premises ($\tau_c = .48^{**}$), have full-time employees ($\tau_c = .47^{**}$), to be well established ($\tau_c = .34^{**}$), and to have received grant aid in the previous five years ($\tau_c = .70^{**}$). Size of budget was also significantly positively associated with all 'policy outcome' variables, 'more than one successful application for cultural grant aid 1981-4' ($\tau_c = .47^{**}$), 'size of cultural grant aid received 1981-4' ($\tau_B = .60^{**}$), and 'size of total leisure grant received 1981-4' ($\tau_B = .51^{**}$). However in respect of the statistical relationship with the first of the 'policy outcome' variables, controlling for the effect of 'organisations in receipt of grant aid in the previous five years' clearly reduces the strength of the association (zero order $\gamma = .53$: partial first order $\gamma = -.13$). Nevertheless, as table 7.3 (c) indicates, there is an

association between this variable and the other two policy outcome indicators which is independent of the effects of the control variables.

(v) **'Organisations Seeking Grant Aid for Projects Serving Disadvantaged Groups':**- These organisations tended to be younger ($\tau_c = -.44^*$), smaller ($\tau_c = -.43^{**}$), and were less likely to have been in receipt of a grant in the previous five years ($\tau_B = -.40^{**}$), to be seeking grant aid for the high arts ($\tau_B = -.54^{**}$), or to be mutual aid groups ($\tau_B = -.41^{**}$). However though they were more likely to be politically active ($\tau_B = .32^*$), there was a significant negative relationship between this variable and that of having 'more than one successful application for cultural grant aid 1981-4' ($\tau_B = -.42^{**}$) which is not explained by the intervening effects of control variables.

(vi) **'Organisations Serving Predominantly Disadvantaged Wards':**- This variable was significantly related only to that of organisations seeking aid for projects serving disadvantaged groups ($\tau_B = .32^*$)

(vii) **'Organisation Predominantly Using Council Facilities':**- These organisations tended to be smaller ($\tau_c = -.37^{**}$) and to be less likely to have full-time employees ($\tau_B = -.47^{**}$). However this variable was not significantly associated with any of the 'policy outcome' variables.

(viii) **'Mutual Aid Organisations':**- These groups tended to have smaller budgets ($\tau_c = -.30^{**}$), not to have full-time employees ($\tau_B = -.59^{**}$), to be less politically active ($\tau_B = -.43^{**}$), to use council facilities ($\tau_B = .31^*$), and not to be seeking aid for projects serving disadvantaged groups ($\tau_B = -.41^{**}$). However there was no significant association with 'policy outcome' variables.

(ix) **'Organisations Seeking Grant Aid for the High Arts':**- These groups tended to be mutual aid organisations ($\tau_B = .49^{**}$), without any full-time employees ($\tau_B = -.41^{**}$), making use of council facilities or premises ($\tau_B = .36^*$). Once again there was no significant relationship with 'policy outcome' variables.

(x) **'Establishment / Political Skills Index':**- Established organisations tended to be large ($r_c = .32^*$), with larger budgets ($r_c = .34^{**}$). This variable was significantly associated with two of the three 'policy outcome' variables, 'size of cultural grant aid received 1981-4' ($r_c = .40^{**}$) and 'size of total leisure grant received 1981-4' ($r_c = .33^{**}$). However, in the case of the latter relationship, controlling for budget size significantly reduces the strength of association (zero order $\gamma = .43$: partial first order $\gamma = .15$).

(xi) **'Political Activity':**- Types of organisation which were more likely to be politically active were those with projects serving disadvantaged groups ($r_B = .32^*$), those with full-time employees ($r_B = .62^{**}$), well established organisations ($r_c = .25^*$) and those which owned their own premises ($r_B = .32^*$). Mutual aid ($r_B = -.43^{**}$), and organisations seeking grants for the high arts ($r_B = -.64^{**}$) tended to be less politically active. However there was no significant relationship between the 'policy outcome' variables and political activity.

(xii) **'Organisations in Receipt of Grant Aid in the Previous Five Years':**- Those organisations which had been in receipt of a grant in the previous five years tended to be seeking grant aid for the high arts ($r_B = .44^{**}$) rather than for projects serving disadvantaged groups ($r_B = -.40^{**}$). These were on the whole larger organisations ($r_c = .42^{**}$) with bigger annual budgets ($r_c = .70^{**}$). This variable was significantly associated with all three 'policy outcome' variables, 'more than one successful application for cultural grant aid 1981-4' ($r_B = .58^{**}$), 'size of cultural grant aid received 1981-4' ($r_c = .47^{**}$), and 'size of total leisure grant received 1981-4' ($r_c = .33^{**}$). However in respect of these last two 'policy outcome' variables the strength of the relationship is reduced by controlling for size of budget (zero order $\gamma = .78$: partial first order $\gamma = .38$) in the case of 'size of cultural grant aid received 1981-4', and by controlling for the age of the organisation (zero order $\gamma = .52$: partial first order $\gamma = .14$) in the case of 'size of total leisure grant received 1981-4'.

The findings reported here in respect of the cultural grant aid scheme indicate that the organisations which were most likely to obtain large grants were older, better 'established', had at least one full-time employee, had received grant aid in the past, or had their own premises. Those most likely to succeed with a grant application under the Cultural Organisations scheme on more than one occasion over the period 1981-4, were older, larger, had bigger budgets, had received grants over the previous five years and were not seeking aid to serve disadvantaged groups.

It is interesting to note that political activity was not significantly associated with the policy output variables (despite the significance of 'establishment / political skills index'). This presumably reflects the way in which the grant application scheme is administered with perennial recipients being contacted by the Council at the beginning of each year and invited to apply for grant aid.

When the influence of control variables is taken into account, the two variables which manifest a strong, 'independent' association with the policy outcome indicator 'more than one successful application for cultural grant aid 1981-4' are 'organisations in receipt of grant aid in the previous five years', and 'grant applications for projects serving disadvantaged groups'. (In the latter case a negative relationship exists.) The only variable which is independently related to the size of grant received, both under the cultural grant aid scheme and under all three schemes taken together, is that of size of budget.

7.6 CONCLUSION

The pattern of grant aid which emerges from the analysis of sport and recreation, and Urban Programme grants reflects some political priorities articulated in Council policy statements (and reflects some which were not). The sport and recreation grant aid data provides evidence of the (independent) influence of 'age', 'disadvantaged groups', and 'mutual aid organisations'. New organisations tended to be more likely to receive grant aid, reflecting the Council's policy of providing 'seed money' for new projects. However the lower

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level of success of mutual aid organisations highlights the favoured position of organisations which operate with some social aim other than simple mutual aid. Sports policy would appear to be being used here as an arm of social policy to achieve desired social goals, a criterion which is not explicitly acknowledged by the politicians and professionals involved in the operation of this grant aid scheme. Positive discrimination in favour of disadvantaged groups was said, by the officer responsible for administering this scheme, to be an implicit criterion in grant aid decision-making. Although interviews with members suggested that such positive discrimination was not wholeheartedly supported by all members, it was promoted by 'political aspirant' and 'new prominent members'. The significance of this criterion for allocation of grant aid is reflected in the independent association between this variable and policy outcomes.

The Urban Programme is explicitly aimed at providing support for disadvantaged groups (in the case of this authority, on a "non-area specific basis"). Indicators of policy outcomes were associated with the variable 'disadvantaged groups' but not with 'organisations serving disadvantaged areas' which is consistent with these policy guidelines. Furthermore, the corporatist nature of the the policy process in this grant aid scheme is reflected in the data. Those organisations which were well integrated into the local government network (registering a high establishment and political skill index, and which had one or more full-time employees) were more likely to achieve success in applications for funds. Some caution should be exercised in drawing conclusions about the nature of cause and effect. In some cases receipt of grant might have resulted in organisations taking on one or more employees and in the local authority taking greater interest in the operation of that group, so that the incorporation of the organisation took place after receipt of grant aid. However in only one case in the Leisure Programme Area had a grant resulted in an organisation taking on full time employees for the first time, and that group had senior members and officers of the Council on its executive committee prior to its application for grant aid. Even were this not the case, the operation of the Urban Programme can be seen to reinforce a system of 'incorporated', 'recognised', and 'acceptable' community groups, operating with the local authority and the Department of Environment, ostensibly to achieve shared aims.

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As was the case with the sport and recreation grant aid scheme, the negative relationship between indicators of grant aid success and mutual aid organisations suggests an emphasis on the use of leisure policy for extrinsic purposes.

In the case of the final grant aid scheme, that for cultural organisations, political priorities were rather less clear. The inspecific nature of the criteria described in policy statements was compounded by a lack of consensus about the value of particular cultural forms, and a concern on the part of some members about the failure of many of the cultural activities traditionally supported by the local authority to reflect the cultural interests of disadvantaged groups. While in other areas of leisure services the 'apolitical' stance of the backbench traditionalists had been challenged, in this instance the nature of the policy practices involved appears to have provided a significant barrier to any radical reshaping of the pattern of grant aid. The organisational factors which were most strongly related to policy outcomes were receipt of grant aid in the previous five years, size of budget, and index of establishment and political skills. The implicit criterion taken into account in reaching decisions about whether or not to provide grant aid would seem to be whether the organisation had been supported in the past. During the research period there was only one organisation which had received aid in the past and which had a request for aid denied. All other 'repeat' applications were accepted. Continued revenue funding may well have fostered grant aid dependency among some organisations making the consequences of failing to continue to aid such organisations more serious. Thus the *process* of inviting applications from organisations previously supported, militated against the reshaping of patterns of grant aid according to new political priorities.

One of the aims of this element of the study was to investigate the relationship between political values and policy outcomes in a specific and limited area of leisure policy. Each of the three schemes of grant aid considered operated in different ways, had different policy aims, and manifested different relationships between policy outcomes and those aims. The Urban Programme (Leisure Programme Area) had a formal mechanism built into its operation for an annual review of policy priorities. Local politicians therefore had the opportunity to overlay the

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policy process with their own political values (as long as these were consistent with the Department of the Environment's own criteria for allocation of financial assistance). Nevertheless the findings of this analysis of policy outcomes demonstrate how the process of inviting bids in the Urban Programme, influenced outcomes to some degree with well established and incorporated organisations gaining the greatest resources from the scheme. Although the sport and recreation grant aid scheme had not been subject to the same annual review, the fact that it offered predominantly 'one-off' grants meant that in considering individual cases the opportunity had been available for evaluating each claim through the filter of political values. The question of whether the political values reflected in policy outcomes were those of Leisure Services members, influential members, or of officers is nevertheless open, since, for example, in filtering grant applications going to committees for decisions about grant aid, opportunities for officer influence (conscious or unconscious, overt or covert) existed and were acknowledged by members. Decisions about grant aid are, therefore, perhaps best described as 'negotiated' outcomes between all these groups of actors. However the mechanism for decisions about cultural grant aid was more resistant to the influence of political values. Policy outcomes here would appear to have been heavily influenced by 'tradition', what had gone before. This may well have resulted in policy outcomes which would appeal to backbench traditionalists and perhaps to officers who have a professional (and / or personal) attachment to traditional cultural forms. Nevertheless, they are outcomes which, though consonant with some political values and dissonant with others, were a function, not of any political debate in the policy process but rather of the practices adopted for policy implementation in this element of the Leisure Services Sub-committee's work. In this case therefore, any reshaping of patterns of grant aid would be difficult to achieve without radical reform of the process adopted for inviting and considering applications.

TABLE 7.3(A): CROSSTABULATIONS BETWEEN POLICY OUTCOME VARIABLES AND ORGANISATION / GRANT APPLICATION CHARACTERISTICS, CONTROLLING FOR THE INTERMEDIATE EFFECTS OF MUTUALLY RELATED VARIABLES - SPORT & RECREATION GRANT AID

	<u>Successful Applicants for Sport & Rec Grant Aid 1981-4</u>		<u>Size of Total Sport & Recn Grants 1981-4</u>		<u>Size of Total Leisure Grants 1981-4</u>	
	Zero Order Gamma	Partial First Order Gamma	Zero Order Gamma	Partial First Order Gamma	Zero Order Gamma	Partial First Order Gamma
<u>AGE</u> controlling for -						
size;	-.57	-.58				
applications for sporting activities;	-.57	-.51	-.40	-.38	-.38	-.37
mutual aid orgs;	-.57	-.51	-.40	-.36	-.38	-.35
disadvantaged wards;	-.57	-.46				
disadvantaged groups;	-.57	-.47	-.40	-.30	-.39	-.25
own premises;	-.55	-.45	-.39	-.28	-.37	-.22
hire council premises;	-.55	-.41	-.39	-.25	-.37	-.23
size of budget;	-.57	-.54				
political activity;					-.35	-.39
<u>SIZE</u> controlling for -						
age;	-.30	-.02				
budget	-.32	-.25				
disadvantaged ward;	-.30	-.27				
disadvantaged group;	-.30	-.19				
own premises;	-.36	-.17				
hire council premises;	-.36	-.22				
<u>BUDGET</u> controlling for -						
age	-.21	-.05				
size	-.23	-.03				
disadvantaged ward	-.24	-.19				
disadvantaged group	-.24	-.02				
own premises	-.25	-.08				
hire council premises	-.25	-.06				
<u>POLITICAL ACTIVITY</u> controlling for -						
mutual aid organisations					-.36	-.19
establishment / pol. skills index					-.36	-.33
<u>ESTABLISHMENT / POLITICAL SKILLS INDEX</u> controlling for -						
political activity					.22	.16
mutual aid organisations					.22	.02
<u>SPORTING ACTIVITIES</u> controlling for -						
age	-.71	-.44	-.51	-.34	-.47	-.39
mutual aid organisations	-.58	-.53	-.44	-.37	-.39	-.32
disadvantaged groups	-.58	-.44	-.44	-.31	-.39	-.25

(CONT.)

TABLE 7.3 (A) CONTINUED. CROSSRELATIONS BETWEEN POLICY OUTCOME VARIABLES AND ORGANISATION / GRANT APPLICATION CHARACTERISTICS.

	Successful Applicants for Sport				Size of Total Sport & Recn				Size of Total Leisure			
	B Rec Grant Aid 1981-4		Grants 1981-4		Grants 1981-4		Grants 1981-4		Grants 1981-4		Grants 1981-4	
	Partial First	Zero Order	Partial First	Zero Order	Partial First	Zero Order	Partial First	Zero Order	Partial First	Zero Order	Partial First	Zero Order
MUTUAL AID ORGANISATIONS controlling for -												
age	-.84		-.77		-.62		-.57		-.58		-.51	
applications for sporting												
activities	-.84		-.97		-.61		-.67		-.57		-.40	
disadvantaged groups	-.84		-.73		-.61		-.47		-.57		-.47	
own premises	-.81		-.79		-.59		-.54		-.55		-.50	
political activity					-.62		-.54		-.58		-.50	
DISADVANTAGED WARDS controlling for -												
age	.39		-.15									
size	.41		.26									
budget	.41		.16									
own premises	.43		.29									
hire council premises	.43		.26									
OWN PREMISES controlling for -												
age	-.54		.2		-.41		-.11		-.43		-.19	
size	-.54		-.42									
budget	-.55		-.56									
mutual aid organisations	-.56		-.50		-.43		-.40		-.45		-.44	
disadvantaged ward	-.56		-.49									
disadvantaged group	-.56		-.29		-.43		-.26		-.45		-.28	
hire council premises	-.56		-.17		-.43		-.11		-.45		-.16	
HIRE COUNCIL PREMISES controlling for -												
age	.63		.25		.47		.16		.46		.22	
size	.63		.48									
budget	.64		.63									
disadvantaged ward	.64		.61		.49		.46		.48		.32	
disadvantaged group	.64		.43		.49		.37		.48		.32	
own premises	.64		.56		.49		.42		.48		.35	
DISADVANTAGED GROUPS controlling for -												
age	.66		.42		.46		.35		.48		.40	
size	.66		.46									
budget	.69		.62									
applications for sporting												
activities	.69		.67		.48		.49		.50		.51	
mutual aid organisations	.67		.61		.48		.44		.50		.48	
disadvantaged ward	.67		.57		.48		.41		.49		.43	
own premises	.66		.58		.46		.40		.49		.43	
hire council premises	.66		.49		.46		.29		.49		.34	

TABLE 7.3(B): CROSSTABULATIONS BETWEEN POLICY OUTCOME VARIABLES AND ORGANISATION / GRANT APPLICATION CHARACTERISTICS
CONTROLLING FOR THE INTERMEDIATE EFFECTS OF MUTUALLY RELATED VARIABLES - URBAN PROGRAMME (LEISURE) GRANT AID

	<u>Successful Applicants for Urban</u> <u>Prog (Leisure) Grant Aid 1982-4</u>		<u>Size of Total Urban Prog</u> <u>(Leisure) Grants 1982-4</u>		<u>Size of Total Leisure</u> <u>Grants 1981-4</u>	
	Zero Order Gamma	Partial First Order Gamma	Zero Order Gamma	Partial First Order Gamma	Zero Order Gamma	Partial First Order Gamma
<u>EMPLOYEES</u> controlling for -						
budget			.76	.71		
political activity			.81	.74	.69	.59
establishment / political skills			.82	.67	.70	.62
grant in previous five years			.79	.76		
<u>BUDGET</u> controlling for -						
employee(s)			.36	-.08		
establishment / political skills			.43	.08		
grant in previous five years			.38	.31		
<u>POLITICAL ACTIVITY</u> controlling for -						
employee(s)			.65	.44	.59	.44
budget			.67	.69		
establishment / political skills			.67	.53	.61	.48
mutual aid organisations			.66	.66	.63	.59
<u>ESTABLISHMENT / POLITICAL SKILLS INDEX</u> controlling for -						
employee(s)			.57	.28	.49	.33
budget			.57	.50		
political activity			.57	.45	.49	.34
mutual aid organisations	.39	.40	.57	.49		
grant in previous five years			.58	.54		
<u>MUTUAL AID ORGANISATIONS</u> controlling for -						
political activity	-.62	-.19	-.46	-.15	-.35	-.04
establishment / political skills	-.62	-.61	-.53	-.32	-.42	-.32
<u>IN RECEIPT OF GRANT IN PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS</u> controlling for -						
employee(s)			.43	.56		
budget			.43	.29		
establishment / political skills			.42	.20		

TABLE 7.3(C): CROSSTABULATIONS BETWEEN POLICY OUTCOME VARIABLES AND ORGANISATION / GRANT APPLICATION CHARACTERISTICS,
CONTROLLING FOR THE INTERMEDIATE EFFECTS OF MUTUALLY RELATED VARIABLES - CULTURAL ORGANISATIONS GRANT AID

	<u>> 1 Successful Application for</u> <u>Cultural Grant Aid 1981-4</u>		<u>Size of Total Cultural</u> <u>Grants 1981-4</u>		<u>Size of Total Leisure</u> <u>Grants 1981-4</u>	
	Zero Order Gamma	Partial First Order Gamma	Zero Order Gamma	Partial First Order Gamma	Zero Order Gamma	Partial First Order Gamma
<u>AGE</u> controlling for -						
budget	.35	.09	.23	-.14	.26	.07
disadvantaged groups	.39	.19				
grant in previous five years	.45	.24	.29	.09	.32	.15
<u>SIZE</u> controlling for -						
age	.48	.31	.22	.08		
disadvantaged groups	.48	.19				
establishment / political skills			.23	.01		
<u>BUDGET</u> controlling for -						
age	.57	.53	.71	.54	.62	.38
employee(s)			.71	.63	.62	.50
own premises			.74	.73	.64	.59
grant in previous five years	.53	-.13	.70	.66	.60	.64
establishment / political skills			.72	.68	.63	.52
<u>ESTABLISHMENT / POLITICAL SKILLS INDEX</u> controlling for -						
size					.47	.45
budget			.52	.36	.43	.15
<u>DISADVANTAGED GROUP</u> controlling for -						
age	-.76	-.76				
size	-.76	-.57				
grant in previous five years	-.79	-.62				
<u>OWN PREMISES</u> controlling for -						
employee(s)					.51	-.25
budget					.51	-1.00
<u>IN RECEIPT OF GRANT IN PREVIOUS 5 YEARS</u> controlling for -						
age	.92	1.00	.71	.49		
budget	.93	1.00	.78	.38	.59	.23
disadvantaged groups	.92	.86				
<u>EMPLOYEES</u> controlling for -						
budget			.90	.14	.77	.14
own premises			.92	.77	.90	.38

TABLE 7.4(A): SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR CROSS TABULATIONS OF ORGANISATION / GRANT APPLICATION DESCRIPTORS

SPORT AND RECREATION GRANT AID

	Age	Size	Gender	Full-time Employee(s)	Budget	Political Activity	Second Order Organisations	Establishment Pol. Sk. Ind	Sporting Activities	Mutual Aid Organisations	Disadvantaged Wards	Disadvantaged Groups	Own Premises	Grant in Previous 5 Yrs	Hire Council Premises	Ward-City- Region
Age	-,-	$r_s = .41^{**}$	$\lambda = .01$	$r_c = .08$	$r_s = .34^{**}$	$r_c = .05$	$r_c = .07$	$r_c = .04$	$r_c = .20^{**}$	$r_c = .23^{**}$	$r_c = -.37^{**}$	$r_c = -.52^{**}$	$r_c = .54^{**}$	$r_c = .22^{**}$	$r_c = -.58^{**}$	$r_c = .02$
Size		-,-	$\lambda = .11$	$r_c = .31^{**}$	$r_s = .47^{**}$	$r_c = .25^*$	$r_c = .11^*$	$r_c = .19^*$	$r_c = .01$	$r_c = -.09$	$r_c = -.23^{**}$	$r_c = -.42^{**}$	$r_c = .55^{**}$	$r_c = .31^{**}$	$r_c = -.48^{**}$	$r_c = .09$
Gender'			-,-	$\lambda = .18$	$\lambda = .16$	$\lambda = .08$	$\lambda = .02$	$\lambda = .20$	$\lambda = .16$	$\lambda = .10$	$\lambda = .00^2$	$\lambda = .06$	$\lambda = .04$	$\lambda = .28^{**}$	$\lambda = 0.0^{**2}$	$\lambda = .05$
Full-time Employees				-,-	$r_c = .50^{**}$	$r_s = .16^*$	$r_s = -.11$	$r_c = .39^{**}$	$r_s = -.08^*$	$r_s = -.13$	$r_s = .05$	$r_s = -.08$	$r_s = .21^{**}$	$r_s = .21^{**}$	$r_s = -.18^{**}$	$r_c = -.10$
Budget					-,-	$r_c = .38^{**}$	$r_c = -.03$	$r_c = .21^*$	$r_c = -.06$	$r_c = -.06$	$r_c = -.25^{**}$	$r_c = -.57^{**}$	$r_c = .65^{**}$	$r_c = .43^{**}$	$r_c = -.65^{**}$	$r_c = .01$
Political Activity						-,-	$r_s = .08$	$r_c = .50^{**}$	$r_s = -.13$	$r_s = -.33^{**}$	$r_s = -.14^*$	$r_s = .08$	$r_s = -.002$	$r_s = .28^{**}$	$r_s = -.01$	$r_c = -.03$
Second Order Organisations							-,-	$r_c = .14^{**}$	$r_s = .11$	$r_s = -.27^{**}$	$r_s = -.17^*$	$r_s = -.02$	$r_s = -.20^{**}$	$r_s = -.06$	$r_s = .19^*$	$r_c = .46^{**}$
Establishment / Pol. Skills Index								-,-	$r_c = -.06$	$r_c = -.33^{**}$	$r_c = .11$	$r_c = .13$	$r_c = -.02$	$r_c = .34^{**}$	$r_c = .05$	$r_c = -.02$
Sporting Activities									-,-	$r_s = .44^{**}$	$r_s = -.11$	$r_s = -.19^*$	$r_s = .10$	$r_s = -.11$	$r_s = -.02$	$r_s = .04$
Mutual Aid Organisations										-,-	$r_s = -.08$	$r_s = -.32^{**}$	$r_s = .18^*$	$r_s = -.14^*$	$r_s = -.14^*$	$r_c = -.11^*$
Disadvantaged Wards											-,-	$r_s = .44^{**}$	$r_s = -.31^{**}$	$r_s = .01$	$r_s = .31^{**}$	$r_c = -.30^{**}$
Disadvantaged Groups												-,-	$r_s = -.55^{**}$	$r_s = -.01$	$r_s = .60^{**}$	$r_c = -.04$
Own Premises													-,-	$r_s = .16$	$r_s = -.75^{**}$	$r_c = -.18$
Grant in Previous 5 Years														-,-	$r_s = -.27^{**}$	$r_c = -.01$
Hire Council Premises															-,-	$r_c = .09$
Organisations Serving Ward-City-Region																-,-

** = significant at 0.01 ; * = significant at 0.05

' = significance of χ^2 is indicated for the nominal variable 'gender'

2 = 1 value is 0 due to distribution of modal value of one of the variables in a single category of the other variable against which it is cross-tabulated.

TABLE 7.4 (B): SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR CROSS TABULATIONS OF ORGANISATION / GRANT AID APPLICATION DESCRIPTORS -

URBAN PROGRAMME (LEISURE) GRANT AID

	Age	Size	Full-time Employee(s)	Budget	Political Activity	Establishment Pol, Sk, Incx	Sporting Activities	Mutual Aid Organisations	Disadvantaged Wards	Disadvantaged Groups	Own Premises	Grant in Previous 5 Yrs.	Hire Council Premises	Ward-City-Region
Age	-,-	$r_s = .43^{**}$	$r_c = .03$	$r_s = .26^{**}$	$r_c = -.04$	$r_c = .05$	$r_c = .24$	$r_c = -.005$	$r_c = -.31^*$	$r_c = -.24^*$	$r_c = .39$	$r_c = .22$	$r_c = -.30^*$	$r_c = .02$
Size		-,-	$r_c = .28^*$	$r_s = .39^{**}$	$r_c = .06$	$r_c = .31^{**}$	$r_c = .16$	$r_c = .05$	$r_c = -.23$	$r_c = -.18$	$r_c = -.24$	$r_c = .28^*$	$r_c = -.25$	$r_c = .16$
Full-time Employees			-,-	$r_c = .55^{**}$	$r_s = .42^{**}$	$r_s = .59^{**}$	$r_s = -.17$	$r_s = -.19$	$r_s = .05$	$r_s = .21$	$r_s = .29^*$	$r_s = .42^{**}$	$r_s = -.12^*$	$r_s = .17^*$
Budget				-,-	$r_c = .33^{**}$	$r_c = .53^{**}$	$r_c = -.07$	$r_c = -.10$	$r_c = -.08$	$r_c = -.15$	$r_c = .59^{**}$	$r_c = .42^{**}$	$r_c = -.48^{**}$	$r_c = .25^*$
Political Activity					-,-	$r_c = .57^{**}$	$r_s = -.002$	$r_s = -.41^{**}$	$r_s = -.10$	$r_s = .14$	$r_s = .13$	$r_s = .13$	$r_s = .13$	$r_s = .03$
Establishment Political Skills Index						-,-	$r_c = .06$	$r_c = -.32^{**}$	$r_c = -.24$	$r_c = -.01$	$r_c = .26$	$r_c = .29^*$	$r_c = -.14$	$r_c = .23^{**}$
Sporting Activities							-,-	$r_s = .08$	$r_s = -.13$	$r_s = .01$	$r_s = -.09$	$r_s = -.06$	$r_s = .12$	$r_s = -.04$
Mutual Aid Organisations								-,-	$r_s = .08$	$r_s = -.21$	$r_s = .01$	$r_s = .07$	$r_s = -.07$	$r_s = -.04$
Disadvantaged Wards									-,-	$r_s = .44^{**}$	$r_s = -.20$	$r_s = .06$	$r_s = .13$	$r_s = -.34^{**}$
Disadvantaged Groups										-,-	$r_s = -.28^*$	$r_s = .16$	$r_s = .27^{**}$	$r_s = -.22^*$
Own Premises											-,-	$r_s = .20$	$r_s = -.80^{**}$	$r_s = .22^*$
Grant in Previous 5 Years												-,-	$r_s = -.31^*$	$r_s = .02$
Hire Council Premises													-,-	$r_s = .18$
Organisations Serving Ward-City-Region														-,-

** - significant at < .01 * - significant at < .05

TABLE 7.5(A) - SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR CROSS TABULATIONS OF 'POLICY OUTCOME' VARIABLES WITH ORGANISATION / GRANT AID DESCRIPTORS:

	Successful Grant Applicants 1981-4	>1 Successful Grant Application 1981-4	Size of Total Sport & Recreation Grants 1981-4	Size of Total Leis. Grants 1981-4
Age	$r_c = -.47^{**}$	$r_c = .05$	$r_c = -.27^{**}$	$r_c = -.30^{**}$
Size	$r_c = -.24^*$	$r_c = .05$	$r_c = -.08$	$r_c = -.07$
Gender	$\epsilon = .22$	$\epsilon = .12$	$\epsilon = .23$	$\epsilon = .21$
Full-time Employees	$r_B = .03$	$r_B = .03$	$r_c = .05$	$r_c = .04$
Budget	$r_c = -.19$	$r_c = .07$	$r_c = -.08$	$r_c = -.11$
Political Activity	$r_B = .13$	$r_B = .15$	$r_c = .21^*$	$r_c = .24^{**}$
Second Order Organisations	$r_B = .02$	$r_B = .04$	$r_c = -.02$	$r_c = -.02$
Establishment Index	$r_c = .14$	$r_c = .04$	$r_c = .11$	$r_c = .13^*$
Sporting Activities	$r_B = -.20$	$r_B = -.13$	$r_c = -.16^*$	$r_c = -.14^*$
Mutual Aid Organisations	$r_B = -.35^{**}$	$r_B = -.14$	$r_c = -.32^{**}$	$r_c = -.30^{**}$
Disadvantaged Wards	$r_B = .19^*$	$r_B = .01$	$r_c = .15$	$r_c = .15$
Disadvantaged Groups	$r_B = .36^{**}$	$r_B = -.02$	$r_c = .34^{**}$	$r_c = .31^{**}$
Own Premises	$r_B = -.30^{**}$	$r_B = -.01$	$r_c = -.29^{**}$	$r_c = -.31^{**}$
Grant in Previous 5 Years	$r_B = .002$	$r_B = .08$	$r_c = -.02$	$r_c = .02$
Hire Council Premises	$r_B = .35^{**}$	$r_B = .09$	$r_c = .35^{**}$	$r_c = .31^{**}$
Organisations Serving Ward-City-Region	$r_c = .08$	$r_c = .06$	$r_c = .04$	$r_c = .03$

** = significant at < 0.01 ; * = significant at < 0.05

**TABLE 7.5(B): SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR CROSS TABULATIONS OF POLICY OUTCOME VARIABLES
ORGANISATION / GRANT APPLICATION DESCRIPTORS URBAN PROGRAMME (LEISURE) GRANT AID**

	Successful Grant Applicants 1981-4	Successful Grant Application 1981-4	Size of Total Urban Prog (Leisure) Grants 1981-4	Size of Total Leis. Grants 1981-4
Age	$r_c = -.18$	$r_c = .03$	$r_B = -.08$	$r_B = -.10$
Size	$r_c = -.18$	$r_c = .005$	$r_B = .004$	$r_B = -.06$
Full-time Employees	$r_B = .19$	$r_B = .14$	$r_c = .43^{**}$	$r_c = .29^{**}$
Budget	$r_c = .01$	$r_c = .26^*$	$r_B = .24^{**}$	$r_B = .13$
Political Activity	$r_B = .21$	$r_B = .13$	$r_c = .45^{**}$	$r_c = .36^{**}$
Establishment Political Skills Index	$r_c = .30^{**}$	$r_c = .10$	$r_c = .43^{**}$	$r_c = .30^{**}$
Sporting Activities	$r_B = -.16$	$r_B = -.13$	$r_c = -.10$	$r_c = -.06$
Mutual Aid Organisations	$r_B = -.33^{**}$	$r_B = -.18$	$r_c = -.34^{**}$	$r_c = -.29^*$
Disadvantaged Wards	$r_B = .03$	$r_B = .17$	$r_c = .10$	$r_c = .09$
Disadvantaged Groups	$r_B = .34^{**}$	$r_B = -.15$	$r_c = .29^*$	$r_c = .32^{**}$
Own Premises	$r_B = -.15$	$r_B = .06$	$r_c = .04$	$r_c = -.02$
Grant in Previous 5 Years	$r_B = -.02$	$r_B = .23$	$r_c = .30^*$	$r_c = .20$
Hire Council Premises	$r_B = .13$	$r_B = -.27^*$	$r_c = -.05$	$r_c = -.01$
Organisations Serving Ward-City-Region	$r_B = .08$	$r_B = .04$	$r_c = .12$	$r_c = .07$

** - significant at $< .01$

* - significant at $< .05$

TABLE 7.5(C): SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR CROSS TABULATIONS OF POLICY OUTCOME VARIABLES
WITH ORGANISATION / GRANT APPLICATION DESCRIPTORS - CULTURAL GRANT AID

	> 1 Successful Grant Application 1981-4 Cultural Grant Aid	Size of Total Cultural Grant Aid Received 1981-4	Size of Total Leisure Grants Received 1981-4
Age	$r_c = .33^*$	$r_B = .22^*$	$r_B = .24^*$
Size	$r_c = .38^*$	$r_B = .16$	$r_B = .25^*$
Full-time Employees	$r_B = -.02$	$r_c = .34^{**}$	$r_c = .32^{**}$
Budget	$r_c = .47^{**}$	$r_B = .60^{**}$	$r_B = .51^{**}$
Political Activity	$r_B = .0$	$r_c = .21$	$r_c = .17$
Establishment / Political Skills Index	$r_c = .22$	$r_c = .40^{**}$	$r_c = .33^{**}$
High Arts	$r_B = .28$	$r_c = .13$	$r_c = .01$
Mutual Aid Organisations	$r_B = .01$	$r_c = -.13$	$r_c = -.10$
Disadvantaged Wards	$r_B = -.08$	$r_c = .11$	$r_c = .06$
Disadvantaged Groups	$r_B = -.42^{**}$	$r_c = -.11$	$r_c = -.17$
Own Premises	$r_B = .09$	$r_c = .29^*$	$r_c = .26^*$
Grant in Previous 5 Years	$r_B = .58^{**}$	$r_c = .47^{**}$	$r_B = .33^*$
Hire Council Premises	$r_B = -.15$	$r_c = -.27$	$r_c = -.19$
Organisations Serving Ward-City-Region	$r_c = .11$	$r_c = .06$	$r_c = .12$

**PART 4: POLITICS, POLICY AND THE FUTURE
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEISURE SERVICES**

Chapter 8: Policy Orientations in Leisure Services and the Future of Local Government

8.1 LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEISURE POLICY AND THE DUAL STATE THESIS

In the opening chapter of this study, the dual state thesis was introduced as a vehicle for the evaluation of local government leisure policy-making. The thesis differentiates the role of central and local government along four principal dimensions, organisational, functional, ideological and political. The following discussion evaluates the usefulness of the thesis as a means of locating and describing the articulation and development of local government leisure policy in the light of the empirical analysis developed in the previous section.

The *organisational dimension* of the dual state thesis characterises and contrasts the corporate, centralised, relatively closed style of policy making at central government level, with local self determination. Leisure is one of the areas of local government policy which might perhaps be regarded as most likely to be locally determined, given the permissive nature of local government powers in this field and the lack of central government required standards of provision. It is accepted that central government will influence the *level* of local government expenditure more directly now than has been the case (through the 1980 Local Government Planning and Land Act, and the Local Government Finance Act of 1982) but anticipated that priorities in local spending patterns will be decided locally. However, local autonomy would seem to be subject to erosion in two important ways which have a direct bearing on leisure service provision. The first is that as local government budgets are squeezed, with a significant proportion of revenue budgets 'committed' because of previous decisions, and with many local government services being mandatory, local discretion to choose to make new spending commitments in non-mandatory services is likely to be severely curtailed. The second way in which local autonomy is threatened results from the growth of new special funding programmes. Given the pressure on mainstream local authority budgets, the Urban Programme and other centrally devised initiatives assume considerably

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more importance in the development of new spending projects. The use of 'targeted funding' with specific beneficiaries and / or policy aims stipulated in large part by central government erodes an element of local autonomy. As we noted in the discussion of the development of leisure policy in Chapter Three, such initiatives would seem to be significantly motivated by a concern with the potential for social disorder, and the interests of some less 'volatile', recreationally disadvantaged groups may therefore be deemphasised, as a response to national rather than local priorities. In the local authority case study reported in the previous section, for example, although the operation of the Urban Programme can be characterised as *local* corporatism, it should not be forgotten that the prioritisation of projects for financial support takes place within the wider context of priorities decided by central government and that some projects selected by the local process would not be approved by the Department of the Environment on behalf of central government. Furthermore, anticipation of failure to achieve approval for a particular project may well result in that project not being selected by the local authority (and its partners) for inclusion in the package of bids forwarded to the DOE. Thus support for the claim that leisure is one area of decision-making which may realistically be characterised as locally determined is being significantly eroded, both by squeezes on mainstream budgets and by the nature of control over decision-making in growth areas such as the Urban Programme.

It should be noted however, that the analysis of local authority spending patterns advanced in Chapter Four highlights the significance of political discretion concerning the level of leisure spending and spending on sport and recreation in Metropolitan Districts. This does suggest some significant local autonomy, at least in the major conurbations. However the pressure placed on local budgets since that period has increased with the 1980 and 1982 Acts constituting serious attempts to enforce centrally determined spending limits and it will be interesting for future research to identify whether this legislation has contributed to an 'evening out' of inter-party differences in levels of leisure spending.

The *functional dimension* of the dual state thesis characterises local concerns as lying predominantly with consumption services, central government concerning itself largely with production issues. Here again the case study

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material in Chapters Five and Six suggests difficulties with the thesis. The case study illustrates a local concern with leisure as a feature of local production rather than simply as a consumption service for local people. This took the form not only of proposals to increase marginal profit from trading services (such as catering) to off-set the losses made by some consumption services; it was also evident in the economic development concerns of members for example promoting the rebuilding of the theatre on the grounds of an anticipated local multiplier effect generated by increased tourism. There was even a proposal considered by the Leisure Services Sub-committee that the local authority should involve itself directly in the local economy by cooperating with a local manufacturer in the making and marketing of sports goods. Leisure is one of the more buoyant areas of the domestic economy with those in work enjoying higher levels of discretionary income (in real terms) and thus has become a likely vehicle for initiatives aimed at employment creation and economic development. Indeed, the competition between local authorities for the domestic tourism market (predominantly, the short second holiday segment) provides some parallels with the competition between nation states for industrial investment. The consumption-production distinction between local and central government is therefore also being eroded as local governments respond to the local effects of recession. Similarly central government is showing some propensity for involvement in what have traditionally been local consumption issues, with, for example, its recent interventions in the field of education, including the development of a national 'core curriculum'.

The distinction between the local and central state along the *ideological dimension* is also undermined to some degree by the evidence discussed in the case study. The notion that the local state is primarily concerned with the meeting of needs while the central state seeks to secure the conditions required for the continued profitability of capital is difficult to sustain. Local government economic development initiatives are invariably aimed at securing the conditions of local profitability in order to foster local investment. Thus for example local tourism initiatives may involve a local authority in designing a 'product' (a tourist package) which will be sold for profit by the private sector. In such circumstances 'profit' and local 'needs' are more than simply compatible, the former is seen as a necessary condition

of the latter. (Whether or not this is an accurate perception is another issue.)

The final element of the dual state thesis is the *political dimension*, in which local politics is characterised as 'competitive', pluralist, fostering democratic accountability and open access to decision-making. This is contrasted with the corporatist, closed nature of policy-making in central government. The case study material underlines the difficulty of characterising local government decision-making as pluralist. The operation of the three grant aiding schemes discussed illustrates the complex and variable approaches to decision-making which can coexist in a single area of leisure policy. Of course Saunders' thesis is intended to identify an organising tendency rather than a set of universal principles, but nevertheless examples such as the cultural grant aid scheme highlight the danger of regarding such policy areas as 'open' or 'democratically accountable'. The pressure on this type of traditionally closed area of policy-making may well render it open to wider participation in the future with the emergence of new types of local councillor, particularly in the Labour Party, with its emphasis on decentralization and local accountability. However, the development of corporate approaches to decision-making in local consumption services in the Urban Programme, and the operation of dominant coalitions in policy development, warn against simple characterisation of this level of political activity as pluralist. Furthermore, Dunleavy's argument, that pluralist explanations of local government activity underemphasise the power of the local government professional, is reinforced in the context of the case study by the accounts of decision-making given by councillors. Newer, policy-oriented members in particular expressed frustration concerning the relative influence of members and professionals.

The evidence reviewed in this study therefore suggests that the ideal typical distinctions identified within the dual state thesis to differentiate the nature of central and local government do not satisfactorily account for the form and function of local government activity in the leisure services field. This may, in part, be a reflection of the changing nature of local government in its response to the economic, social and political pressures to which it is subject in the 1980's. Certainly the erosion of the production-consumption

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division of labour reflects local government's concern with combatting the economic effects of the recession at local level. However, the other distinctions, the ideological, organisational and political dimensions of the thesis, would seem to have been similarly difficult to sustain even in the more 'stable' environment of the period of post war growth.

8.2 LEISURE POLICY ORIENTATIONS AMONG POLITICIANS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROFESSIONALS

The analysis of the assumptive worlds of local councillors and professionals involved in leisure services and related fields highlighted a wider range of policy orientations than those suggested by Dunleavy (1980). In his account of local government policy-making and urban politics, Dunleavy seeks to explain the approaches of both members and officers to local government policy by reference to what he terms 'ideological forms'. He identifies three 'common ideological forms', professionalism, partisanship, and managerialism, which interrelate or overlap to produce three further 'mixed ideological forms' (see figure 8.1). This analysis may be extended to accommodate the policy orientations specific to leisure services which have been identified in this study.

The defining features of the three common ideological forms are as follows.

(a) Professionalism.

This is described as the dominant orientation of local government officers with a commitment to their own area of 'professional' expertise. Elements of this ideological form include,

- the focussing of attention on a narrow span of policy-making which is the preserve of the particular profession, whether this be concerned with the social (e.g. housing, leisure) or physical (e.g. engineering) responsibilities of the authority;

- the deemphasising of continuity in policies across departmental boundaries, (e.g. leisure and education policies are largely discrete);
- stress on the development of professional, technical skills and learning from practice across local authority boundaries within the profession;
- a reliance on bureaucratic rules to foster autonomy from local politicians and other local government professions, with, in particular, control over the gathering of information being protected by such rules.

(b) *Partisanship*.

Dunleavy describes this as the dominant, though not universal, ideology of the local politician. He acknowledges that different parties and party factions will approach local politics in a more or less partisan fashion, but sees the major feature of this ideology as the aggregation of policy issues into district-wide, adversarial policy options. Thus when policy discussion lends itself the identification of partisan positions, with implications specific to the constituency of a local authority, political debate will be fuelled. On the other hand, however, policy issues which do not lend themselves to adversarial politics (and leisure has traditionally been described as apolitical) will tend to be downgraded in importance in this ideological form.

(c) *Managerialism*.

This is not to be confused with urban managerialism, but represents the professional ideology of the central executive and finance departments of local authorities. Here the stress is on fiscal and resource conservation, accountancy control and stringent accounting.

These three common ideological forms overlap or combine in various ways to produce three 'mixed ideological forms'.

(d) *Service Development* (a mixture of professionalism and partisanship).

Adversarial politics within this ideological form is muted into competitive service development among the parties, with politicians (and officers) seeking to obtain resources to sustain or develop the service areas for which they have responsibility, often at the cost of other services. This ideological form, Dunleavy argues, is central to the thinking of service committee chairmen, and is common among Labour and "modernizing" Conservative politicians but rejected by right wing Conservatives.

(e) *Ratepayer Ideology* (a mixture of managerialism and partisanship).

Here the primary concern is with the limiting of service expenditure in order to control domestic and commercial rates. This ideology is common among Conservatives, but is also evident in the case of some Labour chairmen of finance committees.

(f) *Corporate Ideology* (an admixture of partisanship, professionalism and professionalism).

Here the major concern is for unity of political, fiscal and administrative activity, such that policies are seen as mutually reinforcing rather than fragmentary. This ideology is typical of party group leaders, members of policy and resources or management committees, and chief executives.

Cutting across all these 'ideological forms' is what Dunleavy terms 'localism', the particular socio-economic characteristics, political organisation and history, and the structural features of the local authority and its population. Policy outcomes can thus be 'explained' in terms of the interplay between actors representing (or influenced by) both the various ideological forms and local conditions.

Dunleavy's analysis has been introduced in some detail here because, in a qualified form it can help to make sense of the development of leisure policy orientations identified in the empirical elements of this study. There are perhaps two principal limitations in terms of the usefulness of Dunleavy's

framework as it stands in informing our understanding of local government leisure policy. The first is that it oversimplifies the nature of professionalization in local government service professionals. There were important differences among the leisure professionals interviewed in the case study, and such differences presented themselves in significantly different approaches to leisure policy-making. The second, and related limitation, is that Dunleavy's framework is difficult to apply in an unqualified form when leisure (unlike most liberal welfare professions) is concerned with both consumption and production in local government. The rationale and mode of operation, the values and logic underpinning production will differ in important ways from those relating to consumption.

Overlaying Dunleavy's account of ideologies at work in local government with these two further sets of factors (the development of new kinds of professional, and leisure as an area of production) provides a structure for the analysis of leisure service policy orientations in local government which is illustrated in figure 8.1. Seven specific policy orientations are located within this amended framework, the first two of which relate directly to Dunleavy's 'mixed ideological forms'.

(i) *Minimalism and Cost Control:*

In the context of leisure services, this is a manifestation of ratepayer ideology. The emphasis is placed not simply on value for money in service provision, but on minimising or discontinuing discretionary services


(ii) *Traditional Service Development*

With regard to leisure services this policy orientation simply supports the sustaining (and where possible expansion) of existing facilities and services with traditional, professionally-dominated forms of service management and facility-oriented provision.

(iii) *Voluntarism*

Here the emphasis is not on cost cutting per se, but rather relates to an ideological commitment to the fostering of provision by the voluntary sector as the most flexible and effective means of adapting

Figure 8.1: LEISURE POLICY ORIENTATIONS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO DUNLEAVY'S "IDEOLOGICAL FORMS".



local services to meet local needs. Such an approach may draw on ratepayer ideology, though not necessarily so, since *larger scale* investment may be made in the voluntary sector to make the strategy more effective. Equally savings may accrue as the result of making use of volunteer labour and the displacement of administrative overheads etc. However, voluntarism is also likely to draw on corporate ideology, with its concern to infuse political values (partisanship) into the local policy process.

(iv) Entrepreneurial Style

This form of service development is possible in a public sector trading service. Savings on the general level of subsidy are made by taking advantage of market opportunities. The development of a joint equity scheme for a water slide, referred to in the case study, provides an example of just such an approach. This requires new skills on the part of the professional, more akin to those employed in the private sector, which contrast with the product orientation of the traditional, paternalist image of public sector management.

(v) Community Development

Here the concern goes beyond that of developing opportunities for leisure in the community, to one of opportunities for self-determination in communities by developing structures for self expression and participation in decision making (through skills learned in leisure schemes). The philosophy underlying the establishment of the Centres Against Unemployment (at least as described by some politicians and officers) illustrates such a policy orientation. This type of policy orientation draws on both service development and corporate ideology.

(vi) Economic Development

This label describes attempts to use local leisure investment to stimulate local economies. A major example of this approach is the investment made by local authorities in the development of a local tourism infrastructure, particularly those authorities which are suffering the economic and employment effects of the loss of

traditional manufacturing and heavy industries. Such strategies may well only marginally involve those responsible for leisure service planning and management, but nevertheless result in the development of facilities to attract certain tourist market segments but which will also serve the local population. Conversely, existing facilities and services may be adapted to attract tourist inflows. The development of this approach owes something to each of Dunleavy's mixed ideological forms. It draws on the concern of ratepayer ideology to tie local spending to the needs of local industry; it employs an element of service development in extending the existing boundaries of service management incorporating new services or new markets; and it reflects corporate ideology in seeking to unify economic and social policy.

(vii) Cultural Politics

As is noted in the discussion in Chapter Three, this policy orientation is still relatively rare and is normally associated with socialist, authorities. Although there was no evidence of the use of culture to promote particular political messages or to forge alliances between interest groups in support of a socialist programme in the case study, such approaches were developed by the Greater London Council and some attempts at emulation have been produced (e.g. the cultural strategy for Sheffield, viz. Greenhalgh 1987). Such a leisure policy orientation incorporates two principal approaches. The first is the use of leisure events and provision to promote a positive image of the local authority. The second is the intervention of the local authority in the market to foster the development of cultural expression by local groups which would otherwise have been stifled by their inability to distribute their (cultural) products through distribution networks dominated by multi-national producers. This policy orientation draws therefore on both service development concerns and on a form of corporate ideology, since it seeks to develop new forms of service activity to promote corporate (usually socialist) goals.

Although these ideological forms and policy orientations can be identified in contemporary local government leisure discussions, they do not stand isolated from the material conditions within which local government operates, that is

from wider social, economic, organisational and political contexts. The dominance (or even the existence) of certain of the policy orientations identified above is predicated on particular conditions which enable or constrain local government actors in the articulation of policy. If therefore this study is to contribute to an understanding of the nature of policy developments in local government some attention must be given to the nature of the changing structure and context of local government. Local government is currently in a state of flux, with the significance of important recent or pending changes such as the introduction of rate-capping and the community charge yet to be fully evaluated. Their effects may not simply alter the way in which local government operates, but may be sufficiently fundamental to alter the nature of local government itself. The following section therefore, focuses on the relationship between the policy orientations identified and alternative directions which local government might take in the future.

8.3 ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES FOR LEISURE SERVICES


The purpose of this section is to identify and explore alternative future scenarios for local government and to consider their consequences for the provision of leisure services. The aim here is not to produce accurate and precise prediction, such an exercise would be fraught with dangers. Rather the aim is to map out a framework which can make sense of some of the key factors which are likely to influence local government form and structure, and will therefore also invariably affect the nature and delivery of local authority leisure services, the policy orientations of particular authorities. To this end five models or styles of local government are articulated as explanatory devices which are consistent with the dominance of one or more of the policy orientations identified above. The conditions likely to be associated with the emergence of each of these five types of local government are described together with the consequences for leisure service provision of each. The structure for discussion of each of the models is illustrated in figure 8.2.

The preconditions consistent with the emergence of each type of local government are divided into three main headings.

Figure 8.2: THE FUTURE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEISURE SERVICES: A FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSION

PREVAILING CONDITIONS

CONSEQUENCES FOR LEISURE SERVICES



(a) *Prevailing political ideologies of central and / or local governments.* - The five categories of ideology employed in this account are those introduced in Chapter Three: liberalism, the political ideology of the New Right; traditional, 'one-nation' conservatism; 'social democracy'; 'utopian' or Fabian socialism; and the 'radical' socialism of the New Urban Left.

(b) *Prevailing economic conditions.* - Typical factors considered under this heading include; the rate of growth of the economy; the level of unemployment; the rate of inflation; the strength of sterling.

(c) *Prevailing political conditions.* - These factors include; the nature of party control over central or local government; the strength of such majorities or the existence of coalitions; central-local relations.

Similarly in considering the effects on leisure services of each of the five types of local government identified, their consequences are organised into three sets of factors. These sets of factors together constitute the nature and context of leisure policy orientations.

(a) *The nature of leisure service organisation and delivery.* - Issues discussed under this heading include changing concepts of client needs (and therefore of services required); consequences of change for the role of the professional and the skill requirements of the leisure professional.

(b) *Financial characteristics of local government leisure services.* - Included here are consequences for leisure services of requiring higher or lower resource generation, or of changing income-cost ratios; altering the pattern of resource allocation in public sector services; changing revenue-capital relationships; the effects of changes to the methods of resourcing local government for leisure services.

(c) *The context of local authority service provision.* - Here the concern is with changes in the size and structure of the public (and

voluntary or commercial) sector(s); changes in the relative power and influence of politicians, professionals and public, in the local authority decision-making process; central government influence and the role of the leisure quangos in local authority leisure policy.

It is not the case that each of the above factors receives equal and comprehensive treatment in the analysis of the five local government types identified. Emphasis is given to the more salient features of each model. However, the subdivisions for preconditions and consequences introduced are employed to structure the discussion. The models of local government are introduced below, and their preconditions and consequences for leisure services are summarised in table 8.1. (page 408).

It should be reemphasised that although the construction of ideal types represents only the point of departure for analysis, it can nevertheless contribute to forward planning in the political system in highlighting issues for debate at a time when the role of local government is being seriously questioned. It is important therefore to clarify the nature of the relationship between such changes and the development of policy in areas of significant local government activity.

8.3.1 THE 'CONTRACT MANAGEMENT' MODEL.

This model sees local authorities as responsible for the provision of only those services which are both essential, and are either unlikely to be provided by the commercial or voluntary sector or unsuitable for provision within those sectors. Local authorities in such circumstances may manage the provision of certain services (e.g. policing) because these services cannot be devolved to private contractors, but in the majority of service areas the role of the local authority will be one of supervision of private contractors undertaking provision of essential services (e.g. overseeing the operation of an education voucher system in a privatised system of schooling, monitoring the implementation of contracts for grass cutting and landscape maintenance, etc.). Indeed in such a scenario all responsibility for *direct* provision of services may be transferred to central government leaving local government

with responsibility for operating a system of competitive tendering for other services, and for 'quality control' in the provision of such services.

The primary attractions of this approach to local service management are firstly, that it minimises public subsidy by reducing the number of services provided and by introducing an element of competition between bidders for local authority contracts, and secondly that it reduces state intervention per se, which for the New Right in particular, is synonymous with an increase in the freedom of the individual.

(a) The Ideological Preconditions of the Contract Management Model

In the discussion of political ideology in Chapter Three of this study, the values espoused by the New Right were identified as those of *freedom of the individual* to pursue his or her own best interests, unfettered by the state, with each *individual assuming responsibility for his or her own welfare*. Neo-liberals recognise that a society which operates according to such principles will inevitably manifest inequalities, but argue that such inequalities are the price to paid for preserving individual freedom. Many individuals have competing or mutually incompatible interests and therefore it is impossible to aggregate such interests into a working definition of the 'common good'. Even if this were not the case the complexity of the analysis required to aggregate individual interests to derive a measure of the 'common good' would in practice mean that such a calculation could not accurately be performed, even for a relatively small community, let alone in a diverse and complex social structure.

The logical conclusion of such thinking in terms of the role of the local state for New Right theorists such as Nozick, Friedman, and Hayek, is that state activity should be severely curtailed. State intervention, except under very specific conditions, is seen as fostering inefficiency (by handicapping efficient industry by taxation) and as unjust (by 'rewarding' those who are unable to succeed in the market with tax handouts). Indeed the welfare state is also seen as contributing to social instability in that it fuels expectations of welfare services which cannot be met in times of economic recession,

thus fostering resentment which can lead to political action and problems of civil disorder.

Thus the ideological "preconditions" associated with the emergence of this model of local government consist of a growth in influence of neo-liberal thinking, such that the New Right group within the Conservative Party enjoy, not simply positions of influence but also represent something of a consensus within the Party. Some evidence already exists of the New Right's determination to reduce consumption expenditure, and minimise local state activity in the abolition of large scale (Metropolitan County) authorities, and the declaration of plans to allow council housing tenants not simply to purchase their own homes, but also to choose whether to be tenants of the local authority or to transfer responsibility for their rented accommodation to private or voluntary sector landlords (Conservative Party 1987).

(b) The Economic Preconditions of Contract Management Local Government

Clearly the development of economic theory consistent with liberal ideology was one of the key features of British politics in the 1970's. The rise of the New Right and of monetary economics in the Conservative Party was in large part a reaction to the failure of Keynesian macro-economic policies to sustain post war economic growth and to maintain full employment. Thus the economic conditions within which one might expect the political values of the right to become attractive (to politicians if not to the electorate) are those which obtained in the 1970's and early 1980's - that is 'stagflation', negative or low economic growth alongside growing unemployment and inflation. This was a combination of factors for which Keynesian economic theory could not provide an adequate explanation and therefore seemed unable to generate policy solutions. It was under these conditions that the New Right was able to promote the argument that a radical shift away from state welfare was required to revitalise the economy, to ease the burden of public spending and to encourage Victorian values of self help, family responsibility and hard work.

These economic features, high unemployment, inflation and low growth, should be seen as *one combination* of appropriate conditions, rather than as a set of *sufficient conditions*, for the development of the influence of neo-liberal thought. Indeed this same failure of Keynesian economic policy has also regenerated interest in the economic and social critiques of the left. (Furthermore, any attempt to specify sufficient conditions for the emergence of particular social philosophies implies a kind of epistemological determinism which is inconsistent with the theoretical premises of this study).

Other sets of economic conditions might also be said to be consistent with the continued momentum of New Right policy programmes. It remains to be seen whether the progress of the New Right in implementing policies can be sustained as the economy grows, since opposition to attacks on the welfare state has ironically been greatest in times of relative affluence and of full employment. Although in the mid-1980's economic growth has been sustained, it has been achieved without any significant reduction in the level of unemployment. Thus the benefits of economic growth are being realised by those in employment in terms of rising overall living standards, lower inflation, and 'reduced' taxation², while the costs of reduced welfare spending are being borne by the unemployed. Given that the unemployed are a minority and therefore unable to place electoral pressure on the New Right, it might be argued that high economic growth together with relatively high levels of unemployment and low levels of inflation represent preconditions for the growth of the contract management model of local government. However such an analysis assumes the continued quiescence of the unemployed, since even the New Right have demonstrated a willingness to increase public expenditure to secure social order in the inner cities (Treasury 1982).

(c) The Political Preconditions of Contract Management Local Government.

The imposition of the contract management approach on unwilling partners at local level can only be achieved through legislation of one form or another. The Thatcher administration's willingness to curb

local autonomy in pursuit of central government macro-economic policy has already been illustrated in the series of measures since 1980 which have reduced central government's contribution to local spending, enforced harsher cash limits and finally provided for the setting of maximum rate levels for individual authorities by central government. The contract management approach might well be adopted by Conservative controlled local authorities voluntarily, in pockets where such an approach has electoral appeal. Indeed with the introduction of permissive legislation allowing greater privatisation and the eschewing of some statutory duties, some authorities have already gone some way along this path, for example in privatising refuse collection, and discontinuing school meals.

The Conservative Cabinet however, has met with some resistance in the Houses of Parliament and at the local authority level (Newton and Karran 1985) from members of its own Party, both in relation to the reduction of resources available to local authorities and to the abolition of 'wasteful' tiers of the system. It seems likely therefore that legislation, enabling the introduction of wider forms of privatisation and the dropping of certain types of local authority service, is likely to be permissive rather than mandatory. In addition such legislation may be supported by further expenditure squeezes to enforce additional savings and encourage moves towards the contract management approach. Indeed the introduction of the community charge in Scotland and its proposed introduction in England and Wales might be described as an attempt to promote electoral pressure on local authorities to seek to minimise their budgets, since despite offers of aid for the most needy, it seems that many of those most in need of local authority services are likely to be those most susceptible to increases in poll tax (Straw 1987; Rogaly 1987).

The political conditions, therefore, which one would expect to be consistent with the development of the contract management type of authority are a Conservative government with a clear majority in Parliament (so that the prospect of a rebellion is minimal), dominated by ideologues of the New Right (who will hold key Cabinet positions)

offering fiscal incentives and legislative powers for the severe reduction or loss of direct service provision, and the development of contracting arrangements. It remains to be seen whether the return of the Thatcher administration for a third term will constitute such conditions.

However the implementation of a contract management approach would be likely to be limited to traditional Conservative strongholds at local level. Even here the adoption of contract management seems likely to be partial since local Conservative leaders have consistently shown themselves to be less radical than their Cabinet colleagues (Z. Henry 1980, Riddell 1983, Keegan 1984).

(d) The Nature of Leisure Service Organisation and Delivery under Contract Management Local Government.

Given the difficulties associated by the New Right with identifying 'common interests', the aim of "meeting the leisure needs of the community" commonly articulated in leisure policy statements, is regarded as spurious. Indeed the interests which are served by local government leisure departments are seen as sectional, and dominated by the interests of leisure professionals themselves. The concept of leisure need promoted by the New Right (if 'need' is an appropriate term in this context) is one of free market pluralism.

The structure of local government provision in the leisure field under contract management would not so much alter as disappear. Leisure provision for the most part might be seen as the luxury end of social policy and perhaps only three categories of provision are therefore likely to continue to receive subsidy under such circumstances.

- where *financial neighbourhood effects* accrue: leisure provision which provides an essential element of the infrastructure for local capital accumulation may be retained. Tourism promotion, for example, the marketing of a city or district, may be a candidate for public subsidy, given the difficulty of establishing precisely who benefits from such expenditure. This is perhaps more accurately

described as a merit rather than a public good, but it is an area of the present operation of leisure services which may not be effectively undertaken in a free market.

- where *social neighbourhood effects accrue*, as in the case cited in Chapter Three derived from Friedman (1962) of urban parks, where it is difficult to identify all beneficiaries, and perhaps counterproductive to charge many of those who are identified.

- where *externalities* such as a reduction in anti-social behaviour are thought to accrue subsidy may be continued. There is, as has already been noted, a common, though as yet empirically untested claim that leisure spending on disadvantaged groups preempts higher law and order or anti-vandalism expenditure. Public subsidy for facilities and services in areas of high risk might well be regarded by some liberal thinkers as a shrewd investment.

However, in each of the cases cited above it would be possible to contract commercial or voluntary sector organisations to operate such services on behalf of the local authority. The skills required of public sector managers in such areas are therefore likely to be limited to the ability to specify and monitor standards of performance among those commercial and voluntary sector operators under contract to the authority. The skills of the operational manager which represent the major concern of current professional courses (viz I.L.A.M. 1986) would be virtually irrelevant since 'contract management' local authorities would have few staff and a negligible amount of direct service provision.

(e) The Financial Characteristics of Local Authority Leisure Services under Contract Management Local Government

Given the minimalist provision implied by the contract management model, leisure expenditure is likely to be severely restricted. Two types of authority seem likely to present exceptions to this rule. The first is that of authorities encompassing tourist destinations where leisure expenditure on tourism promotion or on the environment (e.g.

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maintenance of parks, beaches and other similar attractions) will be a significant factor. The second is that of inner city authorities with considerable social problems and a tendency towards instability.

The Context of Local Authority Service Provision Under Contract Management Local Government.

Both the contract management and the 'financial stringency' models of local government form part of a major restructuring of the leisure industries. It is not simply that the public sector is shrinking, the commercial sector is also being restructured (Roberts 1986). Monetarism aims to reset the balance between the public and private sectors, claiming to aid business, and in particular the small businessman. Nevertheless cuts in the money supply in the early 1980's, coupled with other antagonistic features led to a reduction in output and the highest rate of business liquidations since the war (Barratt-Brown 1984). Furthermore cuts in public spending have not significantly reduced public spending as a proportion of the national income, because for a period during the early 1980's national income fell in real terms and the bill for unemployment benefits and social security payments, together with other aspects of central government spending has increased (Pliatzky 1982; Riddell 1983).

Radical political economists (cf. Pollard 1982; Barratt-Brown 1984) have argued that the net effect of these circumstances has been to benefit multi-national capital. The falling value of the pound has encouraged foreign investment in this country and this helps to explain the rapid growth of the 'big three' major multi-nationals in the leisure field, Grand Metropolitan, Rank, and Trust House Forte (Torkildsen 1983). Evidence of the degree of industrial concentration in any market sector is difficult to obtain, however, in addition to diversification into a wider range of leisure products and services, the interest being shown by companies such as Ladbroke and Mecca (subsidiaries of the big three) in smaller scale operations such as snooker halls and health studios, indicates that part of the terrain which has been regarded as that of the small scale entrepreneur, is becoming increasingly attractive to larger companies. The closure or

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selling off of public sector leisure facilities may well reduce the competition in this market sector and thus reduce the financial risk, reinforcing the process of multi-national investment.

In Chapter Six reference was made to a range of studies of local government, largely conducted in the 1970's which stressed the influence of professionals in policy-making. The contract management model clearly reduces the influence of professionals by transferring control of provision to other sectors. However, this model also assumes a considerable reduction in the influence of the local politician who is likely to be constrained by central government legislation limiting financial expenditure. The restrictions on the influence of professional and politician are intended to enhance the position of the individual elector, who with lower public expenditure (and 'lower' taxation) can exert greater influence on provision in the commercial sector through his or her spending patterns. Low income groups have lower disposable incomes and are therefore less likely to stimulate a response to their individual demands in the market place. However it should be noted that these are often the very people that the public sector has also failed to attract to its own facilities and services.

Reductions in service areas other than leisure may well also have consequences for the leisure opportunities of various members of the community. The attempt to reduce state intervention in the field of personal social services and health care, for example, which is implied by the contract management model shifts responsibility for aspects of care back onto the family. Since housework and family care fall predominantly to women, such policy change in other fields seem likely to reinforce inequalities in leisure for women. Closure of crèche facilities, reduction of school meals services and reduction of service provision for the elderly, the handicapped etc. are consequent on change in other fields but potentially exert considerable influence on leisure lifestyles.

The position of the leisure quangos under contract management is considerably weakened. The Sports Council's role is diminished in that

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it is unable to influence local authority provision (because direct provision is minimal), and the aspects of its work which relate to promoting national prestige through sporting performance might well devolve to the voluntary sector in the form of the Central Council for Physical Recreation, which has traditionally argued that it should perform this function anyway.

The Countryside Commission and the Arts Council might be regarded as guardians of particular forms of tourist attraction which indirectly meet their own costs by generating additional tourist revenue. However, given neo-liberal values, such functions are likely to be seen as more effectively carried out by government departments. Quangos are opposed in principle by the New Right because not only are they insulated from market forces, but they are not even subject to electoral scrutiny. The result is that, without accountability, employees and ministerial appointees of the leisure quangos are seen by the New Right as following their own personal predilections legitimated as professional analysis of artistic, environmental or societal needs.

Furthermore the neo-liberal emphasis on individualism and the rejection of arguments based on appeals to the 'common good' suggests that neo-liberals are unlikely to support the notion of a shared cultural heritage which can be defined for society as a whole. It seems reasonable to assume therefore that contract management authorities would operate in an environment in which a limited proportion of the responsibilities of the leisure quangos would be taken up by central government departments on the grounds that a significant multiplier effect would be generated by sustaining environmental or cultural tourist attractions which would not otherwise be supported by commercial interests. Even this role would be limited given the type of strategy promoted by the Arts Council, under Luke Ritner (a Conservative appointee) whose primary qualification for the post of Secretary General was experience in generating business sponsorship to off-set the cost of arts provision (Coalter et al. 1986).

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The leisure policy orientations represented in the contract management model of local government are predominantly those of 'voluntarism' and 'economic development'. Voluntarism is consistent with the New Right philosophy of allowing individuals and groups to define their own interests and meet their own needs. Such arguments are not necessarily specific to neo-liberal policy prescriptions, they are common to 'anti-statist' positions adopted along the political spectrum. However the key difference is that in this context, what is being advocated is voluntarism without additional resources. Economic development policies are also likely to be limited to those public and merit goods which will attract private funding (rather than those which will generate income for the local authority itself).

8.3.2 THE FINANCIAL STRINGENCY MODEL

Many of the arguments raised in support of the contract management approach represent a natural extension of those which have been generated in support of the programme of reduction in local government expenditure which has operated since the mid-1970's. The financial stringency model implies an approach to local government which is less ideologically inspired than that of contract management. That is to say there is no opposition *in principle* to local authority direct provision of services, rather financial stringency should be seen as a pragmatic response to economic arguments which suggest that there is an imbalance between commercial sector productivity and public sector spending. This model therefore characterises a situation in which there is an increasing spending squeeze on local authority spending with a consequent restructuring of local authority financing and provision of services; in effect this is the situation within which local government has been operating since the late 1970's.

(a) The Ideological Preconditions of the Financial Stringency Approach to Local Government

The contrast between the financial stringency model and contract management approaches may be illustrated by responses to the major ideological debate within the Conservative Party, with the Tory 'wets' (those drawing on traditional, 'one-nation' versions of conservatism)

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aligning themselves against the New Right on issues which are fundamental to policy. The earlier discussion of political ideology in this study identified key values in traditional conservatism as those of 'tradition', 'authority' and 'allegiance'. Traditional conservatives who were represented for example in the 'Centre Forward' group recently formed around leading figures in the Conservative Party, such as Francis Pym and Ian Gilmour, would seem to be more concerned about radicalism within their own party than about socialist radicalism because the radical right actually occupy positions of power (Pym 1984, Keegan 1984). The set of welfare arrangements which exists at local and national level now represents a British tradition in social policy. To alter radically, or do away with this structure would erode the allegiance of the poorer members of our society, and pose a threat to authority. Without a stake in society they have little or no reason for maintaining social stability.

While traditional Conservatives recognise the need to respond to the current economic difficulties of the state, they wish to do so by implementing limited incremental change (in the form of a selective squeeze on public spending) rather than by radical reforms. For this reason there has been considerable opposition within the Party to the erosion of local autonomy represented by rate-capping and the abolition of Metropolitan Counties which, traditional conservatives argue, represent major changes in forms of local government and in central-local relations (Gyford 1985). Furthermore they argue that strategies such as limiting net unemployment payments to below the level of inflation ultimately represents a threat to social order (Pym 1984).

Although traditional conservatism, as it is characterised here, may provide the ideological preconditions for the financial stringency approach, it should not be forgotten that this approach was first implemented by the Labour administration of 1974-9. However this was rather less a case of policy being derived logically from political principles than the result of external pressures from the International Monetary Fund (which 'required' financial stringency as the condition for granting a loan to the Labour government in 1976) and of the

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influence of anti-Keynesian economic analysis (specifically that of Bacon and Eltis 1978). Indeed the debate within the Labour Party in relation to local government issues focussed primarily on the disjunction between the political values represented by the Party and the economic policies it was attempting to implement.

In this study, the term social democracy has been used to denote the post-war consensus on policy issues which operated within a Keynesian framework of welfare provision funded through the profits generated by economic growth. Thus social democracy is characterised as a compromise between the interests of labour and capital rather than as an ideology per se. There is a sense therefore in which ideological compromise under the new economic conditions of the 1970's and early 1980's might be seen as a precondition of the emergence of the financial stringency approach, whether this be an adjustment of traditional conservatism or of utopian socialism to the 'economic realities' of recession.

(b) The Economic Preconditions of the Financial Stringency Model

The economic conditions associated with this model are likely to be those of low economic growth, and high levels of inflation and unemployment.

It is perhaps an obvious point that it is not the economic conditions themselves but political interpretation of such conditions which generate policy responses from government. Some commentators (cf. Kogan and Kogan 1982) have claimed that the publishing by Bacon and Eltis of their 'crowding out thesis' in a series of articles in the *Sunday Times* in 1975 was particularly influential in determining Labour Government economic policy. The Bacon and Eltis thesis (which is expounded more fully in their book, Bacon and Eltis 1978) is a species of the neo-liberal argument outlined earlier in the study, but which places particular emphasis on the role played by *local* government in soaking up greater resources (money and manpower) thereby forcing up taxes, rates and wage levels to the detriment of industry. Although this analysis has critical weaknesses (cf. Newton and Karran 1985) it appeared at the time to represent an improvement on the Keynesian

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paradigm, the explanatory power of which seemed exhausted. If Kogan and Kogan's analysis is correct, the Labour Government's ideological commitment to increased public sector activity would seem to have been overcome in the light of the appeal of an essentially monetarist explanation of the difficulties of the economy.

(c) The Political Preconditions of the Financial Stringency Model

Given the current debate within the Conservative Party it seems likely that there will be a continued tension between those promoting New Right, monetarist policies, and the traditional wing of the Party. Such a tension has manifested itself in an acceptance of the need for financial retrenchment while falling short of calls to reduce the remit of the public sector.

(d) The Nature of Leisure Service Organisation and Delivery under the Financial Stringency Model

The concept of leisure need incorporated in this model of local government will be dependent upon the ideological predispositions of particular proponents. Essentially two value positions were identified as preconditions of this approach, traditional 'one-nation' conservatism and social democracy. The concepts of leisure 'need' consistent with these two value positions are discussed in Chapter Three and should be distinguished. Traditional conservatism emphasises the notion of a shared cultural heritage, and the role of sport and the arts in promoting appropriate social values. It is consistent therefore with a policy of democratisation of culture, though reservations have been expressed by some conservative writers in relation to the promotion of cultural and social values through state organisations (cf. Scruton 1980). The conservative approach therefore casts the state, and specifically local government, in an enabling role, rather than one of direct provision.

The pragmatism of the social democratic approach is evidenced in the White Papers of 1975 (*Sport and Recreation*) and 1977 (*Policy for the Inner City*) where leisure is recognised as "one of the community's everyday needs" and is also viewed as a means of reducing social

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expenses, i.e. of maintaining social control. The compromise between the social goals of labour and the economic goals of capital, takes the form of the argument which suggests that social expenditure is justified when failure to invest in recreation would incur greater costs than the savings made. There is evidence to suggest that during the period of financial stringency 'leisure as a means' (of reinforcing social stability, or of stimulating the local economy) has predominated over 'leisure as an end in itself' or 'as a right' (of citizenship) as a rationale for public expenditure on leisure. The relatively small and rare areas of growth in public sector leisure spending have been in budgets allocated for specific economic or social purposes e.g. tourism promotion, or Urban Programme, Sports Council grants for urban deprivation, for Areas of Special Need, Football in the Community and Action Sport initiatives etc.. An important effect of this type of policy shift which enhances provision for the more volatile, potentially disruptive groups (in particular young, male, unemployed inner city residents, often from specific ethnic groups) is to erode or ignore the position of other recreationally disadvantaged groups (e.g. the elderly, house-bound mothers, the handicapped etc.) neglect of which is unlikely to generate costs in areas such as law and order.

The financial stringency model incorporates, therefore, a range of concepts of leisure need from the 'democratisation of culture' sought by traditional conservatives in sport and the arts (though where possible without direct state intervention) to the pragmatic, rational cost-benefit analysis of social democracy with its emphasis on certain types of recreational disadvantage. The response by the public sector in recent years to this particular admixture of defined 'needs', has been the growth of policy and provision in the field of community recreation.

Community recreation has become an amorphous, all-purpose term for non-standard, non-facility based forms of provision (Haywood and Henry 1986 a & b). The different emphases given to the use of 'community recreation' by members of different parties within the case study, most of whom supported community recreation initiatives, gives some

indication of the difficulty of characterising this development as a 'policy orientation' in its own right. It is not simply that the term means different things to different people, it is also the case that the policy initiatives which go under this heading are seen as accomplishing different objectives by various policy actors. However, perhaps three dominant, common strands can be identified in the family of services and policies to which the term is generally applied. The first of these is that such policies are associated with decentralisation, the approach to provision through small scale, relatively self-contained units in order to overcome some of the dysfunctions of large scale bureaucracies. The second common theme is a concern predominantly for disadvantaged groups. The third and perhaps most problematic of the principal characteristics of the community recreation approach is an emphasis on community self-determination, a greater say for the community in terms of which services should be provided and how they should be delivered. Not all examples of community recreation initiatives will exhibit all three sets of characteristics, but these may be regarded as the 'family traits' of community recreation, that is they will be present in some combination in such initiatives. These three characteristics may be present in each of the modes of local authority support for recreation activity, in direct provision (e.g. small-scale community sports centres), in acting as a catalyst (e.g. action sport or community development initiatives), and in grant aid to community groups. It seems likely that under financial stringency the community recreation approach would continue to receive support because it may be regarded as addressing the needs of 'priority groups', as circumventing some of the problems associated with local government bureaucracy, making organisations more responsive to local needs, and in some instances shifting the burden of provision onto the voluntary sector.

The development of community recreation policy and provision has considerable implications in terms of the skills required of recreation managers in the public sector. Traditional curriculum concerns have been dominated by 'technical' matters (water treatment, soil science, facility design etc.) and to a lesser degree by generic management

skills (financial management, marketing, personnel management etc.). An area neglected in these curricula has been that of understanding the nature of the social context of leisure policy, the nature and dynamics of communities and the role which leisure can play.

The community recreation approach implies some devolution of power to communities and community groups which conflict with the professionalisation strategy which has been adopted by leisure services staff in the public sector. When occupational groups seek to attain the status and recognition of a 'profession' a number of claims about the nature of their work are normally made including the notion that the 'professionals' are experts in defining and meeting the needs of the community (viz Johnson 1980, Esland 1980, Goodale and Witt 1980). For this reason it seems unlikely that the new, unified professional body (the Institute for Leisure and Amenity Management) will give prominence to the development of community recreation policy (in the sense described here) in the syllabus for its professional examinations, despite its growing importance for local government.

It is important to stress, however, that while community recreation may be seen by some simply as a pragmatic response to financial constraint, for others the community recreation approach is valued in its own right as a means of overcoming fundamental problems of alienation from service provision and the dysfunctions of large scale bureaucracies. Furthermore, traditional conservatives may well oppose some forms of community recreation provision where they are associated not simply with voluntarism but with 'community development' because this can imply political activism. Since traditional conservatism is anti-adversarial in philosophy the benefits of voluntarism may well be sacrificed to the goals of consensual administration. There are therefore tensions and ambiguities which attach to the promotion of community recreation as a policy goal, and this is reflected in the fact that community recreation is described as a feature of both this model of local government and the post-industrial model below, and as a manifestation of distinct policy orientations such as 'minimalism and cost control', 'voluntarism', and 'community development'.

There are at least two distinct sets of skills required of managers in the financial stringency model of local government. While social skills are given primary emphasis in community recreation, financial and entrepreneurial skills are required if income is to be generated by services as a means of off-setting cuts, and market oriented thinking is required in the development of local tourism strategies. Although maximisation of income and maximisation of community participation and satisfaction are not necessarily mutually exclusive, there are clearly situations in which such goals are incompatible, and managers are therefore likely to experience frustrations in attempts to meet or trade off incompatible goals.

This model of local government describes the operation of local government in socially and financially volatile environments. However the traditional bureaucratic structures of local government are ill-suited to the immediate and imaginative responses required to deal with urgent and intractable problems in a fast-changing situation. New organisational structures are therefore required and a number of local authorities (particularly in inner cities) have set up special measures teams with executive powers to deal with issues such as unemployment, (Indeed the government's establishment of Urban Development Corporations and Enterprise Zones displays just such thinking, although these structures by-pass bureaucracy by by-passing local authorities altogether.) This trend of establishing special measures teams *within* local government structures seems likely to continue since it circumvents the 'democratic' but slow process of the committee cycle. It should be noted however (as our case study illustrates by reference to the decision to refurbish the city theatre) that such arrangements tend to concentrate power in the hands of leading politicians and key officers.

(e) The Financial Characteristics of Local Authority Leisure Services under the Financial Stringency Model

Because of the structure of local government finance in this country, and the fact that most capital expenditure is financed through loans, capital commitments place a considerable burden on revenue expenditure.

Debt charges accounted for as much as 19.6% of all local authority revenue spending in 1970, and although interest rates have been somewhat lower in the recent past, the figure was still 11.6% in 1983. The difficulty of making savings from revenue budgets has therefore been exacerbated by the size of debt charges and other 'committed' leisure expenditure. For this reason central government has made considerable efforts to discourage capital spending since the mid 1970's and under this model of local government such a trend is likely to continue.

In addition, leisure (under the general heading of 'Other Environmental Services') has been identified in successive Public Expenditure White Papers, by both Labour and Conservative Governments, as a service area which should be encouraged to generate higher incomes in the form of fees and charges to off-set revenue losses (Hamilton 1983). This also seems likely to continue as an integral element of the financial stringency approach. Little is known about the income elasticity of service pricing however, and even though greater revenues may be forthcoming from charging for previously free services, or from raising prices, there seems likely to be a disproportionate effect for low income groups.

(f) The Context of Local Authority Leisure Services for the Fiscal Stringency Model

The pressure to reduce net expenditure which local government has been experiencing since the mid 1970's has had an inevitable effect on the balance of provision between public and commercial sectors. Forms of privatisation experienced within local government leisure services may be categorised as follows;

- *privatisation of the production of services*, e.g. contracting companies to manage not simply ancillary services such as catering but also primary services such as the operation of sports centres or ski slopes,

- *selling off resources to the private sector*, e.g. the sale of plant, buildings and in particular school playing fields which may or may not continue to be used as leisure resources,

- *liberalization of existing contracts*, e.g. where resources such as a golf course may have been operated by a commercial concern through a management agreement, permission to increase charges or reduce opening hours has been granted in order to lower the cost to the local authority, or to increase its income from profits.

Clearly the tendency for market concentration described in the discussion of the contract management model is consistent with features of the context of fiscal stringency, with multi-nationals controlling an increasing market share. In common with the previous model also, financial stringency in general might be said to reduce the influence of politicians and professionals by reducing the size and scope of local government. There are two caveats however in relation to this last argument. The first is that politicians and professionals may be very influential in deciding from which areas savings should be made. Secondly, as we have noted already, the advent of 'special measures groups' with greater powers than those normally accorded to council committees, will provide some officers and members with opportunities for wielding greater influence. However such special measures teams concerned with service areas such as unemployment or economic development seem likely to remain marginal in terms of the proportion of the overall local authority budget they might control.

Unlike contract management the values underpinning the financial stringency approach do not imply an opposition in principle to quangos as a vehicle for state involvement in leisure. Indeed the arm's length principle is consistent with allaying traditional conservatives' fears about state involvement in leisure. Conservatism also (unlike neo-liberalism) involves a commitment to notions of shared cultural heritage incorporating both sport and the arts and therefore the coordinating role undertaken by the quangos in this respect is viewed as valuable. Nevertheless there has been concern expressed about the

number and profligacy of such organisations (Holland 1979, 1981, 1982) so that the financial stringency model implies a 'squeezed but still quangoid' set of institutions in the public sector.

This discussion of the financial stringency model of local government highlights two dominant policy orientations. The first is that of 'minimalism and cost control' with concerns about the nature of social provision being subordinated to economic policy. This description of policy accounts not simply for making savings by cutting costs directly, but also relates to the attempt to reduce the costs of delinquency and disorder by investing in provision for the most volatile groups, particularly in inner cities. A second, related policy orientation in evidence in this model is that of 'entrepreneurial style' with leisure service personnel seeking to reduce net expenditure by increasing revenue from those service areas which can generate a marginal profit.

8.3.3 THE KEYNESIAN MODEL OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Keynesian economic management dominated post-war government policy until the early 1970's. In basic terms the Keynesian approach sees the economy as an equilibrium between demand and supply, the higher the demand for goods and services, the higher will be the supply of economic investment and therefore of people in employment. Unemployment occurs when an equilibrium is reached below the full potential of supply (i.e. below the level of relatively full employment) and in such circumstances, Keynesian economists argue, governments should stimulate demand by investing public money in the purchase of goods and services. Such investments can take the form of employing more people directly in public services, or of contracting work out to the commercial sector. In both cases greater numbers of people in employment increase the demand for other goods and services since these newly employed people have increased spending power. Inflation is recognised as an unfortunate consequence of increasing public expenditure, but (all other things being equal) Keynesians argue that a trade off can be maintained between inflation and unemployment.

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The Keynesian model of local government represents a recognition of the strategic role local government can play as a generator of local demand, stimulating the local economy by investing in local services and in local capital projects. Such an approach is invariably associated with expanding public sector employment, though increased local government spending may, in many instances, involve the contracting of goods and services from the commercial sector.

(a) The Ideological Preconditions of Keynesian Local Government

Keynesian economic policies have been associated in the post-war period with governments of both major parties. Neo-liberals have clearly never been happy with a growing public sector, and while traditional conservatives were willing to adopt such policies in order to reinforce social cohesion in times of economic expansion, there is a resistance to increases in public expenditure in a recession, and a concern about the expanding influence of the state. However, while the New Right and traditional conservatives stress the role to be played by the market in the meeting of needs, socialists emphasise the need for collective responsibility and collective action in combatting the inequalities generated by capitalism.

In the discussion of socialist ideology and its relationship to leisure policy in Chapter Three, three categories of socialist ideology were distinguished, 'Labourism' (or 'Utopian Socialism'), the socialism of the New Urban Left, and Structural Marxism (or 'Scientific Socialism'). Utopian socialism characterises the approach to achievement of welfare reforms through legislation, funding the reduction of inequalities from the fruits of economic growth. Thus Keynesian policies of reflation through state spending are predominantly associated with utopian socialist strategies, since they are based on the premise that the state can intervene to act in the interests of its citizens and not simply to reinforce the position of capital.

(b) The Economic Preconditions of the Keynesian Model of Local Government

The fundamental principle of Keynesian economic policies, the trade-off

between inflation and unemployment provides the key to understanding when such policies might expect to receive support. Keynesian policies were abandoned when stagflation took hold of the British economy in the early 1970's. Unemployment *and* inflation were rising. However a number of economic theorists in the Labour Party or sympathetic to the Party have argued that the circumstances surrounding the experience of stagflation were unique, non-recurrent crises (the oil crisis, entry into the Common Market, the floating of major currencies etc.) and had Keynesian economic policies been sustained it might have played a part in regenerating the economy (Cripps 1981, Coutts et al. 1981, Hattersley 1987 b). These advocates conclude that Keynesian-type solutions were not tried for long enough or with enough vigour, and that a reversion to greater strategic spending (perhaps in partnership with other Western governments) would restore business confidence, stimulate business activity and generate higher rates of economic growth.

High unemployment rates, low inflation and low economic growth are therefore the classic preconditions of state spending. The form which such spending takes is not necessarily prescribed, though the funding of capital projects has the advantage of stimulating private sector activity while improving the infrastructure (social, physical or economic) for which the public sector is responsible. The Labour Party's recent industrial strategy document, *Jobs and Industry* (Labour Party 1985) on which the industrial planning for the 1987 election manifesto was based, represents a fairly typical Keynesian formula advocating expansion of public sector employment and services, but also emphasising the need for public subsidy of traditional industries. The logic (if not the rhetoric) of this type of argument is that unemployment is not structural, caused by radical changes in the structure of British industry; rather it is the result of a crisis of confidence on the part of investors which has starved traditional industries of investment, resulting in economic restructuring in the form of a reduction of primary and secondary industries. Restructuring is seen as a consequence rather than a cause of Britain's economic problems. (This point will be of critical importance in understanding

the difference between the kinds of public investment advocated under this model of local government and that advocated for the 'post industrial' model below.

(c) The Political Preconditions of the Keynesian Approach to Local Government

The current Labour jobs programme with its tripartite aims of rebuilding our industries, financing construction programmes and capital projects, and improving public services, suggests that the return of a Labour government might be most likely to be associated with a return to 'reconstructed' Keynesian policies. Two qualifications should be made here. The first is that unless Labour is willing to resort to legislation to require all local authorities to spend more on building and services, then it seems likely that reflation through local government spending will be less evident in Tory controlled local authorities. Secondly, the adoption of a Keynesian strategy assumes a right wing dominated Labour government or coalition government. More radical forms of public or worker ownership and control have been the policy concerns of members of the left wing of the Party such that merely stimulating economic growth and improving services may be insufficient to satisfy a Labour government dominated by the left.

It should be noted that the Conservative pre-election budget of 1987 was regarded by some commentators as relatively expansionist in the sense that expenditure levels were higher than anticipated and were coupled with tax cuts, with much of the additional funding being derived from the sale of privatized industries. Whether this signals a reversal of monetarist policies, or, more cynically, a budget constructed with one eye on the then imminent election remains to be seen. The revenue generated by the sale of publicly owned industries will not be available in the long term, however, and without engaging in a programme of borrowing (which the government has explicitly rejected) the Conservative administration would require a far higher rate of economic growth to sustain both tax cuts and increased public spending.

*(d) The Nature of Leisure Service Organisation and Delivery under
Keynesian Local Government*

Service planning in general and leisure planning in particular, grew in importance in the expansionary period of the late 1960's to the early 1970's, only to virtually disappear in the period of restraint which followed. Proactive planning of this nature, whether it was corporate or single service, promoted the importance of the professional whose 'expert' judgement was required to identify which areas of each service should be expanded. This growth in the importance of public sector professionals took place in spite of attempts to generate greater public involvement, for example in town planning following the Skeffington Report (Boaden et al 1982).

Many local authorities have been trying to address the problem of how members of the community might be able to participate more fully in the decision-making process. The fact that decisions in the current climate are now not about which new services should be *added* but about which should be *curtailed* does not make this a less significant problem. However rapid expansion of local authority spending would be likely to require a swift response from local government organisations, perhaps minimising the opportunity for public consultation. In addition the burgeoning of local authority activity implied by this model, suggests that the relative influence of full-time professionals in the determination of local policy is likely to be considerable.

The concept of need which informs leisure policy in this professionally dominated model of local government is one of paternalist prescriptions based on 'expert' assessments of the latent needs of the community. This contrasts with the emphasis placed on self determination in some community recreation schemes. Expansion of services within the existing organisational framework may promote bigger, more powerful, but more ineffectual bureaucracies. Regeneration of the public sector without some strategy to counter the problems of large-scale local government seems likely simply to reinforce the problems experienced in the period following the last large scale reorganisation of local government in 1974.

This model of local government encourages more than a simple expansion of service provision. There is a particular incentive to develop higher levels of capital investment and environmental improvements (because by use of private contractors money can be pumped directly into the local economy). The effect of this strategy would be to provide an opportunity to promote amenity provision (particularly in urban parks and inner city areas which have characteristically experienced neglect during the recession) and to upgrade existing built facilities by replacing the old, and expanding the overused, stock of recreation buildings and plant.

The Financial Characteristics of Local Government Leisure Services under the Keynesian Model

When in the middle 1970's the Labour government sought to reduce local government expenditure, its initial strictures concerned capital spending (Treasury 1976) and although leisure was freed from the subordinate status of 'non-key sector' expenditure, nevertheless it became evident that local authorities were finding it relatively difficult to give priority to leisure projects over other claims on their capital allocation (Treasury 1981). Despite some attempts by the present Conservative administration to stimulate capital spending (without incurring greatly increased revenue costs) capital investment in total for 'Other Environmental Services' (the category which incorporate leisure spending) has not grown significantly (Treasury 1986).

One of the major financial changes which would characterise Keynesian local government would therefore be a significant lowering of the revenue-capital ratio for public sector leisure investment, and this despite a significant increase in leisure current expenditure. A further characteristic change would be the decrease in income-cost ratio which follows from greater revenue investment together with a lesser emphasis on income targets.

(f) The Context of Local Authority Leisure Services under the Keynesian Model of Local Government

The post-war Keynesian policies of Labour and Conservative governments were founded not simply on a theory relating to the way the economy should be managed, but also on the notion that economic and social policy decisions were largely a matter of the application of rational principles to achieve agreed goals. It has already been pointed out that such a position yields power and influence to those technocrats with specialist skills in applying such rational techniques. Such thinking also legitimates the role of leisure quangos as panels of technical experts providing neutral advice on how to maximise welfare and other leisure goals.

It seems doubtful however that given the recent conflict-ridden nature of British politics (which is reflected in accounts of the 'political' nature of the activities of the leisure quangos: cf. Hargreaves 1984, Hutchinson 1982) that the notion of ideological neutrality can be easily restored. It is perhaps because of a rejection of the view of quangos as neutral, and also because of the failure to serve a truly representative cross-section of the population, that the Labour Party has declared its intention of promoting a new Ministry of Leisure to oversee policy in this area (Kinnock 1987).

The effect of a growing public sector investment in leisure may well be to arrest the process of concentration of the industry among the major companies, and to push commercial investment towards the exclusive, high price segments of the leisure market, or indeed towards the high cost non-local facility which may be beyond the scope of most local authorities.

The two policy orientations most strongly associated with the Keynesian model of local government are those of 'traditional service development', and 'economic development'. The latter simply reflects the use of public sector investment to stimulate the local economy, while the former is a function of the dominant role of the professional in expansionist periods.

8.3.4 THE POST-INDUSTRIAL MODEL

The projected role of local authorities for post-industrial theorists is similar in some respects to that portrayed in the Keynesian model. It certainly involves the expansion of local authority services to reduce social inequalities, and the investment of public funds to stimulate economic activity. However, there are crucial differences, both in the rationale for government intervention and in the industries and services which post-industrialists would wish to see funded.

Keynesians, it has been argued, describe Britain's present economic difficulties as the result of a crisis of confidence in the Western economies on the part of investors. Local authorities are therefore to be employed as spending agents, contributing to a strategy of reflation of the (traditional) economy. For post-industrialists however, the root cause of Britain's problems is that the economy is undergoing a metamorphosis, a structural shift analogous to that experienced in the industrial revolution. Whereas the 'growing pains' experienced in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were associated with the development of an urban, industrial, capitalist society from a rural, agrarian, mercantilist system, the present difficulties represent the result of frictions in moving from that industrial system to a trans-national, information based, institutionally controlled economic order (Bell 1973, Stonier 1983, Toffler 1984).

The kinds of change that British industry has experienced are seen as permanent. Large-scale multi-national corporations, when they seek to maintain or extend profits, basically only have three options open to them (when their market is nearing saturation at a given price level). They can seek to reduce wage bills by transferring production from a high, to a low wage economy, or to achieve the reduction by automation, or they may seek to find cheaper raw materials. The first two of these options have been evident in this country with consequent job loss, while the third option (in the form of North Sea oil and gas) has only partially mitigated this process. For the post-industrialist, there is little point in providing government subsidy for traditional manufacturing industries, such as textiles, where jobs and investment have been transferred to the third world. Government subsidy should

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be aimed at facilitating, rather than opposing the structural changes taking place. This facilitating role can take on a number of forms:

- investment in what Stonier has called the new "knowledge based" industries, and other growth areas (such as tourism); fiscal incentives for similar private investment might also be provided;
- provision of an infrastructure, specifically in the fields of education and research, which will service the needs of such industries;
- alleviation of the social costs of the economic restructuring process by providing employment and services for displaced employees.

Within this overall role for the state, local government is likely to undertake some element of all three sets of tasks.

(a) The Ideological Preconditions of the Post-industrial Model

In ideological terms this model is premised upon social democratic consensus, involving the cooperation of labour with capital in the restructuring of the economy. Post-industrial policy prescriptions are consistent with 'one-nation conservatism' in their concern for the role of the state in maintaining social stability in troubled times, while being consistent also with 'utopian' or Fabian socialism, which sees the state as a vehicle for improving the quality of life of the disadvantaged.

(b) The Economic Preconditions of the Post-industrial Model

Perhaps the major difference between the preconditions of this model and those of the preceding model lies in the rate of economic growth. Whereas Keynesian policies might be seen as a reaction to slow economic growth, the post-industrial presumption is that high technology industries will flourish, generating increasing rates of economic growth but employing fewer and fewer people. Inflation would be held at a steady level.

One might expect also some evidence of social unrest as a precursor to increased government intervention, since the gap between rich and poor (those in work in the sunrise industries, and those relying on state benefits) is likely to grow, as workers reap the rewards of the rapid expansion of their high technology industries. Government intervention in such circumstances would be required to reduce such inequities and ensure social stability.

(c) The Political Preconditions of Post-industrial Local Government

The political values which are consonant with this level of state intervention, would seem to require a central government controlled by, or at least heavily influenced by, 'moderates' in either of the two major parties or a coalition grouping. A mixed economy is implied here with a far greater proportion of the gross national product going through government hands than is currently the case, thus alienating the New Right. However the approach stops short of government (or worker) control of industry and will not meet the demands therefore of the radical left. The post-war British and Western European experience has, however, illustrated that in times of relative affluence political militancy is considerably reduced within the mainstream parliamentary groups (Lane and Ersson 1987).

Given the climate of moderate political opinion indicated here, there is likely to be some convergence in the policies adopted by both Labour and Conservative controlled local authorities. Spending patterns and levels of service provision are therefore unlikely to be markedly different across authorities of a given type. Nor under such circumstances would government be required to place statutory controls on local government spending levels.

(d) The Nature of Leisure Service Organisation and Delivery under the Post-industrial Approach

In the same way as the post-industrial approach to public sector economic investment is more specific than its Keynesian alternative in terms of the kinds of industry to be supported, so also the post-industrial model carries with it a more specific prescription for

leisure services than simply a generalised plan of expansion. This model implies the demise of the work ethic in post-industrial societies to be replaced not by a 'leisure ethic' (however that might be defined) but rather by a set of values focused on service. Social status under such a system of values is to be derived not from accumulation of wealth through hard work, but from a demonstration of one's worth to the community, through work certainly, but also through the acquisition and application of socially useful skills. Although therefore the post-industrial explanation predicts extended periods of 'leisure' in the normal life pattern, such periods are likely to be taken up in personal development through (a very broadly-based liberal) education, and through work with people.

Education in particular performs a pivotal role in the social system of the future for post-industrialists. The skills required of individuals in work are likely to change rapidly as technological change accelerates, and therefore vocationally oriented training and education are likely to be required at more regular intervals across the life-span of each individual. Furthermore with increased automation and job-sharing the time available to the individual for self-fulfilment in non-work pursuits will expand, generating increased demand for opportunities for personal development across the whole range of non-vocational interests. Life-long education is seen by post-industrialists (cf. Best and Stern 1978) as providing solution to such problems. The education system is portrayed in such accounts as making the opportunity for self actualization universally available. Although this is contrasted with our current emphasis on education for work, it should not simply be seen as education for leisure. Perhaps a more appropriate banner might be 'education for self fulfilment' - such a title gives an indication of the utopian flavour of post-industrial accounts.

Clearly what post-industrial theorists such as Best and Stern, or Stonier, have in mind when they refer to expansion of the academic system incorporates aspects of traditional leisure services. Self actualisation for many is after all achieved through sports, the arts,

hobbies etc. The post-industrial model therefore incorporates a much more proactive approach on the part of the providers of services. Traditional 'caretaking and maintenance of plant' roles will be superseded by those with an emphasis on inter-personal skills.

Freedom from long hours of work is also seen by post-industrialists as providing a stimulus for greater participation in local and national affairs. This has consequences for the way that leisure services are delivered. It implies both decentralisation of provision and self-determination on the part of the community. In addition, given the social democratic ideology which is expected to predominate, there is likely to be an emphasis placed on the needs of disadvantaged groups. These three criteria, self determination, decentralization and a concern for the needs of the disadvantaged have been identified as key features of community recreation, and this approach is therefore likely to receive greater emphasis within the post-industrial local authority.

Organisational theorists have pointed out that traditional bureaucratic structures are inappropriate to the dynamic and changing environment of a high technology society, and local authorities can therefore expect to experience some of the changes anticipated for work organisations in an unstable environment, with work groups formed around particular types of task, and membership of such groups being decided on skills of the individual rather than his or her position within the organisation.

Public sector organisations are also likely to be required to promote the notion of job sharing as a social responsibility, in order to aid the process of the redistribution of work. A number of local authorities are currently attempting to promote this practice, though admittedly on a fairly small scale. It seems likely that this will be expanded as local government adopts a position of 'moral leadership' in employment practices. Values will have to change if individuals are to be persuaded that it is anti-social to consume a full-time forty hour post. Such a position is not inconceivable, given for example that undertaking overtime is considered anti-social in certain industries.

However, it may require the force of legislation, rather than simply moral leadership, to impose a maximum working week.

Investment in tourism by local government for economic rather than social reasons has been promoted by Stonier (1983) in order to foster an important post-industrial growth area. Ironically, it is our industrial heritage that provides one of the most important advantages for Britain over competing tourist destinations. Tourism is seen as an ideal buffer against the effects of a poor national economic performance, since a weak pound stimulates trade, and local government will have a key role in coordinating and stimulating local tourist provision.

***(e) The Financial Characteristics of Local Government Leisure Services
in the Post-industrial Local Authority***

The kind of expansion which is prefigured here presupposes a considerable expansion of the taxation base which funds such provision. This is in part to be funded by an expansion of the economy as the new industries generate higher levels of income and profit. However, this scenario also presumes a growth in the proportion of gross domestic product taken up by local government spending. As Stonier points out, it would have been inconceivable at the beginning of the industrial revolution that government should 'consume' approximately 40% of GDP in taxation. Nevertheless in a period of industrial and economic growth, spending has increased disproportionately and it is only recently that some economic theorists have been able to argue that the balance between public and private sector spending (or spending on marketable and non-marketable sectors) has resulted in negative effects for the economy as a whole. In contrast to the Bacon and Eltis thesis, post-industrial theorists argue that public spending is essential to the growth of the economy, and can only be viewed in a negative light if consideration of the effects of public spending is limited to its effects on traditional, ailing industries. Their failure is attributed to the realignment of world trade, the newly emerging international division of labour, and their failure is therefore seen as inevitable.

The growth in public sector leisure spending is likely to take the form predominantly of increased numbers of employees dealing face-to-face with clients rather than massive investment in the hardware of leisure services. The rationale for this reflects a major claim of post-industrialism that although industrial jobs may disappear (or radically reduce in number) because of advances in information technology and competition from the third world, there will be increased demand for the kinds of human services which cannot be provided by machines. Such a scenario implies a considerable expansion of revenue budgets for leisure-related services in the public sector.

(f) The Context of Local Government Services in the Post-industrial Local Authority

As has been suggested, this scenario presumes a greater opportunity for citizen involvement in decision-making and a 'service ethic' which implies greater concern for matters of local and national significance. People with more time and greater exposure to education might be expected to make a more significant input into the affairs of the local and national state. However, experience of the period of expansion of the 1960's to the early 1970's suggests that increasing the size and complexity of the public sector militates against public participation, and reinforces the position of the professional. It remains to be seen therefore whether professional influence can be eroded in favour of client involvement in decision-making about services. This will represent a crucial issue for public sector services generally. Community recreation and other related decentralisation movements may be viewed on one level as essentially anti-professional and in part as a reaction against the failure of service professionals to meet the needs of what have ostensibly been priority groups. This major tension which local government is currently experiencing is therefore likely to be reproduced in the post-industrial model.

The role of the leisure quangos is difficult to identify in part because of the same tension between enhanced professional activity and the increasing value placed on participation. This may be resolved to some degree by promoting a more democratic structure for the quangos,

with representation drawn from local elected representatives, the unions, professionals, and interest groups as well as central government appointments.

The retention of the quangos is consistent with the post-industrial de-emphasis of ideology and promotion of the notion of consensual government. Quangos are therefore seen as promoting shared social and economic goals through strategic grant aid and advice, and central government influence of local government policy is likely to be limited to that exercised via the relatively 'neutral' and 'independent' quangos.

There are two key policy orientations consistent with this style of local government. The first is that of 'economic development' with cultural tourism in particular being regarded as a national economic resource, which can earn considerable income if the local tourist infrastructure is managed effectively. The second dominant orientation is that of 'community development' with an emphasis on fostering opportunities for participation in the social, political and economic life of the community. This involves not simply allowing access to decision-making within leisure services, but also the use of leisure programmes to generate community organisations and structures, and to develop the skills required for fuller citizen participation.

8.3.5 THE MUNICIPAL SOCIALIST MODEL

In the discussion of the New Urban Left and the emergence of cultural policy as an issue in the strategies of local socialism in Chapter Three, two principal policy themes emerged. The first was the use of leisure or cultural forms to promote a positive image of socialist local government. The second was the intervention by local government in the leisure market to allow local cultural producers to distribute their products without being 'squeezed out' by large scale capital. This final model of local government encompasses an approach which goes beyond this to undertake investment in areas of the leisure industries where profits are generated and which have therefore

traditionally been the preserve of the commercial sector. Profits generated by these economic investments are to be used to off-set losses on social services provided by the authority.

(a) The Ideological Preconditions of the Municipal Socialist Model

The emergence of the New Urban Left in British local government politics follows in large part from a frustration on the part of elements within the Labour Party with the failure of Labour governments to deliver socialist policies. It further reflects concern over the failure of the Party nationally to combat the labelling of socialist policies as an 'irresponsible', damagingly idealistic product of the 'loony left', which will reduce personal freedoms and be wasteful of public resources. Within the Party also there is a fear that the state machinery itself is an instrument of class domination, controlled as it is by professional bureaucrats acting in their own interests rather than those of the electorate. Such an analysis has led to two forms of action, the first is economic struggle for socialist gains. The second is represented in attempts to control the local state. Critics of 'Labourism' argue that local socialism is more readily achievable because in their decentralised forms both the state apparatus and the Labour Party are more readily controlled (Boddy and Fudge 1984). Local socialism can thus provide two main sets of benefits. First, it is able to protect the interests of local working class communities, and secondly it performs a hegemonic role, demonstrating that socialist policies are workable. The municipal socialist model, therefore represents a form of local socialism which seeks not only to deliver services of a particular kind and in a particular way, but which also seeks to alter the balance of the (local) mixed economy.

(b) The Economic Preconditions of the Municipal Socialist Model

The impetus for the kinds of radical change implied in this model is likely to come from adverse economic and social conditions - high levels of unemployment, low economic growth, and attendant social disorder.

The economic analysis of the left of the current economic recession is similar in many ways to that of the right. Both emphasise the notion of taxation to fund public sector services as an increasing, and eventually intolerable burden for private industry. However whereas economists of the right such as Bacon and Eltis argue that what is required to restore economic growth and therefore social stability is a reduction in state spending, the left interprets such an erosion of collective consumption as being equally disastrous for both capital and labour in the final analysis (cf. Castells 1977). This is because collective consumption services such as education, housing and leisure are essential elements of the capitalist system since they are part of the infrastructure on which industry depends because it requires the reproduction of a fit, healthy, educated and receptive workforce in order to produce profits. This then represents one of the 'contradictions of capitalism' which generates fiscal crisis and which is likely to be resolved only through socialist reform.

(c) The Political Preconditions of the Municipal Socialist Model

The current economic situation is already generating radicalism at local level in the Labour Party in urban areas which are experiencing the worst difficulties - Sheffield, Liverpool, and some of the London Boroughs, for example. However, the freedom of action of local authorities is severely curtailed by the present government's legislation. The political preconditions of the adoption of this approach to local government are therefore likely to be the return of a Labour government dominated by the left, with the political will to enact the legislation required to expand local government powers sufficiently. This model goes beyond mere investment carried out by Enterprise Boards, or even the influencing by local government of local industry's plans through investment (which is currently a feature of the activities of some Enterprise Boards). It is, rather, ownership and control of local industry on a relatively wide scale. Such a strategy would exceed the powers currently invested in local authorities.

(d) The Nature of Leisure Service Organisation and Delivery under the Municipal Socialist Approach

A fundamental distinction between structural marxists and the New Urban Left in respect of leisure lies in their contrasting analyses of need. For the structural marxist, leisure is seen as an area in which false needs have been generated and the values of capitalism reinforced. Its function is therefore ideological. The New Urban Left has been associated (at least in the case of the Greater London Council discussed in Chapter Three) as having a potentially hegemonic function, challenging the dominant value system, generating political awareness. Leisure policy can also have a hegemonic function in terms of the local economy demonstrating the viability of local socialist economics within a mixed market.

The municipalisation of private industry would have considerable effects on local leisure provision given the relatively larger commercial sector which currently exists. Even in the most run down and neglected inner city areas or council housing estates, the pub and the betting shop are often generating sufficient revenue to maintain a presence. If profits could be maintained under public ownership, the revenue from municipal pubs and betting shops for example could be ploughed back into the community rather than redistributed to shareholders.

The markets for leisure clothing and equipment have produced high turnovers and profits in recent years, and are dominated by multi-national names such as 'Adidas' and 'Puma'. The local authority in the case study considered a report advocating the establishment of a municipal industry in this area of the market, together with the launching of sports and interest holidays for overseas visitors. Though the report was not acted upon these represent examples of activities within the leisure industries which the municipal socialist authority might wish to pursue.

Traditional public sector leisure services would not however remain unaffected. Socialist writers have stressed the need to allow greater worker and user participation in the organisation of services, and have stressed also the need to focus more effectively on those whose needs

are not being met in the present system. The skill requirements for professionals operating in the municipal socialist context include greater political awareness (to appreciate the political goals of the local authority) and a balance between entrepreneurial skills (to generate profits) and the predominantly interpersonal skills of the community recreation worker. Furthermore, as has already been noted, some leisure activities may be seen as antipathetic to socialist aims (e.g. boxing) while others may foster such aims (e.g. cooperative arts and sports forms).

(e) The Financial Characteristics of Leisure Services in the Municipal Socialist Authority

The most significant financial feature of this model is the increased volume of financial activity which the expansion of local government activities implies. The growth in volume of business together with socialist concerns about large scale state bodies would suggest a reorganisation at the local level into geographically smaller, more easily controlled local authorities. To maintain existing boundaries and rapidly expand the level of local authority activity would reduce the ability of the local community and its elected representatives to impose radical change on this tier of government.

(f) The Context of Leisure Services in the Municipal Socialist Model

Given the socialist concern that workers, members of the community and / or their representatives be more closely involved in decision-making, this model of local government would carry with it the need for a reform of the make-up and role of quangos to make them more democratically accountable. The rejection of the argument that high arts are more important than, or aesthetically superior to, other art forms which is a feature of some left wing critiques (cf Braden 1977) might also lead one to expect a lesser emphasis on support for the high arts, and perhaps even a radical rethinking of the Arts Council's areas of responsibility. However the role of the traditional arts in stimulating tourism seems likely to ensure that they are given prominence in leisure strategies.

Table 8.1 Leisure Policy Orientations and Local Government Types

PRECONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR EACH TYPE OF LOCAL AUTHORITY				CONSEQUENCES FOR LEISURE OF EACH TYPE OF LOCAL AUTHORITY	DOMINANT POLICY ORIENTATIONS
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TYPE AND ROLE	DOMINANT IDEOLOGICAL POSITION	ECONOMIC CONDITIONS	POLITICAL CONDITIONS		
CONTRACT MANAGEMENT: PROVIDER OF THE LAST RESORT	New Right	Either high inflation, high unemployment, low growth or high growth, low inflation, high unemployment and no problem of social order	Radical Conserv'tive Government with large majority. - local autonomy challenged and restricted	a. Leisure needs to be identified and served through free market b. Govt. to provide only those activities where market imperfections occur, and then use private contractors c. Leisure Quangos disbanded; 'essential' tasks (e.g. tourism; anti-vandalism measures go to central govt.) d. Leisure professional's skills - appraisal and monitoring of contractors' work. e. Growth in role of commercial sector through privatization	Voluntarism Economic Development
FINANCIAL STRINGENCY - MANAGER OF SHRINKING RESOURCES	One nation Conservatism or a form of Social Democracy	High inflation, growing unemployment, low economic growth	Conservative Govt with small majority or Con. led coalition - local autonomy low	a. Leisure needs recognised but not necessarily met through state. b. Priority within shrinking provision given to meeting the needs of 'disruptive' groups among the disadvantaged c. Emphasis on cost-cutting and generating revenue through charges. d. Quangos retained as neutral planning bodies e. Professional's skills - financial (cost-control) and inter-personal (community recreation) f. Significant role for commercial sector, contracting out of services.	Minimalism and Cost Control Entrepreneurial Style
KEYNESIAN - MANAGER OF EXPANDING RESOURCES	'Utopian Socialism' or Social Democracy	Low inflation, low economic growth, high unemployment	Labour Govt. dominated by the right or coalition - local autonomy high	a. Expansion of public sector leisure services as means of reflation b. Leisure needs identified by professionals - new provision to meet latent needs c. Emphasis on positive benefits of public sector expenditure on leisure (new capital projects) d. Quangos drawn into new Ministry of Leisure e. Leisure professional - traditional skills of manager and social planner. f. Public sector competing with commercial sector in many areas of leisure	Traditional Service Development Economic Development
POST-INDUSTRIAL - FACILITATOR OF CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT AND SERVICE ETHIC	One nation Conservatism, 'Utopian Socialism' or Social Democracy	High economic growth, high unemployment, low inflation	'Moderate' Labour or Conservative govts. - local autonomy high.	a. Leisure need seen as an aspect of need for personal development b. Public expenditure on leisure seen as part of positive commitment to education for self fulfilment c. Flexible, non-bureaucratic organisational structures for local govt. d. Quangos democratised. e. Professional skills: community development, educationalist, counsellor f. Public sector support for tourism and high tech industries	Economic Development Community Development
MUNICIPAL SOCIALIST - ACTIVE INTERVENTION TO COUNTERACT THE MARKET	'New Urban Left'	Low growth, high inflation, high unemployment, social disorder	Labour Govt. dominated by left, with large majority - local autonomy high	a. Leisure need seen in terms of equality of opportunity b. Municipalisation of commercial leisure sector to generate revenue (e.g. municipal pubs, and betting shops) c. Selective support of sport and arts (e.g. anti-boxing, pro community arts) d. Professional skills - entrepreneurial, political, interpersonal e. Public sector intervention in commercial sector through equity stakes, joint ventures etc.	Cultural Politics

Chapter 8: Policy Orientations in Leisure Services and the Future of Local Government

Unlike 'utopian socialists' the promoters of municipal socialism would be likely to reject the creation of an over-arching Ministry of Leisure since this would run counter to their proposals for local autonomy. Indeed, it seems likely that opposition to this proposal which was incorporated in the Labour Party's election plans would be stronger at the local level than in the national party, particularly in those urban authorities where the significance of cultural politics for advancing the cause of socialism has been consciously recognized.

The policy orientation most closely associated with the municipal socialist model of local government is that of cultural politics. However it involves not simply using leisure as a political tool (with a hegemonic function) but employing it also as an economic tool for generating the resources to finance other services involving a decentralised form of public ownership.

8.4 CONCLUSION

This study has sought to evaluate the nature and significance of party politics for local government leisure policy, and to identify emerging leisure policy orientations in the mid-1980's. Underpinning the approach adopted in the study is a recognition that the social practices which constitute features of the leisure policy-making system are undergoing change, located as they are in turbulent social, political and economic environments. However social practices should not be seen simply as responses to environmental change, they also help to shape the environment itself. A contribution this thesis seeks to make therefore consists in raising awareness of the nature of such practices so that actors involved may consciously seek to sustain, modify or reject them in order to secure desired outcomes. In other words by articulating an analysis of actors' *practical* knowledge, and of unintended consequences of action, the thesis aims to inform actors' *discursive* knowledge of the policy process.

The choices facing politicians, professionals, public sector workers, and the public do not, however, simply relate to alternative service policy directions, they are more fundamental. They involve consideration of options

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for restructuring the local government system and reviewing the rationale for local state intervention. This study has therefore also aimed to meet a further prerequisite of informed choice in this field by fostering a clearer understanding of the relationship between the rationales for local government activity, local government form, and policy orientations in the field of leisure services.

NOTES - CHAPTER 8

¹ Strictly speaking 'social democracy' has been employed in this study to describe a compromise between competing ideologies rather than an ideological position per se.

² The question of whether reductions in direct personal taxation will produce a reduction in overall individual (direct and indirect) tax payments is disputed by the Labour Party (cf. Hattersley 1987b).

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