**Online Appendix for: *The Paternalist Politics of Punitive and Enabling Workfare: Evidence from a New Dataset on Workfare Reforms in 16 Countries, 1980-2015***

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# Sample reforms

Examples, Source Files: 1) Welfare Reform Act 2012, 2) “Hartz IV”, and 3) Lov om ændring af lov om arbejdstilbud til ledige (Frivilligt arbejdstilbud, selvfundet arbejdstilbud, introduktionsperiode m.v.)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Country | Germany | United Kingdom | Denmark |
| Name of law/rule | Viertes Gesetz für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt (G-SIG: 15019247) Known as: Hartz IV | Welfare Reform Act 2012An Act to make provision for universal credit and personal independence payment; to make other provision about social security and tax credits; to make provision about the functions of the registration service, child support maintenance and the use of jobcentres; to establish the Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission and otherwise amend the Child Poverty Act 2010; and for connected purposes.  | Lov om ændring af lov om arbejdstilbud til ledige (Frivilligt arbejdstilbud, selvfundet arbejdstilbud, introduktionsperiode) |
| Legislation date | 24-12 | 08-03 | 24-06 |
| Legislation year | 2003 | 2012 | 1992 |
| Implementation date | 01-01 | 29-04 | 01-07 |
| Implementation year | 2005 | 2013 | 1992 |
| Links to descriptions | Bundestag - Law proposal:http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/15/015/1501516.pdfBundestag - Law documentation:http://pdok.bundestag.de/extrakt/ba/WP15/380/38052.htmlGaskarth, Glyn (2014): The Hartz Reforms and their lessons for the UK. Centre for Policy Studies.https://www.cps.org.uk/files/reports/original/141024133732-TheHartzReforms.pdfClasen, Jochen (2005): Reforming European Welfare States: Germany and the United Kingdom compared. Oxford University Press.Landeszentrale für politische Bildung:https://www.lpb-bw.de/hartz\_gesetze.html | Library of Congress:https://www.loc.gov/law/help/welfare-reform/great-britian.phpBeasor's guide:http://www.egenda.stockton.gov.uk/aksstockton/images/att17425.pdfUK government - Law:http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/5/notes/contents | Folketinget:http://webarkiv.ft.dk/?/samling/19911/lovforslag\_oversigtsformat/l286.htmRetsinformation - Law:https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=69349Retsinformation - Law proposal:https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=111085  |
| Content summary | This law merges ALH and SA into ALG II. Recipients of ALG II (mostly long-term unemployed and young unemployed) are required to participate in activation and accept any legal jobs offered (also community work and one-euro jobs).  | Introduction of a new benefit, Universal Credit, and a ‘claimant commitment’ which will be a record of the ‘work-related requirements’ claimants are expected to meet in order to receive benefits. This ‘claimant commitment’ will affect basically all claimants on social security benefits. | Insured unemployed people (i.e., those on so called *dagpenge*) have the right to receive a job offer after minimum a year's unemployment, and for young unemployed under 25 it is possible to have the offer after six months of unemployment. |
| Detailed content | The main provisions of Hartz IV are summarized below:- Unemployment benefits and welfare benefits were combined into one single, lower, means-tested payment named ALG II. Previously, unemployed German workers could receive half of their previous salary in benefits while they were out of work indefinitely. As a result, a majority of claimants relied on benefits that no longer reflected former earnings, but rather current needs and means. - ALG II and its requirements are especially aimed at long-term unemployed. - To be eligible for ALG II jobseekers have to: be at least age 15, but not older than age 65; be employable (able to work at least 3 hours a day); be needy (means of subsistence cannot be ensured by their own forces, particularly not by taking up reasonable work. This also means that some claimants with partners in work lose their eligibility to benefit assistance); and have ordinary residence in the Federal Republic of Germany. - To receive payment the claimant must sign a contract. This outlines what they are obliged to do to improve their job situation, as well as the help the state agreed to provide. - New suitability criteria, where ALG II claimants in principle have to accept any legal job offered, even if it does not match their specifications or requires a change of location. They can be required to take on work that is in the general public interest, continuing the tradition whereby recipients of SA have always been legally required to work for social benefits.- Moreover, stronger activation obligations are imposed on this group of claimants. Because of the merging of SA and ALH, this group of claimants also consists of ‘employable people’, which is an extension of the category of people subjected to activation. Recall that activation is not mandatory for recipients of ALG I. - A new programme for getting the unemployed into the nonprivate work sector was introduced. Known as one-euro jobs, they paid €1 an hour for work in the public interest, and the recipient retains their ALG II. The BA can offer the one-euro jobs to the unemployed and can reduce their benefits if claimants refuse to do them.- Young unemployed persons (under 25) are only eligible for ALG II if they accept offers of training, suitable employment, or other job integration measures. | The Act introduces the Universal Credit (UC), which replaces the following means-tested benefits for working-age claimants: working tax credit, child tax credit, housing benefit, Income Support, income-based JSA and income-related ESA. ESA and JSA will continue as contributory-based benefits. UC can be claimed by people who are in and out of work. The basic eligibility conditions for UC are that a claimant must be:- At least eighteen years old, and - Under the qualifying age for the state pension credit, and; - In Great Britain, and;- Not receiving education.The Act also introduces a ‘claimant commitment’, which sets forth work-related requirements that claimants are expected to meet in order to receive their benefit. Essentially, individuals who are considered to be able to look for, or prepare for, work will be required to do so as a condition of receiving the benefit. The Act imposes work-related requirements on claimants as follows:- No work-related requirements will be imposed on lone parents with a child aged under one, people with limited capability for work-related activity (those in the support group for ESA); and carers with substantial caring responsibilities for a severely disabled person.- Work-focused interview requirement only will be imposed on lone parents with a child aged one or two. - Work preparation requirements will be imposed on people with limited capability for work (those in the work-related activity group for ESA), and lone parents with a child aged three or four.- All work-related requirements will be imposed on everyone else including lone parents with a child aged five or more.The ‘claimant commitment’ will be introduced across UC, ESA, JSA and IS (for people claiming JSA the ‘claimant commitment’ replaces the jobseeker’s agreement). There will be financial sanctions if claimants fail to meet the requirements in the commitment. Note: The Act provides both a framework and the authority for secondary legislation to be introduced to address the specific and technical requirements necessary to implement the reform of welfare benefits. | "Loven giver unge under 25 år en mulighed for efter 6 måneders ledighed at få et arbejdstilbud [af minimum 9 måneders varighed]. Herved vil de unge have mulighed for at blive aktiveret på et tidligere tidspunkt i ledighedsforløbet end efter de hidtil gældende regler, og de vil derved få større mulighed for at opnå varig beskæftigelse. Med henblik på at skaffe flere private arbejdstilbud indføres der en introduktionsperiode forud for arbejdstilbudet. Samtidig gives der ledige såvel over som under 25 år mulighed for selv at finde et arbejdstilbud i den private sektor efter 6 måneders ledighed, hvilket er meget tidligere i ledighedsforløbet end efter de hidtil gældende regler."(source: Folketinget)Note: All insured unemployed have the right to a job offer after the rules in Lov om arbejdstilbud til ledige. This law changes the (young) unemployed people's rights and the insured unemployed people's possibility of finding a job offer. An important aspect is that the unemployed are not obliged to accept the job offers. They can refuse to participate and this will not have any financial consequences - this is stated directly in the law. |
| Code; punitive*[-2: substantive new duties/obligations* *-1: some new duties* | -2 | -2 |  |
| Code, enabling*1: clear emphasis on qualification and enablement of jobseekers (= rights)**2: as 1, but more so]* |  |  | +1 |
| Comments Justifying the Code  | Hartz IV is a clear example of workfare policy. Recipients of the new benefit, ALG II, are required to accept any job or training offers from the BA. This means that jobseekers can be obliged to work for their welfare by participating in community work or accepting one-euro jobs (which are not permanent jobs). Furthermore, young unemployed persons can only receive ALG II if they accept all training/jobs offered by the BA. The introduction of new duties in this law therefore implies a substantial policy change.  | This Act introduces a substantial policy change regarding work-related activities. Lone parents are required to participate in activities depending on the age of their youngest child, which means that many parents will face more obligations due to this Act. Furthermore, claimants are obliged to meet the requirements in their claimant commitment regardless of which benefit they receive (though of course not carers, people in the support group, etc.).  | Insured unemployed have the right to receive a job offer, however they are not obliged to accept it. This scheme has existed before. What this law changes is when the (young) unemployed can receive a job offer, which is at an earlier point in time.  |
| Specificity*[High:* ***existing*** *rules or laws are specified/become more specific (for instance, if a rule or law specifies the implementation of existing rules or laws)* *OR* *Low: a general change to the benefits framework (e.g., people now have to work for welfare)]* | Low | Low | High  |
| Additional justifications for specificity? | The law amends the SGB III, which would justify a high specificity (as in the case of Hartz III). However, the merging of two benefit systems involves a new approach and a new way of thinking, which justifies a low specificity.  |  | Strengthens/specifies existing legislation on job offers for insured unemployed people (right to earlier offers). |

# Details on paternalism (item descriptions and examples)

The following UK examples are from:

 <https://visuals.manifesto-project.wzb.eu/mpdb-shiny/cmp_dashboard_corpus/>

**603/traditional morality**

Favourable mentions of traditional and/or religious moral values. May include:
• Prohibition, censorship and suppression of immorality and unseemly behaviour;
• Maintenance and stability of the traditional family as a value;
• Support for the role of religious institutions in state and society.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2001 | Labour Party | Our reforms will build a strong and inclusive society. |
| 1997 | Liberal Democrats | - Strengthen discipline in schools. |
| 1997 | Liberal Democrats | We will, where appropriate, require parents to participate in support projects where their children have been involved in juvenile crime. |
| 2017 | Conservative Party | We reject the cult of selfish individualism. |
| 2017 | Conservative Party | True Conservatism means a commitment to country and community; |
| 2019 | Conservative Party | We will back heads and teachers on discipline. |
| 2017 | United Kingdom Independence Party | Make certain that neither the legal nor the welfare system in Britain ever recognises polygamy |
| 2019 | Conservative Party | A strong society needs strong families. |
| 1997 | Liberal Democrats | We will encourage the provision of parenting classes for young adults. |
| 2001 | Scottish National Party | We will re-examine the duties of parents with the aim of ensuring that they play a full partnership role with schools and take responsibility for their children. |

**605/law and order positive**

Favourable mentions of strict law enforcement, and tougher actions against domestic crime. Only refers to the enforcement of the status quo of the manifesto country’s law code. May include:
• Increasing support and resources for the police;
• Tougher attitudes in courts;
• Importance of internal security.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2001 | Labour Party | - overhaul sentencing so that persistent offending results in more severe punishment. |
| 2001 | Labour Party | We will toughen the laws on rogue traders, unfair terms in contracts, and loan sharks. |
| 2001 | Labour Party | Fraud undermines confidence in the welfare system, so we are committed to reduce it. |
| 2001 | Labour Party | We have been prepared to be tough – preventing fraud by tightening gateways, sharpening sanctions on fraudsters, and now with ‘two-strikes-and-you’re-out’. |
| 2001 | Labour Party | Offenders must know they will be supervised in or out of prison until they can prove they have gone straight. |
| 2001 | Labour Party | stay straight or you will stay supervised or go back inside. |
| 2015 | Labour Party | Anti-social behaviour is too often tolerated, rather than dealt with. |
| 2015 | Labour Party | Labour will do more to increase the amount of time prisoners spend working and learning. |
| 1997 | Liberal Democrats | - Put 3,000 more police officers on the beat. |
| 2015 | Conservative Party | Keeping you and your family safe is our overriding priority. |
| 2015 | Conservative Party | We have stopped prisoners from having the vote, |
| 2015 | Conservative Party | We must always ensure our outstanding intelligence and security agencies have the powers they need to keep us safe. |
| 2015 | Conservative Party | In the last year alone, we have given the authorities greater powers to disrupt and control the movements of people who want to travel abroad to fight, |
| 1997 | Liberal Democrats | We will widen the use of schemes that require offenders to repay their debt to society and to confront the consequences of their actions. |

**305/political authority**

Comprised of political authority party competence, political authority personal competence, political authority strong government, rehabilitation and compensation, pre-democratic elites (not salient in our 16 democracies)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2001 | Labour Party | In our first term, national action was vital – to tackle crises of funding and quality. |
| 2001 | Labour Party | With Labour, the welfare state helps people into work, makes work pay, supports them at work, and demands responsibilities in return. |
| 2001 | Labour Party | Labour will introduce a new principle of ‘employment first’, with rights and responsibilities balanced at every stage. |
| 2001 | Labour Party | Anti-social behaviour was unchecked. |
| 2001 | Labour Party | We lost our say over decisions that affected our lives. |
| 2001 | Labour Party | Labour will stand up for Britain. |
| 2001 | Labour Party | This is our contract with the people. |
| 1997 | Liberal Democrats | Government should help them do so. |
| 1997 | Liberal Democrats | backed by an enabling government. |
| 2015 | Conservative Party | Of course, there are many tasks which require the resources and grip of government. |
| 2015 | Conservative Party | A Conservative Government will tackle these challenges. |

# Discussion of the face validity of the paternalism measure

Generally speaking, the Third Way (Blair, UK)/new centre (Schroeder, Germany)/New democrats (Clinton, US) included an acceptance of the market as a superior mechanism for arriving at certain outcomes (though not as decidedly as the governments led by Thatcher and Reagan). This is what made the Third Way different from ‘old’ Social Democracy. The Third Way ideology also encompassed an important role for strong state intervention and this is what distinguished it from neoliberalism. On the one hand, the Third Way promoted policies such as cuts in personal income taxes, social security retrenchments and increased labour market flexibility that aim at strengthening the economic incentives to work. These were effectively market-oriented policies. On the other hand, there was strong state intervention in the form of active labour market policies and social investments that were also crucial elements in the policy-mix of the ‘third way’ Social Democratic parties in government. The core of the ‘third way’ was about job creation and labour market participation and the means towards achieving these goals were both the market and state intervention (Green-Pedersen and Van Kersbergen 2002).

The famous Blair/Schroeder pamphlet “Europe: The Third Way” (June 1998), for instance, stated, ‘Modern social democrats are not laissez-faire neo-liberals. Flexible markets must be combined with a newly defined role for an active state. The top priority must be investment in human and social capital.’ And: ‘The state must become an active agent for employment, not merely the passive recipient of the casualties of economic failure.’ Or: ‘Part-time work and low-paid work are better than no work…’. And: ‘Introduce targeted programmes for the long-term unemployed and other disadvantaged groups to give them the opportunity to reintegrate into the labour market on the principle of rights and responsibilities going together’.

In his analysis of welfare reform in the US under Clinton and the UK under Blair and challenging the ‘neo-liberal convergence thesis, Driver (2004), explicitly flags “new paternalism” as an important characteristic of New Labour/New democrats: ‘The Labour Government has made the rights of citizens to welfare even more contingent on responsibilities – in particular, the responsibility to find work. New Labour’s welfare reforms demand, **as the new paternalism requires,** certain types of behavioural response and sanction those forms of behaviour deemed ‘irresponsible’. **Third way politics is not neutral on the ‘good citizen’**. This **element of new paternalism** in New Labour and the New Democrats led to the policy of work requirements and marks an obvious break with the old progressive agenda, on both sides of the Atlantic, which believed that rights to welfare should not be contingent on work requirements.’ New Labour’s paternalism could clearly be discerned in the New Deal programm for the unemployed that used intrusive state power to ensure that ‘chances that are given are taken up’. Compulsion was considered necessary ‘in bringing opportunities to people who could not see those opportunities for themselves’. The compulsory nature of the New Deal was legitimized by ‘tough love’ and ‘having to be cruel to be kind’ (quotes are from Morrison 2004).

Stephen Driver (2004), North Atlantic drift: welfare reform and the ‘Third Way’ politics of New Labour and the New Democrats, in Sarah Hale, Will Leggett, and Luke Martell (eds), *The Third Way and beyond*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Christoffer Green-Pedersen and Kees van Kersbergen (2002), The politics of the Third Way: The transformation of social democracy in Denmark and the Netherlands, *Party Politics* *8*(5).

David Morrison (2004), New Labour, citizenship and the discourse of the Third Way, in Sarah Hale, Will Leggett, and Luke Martell (eds), *The Third Way and beyond*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

# Models relegated to Online Appendix (non-effects and trend)

# Trend towards more legislative activity over time

**Trend towards more legislative activity over time**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Year | -0.0158\*\*\* | 0.0110\*\* | 0.0267\*\*\* | -0.0160\*\*\* | 0.0110\*\* | 0.0271\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00522) | (0.00451) | (0.00813) | (0.00519) | (0.00450) | (0.00806) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Partisanship |  |  |  | 0.000664 | -0.000221 | -0.000854 |
| (Left-Right) |  |  |  | (0.000589) | (0.000524) | (0.000879) |
| N | 560 | 560 | 560 | 560 | 560 | 560 |
| *R*2 | 0.101538 | 0.140695 | 0.097567 | 0.104095 | 0.140711 | 0.099600 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2). *Partisanship* calculated by share of left cabinet parties minus share of right cabinet parties (Armingeon et al. 2017).

# No main effects of partisanship 1980–2015

**No main effects of partisanship 1980–2015**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Right share | 0.0000911 | 0.0000701 | 0.000663 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.00108) | (0.000974) | (0.00154) |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left share |  |  |  | -0.00172 | 0.000523 | 0.000748 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.00115) | (0.00101) | (0.00173) |
| Observations | 560 | 560 | 560 | 560 | 560 | 560 |
| *R*2 | 0.070400 | 0.121532 | 0.046628 | 0.074442 | 0.122204 | 0.046725 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

# No main effects of partisanship 1980-2015, controlling for unemployment

**No main effects of partisanship 1980-2015, controlling for unemployment**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Right share | 0.0000528 | 0.000119 | 0.000768 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.00108) | (0.000964) | (0.00153) |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemploy- | -0.0259 | 0.0291\* | 0.0646\*\* | -0.0282 | 0.0299\* | 0.0656\*\*\* |
| ment rate | (0.0225) | (0.0164) | (0.0251) | (0.0221) | (0.0164) | (0.0251) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left share |  |  |  | -0.00187 | 0.000667 | 0.00108 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.00114) | (0.00101) | (0.00173) |
| Observations | 560 | 560 | 560 | 560 | 560 | 560 |
| *R*2 | 0.074132 | 0.127993 | 0.057877 | 0.078976 | 0.129040 | 0.058203 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

# No main effects of partisanship after 1997

**No main effects of partisanship after 1997**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Right share | -0.00132 | 0.000519 | 0.00450\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.00148) | (0.00133) | (0.00205) |  |  |  |
| Left share |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | 0.000323 | -0.000407 | -0.00395\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.00166) | (0.00144) | (0.00232) |
| Observations | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 |
| *R*2 | 0.152720 | 0.263573 | 0.141024 | 0.150668 | 0.263303 | 0.132253 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

# No main effects of partisanship after 1997, controlling for unemployment

**No main effects of partisanship after 1997, controlling for unemployment**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Right share | -0.00171 | 0.000371 | 0.00474\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.00154) | (0.00137) | (0.00209) |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemploy- | -0.0621 | -0.0224 | 0.0386 | -0.0569 | -0.0234 | 0.0260 |
| ment rate | (0.0452) | (0.0212) | (0.0325) | (0.0439) | (0.0207) | (0.0318) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left share |  |  |  | 0.000374 | -0.000384 | -0.00398\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.00168) | (0.00146) | (0.00233) |
| Observations | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 |
| *R*2 | 0.163810 | 0.260392 | 0.142871 | 0.160218 | 0.259929 | 0.132984 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

# No main effect of CMP RILE, with or without controlling for unemployment

**No main effect of RILE, with or without controlling for unemployment**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| RILE | 0.00137 | -0.000849 | 0.00104 | 0.00220 | -0.00174 | -0.000837 |
|  | (0.00305) | (0.00249) | (0.00431) | (0.00308) | (0.00248) | (0.00435) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment  |  |  |  | -0.0283 | 0.0309\* | 0.0644\*\* |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0229) | (0.0166) | (0.0256) |
| Observations | 557 | 557 | 557 | 557 | 557 | 557 |
| *R*2 | 0.071494 | 0.121740 | 0.046912 | 0.075807 | 0.128985 | 0.057489 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

# Robustness Checks

We conduct a variety of additional robustness tests below and we highlight a sample of key tests here: Using logistic regressions, we re-ran the analysis with an alternative ‘simplified’ dependent variable, with all measures coded as either +1 or -1 (i.e., collapsing +2s with +1s, and -2s with -1s). Second, we assessed alternative measures of left-right, replacing our standard measures with Jahn’s (2011) deductive Left-Right Core index, which captures the time- and country-specific nature of Left-Right divisions. Third, we tested alternative temporal structures: while our main models look at the effect of cabinet partisanship on workfare policies at t0 (all data from same year), we also provide results for long term effects as well as results for dynamic models (that add DV and IV changes at t-1). Fourth, we reran the analysis with a LDV specification (we include a lagged dependent variable among the predictors in a PCSE model). Fifth, we tested an alternative measure of problem pressure, looking at the share of the economically inactive population rather than the unemployment ratio (data taken from Armingeon et al. 2017).[[1]](#footnote-1) Sixth, we controlled for variations in unemployment benefit generosity and welfare transfers. In no instance were results substantively different. Then, we looked at the effects of corporatism (Jahn 2016) and how it affects our results. The effects of corporatism are not robust across models – in contrast to our findings for paternalism and market ideology (irrespective of corporatism).

Armingeon, Klaus, Virginia Wenger, Fiona Wiedemeier, Christian Isler, Laura Knöpfel, David Weisstanner, and Sarah Engler. 2017. *Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2017*. Bern: Institute of Political Science, University of Berne.

Jahn, Detlef. 2011. Conceptualizing Left and Right in comparative politics: Towards a deductive approach. *Party Politics*, 17(6), 745–765.

Jahn, Detlef. 2016. Changing of the guard: trends in corporatist arrangements in 42 highly industrialized societies from 1960 to 2010. *Socio-Economic Review*, 14(1), 47–71.

# Results with DV at t+1 year

**Table 1 (t+1 version of Online App. 4.1): Trend towards more legislative activity over time**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | Enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Year | -0.0158\*\*\* | 0.0110\*\* | 0.0267\*\*\* | -0.0160\*\*\* | 0.0110\*\* | 0.0271\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00522) | (0.00451) | (0.00813) | (0.00519) | (0.00450) | (0.00806) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Partisanship |  |  |  | 0.000664 | -0.000221 | -0.000854 |
| (Left-Right) |  |  |  | (0.000589) | (0.000524) | (0.000879) |
| N | 560 | 560 | 560 | 560 | 560 | 560 |
| *R*2 | 0.101538 | 0.140695 | 0.097567 | 0.104095 | 0.140711 | 0.099600 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

**Table 2 (t+1 version of Online App. 4.2): No main effects of partisanship 1980–2015**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Right share | 0.000365 | 0.0000157 | -0.000361 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.00111) | (0.000988) | (0.00168) |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left share |  |  |  | -0.00170 | -0.000180 | 0.00149 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.00120) | (0.00104) | (0.00184) |
| N | 544 | 544 | 544 | 544 | 544 | 544 |
| *R*2 | 0.069100 | 0.124681 | 0.057160 | 0.072855 | 0.124672 | 0.058485 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

**Table 3 (t+1 version of Online App. 4.3): No main effects of partisanship 1980-2015, controlling for unemployment**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Right share | 0.000371 | 0.0000393 | -0.000345 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.00111) | (0.000983) | (0.00168) |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemploy- | 0.00495 | 0.0183 | 0.0134 | 0.00249 | 0.0182 | 0.0157 |
| ment rate | (0.0233) | (0.0164) | (0.0341) | (0.0231) | (0.0165) | (0.0341) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left share |  |  |  | -0.00169 | -0.0000796 | 0.00158 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.00119) | (0.00104) | (0.00184) |
| N | 544 | 544 | 544 | 544 | 544 | 544 |
| *R*2 | 0.069139 | 0.127356 | 0.057495 | 0.072830 | 0.127356 | 0.058948 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

**Table 4 (t+1 version of Online App. 4.4): No main effects of partisanship after 1997**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Right share | -0.00118 | 0.000607 | 0.00181 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.00150) | (0.00134) | (0.00186) |  |  |  |
| Left share |  |  |  | 0.000761 | -0.000986 | -0.00172 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.00169) | (0.00149) | (0.00218) |
| N | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 |
| *R*2 | 0.145030 | 0.284528 | 0.162334 | 0.143419 | 0.285664 | 0.160804 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

**Table 5 (t+1 version of Online App. 4.5): No main effects of partisanship after 1997, controlling for unemployment**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Right share | -0.00145 | 0.000693 | 0.00215 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.00158) | (0.00137) | (0.00187) |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemploy- | -0.0419 | 0.0137 | 0.0540 | -0.0378 | 0.0119 | 0.0483 |
| ment rate | (0.0481) | (0.0228) | (0.0530) | (0.0468) | (0.0223) | (0.0530) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left share |  |  |  | 0.000799 | -0.000999 | -0.00177 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.00171) | (0.00149) | (0.00220) |
| N | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 |
| *R*2 | 0.149771 | 0.284501 | 0.165676 | 0.147215 | 0.285675 | 0.163192 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

**Table 6 (t+1 version of Online App. 4.6): No main effect of RILE, with or without controlling for unemployment**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| RILE | 0.00320 | -0.00194 | -0.00513 | 0.00315 | -0.00255 | -0.00570 |
|  | (0.00314) | (0.00252) | (0.00465) | (0.00320) | (0.00251) | (0.00469) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment  |  |  |  | 0.00146 | 0.0211 | 0.0196 |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0239) | (0.0166) | (0.0349) |
| N | 541 | 541 | 541 | 541 | 541 | 541 |
| *R*2 | 0.072064 | 0.125698 | 0.060687 | 0.072047 | 0.129124 | 0.061375 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

**Table 7 (t+1 version of Table 1 in the paper): Market ideology and workfare policy reform**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | Enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Market  | 0.0231\*\* | -0.0228\*\*\* | -0.0459\*\*\* | 0.0237\*\* | -0.0256\*\*\* | -0.0491\*\*\* |
| Ideology | (0.00919) | (0.00716) | (0.0124) | (0.00958) | (0.00721) | (0.0130) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemploy- |  |  |  | -0.00559 | 0.0297\* | 0.0352 |
| ment rate |  |  |  | (0.0239) | (0.0166) | (0.0345) |
| N | 541 | 541 | 541 | 541 | 541 | 541 |
| *R*2 | 0.082747 | 0.141319 | 0.082209 | 0.083058 | 0.148418 | 0.084851 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

**Table 8 (t+1 version of Table 2 in the paper): Paternalism and workfare policy reform**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Paternalism | -0.0256\*\*\* | 0.0241\*\*\* | 0.0497\*\*\* | -0.0256\*\*\* | 0.0248\*\*\* | 0.0504\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00801) | (0.00636) | (0.0118) | (0.00796) | (0.00632) | (0.0118) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemploy- |  |  |  | -0.000202 | 0.0232 | 0.0234 |
| ment rate |  |  |  | (0.0222) | (0.0157) | (0.0315) |
| N | 541 | 541 | 541 | 541 | 541 | 541 |
| *R*2 | 0.096010 | 0.159252 | 0.105891 | 0.096011 | 0.163763 | 0.106892 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

**Table 9 (t+1 version of Table 3 in the paper): Market ideology, paternalism, and workfare policy reform**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Market | 0.0217\*\* | -0.0215\*\*\* | -0.0295\*\* | 0.0226\*\* | -0.0246\*\*\* | -0.0349\*\*\* |
| Ideology | (0.00888) | (0.00705) | (0.0123) | (0.00925) | (0.00705) | (0.0124) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Paternalism | -0.0248\*\*\* | 0.0233\*\*\* | 0.0306\*\*\* | -0.0250\*\*\* | 0.0241\*\*\* | 0.0320\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00784) | (0.00626) | (0.00951) | (0.00777) | (0.00619) | (0.00942) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemploy- |  |  |  | -0.0104 | 0.0342\*\* | 0.0573\*\* |
| ment rate |  |  |  | (0.0226) | (0.0162) | (0.0252) |
| Observations | 541 | 541 | 541 | 541 | 541 | 541 |
| *R*2 | 0.107808 | 0.169411 | 0.080947 | 0.108535 | 0.177595 | 0.088782 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

# Lagged Dependent Variable (LDV) instead of AR1

**LDV Version of Table 1**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| punitive | 0.0444 |  |  | 0.0436 |  |  |
|  | (0.0578) |  |  | (0.0576) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Market Ideology | 0.0159\* | -0.0149\*\* | -0.0181 | 0.0186\*\* | -0.0180\*\* | -0.0251\* |
|  | (0.00890) | (0.00690) | (0.0130) | (0.00936) | (0.00698) | (0.0131) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| enabling |  | 0.131\*\* |  |  | 0.124\*\* |  |
|  |  | (0.0619) |  |  | (0.0614) |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| absolute |  |  | 0.0161 |  |  | 0.00654 |
|  |  |  | (0.0620) |  |  | (0.0612) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | -0.0278 | 0.0302\* | 0.0709\*\*\* |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0230) | (0.0157) | (0.0269) |
| Observations | 541 | 541 | 541 | 541 | 541 | 541 |
| *R*2 | 0.088045 | 0.164832 | 0.051150 | 0.091655 | 0.170986 | 0.063366 |

Note: LDV models, standard errors in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. With country fixed effects.

**LDV Version of Table 2**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| punitive | 0.0293 |  |  | 0.0292 |  |  |
|  | (0.0569) |  |  | (0.0568) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Paternalism | -0.0234\*\*\* | 0.0154\*\* | 0.0290\*\*\* | -0.0241\*\*\* | 0.0162\*\*\* | 0.0311\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00803) | (0.00627) | (0.0103) | (0.00789) | (0.00622) | (0.0101) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| enabling |  | 0.121\*\* |  |  | 0.116\* |  |
|  |  | (0.0607) |  |  | (0.0602) |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| code\_absolute |  |  | 0.00424 |  |  | -0.00339 |
|  |  |  | (0.0623) |  |  | (0.0616) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | -0.0244 | 0.0256\* | 0.0663\*\*\* |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0216) | (0.0154) | (0.0256) |
| Observations | 541 | 541 | 541 | 541 | 541 | 541 |
| *R*2 | 0.102014 | 0.169757 | 0.063305 | 0.104893 | 0.174355 | 0.074446 |

Note: LDV models, standard errors in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. With country fixed effects.

**LDV Version of Table 3**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Market Ideology | 0.0150\* | -0.0145\*\* | -0.0168 | 0.0180\* | -0.0179\*\*\* | -0.0245\* |
|  | (0.00882) | (0.00685) | (0.0130) | (0.00925) | (0.00689) | (0.0130) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Paternalism | -0.0230\*\*\* | 0.0151\*\* | 0.0285\*\*\* | -0.0238\*\*\* | 0.0161\*\*\* | 0.0308\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00796) | (0.00617) | (0.0103) | (0.00781) | (0.00609) | (0.00994) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| punitive | 0.0208 |  |  | 0.0190 |  |  |
|  | (0.0566) |  |  | (0.0563) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| enabling |  | 0.108\* |  |  | 0.0986 |  |
|  |  | (0.0611) |  |  | (0.0605) |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| absolute |  |  | -0.00243 |  |  | -0.0144 |
|  |  |  | (0.0621) |  |  | (0.0612) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | -0.0325 | 0.0341\*\* | 0.0778\*\*\* |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0223) | (0.0157) | (0.0261) |
| Observations | 541 | 541 | 541 | 541 | 541 | 541 |
| *R*2 | 0.107148 | 0.176709 | 0.066725 | 0.112047 | 0.184461 | 0.081350 |

Note: LDV models, standard errors in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. With country fixed effects.

# Simplified/Binary DV (1 vs 0 and -1 vs 0)/Logistic Regression

**Table 1 (logistic version with binary outcome)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Market  | -0.0322 | -0.0508 | -0.0544\*\* | -0.0355\* | -0.0592 | -0.0590\*\* |
| Ideology | (0.0213) | (0.0358) | (0.0272) | (0.0206) | (0.0372) | (0.0269) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | 0.0471 | 0.0926\*\* | 0.0517 |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0472) | (0.0440) | (0.0357) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| lnsig2u | -15.39 | -15.16 | -14.39 | -15.39 | -15.14 | -14.39 |
| Observations | 557 | 557 | 557 | 557 | 557 | 557 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Standard errors in parentheses, \* *p* < 0.1, \*\* *p* < 0.05, \*\*\* *p* < 0.01

**Table 2 (logistic version with binary outcome)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Paternalism | 0.0579\*\*\* | 0.0557\*\*\* | 0.0595\*\*\* | 0.0600\*\*\* | 0.0579\*\*\* | 0.0605\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0202) | (0.0195) | (0.0222) | (0.0210) | (0.0191) | (0.0223) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | 0.0541 | 0.0826\*\* | 0.0395 |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0591) | (0.0419) | (0.0354) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| lnsig2u | -15.10 | -15.13 | -15.08 | -15.09 | -15.12 | -15.08 |
| Observations | 557 | 557 | 557 | 557 | 557 | 557 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Standard errors in parentheses, \* *p* < 0.1, \*\* *p* < 0.05, \*\*\* *p* < 0.01

**Table 3 (logistic version with binary outcome)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Market  | -0.0304 | -0.0522 | -0.0537\*\* | -0.0351 | -0.0619\* | -0.0590\*\* |
| ideology | (0.0233) | (0.0348) | (0.0266) | (0.0225) | (0.0363) | (0.0264) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Paternalism | 0.0575\*\*\* | 0.0570\*\*\* | 0.0592\*\*\* | 0.0598\*\*\* | 0.0601\*\*\* | 0.0606\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0197) | (0.0200) | (0.0218) | (0.0205) | (0.0195) | (0.0221) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | 0.0670 | 0.109\*\* | 0.0631\* |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0606) | (0.0424) | (0.0333) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| lnsig2u | -15.09 | -15.11 | -15.05 | -15.08 | -15.34 | -15.41 |
| Observations | 557 | 557 | 557 | 557 | 557 | 557 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Standard errors in parentheses, \* *p* < 0.1, \*\* *p* < 0.05, \*\*\* *p* < 0.01

# Unemployment insurance generosity (CWED2)

**Table 1 but controlling for unemployment generosity**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Market Ideology | 0.0223\*\* | -0.0191\*\*\* | -0.0255\*\* | 0.0256\*\*\* | -0.0232\*\*\* | -0.0340\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00892) | (0.00710) | (0.0128) | (0.00933) | (0.00721) | (0.0129) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment  | -0.127\*\* | -0.0654 | 0.0791 | -0.136\*\*\* | -0.0533 | 0.104 |
| Generosity | (0.0524) | (0.0405) | (0.0715) | (0.0526) | (0.0404) | (0.0713) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | -0.0324 | 0.0443\*\* | 0.0869\*\*\* |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0230) | (0.0176) | (0.0271) |
| Observations | 512 | 512 | 512 | 512 | 512 | 512 |
| *R*2 | 0.099534 | 0.147316 | 0.063525 | 0.106933 | 0.160395 | 0.084705 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

**Table 2 but controlling for unemployment generosity**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Paternalism | -0.0249\*\*\* | 0.0188\*\*\* | 0.0306\*\*\* | -0.0254\*\*\* | 0.0195\*\*\* | 0.0320\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00823) | (0.00658) | (0.00996) | (0.00805) | (0.00644) | (0.00957) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment  | -0.122\*\* | -0.0700\* | 0.0739 | -0.128\*\* | -0.0615 | 0.0922 |
| Generosity | (0.0501) | (0.0380) | (0.0678) | (0.0504) | (0.0380) | (0.0680) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | -0.0241 | 0.0362\*\* | 0.0756\*\*\* |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0215) | (0.0165) | (0.0253) |
| Observations | 512 | 512 | 512 | 512 | 512 | 512 |
| *R*2 | 0.112938 | 0.158096 | 0.077494 | 0.116399 | 0.167149 | 0.093679 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

**Table 3 but controlling for unemployment generosity**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Market Ideology | 0.0208\*\* | -0.0179\*\*\* | -0.0235\* | 0.0243\*\*\* | -0.0222\*\*\* | -0.0323\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00864) | (0.00693) | (0.0125) | (0.00898) | (0.00696) | (0.0125) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Paternalism | -0.0240\*\*\* | 0.0180\*\*\* | 0.0294\*\*\* | -0.0245\*\*\* | 0.0186\*\*\* | 0.0308\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00797) | (0.00647) | (0.00977) | (0.00772) | (0.00627) | (0.00930) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment  | -0.131\*\*\* | -0.0620 | 0.0845 | -0.141\*\*\* | -0.0493 | 0.111 |
| Generosity | (0.0502) | (0.0395) | (0.0685) | (0.0505) | (0.0398) | (0.0691) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | -0.0352 | 0.0463\*\*\* | 0.0905\*\*\* |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0217) | (0.0170) | (0.0258) |
| Observations | 512 | 512 | 512 | 512 | 512 | 512 |
| *R*2 | 0.126546 | 0.165092 | 0.085298 | 0.134908 | 0.179312 | 0.108275 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

# Inactive share of the working age population

**Table 1 with share of inactive (instead of unemployment)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Punitive | Enabling | absolute | Punitive | Enabling | absolute |
| Market ideology | 0.0174\*\* | -0.0173\*\* | -0.0193 | 0.0152\* | -0.0162\*\* | -0.0184 |
|  | (0.00882) | (0.00698) | (0.0124) | (0.00868) | (0.00698) | (0.0124) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Share of inactive |  |  |  | 0.0182 | -0.00854 | -0.00724 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.0132) | (0.00909) | (0.0147) |
| Observations | 557 | 557 | 557 | 557 | 557 | 557 |
| *R*2 | 0.079033 | 0.132502 | 0.051781 | 0.083630 | 0.132782 | 0.052132 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

**Table 2 with share of inactive (instead of unemployment)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Paternalism | -0.0254\*\*\* | 0.0191\*\*\* | 0.0306\*\*\* | -0.0238\*\*\* | 0.0186\*\*\* | 0.0315\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00793) | (0.00633) | (0.00955) | (0.00794) | (0.00634) | (0.00965) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Share of inactive |  |  |  | 0.00919 | -0.00273 | 0.00518 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.0131) | (0.00863) | (0.0142) |
| Observations | 557 | 557 | 557 | 557 | 557 | 557 |
| *R*2 | 0.097883 | 0.146115 | 0.068967 | 0.099136 | 0.145847 | 0.069136 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

**Table 3 with share of inactive (instead of unemployment)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Market Ideology | 0.0159\* | -0.0162\*\* | -0.0172 | 0.0153\* | -0.0164\*\* | -0.0184 |
|  | (0.00855) | (0.00683) | (0.0122) | (0.00853) | (0.00685) | (0.0122) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Paternalism | -0.0246\*\*\* | 0.0183\*\*\* | 0.0298\*\*\* | -0.0238\*\*\* | 0.0186\*\*\* | 0.0314\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00778) | (0.00624) | (0.00949) | (0.00786) | (0.00626) | (0.00958) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Share of inactive |  |  |  | 0.00496 | 0.00175 | 0.0102 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.0129) | (0.00861) | (0.0141) |
| Observations | 557 | 557 | 557 | 557 | 557 | 557 |
| *R*2 | 0.105060 | 0.151648 | 0.073049 | 0.105444 | 0.151938 | 0.073673 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

# Results with DV at t+2 years

**Table 1 DV at t+2**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Market ideology | 0.0224\*\* | -0.0197\*\*\* | -0.0290\*\* | 0.0209\*\* | -0.0211\*\*\* | -0.0314\*\* |
|  | (0.00922) | (0.00758) | (0.0127) | (0.00961) | (0.00769) | (0.0131) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | 0.0157 | 0.0146 | 0.0244 |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0238) | (0.0170) | (0.0273) |
| Observations | 525 | 525 | 525 | 525 | 525 | 525 |
| *R*2 | 0.085615 | 0.134365 | 0.063434 | 0.086572 | 0.136546 | 0.064801 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

**Table 2 DV at t+2**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Paternalism | -0.0242\*\*\* | 0.0252\*\*\* | 0.0254\*\* | -0.0236\*\*\* | 0.0255\*\*\* | 0.0259\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00809) | (0.00661) | (0.00993) | (0.00804) | (0.00663) | (0.00993) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | 0.0198 | 0.0108 | 0.0161 |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0222) | (0.0162) | (0.0262) |
| Observations | 525 | 525 | 525 | 525 | 525 | 525 |
| *R*2 | 0.095168 | 0.154508 | 0.065790 | 0.097529 | 0.155877 | 0.066255 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

**Table 3 DV at t+2**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Market ideology | 0.0213\*\* | -0.0187\*\* | -0.0279\*\* | 0.0203\*\* | -0.0206\*\*\* | -0.0308\*\* |
|  | (0.00888) | (0.00753) | (0.0126) | (0.00924) | (0.00763) | (0.0129) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Paternalism | -0.0236\*\*\* | 0.0247\*\*\* | 0.0246\*\* | -0.0233\*\*\* | 0.0253\*\*\* | 0.0255\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00796) | (0.00650) | (0.00970) | (0.00793) | (0.00652) | (0.00972) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment  |  |  |  | 0.0106 | 0.0201 | 0.0301 |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0228) | (0.0166) | (0.0265) |
| Observations | 525 | 525 | 525 | 525 | 525 | 525 |
| *R*2 | 0.107101 | 0.163708 | 0.076720 | 0.107735 | 0.167245 | 0.078602 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

# Left-Right core (Jahn 2011)

**Table 4.3 from Online Appendix, but with Right-Left Core as partisanship variable**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Right-Left Core | -0.00360 | -0.00884 | 0.00827 | -0.00316 | -0.00930 | 0.00718 |
|  | (0.0131) | (0.0113) | (0.0193) | (0.0130) | (0.0112) | (0.0191) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | -0.0259 | 0.0294\* | 0.0640\*\* |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0224) | (0.0164) | (0.0250) |
| Observations | 560 | 560 | 560 | 560 | 560 | 560 |
| *R*2 | 0.070551 | 0.122868 | 0.046821 | 0.074244 | 0.129467 | 0.057846 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

**Table 4.5 from Online Appendix, but with Right-Left Core as partisanship variable (after 1997)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Right-Left Core | -0.0190 | -0.00473 | 0.0239 | -0.0184 | -0.00463 | 0.0237 |
|  | (0.0191) | (0.0190) | (0.0321) | (0.0188) | (0.0191) | (0.0321) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | -0.0562 | -0.0234 | 0.0234 |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0435) | (0.0208) | (0.0310) |
| Observations | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 |
| *R*2 | 0.152819 | 0.262663 | 0.126026 | 0.162368 | 0.259781 | 0.126167 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

**Appendix 1 (from paper) with Right-Left Core as partisanship variable**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Right-Left  | -0.00852 | -0.00320 | 0.0231 | -0.0108 | -0.00135 | 0.0221 | -0.0108 | 0.00346 | 0.0314 |
| Core | (0.0167) | (0.0154) | (0.0257) | (0.0162) | (0.0156) | (0.0249) | (0.0173) | (0.0161) | (0.0266) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Market  | 0.0187\* | -0.0157\* | -0.0292\* | 0.0216\* | -0.0186\*\* | -0.0328\*\* | 0.0221\* | -0.0220\*\* | -0.0397\*\* |
| ideology | (0.0110) | (0.00939) | (0.0161) | (0.0111) | (0.00930) | (0.0157) | (0.0117) | (0.00968) | (0.0164) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Paternalism | -0.0175\*\* | 0.0161\*\* | 0.0245\*\* | -0.0199\*\*\* | 0.0163\*\* | 0.0258\*\*\* | -0.0152\* | 0.0131\* | 0.0207\* |
|  | (0.00839) | (0.00745) | (0.0111) | (0.00773) | (0.00639) | (0.00994) | (0.00830) | (0.00745) | (0.0112) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| N of parties  | 0.0468 | -0.00122 | -0.0681 |  |  |  | 0.0550 | -0.0270 | -0.0778 |
| (legislative) | (0.0561) | (0.0528) | (0.0890) |  |  |  | (0.0586) | (0.0530) | (0.0901) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Labor union  | 0.0114 | -0.00508 | -0.00458 |  |  |  | 0.0135\* | -0.00764 | -0.0127 |
| density | (0.00702) | (0.00532) | (0.00817) |  |  |  | (0.00800) | (0.00800) | (0.0119) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemploy- |  |  |  | -0.0355 | 0.0592\*\*\* | 0.0855\*\*\* | -0.0421\* | 0.0697\*\*\* | 0.0964\*\*\* |
| ment rate |  |  |  | (0.0242) | (0.0195) | (0.0300) | (0.0252) | (0.0205) | (0.0318) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Transfer |  |  |  | -0.0254 | 0.00645 | 0.00854 | -0.0193 | 0.00610 | 0.00951 |
| spending |  |  |  | (0.0222) | (0.0206) | (0.0346) | (0.0243) | (0.0224) | (0.0381) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Budget  |  |  |  | -0.00841 | 0.0285\*\* | 0.00872 | -0.00637 | 0.0293\*\* | 0.00936 |
| deficit |  |  |  | (0.0151) | (0.0114) | (0.0184) | (0.0159) | (0.0117) | (0.0191) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Openness of  |  |  |  | -0.00595\* | 0.000729 | 0.00185 | -0.00319 | -0.00109 | -0.00149 |
| the economy |  |  |  | (0.00312) | (0.00219) | (0.00339) | (0.00355) | (0.00309) | (0.00483) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| (Real) GDP- |  |  |  | -0.0110 | 0.0139 | 0.0194 | -0.0151 | 0.0123 | 0.0195 |
| growth/year |  |  |  | (0.0227) | (0.0186) | (0.0299) | (0.0234) | (0.0188) | (0.0304) |
| Observations | 535 | 535 | 535 | 551 | 551 | 551 | 529 | 529 | 529 |
| *R*2 | 0.111489 | 0.158986 | 0.079829 | 0.120961 | 0.177631 | 0.091609 | 0.123381 | 0.190986 | 0.101730 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects.

# Unemployment lagged by one year

**Table 1 with unemployment lagged by one year**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Market Ideology | 0.0174\*\* | -0.0173\*\* | -0.0193 | 0.0209\*\* | -0.0219\*\*\* | -0.0273\*\* |
|  | (0.00882) | (0.00698) | (0.0124) | (0.00949) | (0.00729) | (0.0131) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | -0.0408\* | 0.0433\*\*\* | 0.0824\*\*\* |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0228) | (0.0163) | (0.0258) |
| Observations | 557 | 557 | 557 | 541 | 541 | 541 |
| *R*2 | 0.079033 | 0.132502 | 0.051781 | 0.093918 | 0.154816 | 0.072104 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

**Table 2 with unemployment lagged by one year**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Paternalism | -0.0254\*\*\* | 0.0191\*\*\* | 0.0306\*\*\* | -0.0248\*\*\* | 0.0189\*\*\* | 0.0309\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00793) | (0.00633) | (0.00955) | (0.00783) | (0.00632) | (0.00950) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | -0.0348 | 0.0360\*\* | 0.0746\*\*\* |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0213) | (0.0156) | (0.0241) |
| Observations | 557 | 557 | 557 | 541 | 541 | 541 |
| *R*2 | 0.097883 | 0.146115 | 0.068967 | 0.108302 | 0.160920 | 0.084766 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

**Table 3 with unemployment lagged by one year**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Market Ideology | 0.0159\* | -0.0162\*\* | -0.0172 | 0.0200\*\* | -0.0210\*\*\* | -0.0258\*\* |
|  | (0.00855) | (0.00683) | (0.0122) | (0.00921) | (0.00716) | (0.0129) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Paternalism | -0.0246\*\*\* | 0.0183\*\*\* | 0.0298\*\*\* | -0.0243\*\*\* | 0.0183\*\*\* | 0.0301\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00778) | (0.00624) | (0.00949) | (0.00765) | (0.00619) | (0.00944) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | -0.0439\*\* | 0.0455\*\*\* | 0.0865\*\*\* |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0217) | (0.0160) | (0.0247) |
| Observations | 557 | 557 | 557 | 541 | 541 | 541 |
| *R*2 | 0.105060 | 0.151648 | 0.073049 | 0.119194 | 0.173107 | 0.093175 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

# Unemployment lagged by two years

**Table 1 with unemployment lagged by two years**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Market Ideology | 0.0174\*\* | -0.0173\*\* | -0.0193 | 0.0213\*\* | -0.0224\*\*\* | -0.0274\*\* |
|  | (0.00882) | (0.00698) | (0.0124) | (0.00961) | (0.00762) | (0.0135) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | -0.0449\*\* | 0.0494\*\*\* | 0.0894\*\*\* |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0225) | (0.0163) | (0.0257) |
| Observations | 557 | 557 | 557 | 525 | 525 | 525 |
| *R*2 | 0.079033 | 0.132502 | 0.051781 | 0.102958 | 0.165915 | 0.077789 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

**Table 2 with unemployment lagged by two years**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Paternalism | -0.0254\*\*\* | 0.0191\*\*\* | 0.0306\*\*\* | -0.0248\*\*\* | 0.0177\*\*\* | 0.0298\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00793) | (0.00633) | (0.00955) | (0.00791) | (0.00650) | (0.00975) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | -0.0400\* | 0.0428\*\*\* | 0.0829\*\*\* |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0214) | (0.0157) | (0.0240) |
| Observations | 557 | 557 | 557 | 525 | 525 | 525 |
| *R*2 | 0.097883 | 0.146115 | 0.068967 | 0.116834 | 0.168840 | 0.089017 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

**Table 3 with unemployment lagged by two years**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Market Ideology | 0.0159\* | -0.0162\*\* | -0.0172 | 0.0208\*\* | -0.0220\*\*\* | -0.0266\*\* |
|  | (0.00855) | (0.00683) | (0.0122) | (0.00934) | (0.00752) | (0.0134) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Paternalism | -0.0246\*\*\* | 0.0183\*\*\* | 0.0298\*\*\* | -0.0244\*\*\* | 0.0173\*\*\* | 0.0292\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00778) | (0.00624) | (0.00949) | (0.00775) | (0.00641) | (0.00972) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | -0.0487\*\* | 0.0520\*\*\* | 0.0940\*\*\* |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0216) | (0.0161) | (0.0248) |
| Observations | 557 | 557 | 557 | 525 | 525 | 525 |
| *R*2 | 0.105060 | 0.151648 | 0.073049 | 0.128197 | 0.182604 | 0.097363 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

# Unemployment rate change

Includes Table 1-3 from paper and all tables in appendix 4 (non-effects) that include unemployment.

**Table 5.3 from Online Appendix, but with change of unemployment**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Right share | -0.000103 | 0.0000799 | 0.000701 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.00108) | (0.000978) | (0.00156) |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment | 0.0558 | -0.0419 | -0.0547 | 0.0513 | -0.0410 | -0.0515 |
| rate  | (0.0497) | (0.0365) | (0.0588) | (0.0497) | (0.0364) | (0.0587) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left share |  |  |  | -0.00171 | 0.000315 | 0.000570 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.00117) | (0.00103) | (0.00177) |
| Observations | 544 | 544 | 544 | 544 | 544 | 544 |
| *R*2 | 0.080689 | 0.131957 | 0.051014 | 0.084417 | 0.132282 | 0.050870 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

**Table 5.5 from Online Appendix, but with change of unemployment**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Right share | -0.00144 | 0.000584 | 0.00444\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.00144) | (0.00134) | (0.00210) |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment | 0.0450 | -0.0231 | 0.0175 | 0.0389 | -0.0217 | 0.0309 |
| rate | (0.0777) | (0.0405) | (0.0658) | (0.0774) | (0.0403) | (0.0654) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left share |  |  |  | 0.000390 | -0.000446 | -0.00390\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.00165) | (0.00144) | (0.00235) |
| Observations | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 |
| *R*2 | 0.154990 | 0.265291 | 0.140295 | 0.152409 | 0.264818 | 0.131917 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

**Table 5.6 from Online Appendix, but with change of unemployment**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Government Rile  | 0.00137 | -0.000849 | 0.00104 | 0.00131 | -0.00121 | 0.000666 |
|  | (0.00305) | (0.00249) | (0.00431) | (0.00308) | (0.00252) | (0.00437) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | 0.0590 | -0.0445 | -0.0590 |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0501) | (0.0369) | (0.0594) |
| Observations | 557 | 557 | 557 | 541 | 541 | 541 |
| *R*2 | 0.071494 | 0.121740 | 0.046912 | 0.082212 | 0.132913 | 0.051620 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

**Table 1, but with change of unemployment**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Market ideology | 0.0174\*\* | -0.0173\*\* | -0.0193 | 0.0171\* | -0.0178\*\* | -0.0192 |
|  | (0.00882) | (0.00698) | (0.0124) | (0.00903) | (0.00723) | (0.0128) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | 0.0605 | -0.0460 | -0.0611 |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0494) | (0.0365) | (0.0593) |
| Observations | 557 | 557 | 557 | 541 | 541 | 541 |
| *R*2 | 0.079033 | 0.132502 | 0.051781 | 0.089286 | 0.143625 | 0.056366 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

**Table 2, but with change of unemployment**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Paternalism | -0.0254\*\*\* | 0.0191\*\*\* | 0.0306\*\*\* | -0.0237\*\*\* | 0.0179\*\*\* | 0.0290\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00793) | (0.00633) | (0.00955) | (0.00795) | (0.00644) | (0.00974) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | 0.0536 | -0.0406 | -0.0540 |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0472) | (0.0352) | (0.0571) |
| Observations | 557 | 557 | 557 | 541 | 541 | 541 |
| *R*2 | 0.097883 | 0.146115 | 0.068967 | 0.105783 | 0.153811 | 0.071336 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

**Table 3, but with change of unemployment**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Market Ideology | 0.0159\* | -0.0162\*\* | -0.0172 | 0.0158\* | -0.0168\*\* | -0.0175 |
|  | (0.00855) | (0.00683) | (0.0122) | (0.00880) | (0.00713) | (0.0127) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Paternalism | -0.0246\*\*\* | 0.0183\*\*\* | 0.0298\*\*\* | -0.0231\*\*\* | 0.0172\*\*\* | 0.0282\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00778) | (0.00624) | (0.00949) | (0.00783) | (0.00635) | (0.00969) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | 0.0556 | -0.0418 | -0.0558 |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0468) | (0.0354) | (0.0573) |
| Observations | 557 | 557 | 557 | 541 | 541 | 541 |
| *R*2 | 0.105060 | 0.151648 | 0.073049 | 0.112492 | 0.160467 | 0.075384 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

# Corporatism (Jahn 2016)

**Table 1 including corporatism**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Market ideology | 0.0197\*\* | -0.0218\*\*\* | -0.0261\* | 0.0225\*\* | -0.0250\*\*\* | -0.0329\*\* |
|  | (0.00950) | (0.00735) | (0.0134) | (0.00984) | (0.00729) | (0.0134) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Corporatism | -0.102 | -0.162\* | -0.0353 | -0.141 | -0.115 | 0.0634 |
|  | (0.129) | (0.0926) | (0.166) | (0.134) | (0.0976) | (0.180) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | -0.0340 | 0.0407\*\* | 0.0854\*\*\* |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0247) | (0.0183) | (0.0289) |
| Observations | 496 | 496 | 496 | 496 | 496 | 496 |
| *R*2 | 0.087719 | 0.141273 | 0.064946 | 0.094731 | 0.153715 | 0.084020 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

**Table 2 including corporatism**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Paternalism | -0.0298\*\*\* | 0.0198\*\*\* | 0.0348\*\*\* | -0.0313\*\*\* | 0.0214\*\*\* | 0.0385\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00856) | (0.00716) | (0.0103) | (0.00831) | (0.00706) | (0.00991) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Corporatism | -0.287\*\* | -0.0152 | 0.190 | -0.342\*\*\* | 0.0439 | 0.323\* |
|  | (0.122) | (0.0958) | (0.160) | (0.127) | (0.102) | (0.174) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | -0.0350 | 0.0379\*\* | 0.0849\*\*\* |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0221) | (0.0174) | (0.0268) |
| Observations | 496 | 496 | 496 | 496 | 496 | 496 |
| *R*2 | 0.112858 | 0.151220 | 0.082786 | 0.119191 | 0.162182 | 0.102353 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

**Table 3 including corporatism**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Market Ideology | 0.0154\* | -0.0191\*\*\* | -0.0207 | 0.0184\* | -0.0224\*\*\* | -0.0277\*\* |
|  | (0.00910) | (0.00712) | (0.0131) | (0.00940) | (0.00700) | (0.0130) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Paternalism | -0.0281\*\*\* | 0.0176\*\* | 0.0324\*\*\* | -0.0296\*\*\* | 0.0192\*\*\* | 0.0357\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00840) | (0.00709) | (0.0103) | (0.00810) | (0.00694) | (0.00981) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Corporatism | -0.237\* | -0.0783 | 0.121 | -0.291\*\* | -0.0183 | 0.246 |
|  | (0.124) | (0.0973) | (0.164) | (0.128) | (0.104) | (0.179) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | -0.0412\* | 0.0454\*\* | 0.0945\*\*\* |
| rate |  |  |  | (0.0226) | (0.0178) | (0.0271) |
| Observations | 496 | 496 | 496 | 496 | 496 | 496 |
| *R*2 | 0.119855 | 0.158003 | 0.088448 | 0.129392 | 0.173210 | 0.112286 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. The balance is the net effect of *punitive* changes (coded -1 or -2) and *enabling* changes (coded 1 or 2).

# Left share (instead of (Left share - Right share))

**Paper Appendix 1, instead of the left minus right cabinet share indicator we use the left share**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Market  | 0.00859 | -0.0162\*\* | -0.0162 | 0.0171\* | -0.0191\*\*\* | -0.0238\* | 0.00957 | -0.0200\*\*\* | -0.0223\* |
| Ideology | (0.00938) | (0.00784) | (0.0133) | (0.00902) | (0.00686) | (0.0124) | (0.0101) | (0.00766) | (0.0134) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Paternalism | -0.0214\*\* | 0.0159\*\* | 0.0295\*\*\* | -0.0216\*\*\* | 0.0161\*\*\* | 0.0293\*\*\* | -0.0192\*\* | 0.0138\* | 0.0268\*\* |
|  | (0.00870) | (0.00728) | (0.0111) | (0.00762) | (0.00611) | (0.00946) | (0.00846) | (0.00723) | (0.0111) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left share | -0.00211 | 0.000257 | 0.00113 |  |  |  | -0.00245\* | 0.000179 | 0.00130 |
|  | (0.00131) | (0.00112) | (0.00186) |  |  |  | (0.00137) | (0.00110) | (0.00193) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| N of parties  | 0.0506 | -0.000307 | -0.0767 |  |  |  | 0.0587 | -0.0277 | -0.0846 |
| (legislative) | (0.0547) | (0.0518) | (0.0879) |  |  |  | (0.0577) | (0.0525) | (0.0901) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Labor union  | 0.0121\* | -0.00502 | -0.00558 |  |  |  | 0.0158\* | -0.00790 | -0.0147 |
| density | (0.00710) | (0.00530) | (0.00813) |  |  |  | (0.00827) | (0.00801) | (0.0120) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemploy- |  |  |  | -0.0327 | 0.0595\*\*\* | 0.0797\*\*\* | -0.0401\* | 0.0689\*\*\* | 0.0892\*\*\* |
| ment rate |  |  |  | (0.0234) | (0.0186) | (0.0287) | (0.0239) | (0.0198) | (0.0307) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Transfer |  |  |  | -0.0277 | 0.00615 | 0.0133 | -0.0245 | 0.00691 | 0.0164 |
| spending |  |  |  | (0.0223) | (0.0203) | (0.0343) | (0.0239) | (0.0224) | (0.0381) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| (Real) GDP- |  |  |  | -0.0129 | 0.0137 | 0.0233 | -0.0148 | 0.0127 | 0.0235 |
| growth/year |  |  |  | (0.0226) | (0.0183) | (0.0297) | (0.0230) | (0.0186) | (0.0300) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Budget  |  |  |  | -0.00766 | 0.0286\*\* | 0.00718 | -0.00639 | 0.0292\*\* | 0.00757 |
| deficit |  |  |  | (0.0150) | (0.0112) | (0.0182) | (0.0156) | (0.0115) | (0.0188) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Openness of  |  |  |  | -0.00610\* | 0.000711 | 0.00215 | -0.00313 | -0.00108 | -0.00135 |
| the economy  |  |  |  | (0.00314) | (0.00220) | (0.00342) | (0.00349) | (0.00311) | (0.00487) |
| Observations | 535 | 535 | 535 | 551 | 551 | 551 | 529 | 529 | 529 |
| *R*2 | 0.116216 | 0.158864 | 0.078578 | 0.120109 | 0.177675 | 0.089836 | 0.129577 | 0.190460 | 0.099018 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects.

# Controlling for legislative activity

**Table 5.13-1: controlling for volume of laws**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Market  | 0.0259\*\* | -0.0152\* | -0.0280\* |  |  |  |
| Ideology | (0.0108) | (0.00821) | (0.0150) |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Legislative | -0.000119\* | 0.0000529 | 0.000182\* | -0.000110\* | 0.0000475 | 0.000172\* |
| activity as n volume laws | (0.0000618) | (0.0000559) | (0.000102) | (0.0000618) | (0.0000558) | (0.0000999) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Paternalism |  |  |  | -0.0504\*\*\* | 0.0240\*\*\* | 0.0572\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.0104) | (0.00853) | (0.0134) |
| Observations | 390 | 390 | 390 | 390 | 390 | 390 |
| R2 | 0.107241 | 0.157992 | 0.078420 | 0.155155 | 0.174168 | 0.115149 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. Activity based on country specific sources and – where necessary – Comparative Agenda Project data.

**Table 5.13-2: controlling for volume of laws and unemployment**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Market  | 0.0280\*\* | -0.0206\*\* | -0.0358\*\* |  |  |  |
| Ideology | (0.0111) | (0.00820) | (0.0149) |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Legislative | -0.000121\*\* | 0.0000582 | 0.000190\* | -0.000110\* | 0.0000516 | 0.000177\* |
| activity as n volume laws | (0.0000613) | (0.0000551) | (0.0000999) | (0.0000621) | (0.0000553) | (0.0000995) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment | -0.0219 | 0.0574\*\*\* | 0.0839\*\*\* | -0.00180 | 0.0454\*\*\* | 0.0602\*\* |
|  | (0.0248) | (0.0180) | (0.0297) | (0.0230) | (0.0175) | (0.0278) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Paternalism |  |  |  | -0.0503\*\*\* | 0.0223\*\*\* | 0.0548\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.0105) | (0.00829) | (0.0133) |
| Observations | 390 | 390 | 390 | 390 | 390 | 390 |
| R2 | 0.110837 | 0.185404 | 0.098185 | 0.155169 | 0.192388 | 0.124164 |

Note: Prais-Winsten regressions, PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects. Activity based on country specific sources and – where necessary – Comparative Agenda Project data.

# Including t-1 DV *and* t-1 for IVs

**Table 1b: Market ideology and workfare policy reform**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Punitive t-1 | 0.504\*\*\* |  |  | 0.507\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (0.0269) |  |  | (0.0267) |  |  |
| Enabling t-1 |  | 0.504\*\*\* |  |  | 0.505\*\*\* |  |
|  |  | (0.0329) |  |  | (0.0321) |  |
| Absolute t-1 |  |  | 0.509\*\*\* |  |  | 0.511\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.0295) |  |  | (0.0289) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Market Ideology | 0.0219\*\*\* | -0.0210\*\*\* | -0.0236\*\* | 0.0256\*\*\* | -0.0258\*\*\* | -0.0323\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00657) | (0.00520) | (0.00925) | (0.00724) | (0.00515) | (0.00927) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  t-1 | -0.0121 | 0.000515 | -0.00844 | -0.0144 | 0.00238 | -0.00498 |
|  | (0.0111) | (0.00848) | (0.0154) | (0.0111) | (0.00826) | (0.0150) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | -0.0292\* | 0.0427\*\*\* | 0.0783\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.0177) | (0.0120) | (0.0204) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  t-1 |  |  |  | 0.112\*\*\* | -0.0742\*\*\* | -0.139\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.0382) | (0.0268) | (0.0434) |
| Observations | 540 | 540 | 540 | 540 | 540 | 540 |
| R2 | 0.530614 | 0.528436 | 0.524516 | 0.544837 | 0.545246 | 0.545443 |

PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects (country dummy = 1).

**Table 2b: Paternalism and workfare policy reform**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Punitive t-1 | 0.505\*\*\* |  |  | 0.507\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (0.0266) |  |  | (0.0265) |  |  |
| Enabling t-1 |  | 0.507\*\*\* |  |  | 0.507\*\*\* |  |
|  |  | (0.0320) |  |  | (0.0315) |  |
| Absolute t-1 |  |  | 0.508\*\*\* |  |  | 0.509\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.0296) |  |  | (0.0292) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Paternalism | -0.0258\*\*\* | 0.0188\*\*\* | 0.0300\*\*\* | -0.0255\*\*\* | 0.0192\*\*\* | 0.0308\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00624) | (0.00491) | (0.00698) | (0.00601) | (0.00476) | (0.00659) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  t-1 | 0.00985 | 0.00669 | -0.0119 | 0.00825 | 0.00717 | -0.0111 |
|  | (0.00991) | (0.00818) | (0.0129) | (0.00973) | (0.00811) | (0.0126) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | -0.0224 | 0.0338\*\*\* | 0.0684\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.0157) | (0.0116) | (0.0193) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  t-1 |  |  |  | 0.0969\*\*\* | -0.0641\*\* | -0.122\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.0354) | (0.0253) | (0.0417) |
| Observations | 540 | 540 | 540 | 540 | 540 | 540 |
| R2 | 0.543644 | 0.535055 | 0.533256 | 0.554101 | 0.546808 | 0.549992 |

PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects (country dummy = 1).

**Table 3b: Market ideology, paternalism, and workfare policy reform**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Punitive t-1 | 0.505\*\*\* |  |  | 0.508\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (0.0261) |  |  | (0.0259) |  |  |
| Enabling t-1 |  | 0.509\*\*\* |  |  | 0.510\*\*\* |  |
|  |  | (0.0314) |  |  | (0.0306) |  |
| Absolute t-1 |  |  | 0.510\*\*\* |  |  | 0.512\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.0292) |  |  | (0.0284) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Market Ideology | 0.0194\*\*\* | -0.0192\*\*\* | -0.0206\*\* | 0.0235\*\*\* | -0.0242\*\*\* | -0.0297\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00651) | (0.00506) | (0.00942) | (0.00707) | (0.00494) | (0.00921) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  t-1 | -0.00936 | -0.00575 | -0.0130 | -0.0112 | -0.00410 | -0.00996 |
|  | (0.0111) | (0.00861) | (0.0157) | (0.0110) | (0.00830) | (0.0151) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Paternalism | -0.0246\*\*\* | 0.0178\*\*\* | 0.0290\*\*\* | -0.0242\*\*\* | 0.0182\*\*\* | 0.0296\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00610) | (0.00459) | (0.00678) | (0.00583) | (0.00439) | (0.00632) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  t-1 | 0.00943 | 0.0108 | -0.00582 | 0.00786 | 0.0114 | -0.00474 |
|  | (0.0102) | (0.00828) | (0.0132) | (0.00991) | (0.00815) | (0.0127) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment |  |  |  | -0.0330\*\* | 0.0455\*\*\* | 0.0830\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.0166) | (0.0116) | (0.0194) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  t-1 |  |  |  | 0.105\*\*\* | -0.0716\*\*\* | -0.132\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.0347) | (0.0244) | (0.0406) |
| Observations | 540 | 540 | 540 | 540 | 540 | 540 |
| R2 | 0.551658 | 0.549390 | 0.540495 | 0.565258 | 0.567171 | 0.562134 |

PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects (country dummy = 1).

**Appendix 1b: Determinants of workfare reforms, political and economic context variables**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |
|  | **Political Context** | **Economic Context** | **Combined** |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|  | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute | punitive | enabling | absolute |
| Punitive t-1 | 0.510\*\*\* |  |  | 0.507\*\*\* |  |  | 0.510\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (0.0267) |  |  | (0.0271) |  |  | (0.0280) |  |  |
| Enabling t-1 |  | 0.512\*\*\* |  |  | 0.508\*\*\* |  |  | 0.510\*\*\* |  |
|  |  | (0.0314) |  |  | (0.0319) |  |  | (0.0316) |  |
| Absolute t-1 |  |  | 0.513\*\*\* |  |  | 0.512\*\*\* |  |  | 0.516\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.0301) |  |  | (0.0301) |  |  | (0.0310) |
| Market  | 0.0183\*\* | -0.0221\*\*\* | -0.0253\*\* | 0.0214\*\*\* | -0.0239\*\*\* | -0.0297\*\*\* | 0.0207\*\* | -0.0276\*\*\* | -0.0359\*\*\* |
| Ideology | (0.00723) | (0.00544) | (0.0103) | (0.00746) | (0.005) | (0.00972) | (0.00847) | (0.00515) | (0.0108) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  t-1 | -0.00727 | -0.00457 | -0.00793 | -0.00946 | -0.00193 | -0.00770 | -0.00504 | -0.00204 | -0.00478 |
|  | (0.0119) | (0.00881) | (0.0160) | (0.0112) | (0.00864) | (0.0160) | (0.0125) | (0.00841) | (0.0166) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Paternalism | -0.0200\*\*\* | 0.0153\*\*\* | 0.0275\*\*\* | -0.021\*\*\* | 0.0162\*\*\* | 0.0311\*\*\* | -0.0175\*\*\* | 0.0128\*\* | 0.0261\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00647) | (0.00498) | (0.00779) | (0.00603) | (0.00449) | (0.00673) | (0.00653) | (0.00499) | (0.00797) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  t-1 | 0.00503 | 0.0162\* | -0.000652 | 0.00478 | 0.0108 | -0.0106 | 0.00252 | 0.0180\*\* | -0.00364 |
|  | (0.0106) | (0.00894) | (0.0141) | (0.0102) | (0.00854) | (0.0142) | (0.0111) | (0.00914) | (0.0150) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Partisanship | 0.000606 | 0.000200 | -0.000035 |  |  |  | 0.000589 | 0.000350 | 0.000294 |
|  | (0.000509) | (0.000425) | (0.000725) |  |  |  | (0.000563) | (0.000422) | (0.000800) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  t-1 | -0.000598 | -0.000439 | -0.000754 |  |  |  | -0.000943 | -0.000341 | -0.000500 |
|  | (0.000913) | (0.000680) | (0.00117) |  |  |  | (0.000981) | (0.000695) | (0.00126) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| N of parties  | 0.0605 | 0.00340 | -0.0841 |  |  |  | 0.0489 | -0.0317 | -0.0597 |
| (legislative) | (0.0463) | (0.0425) | (0.0751) |  |  |  | (0.0534) | (0.0472) | (0.0827) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  t-1 | -0.0903 | 0.0778 | 0.129 |  |  |  | -0.0866 | 0.102\*\* | 0.119 |
|  | (0.0602) | (0.0476) | (0.0897) |  |  |  | (0.0635) | (0.0468) | (0.0933) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Labor union  | 0.0124\*\* | -0.00249 | -0.00242 |  |  |  | 0.0132\*\* | -0.00387 | -0.00537 |
| density | (0.00534) | (0.00351) | (0.00596) |  |  |  | (0.00643) | (0.00597) | (0.00993) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  t-1 | 0.0838\*\*\* | -0.0159 | -0.0450 |  |  |  | 0.0585\* | 0.0262 | 0.000638 |
|  | (0.0282) | (0.0208) | (0.0359) |  |  |  | (0.0312) | (0.0242) | (0.0420) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemploy- |  |  |  | -0.0220 | 0.0622\*\*\* | 0.0814\*\*\* | -0.0213 | 0.0770\*\*\* | 0.0879\*\*\* |
| ment rate |  |  |  | (0.0197) | (0.0155) | (0.0259) | (0.0198) | (0.0173) | (0.0276) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  t-1 |  |  |  | 0.0803 | -0.0396 | -0.141\*\* | 0.0573 | -0.0543 | -0.154\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.0507) | (0.0367) | (0.0679) | (0.0525) | (0.0377) | (0.0691) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Transfer |  |  |  | -0.0350\*\* | 0.00483 | 0.0211 | -0.0401\*\* | 0.00656 | 0.0311 |
| spending |  |  |  | (0.0163) | (0.0168) | (0.0283) | (0.0180) | (0.0187) | (0.0312) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  t-1 |  |  |  | 0.0378 | -0.0203 | 0.0563 | 0.0444 | -0.0302 | 0.0397 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.0664) | (0.0513) | (0.0907) | (0.0675) | (0.0510) | (0.0923) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| (Real) GDP- |  |  |  | -0.00699 | 0.0139 | 0.0428 | -0.00765 | 0.0112 | 0.0372 |
| growth/year |  |  |  | (0.0333) | (0.0246) | (0.0432) | (0.0340) | (0.0240) | (0.0428) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  t-1 |  |  |  | 0.00268 | -0.00585 | -0.0115 | 0.00411 | -0.00825 | -0.0135 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.0216) | (0.0162) | (0.0272) | (0.0216) | (0.0165) | (0.0277) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Budget  |  |  |  | -0.00397 | 0.0209\*\* | -0.00810 | -0.00173 | 0.0241\*\* | -0.00708 |
| deficit |  |  |  | (0.0132) | (0.00904) | (0.0165) | (0.0141) | (0.00988) | (0.0175) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  t-1 |  |  |  | 0.000840 | -0.0166 | -0.0156 | 0.000703 | -0.0170 | -0.0158 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.0172) | (0.0119) | (0.0201) | (0.0179) | (0.0123) | (0.0210) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Openness of  |  |  |  | -0.0054\*\* | 0.000699 | 0.00168 | -0.00323 | 0.000751 | 0.00176 |
| the economy |  |  |  | (0.00262) | (0.00175) | (0.00307) | (0.00275) | (0.00253) | (0.00417) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  t-1 |  |  |  | 0.00938 | -0.00488 | -0.0144 | 0.00742 | -0.00626 | -0.0147 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.00857) | (0.00617) | (0.00939) | (0.00859) | (0.00637) | (0.00968) |
| Observations | 518 | 518 | 518 | 534 | 534 | 534 | 512 | 512 | 512 |
| *R*2 | 0.569685 | 0.561913 | 0.547963 | 0.570004 | 0.573723 | 0.566112 | 0.581912 | 0.593367 | 0.576593 |

PCSE in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All models with country fixed effects (country dummy = 1).

1. We do so since unemployment can be endogenous to workfare reforms, given that activation measures (e.g., training) may mechanically alter the labour market status of participants. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)